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It publishes daily commentary, long-form analysis, essays and curated resources on the forces shaping the world — with a specific focus on the perspectives, interests and stories that mainstream international coverage leaves behind. It is written and edited by one person. My name is Sunny Peter. I am a Mumbai-based writer and analyst with a Master's degree in Politics and International Relations. I have been watching international affairs for decades — from South Asia's nuclear standoffs to the slow unravelling of the post-Cold War order, from the rise of the Global South as a political identity to the selective application of international law that protects the powerful and abandons everyone else. DiploPolis began as a conviction that international affairs coverage needed more argument and less aggregation. More moral clarity and less diplomatic hedging. More attention to who pays the cost of decisions made in rooms they were never invited into. 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A very small number receive an offer. The experience is so uniform, and so uniformly bewildering, that the most common question asked in every international affairs graduate programme in the world is some version of: how does the UN actually hire? The United Nations does not hire the way it says it hires. The official process describes a meritocratic global competition open to qualified candidates from all Member States. The actual process rewards patience, insider knowledge, roster membership, language skills, network access and a specific understanding of how the system works that no official document will give you. This guide closes that gap. ## The Grade Structure: What Each Level Actually Requires The professional hierarchy that governs most UN careers runs from [P-1 through P-5](https://unvacancies.org/guides/un-grade-levels-explained?ref=diplopolis.com), with director-level grades above that. Understanding what each level requires in practice — rather than in the published job descriptions — is the foundation of a realistic career strategy. P-1 is the entry level and is almost exclusively accessed through one route: the [Young Professionals Programme](https://www.un.org/en/academic-impact/work4un-young-professionals-programme?ref=diplopolis.com). It requires a bachelor's degree and no work experience. Almost no open-competition vacancies are advertised at P-1. P-2 is the first level at which open-competition vacancies regularly appear. A P-2 position typically requires two years of relevant professional experience and a relevant postgraduate degree, with a [base salary range of approximately $57,000 to $78,000 per year](https://untalent.org/contract/p-2?ref=diplopolis.com), net of tax, with post-adjustment supplements that vary significantly by duty station. A P-2 in New York receives a different effective salary from a P-2 in Nairobi, even on identical base rates. P-3 through P-5 require progressively more experience — five, seven and ten or more years respectively — and represent the range where most professional UN careers are spent. Entry at P-3 is theoretically possible for candidates with five years of experience and a master's degree. In practice, the competitive pool for any P-3 vacancy is dense with candidates who already have internal UN experience, and external candidates without prior UN service face a structural disadvantage that no application quality alone can overcome. The G-grade posts — G-1 through G-7 — are General Service positions. They are locally recruited, which means they are open only to people who are already legally authorised to work in the country where the post is located. They are not the pathway for an international professional career. National Officer posts are similarly nationally recruited. ## The Inspira System: How Not to Be Screened Out Before a Human Reads Your Application [Inspira](https://careers.un.org/?ref=diplopolis.com) is the UN Secretariat's staff selection system. It is the portal through which all applications to the Secretariat are submitted, processed and screened. Understanding how Inspira works is not optional for a serious applicant — a complete and precisely configured Inspira profile is the first filter that every application must pass. Inspira screens applications automatically before any human review occurs. The screening checks the Inspira profile against the specific requirements of the vacancy announcement. A profile that is missing information — that does not accurately reflect the degree level, years of experience or language competencies required — will be flagged as not meeting minimum requirements and screened out before a recruitment officer sees the application. This is not a judgment of quality. It is an algorithmic check. Many qualified candidates fail it because their profiles are incomplete or because the profile information does not precisely match the language of the job opening. [Rostered candidates are specifically instructed to apply early](https://languages.un.org/sites/default/files/2025-04/text%5Ftypes%5Ftoolkit%5F-%5Fsample%5F2.3%5Fjob-related-un%5Fii%5Fapplicant%5Fguide%5Fen.pdf?ref=diplopolis.com) and to keep their profiles current. A vacancy advertised as open competition may in fact be filled by a rostered candidate during the posting period — the position stays advertised while the hiring manager draws from the pre-approved roster. An external applicant who submits during this period competes against candidates who have already cleared the full selection process. The practical rules for Inspira are specific. Complete every section of the profile, not just the sections that seem relevant. Match the language of the vacancy description in the work history sections — if the vacancy asks for 'programme management experience', use those words in the experience description. Apply to vacancies where the profile genuinely meets every stated requirement. Applying to vacancies where the minimum requirements are not met wastes time and generates rejections that do not distinguish between genuinely unqualified candidates and candidates who applied to the wrong opening at the wrong stage of their career. ## The Young Professionals Programme: What It Is, Who Can Apply, and What Passing Actually Means The [UN Young Professionals Programme](https://careers.un.org/lbw/home.aspx?viewtype=NCE&ref=diplopolis.com) is the most direct entry route into the UN Secretariat for candidates with no prior UN experience. It is also the most misunderstood, and the misunderstanding has two forms: candidates from eligible countries who do not pursue it, and candidates from ineligible countries who study for it for months before discovering they cannot apply. The YPP is [open only to nationals of Member States that are under-represented or unrepresented in the UN Secretariat](https://www.un.org/en/academic-impact/work4un-young-professionals-programme?ref=diplopolis.com). The list of participating countries changes every year and is published on the UN Careers website at the start of each annual cycle. India, with a large presence in the Secretariat historically, has not been on the eligible list in recent cycles. Many African countries are on the list precisely because their representation in the Secretariat is low relative to their Member State status. Check the current year's list before beginning any preparation. The age limit is absolute. [Candidates must be 32 years or younger as of 31 December of the examination year](https://www.unjobnet.org/career-resources/un-young-professionals-programme-ypp-guide?ref=diplopolis.com). A candidate who turns 33 at any point during the examination year, including on 31 December, is ineligible. There is no flexibility and no appeal process. Passing the YPP does not get you a UN job. It places you on a roster, from which the UN may appoint you to a P-1 or P-2 position as vacancies arise. [Roster validity runs for three years.](https://flexjobspace.com/2025/10/22/un-young-professionals-programme-ypp-2025-2026/?ref=diplopolis.com) Placement depends on the Secretariat's operational needs, geographic representation requirements and the specific profile match for each vacancy as it opens. Candidates placed on the YPP roster wait for appointments ranging from a few months to the full validity period of the roster. Some never receive an appointment despite passing the examination. The examination structure is competitive. Eligible candidates sit a two-stage online examination — a written stage covering substantive and general competencies — followed by a competency-based interview for those who pass the written stage. One job family is examined per year; candidates may apply for only one family. The exam is taken simultaneously at UN offices and designated test centres globally. For a candidate from an eligible country who is under 32, the YPP is the most clearly structured pathway into a long-term UN career and the one least dependent on prior internal network. Pursue it while you are eligible. ## The Junior Professional Officer Programme: The Donor-Funded Route Most Guides Underexplain The [Junior Professional Officer programme](https://glojobs.org/guides/un-jpo-junior-professional-officer?ref=diplopolis.com) is fundamentally different from the YPP in one defining way: the post is funded by a sponsoring donor government, not by the UN agency's core budget. The sponsoring government controls eligibility and selection, not the UN. For most JPO positions, eligibility is restricted to nationals of the sponsoring country. A JPO sponsored by the government of the Netherlands is open to Dutch nationals. A JPO sponsored by Japan is open to Japanese nationals. This means the JPO route is primarily accessible to citizens of donor governments — Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States and similar high-income countries that sponsor JPO positions. For citizens of South Asian, African and Latin American countries, the standard JPO route is largely inaccessible precisely because their governments are typically not among the major JPO donors. The exception matters: some donor governments specifically sponsor JPO positions for nationals of developing countries. Italy, in particular, runs a programme under which a significant number of positions are open to candidates from developing nations. Italian JPO positions for developing country nationals are coordinated through UN/DESA in Rome as well as the [UNDP JPO Service Centre](https://jpo.undp.org/?ref=diplopolis.com). Checking the current JPO listings for positions open to developing country nationals is worth doing specifically rather than assuming the entire programme is closed to non-donor citizens. For those who are eligible, the JPO delivers what a direct P-grade hire rarely provides: two to three years of genuine Professional-level UN experience, a duty station assignment, a functioning internal network and the record that makes subsequent open-competition applications competitive in ways they are not for external candidates applying without prior UN service. ## The Roster System: The Architecture Most Applicants Never Know Exists Much of UN hiring runs through [rosters](https://careerdesignstudio.buffalo.edu/blog/2026/04/20/un-roster-talent-pools-how-to-get-in-and-get-hired-2026/?ref=diplopolis.com) — pre-vetted pools of candidates who have passed a competitive selection process and can be appointed to matching vacancies without a new full recruitment cycle. The reduction in hiring time is significant: from the typical three to six months of open competition down to as little as two to four weeks for a roster appointment. Rosters exist across most major UN entities. UNDP maintains talent pools organised by practice area and grade. UNICEF uses talent groups aligned to functional areas. WHO maintains rosters covering emergency response, epidemiology and health systems specialisations. The UN Secretariat uses roster-based recruitment for peacekeeping operations and field missions. The specific mechanics vary by agency; the underlying principle is the same. A candidate who passes all stages of a competitive selection process but is not immediately selected for the specific post receives a roster notification rather than an offer. The notification confirms that they are eligible for consideration — that [they may be selected for future vacancies at the same level and in similar functions without repeating the full recruitment process](https://www.unjobnet.org/career-resources/hidden-un-job-market?ref=diplopolis.com). Roster status is valid for one to three years depending on the organisation. Being rostered does not guarantee an offer. It means a hiring manager can select you directly rather than reopening competition. Whether a hiring manager does so depends on operational needs, the number of other rostered candidates available, geographic representation requirements and factors the rostered candidate cannot observe or control. [The UN Secretariat's own guidance recommends that rostered candidates continue applying to suitable vacancies](https://unvacancies.org/guides/un-roster-explained?ref=diplopolis.com) rather than waiting passively for their roster status to produce an offer. For an external applicant who has never worked inside the system, understanding this means two things. First, an application that reaches the roster stage is a genuine achievement — it means full competition has been cleared. Second, clearing competition and getting an offer are separated by a further process that the candidate does not control. ## The Consultant and Contractor Pathway: The Most Accessible Entry Point The most accessible pathway into the UN system for a qualified external candidate is not the YPP, the JPO or open-competition professional posts. It is the consultant and contractor track. UN agencies routinely hire consultants and individual contractors for specific deliverables and short-term assignments. These are not staff positions — they carry no guarantee of continuation, no access to staff benefits and no formal grade assignment. They are also, for many candidates, the most realistic first step into the system. A consultant who produces good work in a UNDP country office or a UNICEF programme division builds a name, a reference and an internal profile that external applications cannot build. When a P-3 position opens in the same office, the consultant who is known to the hiring manager is not the same as the external candidate who exists only on an Inspira form. The consultant track is also where the minimum years of experience problem is most tractable. A candidate with three years of relevant professional experience who cannot yet compete for a P-3 in open competition can frequently secure a short-term consultancy in the same functional area. That consultancy becomes UN experience on the next Inspira profile, which becomes relevant when the experience threshold for a professional post is assessed. ## The Language You Are Not Using: French as a Structural Advantage English and French are the two working languages of the UN Secretariat. Most aspiring UN professionals from South Asia, Anglophone Africa and Southeast Asia focus exclusively on English. The Francophone African candidates who add English, and the South Asian candidates who add French, operate in a fundamentally different competitive environment. [French-language competency is verified during the selection process for most Secretariat positions](https://www.un.org/en/academic-impact/work4un-young-professionals-programme?ref=diplopolis.com) and is a requirement for many field postings in francophone Africa, the Sahel and Central Africa, where a disproportionate share of UN operational activity is concentrated. The pool of candidates who can genuinely work in both working languages is smaller than the pool who claim both on their profiles. Demonstrated French competency — at a level that can be verified, through a DELF certificate or equivalent — is one of the clearest structural advantages an applicant can build into their profile at relatively low cost compared to the years required to develop regional expertise or programme management experience. ## The Budget Reality: What the Current Financial Situation Means for Hiring The UN system has been under significant and sustained financial pressure. [A cash flow deficit and broader budgetary constraints](https://www.iojobs.org/articles/reality-io-jobs-2025?ref=diplopolis.com) triggered hiring freezes across multiple agencies in 2024 and 2025\. The effects were uneven — peacekeeping operations and field missions continued hiring while Secretariat headquarters posts were more constrained — but the aggregate effect on vacancy volumes was real. This does not mean a UN career is inaccessible. The UN's mandate is permanent, and the system eventually hires to meet operational needs even when budget cycles compress short-term vacancy volumes. What it does mean is that the timeline a candidate should build into their strategy is longer than it was five years ago. A candidate who applies for the YPP in 2026 and passes the examination may wait until 2027 or 2028 for an appointment. A candidate who secures a consultancy in 2026 may spend 18 months in that role before a professional vacancy opens in the same function. Planning for patience is not pessimism — it is the correct reading of the system as it currently operates. ## The Verdict The United Nations is worth pursuing for the candidates who understand what they are actually pursuing. It is not a meritocratic open competition that selects the most qualified candidate for each position through a transparent process. It is a layered system of rosters, internal networks, language requirements and donor-funded pathways that rewards candidates who understand all of its components and use them simultaneously rather than relying on any one of them alone. The candidates who build UN careers from outside the system do specific things. They complete Inspira profiles precisely and keep them current. They pursue the YPP if their nationality is eligible and their age permits — it is the only route that does not require prior UN experience. They look for JPO opportunities from donor governments that sponsor developing country nationals. They pursue consultancies that build the internal profile that external applications cannot build. They develop French to a verifiable level of professional competency. And they plan for a longer timeline than feels reasonable — because the timeline the system requires is always longer than any official document will tell you. 🚧 **UN hiring policies, grade requirements, YPP eligibility country lists and budget conditions change each year. The YPP country eligibility list in particular must be checked on the* [UN Careers website](https://careers.un.org/?ref=diplopolis.com) *each cycle before beginning preparation. If you spot an error or an outdated link in this piece, write to* [editor@diplopolis.com](mailto:editor@diplopolis.com) *and we will correct it promptly.* This Dossier article is free to read. Future Dossier pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Xi Went to Egypt. The US Was in Iran. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/xi-went-egypt-us-was-iran-china-influence-gap/ Last updated: 2026-09-04T17:23:57.000Z [Xi Jinping arrived in Cairo this week](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/3/xi-jinping-arrives-in-egypt-as-china-deepens-middle-east-ties?ref=diplopolis.com) for the first time in a decade. NPR described the visit simply: it illustrates China's growing ambitions at a time when US influence has been weakened by its war in Iran. The sentence contains the essential geopolitics of September 2026 in fourteen words. The US is in Iran. China is in Egypt. Both are pursuing influence in the same region. One of them is bombing. The other one is visiting. Egypt is the Arab world's most populous country and its historical cultural capital. Its relationship with the United States has been the anchor of American Middle East strategy since the 1979 Camp David accords gave Washington a reliable ally in Cairo in exchange for the largest US aid package in the world outside of Israel. The Iran war has disrupted that architecture in specific ways. Egypt closed its airspace to US military aircraft transiting to the region in the early weeks of the war. It joined the 22-nation EU emergency statement calling for stronger border controls after the Morocco-Spain Ceuta crisis in August. It has maintained back-channel diplomatic contact with Iran through the Arab League. Its position on the war is careful: not opposition, not support, but the studied non-alignment that Egyptian foreign policy has cultivated for decades as a hedge against being consumed by great power competition. Xi's visit is the other side of that calculation. China is Egypt's largest trading partner by bilateral trade volume. Chinese companies are major investors in the Suez Canal Economic Zone — the development corridor Egypt has been building along the Canal since 2015\. The Belt and Road Initiative runs through Egypt on its Mediterranean corridor. China's relationship with Egypt predates the Iran war. What the visit signals is that the relationship is being actively tended at a moment when American attention is entirely elsewhere, and that Beijing understands what Egyptian decision-makers understand: the countries that maintain consistent, reliable engagement during American distraction are the ones that build durable influence. The US influence that NPR describes as weakened is specifically weakened in Africa and the Middle East, precisely the regions where China has been most methodically expanding its presence. The Abraham Accords framework — Washington's signature diplomatic achievement in the region — has stalled. Saudi Arabia signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement with Turkey and Pakistan, not with Washington. The Gulf states are building their own security architecture. Egypt is receiving Xi Jinping. Iran's Red Crescent is appealing to the ICC. Nepal is receiving Indian and Chinese rescue teams in its glacial disaster zone. DiploPolis wrote 'Two Presidents. One Conclusion.' about Xi receiving Trump and Putin in the same week in May. The August-September sequence is the next chapter of the same argument. Trump received Venezuela's oil deal. Xi received Egypt's attention. Both are pursuing influence in the Global South simultaneously. One is doing so through military campaigns that have produced wedding strikes and 65-billion-barrel oil annexations. The other is doing so through diplomatic visits and infrastructure investment. The influence gap that is opening between them is not primarily military. It is relational. Egypt has not left the American orbit. It will not. Its military receives US equipment, its economy depends on US-backed multilateral lending and its government requires Washington's acquiescence for its own stability. But Xi came to Cairo this week and the US Secretary of State did not. The US President's attention is on Iran, Venezuela and the midterms. Xi's attention is on Egypt, which is the gateway to Africa, the Arab world and the Mediterranean shipping corridor that carries 12 per cent of global trade through the Suez Canal. The visit lasts several days. The war has lasted six months. Both are still running. ### The 200,000 URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-200000-wfp-food-cuts-west-bank-gaza-donor-fatigue/ Last updated: 2026-09-04T17:22:46.000Z [On September 2, the World Food Programme's country director for Palestine, Shaun Hughes, told reporters in Geneva](https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/09/1168237?ref=diplopolis.com): 'We're running out of funding, and that means that from today, some 200,000 people will lose access to critical assistance.' The cash transfer the WFP had been providing to families in the West Bank was approximately 50 shekels per person per month — less than $20\. Hughes described it as a 'real lifeline' for many people. From September 2026, that lifeline is cut for 200,000 of the 400,000 people the WFP had been reaching. [The WFP is not stopping because Israel blocked the food.](https://www.wfp.org/news/funding-shortfall-forces-world-food-programme-cut-food-assistance-half-west-bank?ref=diplopolis.com) It is stopping because the money ran out. The WFP's statement is specific about the cause: 'critical funding constraints.' The food needs in the West Bank have more than doubled since 2023\. Today an estimated 900,000 people are food insecure. Seventy-six per cent of West Bank households have experienced a significant decline in income. Food and fuel prices are among the highest in the Middle East. The WFP was reaching 400,000 of the most vulnerable people with cash, food, vouchers, livelihood programmes and nutritional services. It will now reach 200,000\. The gap is not the people who ceased to be food insecure. It is the people who remain food insecure and will no longer receive assistance. In Gaza, where the WFP supports 1.5 million people — including one million who receive monthly food assistance — the situation is already deteriorating. In July, WFP reduced the cash value of its assistance by 40 per cent for 375,000 people. It warned that further cuts were unavoidable unless new funding was secured. Three-quarters of Gaza households had difficulty accessing markets in August 2026\. Three UN warehouses were damaged in Deir Al Balah during an Israeli strike. Despite a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas signed in October 2025, ongoing hostilities and security restrictions continue to hamper aid movement. [The WFP says it urgently needs $386 million over the next six months](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/1/un-slashes-food-aid-for-occupied-west-bank-and-gaza-amid-funding-shortfall?ref=diplopolis.com) to continue serving the two million food-insecure people it reaches across Gaza and the West Bank. The $386 million is not available. ## How the Funding Ran Out [Al Jazeera reported directly what the WFP's own statement left in the passive voice](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/1/un-slashes-food-aid-for-occupied-west-bank-and-gaza-amid-funding-shortfall?ref=diplopolis.com): 'International aid organisations across the globe have been struggling for money as the United States has led a sharp cut in support, with other Western nations also reducing donations.' The United States was historically the WFP's largest single donor. The Trump administration's cuts to foreign aid, implemented across 2025 and 2026, reduced American contributions to the WFP and other UN agencies significantly. The $386 million the WFP needs exists. The governments that have it have chosen not to allocate it. The WFP launched its 2026 global appeal asking for only half of what it said it needed. The appeal was reduced before it was made because the agency had internalised the scale of donor fatigue. A humanitarian organisation is now self-censoring its own funding requests because it has calculated that asking for what is required will produce worse outcomes than asking for less. The 200,000 people losing food assistance in the West Bank on September 2 are, in part, the consequence of an appeal that was never made because the agency did not believe the appeal would succeed. The political architecture that produced the funding shortage is worth naming precisely because the WFP's statement does not name it. The US cut foreign aid. Other Western governments reduced donations. The Trump administration specifically cut contributions to UN agencies involved in Palestinian aid. Congress has repeatedly debated — and in some cases restricted — American contributions to UNRWA and associated agencies. The 200,000 people losing food access in the West Bank are the downstream consequence of decisions made in appropriations committees and executive budget offices in Washington, London and Brussels, dressed as a funding constraint. The constraint is real. It was also chosen. ## The Specific Architecture of This Starvation The WFP's funding crisis sits inside a specific legal architecture that makes its implications more damaging than a simple gap between need and supply. The International Court of Justice's provisional measures in South Africa versus Israel, issued in January 2024 and reaffirmed multiple times since, explicitly required Israel to ensure that humanitarian assistance reached Gaza without restriction. The measures are binding international law. Israel has submitted compliance reports. The WFP is now halving food assistance in the West Bank and warning of further cuts in Gaza — not because Israel has physically prevented the food from entering, though physical restrictions have also hampered delivery, but because the international system that funds the food delivery has run out of money. The distinction matters analytically even as it changes nothing practically for the 200,000 people who will not receive food this month. The ICJ ordered that humanitarian assistance must reach Palestinians. The system designed to deliver that assistance is insolvent. The court's authority extends to state parties who block food. It does not extend to donor governments who decline to fund the agencies that deliver it. The architecture of accountability has a specific gap through which the $386 million is falling. [PBS NewsHour noted](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/amp/world/un-food-agency-halves-west-bank-aid-from-400000-to-200000-people-because-of-funding-shortages?ref=diplopolis.com) that despite the October 2025 ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, 'ongoing hostilities and security restrictions continue to hamper movement and recovery efforts.' The ceasefire exists. The movement restrictions exist. The food funding gap exists. Each of these conditions is produced by a different set of decisions, made by different governments, for different stated reasons. Their combined effect is that 200,000 people in the West Bank and an uncertain number in Gaza will have less food in September 2026 than they had in August 2026. ## What Donor Fatigue Is and Is Not The phrase 'donor fatigue' has been used by humanitarian organisations for decades to describe the phenomenon in which donor governments reduce contributions to ongoing crises as the crises age and public attention moves elsewhere. It is a real phenomenon. It is also a description of a choice dressed as a condition. Donor governments do not lose the capacity to contribute to humanitarian crises as those crises age. They lose the political incentive to do so. The money does not disappear. The political will does. [The WFP's country director used language](https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/09/1168237?ref=diplopolis.com) that is measured and institutional — 'critical funding constraints,' 'difficult decision,' 'prioritising the most vulnerable while cutting assistance to others despite widespread needs.' The language is the language of an organisation that depends on its donors for its existence and cannot afford to characterise their choices as choices. Every sentence the WFP spokesperson did not say was said by Al Jazeera: the United States led the cuts, other Western nations followed, and the money that would have reached 200,000 people was not allocated. The Refugee the West Made — DiploPolis's Analysis from August 2026 — traced the displacement crisis from the Berlin Conference of 1884 through to the present, arguing that the bill for Western foreign policy decisions has consistently been presented to the Global South. The WFP announcement on September 2 is a smaller entry on the same ledger: not colonial extraction or proxy warfare or climate emissions this time, but the more prosaic mechanism of an appropriations decision. The governments that created the conditions for Palestinian food insecurity — through their support for Israeli military operations, through the siege economy of the blockade, through decades of settlement policy that has reduced Palestinian land access and destroyed Palestinian livelihoods — are the same governments that have led the reduction in funding to the agencies trying to mitigate the consequences of those conditions. The hand that tightened the situation and the hand that withdrew the lifeline belong to the same governments. ## The Number That Should Not Be Abstract [The WFP statement from Hughes](https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/09/01/world-food-programme-halves-number-of-aid-recipients-in-occupied-west-bank/?ref=diplopolis.com) describes what the 50-shekel cash transfer meant: 'a real lifeline for many people.' Less than $20 per person per month. The families that relied on it were 'once thriving and earning a living from their land.' They are now 'unable to afford enough food.' The increase in settler violence and displacement since 2023 disrupted livelihoods. Food and fuel prices at Middle Eastern highs compounded the pressure. The 50 shekels — roughly the cost of a mid-range restaurant meal in a Western city — was the buffer between surviving and not surviving for people whose economy has been deliberately and systematically degraded. From September 2026, 200,000 of those people will not receive the 50 shekels. The WFP will prioritise the 200,000 most vulnerable among the 400,000 it had been reaching. The 200,000 who lose access are, by the WFP's own assessment, among the food insecure in a territory where 900,000 people meet that definition. They are not the least vulnerable. They are the people the WFP can no longer afford to reach. The $386 million the WFP needs over six months is less than the cost of two days of US military operations in Iran at the peak of the air campaign. It is less than the value of a single LNG tanker cargo that was blocked during the Hormuz closure. The governments that have it have made a calculation about its allocation. The 200,000 people who will not receive food this month are the specific outcome of that calculation — not an abstraction, not a funding constraint, not donor fatigue. A decision, with 200,000 faces. This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Iran Asked the ICC. The ICC Is Being Dismantled. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/iran-asked-icc-dismantled-sirik-wedding-war-crime/ Last updated: 2026-09-04T17:19:59.000Z On Wednesday, Iran's Red Crescent asked the International Criminal Court to investigate the US strike on the wedding in Sirik as a war crime. The strike happened Tuesday. Amir-Ali Karimi, four years old, died at a wedding ceremony. Sixty-seven were wounded. The Red Crescent characterised the strike on a civilian gathering as a violation of international humanitarian law and asked the court to open a formal investigation. Neither the United States nor Iran is a party to the ICC's Rome Statute, meaning the court has no automatic jurisdiction over either nation. The Red Crescent went to the court anyway. It went to what remains of it. [The connection is not rhetorical.](https://www.democracynow.org/2026/9/3/headlines/irans%5Fred%5Fcrescent%5Fasks%5Ficc%5Fto%5Finvestigate%5Fus%5Fstrike%5Fon%5Fwedding%5Fthat%5Fkilled%5Ffour?ref=diplopolis.com) The Rome Statute covers wilful killing of civilians, attacks on civilian objects and acts that violate the principles of distinction and proportionality. A US strike that kills a four-year-old boy at a wedding ceremony in a coastal town is precisely the category of act the court was designed to examine. The Red Crescent's request is legally coherent within the court's mandate. The obstacle is not only the jurisdictional gap. The obstacle is that the United States has been conducting a campaign — confirmed on camera by Trump, executed by Rubio — to dismantle the ICC brick by brick. Five countries have left the court since the US campaign began. The court's chief prosecutor has been removed. DiploPolis published 'A Home on Qeshm. No Court to Say So.' in August — about the bomb confirmed by the New York Times visual investigation on a residential building on Qeshm Island, three civilians dead, CENTCOM calling it a successful strike on IRGC targets. The same structural argument applies to Sirik. The evidence exists. The strike happened. The civilian deaths are confirmed. The court that examines such evidence is being taken apart by the government conducting the strikes. The Red Crescent asked the ICC on Wednesday. On the same day, Rubio announced new sanctions against ICC staff. Both events happened on Wednesday September 2. The Israeli Defence Minister also made a request on Wednesday. Israel Katz said he was seeking Trump's support for plans to permanently expel Palestinians from the Gaza Strip. He told a conference in Jerusalem: 'There is no real solution for Gaza in the end without migration.' Maryland Senator Chris Van Hollen responded that the Netanyahu government had just confirmed what his report had found — that it was implementing a plan to ethnically cleanse Gaza of Palestinians. The Board of Peace official had warned on August 26 that the alternative to Trump's Gaza plan was the next war. The Israeli Defence Minister answered that warning by asking for support to remove Gaza's population permanently. The accountability mechanisms that exist for examining these claims are the same mechanisms under simultaneous assault. The ICC is being dismantled. The US is sanctioning its staff. The court's prosecutor was removed. Countries are leaving. The Red Crescent asked it to investigate a wedding strike on Wednesday. On the same Wednesday, Rubio extended the sanctions campaign against it. The request will not produce a judgment at the pace the dismantlement is proceeding. The sanctions will not stop the requests. Both things continue in parallel, like two tracks that do not meet. The wedding in Sirik had 67 wounded and four dead, including a child of four. The Qeshm house had three dead. The ICC has 130 remaining state parties after five withdrawals. The dismantling has been described as brick by brick. The Red Crescent went to what remains. There was no response. There will not be, until the bricks stop coming down. ### Truth as a Casualty URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/ai-international-conflict-cyberspace-cristiano-review/ Last updated: 2026-09-04T17:23:24.000Z The most dangerous thing AI does in cyberspace is not the fastest or the most visible. It is not the automated intrusion that penetrates a network in milliseconds, nor the reconnaissance algorithm that maps a target's infrastructure in hours rather than weeks, nor even the deepfake video that alters a public moment. The most dangerous thing AI does is make truth slower than the attack it is trying to explain. Synthetic deception sits at the centre of what [Cristiano](https://link.amazon/B09DBCAe8?ref=diplopolis.com) — a researcher at The Hague Program for Cyber Norms at Leiden University — Broeders, Delerue, Douzet and Géry have assembled in this serious and technically grounded volume on AI and international conflict in cyberspace. It is not the only subject, and the book's ambition is broader: to bring technical, strategic and legal scholarship into the same conversation about what is at stake when automation enters the domain of international cyber conflict. But the epistemic dimension is where the book's stakes are highest, and where its most unsettling arguments live. Escalation management depends on shared facts, or at least on a disagreement narrow enough that diplomacy can work within it. When AI-generated deception makes every intrusion, every communication trail, every piece of malware and every behavioural pattern permanently contestable, the problem is no longer only cyber insecurity. It is epistemic insecurity. The adversaries are not merely fighting over networks. They are fighting over what happened. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/09/Artificial-Intelligence-and-International-Conflict-in-Cyberspace_BC.png)](https://link.amazon/B09DBCAe8?ref=diplopolis.com) The volume's structure reflects genuine intellectual ambition. It divides AI-enabled cyber conflict into technical and operational challenges, strategic and geopolitical challenges, and normative and legal challenges. That tripartite frame is valuable because it refuses to treat the subject as a purely technical acceleration problem. States, scholars and lawyers are brought into the same argument. The technical section reveals the operational logic of AI-enabled attacks, including faster reconnaissance, automated exploitation and adaptive malware that evades detection by learning the environment. The strategic section addresses the geopolitical stakes, including a chapter on what the editors call the middleware dilemma of middle powers, examining how Brazil, India and Singapore are exposed to AI-enabled cyber conflict precisely through their dependence on services, platforms and infrastructural layers they do not fully control. The legal section confronts the normative questions that follow: what happens to international law when the conduct it is trying to regulate cannot be reliably attributed? [*Artificial Intelligence and International Conflict in Cyberspace*](https://link.amazon/B09DBCAe8?ref=diplopolis.com) is strongest in the territory where these three sections overlap. Attribution is the hinge between technical evidence and legal consequence, and AI complicates attribution in both directions simultaneously. It can improve detection by analysing malware behaviour, identifying infrastructure reuse, clustering attacker techniques and finding patterns across datasets at a scale no human team can match. But it also makes attribution harder by enabling synthetic false flags, AI-generated personas, adaptive obfuscation and operations designed to look like someone else's work. The same capability that sharpens the analyst's vision also helps the adversary blur its own footprint. That is not a temporary technical limitation awaiting a better algorithm. It is a structural feature of the contest. The legal consequences are severe and underappreciated. International law's application to cyber conflict depends on the ability to identify conduct, establish responsibility and cross a threshold. Who acted? Was it a state or a proxy? Did the state exercise due diligence? Was it an armed attack? Was the response proportionate and lawful? If attribution remains permanently contested, the law does not disappear. But its authority weakens at the exact moment it is most needed. States will attribute, intelligence agencies will attribute, private cyber security firms will attribute and alliances will issue statements. The danger is that attribution becomes politically legible only to those who already trust the attributing power. In an unequal international order, this means that the powerful will be believed by their partners and doubted by everyone else. A smaller state that has been attacked, cannot prove it to the satisfaction of international institutions it did not build and cannot afford the forensic capacity to make its case, may find that its suffering is acknowledged by its friends and denied by the world. AI-enabled cyber conflict may produce a world in which every state claims evidence, every adversary claims fabrication and every victim must prove harm inside a system designed to manufacture doubt. That is the legal crisis beneath the technical one. The volume's most important single chapter is the one on middle powers, because it gestures toward an argument the book does not fully make but that the DiploPolis reading insists upon. For a powerful state with sophisticated offensive and defensive cyber capacity, AI-enabled conflict is a strategic problem: how to deter, attribute, respond and regulate. For a less capable state, it is also a sovereignty problem. Its banking systems, telecom networks, health databases, digital identity infrastructure, airports, payment rails and government clouds may depend on architectures designed elsewhere, secured through standards it did not write, governed by cloud providers whose obligations run to shareholders and regulators in other jurisdictions. When AI-enabled attacks hit that infrastructure, the weaker state is not merely a victim of cyber conflict. It is a victim of digital dependency that preceded the conflict and will outlast it. The book sees part of this. What it does not do, and what the review should name, is make that structural inequality the gravitational centre of the whole argument rather than the subject of one chapter in the strategic section. The framing remains AI, cyber conflict and international security writ large. That is a legitimate and serious framing. But it describes the problem from the vantage point of states that have the capacity to manage it, even if imperfectly. A different book, not yet written, would begin from the position of the state that cannot attribute, cannot respond, cannot negotiate the standards and cannot afford the capacity to do any of these things. That state's experience of AI-enabled cyber conflict is not a harder version of the same strategic challenge that the United States, China or Russia faces. It is a different kind of vulnerability, and it requires a different kind of analysis. That is not primarily a criticism of this volume. It is a description of where the field needs to go next. Cristiano, Broeders, Delerue, Douzet and Géry have produced a rigorous and genuinely multidisciplinary examination of a subject that most scholarship handles too narrowly. Read it for the technical depth, which is precise without being inaccessible. Read it for the legal argument, which is honest about the limits of the normative framework. Read it for the attribution paradox, which is the clearest account in this series of why AI makes cyber conflict not just more dangerous but harder to govern. Then read it alongside the single most important fact about digital infrastructure in the world today: most of the countries on earth did not build the systems they now depend on, cannot fully secure them and have no meaningful voice in how they are governed. AI will not merely transform cyber conflict. It will reveal the hierarchy that was already built into the digital world. This Book Review is free to read. Future Book Reviews will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### The Wedding Was in Sirik URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/wedding-was-in-sirik-us-strike-iran-civilians-killed/ Last updated: 2026-09-04T17:15:22.000Z On Tuesday, the United States military struck targets across southern Iran as part of its resumed campaign against Iranian military infrastructure. Iran's health minister confirmed 18 civilians killed and more than 100 wounded in the strikes. Among the dead were four people who were at a wedding ceremony in Sirik — a small coastal town in Iran's Hormozgan Province on the Strait of Hormuz. [The four killed were Amir-Ali Karimi, a four-year-old boy, Mohammad Mollahi, sixteen, Kolsoum Malahi, forty-three, and Zarkhatoun Taheri, forty-three.](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/2/iran-says-us-strikes-hit-a-wedding-party-in-sirik-killing-five?ref=diplopolis.com) Sixty-seven others at the wedding were wounded. The US strike targeted a location near the ceremony. The ceremony is not a target category under the laws of armed conflict. It was a wedding. Amir-Ali Karimi was four years old. The war resumed its bombing cycle in September after the 60-day Versailles MOU window expired on August 17 without a deal. The US struck Iran on Tuesday. Iran struck US bases in Kuwait and the UAE in response. The pattern has been running since February 28 — strike, retaliation, strike, ceasefire, MOU, collapse, resumed strikes. Each iteration has produced civilian casualties. The Sirik wedding is one of the most specific single incidents: a gathering of people in a private celebration on the shore of the Strait of Hormuz, struck during a US military operation against southern Iranian targets. The Strait runs directly past Sirik. The town sits on the Iranian coast at the point where the Strait narrows to its minimum width. The town's proximity to the Strait's navigational chokepoint — the waterway over which both Iran and the United States are simultaneously claiming permanent sovereignty — is the reason that military infrastructure exists in the surrounding area. The wedding was held in the same geographical context as the military targets. Amir-Ali Karimi and the three adults at that wedding were not military targets. DiploPolis has been documenting what US strikes in southern Iran have produced since February 28\. The Qeshm couple and their two-year-old child — killed by a 2,000-pound Mark 84 bomb on a residential building, confirmed by a New York Times visual investigation. The 18 civilians killed on Tuesday, including the four at the wedding in Sirik. Each incident has been described by US Central Command as a strike on IRGC targets, military infrastructure, command and control facilities and maritime capabilities. Each incident has also produced a death toll that includes people who were not in any of those categories. CENTCOM said it does not target civilians. Iran's Foreign Ministry said: 'Sirik is not a story. The civilians are real. The victims are real.' Iran's military struck back on Tuesday, hitting satellite communications systems, warehouses and fighter jet hangars at Ahmad al-Jaber Air Base in Kuwait, and targeting US troops and radar stations at Al Minhad Air Base in the UAE. Both Gulf states host US military infrastructure. Both are now regularly struck in Iran's retaliation for strikes on Iranian territory. The war has continued to expand its geographic scope — both sides striking civilian-adjacent targets. One side struck a wedding. Sirik is 240 kilometres from Qeshm. The Sirik strike happened six months and two days after Operation Epic Fury began. The couple at the Qeshm house were the July accounting. Amir-Ali Karimi, four years old, was the September accounting. The accountability gap remains open. The war continues. ### What the MOU Produced URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/what-the-mou-produced-iran-war-resumes-september-2026/ Last updated: 2026-09-04T17:14:37.000Z On August 30, US forces struck Iranian rocket launchers on a small island in the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran retaliated by launching missiles at US military targets in Jordan. On August 31, a tanker was struck by three unknown projectiles seventeen nautical miles east of Khasab, Oman. Jordan's armed forces said it shot down eight missiles entering its airspace. [At noon ET on September 1, CENTCOM announced](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/09/01/us-strikes-iran-after-new-hormuz-strait-shipping-attacks-centcom.html?ref=diplopolis.com) that US forces had begun striking Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps targets in Iran — air defence sites, radar systems, maritime assets and facilities, mine-laying capabilities and communications sites. For the first time in the conflict, US forces struck two Iranian government tankers directly under what officials described as a 'tanker for tanker' policy. Iran reported at least 18 killed, four of them at a wedding ceremony in a coastal town, a claim CENTCOM denied. Iran's foreign minister said Tehran had targeted US assets in Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait and Iraq. Saudi Arabia said Iran had struck a Saudi tanker in Hormuz and killed crew members. The Islamabad Memorandum, signed at Versailles on June 17, 2026, lasted 75 days. The war that paused on June 17 resumed on August 30 at a higher escalation level than the one at which it paused. The MOU did not hold the conflict at the point where the ceasefire found it. It held it for 75 days, during which Iran restructured its military, accelerated its weapons output and appointed a hardline IRGC veteran to head its supreme security council — and the war resumed with the United States implementing a policy it had not previously used: striking the other side's commercial vessels in direct retaliation for the other side's attacks on commercial vessels. The tanker for tanker precedent is new. The conflict it governs has been running since February 28. ## What the Pause Was Worth The Islamabad Memorandum was presented, at Versailles, as the beginning of a resolution. The G7 applauded it at Évian. Bessent described it as 'a historic step toward sustainable peace.' Iran's foreign minister described it as the end of the war, not a ceasefire — and said that since the US had violated it within 48 hours of signing, there was nothing to extend. Both readings were, in different ways, accurate: it was historic in the sense that it temporarily halted the most intensive American air campaign since Iraq in 2003, and it was not a ceasefire in the sense that the conditions that produced the war remained entirely unresolved. [DiploPolis tracked what Iran did with the 75 days in August](https://www.diplopolis.com/clock-ran-in-tehran-islamabad-mou-expired-iran-war): the IRGC was given greater authority over the regular military; military appointments shifted toward hardliners with experience in previous conflicts; missile and drone production was accelerated; Mohsen Rezaei, a former IRGC commander, was named head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council. The Wall Street Journal reported that Iran's hardline leadership treated the MOU as a tactical pause and possibly as a US-Israeli ploy to ease pressure on the global economy while buying time for a larger operation. Whether or not that reading was accurate, the 75 days of pause produced, on Iran's side, a more consolidated IRGC and a more hardline political leadership. On the American side, the 75 days produced sanctions packages that China refused to join, a Hormuz mine-clearing operation and a further degradation of the Patriot interceptor stockpile that the Ukrainian government had been refused access to in July. [The MOU's 60-day clock was supposed to produce a nuclear deal. The clock expired on August 17 without one.](https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-live-blog-trump-middle-east/33803414.html?ref=diplopolis.com) The 75 days of the pause — from Versailles to the resumption of fighting — produced no settled question. Iran's enrichment programme remains intact. The Hormuz arrangement with Oman was never completed. The Lebanon provisions that were the first clause of the MOU and the structural flaw the DiploPolis Lebanon Trap piece identified in June were never resolved. The Islamabad Memorandum produced a pause. The pause produced preparation. The preparation produced escalation. ## The Escalation the Pause Made Possible The specific character of the resumed fighting is worth noting because it differs from the pre-MOU conflict in one documented way: the tanker for tanker policy. Throughout the first phase of the war — from February 28 to the June 17 ceasefire — the US struck Iranian military targets, infrastructure, naval vessels and missile sites. It did not formally adopt a policy of striking Iranian commercial tankers as direct retaliation for Iranian attacks on commercial shipping. [The September 1 strikes changed that.](https://www.airandspaceforces.com/us-and-iran-trade-strikes-as-fighting-resumes-in-gulf/?ref=diplopolis.com) CENTCOM struck two Iranian government tankers. Trump described the strikes as 'a very heavy attack' that 'took out all of the new equipment they tried to build along the Strait of Hormuz.' He threatened a 'much bigger attack' if Iran retaliated again. The escalation ladder has moved. Each phase of the conflict has introduced weapons, targets or policies that the previous phase had not. The initial strikes on February 28 produced Iranian naval mining of the Strait. The mining produced US mine-clearing operations. The mine-clearing produced Iranian attacks on vessels transiting the cleared corridor. The vessel attacks produced the tanker for tanker policy. Each step has formalised a precedent that then governs the next phase. The tanker for tanker policy will govern the next round of negotiations, if there are negotiations, as a baseline that did not exist before the MOU. [NPR reported](https://www.npr.org/2026/08/31/g-s1-141175/attacks-flare-us-iran?ref=diplopolis.com) that a supertanker had caught fire over the weekend after striking two naval mines in the Strait — a detail that contradicted the US military's claim that it had cleared mines from the international shipping routes. CENTCOM had announced on August 25 that underwater drones had identified over 100 suspected mines and private contractors had dealt with them. The mines that stopped the supertanker were not in the cleared corridor. The Strait of Hormuz is not a contained waterway. Its geography resists the administrative logic that 'cleared' and 'safe' are the same condition. Putin and Pezeshkian met on September 1 and reaffirmed the Moscow-Tehran alliance. Putin expressed support for Iran's position in the conflict. Pezeshkian thanked Putin and said Tehran remained ready for diplomacy. Qatar said it was making efforts to restart negotiations. The diplomatic track and the military track are running simultaneously, as they have been since February 28, producing no conclusion on either. The latest round of diplomacy that Qatar is attempting will have to account for the tanker for tanker policy, the Saudi tanker Iran struck, the IRGC command restructuring and the 75 days the MOU provided without resolving the war's underlying causes. ## What Comes After the Pause The Islamabad Memorandum's architects presented it as the foundation for a negotiated resolution. Its actual function was to hold the conflict at a particular level while both sides prepared for what came next. Iran prepared by restructuring its military. The US prepared by sanctioning 60 entities in multiple countries, clearing Hormuz mines and attempting to build an economic coalition that China declined to join. Neither preparation produced a resolution. Both produced the conditions for the resumed conflict. [The GlobalSecurity.org daily report for September 2](https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran-war-oprep.htm?ref=diplopolis.com) described the Strait as 'a two-sided kinetic theater again.' The language is military and precise. The Strait of Hormuz is not a diplomatic problem. It is a physical waterway through which 20 per cent of the world's oil passes, contested by two militaries implementing opposing policies about who controls it. The MOU's provision on Hormuz — which committed both parties to 60 days of negotiations about its reopening — produced, after 75 days, a tanker for tanker policy and a resumed naval confrontation in the disputed waters. Trump called Iran a 'failed nation' on August 31\. Iran's IRGC said the US was 'defeated on the battlefield' and resorting to economic pressure as a result. These are the public positions of two governments that fought a 75-day ceasefire and emerged from it with the same objectives they entered with. The MOU produced a pause. The pause produced what pauses between unresolved conflicts produce. The Ceasefire That Wasn't — DiploPolis's characterisation from June — has become the War That Resumed. The MOU's legacy is not what it resolved. It is what it deferred while Iran restructured its IRGC and the US ran out of Patriot interceptors. This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### First They Have to Find the Plants URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/first-find-plants-nepal-hydropower-tunnel-workers-trapped/ Last updated: 2026-09-04T17:13:18.000Z Arnold Dix is a geologist in Australia. He has been advising rescue teams in Nepal's Trishuli valley since Saturday, reviewing technical drawings, satellite images and aerial videos, trying to determine the best way to access tunnels that may contain living workers. He has spent a career entering collapsed structures to recover survivors. What he described to [CNN and ABC Australia on Monday](https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/31/asia/nepal-missing-hydropower-tunnels-flood-explainer-intl-hnk?ref=diplopolis.com) was different: 'Normally, they collapse and I'm trying to get people out. This time, they haven't collapsed, but everything around them has, and I'm trying to get in.' It has removed the power stations from the surface, he said. Like they're just not there. The flash floods triggered on August 26 when part of a glacier collapsed near Nepal's border with Tibet were the worst natural disaster to hit Nepal in years. The glacier was 3,000 feet wide. It fell 4,000 feet into a river valley, releasing a wall of water, ice, mud and debris that barrelled 62 miles downstream. It killed more than 750 people, left more than 3,000 missing and buried entire communities beneath layers of sediment so thick that the landscape was fundamentally altered. The rivers that feed Nepal's hydropower grid run through exactly the territory the glacier destroyed. Nepal has built extensively along those rivers. The Trishuli River and its tributaries power much of the country's electricity grid and provide surplus energy sold to India. The hydropower plants — some of the largest infrastructure investments in Nepal's modern history — were built inside mountains, tunnelled deep into rock specifically because the tunnels are designed to withstand floods. They withstood the flood. But the entrances to the tunnels were buried. The plants themselves were removed from the surface. [933 workers are missing across 11 major hydropower projects](https://abc17news.com/news/national-world/cnn-world/2026/08/31/race-against-to-time-to-find-workers-missing-in-nepals-hydropower-tunnels-heres-what-we-know/?ref=diplopolis.com). Nepal's National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Authority confirmed this figure on August 31\. At the Trishuli 3A plant alone, rescuers believe as many as 100 workers may be alive inside the turbine room — the deepest part of the facility, the farthest from the entrance, built to be the most structurally robust section. Dix and his team located the buried entrance after days of effort. They drilled a hole large enough to rappel into the tunnel. They called out. They received no response. It is not known whether the turbine room is intact, partially flooded or entirely submerged. They might have to dig 10 metres to reach the workers. They might have to dig 100 metres. They do not know. The workers inside those tunnels came from Nepal's rural districts — from the same villages that send men to the Gulf states, to construction sites in India and to mountain projects across the Hindu Kush Himalaya. 279 workers have been rescued or managed to walk out on their own. The rest are still missing. One survivor described his team, the money they sent home, the weeks away from family. His brother-in-law worked on the same team. His sister, who is pregnant, is waiting. This is the story the glacier collapse produced that did not fit inside the first few days of coverage. The 1,300 missing became the headline. The 933 workers in hydropower tunnels buried by mud are the specific human consequence of building energy infrastructure in a climate system that is accelerating beyond the design parameters of the infrastructure built inside it. Nepal's hydropower industry was built to generate electricity and development. The glacier collapse buried the plants that generated both. Rescuers are drilling into mountains on the Nepal-Tibet border to find workers they cannot see, in tunnels whose entrances the flood removed from the surface. They are calling out into the dark. They have not heard back. ### "THE BIGGEST OIL DEAL IN WORLD HISTORY." The Country the US Captured. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/biggest-oil-deal-world-history-venezuela-us-capture-oil-reserves/ Last updated: 2026-09-04T17:12:24.000Z On Friday evening, Trump posted on Truth Social in full capitals. 'THE BIGGEST OIL DEAL IN WORLD HISTORY!' The United States had entered into an agreement with Venezuela securing majority US control of more than 65 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. Negotiated by Marco Rubio and Pete Hegseth with Venezuela's acting president Delcy Rodríguez. At no cost to the American taxpayer. More than doubling American oil reserves. Substantially lowering gas prices for all Americans, long into the future. The country is Venezuela. The country whose president the United States captured in a military operation in January 2026, transferred to US custody to face federal narcoterrorism and drug trafficking charges, and whose government was replaced with an interim administration headed by Rodríguez. The country into which the US then deported 146 Venezuelans in June, placing them in a hotel that collapsed in an earthquake the same evening. The country whose oil the US has now announced it controls, at no cost to the American taxpayer, through a private company that will hold [the second-largest corporate reserves of proven oil after Saudi Aramco](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-venezuela-oil-u-s-majority-control-65-billion-barrels/?ref=diplopolis.com). The deal gives the United States 55 per cent effective output of a new private joint venture — including an ownership stake and the right to buy oil at cost. The 65 billion barrels represents approximately 21 per cent of Venezuela's total proven reserves of 303 billion barrels. Venezuela holds the world's largest proven oil reserves. It currently produces 1.25 million barrels per day — far below its potential after years of sanctions, underinvestment and mismanagement. The deal calls for development of 17 strategic fields, more than $100 billion in investment and more than $209 billion in tax revenue for Venezuela. Rodríguez called it a new era of recovery, growth, production, security and prosperity for the Venezuelan people. None of the Venezuelan people voted for this arrangement. They did not vote for the January military operation that removed their elected government. They did not vote for the interim administration now signing oil agreements on their behalf. They did not vote for the 65-billion-barrel deal that gives 55 per cent effective output to a US private company. The people of Venezuela are the context for the biggest oil deal in world history in the same way that the Strategic Petroleum Reserve — which fell to levels not seen since the 1980s this August — is the context for Trump announcing it on a Friday evening six months into a war with Iran that has driven US gas prices to record highs. The deal is the answer to a political problem. Venezuela's oil is the instrument. DiploPolis wrote about Venezuela in July — 'Twenty Minutes.' 146 Venezuelans were deported from Texas to Caracas. Hours later, the hotel processing them collapsed in an earthquake. Three people named, three lives documented, three people dead after the US completed their removal. The government that said its responsibility ended at the tarmac has now announced majority control of the country it deported them to. The deportees got the earthquake. Their country's oil goes to a US private company. Both outcomes are described as beneficial for Venezuela. [NPR noted](https://www.npr.org/2026/08/31/nx-s1-5949305/trump-says-u-s-struck-deal-to-take-control-of-65-billion-barrels-venezuelan-oil?ref=diplopolis.com) what Trump did not address: it is not clear when, or if, the oil from this deal will actually reach US gas pumps. Venezuela's oil infrastructure has been severely degraded. Getting production up to the deal's implied scale requires billions of dollars of investment, years of construction and the physical rehabilitation of fields that have been neglected for decades. The deal more than doubles American oil reserves on paper. On the ground in Venezuela, the abandoned pumpjacks around Lake Maracaibo are the more accurate picture. Trump is facing his midterms. Gas prices are at record highs. The Iran war is six months old and has no conclusion in sight. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve is at its lowest in 40 years. On Friday evening, he announced the biggest oil deal in world history with the country his administration captured in January. Rodríguez announced a new era of prosperity. Neither said when production would begin. The announcement was immediate. The oil is not. ### The Best IR Programmes in the United States: A Guide for 2027 Intake URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/best-ir-programmes-united-states-2027-guide/ Last updated: 2026-08-28T22:20:48.000Z Every year, the rankings circulate. Georgetown at the top. Harvard close behind. Columbia, SAIS, Fletcher and Princeton somewhere in the middle depending on which survey is consulted and who is answering it. The surveys that produce these lists are conducted by American scholars, American policymakers and American employers. They name the programmes they attended, the ones whose graduates they hire, and the ones whose alumni populate the institutions they run. The result is an accurate map of where the American IR establishment studied — and an incomplete map of where a student from Mumbai, Lagos or Jakarta should spend two years and $180,000. This guide assesses ten US programmes against that more demanding question. For each one it covers what the programme genuinely delivers, what it costs, what the rankings miss, and which IR career tracks it most directly serves. The scholarship routing — how each programme connects to Fulbright and other major funding sources — is addressed in a dedicated section at the end. One fact this guide names upfront, before any ranking or assessment: one of the ten programmes below funds every admitted student in full. Not 'has scholarships available.' Not 'offers partial tuition waivers for top candidates.' Every admitted student — domestic and international — receives 100 per cent of tuition, required fees and health insurance, plus a living stipend, with no separate application and no essay to write. Most applicants discover this after they have already spent months deciding between Georgetown, SAIS and Columbia. It is named here first. ## How to Read This Guide The UK programmes guide published in this series on 8 August covered eight institutions and built a career routing table that connected each programme to twelve IR career tracks. This guide uses the same structure for the American market, with one additional variable: cost. The tuition gap between the US and UK IR programme markets is significant. The most expensive UK programme on that guide costs approximately £37,000 per year. The most expensive US programmes run to $65,000 per year in tuition alone, with Washington DC and New York living costs adding $30,000 to $40,000 annually on top. Two years at Georgetown, Columbia or Harvard costs more than twice what two years at LSE, King's or Edinburgh costs. That differential matters enormously for a student returning to a career in the Global South, where salary structures do not support the debt service that American programme costs generate. The routing principle applies here too: the right programme depends entirely on which career you are building toward and where you intend to build it. Read every section relevant to your career track before deciding. The ranking order in this guide is not a prestige hierarchy — it is the order that serves the career routing argument most clearly. ## Princeton — School of Public and International Affairs (MPA) **Duration:** 2 years | **Cost to admitted students:** Zero — full tuition, fees, health insurance and living stipend | **Cohort size:** Approximately 57 MPA students annually | **Application deadline:** December 2026 [Princeton SPIA funds every admitted student.](https://spia.princeton.edu/graduate-admissions?ref=diplopolis.com) Full stop. One hundred per cent of tuition and required fees — [the 2024-25 tuition and health plan fee was $65,910](https://spia.princeton.edu/graduate-admissions/master-public-affairs/financial-aid?ref=diplopolis.com), all covered — plus comprehensive health insurance and a living stipend for two years. No separate application. No essay. No loan. Both domestic and international students receive the same package. The implications are specific. A student admitted to Princeton SPIA and Georgetown MSFS simultaneously has received two offers with a financial difference of approximately $180,000 over the degree period. Princeton covers tuition and provides a living stipend, meaning a Princeton admit pays nothing and receives financial support for living costs. Georgetown's total cost of attendance — tuition of $132,384 plus two years of Washington DC living costs — runs to $180,000 to $200,000\. That is the full gap: Princeton costs nothing; Georgetown costs $180,000 to $200,000\. Most applicants choose Georgetown. The ones who have read the financial data choose Princeton. The admission process is demanding in ways the financial generosity can obscure. The [2025-26 entering class of 57 MPA students](https://spia.princeton.edu/news/princeton-spia-continues-run-accomplished-incoming-classes?ref=diplopolis.com) came from 27 countries and 73 undergraduate institutions. The MPA requires the GRE — Princeton does not grant waivers for any circumstance. The programme is quantitatively oriented; previous coursework in mathematics, statistics and economics is strongly recommended. The selection prioritises demonstrated commitment to public service above all other criteria — not academic excellence, not professional prestige, but a sincere record of engagement with the public good through professional work, internships or volunteer experience. Princeton is located in New Jersey, not Washington. The career proximity that Georgetown provides automatically — internships at the State Department, think tank events on K Street, networking dinners on Capitol Hill — Princeton does not provide from its campus. Students who want that access build it actively through summer placements and the Princeton alumni network, which reaches into every significant institution in American foreign policy. The absence of geographical proximity is a genuine trade-off, not an irrelevant detail. **Best for:** Students committed to public service careers who can be admitted and who understand that the funding model changes the career calculus entirely. If you can get in, apply. There is no rational argument for paying $180,000 elsewhere for the same career outcome. ## Georgetown University — Master of Science in Foreign Service (MSFS) **Duration:** 2 years | **Tuition:** [$2,758 per credit](https://sfs.georgetown.edu/ms-foreign-service/admissions-tuition/?ref=diplopolis.com) × 48 credits = approximately $132,384 | **Total cost:** $180,000 to $200,000 | **Priority deadline:** January 15, 2027 [Georgetown's MSFS](https://sfs.georgetown.edu/ms-foreign-service/?ref=diplopolis.com) has topped the Foreign Policy/TRIP Masters ranking in every edition that included international programmes — a consequence of the survey methodology as much as the programme's quality. The respondents are American IR scholars, policymakers and think tank staff. They name Georgetown because its graduates populate their institutions and their offices. The ranking accurately reflects the esteem in which the American foreign policy establishment holds the degree. The per-credit tuition for 2026-27 is $2,758, making the 48-credit MSFS programme approximately $132,384 in tuition before fees, health insurance and Washington DC living costs. Total cost of attendance for two years in DC runs to $180,000 to $200,000 for an international student without scholarship support. Merit scholarships are available; the priority deadline for scholarship consideration is January 15, 2027\. The scholarships are competitive and rarely cover full costs. A student arriving without significant external funding will graduate with debt that takes a decade to clear at most international affairs salary levels outside the American private sector. The honest question for a Global South applicant: does the Georgetown network pay off if your career is in Nairobi or Jakarta? The reputational value of the degree travels internationally. The relational value — the Washington network of contacts built during two years on the Potomac — does not travel. It is useful for careers that remain proximate to Washington. For careers returning to the Global South, the credential provides prestige without the network advantage that justifies its cost at full price. **Best for:** Students committed to Washington-based careers in government, international organisations with major Washington operations, or think tanks — and who either have scholarship support or have made a clear-eyed calculation about the debt-to-salary return on a Washington career. ## Harvard Kennedy School — MPA, MPA/ID and MC/MPA **Duration:** 2 years (MPA, MPA/ID); 1 year (MC/MPA) | **Tuition:** Approximately $61,926 per year | **Aid:** Only 39% of students received Harvard aid in 2025-26 | **Application deadline:** December 2026 Harvard Kennedy School is ranked first globally for Social Policy and Administration by QS 2026 and third among US public affairs schools by US News. The name carries the most portable prestige of any institution on this list — a Harvard credential opens doors in Washington, Geneva, London and Singapore with an authority that no other American school matches. The programme admits approximately 80 MPA students annually with an average cohort age of 29 and average professional experience of five years. Only 39 per cent of enrolled students receive any form of Harvard aid; the majority of scholarships are merit-based. For the 61 per cent who receive no institutional support, two years of tuition plus Cambridge living costs approaches $150,000\. HKS offers three MPA tracks. The standard two-year MPA is a flexible, self-designed curriculum for early to mid-career professionals. The [MPA in International Development (MPA/ID)](https://www.hks.harvard.edu/educational-programs/masters-programs?ref=diplopolis.com) is a quantitative, economics-heavy programme for professionals with strong background in global development — the most rigorous development economics training available at any school on this list. The Mid-Career MPA requires a minimum of ten to fifteen years of professional background. For a Global South applicant specifically interested in development finance careers at the World Bank, IMF or regional development banks, the MPA/ID is the most targeted preparation available in the American market. Pursue it with a parallel external fellowship application — Fulbright, Aga Khan Foundation or a national government fellowship — rather than counting on Harvard aid. **Best for:** Mid-career professionals with significant experience who can access scholarship support; MPA/ID applicants targeting multilateral development finance careers; and students for whom the Harvard credential's specific prestige is worth the cost premium over Princeton. ## Johns Hopkins University — School of Advanced International Studies (MAIR) **Duration:** 2 years | **Tuition:** Approximately $43,855 per year at the DC campus | **Application:** Rolling admission; test-optional as of 2026 [SAIS](https://sais.jhu.edu/?ref=diplopolis.com) is the programme that practitioners rank most consistently second after Georgetown, and its two-campus architecture distinguishes it from every other school on this list. Students can spend their first year in Bologna, Italy — at the SAIS Europe campus — and their second year in Washington DC, or combine the DC year with a year at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center in China. No other programme on this list offers a legitimate two-country or three-country degree structure as part of its standard curriculum. SAIS's strength is in international economics and security studies. Its economics training is more rigorous than Georgetown's and comparable to Columbia SIPA's, without Columbia's full cost premium. The DC campus places students in the same Washington ecosystem as Georgetown at a lower tuition rate. Institutional scholarships at SAIS are awarded without regard to citizenship. **Best for:** Students who want Washington policy access at a lower cost than Georgetown; students whose career plans involve East Asian or European expertise that the Bologna or Nanjing campus serves directly. ## Columbia University — School of International and Public Affairs (MIA) **Duration:** 21 months | **Tuition:** Approximately $109,704 for the full programme | **Aid:** Limited; Columbia SIPA is the outlier on financial support | **Entry:** Single-digit to low-teen acceptance rate [Columbia SIPA's Master of International Affairs](https://www.sipa.columbia.edu/?ref=diplopolis.com) is the most quantitatively rigorous programme on this list and the one with the most honest reputation among its own alumni for limited institutional aid. The 21-month, 54-credit MIA expects students to engage seriously with economics and quantitative methods. Its New York location provides proximity to the United Nations, the Council on Foreign Relations and the global financial institutions that make the city relevant to international careers. Direct costs for the full programme run to approximately $109,704 before New York living costs. New York City's cost of living adds $30,000 to $40,000 over 21 months. Columbia SIPA remains the outlier in the US IR programme market: aid is limited and most students borrow or pay out of pocket. A student arriving at SIPA without external funding needs a realistic plan for how $150,000 or more in total costs is recovered — and that plan looks different if the career takes the graduate back to Accra rather than to a New York salary. **Best for:** Students with strong quantitative backgrounds targeting international finance, economic policy, UN New York or the financial sector — and who have external scholarship funding or a clear-eyed calculation about the cost-to-outcome ratio. ## The Fletcher School, Tufts University — Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy (MALD) **Duration:** 2 years | **Tuition:** Comparable to Georgetown and SAIS | **Financial aid:** Stronger Global South fellowship record than Columbia | **Location:** Medford, Massachusetts [The Fletcher MALD](https://fletcher.tufts.edu/academics/masters-programs?ref=diplopolis.com) is the programme that practitioners consistently recommend above those with higher name recognition: it allows students to construct their own field of study across fields including international security, environmental policy, human security, international business and international negotiation. The flexibility produces graduates who are more adaptable to the way international affairs careers actually evolve — across sectors, across regions, across changing institutional needs. Fletcher's weakness is geographic visibility in the Washington hiring market. Georgetown graduates are in Washington when the internship listings appear. SAIS graduates are in Washington when the government positions open. Fletcher graduates, based in Medford outside Boston, work harder to establish themselves in those ecosystems. Fletcher has a stronger financial aid record for international and Global South students than Columbia. **Best for:** Students who prioritise intellectual flexibility and rigour over Washington proximity; applicants targeting international development, humanitarian work, environmental diplomacy and conflict resolution careers; and Global South students who need scholarship support. ## Yale University — Jackson School of Global Affairs (MA) **Duration:** 2 years | **Cost:** Comparable to Georgetown and Columbia | **Established:** 2022 | **Application deadline:** January 2027 [The Yale Jackson School](https://jackson.yale.edu/?ref=diplopolis.com) was established in 2022 and is the newest institution on this list by a significant margin. The Yale name carries prestige that the school's three-year history does not yet fully justify in terms of alumni placement records, employer recognition and the career networks that take decades to build. Both will come — the Jackson School's founding director, James Levinsohn, has built a faculty of serious scholars, and the Yale ecosystem of contacts is formidable. Apply knowing that you are investing partly in the brand and partly in a programme whose full value is still being constructed. For Global South applicants specifically: the Jackson School's relatively new status means its alumni network in developing country governments, regional organisations and Global South institutions is thinner than Georgetown's or Fletcher's. The Yale credential carries global prestige. The Yale Jackson alumni network does not yet carry the depth of the networks at older institutions. The calculus may change in five years. For a 2027 intake student, it has not yet changed. **Best for:** Students for whom the Yale brand carries specific value in their target career environment, who can access financial support, and who understand they are enrolling in a programme whose network and placement infrastructure is still developing. ## George Washington University — Elliott School of International Affairs **Duration:** 2 years | **Tuition:** Lower than Georgetown and comparable to SAIS | **Location:** Washington DC [The Elliott School](https://elliott.gwu.edu/?ref=diplopolis.com) is the largest IR school in the United States by faculty count and sits three kilometres from the White House in the Foggy Bottom neighbourhood that houses the State Department, the World Bank and the IMF. Its DC location provides the same policy proximity as Georgetown at a lower cost and a lower profile. Elliott graduates compete in the same Washington market as Georgetown graduates for a smaller share of the most competitive positions — the institutional prestige differential between the two schools is real in hiring contexts where Georgetown's name recognition carries weight. **Best for:** Students who want Washington policy access and cannot secure Georgetown admission or funding; applicants targeting development policy, international security and multilateral institution careers from a DC base. ## American University — School of International Service (SIS) **Duration:** 2 years | **Tuition:** Lower than Georgetown and SAIS | **Location:** Washington DC [American University's SIS](https://www.american.edu/sis/?ref=diplopolis.com) consistently appears in FP/TRIP rankings above schools with higher general name recognition. Its DC location provides the same Washington access as Georgetown and Elliott at a tuition rate that is meaningfully lower than either. SIS is particularly strong in international development, environmental governance, international communication and gender in international affairs — specialisations that Georgetown covers less thoroughly. The honest limitation: in a city where Georgetown sets the hiring benchmark for international affairs graduates, SIS graduates navigate a credential hierarchy that affects access to the most competitive positions. The programme is strong; its graduates are well-prepared; the institutional prestige differential with Georgetown is real in the Washington market and cannot be wished away. **Best for:** Students whose career goals are in international development, environmental governance, NGO work and multilateral institutions; applicants who want Washington access at a lower cost. ## Stanford University — Master of International Policy (MIP) **Duration:** 2 years | **Cohort size:** Approximately 25 students | **Location:** Stanford, California | **Concentrations:** Cyber policy and security, energy and natural resources, governance and development, international security [Stanford's MIP](https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/master-international-policy?ref=diplopolis.com) is the smallest programme on this list and the one located furthest from the Washington policy ecosystem. Both facts are intentional. Stanford's proximity to Silicon Valley rather than the Potomac means the institutional network plugs into technology companies, venture capital funds, defence technology firms, and the governmental and multilateral organisations shaped by their relationship with the technology sector. For a student whose interest in international affairs includes cyber policy, digital governance, climate finance technology or the intersection of artificial intelligence with security and foreign policy, Stanford is the most relevant programme on this list. For a student oriented toward traditional diplomacy, multilateral organisations or development work, Stanford's location is a significant practical limitation. **Best for:** Students whose career plans involve technology policy, cyber security, energy and climate finance, and the Silicon Valley institutions that are reshaping international affairs. ## The Career Routing Guide For diplomacy and foreign service: Georgetown for the US State Department pipeline; SAIS for two-campus intellectual depth combined with DC access; Princeton for candidates with public service commitments who can secure admission. For multilateral organisations and the UN system: Harvard MPA/ID for economics-heavy development roles; Columbia SIPA for New York UN access; Fletcher for humanitarian and conflict resolution tracks. For multilateral development finance at the World Bank, IMF and regional banks: Harvard MPA/ID is the most targeted preparation; Princeton's quantitative rigour is a close second; SAIS's economics training provides a solid foundation. For think tanks and policy research: Georgetown and GWU for Washington DC access; Princeton for research-oriented roles requiring analytical depth. For international development and humanitarian work: Fletcher for programme flexibility and Global South financial aid; SIS for thematic depth in development and environment; Harvard MPA/ID for economics-driven development careers. For technology and cyber policy: Stanford, without close competition on this list. For international business and corporate affairs: Columbia SIPA for New York financial sector access; Stanford for technology sector corporate affairs; Princeton for prestige without cost. ## The Scholarship Routing Fulbright funds graduate study and research in the United States for citizens of over 160 countries through country-specific Commissions and US Embassies. All ten programmes on this list are Fulbright-eligible. The next Dossier scholarship guide covers Fulbright in detail. The Aga Khan Foundation International Scholarship funds postgraduate study at any reputable institution for citizens of specific developing countries — Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Kenya, Pakistan, Tanzania, Uganda and others. All ten programmes here are eligible. National government fellowships from India, Nigeria, Kenya, Pakistan and other Commonwealth countries often fund study at American institutions. Check your national government scholarship programme before applying to US institutions at full cost. The critical scheduling note: most US IR programmes have December or January priority deadlines for merit scholarship consideration. Georgetown's scholarship priority deadline is January 15, 2027\. Princeton's application deadline is December 2026\. Apply in the first half of the application window, not the second. ## The Verdict The most important decision in the American IR programme market is not which school has the highest ranking. It is whether you can attend the school that funds you fully — and if you cannot, whether the cost of the alternative is proportionate to the career outcome it produces. Princeton funds every admitted student. No other programme on this list does. If your profile is competitive for Princeton — a demonstrated commitment to public service, strong quantitative preparation, a GRE score, prior work or service experience — apply. The financial argument is decisive and the credential is among the strongest in the field. For the programmes that do not fund fully, the question is specific: will a career in Washington recover $180,000 in student debt, and is a Washington career what you are actually building? For a student from the Global South returning to a career in their home country, the debt burden of a full-price American programme is rarely justified by the salary it enables. The credential value is real; the network value depends on where the career is based; the debt is absolute. Make the calculation before choosing the programme, not after. 🚧 **Programme fees, tuition rates and application deadlines change each cycle. Verify all details on official university websites before applying. If you spot an error or an outdated link in this piece, write to* [editor@diplopolis.com](mailto:editor@diplopolis.com) *and we will correct it promptly.* This Dossier piece is free to read. Future Dossier pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### 1,300 Missing. The World Watched the Strait. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/1-300-missing-the-world-watched-the-strait/ Last updated: 2026-08-28T22:08:12.000Z [The collapse of a glacier](https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/26/world/live-news/nepal-flash-flooding-floods-intl?ref=diplopolis.com) sent a wall of water, ice, rock and mud down the Bhotekoshi River on August 27, sweeping entire villages off the Nepal-Tibet border. More than 390 people were confirmed dead and more than 1,300 are missing, including more than 600 foreign tourists who were in the border region when the flood struck. Buildings were swept from their foundations. Roads connecting the valley towns to Kathmandu were cut. The Bhotekoshi valley — a narrow gorge connecting Nepal's Sindhupalchok district to the Tibetan plateau — has flooded before. It has never flooded like this. The collapse was not a surprise in the geological sense. The Bhotekoshi corridor is one of the world's most flood-prone mountain passages. It carries the principal overland trade route between Nepal and China, a route that has been disrupted repeatedly by landslides and glacial lake outbursts since monitoring began. [The US Geological Survey confirmed](https://www.npr.org/2026/08/27/nx-s1-5946309/nepal-tibet-deadly-floods?ref=diplopolis.com) that what initially appeared to be a 4.4 magnitude earthquake was actually the seismic energy generated by the sudden collapse of glacial rock and ice, followed by a massive debris flow. Climate researchers have been documenting the acceleration of glacial melt in the Hindu Kush Himalaya for decades. The glaciers are retreating faster, the glacial lakes are growing larger and the probability of catastrophic outburst events is increasing with each degree of warming. Wednesday was one of those events. The villages in the valley had no evacuation warning that was sufficient. Many of them had nowhere higher to go. More than 600 of the missing are foreign tourists. They were trekking the Friendship Highway — the high-altitude route connecting Kathmandu to Lhasa — when the flood struck. Among the missing: 90 Americans, 24 Canadians, 34 Australians, 133 Indians and nationals from across Europe and Asia. Some were from countries whose foreign policy has been entirely consumed by the Iran war's diplomatic management since February 28\. Their governments are, at this moment, simultaneously monitoring ceasefire negotiations with Iran and searching for their citizens in the Bhotekoshi valley. The Nepal-Tibet floods have produced no Security Council emergency session. They have produced no presidential statement from the United States. They have produced no coordinated international response commensurate with 390 confirmed dead and 1,300 missing people in a mountain gorge. They have produced [NPR's August 27 report](https://www.npr.org/2026/08/27/nx-s1-5946309/nepal-tibet-deadly-floods?ref=diplopolis.com) and the Washington Post's live updates and the missing persons lists being compiled by embassies in Kathmandu. They have produced the specific, measurable attention that a humanitarian disaster receives when the world's institutional attention is directed elsewhere. Elsewhere is Tehran, and Doha, and the Strait of Hormuz, and the UN Security Council in New York where Mladenov warned of the next Gaza war, and the Kenscoff hills in Haiti where the gang leader's video is still circulating, and the Arabian Sea where the Lincoln has finally turned for home. The world has its agenda. The Bhotekoshi has its flood. Both are happening simultaneously. The 1,300 missing are in neither agenda. This is the displacement that DiploPolis has been naming since February 28: the war that consumed global attention also consumed the institutional capacity to respond to everything that was happening in the weeks and months around it. The Nepal-Tibet floods are the most specific proof available. More than 390 confirmed dead. More than 1,300 missing. More than 600 of them tourists from countries with embassies and emergency protocols and diplomatic capacity. The response is live updates. The villages are gone. The world watched the Strait. ### Forget About Going Back URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/forget-about-going-back-rohingya-crisis-nine-years-analysis/ Last updated: 2026-08-28T22:36:57.000Z Nine years ago this week, Myanmar's military and armed Rakhine civilians burned hundreds of Rohingya villages and killed at least 6,700 people in a single month. Between 700,000 and 750,000 people crossed into Bangladesh in that wave alone. It was the largest and fastest displacement of people since the Rwandan genocide. The United States called it a genocide. The United Nations Secretary-General called it a textbook example of ethnic cleansing. The world watched, held emergency summits, pledged emergency funding and moved on. [On August 25, 2026, NPR published a report](https://www.npr.org/2026/08/25/g-s1-140007/forget-about-going-back-9-years-on-rohingya-crisis-enters-dangerous-phase?ref=diplopolis.com) from the camps. The headline was drawn from a quote given by Jessica Olney, an independent researcher who has worked with the Rohingya for a decade. 'Forget about going back right now,' she told the reporter. 'People are still coming in, and nobody seems to talk pragmatically about that.' The report noted that the world's attention was fixed on the Middle East and Ukraine. The ninth anniversary of the largest single-month displacement of people in a generation passed largely unnoticed. More than one million Rohingya are in the camps around Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh. The World Food Programme's food ration for some of them is now $7 per person per month. In 2023, the ration was cut from $12 to $8 while 40 per cent of children under five were already chronically malnourished. It was restored to $12 in 2024\. This April, it was cut again, to as little as $7 under a new tiered system. The Rohingya are barred from legally working in Bangladesh. They depend almost entirely on humanitarian assistance. The humanitarian assistance is shrinking. Some are risking 1,000-mile boat journeys to Malaysia because the camps have become intolerable. And still they are coming. More Rohingya continue crossing from conflict-torn Rakhine state into southern Bangladesh, even as the million who crossed before them have nowhere to go. ## What Nine Years Has Built The Kutupalong-Balukhali camp complex near Cox's Bazar is the largest refugee camp in the world. It was not designed to be permanent. Nothing about the international community's response to the 2017 exodus was designed to be permanent. The emergency shelters, the emergency rations, the emergency funding appeals, the emergency summits — all were framed as temporary measures for a population that would return home once conditions permitted. Nine years later, the conditions do not permit it. The temporary measures have become the permanent architecture of a stateless population's existence. The Rohingya were not citizens of Myanmar before August 2017\. They have been denied citizenship since the 1982 Citizenship Law excluded them from the list of recognised national races. They were stateless in Myanmar before the crackdown. They are stateless in Bangladesh after it. The children born in the Cox's Bazar camps in 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021 have never lived anywhere but a temporary shelter. They are growing up without the legal right to work, to move freely, to access formal education beyond what NGOs can provide, or to claim citizenship in any country. Their parents cannot go back. They have nothing to go back to. Myanmar's military junta, which seized power in February 2021, has intensified the violence in Rakhine state. The Arakan Army — a Rakhine ethnic armed organisation — has been fighting the junta across the region, and the conflict has produced a new wave of displacement on top of the one that never resolved. People crossing into Bangladesh in 2026 are not the same people who crossed in 2017\. They are a different population being driven out by a different phase of the same violence in a country where the political conditions for Rohingya return have, if anything, deteriorated since the exodus began. The Gambia filed a case against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice in November 2019, under the Genocide Convention, on behalf of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. [In January 2020, the ICJ ordered provisional measures](https://www.icj-cij.org/case/178?ref=diplopolis.com) requiring Myanmar to protect the Rohingya from genocide. Myanmar was required to preserve evidence, prevent genocidal acts and report to the court on its compliance. The measures exist. The reports were submitted. Myanmar's military then staged a coup. The ICJ's jurisdiction extends to the government that signed the court's measures. The government that signed the measures no longer exists. The violence in Rakhine state continues. ## The Architecture of Structural Neglect The DiploPolis piece published in April 2026, The Refugee the West Made, made an argument about the global displacement crisis that the Rohingya case now illustrates with specific precision. The piece argued that the international community manages refugee crises with initial emergency generosity and permanent structural neglect — that the funding follows attention, and the attention follows geopolitical interest, and the crises that do not connect to the strategic interests of powerful states are the ones that get the $7 food ration. The Rohingya do not have oil. Rakhine state is not a chokepoint for global trade. Myanmar's military junta has no Security Council patron willing to advocate for Rohingya return. The Gambia's genocide case at the ICJ — brought by a small West African state acting on behalf of Islamic solidarity, not by any of the states with the power to enforce the court's orders — is a measure of precisely how far outside the centres of geopolitical power the Rohingya crisis sits. The funding architecture confirms the structural argument. The UNHCR Bangladesh operation requested $876 million for 2024 and received 49 per cent of it. The WFP's food assistance for the Rohingya has been chronically underfunded — hence the ration cuts. Programs to support the Rohingya were only around half funded in 2025, and are only 19 per cent funded this year. The gap between what is requested and what is provided is not random. It tracks the attention cycle. When Bangladesh floods or Myanmar makes the news, donations increase. When the Strait of Hormuz is the centre of the world's energy anxiety, Bangladesh's camps are not. The world's attention this week is on Operation Economic Outcast and what China will do about it. The world's attention last week was on the Islamabad Memorandum's collapse and Iran's military restructuring. The week before that, it was on Netanyahu's rejection of Trump's 15-point plan. All of these stories matter. All of them generated DiploPolis analysis pieces. None of them has any practical bearing on whether a nine-year-old child in Kutupalong gets a food ration of $7 or $12 this month. ## What Accountability Has Produced The international community's accountability machinery has been applied to the Rohingya crisis with an unusual level of seriousness. The Gambia's ICJ case is proceeding. The court's provisional measures are on the record. Several countries have used the word genocide, including the United States under Joe Biden. Multiple UN special rapporteurs have documented the violence and the displacement with precision and regularity. Human rights organisations have produced thousands of pages of testimony from survivors. The evidence of what happened in August 2017, and of what has continued to happen since, is not contested. What the accountability machinery has not produced is accountability. No member of Myanmar's military leadership has been arrested. No senior official has appeared before any court. The junta that staged the coup in 2021 is the entity now being asked, through diplomatic pressure, to create conditions for Rohingya return — the same military institution whose commander-in-chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, has been sanctioned by Western governments and has continued to govern without consequence. The pattern the Rohingya crisis describes is the pattern the Nuremberg Files series has been tracing across DiploPolis's coverage of international accountability: legal instruments that name the crime, courts that document the violation and orders that cannot be enforced against those with the power to ignore them. The ICJ ordered Myanmar's military to protect the Rohingya in January 2020\. The military staged a coup thirteen months later. The orders are still on the record. The Rohingya are still in Cox's Bazar. ## What Nobody Is Talking About Pragmatically The NPR report's central finding is that the discussion of repatriation — the conversation about when and how the Rohingya might go home — is premature. It is premature because the violence in Rakhine state has not stopped, because Myanmar has not offered any framework for Rohingya citizenship or security, because the political conditions for return do not exist and there is no credible mechanism for creating them. More people are crossing in than the existing population has any prospect of leaving. The discussion that is not happening, the one Olney identifies as the pragmatic one, is about the camps themselves — about what it means for the international community to have created, funded and then underfunded a permanent city of stateless people on the edge of Bangladesh. Cox's Bazar's Rohingya population is larger than the population of many of the countries whose diplomats attend UN emergency sessions on their behalf. They are not a temporary crisis requiring emergency management. They are a permanent population requiring a permanent solution. And the permanent solution — citizenship, security, a political framework for their existence — requires decisions from the Myanmar military that the international community has no mechanism to compel. Olney's instruction — forget about going back — is addressed to the policy community that still frames the crisis as a repatriation problem. But it is also the instruction that the international community has effectively issued to the Rohingya themselves through the decisions it has and has not made over nine years. The emergency shelters that became permanent structures. The rations that started at $12 and ended at $7\. The attention that moved to the Strait of Hormuz and the 60-day nuclear deadline and the sanctions on Singapore shipping companies. The Rohingya did not disappear from Cox's Bazar when the world's attention moved elsewhere. They are still there, and still coming, and the world is still not talking pragmatically about that. This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### The Alternative Is the Next War URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/alternative-next-war-gaza-board-of-peace-mladenov-food-warehouse/ Last updated: 2026-08-28T22:06:47.000Z Nikolay Mladenov stood before the UN Security Council on Wednesday and said something the United States has not said publicly about its Gaza plan: that the alternative to it is the next war. Mladenov is the Board of Peace high representative — the official in charge of implementing Trump's 20-point plan for Gaza. [He criticised Israel for its attacks on the Palestinian territory.](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/27/board-of-peace-official-warns-un-alternative-to-plan-is-next-war-gaza?ref=diplopolis.com) He said the plan had not stalled and had 'moved from the negotiating table to the engineering table.' He said Hamas had agreed to the plan's key provision — disarming and handing Gaza over to civilian rule. He did not say Israel had agreed to anything equivalent. The photograph taken that same day in Deir al-Balah, central Gaza, shows Palestinians walking past a food-aid warehouse. The warehouse was damaged when an Israeli airstrike targeted a nearby house. AP photographer Abdel Kareem Hana captured the image. The warehouse is visible: its walls punctured, its roof partially collapsed, its function as a food distribution point interrupted by an airstrike on a residential target next to it. Mladenov was at the Security Council saying the plan had moved to the engineering table. The food warehouse was the engineering. The marathon meeting between Jared Kushner and Netanyahu ended without a firm commitment from Israel to the latest US plan. The meeting lasted hours. Netanyahu did not commit. The Board of Peace official said at the UN: if the plan fails, the alternative is the next war. Netanyahu had said on August 9, in his Cabinet, that no Palestinian state would be established — not in Gaza, not in the West Bank — as long as he is prime minister. Hamas has agreed to disarm. Netanyahu has not agreed to withdraw. The plan requires both. One party has agreed to its most difficult provision. The other has not agreed to anything. The death toll in Gaza since the October 2025 ceasefire is now above 1,100\. The ceasefire that DiploPolis has covered from its first day has continued to function as described: the world's longest humanitarian pause that keeps producing casualties. Israel's airstrike on a house in Deir al-Balah that damaged the food warehouse next to it was not an isolated incident. It was Wednesday. Wednesday is a day in Gaza the same way all other days are days in Gaza, characterised by the same daily arithmetic of strikes, warnings, casualties and condemnations. Mladenov's words at the UN Security Council are the most explicit warning the US's own peace mechanism has issued: implement the plan, or face the next war. The plan requires Hamas to disarm and Israel to withdraw. Hamas has agreed. Israel has not. The Board of Peace is criticising Israel by name at the UN Security Council. The food warehouse is damaged. The alternative is the next war. Nobody has said what the next war is a war for, given that the current war's stated objectives have not been achieved. ### The Art of Not Processing URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/ai-use-cases-diplomats-kilburg-review/ Last updated: 2026-08-28T22:22:05.000Z Diplomacy has a grammar that most governance theory misses. It depends on what is not said: the cable that was not sent, the meeting that was not requested, the concession that was not named, the ultimatum that was left as implication rather than text. A skilled diplomat reads the pause before an answer as carefully as the answer itself. She manages the delay. She leaves things unresolved when resolution would foreclose something more important. She understands that the most consequential diplomatic act is sometimes the refusal to act, to process, to respond, to make something definite that must remain provisional. Don Kilburg's [AI Use Cases for Diplomats](https://link.amazon/B0fMOBlBA?ref=diplopolis.com) is a serious practitioner's attempt to think through what artificial intelligence means for the people who conduct that art. It deserves to be read seriously, which means it deserves to be read against the hardest test its subject demands. That test is whether the book understands silence. Not as failure of communication, but as instrument of statecraft. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/08/_Ai-Use-Cases-for-Diplomats-Applying-Artificial-Intelligence-to-Diplomacy--Chapman---HallCrc-Artificial-Intelligence-and-Robotics-Series-_BC.png)](https://link.amazon/B0fMOBlBA?ref=diplopolis.com) Kilburg passes that test in part. He is not writing techno-optimism. The book stresses that diplomats must learn when not to use AI, that human wisdom remains central to diplomatic work and that AI should complement rather than replace expertise. Those are not marketing slogans; they are the right instincts, and they place this book well above the uncritical enthusiasm that characterises too much AI-and-governance writing. A book that says AI must have limits, that humans must remain in the loop and that ethical complexity must be confronted is already more honest than most. But the human-in-the-loop test is easier than the silence test, and the review should say why. Saying that humans must remain in control does not address the deeper question: whether the human in the loop has been subtly trained by the system to think in ways that make silence less legible. The risk is not only that AI replaces the diplomat. The subtler risk is that it changes what diplomats recognise as decision-worthy. A system that surfaces, prioritises, summarises and flags will inevitably shape the attention of the official who uses it. What the system cannot capture will receive less attention. What the system presents as urgent will feel urgent. What the system cannot process, the unwritten understanding, the deliberate ambiguity, the strategic non-response, will gradually become harder to see. Kilburg seems alert to this risk in the ways he discusses crisis management, negotiation support and consular work. The book describes AI's utility across communication strategies, media analysis, embassy management and stakeholder mapping. These are real diplomatic functions, and AI's contribution to them is genuine: better preparation, faster scanning, reduced cognitive load on routine tasks, improved ability to track public sentiment across multiple languages simultaneously. None of that is negligible. A diplomat drowning in cable traffic, local press, consular caseloads and bureaucratic demand would be foolish to decline assistance that addresses any of those burdens. The danger begins when AI moves from organising the diplomatic environment to defining it. If a system tells an ambassador which audiences matter, which local narrative is gaining force, which negotiating position is optimal or which public message will land best, it has entered the zone of political judgement. Kilburg asks precisely the right question: will tomorrow's diplomats represent nations or algorithms? That is a serious question, not a rhetorical flourish. The fact that he asks it suggests he understands the risk. The review's task is to press whether the book's practical prescriptions are equal to the seriousness of the concern. Diplomacy is the management of consequence, not merely the management of information. That distinction, simple to state, is the hardest thing for any AI system to learn. Information can be processed. Consequence must be imagined. A human diplomat in a difficult bilateral meeting is doing something no current AI can fully support: she is reading the room, sensing the emotion beneath the formality, calculating what can be said now versus what must be left for a private moment, deciding whether the silence that just fell is hostile or receptive, and choosing a word she cannot explain algorithmically because the right word was never in the briefing papers. That is not a failure of AI capability that better training data will fix. It is a different kind of knowing. The book's most significant limitation is not methodological. It is geographical. Kilburg is a retired United States diplomat with long experience in public diplomacy, strategic communication and technology in foreign affairs. That experience gives the book real authority. It also shapes its imagination in ways that the book cannot fully see. For a well-resourced diplomatic service, AI offers amplification: better tools, faster processing, broader monitoring, reduced administrative burden. For an under-resourced foreign ministry, the calculus is entirely different. Ghana, Nepal or Paraguay is not asking how to optimise diplomatic work with AI. It may be asking who owns the system through which its diplomatic work will now be mediated. The asymmetry is structural. A smaller foreign ministry that deploys AI tools built on foreign platforms, trained on foreign data, governed by foreign standards and hosted on foreign cloud infrastructure has not simply adopted a neutral instrument. It has created a dependency. Its cables may be drafted with AI assistance built by a company whose servers are in Virginia. Its sentiment analysis may reflect language models trained overwhelmingly on English and Mandarin. Its negotiation preparation may be shaped by tools whose assumptions about what constitutes a good outcome were built into architectures designed elsewhere. The dependency is not unique to smaller states — even well-resourced foreign ministries rely on private contractors for much of their digital infrastructure — but it is most acute where the ministry has the least leverage to set the terms. And if the AI system shaping that negotiation preparation was built by a power whose interests diverge from the smaller state's own, then the diplomat is not merely using a tool. She is reasoning inside an environment her adversary helped construct. This is not a hypothetical concern. It is the condition of most diplomatic services in the world. Kilburg acknowledges that AI should be deployed with equal access and ethical care. But equal access within an unequal infrastructure is not equality. A guide to AI use cases for diplomats that does not make this asymmetry central has written a guide for the already powerful, while assuming that the practical strategies it offers are universally available. They are not. *AI Use Cases for Diplomats* is a valuable and honest book for the audience it was written for. Read it as a practitioner's guide to navigating the integration of AI into a well-resourced diplomatic establishment. Read it for its seriousness about limits, its genuine concern for the human at the centre of the process and its willingness to ask the question that matters most. Then read it from the other side of the asymmetry, and ask what a guide to AI and diplomacy looks like when the diplomat's ministry does not own the tools, the data or the standards. The silence at the centre of diplomacy, the pause that must not be filled, the ambiguity that must not be resolved, the consequence that must be imagined rather than processed, has no AI use case. That book has not yet been written. Until it is, this one is indispensable and incomplete in equal measure. This Book Review is free to read. Future Book Reviews will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### 47 Dead. 50 Kidnapped. 22 in a Church. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/47-dead-50-kidnapped-22-church-haiti-kenscoff-attack/ Last updated: 2026-08-28T22:05:09.000Z On Sunday August 23, armed men attacked the community of Kenscoff — a once-peaceful neighbourhood nestled in the hills above Port-au-Prince. They killed 47 people. Five of the dead were children. They kidnapped more than 50 others. Twenty-two of the 47 were reportedly executed in a church compound where they had sought shelter. The Kenscoff mayor told the Associated Press that gangs set fire to 25 homes. The gang leader posted a video threatening to kill all hostages if any of his fighters were harmed. 'Paraison, if any of our soldiers are hurt, I will kill all of them,' he said, addressing Vladimir Paraison, director of Haiti's National Police, directly by name. [The United Nations confirmed the figures on Tuesday August 25.](https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/08/1168935?ref=diplopolis.com) The UN Secretary-General António Guterres condemned the attack and said the relentless gang attacks on communities underscored the alarming security conditions in the country. Romain Le Cour, head of the Haiti Observatory at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, described it as a major political and security test for the government, the police and the international mission. The attack's scale, he said, was the largest of its kind in recent Haitian history. Kenscoff was not supposed to be vulnerable. It sits above Port-au-Prince in the mountains, away from the lowland gang territories that have consumed the capital's central districts, the airport and the port. The first major attack on Kenscoff happened in January 2025\. Sunday's was the largest yet. Gangs that had previously concentrated on the plains have moved upward, into communities that thought geography was their protection. The mountains are no longer neutral. DiploPolis wrote about Haiti in June after UN Secretary-General Guterres visited Port-au-Prince and said 'what I saw will not leave me.' He described the biggest disgrace as indifference — the world's refusal to look at what was happening inside Haiti's capital. He said the families he met were not asking for sympathy. They were waiting for action. Since then, the gang federation Viv Ansanm and other armed groups have continued their territorial expansion. The multinational security mission, Kenya-led, remains underfunded. The international community's attention has been elsewhere — on the Strait of Hormuz, on Gaza, on the NATO review. Marc Paul, 42, told reporters that gangs had kidnapped his brother, stepmother, stepfather and two cousins in the attack. His 16-year-old niece was also kidnapped and raped but managed to escape and reached him. 'My brother is probably going to die,' he said, after watching the gang leader's video. He said it in the same week that the US government was debating how to impose the greatest economic isolation in the history of the world on Iran. Haiti has 12 million people and 47 confirmed dead in a single community attack. Neither number has the leverage of a nuclear programme or a strait. Guterres condemned the Sunday attack from New York. His words in June were: 'The biggest disgrace is indifference.' His words this week were: 'The relentless gang attacks on communities and the loss of lives underscore the alarming security conditions in Haiti.' Both statements are true. Both describe the same place. The indifference has continued. The gangs have moved higher. ### The Isolation That Requires China URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/operation-economic-outcast-iran-china-sanctions-isolation/ Last updated: 2026-08-28T22:11:04.000Z On August 24, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stood in the Cash Room at the Treasury Department, announced Operation Economic Outcast and waved goodbye to reporters. He had just described the campaign as 'an economic D-Day.' He said the US objective was to 'sever every economic lifeline that sustains this tyrannical regime until Tehran stands alone.' He promised 'the greatest coordinated economic isolation in the history of the world.' He sanctioned [nearly 60 individuals and entities](https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/8/25/trumps-latest-wave-of-iran-sanctions-which-60-entities-are-targeted?ref=diplopolis.com) spread across Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, the UK, France, Syria, Ukraine, Greece and the Marshall Islands. He did not sanction a single Chinese financial institution. Asked why, Bessent was direct. 'Why would I want to blow up the global financial system?' he said. That question, from the man announcing the greatest economic isolation in the history of the world, contains the strategy's fundamental impossibility. China is Iran's largest oil buyer. Chinese financial institutions facilitate the transactions that keep Iranian oil revenue flowing. The greatest coordinated economic isolation in history cannot isolate Iran without stopping those transactions. Stopping those transactions requires sanctioning Chinese financial institutions. Sanctioning Chinese financial institutions risks the global financial system. Bessent has declined to do it. The 60 entities sanctioned on August 24 are real and the network they represent is real. Several Chinese companies involved in procurement, logistics and shipping support for Iranian oil are named. What is not named is the financial architecture that makes the network function — and that architecture is Chinese. ## **What the Strategy Requires** Operation Economic Outcast operates on the premise that the United States can economically isolate Iran by sanctioning the entities through which Iran trades with the world. The premise has a specific structural requirement: the countries that matter most to Iranian trade must either comply with American pressure or face consequences severe enough to compel compliance. [Iran's key trading partners](https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/8/25/trumps-latest-wave-of-iran-sanctions-which-60-entities-are-targeted?ref=diplopolis.com) are China, India, Turkey, Iraq, the UAE and Pakistan. China is the largest buyer of Iranian oil by a substantial margin. India is the second. Turkey, Iraq, the UAE and Pakistan collectively account for most of the remainder. The UAE suspended trade with Iran this week — Bessent described the timing as 'not coincidental,' implying American pressure produced the result. The UAE represents a small fraction of Iranian trade compared to China. [China's foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian stated on August 25](https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/8/25/china-says-will-safeguard-its-own-interests-as-us-expands-iran-sanctions?ref=diplopolis.com) that Beijing's economic cooperation with Iran 'has always been conducted within the framework of international law and should not be interfered with or disrupted.' China, Lin said, 'firmly opposes illegal unilateral sanctions' and 'will take all necessary measures to firmly safeguard its own rights and interests.' The statement was not a negotiating position. It was a refusal. [The Bloomberg reporting on August 25](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-25/xi-signals-defiance-as-us-threatens-sanctions-for-iran-support?ref=diplopolis.com) captured what the refusal means strategically: Washington's plan 'risks derailing a fragile truce with China' — the trade framework that both sides have been managing carefully since 2025\. Bessent has given companies a 'cure period' to sever ties with Iran, without specifying which companies, which countries or how long the period is. The ambiguity is deliberate. Naming China as a primary target would require either following through or publicly accepting a Chinese refusal. The cure period delays that choice. Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander James Stavridis told CNN: 'China is only the first country that's going to decline the honour of being part of the blockade of Iran.' He was describing not a diplomatic failure but a structural condition: the countries most capable of enforcing an Iranian economic isolation are precisely the countries that have spent a decade building alternative economic infrastructure to avoid American leverage. ## **What the Sanctions Cannot Reach** [The Al Jazeera reporting on the 60 entities](https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/8/25/trumps-latest-wave-of-iran-sanctions-which-60-entities-are-targeted?ref=diplopolis.com) reveals the specific architecture of what Operation Economic Outcast can and cannot do. The sanctioned network spans procurement intermediaries, logistics firms, shadow banking facilitators and shipping companies. It targets the arteries of Iran's shadow trade — the front companies and logistics chains that allow Iran to sell oil and import restricted technology despite existing sanctions. What it does not target is the demand side. Iran sells oil because China buys it. China buys it because Iranian crude is cheap, available and outside the Western-controlled financial system. That equation does not change when American Treasury officials sanction a Hong Kong logistics firm or a Singapore shipping company. Iran develops new intermediaries. The cycle, described by Ali Akbar Dareini, a researcher at Tehran's Centre for Strategic Studies, is specific: 'Iran has a PhD in circumventing sanctions.' He told Al Jazeera that Iran has been running this curriculum since 1979. Abbas Araghchi, Iran's foreign minister, placed the latest round in its historical sequence. 'This is a repetitive scenario, from the crippling sanctions imposed during the Obama administration to the maximum-pressure campaign during Trump's first administration and now the latest sanctions,' he said. 'All of these measures have been introduced under different titles, but they represent the same kind of bullying that we have always seen in American policy. In other words, it is the same movie they keep playing over and over again. We know this movie, so we know how to confront and deal with it.' According to updated IMF projections, Iran's economy is expected to contract by nearly 5.5 per cent in 2026\. Iran's currency hit a record low against the dollar on August 23\. Fuel prices are surging, a pattern that preceded the 2019 protests and the 2026 uprising. The economic pressure is real and it is producing civilian suffering. What it has not produced, across six months of war and sanctions, is the strategic outcome the administration announced: the surrender of Iran's nuclear programme, the dismantlement of its proxy network, the IRGC stripped of power. It has produced, instead, an IRGC with more control of the military than it had in February, a hardliner as head of Iran's supreme security council and an Iranian government that has characterised economic pressure as proof of battlefield defeat. [Former UN Special Rapporteur Alfred-Maurice de Zayas](https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/8/25/china-says-will-safeguard-its-own-interests-as-us-expands-iran-sanctions?ref=diplopolis.com) described the direction of travel: 'This will boomerang because more and more countries feel offended by US arrogance and resent the threats. They draw rational conclusions: decouple from the dollar.' Iran's foreign ministry characterised the strategy itself as legally incoherent: 'Economic coercion designed to force a sovereign State to alter its lawful policy choices constitutes an outright internationally wrongful act.' Sardar Mohebi of the IRGC said the US resorting to economic pressure was 'proof of its defeat on the battlefield.' ## The Gap Bessent Named The strategy's core difficulty is not operational. It is structural. American economic coercion works when the countries being asked to comply depend on access to the American financial system for their economic functioning. The sanctions architecture of the 2010s worked against Iran because Western banks, dollar clearing and the SWIFT network were the infrastructure Iran needed and could not replace. That infrastructure is no longer the only game in the global economy. China has spent two decades building alternatives to dollar dependency — in settlement systems, in currency swap arrangements, in bilateral trade mechanisms that operate outside SWIFT. The renminbi's share of global trade settlements has increased materially since 2022\. Russia's 2022 exclusion from SWIFT accelerated the development of non-Western alternatives. Iran has been adapting to dollar exclusion since 1979 and has developed the circumvention infrastructure that Dareini describes as a PhD programme. Bessent's question — 'Why would I want to blow up the global financial system?' — is honest and revealing. He is acknowledging that the leverage required to actually isolate Iran financially would damage the infrastructure that makes American financial power meaningful. The threat to sanction a major Chinese financial institution exists as a threat because using it risks consequences the US is not prepared to absorb. China knows this. Iran knows this. The cure period is the gap between promising the greatest economic isolation in history and declining to use the tool that would make it possible. [Just Security confirmed on August 21](https://www.justsecurity.org/154807/early-edition-august-21-2026/?ref=diplopolis.com) that Vance had said the war entered 'a new phase of economic pressure' with the aim of achieving 'the final objective.' The final objective has not changed: Iran's nuclear surrender and the end of the IRGC's regional influence. The new phase involves sanctioning companies in Singapore and Greece while specifically declining to sanction the financial institution through which Iran's oil revenue actually flows. The greatest coordinated economic isolation in the history of the world has a specific opening. China is standing in it. This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### 'One Day a Decision Must Be Made' URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/one-day-decision-must-be-made-pezeshkian-iran-war-supreme-leader/ Last updated: 2026-08-28T22:02:52.000Z Iran's president said it publicly on Sunday. At two appearances in Tehran on August 23, Masoud Pezeshkian defended the Versailles MOU — the memorandum that his Supreme Leader has publicly associated with American violations and that the new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has described through his spokespeople as no longer relevant. ['One day, a decision must be made to save the country from the state of neither war nor peace,'](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/23/irans-president-signals-openness-to-renewed-diplomacy-with-us?ref=diplopolis.com) Pezeshkian said, in remarks reported by state news agency IRNA. 'By implementing this memorandum, we can resolve the problems with logic and dignity.' All those directly involved in the negotiations, he added, believed it was the best way forward. Mojtaba Khamenei's position is different. His position is revenge. The kill list published by Hamshahri. The vow that those named will not die peacefully in their beds. The shift to a fully offensive military posture announced when the MOU expired on August 17\. Iran's foreign ministry has said the 60-day discussion is basically no longer relevant. Iran's Revolutionary Guard has said the Strait is under Iranian control and management. And Iran's president, standing in Tehran, is publicly defending the agreement that his own Supreme Leader's government has declared dead. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told CNBC that Washington was preparing 'the greatest coordinated economic isolation in the history of the world.' JD Vance described the war as entering a 'new phase' of economic pressure rather than military escalation. Washington is moving toward sanctions. Tehran's president is moving toward diplomacy. Tehran's Supreme Leader is moving toward revenge. The three vectors do not point in the same direction. [The Democracy Now August 21 headline](https://www.democracynow.org/2026/8/21/iran%5Fwar%5Fheadlines?ref=diplopolis.com) captured the American framing: 'You Are Either With Us or Against Us.' Bessent's warning is specifically aimed at countries continuing to do business with Iran — China, India, Turkey among them. China's foreign ministry responded that American sanctions and pressure 'will not help resolve the issue.' The countries being told to choose sides are making the same calculation Iran's president is implicitly making: that the war cannot continue forever, that a decision must eventually be made and that the question is only who makes it and when. Pezeshkian has made his position clear. He is not the most powerful man in the Iranian system — that is Mojtaba Khamenei, whose position on the MOU is the opposite of his president's. But the president's public statements are not incidental. In the Islamic Republic, no senior official publicly disagrees with the Supreme Leader's position without consequence. Pezeshkian's remarks at two public appearances in Tehran on Sunday are the most specific public indication yet of a divergence within Iran's leadership about whether the war should continue. The divergence matters because it is the mechanism through which negotiations have historically become possible. The 2015 JCPOA was negotiated when reformist elements within Iran's system found sufficient space to conclude that a deal was preferable to continued pressure. The 2026 MOU was negotiated under broadly similar conditions. The MOU collapsed. The conditions are different now: the new Supreme Leader has publicly vowed revenge and the military has declared an offensive posture. But Iran's president is publicly saying 'one day a decision must be made' — which is a specific kind of signal from a specific kind of official at a specific kind of moment. The decision has not been made. The offensive posture is the official position. The president's words are on the record. The sanctions campaign is being assembled. The war is in its 178th day. ### He Watched His Child Born on FaceTime. He Has Never Met Her. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/uss-abraham-lincoln-272-days-facetime-iran-war/ Last updated: 2026-08-28T22:01:40.000Z The USS Abraham Lincoln left San Diego on November 21, 2025\. It was supposed to return after a standard six-month rotation. Instead it was redirected to the Middle East when the war with Iran began on February 28\. By August 20, it had been at sea for 272 consecutive days — [one of the longest continuous carrier deployments in modern US history](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/uss-lincoln-heads-home-extended-deployment-middle-east-rcna593639?ref=diplopolis.com). One sailor, speaking to CNN, described his year simply: he had not stepped off the ship at all in 2026\. Another had watched the birth of his first child on FaceTime. He had never met her. The Navy announced on August 20 that the Lincoln was finally heading home. The USS George Washington arrived in the region the same day to take its place. Admiral Brad Cooper, the CENTCOM commander, flew out to the Lincoln in the Arabian Sea and told the crew they were going home. He published an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal to make it official. After 272 days at sea — including 200 without a port call — the ship turned for San Diego. The Lincoln's deployment produced a record. It also produced something else: the most documented account of what a prolonged naval deployment in a war of indefinite duration does to the people conducting it. Families had been raising alarms for months. Lawmakers from California, whose district includes the Lincoln's homeport, held hearings. Sailors described faulty plumbing, rationed meals of poor quality, shortages of basic supplies and the accumulated psychological weight of 200 days without stepping on land. One father in San Diego said his son, Devynn, had told him: 'The captain just announced that we're going home.' Devynn Sickinger had received the news through his father's forwarded news alert. [Stars and Stripes and Navy Times](https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/15/politics/sailors-air-craft-carriers-longer-deployments-uss-abraham-lincoln?ref=diplopolis.com) reported in August that conditions aboard the Lincoln had deteriorated significantly, with multiple sailors experiencing mental health crises. One confirmed incident saw a sailor go overboard wearing a life vest and was rescued within an hour. The Navy described it as a mental health episode. These are not the statistics of a sustainable operational tempo. They are the statistics of a war whose human cost has been accumulating on a ship in the Arabian Sea. The Lincoln launched more than 10,000 combat sorties during its deployment. It flew them through Operation Epic Fury beginning February 28, through the naval blockade of Iranian ports, through the collapse of the Versailles MOU, through the second July pause and through the subsequent resumed bombing campaign. The ship was present for every significant escalation of the war from its launch through August. Its crew lived every day of 2026 on a steel deck in the Arabian Sea. DiploPolis published 'Dangerously Low' in August, reporting that the US had depleted nearly 80 per cent of its THAAD interceptors and more than half its Patriots. The Lincoln's departure is partly a function of the same arithmetic. JD Vance described the war as entering a 'new phase' of economic pressure precisely as the military phase's human cost was becoming impossible to manage publicly. The Lincoln's rotation is the military's acknowledgment that 272 days was the limit. The war that was supposed to last two to three weeks — Trump said this on April 1, 172 days before the Lincoln turned for home — has sent one aircraft carrier home after one of the longest continuous deployments in modern naval history. The USS Theodore Roosevelt has now been dispatched to relieve the George Washington when its rotation ends. The rotation that Hegseth called indefinitely sustainable is rotating. The cost of sustaining it is on a ship sailing toward San Diego, in the form of a sailor who watched his daughter's birth on a phone screen and has not yet held her. She is the age of the war. ### Commonwealth Scholarship 2027: The Most Honestly Designed UK Award — and How to Win It URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/commonwealth-scholarship-2027-application-guide/ Last updated: 2026-08-21T20:00:50.000Z This five-part Dossier series has covered four major UK postgraduate scholarships alongside a study guide: Chevening, Rhodes, Gates Cambridge and now Commonwealth. All four scholarships share one surface feature — they claim to fund exceptional talent regardless of financial means. Three of them effectively require applicants to already have the educational and professional infrastructure that financial means provides. One of them says something different. The Commonwealth Scholarship is the only major UK postgraduate award that names, in its own eligibility criteria, the structural barrier it is designed to remove. It is for students who [could not otherwise afford to study in the UK](https://www.scholars4dev.com/4900/commonwealth-scholarships-for-developing-commonwealth-countries/?ref=diplopolis.com). That is not a marketing phrase. It is a precise eligibility condition, and it disqualifies applicants who cannot demonstrate that the UK would otherwise be financially out of reach. No other scholarship on this list will tell you that plainly. Applications for the 2027/28 cycle [open on Tuesday 8 September 2026.](https://cscuk.fcdo.gov.uk/scholarships/commonwealth-masters-scholarships/?ref=diplopolis.com) The CSC deadline is 16:00 BST on 20 October 2026\. These are not the deadlines you need to worry about. The deadline you need to worry about is your national nominating agency's internal deadline — which is often weeks before the CSC date, and which most applicants discover too late. ## What the Commonwealth Scholarship Actually Is The Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan has been running since [1959](https://guides.scholarshipunion.com/commonwealth/?ref=diplopolis.com) — making it one of the oldest continuously operating international scholarship programmes in the world. It is funded by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and administered by the [Commonwealth Scholarship Commission](https://cscuk.fcdo.gov.uk/?ref=diplopolis.com) in London. Since its founding, more than 31,000 people have taken up a Commonwealth Scholarship or Fellowship. Alumni include prime ministers, cabinet ministers, Nobel Prize winners, senior UN officials and leaders across NGOs, academia and public institutions across the Commonwealth. The programme runs four distinct award types relevant to postgraduate applicants. The Commonwealth Master's Scholarship funds a fully-funded one-year taught Masters at any UK university. The Commonwealth PhD Scholarship funds full doctoral study for up to four years. The Commonwealth Shared Scholarship funds a one-year Masters at a participating UK university through a joint agreement between the CSC and the host institution. The Commonwealth Split-site Scholarship funds 12 months of doctoral research at a UK university for PhD students currently enrolled at a home country institution. This guide focuses on the Master's and PhD tracks, which are the most widely available and most directly relevant to the DiploPolis readership. The distinctions between them matter: the Master's scholarship is administered through national nominating agencies in each eligible country; the Shared Scholarship involves direct application through participating UK universities; the PhD scholarship follows the same national agency route as the Master's but with a longer process and a thesis proposal requirement. A reader applying to the wrong type through the wrong route will have their application rejected regardless of its quality. ## The Nominating Agency: The Gatekeeper Nobody Explains Clearly Every guide to the Commonwealth Scholarship spends most of its space on the application criteria. Almost none of them spends enough space on the structural feature that determines whether those criteria are ever assessed by the CSC: the national nominating agency. [The CSC does not accept direct applications for Master's or PhD scholarships.](https://www.scholars4dev.com/4900/commonwealth-scholarships-for-developing-commonwealth-countries/?ref=diplopolis.com) Every application must be submitted through a national nominating body in your home country. These are typically Ministries of Education, University Grants Commissions or equivalent government bodies. Each country's agency is responsible for its own selection process, its own eligibility criteria and its own internal deadline. The CSC's October 20 deadline is the date by which nominated candidates must have completed their CSC Electronic Application System submission. Before you can submit to the CSC, your national agency must have selected and approved you. This means the Commonwealth Scholarship is effectively two consecutive applications. First, you must compete within your own country's selection process and secure a nomination from your national agency. Second, nominated candidates submit their full application to the CSC. Applicants who apply only to the CSC without going through their national agency — and there are many each cycle — receive no consideration regardless of how strong their application is. The internal deadlines of national agencies vary significantly and are not published on the CSC website. [Indian applicants must apply through both the CSC Central system and the SAKSHAT portal](https://impactgrad.com/commonwealth-scholarship-2027-28-india-strategic-guide/?ref=diplopolis.com) — the Ministry of Education's national system — with separate deadlines for each. Missing either portal disqualifies the application entirely. India receives approximately 39 nominations per cycle from more than 4,500 SAKSHAT submissions. Kenyan applicants apply through the Kenya Universities and Colleges Central Placement Service or the Ministry of Education directly. Nigerian applicants apply through the National Universities Commission. Pakistani applicants go through the Higher Education Commission. Ghanaian applicants apply through the Scholarships Secretariat. The first task for every applicant — before writing a single word of the CSC application — is to identify their national nominating agency and its internal deadline. Contact the agency directly if the deadline is not published online. Apply to the national selection process before you apply to the CSC. ## The Six Development Themes: What They Are and Why They Determine Your Application Every element of the Commonwealth Scholarship selection is organised around six development themes. An application that does not connect clearly and specifically to at least one of these themes is de-prioritised in the selection process. Understanding what they mean in practice is the foundation of a competitive application. The six themes are: science and technology for development; strengthening health systems and capacity; [promoting global prosperity](https://cscuk.fcdo.gov.uk/our-development-impact/?ref=diplopolis.com); strengthening global peace, security and governance; strengthening resilience and response to crises; and access, inclusion and opportunity — each defined in relation to the UN Sustainable Development Goals that the CSC expects scholars to identify and commit to at the application stage. The themes are broad enough to accommodate most substantive postgraduate programmes. International relations falls most naturally across two of them: strengthening global peace, security and governance covers diplomacy, conflict prevention, arms control, multilateral institutions and foreign policy; strengthening resilience and response to crises covers climate adaptation, humanitarian policy, disaster risk reduction and post-conflict reconstruction. An applicant whose Masters is in IR or international affairs should be able to make a genuine connection to at least one theme without distorting their research agenda. What the themes require is specificity in the development impact statement. Selecting a theme and asserting that your degree is related to it is not a competitive application. What the CSC selection panel is looking for — at both the national agency and the CSC level — is a candidate who can name the specific development problem in their home country they are addressing, the specific qualification they need to address it, and the specific mechanism by which they will apply that qualification on return. A Kenyan applicant working in public health governance who can connect an MPhil in Health Policy at a UK university to a specific gap in Kenya's health regulatory capacity, name the institution or ministry they intend to return to, and quantify what that return will produce — that is the level of specificity the development impact statement requires. ## Eligibility: Who Can and Cannot Apply The eligibility criteria for the Master's scholarship are simpler and broader than most applicants expect. You must be a citizen of or have been granted refugee status by an [eligible Commonwealth country](https://cscuk.fcdo.gov.uk/scholarships/commonwealth-masters-scholarships/?ref=diplopolis.com) and be permanently resident there. The eligible country list covers most of sub-Saharan Africa, South and Southeast Asia, the Pacific and the Caribbean, with countries classified as low and middle-income by the OECD Development Assistance Committee. Citizens of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom are not eligible — the scholarship is designed for the developing Commonwealth, not its high-income members. You must hold a first degree of at least [upper second-class honours standard](https://www.globaladmissions.com/scholarship/commonwealth-scholarship?ref=diplopolis.com), which is a 2:1 or equivalent. A lower second-class degree combined with a relevant postgraduate qualification is accepted. There is no work experience minimum — unlike Chevening's 2,800 hours, the Commonwealth Scholarship has no professional experience floor, which makes it genuinely accessible to recent graduates. You must not have studied in a high-income country for more than 12 months at any point. This clause specifically targets the scholarship at students who have not already had access to high-income country education. A student who has previously studied in the UK for more than a year is ineligible. A student who has spent a year or less — an exchange semester, a short course — retains eligibility. You must be available to begin your UK studies in September or October 2027\. The scholarship cannot be deferred. [MBA programmes are explicitly excluded](https://impactgrad.com/commonwealth-scholarship-2027-28-india-strategic-guide/?ref=diplopolis.com) from eligibility. The CSC does not fund MBA study regardless of how the development impact is framed. ## What the Scholarship Funds The Commonwealth Master's Scholarship is fully funded through an agreement between the CSC and the host UK university, meaning scholars are not liable for any part of the tuition fee. The monthly living [stipend is £1,452 per month for most UK locations](https://cscuk.fcdo.gov.uk/pre-award-faqs-shared-scholars/?ref=diplopolis.com) and £1,781 per month for universities in the London metropolitan area — a higher rate that acknowledges London's cost of living without requiring scholars to avoid the city. The scholarship covers economy return airfare from the home country, a thesis grant for research scholars, a study travel grant for academic visits or fieldwork, and a warm clothing allowance. The stipend rates are comparable to Chevening and more generous than most national government scholarships. The package is designed to cover the full cost of a year of study in the UK without requiring supplementary income. Whether it achieves that in practice depends on the cost of the city, the university and the lifestyle — but unlike the Shared Scholarship, which has a funding cap of £18,000, the full Commonwealth Master's Scholarship carries no such ceiling. The scholarship does not fund dependants' travel, and it does not cover the cost of language preparation courses or pre-sessional English programmes before the main award period begins. Scholars who require pre-sessional language support should account for this separately. ## How Commonwealth Differs From the Other Scholarships in This Series Placing Commonwealth alongside the other scholarships in this series makes its distinctive character clearer. Chevening selects for leadership and influence — candidates who have a track record of leading others and a precise plan for how a UK qualification advances a defined career goal. Commonwealth does not require demonstrated leadership or a professional leadership record. It requires a development rationale. The two criteria often overlap in practice, but a recent graduate with a strong academic record and a genuinely compelling development impact plan is competitive for Commonwealth in ways they are not yet competitive for Chevening. Rhodes selects for character and long-term public significance — who you are, not what you will do with your degree. Commonwealth selects for development impact — what will change in your home country because of this award. These are different selection logics and they attract different kinds of applications. Gates Cambridge selects on intellectual excellence combined with commitment to improving lives, and funds study at Cambridge specifically. Commonwealth funds any eligible UK university, including Cambridge. A Gates Cambridge rejection does not prevent a Commonwealth application to Cambridge — and the two applications are compatible because the Commonwealth route goes through the national nominating agency rather than through the Cambridge admissions process directly. The Commonwealth Scholarship has no age limit and no work experience minimum. Unlike Chevening, however, the CSC Master's award does enforce a mandatory two-year return obligation to the scholar's home country after graduation — a commitment that scholars make formally as part of the award acceptance. The development impact statement describes exactly how that return will be put to use. Chevening's return commitment and Commonwealth's are structurally similar, though Commonwealth applies it across a different selection context. These two conditions, combined with the absence of a professional experience floor, make Commonwealth the most accessible major UK award for recent graduates from the developing Commonwealth — provided they can demonstrate a clear development rationale and meet the return commitment. ## The Timeline for 2027/28 Entry **Applications open:** Tuesday 8 September 2026 **National nominating agency deadline:** Varies by country — contact your agency immediately. This is almost always before the CSC deadline and is the critical date for your preparation. **India (SAKSHAT) deadline:** Check SAKSHAT portal from early September — internal SAKSHAT deadline typically precedes the CSC October deadline by two to three weeks. **CSC Electronic Application System deadline:** 16:00 BST on Tuesday 20 October 2026 **Selection and results:** Successful candidates notified from March to June 2027 **Studies begin:** September or October 2027 The most important preparation that can happen right now — before September 8 — is identifying your national nominating agency and its specific internal deadline. The application to the CSC takes time to complete well; the national selection process takes additional time before that. A reader who begins preparing on September 8 when applications open is already behind a reader who has identified their agency, understood its criteria and begun gathering supporting documents in August. ## The Verdict The Commonwealth Scholarship is not the most prestigious award in this series. It is the most equitably designed. Chevening funds 1,800 scholars with professional records and a clear vision for national influence. Rhodes funds 100 scholars of exceptional character with long-term public leadership potential. Gates Cambridge funds 80 scholars of outstanding intellectual ability with a documented commitment to improving lives. Commonwealth funds 700 to 800 scholars from developing countries who have the academic merit and the development intention to use a UK qualification to contribute to their home country — and who could not get there without the funding. That design is worth naming clearly. The scholarship acknowledges a reality that the others do not: that the cost of UK postgraduate education is not merely an inconvenience but a structural barrier that excludes qualified candidates from precisely the countries whose development most needs the investment. A student from Kenya, Bangladesh, Ghana or Pakistan who has the academic record, the development rationale and the national agency nomination is not a consolation prize for a student who could not get Chevening. They are the student this scholarship was designed for. If that is you — apply. The window opens in two weeks. 🚧 **Applications for the Commonwealth Master's Scholarship 2027/28 open on 8 September 2026 and close at the CSC on 20 October 2026\. Your national nominating agency's internal deadline is almost certainly earlier — contact them immediately. Eligibility, award values and nomination routes change each cycle. Verify all details on the* [official Commonwealth Scholarship Commission website](https://cscuk.fcdo.gov.uk/?ref=diplopolis.com) *before applying. If you spot an error or an outdated detail in this piece, write to* [editor@diplopolis.com](mailto:editor@diplopolis.com) *and we will correct it promptly.* 💡 **This piece completes the Dossier's five-part scholarship series:* [Chevening on 25 July](https://www.diplopolis.com/chevening-scholarship-2027-application-guide-how-to-win/)**,* [Rhodes on 1 August](https://www.diplopolis.com/rhodes-scholarship-2027-application-guide-selection-committee/)**,* [UK IR programmes on 8 August](https://www.diplopolis.com/best-ir-programmes-uk-guide-2027-intake/)**,* [Gates Cambridge on 15 August](https://www.diplopolis.com/gates-cambridge-scholarship-2027-guide-selection-panel/) *and Commonwealth today.* This Dossier article is free to read. Future Dossier pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### 19 Months. Then an Investigation. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/19-months-then-an-investigation-hind-rajab-paramedics-icc-dismantled/ Last updated: 2026-08-21T09:49:07.000Z In February 2024, Israeli forces killed five-year-old Hind Rajab in Gaza. She was trapped in a vehicle with her slain relatives, pleading for help by phone to the Palestinian Red Crescent Society. Her final pleas were recorded and heard around the world. In [March 2025](https://www.npr.org/2026/08/20/nx-s1-5939310/israeli-military-criminal-probes?ref=diplopolis.com), Israeli forces fired on an ambulance driving to retrieve casualties in Rafah. They then fired on other emergency vehicles that came looking for the first. They killed 15 medics and emergency responders from the Red Crescent and Gaza's Civil Defense. Then they bulldozed the vehicles and bodies into a mass grave. It took UN and rescue workers a week to reach the site and dig them out. On Wednesday, 19 months after Hind was killed and 17 months after the paramedics were buried, Israel's military announced its first criminal investigations into troop conduct in Gaza, covering both incidents. The military said it had completed reviews of 150 incidents and made decisions on five cases. Criminal investigations were opened on two of the five. The other three — including the killing of aid workers from World Central Kitchen and Doctors Without Borders — were reviewed and closed without criminal referrals. Chef José Andrés, who founded World Central Kitchen, called the decision not to investigate his colleagues' deaths 'wrong and painful.' The military did not elaborate on why those cases were closed. The announcement's timing is specific in ways that are not difficult to read. In July 2024, United Nations independent experts wrote to the Israeli government demanding accountability for Hind's killing, saying the absence of investigation was deeply troubling and that the systematic nature of attacks on civilians may in itself amount to a violation of the right to life. That letter was written 13 months ago. No investigation was opened in response to it. On August 4, 2026, Trump confirmed on camera that the US campaign to dismantle the International Criminal Court was specifically intended to defend Netanyahu and other Israeli officials from prosecution. On August 19, 2026, Israel's military announced criminal investigations into two of the highest-profile killings in Gaza. Both events occurred in the same fortnight. The ICC — which has jurisdiction over exactly the conduct being investigated — is being demolished. The military investigation has been opened. This is not coincidence. It is structural. DiploPolis wrote in August about the relationship between documented evidence and demolished courts: the bomb on a home in Qeshm was confirmed by the New York Times while the ICC was being dismantled by the US. The same relationship applies here. The killing of Hind Rajab was documented in real time — her voice, her phone calls, the satellite imagery of the site, the movements of the Israeli vehicles. The killing of the paramedics was documented by the sole survivor, by phone footage, by the physical evidence of the bulldozed mass grave. The ICC has jurisdiction over wilful killing of protected persons, intentional attacks on medical personnel and the use of prohibited methods of warfare. It is the precise court for precisely this evidence. It is being taken apart. What the military investigation replaces is not the ICC. It replaces the ICC's credibility as a threat. A military that investigates itself has answered the accountability question in institutional terms: we are looking into it. The investigation does not produce an independent prosecutor, a warrant or a defendant. It produces a process controlled by the institution whose troops committed the acts being investigated. The Israeli military initially said it opened fire because the vehicles were 'advancing suspiciously.' The same military is now investigating whether its own explanation was true. The institution that produced the conduct is examining whether the conduct was appropriate. The court that would apply an external standard to that question is being dismantled on the other side of the world by the government providing the legal cover. Hind Rajab's grandmother was photographed on August 19 in Gaza City, holding a photograph of her five-year-old granddaughter. The photograph was taken the same day the investigation was announced. She did not speak on camera. The investigation is internal. The court is being demolished. The photograph is what remains. ### The Door the War Opened URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/door-war-opened-saudi-arabia-nuclear-iran-mou/ Last updated: 2026-08-21T09:39:38.000Z In March 2018, CBS News asked Mohammed bin Salman whether Saudi Arabia would develop nuclear weapons if Iran did. The Crown Prince answered without hesitation: 'Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.' In September 2023, Fox News pressed him again. 'If they get one, we have to get one,' he said. Saudi Arabia's foreign minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan stated at the World Policy Conference in December 2022: 'If Iran gets an operational nuclear weapon, all bets are off.' These are not private assessments or diplomatic rumour. They are public, repeated commitments by the head of government and the foreign minister of the most significant Arab state in the world, made across five years and three separate media appearances, consistently and without equivocation. The condition they specify — Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon — has not yet been met. What has changed since the Iran war began on February 28, 2026 is the proximity of that condition. The Islamabad Memorandum expired on August 17 without producing a nuclear deal. Iran's enrichment programme is intact. [Iran's hardline leadership spent the MOU's 60 days restructuring its military and accelerating missile production.](https://www.justsecurity.org/154305/early-edition-august-17-2026/?ref=diplopolis.com) The IRGC commander who is now Iran's top security official has publicly stated Iran will shift from defensive to offensive posture. The war that was launched to end Iran's nuclear threat has not ended it. The question the Saudi commitment now demands is: how close is close enough? ## What Saudi Arabia Has Been Building Saudi Arabia's nuclear ambitions extend beyond the public statements of its leadership. The kingdom is pursuing a civilian nuclear programme of substantial scale — it has announced plans for 16 nuclear reactors and has been negotiating the terms of American nuclear technology transfer for years. The specific terms of that negotiation are the part of the story that has received insufficient analytical attention. Saudi Arabia's energy minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman stated at a mining conference that Riyadh wants 'the entire nuclear fuel cycle, which involves the production of yellowcake, low-enriched uranium, and the manufacturing of nuclear fuel both for our national use and of course for export.' The phrase 'entire nuclear fuel cycle' is the critical one. The centrifuges that enrich uranium to the low levels required for nuclear reactor fuel can enrich it to the high levels required for a nuclear weapon. The reprocessing plants that handle spent fuel rods can separate out the plutonium those rods contain. Both pathways to a nuclear weapon — uranium and plutonium — flow from the 'entire nuclear fuel cycle' that Saudi Arabia has said it wants. On [July 22, 2026, US Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Minister of Energy Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman signed a 30-year civilian nuclear cooperation agreement](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/23/what-are-the-security-implications-of-the-us-saudi-nuclear-deal?ref=diplopolis.com). The agreement is in Congress for review. US officials said it could allow Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium domestically — the specific capability that the United States has historically refused to grant to non-nuclear states in the region as a condition of nuclear cooperation. Trump contradicted his own officials the following day, posting on Truth Social that 'there will be no enrichment of material' — an assertion that the deal's documented terms do not clearly support and that US officials privately contradicted. The UAE, which operates four nuclear reactors at the Barakah plant, agreed in its own 2009 nuclear cooperation agreement with the US to forgo enrichment and reprocessing. Saudi Arabia has refused to make the same commitment. The July 2026 civilian nuclear deal between Trump and Saudi Arabia is therefore not a routine technology transfer. It is a potential transfer of enrichment capability to a country whose leader has publicly said it will build a nuclear weapon if Iran does, whose nuclear ambitions include the entire fuel cycle, and whose closest regional rival's nuclear programme has just survived six months of American bombing without being dismantled. ## The Cascade the MOU's Failure Risks Saudi Arabia is not the only regional government recalculating. Dov Zakheim, writing for the Foundation for Defence of Democracies on August 17, warned that if the Iran deal collapses, Saudi Arabia developing a bomb could trigger Egypt to follow — and that if Egypt followed, the UAE might revoke its existing nuclear cooperation agreement with Washington and pursue its own capability. The cascade is not guaranteed. It is the direction of travel if the Iran nuclear question remains unresolved while enrichment capability spreads across the region. Egypt has expressed interest in nuclear energy and has moved toward Russian nuclear cooperation for years. It is not a nuclear threshold state in the way Saudi Arabia is approaching. But Egypt is the Arab world's most populous country and its traditional military power. If Saudi Arabia's nuclear ambitions produce a weapon, Egypt's calculation changes. The same calculation that MBS has publicly articulated — we cannot allow a rival to acquire what we do not have — applies to Egypt's relationship with Saudi Arabia as much as to Saudi Arabia's relationship with Iran. The UAE's position is the most specific near-term risk. The Barakah nuclear plant is operational. The UAE agreed in its 123 Agreement with Washington to forgo enrichment and reprocessing — the so-called 'gold standard' for nuclear cooperation that the Trump administration notably did not require of Saudi Arabia in its July 2026 deal. If Saudi Arabia is allowed to enrich uranium under an American civilian nuclear agreement while the UAE is not, the UAE faces a specific strategic asymmetry within its own neighbourhood. The pressure to revise the Emirati commitment grows in direct proportion to the gap between what Riyadh is permitted and what Abu Dhabi agreed to forgo. The non-proliferation architecture that exists to prevent exactly this cascade depends on two things: a credible commitment by the United States to enforce the distinction between civilian and weapons-grade nuclear capability, and a resolution of the Iranian nuclear question that does not leave Iran retaining enrichment capacity while demanding that Sunni Arab states forgo the same. [The Iran war was supposed to produce the second of these conditions.](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/23/what-are-the-security-implications-of-the-us-saudi-nuclear-deal?ref=diplopolis.com) It has not. The July 2026 civilian deal with Saudi Arabia has complicated the first. ## What the War Was Supposed to Close The United States launched Operation Epic Fury on February 28, 2026, with four stated objectives. The fourth was to guarantee that Iran could never obtain a nuclear weapon. Six months later, Iran's nuclear programme is under negotiation rather than dismantlement. The 60-day nuclear talks the Islamabad Memorandum created expired without an agreement on enrichment. Iran retains its stockpile of highly enriched uranium in underground facilities the IAEA cannot access. The hardliners who spent the MOU period preparing for a larger conflict now head Iran's supreme security council. MBS's commitment was conditional: Saudi Arabia does not want a nuclear bomb, but will build one if Iran does. That condition has not been triggered. Iran has not built a bomb. The war's stated objective was to ensure it never could. That objective has not been achieved. The condition and the objective are therefore both in suspension, in a specific and uncomfortable relationship: the war's failure to achieve its objective is the factor most likely to eventually trigger the condition. The nuclear order that the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty constructed depends on a distinction between states permitted to hold nuclear weapons — the five permanent Security Council members — and states not permitted to do so. That distinction survived the Cold War, various near-misses and decades of proliferation pressure because the states closest to the threshold believed that American guarantees and American deterrence made acquisition unnecessary. Pakistan and India stepped outside the framework in 1998, accepting the consequences. Israel has operated outside it implicitly for decades. North Korea stepped outside it explicitly. What has not happened is a cascade of Arab states simultaneously concluding that the framework no longer provides the protection it promises. [What MBS said in 2018 and 2023](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/mbs-saudis-pursue-nuclear-weapons-iran-180315152433732.html?ref=diplopolis.com) was not a diplomatic signal. It was a strategic statement, made publicly and consistently, about the conditions under which Saudi Arabia would seek the weapons the NPT says it cannot have. Those conditions have moved materially closer in six months than they had in the preceding eight years. The Iran war did not close the nuclear door it promised to close. The door it may have opened leads to Riyadh. ## The Argument That Cannot Be Made Quietly The specific danger the MOU's collapse creates is not that Iran will build a bomb tomorrow. Iran's enrichment programme and its underground facilities represent a latent capacity, not an imminent weapon. The danger is that the war's failure to resolve the nuclear question, combined with the enrichment rights potentially granted to Saudi Arabia under the July 2026 civilian deal, has created the conditions for the most strategically destabilising development in the region since Israel's undeclared nuclear programme: an openly declared Saudi intent to match Iranian capability, expressed by the head of government in multiple public forums, now backed by a civilian nuclear infrastructure whose own government has refused to rule out the weapons pathway. The war was sold as the solution to the Middle East nuclear problem. Six months in, with the MOU collapsed and Iran's hardliners in control of its security architecture, the problem has not been solved. What has been created instead is the specific regional configuration in which a nuclear-armed Iran — or an Iran that credibly appears to be approaching nuclear capability — triggers a Saudi response that its own leadership has publicly committed to and whose infrastructure the United States is now helping to build. This is not an argument against civilian nuclear power or against US-Saudi cooperation. It is an argument about sequencing, conditions and the specific strategic consequence of launching a war to close a door and then signing a deal that opens another one. The Iran war's most consequential legacy may not be what it did to Iran. It may be what it has started in the region around it. This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Kim Condemned the Exercises. He Didn't Thank Trump. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/kim-condemned-exercises-didnt-thank-trump-north-korea-south-korea/ Last updated: 2026-08-21T09:31:26.000Z North Korean state media [condemned United States and South Korean military exercises on Wednesday](https://www.npr.org/2026/08/18/g-s1-139096/s-korea-stresses-us-alliance-amid-confusion-over-trump-drill-cut?ref=diplopolis.com) as the 'most immediate and open threat' to Pyongyang's security. The condemnation was standard in its language — the same formulation North Korea uses each August when Ulchi Freedom Shield begins. What was not standard was what the statement did not say. It did not mention that Trump had substantially reduced the exercises four days earlier. It did not acknowledge the gesture. It offered no reciprocal language. Kim Jong Un's government received a security concession from the president of the United States and responded by condemning what remained of the concession. On August 16, Trump directed Pete Hegseth to substantially reduce the joint exercises, citing his good relationship with Kim and his view that the drills send a signal that is 'totally inappropriate and hostile' toward North Korea. He described Kim as 'unthreatening and respectful.' He said he had recently called South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and asked if Seoul would help in the Iran war. Lee said no. Trump punished South Korea by reducing the exercises designed to protect it from Kim. He expected Kim to notice. Kim noticed. His government's response — that the exercises remain the most immediate and open threat to North Korean security — treats the reduced exercises as indistinguishable from the full-scale ones. The signal Trump was trying to send by cutting the exercise's scope was not received by the audience for whom it was intended. North Korea has conducted two ballistic missile launches since August 6, even as Trump described Kim as unthreatening. South Korea must now operate a reduced deterrence rehearsal while facing the same North Korean military posture that preceded the reduction. Trump was asked directly at the White House on Monday whether Kim had personally requested that the exercises be scaled back. The exchange ended with Trump telling a CNN reporter to be quiet and calling her 'fake news' when she pressed for an answer. He did not confirm that Kim asked. He did not deny it. The question of whether the US president reduced the deterrence exercises of a treaty ally at the personal request of a nuclear-armed adversary has not been answered by the president. What is clear is the sequence: Trump valued his relationship with Kim sufficiently to describe him as unthreatening while North Korea builds new nuclear bomb fuel facilities, provides troops and missiles to Russia's war in Ukraine, and technically remains at war with South Korea. He valued that relationship sufficiently to punish an ally's refusal to join a war in Iran by reducing the exercises that protect the ally from its most immediate nuclear threat. And Kim's government, having received the reduced-exercise gesture, condemned the exercises as the most immediate threat anyway. The policy has a clear logic: Trump believes personal relationships between leaders override institutional frameworks, treaty obligations and military postures. If Kim is treated as 'unthreatening and respectful,' the exercises that deter him become unnecessary and provocative. The problem is that North Korea's military posture is not governed by Kim's personal relationship with Trump. It is governed by North Korea's strategic interests, which include maintaining the credibility of its nuclear deterrent. Reducing the exercises is, from Kim's perspective, a marginal concession that does not require reciprocation. He took it. He then condemned what remained. The gesture has been made. South Korea's deterrence rehearsal is smaller. North Korea's condemnation is unchanged. The relationship between Trump and Kim is, presumably, still very good. The security of 52 million South Koreans is somewhat reduced. The thank-you has not arrived and will not. ### A Map Drawn After the Explosion URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/routledge-handbook-ai-international-relations-review/ Last updated: 2026-08-21T07:52:28.000Z A handbook implies mastery. It implies that a field has accumulated enough knowledge, settled enough disputes and agreed enough on its methods that a group of scholars can usefully map the territory for those who come after. [The Routledge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence and International Relations](https://link.amazon/B0aaJjRQb?ref=diplopolis.com) arrives at a moment when none of those conditions fully apply. The field it is trying to map is still moving. The disputes are not settled. The methods are contested. The terrain keeps changing shape. That is not the editors' fault. It is the condition of the subject. Artificial intelligence and international relations is a field defined by the speed of its object, and a handbook that waits for stability will always be late. The question is whether a handbook produced under these conditions can be genuinely useful rather than merely comprehensive. The answer, in this case, is a qualified yes. Diego Brasioli — a career diplomat at Italy's Ministry of Foreign Affairs specialising in cybersecurity and AI — together with Laura Guercio, Giovanna Gnerre Landini and Andrea de Giorgio have assembled a genuinely broad volume covering war, diplomacy, governance, ethics, regulation, data, intelligence, autonomy and knowledge production. The breadth is not arbitrary. AI touches all of these domains simultaneously, and a handbook that tried to organise the field around a single argument would be dishonest about how scattered the conversation currently is. The scatter, in this sense, is honest. What it reveals is that AI and IR scholarship has not yet found a shared vocabulary strong enough to make its different strands argue with one another. The chapters map the field more than they disturb each other. That is the handbook's principal limitation, and it is worth dwelling on before praising its virtues. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/08/The-Routledge-Handbook-of-Artificial-Intelligence-and-International-Relations_BC.png)](https://link.amazon/B0aaJjRQb?ref=diplopolis.com) The editorial apparatus does the expected handbook work. It organises the material, provides an introduction and divides the field into sections. What it does not do, at least from the evidence available, is force the contributors into a sustained debate. The result is genuine intellectual diversity under insufficient editorial pressure. The distinction matters. Genuine diversity acknowledges that ethics scholars, security scholars, diplomacy scholars and data governance scholars are all working on different parts of the same problem. Insufficient editorial pressure means that these scholars are not required to test their frameworks against each other. A handbook is most valuable when it produces collision, not just coverage. This one produces more of the latter than the former. The review's organising question, and the most important question any AI and IR handbook must answer, is whether artificial intelligence is genuinely changing IR theory or whether IR scholars are mainly applying old categories to new machines. The honest answer, looking at the state of the field, is both; and the balance matters. Sovereignty still matters because states regulate, procure, surveil, censor and wage war using AI systems. Balance of power still matters because AI capability is radically unevenly distributed. Liberal institutionalism still matters because governance regimes, standards bodies and treaties are being actively contested. Constructivism still matters because AI reshapes identity, trust, legitimacy and threat perception in ways that material accounts cannot fully capture. But those categories are no longer sufficient. AI forces new questions about agency that the existing framework cannot absorb. A state may decide, but the decision is now mediated by a platform, a model, a dataset, a recommender system or an autonomous weapon whose logic the state may not fully understand. Power is not only territorial, military or institutional. It is infrastructural, computational and epistemic. The unit of analysis cannot remain only the state, the institution or the individual. It must also include the model, the platform, the cloud provider, the data pipeline, the chip supply chain and the standards body. The most interesting chapters in a handbook like this one will be those that make the old categories feel inadequate. The least interesting will be those that simply affix 'AI' to existing debates and call that transformation. Both kinds of chapter exist here. The Global South is where this limitation becomes most consequential. A handbook on AI and international relations that does not seriously reckon with who builds AI, who owns it, who controls the infrastructure, whose languages train the models, whose data is extracted and whose societies become governed populations is not a handbook on AI and international relations. It is a handbook on AI and the international relations of the powerful. This volume appears aware of the problem. It includes postcolonial and critical perspectives, and addresses China's strategies in Africa alongside questions of sustainable development. That awareness matters. It means the handbook is not entirely written from the control room of the powerful. But awareness is not reorientation. There is a difference between including the Global South as a chapter or a case study and building the handbook's architecture around the recognition that the Global South is where the inequality of the AI order becomes most visible. India, Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia are not merely adoption zones or markets for AI systems designed elsewhere. They are where dependency, aspiration, linguistic exclusion, data extraction, platform governance and state surveillance intersect at their most intense. Consider what linguistic exclusion means in practice: a model trained overwhelmingly on English-language data will classify, recommend, moderate and translate with assumptions baked into a fraction of the world's linguistic reality, then present its outputs as neutral inference to speakers of languages it barely knows. The countries least able to shape AI development will be most shaped by it. A handbook whose main story remains great powers, security, regulation and innovation, with Global South concerns appearing at the margins, describes AI and the international relations of the powerful while occasionally noticing everyone else. That observation is not unique to this handbook. It describes the field. And the field's failure to centre these questions is itself an argument for why IR theory needs genuine renovation, not renovation-flavoured extension of existing frameworks. There is a useful comparison to be made with an earlier edited volume on AI and international relations. Hudson's volume, produced at a moment when artificial intelligence in IR meant expert systems and computational modelling, reads today as a time capsule from before the explosion: a record of what the field believed AI would do before AI arrived as something unrecognisable. This handbook belongs to the moment after that explosion. Its virtue is that it knows the terrain has changed. It acknowledges generative AI, platform power, autonomous systems and the geopolitics of data infrastructure as genuine transformations rather than extensions of known problems. Its weakness is that it still sometimes reaches for the old compass. The categories of sovereignty, security dilemma, great power competition and international regime, adjusted for AI but not fundamentally renovated by it, still organise much of what appears here. [The Routledge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence and International Relations](https://link.amazon/B0aaJjRQb?ref=diplopolis.com) is a genuinely useful reference and a serious attempt to map a field that defies easy mapping. Read it as a record of where the conversation is, not where it needs to go. Read it for the chapters that make old frameworks feel inadequate, and approach the chapters that merely extend them with healthy scepticism. Then ask the question the handbook cannot quite answer: at what point does the accumulation of AI-adjusted IR arguments become a new theory, rather than the old theory with new examples? The renovation IR theory needs is not incremental. It is ontological. The field is not there yet. This handbook shows both how much progress has been made and how much ground remains. This Book Review is free to read. Future Book Reviews will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### 800,000 Barrels. The War's First Environmental Disaster. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/800000-barrels-war-environmental-disaster-caroline-bezengi-oman/ Last updated: 2026-08-21T07:38:01.000Z The Caroline Bezengi left Novorossiysk — the Russian Black Sea port Ukraine has been targeting since 2022 — carrying approximately 800,000 barrels of Russian crude oil. It travelled south, entering the waters off Yemen where the Houthis have been attacking ships since October 2023\. In early June, still off the Yemeni coast, the vessel suffered what an operator described as unexplained explosions. It limped toward Oman. On June 30, it [ran aground near Al-Qibliyyah Island](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/12/oil-spill-oman-caroline-bezengi-iran-war?ref=diplopolis.com) — a protected marine nature reserve home to Arabian Sea humpback whales and Socotra cormorants. The tanker has been leaking ever since. No party has claimed responsibility for the explosions. No responsible party has been officially identified. The vessel navigated from one war zone through another and ran aground in a third. Three conflicts contributed to its journey. None has answered for where it ended. The spill grew with the monsoon. It covered 45 square kilometres at the end of July. By August 2 it had reached 150\. By August 4 it had quadrupled to 600 square kilometres as storm conditions pushed the oil across the Arabian Sea. By August 12, satellite imagery showed it exceeding 2,000 square kilometres — roughly the size of Rhode Island — spreading across one of the world's most biodiverse maritime environments. By August 13, oil had reached the Omani mainland, [fouling 40 kilometres of the Ras Madrakah coastline.](https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/oman/caroline-bezengi-oil-spill-oman-coastline-2026?ref=diplopolis.com) The Omani government instructed residents to avoid fishing in affected areas and to report unusual odours. A British maritime security firm, Ambrey, was engaged to salvage the vessel. The International Maritime Organisation said seasonal monsoon conditions had limited access and delayed operations. Environmental specialists at Greenpeace described the spill as fragmented across multiple areas rather than one continuous mass — which makes containment significantly more difficult and the affected zone larger than single-point measurements suggest. This is not the only oil in the water. Two additional slicks appeared in Iranian waters — one near Qeshm Island reaching its mangrove forests and a second near Sirri Island further into the Gulf — both appearing linked to a strike on the Minoan Pioneer, a dry bulk ship hit by an unknown projectile in the Strait of Hormuz on August 3\. Iran has claimed trillion-dollar pollution damage. The question of which party caused which spill in which waters under which legal framework has not been answered, partly because no functioning international legal mechanism is currently examining the Strait of Hormuz's environmental status. Crude oil futures climbed above $90 a barrel after reports that Iran had seized a UAE-owned tanker. US petrol prices set a mid-August record with a national average of $4.06 a gallon. The war's energy costs — which DiploPolis has tracked since the WFP warned of six million people approaching food insecurity — are now denominated in gallons at American petrol stations as well as in food basket prices in Mogadishu and Colombo. The spill adds the cost of environmental destruction to both columns. Iran's own environmental officials confirmed that oil reached Qeshm Island's beaches and its Hara mangrove forests — one of the most ecologically significant habitats in the Gulf region. They said cleanup operations had largely cleared the Qeshm slick by mid-week. The Caroline Bezengi's spill has not been cleared. It is still growing. The war that began on February 28 has produced, among its other consequences, 800,000 barrels of Russian crude spreading across the Arabian Sea in a marine nature reserve. The tanker navigated three wars to reach this point. The war's first confirmed large-scale environmental disaster has no responsible party and no cleanup plan capable of addressing its current scale. ### The Clock That Ran in Tehran URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/clock-ran-in-tehran-islamabad-mou-expired-iran-war/ Last updated: 2026-08-21T07:29:18.000Z On June 17, 2026, Donald Trump signed the Islamabad Memorandum at Versailles. The ceremony was deliberate: the Palace of Versailles, where the post-war order was codified in 1919, was chosen as the location for a document the administration presented as the beginning of a new order for the Middle East. The MOU committed both sides to an 'immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts,' pledged 60 days of nuclear negotiations, and included provisions for the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Trump called it historic. The G7 applauded. [On August 17, the 60-day clock expired.](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/17/us-iran-memorandum-of-understanding-expires-how-and-why-it-fell-apart?ref=diplopolis.com) There is no nuclear deal. There is no durable Hormuz agreement. Lebanon remains under Israeli military occupation, as the MOU's first clause required but could not produce. Both Trump and Iranian leaders said in the days before the deadline that the deal had 'basically collapsed.' Iran called the 60-day period 'irrelevant.' Trump called for Iran's surrender. What happened in the 60 days between Versailles and the collapse is the story the ceremony obscured. The Wall Street Journal reported on August 17, [citing Iranian and Arab officials](https://www.justsecurity.org/154305/early-edition-august-17-2026/?ref=diplopolis.com), that Iran's hardline leadership had treated the MOU as a 'tactical pause' — and possibly as a US-Israeli ploy to ease pressure on the global economy and buy time for a larger strike. Whether or not that suspicion was accurate, Iran's use of the 60 days is documented. The pause the MOU created did not de-escalate the conflict symmetrically. It ran, strategically, in Tehran's favour. **What Iran Did With the Pause** The Wall Street Journal's reporting, confirmed by a Congressional Research Service report published August 7, is specific about how Iran used the 60-day window. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was given greater authority over the country's regular military. Military officers with experience in the Iran-Iraq War and previous domestic crackdowns were appointed to key positions. Internal counterintelligence operations were expanded. Missile and drone production was accelerated. Iran took measures to strengthen its control over the Strait of Hormuz, including maritime vessel operations. The IRGC also used the calm the MOU created to lay groundwork with allied militias in Iran, Yemen and Lebanon to step up attacks if needed, sending advisers and increasing coordination. [The appointment of Mohsen Rezaei](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/16/us-iran-mou-is-set-to-expire-what-to-know?ref=diplopolis.com) — former IRGC commander and consistent hardliner — as the new head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council is the clearest institutional signal of direction. Al Jazeera quoted analysts saying the appointment and other recent leadership changes 'show Iran believes it has the upper hand.' Iran's foreign minister Abbas Araghchi, speaking on August 15, provided the legal framing Tehran is using for its position. What was in the Islamabad MOU was 'the end of the war, not a ceasefire,' Araghchi said. Since the US violated the MOU and continued attacks, 'there was no 60-day ceasefire that needed to be extended.' In Tehran's reading, the MOU was already dead before the deadline, killed by Washington's own conduct. A separate Iranian diplomatic statement described the MOU as being in a 'coma' from which it could be revived only if Washington abandoned its 'habit of breaching commitments.' The US reading is different. Washington described mediation efforts involving Pakistan and Qatar as 'static.' Trump ruled out extending the ceasefire and called for Iran to 'put up the white flag of surrender.' He threatened to 'bomb the shit out of Oman' if it obstructed Hormuz reopening efforts. He posted a map on social media showing the Strait of Hormuz as US territory. Brigadier General Yadollah Javani, head of the IRGC political bureau, responded on Iranian state television that 'the enemy started the war and our efforts have been defensive, although they might take on an offensive aspect,' warning opponents to expect 'strategic surprises.' The gap between 'put up the white flag' and 'strategic surprises' is the current state of US-Iran diplomacy. **What the 60 Days Were Supposed to Produce** The Islamabad Memorandum committed both parties to 60 days of nuclear negotiations. The three specific disputes the MOU was designed to resolve were Iran's nuclear programme, the status of billions in frozen Iranian financial assets and the security status of the Strait of Hormuz. On August 17, all three remain unresolved. Iran's enriched uranium stockpile — approximately 440 kilograms of material enriched to 60 per cent — remains in Iran. The frozen assets have not been released. The Hormuz negotiation with Oman continues but has produced no durable agreement. DiploPolis identified the MOU's structural flaw in June: the document's first clause committed all parties to a Lebanon ceasefire, but Israel — whose military behaviour in Lebanon determines whether that ceasefire holds — did not sign it. That flaw did not disappear when the 60-day clock started. It compounded. Israeli operations in Lebanon continued throughout the MOU's lifespan, giving Iran both the legal justification and the political rationale to treat the document as void. The Lebanon trap was not resolved by the MOU. It was embedded in it. The nuclear talks that were supposed to fill the 60 days encountered an unbridgeable gap that existed before February 28\. Iran's president stated Iran would never back down from its right to enrich uranium. Trump stated Iran must surrender all enrichment. Those positions have not moved. A Congressional Research Service report published August 7 compared the current situation to the 1980s Tanker War, noting that the experience of that period 'may not be analogous in the context of US-Iran conflict in 2026.' The analogy does not hold because Iran in 2026 is not the Iran of 1988 — it has hardline leadership with a nuclear programme, a restructured IRGC and a strategic assessment that it has survived the most intensive American air campaign in decades without conceding its core positions. **The Pause and What It Was For** The Islamabad Memorandum's architects presented the 60-day clock as a countdown to a deal. The evidence of what Iran did during the countdown suggests it was experienced in Tehran as something different: an opportunity to consolidate strategic position before the next phase of a conflict whose trajectory Iran's hardline leadership believes is running in Iran's favour. That assessment may be wrong. Iran has suffered enormous damage — its infrastructure, its civilian economy, its military capacity, its international standing. The war has been catastrophic for Iranian citizens. But the hardliners making strategic decisions are not measuring the war by its civilian costs. They are measuring it by whether Iran's nuclear programme survived, whether the IRGC survived, whether the proxy network survived and whether Iran's control of the Strait of Hormuz produced leverage. On all four measures, the 60-day MOU period ended with Iran in a stronger position than when it began. Trump ended the MOU period by calling for surrender. Iran ended it by appointing a hardline IRGC commander to its top security body and promising strategic surprises. The clock that was supposed to be counting down to a nuclear deal has revealed itself to have been counting down to something else: the next phase of a conflict in which one side used the pause to prepare and the other used it to negotiate. The Islamabad Memorandum did not end the war. It gave Iran 60 days to get ready for it. This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### 60 Days. No Deal. The Window Closes. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/60-days-no-deal-window-closes-iran-mou-versailles/ Last updated: 2026-08-21T07:13:38.000Z On June 18, the United States and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding in Versailles. It opened a 60-day negotiating window — the structure through which a permanent nuclear deal, freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and a halt to proxy attacks would be negotiated. The window closed on August 17\. [The White House announced it would not seek an extension.](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/08/17/trump-south-north-korea-military-drills-iran-israel-hamas-deals/?ref=diplopolis.com) There is no deal. The 60 days produced the following. On July 7, the MOU collapsed when Iran attacked commercial ships and the US reimposed sanctions and struck 80 Iranian targets within 19 days of the signing. The US then resumed bombing for 11 consecutive nights. Trump declared he would keep permanent control of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran declared it would shift to a fully offensive military posture. The US depleted 80 per cent of its THAAD interceptors. Hegseth testified that the war had cost $37.5 billion. A Republican senator asked how they would explain why they went in and how they would get out. Nobody answered. On Monday, Trump called on Tehran to 'put up the white flag of surrender.' Iran's Foreign Ministry said Tehran would shift to a fully offensive military posture. Iran's spokesperson Esmail Baghaei said 'the 60-day discussion is basically no longer relevant' because the United States had committed gross violations of the MOU text just weeks after signing it. On the same day the window expired, Trump told Fox News he would 'bomb the shit out of' Oman if it impeded American operations in the Strait. The two governments are describing the same expired document in precisely opposite terms. The US says Iran failed to comply. Iran says the US never began negotiating. Both cannot be describing the same 60 days. They are not. The window was supposed to be the pathway that the Versailles MOU opened. DiploPolis called the signing ceremony the 'Fall of the G7' — the G7 reduced to bystanders while Washington and Tehran signed in Versailles without consulting anyone managing the war's energy and humanitarian consequences. The piece noted that the new deal had the same architecture as the JCPOA that Trump tore up in 2018: enrichment permitted at low levels, inspectors back, sanctions relief. It lasted 19 days before mutual violation. The war that was supposed to last two to three weeks — Trump said this on April 1, which is now 139 days ago — has produced three named ceasefire frameworks: the April pause, the Versailles MOU and the second July pause. None produced a permanent settlement. The 60-day window was the latest and most formally structured attempt. It expired without a nuclear agreement, without a Hormuz settlement and without a halt to proxy operations. The Houthis are still attacking ships in the Red Sea. Israel is conducting what the UN has called an alarming surge of attacks in Lebanon. The Strait remains effectively closed. Iran's new Supreme Leader has vowed revenge for his father's killing. Saudi Arabia has built a new regional alliance because the US security umbrella proved insufficient. The window is closed. The war is on its 171st day. Trump says surrender. Iran says offensive. The 60 days are gone. ### 'No Thanks.' The Exercises Were Cut. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/no-thanks-exercises-were-cut-south-korea-north-korea-iran-war/ Last updated: 2026-08-21T06:59:49.000Z On Sunday, Trump called South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and asked whether his country would help in the Iran war. Lee said no. Trump's account: 'Wait a minute. We have 39,000 soldiers over there, guarding you from Kim Jong Un, your next-door neighbour, and you're not going to help us on a very easy military operation in Iran. That's strange.' The actual US deployment is 28,500 — a figure [Trump inflated to 39,000](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-administration/trump-orders-military-substantially-reduce-joint-exercises-south-korea-rcna592832?ref=diplopolis.com) in his Truth Social post. The United States has 28,500 troops permanently stationed in South Korea to deter a nuclear-armed neighbour technically still at war with Seoul. On the same day, Trump directed Pete Hegseth to 'substantially reduce the Joint Military Exercises!' — [Ulchi Freedom Shield 2026](https://thediplomat.com/2026/08/trumps-exercise-cut-risks-turning-south-korea-us-alliance-readiness-into-a-bargaining-chip/?ref=diplopolis.com), the annual combined exercise designed to practise exactly the scenarios that 28,500 American troops are there to prevent. The exercises had already begun. Trump said it was too late to cancel, so he ordered reduction within the exercise itself: fewer participating US units, shorter tactical phases, lower sortie generation, fewer live-fire events, fewer combined activities. The deterrence value of a military exercise is proportional to the scenario it rehearses. Reducing the exercise reduces the rehearsal. Reducing the rehearsal reduces the signal. The stated reason Trump gave was twofold. First: South Korea declined to assist in the Iran war. Second: North Korea has been 'unthreatening and respectful' during his presidency and the exercises send a signal that is 'totally inappropriate and hostile' toward Pyongyang. Those two justifications are not merely in tension. They are in contradiction. North Korea is the reason the 28,500 American troops are in South Korea. The exercises are there to deter North Korea. Trump is reducing the exercises because South Korea wouldn't help in a war against a third country, while simultaneously describing the country those exercises are designed to deter as non-threatening. The logic of deterrence requires the other party to believe the exercises are real. The president of the country conducting them has said they are inappropriate and hostile. Kim Jong Un has not commented on the reduction. He has visited a new nuclear bomb fuel production facility. He has provided troops and missiles to Russia's war in Ukraine. He has ICBMs capable of reaching the continental United States. He called the US-Israel war on Iran proof that his country's decision to keep its nuclear weapons was correct — a judgment that is difficult to dispute. His state media published photographs of him watching a circus performance with his daughter on Monday. He and his daughter have been publicly and calmly present while the exercises designed to deter him were being cut. The pattern the Iran war has established in its six months is now visible in its complete form. Spain refused to allow US forces to use its bases and had the Rota naval base placed under a Pentagon review. South Korea declined to join the war and had its joint military exercises cut. Both countries are being punished for refusing a war they had no treaty obligation to join, by having their own security commitments reduced. [The Hill noted](https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/6033853-trump-south-korea-military-exercises-iran/?ref=diplopolis.com) what other analysts confirmed: the move is the latest example of Trump turning against an ally in favour of a leader that previous administrations considered an adversary. The exercises exist for a reason. The readiness they build is the readiness that makes deterrence credible. The credibility that makes deterrence credible is what the reduction diminishes. South Korea faces a nuclear-armed neighbour 50 kilometres from its capital. The exercises that practise deterring that neighbour are being cut because South Korea would not help in a war in the Persian Gulf. North Korea is watching. The circus photographs suggest Kim is not concerned. Trump called South Korea's refusal strange. It is no stranger than being asked to send forces to the Persian Gulf to fight Iran while depending on American forces to protect you from a nuclear-armed neighbour that has been building new bomb fuel facilities. Lee said no thanks. Trump reduced the deterrent. The 28,500 American troops remain. The exercises that make them useful are smaller. ### Gates Cambridge Scholarship 2027: What the Selection Panel Actually Wants URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/gates-cambridge-scholarship-2027-what-the-selection-panel-ac/ Last updated: 2026-08-14T20:00:28.000Z Three pieces. Three scholarships. Three entirely different theories of what a postgraduate award should do. Chevening, covered here on 25 July, selects for future influence — candidates who can articulate a precise plan for how a UK Masters will advance a specific career goal at home. Rhodes, covered on 1 August, selects for character — the person the committee believes will become significant over a 40-year public life. Gates Cambridge selects for something different from both: the intersection of outstanding intellectual ability and a genuine, evidenced commitment to improving the lives of others, applied to a specific Cambridge course for a specific intellectual reason. If the Rhodes asks who you are, Gates Cambridge asks what you will do with it. That distinction shapes every element of the application — and understanding it is more valuable than any amount of time spent polishing your academic credentials. [Applications for 2027-28 entry open in September 2026.](https://www.gatescambridge.org/programme/scholarships/apply/?ref=diplopolis.com) US citizens currently resident in the United States apply in October 2026\. All other eligible applicants — including every reader in India, Nigeria, Kenya, Pakistan, Ghana, Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa and every other non-UK country — apply in the International round, with a deadline in December 2026 or January 2027 depending on the Cambridge course chosen. The exact date for each course is listed in the [Cambridge postgraduate course directory](https://www.graduate.study.cam.ac.uk/courses?ref=diplopolis.com), which is the only source that should be trusted for individual programme deadlines. ## What Gates Cambridge Actually Is The Gates Cambridge Scholarship was [established in October 2000](https://www.gatescambridge.org/programme/scholarships/?ref=diplopolis.com) through a US$210 million endowment from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation to the University of Cambridge — one of the largest single donations ever made to a UK university. Since its founding, the programme has supported over 2,000 scholars from more than 100 countries. Approximately 80 scholarships are awarded each year, with roughly 25 going to the US round and 55 to the International round. Approximately two-thirds of all awards go to PhD students; Masters-level awards account for the remaining third. The value of the scholarship is comprehensive. It covers the full University Composition Fee — Cambridge's tuition — at whatever rate applies to the course; a maintenance allowance of [£22,050 for 12 months](https://www.gatescambridge.org/programme/scholarships/what-does-the-scholarship-cover/?ref=diplopolis.com), pro-rated for shorter courses and available for up to four years for PhD scholars; one economy airfare at the beginning and end of the course; inbound visa costs and the Immigration Health Surcharge; academic development funding of up to £2,000; and family allowances of up to £12,184 per year for one child or £17,375 for two or more. The package is one of the most complete in international scholarship funding — it is designed so that a scholar's financial position is not a barrier to any aspect of the Cambridge experience. Any non-UK citizen applying for a full-time postgraduate degree at Cambridge is eligible. There is no formal age limit, no minimum GPA specified in the eligibility criteria, and no work experience requirement. A pilot scheme introduced in October 2024 now allows applications for part-time doctoral degrees. The scholarship cannot be used to fund the remainder of an ongoing course. ## The Hidden Gatekeeper Nobody Tells You About Every guide to Gates Cambridge focuses on the four selection criteria. Almost none of them explains the structural feature that determines whether those criteria are ever assessed: the departmental nomination. [Gates Cambridge is embedded within the Cambridge graduate admissions process.](https://www.gatescambridge.org/programme/scholarships/apply/?ref=diplopolis.com) You do not apply to Gates Cambridge separately. You apply to Cambridge through the standard graduate application portal, and within that portal you tick a funding box that marks you as a Gates Cambridge applicant. Without ticking that box, the Gates committee never sees your application. Many applicants — including some who are admitted to Cambridge — have failed to tick it and received no Gates consideration at all. The departmental nomination is the first filter. Your academic department at Cambridge must review your application and consider you among the strongest candidates they have seen before they pass your file to the Gates committee. Only nominees reach the Gates selection stage. If the department does not nominate you, the Gates committee never evaluates your personal statement, your references or your leadership record. This means Gates Cambridge is effectively two consecutive applications: first, you must convince your chosen Cambridge department that your academic profile is exceptional; second, and only then, you must convince the Gates committee that you meet all four criteria. The practical implication is specific. Securing the departmental nomination requires the same things that Cambridge admission requires: an outstanding academic record, strong references, and — for PhD applicants — a research proposal that demonstrates genuine engagement with a question the department is equipped to supervise. PhD applicants should contact potential supervisors in the department before submitting their application. A department that has been approached by a candidate whose research aligns with a faculty member's current work is more likely to nominate that candidate than one arriving without prior contact. This is not a guarantee, but it changes the odds. Rejection from Gates does not affect Cambridge admission. Many applicants receive a Cambridge offer without a Gates scholarship and enrol, funding themselves through the Cambridge Trust, departmental awards, national scholarship programmes or personal means. The Gates application is a component of the Cambridge application, not a prerequisite for it. ## The Four Criteria: What the Panel Actually Assesses The Gates Cambridge selection panel evaluates every application against four criteria. Understanding what each criterion means in practice — rather than as a phrase on the programme website — is the work the application preparation requires. **Outstanding intellectual ability** is the first criterion and the gatekeeper within the Gates stage. This is assessed through your academic record, your references and, for PhD applicants, your research proposal. The standard is Cambridge-level: the Gates committee is looking for academic work that would be outstanding in the environment of one of the world's most research-intensive universities. A strong undergraduate record from a well-regarded institution satisfies the floor. What distinguishes competitive applications at this stage is evidence of intellectual engagement that goes beyond the requirements of the degree: independent research, published or publishable writing, a research proposal that identifies an original question rather than rehearsing existing literature. **Reasons for course choice** is the criterion most consistently answered poorly by strong candidates. 'Cambridge is a world-leading institution' does not answer this criterion. Neither does 'I want to develop my expertise in international relations.' The panel is asking a specific question: why this course, at Cambridge specifically, pursued by you at this point in your intellectual trajectory? A competitive answer names a specific supervisor whose research intersects with a question the applicant has already been pursuing. It names a Cambridge research group, laboratory or institutional resource that exists nowhere else. It demonstrates that the applicant has researched Cambridge's specific contribution to the field and can articulate why that contribution matters for the work they intend to do. A generic application that could have been addressed to Oxford, LSE or Edinburgh has already failed this criterion. **Commitment to improving the lives of others** is the criterion most distinctive to Gates Cambridge and the one that most clearly separates it from Chevening and Rhodes. The panel is not looking for volunteers. It is looking for candidates who have already demonstrated, through specific and documented action, that their intellectual work is oriented toward a real problem affecting real people. 'Improving lives' is interpreted broadly — the domain can be research, policy, education, technology, healthcare or any other field. What the panel cannot accept is a general statement of good intentions. The specific example matters: what did you do, how many people did it affect, what changed as a result of your work rather than of your good will? A candidate who built a system, changed a policy, led an intervention or produced research that has been used by practitioners is providing evidence. A candidate who volunteered with several organisations is providing a résumé entry. **Capacity for leadership** is assessed through initiatives driven and outcomes produced, not through titles held or organisations joined. The Gates committee is looking for evidence that the candidate can bring people along toward a goal — that when they decided something needed to happen, they made it happen rather than waiting for an institution to give them permission. Gates Cambridge requires a single personal statement of up to 500 words — approximately 3,000 characters — addressing all four criteria together. This is not four separate short essays; it is one integrated statement in which the four dimensions of your application must be made coherent with each other. 500 words is less space than it appears. Every word must carry weight. Write the evidence first, then cut everything that is not evidence. The scholars who have gone through this process describe it as one of the hardest writing challenges in any postgraduate application: years of experience compressed into a single, tightly integrated argument for why you, at this moment, pursuing this specific work at Cambridge, with this commitment to improving others' lives. ## The Interview [Shortlisted candidates are invited to a 25 to 30 minute interview](https://www.gatescambridge.org/programme/scholarships/selection/?ref=diplopolis.com) conducted virtually, typically in January for US round applicants and February to March for International round applicants. Panels are divided into four disciplinary categories — Arts, Biological Sciences, Physical Sciences and Social Sciences — and include senior academics, practitioners and Gates Cambridge alumni. The interview follows a structured format across four sections: an introduction by the chairperson; discussion of the candidate's understanding of the Gates Cambridge mission, motivation for applying and awareness of the scholarship's responsibilities; evaluation of academic work, rationale for course selection and alignment with long-term impact goals; and a closing section where candidates can add what they want the panel to know or ask questions. Every element of the interview is drawn from the application. The panel has read the personal statement, the references and the research proposal. The questions are designed to probe whether the person in the interview matches the person in the documents — whether the commitment to improving others' lives is genuine or performed, whether the intellectual curiosity is sustained or prepared specifically for this moment, whether the course choice follows naturally from the intellectual trajectory described in the application or has been constructed to satisfy a criterion. Virtual interviews — all Gates Cambridge interviews for the International round are conducted online — remove the informal social component that distinguishes some other scholarship processes. The Rhodes interview includes a social event the day before or on the interview day. Gates Cambridge does not. Every impression is made within the 25 to 30 minutes. ## What Distinguishes Gates Cambridge From Chevening and Rhodes The trilogy of scholarship pieces this Dossier has published over three Saturdays covers three genuinely different propositions. Placing them side by side makes each one clearer. Chevening requires a minimum of 2,800 hours of professional work experience and a return-home commitment of two years after the award. Gates Cambridge has no work experience requirement and no return-home commitment. A graduating student with no professional experience but an outstanding academic record and a genuinely compelling research agenda can apply for Gates Cambridge in ways they cannot apply for Chevening. A scholar who wants to remain in Cambridge for further study after completing the funded degree is free to do so. Chevening funds any eligible UK university. Gates Cambridge funds Cambridge only. If the specific supervisor, research group or Cambridge resource you need does not exist at Cambridge, Chevening is the right scholarship. Gates Cambridge requires that Cambridge itself — not UK universities generally — is the answer to what your intellectual work requires. Rhodes funds Oxford only, for two or more years, and selects on the basis of character and the qualities most likely to produce a significant public life over decades. Gates Cambridge funds Cambridge for one year (Masters) or up to four years (PhD) and selects on the basis of intellectual excellence combined with demonstrated social commitment. A Rhodes scholar is selected for who they are. A Gates Cambridge scholar is selected for what they will do with their intellectual capacity. PhD applicants represent approximately two-thirds of the Gates Cambridge cohort. This proportion reflects the scholarship's founding orientation: it was created to build a global network of future leaders whose work contributes to improving human welfare, and research degrees — the credentials that produce the academics, scientists, policy researchers and institutional thinkers who advance knowledge over careers rather than years — serve that mission more directly than taught Masters degrees alone. ## What Global South Applicants Specifically Need to Know The 'improving the lives of others' criterion is where applicants from the Global South carry a genuine advantage that most guides do not name explicitly. The problems that Gates Cambridge's mission is designed to address — public health crises, educational inequality, climate vulnerability, governance failures, development challenges — are not evenly distributed across the world. They are concentrated precisely in the countries where this readership lives and works. A candidate from India who has researched the impact of groundwater depletion on agricultural communities, or from Nigeria who has built an educational intervention in a low-resource school system, or from Bangladesh whose work addresses climate adaptation in coastal communities, is not merely providing a good example. They are providing evidence of engagement with a problem that Gates Cambridge was founded to address. That evidence cannot be provided by a candidate whose life has been spent entirely in high-resource institutions in the Global North, regardless of how distinguished their academic record is. The Gates Cambridge application asks for specific evidence of specific impact. The candidate from the Global South who has worked in the systems they intend to improve — not as an observer, not as a tourist, but as a participant who understands the constraints and has contributed to the outcomes — brings something to this criterion that the programme needs. The Cambridge fit requirement means specific research is non-negotiable before writing a single word of the application. Identify the faculty member at Cambridge whose current research intersects most directly with your intellectual agenda. Read their recent publications. Understand how your proposed work relates to their existing projects. Where possible, contact them before submitting the application — a potential supervisor who knows your name and has read your research proposal when the department makes its nomination decision is an asset of a kind that no personal statement can create after the fact. ## The Timeline for 2027 Entry **Applications open:** September 2026 — exact date to be confirmed by the Gates Cambridge Trust **US round deadline:** October 2026 — exact date to be confirmed; approximately 16 October based on the 2026 cycle **International round deadline:** December 2026 or January 2027 — depends on specific Cambridge course; check the [Cambridge postgraduate course directory](https://www.graduate.study.cam.ac.uk/courses?ref=diplopolis.com) for the exact deadline for your programme **Interviews:** January 2027 (US round); February to March 2027 (International round) — conducted virtually **Results:** Late March to April 2027 **Studies begin:** October 2027 There is no application fee charged by Gates Cambridge itself. Cambridge's standard postgraduate [application fee](https://www.postgraduate.study.cam.ac.uk/apply/how/application-fee?ref=diplopolis.com) is £85 for Masters applications and £20 for doctoral applications (covering up to seven doctoral course applications). Fee waivers are granted automatically — without any action required — to nationals of eligible low-income countries who have lived there since birth. Applicants from countries not on Cambridge's waiver list cannot request individual hardship waivers; the waiver system is country-based, not means-tested on an individual basis. Check the [Cambridge application fee waiver page](https://www.postgraduate.study.cam.ac.uk/apply/how/application-fee-waiver?ref=diplopolis.com) to confirm whether your country is on the automatic waiver list before submitting. The most important preparation for the International round deadline happens now, before applications open: identify the Cambridge programme, identify the potential supervisor (for PhD), and research the Cambridge-specific reasons for your course choice. A candidate who begins writing their application in September without having done this research will produce a generic application that fails the course-fit criterion regardless of how strong everything else is. 💡 **This piece completes the Dossier's four-part scholarship series: Chevening on 25 July, Rhodes on 1 August, UK IR programmes on 8 August and Gates Cambridge today.* 🚧 **Application dates, award values and eligibility criteria change each cycle. Verify all details on the* [official Gates Cambridge Trust website](https://www.gatescambridge.org/?ref=diplopolis.com) *before submitting. If you spot an error or an outdated detail in this piece, write to* [editor@diplopolis.com](mailto:editor@diplopolis.com) *and we will correct it promptly.* This Dossier piece is free to read. Future Dossier pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### The Alliance the War Built URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/alliance-the-war-built-mecca-joint-defence-agreement-saudi-arabia-pakistan-turkey/ Last updated: 2026-08-14T14:10:20.000Z On August 7, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif [signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/7/turkiye-saudi-arabi-pakistan-sign-joint-defence-agreement-whats-in-it?ref=diplopolis.com). The text is explicit: any armed attack against any one of the three states shall be regarded as an attack against all. Named for the city in which it was signed, the pact brings together the world's largest oil exporter, NATO's second-largest army and the only nuclear arsenal held by a Muslim-majority country. None of those three was supposed to need a new alliance. The war on Iran was supposed to have eliminated the threat that made one necessary. Saudi Arabia has hosted US military forces since 1990\. The post-Gulf War arrangement was built on a specific premise: American forces protect Gulf oil infrastructure from Iranian threats in exchange for basing rights and oil market stability. For 35 years that arrangement was the foundation of American Middle East policy. On February 28, 2026, the United States launched a war on Iran. Iran responded by striking Saudi oil facilities, its Red Sea shipping routes and its supply chains. The arrangement produced a war that left Saudi Arabia more exposed to Iranian attack than at any point since the arrangement began. The [Gulf states have confronted the limits of US deterrence](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/why-saudi-arabia-pakistan-and-turkey-just-signed-a-defense-pact/?ref=diplopolis.com), as the Atlantic Council confirmed this week. Mecca is what confronting those limits produces. The pact's combined weight is specific. Nearly 1.4 million active military personnel. 3,400 aircraft. 6,000 tanks. More than 340 naval assets. Saudi Arabia contributes capital, geography, infrastructure and political convening power. Turkey contributes its defence-industrial base — drones, missiles, sensors, electronic warfare systems and NATO-derived military expertise. Pakistan contributes manpower with genuine combat experience and, as the [MEPEI analysis notes](https://mepei.com/the-mecca-joint-defense-agreement-and-the-limits-of-gulf-strategic-autonomy/?ref=diplopolis.com), 'unstated but unmistakable,' a nuclear arsenal. Pakistan has not explicitly extended nuclear cover to the other signatories — Islamabad has historically reserved its nuclear capability for Pakistan's own security — but the arsenal's presence within the pact's collective defence structure changes the strategic calculus regardless. The Mecca pact is the first collective defence agreement of the 21st century to include the only nuclear power in the Muslim world. The pact did not emerge from nothing. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan [formalised a bilateral collective defence commitment in September 2025](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mecca%5FJoint%5FDefence%5FAgreement?ref=diplopolis.com). Pakistan had already deployed thousands of troops, fighter aircraft, drones and an air-defence system to Saudi Arabia by mid-2026\. Turkey had been selling Saudi Arabia drones since 2023\. The Mecca pact merged two converging bilateral relationships — which is precisely why it is likely to be more durable than agreements negotiated cold. The operational cooperation precedes the treaty. The treaty formalises what was already happening on the ground. Turkey's position within the pact deserves specific attention. Turkey is a NATO member. NATO's Article 5 commits all members to collective defence if any ally is attacked. Turkey has now committed, under Mecca, to collective defence if Saudi Arabia or Pakistan is attacked. Those obligations do not formally conflict — Article 5 covers NATO members, not Saudi Arabia or Pakistan. [Pakistan's Foreign Minister confirmed](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/pakistan-says-new-defense-pact-with-saudi-arabia-and-turkey-is-purely-defensive-and-open-to-others?ref=diplopolis.com) that the pact 'does not abrogate or replace any existing bilateral or multilateral agreements.' But the practical implication is precise: if Iran attacks Saudi Arabia, Turkey is bound by treaty to respond. If Turkey responds to a Saudi attack, a NATO member is militarily engaged with Iran. NATO's Article 5 does not trigger. The other 31 NATO members are not obligated. But a NATO country is in the conflict, without NATO having been formally invoked. Turkey called the Iran war illegal and refused its bases for American strikes. It has now signed a pact that could bring it directly into the conflict through a different legal mechanism. Egypt was supposed to sign. The original negotiations were quadrilateral. By August, Cairo had dropped out. Washington reportedly signalled its discomfort with Cairo's participation — a signal that produced the absence. Egypt has the Arab world's largest military and a longstanding bilateral security relationship with Washington. Its absence from the final text is the most revealing blank in an agreement otherwise notable for what it contains. A pact without Egypt is smaller. It is also a pact whose quadrilateral ambition was trimmed by the same American patron whose security guarantees were found insufficient. Nobody at any of the three signing tables has confirmed this publicly. The war on Iran was supposed to end the Iranian threat to Gulf stability. It has produced a new Gulf alliance because three countries concluded that existing arrangements were insufficient. Saudi Arabia did not leave the American security umbrella. It built an additional one, in the holy city, with a nuclear power. The question that follows — what happens if the two conflict — has not been asked at any press conference. It is the most important question the Mecca pact raises. ### The State That Could URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/lebanon-abolishes-death-penalty-first-middle-east-analysis/ Last updated: 2026-08-14T13:57:06.000Z On August 11, Lebanon's parliament voted to abolish the death penalty. A majority of the 128-member assembly supported the legislation, introduced by lawmaker Abdul Rahman Bizri and amended in session. All existing death sentences — 85 people at the end of 2025, according to the Lebanese Ministry of Justice's Directorate of Prisons — were replaced with life imprisonment with aggravated hard labour. [Justice Minister Adel Nassar walked out of parliament and told reporters](https://www.upi.com/Top%5FNews/World-News/2026/08/12/lebanon-abolish-death-penality/7381786514418/?ref=diplopolis.com): 'I just came to tell the Lebanese people that the death penalty was lifted and this is a historic day for Lebanon. Lebanon is regaining its leading role in the region and worldwide.' The law must be transmitted to President Aoun for signature and published in the Official Gazette before entering into force — a step that is expected but not yet completed. [Lebanon is the first country in the Middle East to formally end capital punishment](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/11/lebanons-parliament-votes-to-end-death-penalty-first-in-middle-east-to-so?ref=diplopolis.com). It had maintained a de facto moratorium on executions since January 2004 — twenty-two years of choosing not to kill — but courts had continued sentencing people to death throughout those decades, producing a death row of 85 people who knew they had been condemned to die without any expectation of when or whether the sentence would be carried out. [Amnesty International's Regional Director Heba Morayef](https://www.amnestyusa.org/press-releases/lebanon-abolition-of-death-penalty-a-landmark-victory-affirming-justice-must-be-rooted-in-human-rights/?ref=diplopolis.com) described the vote as transforming 'a precarious hiatus in executions into lasting legal protection upholding the right to life.' On August 11, those 85 people woke up under sentence of death and went to sleep serving life sentences. The parliament had made a decision about human dignity and state power that no other Middle Eastern government has made. The same parliament cannot enforce Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon's south. The same state cannot prosecute anyone for the Beirut port explosion. The same government cannot fund the rebuilding of the villages that Israeli forces demolished during the occupation. Those things are true, and they are not a reason to diminish what the parliament did on August 11\. They are the context in which what the parliament did should be understood: a state operating at the edge of its institutional capacity made the most ambitious moral statement a government can make about the value of human life. ## What Lebanon's Parliament Can and Cannot Do The list of what Lebanon's government cannot do is long and documented. It cannot enforce the ceasefire provisions that require Israeli withdrawal from the south, because Israel refuses to withdraw and neither the Lebanese army nor the international monitoring force has the means to compel it. It cannot prosecute those responsible for the August 4, 2020 port explosion, because the investigation — completed by Judge Tarek Bitar in March 2026 and referred to the public prosecutor — is still awaiting the prosecutor's response six months later. It cannot fund hospital salaries or civil servant pay at levels that prevent medical professionals from emigrating, because the Lebanese pound's collapse and the state's debt structure have not been resolved despite years of IMF negotiations. It cannot rebuild southern Lebanese villages that Israeli forces systematically demolished — by bombing heavy machinery, destroying prefabricated housing units and targeting workers clearing rubble — because reconstruction requires both funding and Israeli withdrawal, and neither is available. Hezbollah's parliamentary bloc voted against the abolition, arguing that eliminating the death penalty alongside an amnesty law could reduce sentences for bombings and crimes against the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Free Patriotic Movement and independent MP Jihad Samad also voted against it. Their argument was not theological — Lebanon is a multi-confessional state in which no single religious authority governs criminal law — but political: the concern that abolition, combined with the broader amnesty legislation passed on August 12, would reduce accountability for serious political violence. The concern is not unreasonable in the Lebanese context. The port explosion killed 220 people. Nobody has been convicted. The political class that blocked the investigation for five years exists inside the same system that just voted to abolish the death penalty. The moral ambition and the institutional failure are not in different Lebanese institutions. They are in the same parliament, expressed by different blocs, in consecutive legislative sessions. ## The First in the Region The significance of Lebanon being the first Middle Eastern country to abolish the death penalty requires the regional context to land properly. Saudi Arabia carried out 172 executions in 2022 and has continued executions since at comparable rates. Iraq executes prisoners by hanging, frequently in large groups, for crimes including drug offences. Yemen's conflict has produced both state and non-state executions with no functioning accountability mechanism. Egypt executes prisoners regularly, including those convicted after proceedings that international observers have described as falling short of fair trial standards. Iran executes more people per capita than almost any country in the world. Against that regional backdrop, Lebanon's parliament did something specific and unprecedented: it decided that the state should not kill its citizens as a form of punishment, that the existing framework — in which courts sentenced people to die and the government then chose not to carry out the sentence for two decades, leaving those people in a state of suspended condemnation — was an institutional contradiction that needed resolution. The resolution it chose was not to resume executions. It was to eliminate the category. [The National noted](https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/08/12/which-arab-countries-still-have-the-death-penalty/?ref=diplopolis.com) that Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen, Egypt and Somalia continue to carry out executions, while Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia have not done so in over a decade. Djibouti, a member of the Arab League but located in the Horn of Africa, had previously abolished capital punishment. Lebanon is the first country in the region that most defines the Arab world — the Levant, the cradle of the civilisational and political arguments about governance, dignity and statehood that have animated the Middle East for a century — to make this decision. ## What Nassar Said and What It Means Justice Minister Adel Nassar's statement outside parliament — 'Lebanon is regaining its leading role in the region and worldwide' — is the kind of declaration that risks sounding like the inflation of a parliamentary vote into a civilisational claim. It deserves to be taken seriously rather than dismissed. Lebanon's historical claim to regional leadership was cultural, intellectual and institutional. Beirut was the Arab world's publishing capital, its university city, its place of relative press freedom and legal pluralism. The civil war that ran from 1975 to 1990 damaged all of that. The Taif Agreement that ended the war preserved the confessional system that had produced the war. The thirty years since have involved successive institutional failures — the port explosion, the currency collapse, the migration of the educated professional class, the Israeli occupations — that have progressively narrowed what the Lebanese state can do and what Lebanon's claim to regional significance means. Nassar's statement is a claim about reclaiming something. On human rights, specifically, Lebanon has historically tracked with international norms more closely than its neighbours. The abolition of the death penalty is a specific step toward an international human rights standard that the region's more powerful states actively resist. It is a statement that Lebanon, despite everything, retains the capacity to make decisions based on principle rather than purely on power. The irony is precise and worth naming: the state that cannot enforce its own sovereignty in its own south, that cannot prosecute the deaths of 220 of its own citizens in its own port, has just decided that the state should not have the power to take a human life as punishment. The specific things Lebanon's state cannot do involve failures of enforcement, of resources and of political will against entrenched interests. The thing it just did required a parliamentary majority, a principled argument and the willingness to move against a regional consensus. Those are different categories of capacity. ## What the Vote Tells Us About the New Government The vote reflects something real about the political character of the Nawaf Salam government that took office in early 2025\. Salam came to office explicitly promising institutional reform, accountability and alignment with international human rights norms — a departure from the transactional, clientelist politics that had governed Lebanon since Taif. The death penalty abolition is the most visible expression of that commitment in the legislative record so far. [The amnesty law passed on August 12](https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5305720-lebanon-abolishes-death-penalty-landmark-parliament-vote?ref=diplopolis.com), the day after the death penalty vote, releasing categories of prisoners and reducing overcrowding in Lebanese prisons, is part of the same legislative programme: a government attempting to bring Lebanon's criminal justice institutions into alignment with international standards it had previously only nominally observed. Both votes represent the Salam government using the parliamentary majority it holds to make decisions that the previous political order was unwilling to make. The limitation of this programme is visible too. The Beirut port explosion investigation remains with the public prosecutor. The south remains under Israeli occupation. The reconstruction bill remains unpaid. The institutional ambitions of the Salam government have not yet produced accountability for the most consequential institutional failure of the Lebanese state in modern history. The abolition of the death penalty is a genuine achievement and a genuine signal of direction. It is not a resolution of Lebanon's deeper institutional crisis. Nassar was right to call it a historic day. He would have been more precisely right to call it a necessary but insufficient one. Lebanon's parliament has demonstrated, on August 11, that it can make a decision about human dignity that no other Middle Eastern parliament has made. What it has not yet demonstrated is that it can make the decisions — on accountability, on reconstruction, on sovereignty — that would make Lebanon's historic day mean something to the people it cannot yet protect. This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### 'I Think We Will Keep It' URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/i-think-we-will-keep-it-trump-hormuz-declaration-freedom-navigation/ Last updated: 2026-08-14T13:56:16.000Z On Tuesday evening, Trump told reporters on the tarmac at Andrews: 'We have total control over the Hormuz Strait right now. They don't have control. We have total control. We own it.' On Wednesday, he [posted on Truth Social](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/12/as-strait-of-hormuz-transit-drops-trump-again-says-us-has-control?ref=diplopolis.com): 'The U.S.A. has total control over the Strait of Hormuz. I THINK WE WILL KEEP IT!' The war was launched on February 28 to restore freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. The war is now on its 166th day. The president of the United States has declared he intends to keep control of the world's most important energy shipping channel. Permanently. In capital letters. The specific reversal is worth tracing. In June, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said in the Middle East that no country was allowed to charge tolls or fees on an international waterway — that was existing international law. DiploPolis wrote about that in July when Trump announced a 20 per cent toll on cargo passing through the Strait, using Rubio's own words to describe what his president was doing. The toll was dropped when Gulf kings offered investment instead. That was July 16\. Now it is August 13\. The toll is gone. The claim of permanent control is in its place. The Strait has passed through four regimes in five months: Iranian sovereign assertion, Iranian toll, American toll, American control. Freedom of navigation — the principle that launched the war — has not been restored. It has been replaced. On Tuesday — the same day Trump told reporters the US owns the Strait — the [US Navy fired missiles at a civilian cargo ship](https://libertarianinstitute.org/news/trump-says-i-think-we-will-keep-strait-of-hormuz/?ref=diplopolis.com) attempting to transit the waterway in violation of the American blockade. Not an Iranian warship. Not an IRGC vessel. A civilian commercial cargo ship navigating what has been an international shipping channel for centuries. The country that went to war to protect freedom of navigation has fired on a civilian ship to prevent it from exercising freedom of navigation. Kpler data shows Tuesday's vessel count fell to eight ships — below the 10-day average of 12, the lowest since August 5\. The principle is consistent. It is consistently being violated by the country that declared it. Iran's newly appointed national security chief Mohsen Rezaei responded to Trump's declaration by hardening his country's conditions. The Strait would not be fully reopened, he said, unless Washington unfreezes Iranian assets, ends its naval blockade and ends Israel's wars in both Lebanon and Gaza. Those demands now go beyond the memorandum of understanding signed in June — which said nothing about Gaza. Iran has expanded its conditions in direct response to Trump expanding his claim. Both parties are asserting permanent positions over the same waterway. The Strait of Hormuz has, in effect, become the subject of a territorial dispute between two countries, one of which was at war with it six months ago over the right of other countries to use it freely. The broader picture on Wednesday is similarly precise. Hamas publicly committed to Trump's 15-point Gaza plan — the same plan Netanyahu publicly rejected on Sunday. The party designated as the peace obstacle has accepted the peace plan. The party whose security was the stated justification for the Iran war has rejected it. Trump described his negotiations with Iran as 'only semi-negotiating' — 'we are just watching Iran with its huge inflation and the fact they have no money.' The peace plan has no side willing to implement it from Israel. The Iran negotiations are being described by their lead party as semi-negotiations. The Strait has been declared American property. 'I think we will keep it.' That sentence was not in any congressional authorisation, because there has been no congressional authorisation. It was not in any treaty, because no treaty governs this. It was not in the memorandum of understanding signed at Versailles in June, because the MOU was about ending the war, not about what the ending would produce. It was on Truth Social, on Wednesday, in response to a question about the war's trajectory. The answer is now on the record. The war that was launched to restore an international principle has produced a declaration that the country which launched it intends to keep the thing the principle was supposed to protect from being kept by anyone. Rubio said no country was allowed to charge a toll. Trump said he thinks the US will keep the Strait. Both statements describe existing international law. Only one of them is following it. ### Before the Explosion URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/artificial-intelligence-international-politics-hudson-review/ Last updated: 2026-08-14T13:33:12.000Z There is a particular kind of intellectual pathos in reading a book about the future written just before the future arrived in a form nobody anticipated. [Artificial Intelligence and International Politics](https://link.amazon/B0i7AUDfT?ref=diplopolis.com), published in 1991 and edited by Valerie M. Hudson, then at Brigham Young University and now Professor and George H.W. Bush Chair at Texas A&M, belongs to that category. Published to capture a field's best thinking about what artificial intelligence would mean for international relations, it records something valuable and something unexpected in equal measure. It is valuable as an account of how IR scholars once believed AI would work. It is unexpected because the AI that actually arrived bore so little resemblance to what those scholars imagined that the book now reads less as a guide to the present than as a map of a country that no longer exists. That is not a dismissal. It is, if anything, a more interesting critical claim. Hudson's volume is a time capsule, and time capsules reveal not only the past they preserve but the distance between that past and where the reader stands. Reading it from 2026, with generative AI embedded in intelligence workflows, synthetic media reshaping information environments, autonomous systems being tested in conflict zones and language models sitting inside the everyday reasoning of diplomats, analysts and ordinary citizens, is to understand something important about what the field got right, what it got wrong and why the gap between the two matters for how we think about AI and international politics today. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/08/Artificial-Intelligence-And-International-Politics_BC.png)](https://link.amazon/B0bmo4vi9?ref=diplopolis.com) The volume belongs to an earlier intellectual moment when artificial intelligence in IR meant something narrower and more orderly than it means now. It meant expert systems, decision rules, formalised reasoning, computational models and the attempt to make political judgement legible to machines. In that world, the strongest version of the claim was not that AI could predict international politics, but that modelling could expose the assumptions behind a theory. That is the part worth rescuing. A formal model forces the scholar to specify what the actor knows, what it wants, what options it sees, what rules it follows and what outcome counts as success. Even when the model fails, it can fail usefully. It reveals what the theorist smuggled in. Hudson's volume mostly understands this distinction, but does not always resist the seduction of prediction. The computational elegance of formalised systems tempts the reader toward a stronger claim: that if the rules are sufficiently refined, the future becomes more legible. That is where the review should press. The volume is most valuable when it treats AI as a mirror held up to IR theory, forcing scholars to make their assumptions explicit. It is weakest when it hints that politics can be made machine-readable in any deep predictive sense. International politics can be modelled. It cannot be domesticated. The deepest methodological limit of the computational approach is not one the volume fully reckons with, and it is worth naming. The approach can model choices once preferences are given. But in politics, the formation of preference is often the real story. Why does a state choose escalation when restraint would be materially wiser? Why does a leader prefer symbolic victory to practical gain? Why does a population accept economic pain for national dignity? The answer to these questions often involves something that formal modelling cannot adequately handle: humiliation. Humiliation is the most absent element in Hudson's volume and in the computational IR tradition it represents. Fear appears. Misperception can be modelled, awkwardly. Ideology can be coded, with difficulty. Hierarchy appears in structure, though too abstractly. But humiliation is harder because it is not simply a preference, a perception or a material constraint. It is memory with a wound inside it. States do not only pursue interests. They pursue status, revenge, dignity, recognition and escape from shame. They remember defeats. They narrate insults. They convert past injury into present policy in ways that rational choice models find inexplicable. For DiploPolis readers, this is not an abstract methodological point. South Asia cannot be understood without humiliation as a political category. Partition, the 1971 liberation of Bangladesh, the Sino-Indian war of 1962, Pakistan's structural insecurity, India's status anxiety, the desire to be recognised as Vishwaguru, the Sanskrit term for teacher of the world: none of this fits comfortably inside a model of rational choice under formalised constraints. The politics of humiliation does not replace material analysis. It explains why material analysis so often fails to predict what states actually do. A computational model can assign value to prestige or reputation. That is not the same as understanding why a wounded state will accept enormous costs to recover a symbolic position it has lost. Looking from 2026, the field's most significant mistake was assuming that AI would enter international politics primarily as a specialised reasoning system sitting near the analyst. That was understandable at the time. The imagined AI was orderly, expert, domain-specific, legible. What arrived was more unruly: generative models embedded in public culture, synthetic media reshaping electoral environments, autonomous agents operating in conflict zones, algorithmic systems making bureaucratic decisions whose logic is invisible to the people subject to them, and language models sitting inside the everyday reasoning of governments, journalists and citizens who may not know they are being shaped. IR scholars built formal models of how AI might reason about international politics. Then AI arrived as a force that changed the information environment in which everyone reasons about politics. The field expected AI to sit inside the analysis. It did not anticipate AI sitting inside the feed — inside the translation layer, the intelligence workflow, the propaganda network and the classified file. And yet the field deserves credit for one important insight it articulated early and correctly: AI is not simply a technology of speed. It is a technology of formalised judgement. When judgement is encoded, automated, delegated or hidden inside a technical system, questions of accountability, bias, transparency and power do not disappear. They become harder to answer. Today's AI systems are ontologically different from the expert systems Hudson's volume represents, but that old question has not lost its force. What happens when human judgement is replaced by machine inference? Who is responsible? Who can challenge it? Who even knows it happened? The question was right. The imagined machinery was wrong. *Artificial Intelligence and International Politics* is not a guide to the AI politics of 2026\. It is something more interesting: a record of the moment before the explosion, when the field still believed artificial intelligence would make international politics more formally intelligible. Read it for the methodological honesty of its best chapters, which show that modelling exposes assumptions without necessarily predicting outcomes. Read it for the humility it generates retrospectively, when you realise how much the field's imagination was constrained by the technology available to it. Read it, above all, as a reminder that the hardest questions about AI and power were being asked long before the technology became capable of answering them in ways nobody wanted. Then ask the question the book cannot answer, because it could not have known to ask it: what happens to international order when AI does not make the world more legible, but more saturated, more synthetic and harder to know? This Book Review is free to read. Future Book Reviews will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Not in Gaza. Not in the West Bank. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/not-in-gaza-not-in-west-bank-netanyahu-declaration-2026/ Last updated: 2026-08-14T13:23:18.000Z [Netanyahu told his Cabinet on Sunday](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/israel/israel-rejects-trumps-15-point-plan-gaza-pm-benjamin-netanyahu-says-rcna591555?ref=diplopolis.com): 'Israel rejects the 15-point document.' He said he had heard people claiming he had not said this. 'So here I am saying it again,' he added. He said the IDF would not carry out any withdrawal until Hamas was fully disarmed. Then he said the thing that has now been said openly, on the record, by a sitting Israeli prime minister, in a Cabinet meeting, for the first time. No Palestinian state will be established — not in Gaza, not in the West Bank — as long as he is prime minister. He posted the same statement on X: 'Not Fatahstan and not Hamasstan.' Trump received the news and said he had a 'good response' from Netanyahu on the Gaza plan. Not disappointment. Not concern. A good response. The president who announced the 15-point document as a significant diplomatic achievement received the news of its complete rejection by the prime minister it was designed to move, and described the rejection as good. Both men have now spoken. Neither is embarrassed. The 15-point Board of Peace document called for Hamas to disarm, for Israeli forces to withdraw progressively from Gaza, for a Palestinian governing authority to assume control of the territory and for reconstruction to begin. It was the framework around which Trump had been building his Gaza diplomacy for months. It was described by his own officials as a historic step. [Netanyahu rejected every element on Sunday](https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-rejects-trumps-15-point-gaza-plan-insists-he-can-stand-up-to-us-president/?ref=diplopolis.com). He said the IDF will not withdraw. He said no Palestinian state. He said it clearly, with the specific instruction that it should not be misquoted again. For thirty years, Israeli governments maintained the official position that a two-state solution was the theoretical, eventual, conditional endpoint of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The Oslo Accords of 1993\. UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338\. The Annapolis conference. The quartet framework. The Arab Peace Initiative. Every diplomatic architecture for ending the conflict has been premised on the eventual existence of two states as the shared goal. Even the governments that made two states impossible in practice said two states in principle. Netanyahu has now removed the principle. There is no two-state endpoint. There is his statement: not in Gaza, not in the West Bank. DiploPolis published a piece on May 19 arguing that the disarmament demand had never been a path toward Palestinian statehood — that it was the occupation's instrument, dressed in the language of peace. A framework that required one party to disarm while the other expanded its military footprint, broke the ceasefire's terms and destroyed the infrastructure any successor government would require was not a peace process. It was the formalisation of defeat. On Sunday Netanyahu confirmed the argument. He rejected the plan that required disarmament. He added that no Palestinian state would follow it. The two positions together are the complete picture: Hamas must disarm, and when it does, there will be no state. The disarmament is not the path. It is the end. The ICJ has found it plausible that genocidal acts are being committed in Gaza. It has issued binding provisional measures ordering Israel to prevent such acts. Netanyahu has said no Palestinian state will be established. The court's provisional measures remain in force. The military operations continue. The IDF will not withdraw until Hamas disarms. Hamas will not disarm without assurances of statehood. Statehood will not be established. This is the declared position of the prime minister of Israel, stated on Sunday in his Cabinet meeting, in response to a peace plan his closest ally described as historic. Trump said it was a good response. The PBS account of what followed noted that details of the Iran-Oman Hormuz deal were continuing to emerge. The world moved on to the next story. Netanyahu's statement stayed on the record. Not in Gaza. Not in the West Bank. He said it again. Trump said good. The plan was historic. ### What Hamas Accepted URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/what-hamas-accepted-netanyahu-rejects-trump-gaza-plan/ Last updated: 2026-08-14T13:04:17.000Z On August 9, Benjamin Netanyahu stood before his cabinet and said: 'I want to clarify this: Israel rejects the 15-point document. I have heard people saying, "You didn't say that." So here I am saying it again.' The 15-point document was Trump's Gaza peace plan, announced on July 30 as a 'historic' breakthrough, a 'monumental step toward lasting peace and security.' On the same day Netanyahu rejected it, Hamas published a statement reaffirming its commitment to implementing the plan and said it was prepared to 'engage seriously and responsibly' with the process. The White House did not comment. The ally rejected what the adversary accepted. The patron said nothing. This sequence, which should be the leading story in every analysis of Middle East diplomacy, has received less analytical attention than it deserves because it is so precisely the opposite of the established narrative. The established narrative is that Hamas is the obstacle — the group that cannot be trusted, the organisation that prevents Gaza from reaching a settlement, the reason negotiations have collapsed repeatedly across two years of war. On August 9, Hamas agreed to Trump's plan. Netanyahu rejected it. The obstacle is not where the narrative said it was. ## What the Plan Required and What Netanyahu Refused [Trump's Board of Peace announced on July 30](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/08/09/netanyahu-rejects-trump-backed-plan-hamas-disarm-israel-leave-gaza/?ref=diplopolis.com) that it had achieved 'the complete disarmament of Hamas and all other armed groups in Gaza.' The plan — fifteen points negotiated over months with roughly 40 countries including Israel as a participant — called for a phased withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza alongside the progressive disarmament of Hamas, with Gaza's day-to-day administration eventually transferred to a technocratic Palestinian committee under Board of Peace oversight. Netanyahu's objection was to the word 'phased.' He demanded complete and genuine Hamas disarmament before any Israeli forces withdraw. Not phased. Not concurrent. Complete, first, then withdrawal. [His cabinet statement was specific](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/israel/israel-rejects-trumps-15-point-plan-gaza-pm-benjamin-netanyahu-says-rcna591555?ref=diplopolis.com): 'The IDF will not carry out any withdrawal until Hamas is genuinely disarmed and will continue to thwart threats against our forces and our citizens.' Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich said the IDF 'cannot retreat one millimeter in the Gaza Strip.' Netanyahu also used the occasion to reiterate his broader position: 'As long as I am Prime Minister, a Palestinian state will not arise — not in Gaza and not in the West Bank. Not Fatahstan and not Hamasstan.' The sequencing dispute is not technical. It is structural. Hamas cannot disarm under military occupation because disarmament while occupied is surrender. Israel will not withdraw before disarmament because withdrawal before disarmament, from Netanyahu's perspective, allows Hamas to survive as a political and eventually military force. The two positions cannot be simultaneously satisfied. Netanyahu knows this. His demand for complete upfront disarmament is not a negotiating position. It is a structural impossibility designed to prevent the agreement's implementation while maintaining the appearance of conditionality. [Al Jazeera's reporting from Gaza](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/9/israel-rejects-trumps-15-point-plan-for-gaza?ref=diplopolis.com) captured what the rejection means on the ground: it 'raises serious questions for Palestinians about the path out of hostilities.' 'The full rejection here puts the sequencing and the steps into question,' Al Jazeera's Hani Mahmoud said. Egypt's foreign minister said after meeting the UN's special envoy that all parties must 'fulfil their commitments and refrain from taking any actions that could hinder the implementation process.' The mediators said the right things. The implementer said no. ## The Third Rejection in Three Months This is the third formal act of Israeli defiance against American diplomatic initiatives since June. The pattern matters because each instance has occurred without meaningful American consequence, and the absence of consequence has shaped the next act of defiance. In June, Israeli operations in Lebanon directly undermined the US-Iran nuclear negotiations that the Islamabad Memorandum was designed to advance. Trump reportedly called Netanyahu and told him he was 'f\*\*\*ing crazy.' Netanyahu continued operations. The Bürgenstock nuclear talks were postponed. They eventually resumed. No consequences for Israel. In July, Ben-Gvir publicly called on Netanyahu to tell Trump 'no.' Netanyahu attended a US senator's funeral in Washington under an active ICC arrest warrant. He met American officials. He flew home. No consequences. In August, Netanyahu has now formally rejected the Gaza peace plan that Trump has been promoting as his key foreign policy achievement in the Middle East. Hamas accepted it. The White House has not commented. Israeli forces continue daily operations in Gaza. Israeli forces occupy more than half of the Strip. [CNN noted](https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/09/middleeast/israel-gaza-trump-netanyahu-plan-intl?ref=diplopolis.com) that Netanyahu's explicit rejection 'will further strain a close relationship' and comes 'after months of growing tensions between the White House and Israel's leadership over Iran.' The straining is real. The consequences, so far, are not. ## The Calculation Netanyahu Is Making Netanyahu is facing elections in October. His political survival depends on satisfying the far right of his coalition — the Smotriches and Ben-Gvirs whose support he needs and whose ideological commitments preclude a Palestinian state, an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza or the acceptance of any American plan that would constrain Israeli military action. The October deadline is not a background fact. It is the operating context for every decision Netanyahu makes about Gaza, about Lebanon, about Trump's peace architecture. The rejection of the 15-point plan serves three simultaneous purposes. It preserves the coalition. It forecloses the Palestinian state option that Smotrich has made a condition of government participation. And it tests whether Trump, whose Gaza plan has now been publicly humiliated, will impose consequences that would cost Netanyahu votes before October. The answer Netanyahu has received to that test, across three iterations of defiance, is consistent: Trump will express frustration and take no action. The 'f\*\*\*ing crazy' call produced continued Lebanon operations. The Ben-Gvir statement produced no diplomatic response. The Gaza rejection has produced, so far, White House silence. The Liability State piece DiploPolis published in June identified the central dynamic: the liability is visible, the mechanism for addressing it is broken, and in the gap between what Washington knows and what Washington will do, the most radical elements of Netanyahu's government have found their operating space. The August 9 rejection is the most complete demonstration yet of that dynamic. Netanyahu has moved from defying American operational requests to defying American diplomatic architecture — from ignoring ceasefire announcements to rejecting a peace plan publicly, by name, at a cabinet meeting, on the record. ## The Question the White House Did Not Answer Hamas's acceptance of the 15-point plan creates a specific political problem for the established narrative about Gaza. If Hamas accepts Trump's plan and Israel rejects it, then the framing that has defined two years of international coverage — that the obstacle to peace in Gaza is Hamas — requires revision. Hamas's acceptance does not make Hamas trustworthy, democratic or reformed. It makes Hamas, in this specific instance, the party that agreed to the American proposal. That distinction matters for the accountability question. The Egyptian foreign minister noted that parties must 'fulfil their commitments.' The Hamas politburo called on 'mediators and guarantor countries to assume their responsibilities and prevent any violations.' Both statements are directed at Israel. Egypt is a traditional American ally. The mediators built into Trump's own Board of Peace framework are pointing at Israel as the party in breach. The White House's silence is not neutral. A patron who touted a plan as a 'monumental step toward lasting peace and security,' watched his ally reject it publicly and said nothing, has communicated something precise: the rejection will not cost Netanyahu anything. That communication is understood in every capital that is watching this war, calculating what American pressure means and how reliably American commitments are enforced. An ally that can reject its patron's peace plan, at a cabinet meeting, by name, with the words 'I have heard people saying you didn't say that, so here I am saying it again,' and receive no response from the White House — that ally has not merely defied its patron. It has demonstrated the terms of the relationship. The liability state is not a condition that is becoming more dangerous. It is a condition that has already produced its own logic, and the logic is this: say no, wait, nothing happens, say no again. ### Fractured Ribs. Shattered Tailbone. International Waters. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/fractured-ribs-shattered-tailbone-international-waters-flotilla-medical-records/ Last updated: 2026-08-14T13:03:19.000Z In May, Israeli naval forces boarded the Global Sumud Flotilla in international waters on the Mediterranean and detained more than 400 activists attempting to deliver humanitarian supplies to Gaza. Israel described it as a security operation conducted in accordance with international law. The [New York Times published its investigation on Monday](https://gvwire.com/2026/08/07/seized-on-their-way-to-gaza-activists-tell-of-abuse-in-israeli-custody/?ref=diplopolis.com), having interviewed 24 of the people detained. What they described was not a security operation. Twenty-two of the 24 said they were subjected to physical assault while in Israeli custody. The 23rd said she witnessed the violence. The 24th, a doctor, said she had treated the injuries it produced. The injuries are documented. Six of the 24 brought medical records. Those records show fractured ribs, a fractured vertebra, a broken coccyx, a firearm wound and a collapsed lung. These are not the injuries of a routine detention at sea. They are the injuries of sustained physical assault conducted after the ship was boarded. What happened before that is also documented. Four of the activists said Israeli forces shot them with rubber bullets and beanbag rounds while they were still on the ship — before they had been transferred to Israeli custody at all. Three said they were Tasered while being beaten inside shipping containers after boarding. Seven were hospitalised after Israel released them. [Italian prosecutors have opened an investigation](https://www.timesofisrael.com/report-details-further-allegations-that-gaza-flotilla-activists-were-abused-by-israel/?ref=diplopolis.com) into possible offences including kidnapping and sexual assault. Germany described some of the accusations as serious. Israel has said any allegations of mistreatment would be investigated. It has brought no charges against the detained activists. Most were deported. The flotilla was in international waters when it was boarded. This is not in dispute. The 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation — which Israel has ratified — prohibits violent acts against ships at sea. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea protects freedom of navigation and the right of civilian vessels to travel through international waters. The activists on the Global Sumud Flotilla were exercising those rights in international waters on the Mediterranean when they were boarded at gunpoint, detained, transferred to shipping containers and shot with rubber bullets and beanbag rounds. The International Court of Justice has issued binding provisional measures finding it plausible that genocidal acts are being committed in Gaza. The blockade the flotilla was attempting to breach is part of the context the ICJ is examining. The accountability infrastructure is worth naming. Medical records documenting a fractured vertebra and a collapsed lung aboard a ship in international waters are precisely the kind of documented evidence that international legal mechanisms exist to examine. The ICC — whose jurisdiction covers grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, including wilful killing and torture of protected persons — is the institution most directly relevant to the documented injuries. The ICC is, as DiploPolis reported last week in 'A Home on Qeshm. No Court to Say So,' being dismantled specifically to prevent accountability for actions committed by Israel and by the United States in this conflict. Trump confirmed that purpose on camera. Rubio said it would be taken apart brick by brick. The medical records exist. The court that would examine them is being disassembled. Israel has previously described its maritime operations as lawful and proportionate measures to prevent weapons from reaching Gaza. The flotilla was carrying humanitarian supplies. The 24 activists the Times interviewed were not armed. The doctor among them was treating the injured. The 22 who said they were assaulted had been attempting to bring aid to a blockaded territory in which, as the World Food Programme has confirmed, acute food insecurity is accelerating. The broken coccyx is on the medical record. The fractured vertebra is on the medical record. The collapsed lung is on the medical record. The ship was in international waters. The court that would ask the next question is being taken apart to prevent the answer. Twenty-two of twenty-four said they were assaulted. The 23rd witnessed it. The 24th treated it. Israel called it a security operation. The medical records call it something else. ### 370,000 Bunkers. Just in Case. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/370000-bunkers-just-in-case-switzerland-nuclear-shelter-2026/ Last updated: 2026-08-14T13:02:33.000Z The entrance to the Sonnenberg nuclear bunker in Lucerne is in the middle of a children's playground. Past the seesaws and swing sets, carved into a hill, is a blast-proof door. Beyond it, a tunnel descends underground for as far as the eye can see. The bunker was built in the 1970s to house 20,000 people — one third of Lucerne's population at the time. 'Back then, 20,000 people constituted a third of our city's inhabitants,' says Zora Schelbert, who guides visitors through the complex. It has a hospital. A prison. Bunk beds. Diesel generators with two weeks of fuel. [It has never been used for its original purpose](https://www.npr.org/2026/08/08/g-s1-137635/switzerland-nuclear-bunkers?ref=diplopolis.com). The Swiss government spends tens of millions of dollars a year maintaining it. Just in case. Switzerland has more than 370,000 nuclear bunkers — more than any country on earth. Every one of its nine million citizens is guaranteed a space in one. This is not a Cold War relic kept by bureaucratic inertia. It is maintained policy. The Swiss government never scrapped the network when the Soviet Union collapsed. It kept building. The legal requirement that every new building include nuclear shelter capacity remains in force. The seesaws above the blast-proof door are not irony. They are the Swiss government being honest about what it is building for. Switzerland has spent more than 200 years watching Europe's wars from the outside. It watched the Franco-Prussian War, both World Wars, the Cold War, the Balkans, Iraq, Ukraine and now the US-Israel war on Iran — all from the same neutral position, absorbing the consequences without the combatant's agency. When a country with that vantage point looks at the world and decides to maintain 370,000 nuclear bunkers, in peacetime, at tens of millions of dollars a year, it is making an institutional judgment about the world's trajectory. The Swiss are not alarmists. They are the world's most experienced observers of other people's catastrophes. Their conclusion, maintained for eight decades, is: underground shelter is a reasonable precaution. The Sonnenberg bunker's capacity was reduced from 20,000 to 2,000 in 2002, when the Cold War's end made the full scale seem excessive. The floors that once housed bunk beds for 20,000 now shelter asylum seekers and the homeless. Some have protested against being housed underground in a nuclear bunker. The bunker serves two emergencies simultaneously — the one it was built for, and the one the world is currently producing. The same structure designed to protect citizens from nuclear fallout is housing people fleeing the wars and climate disruptions of a world that insists it has moved past the need for nuclear bunkers. It has not moved past the need. It has moved the asylum seekers into one. DiploPolis published two pieces last week that the Swiss bunker policy quietly answers. Wednesday's piece established that the United States has burned through 80 per cent of its THAAD interceptor inventory — the missiles designed to shoot down nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles — in a conventional war. Thursday's piece established that the institutional framework built after Hiroshima to prevent nuclear proliferation is being unlearned in every direction simultaneously. North Korea opened a new nuclear bomb fuel production facility in August. Iran's new Supreme Leader is assessed by US intelligence as more inclined to seek nuclear weapons than his predecessor. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has not been meaningfully implemented by any nuclear-armed state in 58 years. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has not been ratified by the United States, China, India, Pakistan or Israel. The International Criminal Court — the institution that would examine the use of weapons of mass destruction against civilians — is being taken apart. The Swiss response to this landscape is: maintain the bunkers. Not as a prediction. As a precaution. The difference matters. A prediction assumes inevitability. A precaution assumes possibility. The Swiss are not predicting nuclear war. They are maintaining the infrastructure for surviving it, as they have maintained it through every decade since 1945, because the possibility has never fully receded in the more than 200 years they have been watching. The Sonnenberg's capacity was cut to 2,000 in 2002 because the threat seemed lower. It was not decommissioned. The Swiss government considered the difference between lower and gone, and decided lower did not justify removing the infrastructure entirely. That decision — quiet, institutional, expensive and entirely rational — is the most honest assessment of nuclear risk that any government has produced in the post-Cold War period. It is not in a treaty. It is not in a speech. It is in a playground in Lucerne, in front of a blast-proof door that leads to a hospital, a prison and two weeks of diesel fuel, waiting. ### The Best IR Programmes in the UK: A Guide for 2026 and 2027 Intake URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/best-ir-programmes-uk-guide-2026-2027-intake/ Last updated: 2026-08-07T20:00:00.000Z The Chevening piece published here two Saturdays ago told you to apply to three UK universities in parallel with your scholarship application. The Rhodes piece last Saturday told you that your course choice must follow naturally from who you are and what you intend to do. Neither piece named the courses. This one does. There are [360 Masters programmes in international relations](https://www.mastersportal.com/search/master/international-relations/united-kingdom?ref=diplopolis.com) at 136 UK universities. Most of them are not relevant to a student building a serious career in international affairs. Eight programmes across seven institutions account for the vast majority of meaningful career outcomes in the field — and the choice between them matters far more than most applicants realise, because the right programme depends entirely on which career track you are building toward, and because two of the three major scholarships covering UK study fund specific institutions, which makes the course decision the most consequential single choice in the application. The prestige rankings do not account for any of that. This guide does. ## How to Read This Guide The eight programmes assessed below cover Oxford, Cambridge, LSE, King's College London, SOAS, Edinburgh, Warwick and Sheffield. For each one, the assessment covers what the programme is genuinely strong at, what it does not do well, what it costs and which career tracks it most directly serves. One scheduling note before anything else. The King's College London deadline for most programmes is [25 August 2026](https://www.kcl.ac.uk/study/postgraduate-taught/courses/international-relations-and-war-ma/requirements?ref=diplopolis.com) — and this is for 2026 entry, meaning starting September 2026, not 2027\. If you are considering King's for September 2026 entry, you have seventeen days from the date of this publication. Applications for September 2027 entry will open in Autumn 2026\. Read the King's section first if either deadline applies to you. The scholarship routing is addressed explicitly at the end. Rhodes funds Oxford (for two or more years) and permits any Oxford course. Chevening funds any eligible UK university — the full list of eight programmes here is Chevening-eligible. Gates Cambridge, which this Dossier covers next Saturday, funds Cambridge exclusively. That single fact makes the Cambridge section the most important one to read if you are preparing a Gates Cambridge application for the October 2026 deadline. ### Oxford — MPhil in International Relations Duration: 21 months | Tuition: [£37,100 per year](https://www.ox.ac.uk/admissions/graduate/courses/mphil-international-relations?ref=diplopolis.com) for international students | Entry: First Class or strong upper second-class; research proposal required | Applications for 2027-28: Open approximately November 2026 The [Oxford MPhil in International Relations](https://www.ox.ac.uk/admissions/graduate/courses/mphil-international-relations?ref=diplopolis.com) is a research degree, not a taught degree in the conventional sense. The distinction matters and is poorly understood by applicants who apply to Oxford because of its prestige rather than because of what the programme actually requires. The 21-month structure combines theoretical and conceptual training in international relations with recent world history and research methods, culminating in a thesis on a specialised topic. It is the most direct preparation for doctoral work of any programme on this list — students who complete it well are positioned to continue to the Oxford DPhil, incorporating their MPhil thesis into the doctorate, which is a structural advantage no other programme here offers. The entry requirement is demanding in a specific way. Alongside the standard academic credentials — first-class or strong upper second-class undergraduate degree, minimum GPA of 3.8, IELTS 7.5 or TOEFL 110 — applicants must submit a research proposal that demonstrates genuine intellectual engagement with a specific question in the field. The proposal is not optional and is not a formality. Reviewers assess it for evidence that the applicant has identified a question that can be pursued at Oxford with the expertise available in the Department of Politics and International Relations. Generic proposals about broad themes do not pass that test. What Oxford does extraordinarily well: intellectual depth, theoretical breadth across the realist, liberal, constructivist and critical traditions, and research training rigorous enough that its graduates are competitive for faculty positions at leading universities globally. What it does not do: practical career development of the kind that a London-based degree provides through proximity to think tanks, embassies and international organisations. An Oxford MPhil graduate enters the job market with exceptional intellectual credentials and a thinner professional network than their LSE or King's counterpart, unless they have actively built that network during and before the degree. For Rhodes applicants: Oxford is the only university Rhodes funds. The academic statement of study in the Rhodes application must name a specific Oxford programme and demonstrate why it follows from your intellectual trajectory. **Best for:** Academic careers, research-track positions at think tanks and international organisations, and senior government or diplomatic roles requiring deep analytical credibility. ### Cambridge — MPhil in Politics and International Studies Duration: 1 year | Tuition: Approximately £35,000 for international students | Entry: Strong upper second-class or first-class | Applications for 2027-28: Deadline approximately January 2027 The [Cambridge MPhil in Politics and International Studies](https://www.postgrad.com/the-university-of-cambridge-department-of-politics-and-international-studies/course/?ref=diplopolis.com) covers comparative politics, international relations, political theory and the politics of developing areas across four broad modules, culminating in a dissertation. It is a shorter and more socially scientific programme than Oxford's MPhil — Cambridge's Department of Politics and International Studies approaches international relations through a more comparative and methodological lens, which produces graduates with a distinctly different intellectual profile. For readers preparing a Gates Cambridge application — next Saturday's Dossier covers this in full — the Cambridge section here deserves particular attention. The Gates Cambridge application requires applicants to name a specific Cambridge programme and demonstrate that the programme choice follows logically from their research agenda and career intentions. Cambridge is eligible for Chevening, meaning the full scholarship covering Cambridge tuition and living costs is available to Chevening recipients who list it as one of their three university choices. **Best for:** Academic research careers, policy research roles requiring strong methodological grounding, and students preparing for doctoral work in comparative politics or international relations. ### LSE — MSc International Relations Duration: 1 year | Tuition: [£32,500 for 2026-27](https://www.diplopolis.com/best-masters-international-relations-top-20-global-guide-2027/) | Entry: Strong upper second-class; rolling admissions | Apply by: January 2027 for best consideration LSE's [Department of International Relations](https://www.lse.ac.uk/study-at-lse/graduate/msc-international-relations?ref=diplopolis.com) was founded in 1927 by Philip Noel-Baker, making it one of the oldest dedicated IR departments in the world. The MSc is a one-year taught degree built around the English School tradition. Its faculty includes some of the most cited scholars in the field, and its London location puts students in daily proximity to the think tanks, embassies, international organisations and media institutions that make the city genuinely relevant to international affairs careers. The London premium is real. An LSE graduate who spends their year actively engaging with the think tank events, public lectures, government consultations and internship opportunities available within walking distance of the campus leaves with a professional network that no campus-based university can match. LSE is eligible for Chevening, and given its one-year structure, a Chevening scholarship at LSE is among the most efficient scholarship investments available. **Best for:** Policy-oriented students with professional experience, think tank and international organisation careers, and students who want a prestigious credential combined with London's professional access in the most compact possible time frame. ### King's College London — Department of War Studies Duration: 1 year | Tuition: [£33,258](https://www.shiksha.com/studyabroad/uk/universities/king-s-college-london/war-studies-ma?ref=diplopolis.com) | Entry: Minimum 2:1 | Deadline: 25 August 2026 for September 2026 entry The [Department of War Studies at King's College London](https://www.kcl.ac.uk/study/postgraduate-taught/courses/war-studies-ma?ref=diplopolis.com) is the only institution in the world where war — its causes, conduct and consequences — is the primary object of inquiry rather than a subset of politics or history. Its MA in War Studies and its MA in International Relations are the two main entry points for postgraduate students. The deadline is urgent for 2026 entry. [Applications for September 2026 entry close on 25 August 2026](https://www.kcl.ac.uk/study/postgraduate-taught/courses/international-relations-and-war-ma/requirements?ref=diplopolis.com) — seventeen days from the date of this publication. Applications for September 2027 entry will open in Autumn 2026\. If you are reading this after 25 August 2026, the 2027 application cycle is your window. **Best for:** Security studies, strategic studies and defence policy careers; geopolitical risk consulting; intelligence-adjacent policy research; and any career requiring credibility with British government and NATO institutions. ### SOAS — MA International Studies and Diplomacy Duration: 1 year | Tuition: Approximately £28,000 to £29,000 — [confirm on the SOAS fees page](https://www.soas.ac.uk/study/student-fees-and-funding/tuition-fees/postgraduate-taught-fees?ref=diplopolis.com) as 2026-27 rates may differ | Entry: 2:1 or equivalent; no prior IR degree required | Applications: Rolling [SOAS University of London](https://www.soas.ac.uk/study/find-course/ma-international-studies-and-diplomacy?ref=diplopolis.com) is ranked 3rd in the world for Academic Reputation in Politics by QS 2026 — a sub-metric of the overall Politics ranking where SOAS places 16th globally and 5th in the UK. The Academic Reputation metric specifically measures how scholars in the field rate the institution's research and expertise, which reflects SOAS's specialist depth in Asia, Africa and the Middle East rather than its overall size or resources. Most guides cite the 3rd-place ranking without explaining what it measures. Now you know. The MA in International Studies and Diplomacy draws on SOAS's departments of International Politics, Law, Economics and area studies, alongside a languages programme that includes Arabic, Swahili, Mandarin, Hindi, Japanese, Persian and more than a dozen others. A student who combines the ISD programme with a language not available at any other London institution leaves with a credential that is genuinely rare in the international affairs job market. No prior IR degree is required, which makes SOAS accessible to students from law, economics, history or area studies backgrounds. For Global South applicants specifically: SOAS is the UK programme most deliberately designed to treat Asian, African and Middle Eastern societies as subjects of serious intellectual inquiry rather than as regions to be managed. **Best for:** NGO and humanitarian careers in Asia, Africa and the Middle East; diplomatic service roles requiring regional expertise; UN roles in non-Western regions; development finance positions at the Asian Development Bank or African Development Bank; and students who want a UK degree combined with specialist language acquisition. ### University of Edinburgh — MSc International Relations Duration: 1 year | Tuition: [£32,000](https://gradsmatch.com/programs/university-of-edinburgh/international-relations-msc-17981?ref=diplopolis.com) | Entry: 2:1 in politics, IR or social sciences | Applications: Rolling, apply early The [Edinburgh MSc](https://study.ed.ac.uk/programmes/postgraduate-taught/687-international-relations?ref=diplopolis.com) sits in the [35th-ranked university globally by QS 2027](https://www.postgrad.com/the-university-of-edinburgh-school-of-social-and-political-science-international-relations/course/?ref=diplopolis.com) and fourth in the UK for research power. Edinburgh's most practical advantage over London-based programmes is cost. Tuition at £32,000 is comparable to LSE, but Edinburgh's estimated annual living costs of £18,504 are significantly lower than London. For a student partially self-financing, Edinburgh is the most honest financial option in this tier. **Best for:** Research-oriented students who want a rigorous one-year programme without London costs; students whose careers will be in international organisations where the Edinburgh credential carries weight; and students funding their degree partially without scholarship support. ### University of Warwick — MA International Political Economy Duration: 1 year | Tuition: Approximately [£29,880 to £31,670](https://www.hotcoursesabroad.com/study/course/uk/international-political-economy-ma/52340662/program.html?ref=diplopolis.com) — confirm on the [Warwick website](https://warwick.ac.uk/study/postgraduate/courses/ma-international-political-economy/?ref=diplopolis.com) as 2026-27 fees are subject to confirmation | Entry: 2:1 in a related subject | On-time deadline: 2 August 2026; late applications still accepted The [Warwick Department of Politics and International Studies (PAIS)](https://warwick.ac.uk/study/postgraduate/courses/ma-international-political-economy/?ref=diplopolis.com) is one of the top-ranked politics research departments in the UK by the 2021 Research Excellence Framework. Its MA in International Political Economy is the most quantitatively and economically rigorous programme on this list, covering trade, finance, development and global governance. Warwick is also the most internationally networked programme structurally: double degree arrangements with American University in Washington, the University of Waterloo in Canada, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, the University of Konstanz, Monash University in Melbourne and Nanyang Technological University in Singapore give students options that no other UK institution on this list provides. **Best for:** International trade policy careers, multilateral development finance, international business and corporate affairs, and students with economics backgrounds who want the economics-IR combination that no London programme offers as explicitly. ### University of Sheffield — MA International Relations Duration: 1 year | Tuition: Full fee minus [automatic £3,000 overseas discount](https://sheffield.ac.uk/postgraduate/taught/courses/2026/international-relations-ma?ref=diplopolis.com) for September 2026 entry | Entry: Competitive | Applications: Apply early The [Sheffield MA](https://sheffield.ac.uk/postgraduate/taught/courses/2026/international-relations-ma?ref=diplopolis.com) covers the global order, its key actors and its current strains through a curriculum that is less theoretically intensive than Oxford or Cambridge and more accessible for students from non-standard IR backgrounds. Sheffield's automatic £3,000 overseas fee discount — applied without a separate application — makes it one of the most financially transparent institutions on this list. **Best for:** International development and humanitarian careers, NGO roles, and students entering the UK Masters market from non-standard academic backgrounds who want a respected degree with a straightforward financial proposition. ## The Career Routing Guide For academic careers: Oxford MPhil is the only programme that provides the research training and departmental relationships to make a doctoral application competitive at a leading institution. For multilateral organisation and UN careers: LSE and SOAS both serve this track well. LSE through its London networks; SOAS through its regional expertise in the areas where UN deployment is most concentrated. For think tanks and policy research: LSE and King's, for the same reason — London proximity. Oxford for research-oriented think tank roles that require intellectual depth over practitioner access. For security studies and geopolitical risk: King's War Studies, without close competition. It is the only programme where security is the primary subject rather than a sub-field. For international trade policy and development finance: Warwick's IPE is the strongest economics grounding available in the UK IR market. For international development and humanitarian work: SOAS, where Asia, Africa and Middle East regional expertise is embedded in the curriculum rather than available as an optional module. For diplomacy and foreign service: all eight institutions produce diplomatic service entrants. The strongest preparation for the most competitive services comes from programmes that develop both analytical depth and language skills. Oxford for the analytical credential; SOAS for the language acquisition; LSE for the UK government network. ## The Scholarship Routing Rhodes Scholarship: Oxford only. All Oxford programmes eligible subject to faculty availability. Your academic statement must name the Oxford programme specifically. Gates Cambridge: Cambridge only. The MPhil in Politics and International Studies is the most directly relevant programme for IR students. Next Saturday's Dossier covers the Gates Cambridge application in full. Chevening: Any eligible UK university. All eight programmes on this list are Chevening-eligible. The Chevening piece published 25 July 2026 covered the application strategy in detail. Commonwealth Scholarship: UK universities, postgraduate level. All eight programmes are eligible for Commonwealth applicants from developing Commonwealth countries. 🚧 **Programme fees, entry requirements and application deadlines change each cycle. The King's College London deadline for September 2026 entry is 25 August 2026\. Applications for September 2027 entry open in Autumn 2026\. Verify all details on official university websites before applying. If you spot an error or an outdated link in this piece, write to* [editor@diplopolis.com](mailto:editor@diplopolis.com) *and we will correct it promptly.* This Dossier piece is free to read. Future Dossier pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Tunisia Is Dying in the Dark URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/tunisia-dying-in-the-dark-blackouts-deaths-kais-saied-2026/ Last updated: 2026-08-07T04:30:46.000Z 'It feels like God has opened the gates of hell,' said an employee at a pastry shop in Tunis. The refrigerators had stopped running. The cakes sat in the dark. He was describing what it had felt like to live and work in Tunisia since July 12, when the blackouts began in the middle of an exceptional heatwave that would push temperatures above 50 degrees Celsius and send [900 wildfires burning across the country](https://www.newarab.com/news/tunisia-hit-protests-blackouts-continue-50c-heatwave?ref=diplopolis.com) in three days. Between 150 and 200 people are reported dead since the power cuts began. The figures come from [the Organisation of Young Doctors in Tunisia](https://www.euronews.com/2026/07/25/tunisia-marks-saieds-emergency-measures-anniversary-amid-deadly-power-crisis?ref=diplopolis.com). The authorities have not confirmed or denied them. At least five deaths directly linked to the outages were reported by local media in the first days — among them a cancer patient whose home oxygen equipment stopped working when the power went out. Tunisia's state electricity company, STEG, has been implementing rolling blackouts to prevent total grid collapse. Residents described their power going off for six hours at a stretch. Others said longer. Some said they had stopped using the lift for fear of being trapped inside it. The deaths are the product of three simultaneous failures. The first is structural: Tunisia's electricity grid is ageing, built for a climate that no longer exists, running at record demand during peak tourism and summer simultaneously. The second is climatic: the heatwave is not an anomaly but a trend — what climate scientists have been predicting for the North African littoral for decades, arriving now with regularity and force. The third is political: Tunisia's energy supply has been squeezed by the same disruption that killed six million people's food security across Somalia, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka — the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the disruption of Gulf energy supply chains. Tunisia imports a substantial portion of its energy. The Iran war's energy bill is being paid in Tunis as it is being paid in Colombo and Mogadishu. In Tunisia it is being paid in the dark. President Kais Saied appeared publicly after several days of silence to describe the pace of outages as 'not normal' and said those responsible must 'assume their responsibility.' He announced no specific measures. His presidency said it was 'monitoring the situation closely' and that a cabinet meeting had been held. He reportedly stressed the outages must 'end immediately.' The deaths are not normal. The president said so. Nothing changed. The blackouts reached their peak in the same week Tunisia marked the fifth anniversary of the day Saied suspended parliament and assumed emergency powers. On July 25, 2021, Saied declared a national emergency and began to rule by decree. Tunisia had been the Arab Spring's only democratic success — the country that went from revolution to elected government, that wrote a constitution with broad civic participation, that showed that the Arab world's demand for dignity and self-governance could produce something durable. That experiment lasted ten years. In 2021, Saied ended it. The political debates that had filled Tunisia's airwaves after 2011 have given way to sports and entertainment shows. The octogenarian leader of the Ennahda movement, Rached Ghannouchi, has been detained. Journalists have been sentenced. Opposition figures have been imprisoned. Haifa Chebbi, the daughter of jailed opposition leader Ahmed Nejib Chebbi, posted a video saying prison conditions had become unbearable for her father, uncle and other detainees — in the same heat that was killing people in the street. Courts have handed down rulings that international human rights organisations describe as politically motivated. The West's response to the coup was, initially, criticism. Then it was [a gradual thaw from 2023](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/07/29/tunisia-libya-north-africa-protests-extreme-heat-power-cuts/?ref=diplopolis.com), driven by the calculation that Tunisia's cooperation on migration — the human pipeline across the Mediterranean that European governments need to contain — was worth more than the democratic principle that Saied had violated. The same Morocco logic that DiploPolis described in the Ceuta piece: the state that controls migration has a veto over accountability. Tunisia learned this. Saied learned it faster. Thousands of Tunisians demonstrated in the capital on July 25 to mark five years since the power grab, directing their anger at Saied's inaction as the blackouts continued. [Hamza Bouchrit](https://www.africanews.com/2026/07/28/tunisia-power-cuts-amid-heatwave-leave-residents-and-businesses-struggling/?ref=diplopolis.com), a poultry farm veterinarian, told Africanews that nearly 90 per cent of the chickens on his farm — between 150,000 and 200,000 — died when the generator overheated and stopped working during a prolonged cut. The power is reportedly returning to normal as temperatures fall. The coup is five years old. The West has normalised it. The people have not. 150 to 200 people are dead. The Organisation of Young Doctors counted them. The state has not confirmed or denied. The gates of hell, the pastry shop employee said, had been opened. He was describing a heatwave. He was also describing something that took five years to build. ### What Iran Took from Kyiv URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/what-iran-took-from-kyiv-patriot-missiles-ukraine-iran-war/ Last updated: 2026-08-06T11:00:51.000Z Some time after midnight on August 5, Russian missiles and drones struck Kyiv and the surrounding region, killing 17 people and wounding 44\. Russia fired 24 ballistic missiles, four hypersonic or supersonic missiles and 115 drones in a barrage that lasted approximately two hours. Ukraine's air defences failed to intercept a single one of the incoming missiles. By the measure of this war's grimmer statistics, it was not the deadliest attack Ukraine has suffered. It was, however, one of the most consequential in its specific timing: it came hours after the Financial Times reported that Trump had refused to transfer 300 Patriot interceptor missiles to Ukraine at an Oval Office meeting the previous week, citing a shortage of interceptors caused by the war with Iran. The shortage is documented. [NPR confirmed on August 4](https://www.npr.org/2026/08/04/g-s1-137354/us-iran-precision-missiles-stockpiles?ref=diplopolis.com), independently of Reuters, that US stockpiles of certain precision missiles are almost depleted as the war in Iran enters its sixth month. [CNN reported](https://edition.cnn.com/2026/08/04/politics/us-iran-key-missile-interceptors-low?ref=diplopolis.com) the same day that the US military has burned through nearly four-fifths of its THAAD ballistic missile interceptors and roughly half of its Patriot interceptors since the war began. Senior US military commanders are warning that the Pentagon's munitions stockpile is 'dangerously low.' Stockpiles are expected to take years to replenish. The interceptors that were not in Kyiv's air defences on the night of August 5 were not there for a reason. That reason is called Operation Epic Fury. ## What the War Consumed The Reuters investigation published August 4 is the most precise public accounting of what the Iran war has cost the United States in military hardware. The US Army has expended what sources described as 'virtually all' of its ATACMS — the Army Tactical Missile System — and its newer Precision Strike Missile, or PrSM, during five months of operations against Iran. These are long-range, surface-to-surface weapons that allow strikes without putting aircraft crews at risk. Before the war, they formed the backbone of the US Army's long-range strike capacity. One US Army unit, according to sources cited by NPR, exhausted its entire PrSM inventory early in the conflict. The numbers that the Centre for Strategic and International Studies has published give the depletion concrete dimensions. [Before the war began, the US held approximately 2,200 Patriot interceptors of its two most modernised variants, and 452 THAAD missiles](https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/29/politics/us-weapons-stockpiles-dwindle-iran-war?ref=diplopolis.com). By July 29, CSIS estimated that fewer than 827 Patriots remained in US stockpiles and fewer than 278 THAAD. The US has also used slightly less than half of its global Tomahawk cruise missile inventory since February 28\. Raytheon has reached a tentative multiyear agreement with the Pentagon to increase Tomahawk production. The implication of a multiyear production agreement is that the gap will not be closed quickly. The Pentagon's response to the Reuters report was vigorous denial. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth called the reporting false. Trump said the US had 'far more munitions than anyone in the world, and far more than we need.' The White House's public posture is that there is no shortage. The Financial Times' Oval Office reporting, published the day after the denials, describes the president telling Zelensky in person that the interceptors are needed in the Middle East. Both things can be true simultaneously. The US may have more munitions than any other country in the world. It may also have fewer of the specific interceptors that Ukraine needs than it did in January, and fewer than it can spare while simultaneously protecting American installations across the Gulf. The shortage is not absolute. It is specific, contextual and consequential. Last week, the Department of Defence circulated a memo asking for 'creative' ways to pressure Iran. The New Republic, which reported the memo, observed [the obvious implication: that conventional long-range strike options had been exhausted](https://newrepublic.com/post/213931/pentagon-depletes-long-range-missile-stockpile-iran-war?ref=diplopolis.com). When a superpower's defence department asks for creative alternatives to its standard instruments of coercion, it is because the standard instruments are no longer available at the required scale. ## The Refusal and Its Consequence Zelensky requested 300 PAC-3 interceptor missiles at his Oval Office meeting with Trump last week. Trump declined, citing Iranian war depletion and the need to protect US military installations across the Middle East and the Persian Gulf countries. He also declined to grant Ukraine a licence for the independent production of Patriot interceptors, despite earlier signals that this option was under consideration. [NPR confirmed separately](https://www.npr.org/2026/08/04/g-s1-137287/us-patriot-missiles-ukraine-middle-east-iran-war?ref=diplopolis.com) that the administration is pressing ahead with talks on allowing Ukraine to manufacture its own PAC-3 missiles, but that process will take time Ukraine does not have tonight. The Kyiv strikes of August 5 demonstrated what the gap in air defence coverage means in concrete terms. Ukraine's air defences intercepted none of the incoming ballistic missiles. Russia used a record 8,300 guided aerial bombs in July alone, according to the Ukrainian General Staff, more than the previous record of 8,266 in June. The aerial campaign is not contracting. The interceptor supply is. The gap between those two trajectories is measured in dead. North Korean military contributions are accelerating the pressure. A North Korean missile unit has begun deploying to western Russia equipped with up to 120 ballistic missiles and six launchers for strikes against Ukraine, according to Ukraine's military intelligence agency. The western Russia deployment connects two wars that the world has been tracking as separate: the Iran conflict and the Ukraine conflict now share a supply relationship. North Korea provides Russia with additional ballistic missile capacity. Russia uses that capacity against Ukraine. The US has consumed its own interceptors fighting Iran. Ukraine asks for those interceptors and is told they are needed in the Middle East. The connections are documented. They are not speculative. ## What Was Promised and What Was Built Operation Epic Fury was launched on February 28, 2026 with four stated objectives: destroy Iran's ballistic missiles and its missile industry; annihilate the Iranian navy; sever Iran's proxy network; guarantee that Iran would never obtain a nuclear weapon. None of those objectives has been achieved in full. Iran's nuclear programme is under negotiation, not dismantled. The proxy network continues to operate. The navy was damaged, not annihilated. The missile programme was degraded but not destroyed; Iran displayed domestically produced ballistic missiles at a Tehran military ceremony as recently as August 2. What Operation Epic Fury achieved that its architects did not announce as an objective was the consumption of a significant portion of the United States' long-range precision strike capacity, the depletion of roughly half its Patriot interceptors, the near-total exhaustion of its ground-launched long-range missiles and the diversion of presidential attention, diplomatic bandwidth and military resource from a European war in which Russia has killed 17 people in Kyiv on a single night while Ukraine's president sits in Washington being told there are no more interceptors to spare. The Distraction War piece DiploPolis published in June tracked how the Iran war gave Putin diplomatic relief from the June deadline. The administration that pressed Zelensky for a peace agreement by June started a war in the Middle East ten days before the next scheduled round of Ukraine talks and never came back. That analysis remains correct. This piece adds the hardware dimension: the distraction was not only temporal. It was physical. It consumed the weapons. [When commanders warned that the munitions stockpile was 'dangerously low,'](https://edition.cnn.com/2026/08/04/politics/us-iran-key-missile-interceptors-low?ref=diplopolis.com) they were not describing an abstraction. They were describing the specific condition that produces a president telling a wartime ally no at the exact moment the ally's capital is being struck. Trump said this week, of the Iran situation, that 'IRAN WILL NEVER HAVE A NUCLEAR WEAPON.' Whether that commitment can be sustained without the long-range precision missiles that have been expended in its pursuit is not a question the administration has answered publicly. What it has answered, in an Oval Office meeting, is the question of who pays when the arsenal runs short. Ukraine pays. It pays in refused requests and depleted air defences and the specific people killed in Kyiv on nights when Russian missiles are not intercepted. ## The Accounting That Has Not Been Done There is an accounting that the United States has not performed publicly and does not appear to be preparing to perform. It concerns the relationship between a war started in February and a war that has been running since February 2022, and whether the resources consumed in the first were essential to a stated objective that has not been achieved, and whether those resources were needed in the second and were refused because they were consumed in the first. The accounting is not anti-war. It is the accounting that every competent military establishment performs after every conflict: what was expended, what was achieved, what it cost, what it prevented. The Iranian nuclear programme is under negotiation. The Strait of Hormuz is under a 60-day arrangement pending further talks. Iran's government is intact. The IRGC is operating. Hezbollah is in Lebanon. The proxy network is functional. The long-range missiles are gone. The THAAD is almost gone. Kyiv's Patriot request was denied. Whether that exchange is strategically worth the cost depends on what the negotiations eventually produce. If the 60-day Hormuz arrangement produces a durable nuclear settlement, the exchange may be defensible. If the talks collapse and the war resumes, the US will resume combat with a depleted arsenal and a European ally whose capital is being struck because the interceptors were spent elsewhere. Zelensky has accepted the unconditional ceasefire Trump demanded. Putin has refused it. The war continues regardless of what Ukraine has agreed to. Trump told Zelensky there were no interceptors to spare. Russia killed 17 people in Kyiv that night. Ukraine's air defences intercepted none of the incoming missiles. The war that was supposed to guarantee Iran would never have a nuclear weapon has not yet guaranteed that. What it has guaranteed is that Ukraine has fewer interceptors than it had in January, and that the president of the United States told the president of Ukraine in the Oval Office that the reason for that is Iran. That is the bill. It arrived in Kyiv on August 5. This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Eighty-One Years. The Lesson Unlearned. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/eighty-one-years-lesson-unlearned-hiroshima-day-2026-iran-war/ Last updated: 2026-08-06T04:30:05.000Z At 8:15 a.m. on August 6, 1945, the Enola Gay dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Between 70,000 and 80,000 people died instantly. By the end of that year, the death toll had climbed toward 140,000 — from burns, blast injuries and radiation sickness that no medicine could stop. The survivors became known as hibakusha. They bore the costs for the rest of their lives: cancers, birth defects, social stigma and the specific, irreplaceable burden of having witnessed what nuclear weapons do to a city and to the people in it. For 81 years they have been telling the world what happened. The world has drawn certain conclusions from their testimony. It is drawing different ones now. In the week of the 81st anniversary, the United States has depleted [nearly 80 per cent of its THAAD missile interceptors](https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/04/politics/us-iran-key-missile-interceptors-low?ref=diplopolis.com) — the systems designed to intercept ballistic missiles, including nuclear-tipped ones — in a war launched partly to prevent another country from obtaining nuclear weapons. The war has produced a new Iranian Supreme Leader whom US intelligence assesses as far more inclined to seek nuclear weapons than his father. North Korea has opened a new facility to produce nuclear bomb fuels, publicly, photographed, announced — while South Korea has moved away from denuclearisation as its primary policy objective and the world's intelligence attention is elsewhere. The International Criminal Court — built in the institutional legacy of the very atrocities that Hiroshima's survivors helped make impossible to ignore — is being dismantled to protect a sitting head of government from prosecution. The atomic bomb was dropped once. The lesson drawn from it was: never again, and build the institutions that make never again possible. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Genocide Convention. The Geneva Conventions. The [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty](https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/?ref=diplopolis.com). The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The International Criminal Court. Each was built in the years after 1945 as a collective human decision that the 20th century's worst hours must not repeat themselves. Each represents an attempt to encode in law and institution the testimony of survivors: that war produces things that law must forbid and accountability must reach. In August 2026, the NPT's Article VI — which obligates nuclear-armed states to pursue disarmament — remains unimplemented after 58 years. The CTBT has not been ratified by the United States, China, India, Pakistan or Israel. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons has 69 signatories and no nuclear-armed state among them. The ICC is being disassembled brick by brick. The THAAD interceptors that would defend against the missiles the same states are building are nearly 80 per cent consumed. The war to prevent nuclear proliferation has produced a Supreme Leader more committed to a nuclear programme. Saudi Arabia may receive civilian nuclear technology as the price of a peace deal that ends the war that was launched to prevent nuclear weapons. The logic of 1945 was: nuclear weapons are categorically different from other weapons. They cannot be limited to military targets. They cannot be recalled once launched. The hibakusha's testimony made this concrete: the Enola Gay dropped one bomb and destroyed a city. The lesson was categorical prohibition and the institutional architecture to enforce it. The architecture is being dismantled in August 2026 with more speed and more deliberateness than it was ever built. The [Flame of Peace](https://www.city.hiroshima.lg.jp/site/hiroshimapeace-en/8788.html?ref=diplopolis.com) has burned continuously at Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park since 1964\. This morning the Peace Bell rang at the ceremony near the epicentre of the blast. The moment of silence fell at 8:15\. Doves were released. The testimony of survivors — fewer every year and older than the century that produced them — was heard again. The world observed, as it has observed for 81 years, and recommitted to the principles that the bomb made necessary. By this afternoon, the missiles that would intercept a nuclear weapon will still be nearly 80 per cent depleted. The court that would examine its use will still be three countries lighter than last month. The North Korean facility will still be producing bomb fuel. The lesson drawn from Hiroshima in 1945 is the right lesson. The week of its 81st anniversary is a specific and measurable account of how far the world has moved from learning it. ### The Discipline of Resistance URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/history-international-relations-malchow-review/ Last updated: 2026-08-05T18:17:34.000Z In 1938, a British prime minister flew to Munich, made an agreement with Adolf Hitler and returned to London announcing that he had achieved peace for our time. In the decades that followed, Munich became something more than a historical event. It became a lesson. Appeasement equals capitulation. Negotiation with dictators is weakness. The lesson was applied to Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, the Gulf War, Iraq and, most recently, to every diplomatic conversation with Russia, Iran and China that anyone wants to foreclose. Munich did not merely happen. It became a word that ends arguments. That is the problem Howard LeRoy Malchow's [History and International Relations](https://link.amazon/B0iCWGkm8?ref=diplopolis.com) sets out to address. Not Munich specifically, but the habit it exemplifies: the conversion of complex historical moments into portable moral lessons, stripped of their context, their contingency, their uncertainty and their specific human texture, and pressed into service as theory. International relations, as a discipline, has made this habit its working practice. Munich means appeasement. Vietnam means quagmire. 1914 means miscalculation. Nuremberg means justice. The history becomes shorthand. Shorthand becomes doctrine. Doctrine closes the mind to the next event, which is never quite the same as the last one. The best historical thinking does the opposite of all this. It makes shorthand impossible. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/08/The-Discipline-of-Resistance_BC-1.png)](https://link.amazon/B0iCWGkm8?ref=diplopolis.com) Malchow, Walter S. Dickson Professor of English and American History at Tufts University, writes from the historian's side of a disciplinary divide that has rarely been crossed with sufficient honesty in either direction. His book is framed as an introduction to international relations from a historian's perspective, covering the development of IR theory from its origins to the present day, the key moments in war and peace that shaped the discipline and the relationship between historical narrative and theoretical abstraction. That framing is deliberately pedagogical, aimed at students of both history and IR who need to understand what each discipline can offer the other. But beneath the pedagogical surface lies a more uncomfortable argument: that IR has been shaped by the history it claims to study, and that it often does not know this about itself. That is the most important insight in the book, and it is worth dwelling on before discussing its limits. Realism did not fall from the sky. It emerged from the ruins of idealism after the Second World War, from the intellectual trauma of watching liberal internationalism fail to prevent catastrophe and from the anxieties of American power in an unstable world. Liberalism in IR carries the optimism of post-war institution-building and the ideological commitments of the Cold War. Constructivism emerged partly as a response to the failure of both realism and liberalism to anticipate the peaceful end of the Cold War. Every major IR theory is, in this sense, a historical document as much as an analytical framework. It carries the fears, the hopes, the blind spots and the political circumstances of the moment that produced it. Malchow's insistence on historicising IR itself, rather than simply deploying history as IR's raw material, is the book's genuine intellectual contribution. This is where the DiploPolis reading pushes beyond what Malchow articulates. History does not merely need to be better integrated into IR. It needs to interrupt IR's appetite for simplification. The disciplinary habit is not just that IR uses too little history. It is that the history IR uses has already been processed through theoretical categories that predetermine what that history means. The Cuban Missile Crisis becomes a game-theoretic problem. The Congress of Vienna becomes a case study in successful balance-of-power management. The Rwandan genocide becomes a failure of collective security. Each framing captures something real. Each one also loses something irretrievable: the human interior of the event, the contingency of the outcome, the possibility that different actors, different weather, different timing would have produced a different result. Serious historical thinking resists that kind of retrospective tidiness. A historian reading the same events inhabits their uncertainty rather than explaining it away. The Cuban Missile Crisis could have ended in nuclear war and very nearly did, and that near-miss matters more for how we should understand deterrence than the clean rational-actor narrative that IR absorbed from the event afterwards. The Congress of Vienna was shaped by personal animosities, physical exhaustion, ballroom politics and the specific limitations of the men in the room in ways that any theory of great power management needs to acknowledge. History makes the argument that things could have been different. Theory, too often, implies they could not have been anything else. Malchow's second edition expanded its treatment of non-Western history and its critique of the Eurocentric nature of IR theory and practice. That expansion is valuable and the book is better for it. But the review should say clearly what acknowledging Eurocentrism does not do. Western IR's problem with non-Western history is not simply that it has paid too little attention to it. It is that when it does pay attention, it tends to process what it finds through categories the non-Western world had no hand in building. China becomes a case for power transition theory. India becomes a case for non-alignment or rising-power behaviour, its thousand years of precolonial diplomacy, its maritime trade networks, its traditions of interstate conduct all compressed into the question of how a postcolonial democracy fits inside a Western-designed international order. The Middle East becomes a case for sectarianism or state failure. Africa becomes a case for weak states or postcolonial disorder. The local history is invited into the theory only after the theory has already decided what kind of history it is. That is not engagement. It is absorption. The deeper methodological point is one that the best historical scholarship about South Asia, Africa and the Middle East has been making for decades: the categories themselves are historical, and their origins are not neutral. Sovereignty, the state, the balance of power, anarchy, national interest, deterrence: these concepts were forged in European wars, European diplomacy and European philosophy. When IR applies them universally, it is not simply describing the world as it is. It is describing the world as it was shaped by European power, then presenting that description as objective analysis. History, properly used, would show this. It would make the categories themselves strange rather than transparent. *History and International Relations* is a serious and useful book. It is most valuable for readers coming to IR theory for the first time who need to understand what kind of intellectual enterprise they are entering and why the theories they are about to learn look the way they do. Read it for the historicisation of IR itself, which is the book's best argument. Read it for the critique of Eurocentrism, which points in the right direction even if it does not travel far enough. Then press the argument further than Malchow takes it. The book earns that pressure by asking the right question, and the right question is worth asking as forcefully as possible. History is not a warehouse of examples. It is a discipline of resistance. It resists false analogy, premature pattern and the theorist's desire to make the world simpler than it is. The greatest service a historian can do for international relations is not to provide better case studies. It is to insist, again and again, that Munich was not a lesson. It was a moment. And moments, unlike lessons, cannot be applied. This Book Review is free to read. Future Books Reviews will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Dangerously Low. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/dangerously-low-iran-war-missile-interceptors-thaad-patriot-depleted/ Last updated: 2026-08-05T06:27:24.000Z Before the latest pause in bombing, Gen. Dan Caine told a White House meeting that interceptors available to CENTCOM were running out. It was the second time in recent weeks the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs had raised the stockpile concern during a military options discussion with the president. On Tuesday, [CNN confirmed](https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/04/politics/us-iran-key-missile-interceptors-low?ref=diplopolis.com) what Caine was measuring: the US military has burned through nearly four-fifths of its THAAD missile interceptor inventory since February 28\. It has used more than half of its Patriot interceptors. The Pentagon entered the Iran war with 452 THAAD missiles and approximately 2,200 of its most modernised Patriot variants. Nearly four-fifths of the THAAD stockpile is gone. Fewer than 827 Patriots remain. Each interceptor costs millions of dollars. Both take years to produce. The White House spokesperson said this week that the US military 'has more than enough munitions, ammo, and stockpiles to serve all of President Trump's strategic goals and beyond.' Caine told senators last week that without the additional funding the Pentagon is requesting, the military 'will not get the munitions it needs.' Trump said the inventories are 'in very good shape.' Trump has also requested $67 billion in supplemental defence funding, a substantial portion of which is to replace the munitions the Iran war has consumed. These statements were all made by people who had access to the same inventory report. Some were more accurate than others. The most specific operational consequence of the depletion has gone largely unreported. [CNN confirmed this week](https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/04/world/live-news/iran-war-trump?ref=diplopolis.com) that US commanders are now choosing which Iranian projectiles to intercept and which to let through. Commanders are opting not to shoot down Iranian missiles and drones on track to hit unpopulated areas of US military bases — specifically to conserve interceptors for projectiles that would hit populated or critical areas. American military bases are being struck by Iranian missiles that the US has decided not to intercept. The decision is not incapacity. It is triage. The interceptors are too valuable to use on empty ground. The [Center for Strategic and International Studies](https://www.stripes.com/theaters/middle%5Feast/2026-07-30/iran-war-missile-stockpiles-patriots-22406307.html?ref=diplopolis.com), whose July 27 report the Pentagon sources confirmed was close to internal government figures, offered the most direct assessment of what the depletion means: 'Diminished stockpiles may force the United States and its coalition partners to take more risks with interceptions. There are no good alternatives to Patriot and THAAD for ballistic missile defense.' The replenishment rate makes the timeline clear: the Pentagon is currently receiving roughly 15 new Tomahawks and 20 new Patriot missiles per month. At that rate, rebuilding THAAD inventories to pre-war levels will take three or more years. The war consumed them in five months. The retired Marine Corps colonel who led the CSIS analysis went further. Continued fighting with Iran, he told CNN, could deplete stockpiles to the point where the US military's ability to fight a future war with China or North Korea would be compromised. The war launched to prevent one nuclear threat has consumed the principal defensive instruments with which the United States would respond to three others. Gulf allies have also raised concerns. Countries hosting US military bases — the same countries that have been intercepting Iranian missiles aimed at their own infrastructure — are watching the interceptor supply deplete and asking what happens when it runs out. 'The lack of interceptors means that conventional attacks can backfire if the suicide drones start making it through en masse,' one source familiar with the stockpile concerns told CNN. The sentence is precise. If Iran launches enough simultaneous projectiles, the US and its allies can no longer guarantee that all of them will be stopped. The mathematics of the depleted inventory is not theoretical. It is operational. The war that was going to be over in two to three weeks (Trump, April 1) and has cost $37.5 billion (Hegseth, July 21) has burned through nearly four-fifths of America's THAAD interceptors and more than half of its Patriots. The Defence Department has accelerated production — new deals for Patriot and THAAD rocket motor manufacturing were signed this week. But analysts say it will take three or more years to rebuild the THAAD inventory to pre-war levels. The war consumed it in five months. Dangerously low. That is what the commanders called it in the White House meetings. More than enough. That is what the spokesperson said in public. Both used the same numbers. Only one described them accurately. ### What the State Knew URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/beirut-port-explosion-sixth-anniversary-accountability-what-state-knew/ Last updated: 2026-08-05T07:26:05.000Z At exactly 6:07 PM on August 4, 2020, 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate stored in Hangar 12 at the Port of Beirut ignited. The blast killed more than 220 people, wounded more than 6,500, levelled entire neighbourhoods and shattered windows as far away as Cyprus. It was one of the largest non-nuclear explosions in modern history. Fifteen days before it happened, Lebanon's State Security sent a three-page report to President Michel Aoun and Prime Minister Hassan Diab. [The report warned that ammonium nitrate 'that could be used to make explosives' was being stored at the port](https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/08/04/lebanon-marks-sixth-anniversary-of-beirut-port-blast-as-calls-for-justice-continue/?ref=diplopolis.com). Both Aoun and Diab later admitted to having received it. Both said they took no action. Fifteen days later, the nitrate exploded. Today, on the sixth anniversary of the blast, [Hiyam al-Bikai stood at the port](https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/six-years-after-beirut-port-blast-victims-families-say-wound-has-not-healed-2-1.500630557?ref=diplopolis.com) carrying a photograph of her son Ahmad. 'Until now, we haven't gotten justice. There has been no accountability and nobody has been arrested,' she told AFP. 'This is an extremely painful anniversary. Our pain has not stopped and our wound has not healed.' No one is in custody in Lebanon in connection with the explosion. No indictment has been issued. The public prosecutor is, according to the justice minister, preparing his response. This is not the story of a country that tried to find accountability and failed. It is the story of a country whose political system treated accountability as a threat to be managed and, for six years, managed it successfully. ## **The Letter and What Was Done With It** The July 20 warning letter is the factual core of the Beirut explosion case, and it has received less attention than it deserves. It means that the Lebanese head of state and the Lebanese prime minister possessed specific written intelligence that explosive material capable of mass destruction was being stored improperly in a busy commercial port, in the centre of the capital, fifteen days before that material exploded and killed 220 of their citizens. What the warning produced was not an inspection, not an emergency removal order, not a public safety alert. It produced nothing. The material stayed. The port stayed open. The people of Beirut went about their lives without being told that their government had received a warning about a bomb in their harbour. What makes this significant is that it transforms the nature of what occurred on August 4, 2020\. The explosion was not simply a consequence of negligence accumulated over years of corrupt port management, though it was also that. It was a consequence of a specific decision — or more precisely, a specific failure to decide — made within the period covered by documentation. That documentation exists. That documentation names the people who received it. Those people have acknowledged receiving it. The investigation that Judge Tarek Bitar has spent years trying to complete covers the 70 individuals whose alleged offences include this chain of events. The investigation's obstruction has therefore never been a mystery about the past. It has been a very clear calculation about the present: those with the power to block accountability are also among those the accountability might reach. ## **The Six-Year Machine** The [legal and political mechanisms used to obstruct the investigation](https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/8/4/six-years-after-beirut-blast-families-fight-for-truth?ref=diplopolis.com) constitute a documented record of institutional self-preservation. The most damaging single actor was Prosecutor General Ghassan Oueidat — who was himself indicted on negligence charges in connection with the blast — and who used his powers to systematically obstruct Bitar's investigation: releasing suspects, banning law enforcement from executing Bitar's orders and filing a lawsuit against Bitar for usurpation of power. Oueidat retired in 2024\. His successor Jamal Hajjar lifted the ban on cooperation in 2025\. Beyond Oueidat, politicians challenged Bitar's jurisdiction, former ministers filed legal complaints against him, parliamentary immunity was invoked to prevent questioning, and legal challenges accumulated faster than the investigation could process them. The 'state within the state' — the phrase Joe Bou Saab, whose brother died in the blast, used to describe the coordinated obstruction — operated not through violence or overt illegality but through the country's own judicial and parliamentary procedures, applied strategically to produce paralysis. Bou Saab has attended almost every protest since the explosion and himself faced questioning and detention over demonstrations opposing political interference. [Looking back on six years](https://www.newarab.com/news/beirut-port-blast-families-hope-justice-finally-within-reach?ref=diplopolis.com), he described them as the hardest of his life. 'We were fought by the state and by the state within the state,' he said. 'The past six years have aged me by decades. But they also taught me to keep fighting until I reach my goal, both in life and for my brother Joe.' The system he describes is not unique to the Beirut explosion. It is the operational logic of Lebanese confessional politics — the arrangement in which sectarian patronage networks, overlapping with parliamentary blocs, militia power and commercial interests, produce a governing class whose primary loyalty is to the system's preservation rather than to any citizen it nominally serves. Accountability for the port explosion would require the system to turn on itself. For six years, it did not. A turning point came, cautiously, in early 2025\. The election of President Joseph Aoun and the formation of a government under Prime Minister Nawaf Salam introduced, for the first time in the investigation's history, a political leadership that was not implicated in the obstruction and that explicitly promised accountability. Bitar resumed his probe. [In March 2026, he submitted an investigative report to Lebanon's public prosecutor's office](https://www.unionleader.com/news/courts/six-years-on-families-of-those-killed-in-huge-lebanon-port-blast-hope-for-justice/article%5F3a615394-e384-5a45-8913-5bfbfa895f1c.html?ref=diplopolis.com), naming 70 individuals for various offences. The case is now with the prosecutor. Justice Minister Adel Nassar told AFP on Tuesday that a decision is expected within 60 to 90 days, after which the case returns to Bitar for the formal indictment act — the step that triggers the trial. Families hope the indictment arrives before the end of 2026. Salam spoke at today's commemoration. 'Let no one doubt that there is no cover for any official, whatever their position,' he said. 'Accountability will spare no one.' The commitment is the right commitment. The question it leaves open is whether the system Salam now governs is capable of delivering what it has spent six years refusing to deliver. The prosecutor has had Bitar's report for several months. The 60 to 90 day response window is now running. The cautious optimism the families feel is real. So is the record that produced the caution. ## **The Anniversary That Was Overshadowed** Cecile Roukoz, a lawyer whose brother died in the blast, told the crowd at the port today: 'No matter how bad the painful circumstances in Lebanon become... the crime of August 4 is not behind us. Knowing the truth and holding the criminals to account remains the priority.' The specific phrase — how bad the painful circumstances become — is not abstract. [Al Jazeera's Zeina Khodr could not be at the Beirut commemoration today](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/4/beirut-port-blast-anniversary-overshadowed-by-new-wave-of-destruction?ref=diplopolis.com). She was in Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh, in southern Lebanon, where Israeli military operations have reduced houses to rubble and driven residents from their homes. She watched an 80-year-old man stand in front of what had been his house and say: 'I feel humiliated. I have no choice but to collect the scrap metal from my destroyed home to sell in order to be able to survive.' He was describing, in specific and personal terms, the cost of a state that has been unable to protect him from external destruction any more than it was able to protect the 220 people who died at the port from internal negligence. The two stories running simultaneously today — the sixth anniversary of the blast, the ongoing displacement of more than a million people from southern Lebanon — are not separate. They are expressions of the same structural condition. A state that cannot account for a catastrophe it was warned about cannot build the institutions that would give it sufficient sovereignty to resist being treated as a battlefield by stronger powers. Lebanon's accountability failure and Lebanon's sovereignty failure grow from the same root. The reconstruction bill from the latest Israeli military escalation alone is estimated at $20 billion. Lebanon's government does not have $20 billion. International donors have made reconstruction aid conditional on the disarmament of Hezbollah — using the human cost of the war as leverage in a political negotiation. The World Bank estimated losses from the 2024 escalation at $11 billion, money the government also did not have, reconstruction that had not begun before the next escalation made it redundant. The Lebanese army deployed to some southern villages in late July, and residents returned to inspect ruins that Israeli forces had continued to demolish even after the ceasefire was declared. The municipality head in al-Mansouri told Khodr: 'The Israelis drop stun grenades every time someone tries to reach those areas. Every day there is machinegun fire around the village. There is no stability.' On the sixth anniversary of the port explosion, Lebanon is simultaneously trying to hold its political class accountable for a disaster they were warned about and trying to survive a military occupation whose destructive logic mirrors the impunity the political class has always assumed for itself. The victims at the port and the old man in Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh are living inside the same failure: a state that knows what is being done to its people and either will not or cannot act. ## **The Indictment That Has Not Come** Bitar's referral to the public prosecutor in March 2026 is the most significant development in the investigation since it began. Seventy individuals. Six years of work. The families hope the indictment comes this year. The Justice Minister says 60 to 90 days. What the indictment will not undo is the six years in which it did not come. The obstruction was not merely a delay. It was an education — for Lebanese citizens, for the political class, for every government anywhere that chooses self-preservation over accountability. The lesson the obstruction delivered is that a sufficiently entrenched political system can survive almost any catastrophe if it controls the institutions that would investigate it. The lesson the investigation's survival delivered, against that, is that families who refuse to stop demanding accountability eventually exhaust the machine's willingness to keep blocking them. Both lessons are true. Lebanon has lived both of them simultaneously, in front of the whole world, for six years. The families are still at the port. The public prosecutor is still preparing his response. The man in Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh is still collecting scrap metal from his house. The state knew about the nitrate for fifteen days before it exploded, and said nothing. Six years later, it is still preparing its response. This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### A Home on Qeshm. No Court to Say So. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/home-on-qeshm-no-court-to-say-so-mark-84-icc-dismantled/ Last updated: 2026-08-04T05:35:40.000Z The [New York Times published a visual investigation Monday](https://www.khaleejtimes.com/world/americas/nyt-analysis-visuals-suggest-us-dropped-2000-pound-bomb-iran-home-3-killed?ref=diplopolis.com) based on satellite imagery, weapons analysis and video footage from Qeshm Island. The investigation found that the US dropped a Mark 84 bomb — a 2,000-pound conventional munition — on a family home on July 29\. Iranian officials confirmed the deaths: a husband, a wife and their two-year-old son. The crater and munitions fragments confirmed the weapon. The Times found no evidence of military facilities near the target site. US Central Command said it was 'looking into reports of civilian casualties.' DiploPolis [named them on July 30](https://www.diplopolis.com/the-child-was-two-heavy-wave-strikes-iran-qeshm-july-30/). We wrote: 'A couple and their two-year-old child were killed when a US missile struck a residential building on Qeshm island. CENTCOM called it successful.' We did not know then what the NYT confirmed Monday: the weapon used was a Mark 84\. It weighs 2,000 pounds. It was used on a home containing a family. Weapons experts who examined the satellite imagery determined the bomb had been fitted with a Joint Direct Attack Munition guidance kit — a device that converts an unguided bomb into one guided by GPS. A Mark 84 fitted with a JDAM guidance kit is precision-guided. The precision guided it to a home. According to a US Army office that manages ammunition for the Pentagon, bombs of this size are typically meant for targets such as buildings, rail yards and transportation routes. The home on Qeshm is confirmed as the building that was targeted. CENTCOM is reviewing it. On the same Friday that the NYT's visual journalists were verifying munitions fragments in satellite imagery, Trump [confirmed on camera at Camp David](https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2026-07-31/trump-says-icc-campaign-aimed-at-defending-netanyahu-not-himself?ref=diplopolis.com) that the US campaign to dismantle the International Criminal Court was specifically intended to defend Netanyahu from prosecution. He said: 'There's no information that they're after me. He's trying to defend Bibi and various other people.' Rubio told the cabinet that five countries had announced plans to quit the court since the US campaign launched. The ICC's chief prosecutor has been removed. The campaign, in Trump's own words, is for Netanyahu. The ICC exists to investigate exactly what the NYT documented. Article 51 of the Geneva Protocols prohibits attacks which cannot distinguish between civilian objects and military targets. The Times found no military targets near the Qeshm home. The ICJ found in January 2024 that it was plausible that acts of genocide were being committed in Gaza. These are not abstract legal propositions. They are the institutional framework built specifically for situations in which a state drops a 2,000-pound bomb on a family home and then says it is looking into whether civilians were harmed. The court that would examine the Mark 84 crater on Qeshm is being disassembled. Its prosecutor has been removed. Five countries are leaving it under American encouragement. The country that dropped the bomb is the country dismantling the court. Trump confirmed the purpose: to defend the ally. The ally's military and America's military launched the war together on February 28\. The bomb on Qeshm was part of the war. The court that would be asked about the bomb on Qeshm is being taken apart. The sequence is not coincidental. It is structural. This is impunity described from the inside. Not claimed, not inferred — stated. Trump said the ICC campaign is for Netanyahu. Netanyahu's government and Trump's government launched the war together. The NYT found a 2,000-pound bomb in the crater where a family home used to be. The Times found no military facilities near the site. CENTCOM said it is looking into civilian casualties. No institution exists with the authority to compel a different answer. Five countries are in the process of ensuring that no such institution will exist in the near future. Rubio said it would be dismantled brick by brick. The bricks are coming down. The couple on Qeshm are dead. Their two-year-old is dead. The NYT confirmed the bomb and found no military target near the home. Trump confirmed the court's purpose. CENTCOM is looking into it. That sentence — looking into it — is what happens when the court that says otherwise is being deliberately dismantled. ### Morocco Sat on Its Hands. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/morocco-sat-on-its-hands-ceuta-crisis-spain-2026/ Last updated: 2026-08-03T18:59:53.000Z By Friday morning, an estimated 60,000 people had crossed from Morocco into Ceuta — the Spanish city of 84,000 on the North African coast. At least 72 died in the crossing. Spain's Interior Minister said 'almost all' had been returned to Morocco by Saturday and the situation had practically returned to normal. [Ignacio Cembrero](https://www.thelocal.es/20260731/why-did-morocco-open-the-border-to-migrants-at-spains-ceuta-enclave/?ref=diplopolis.com), a Spanish journalist who has covered migration in North Africa for decades, offered a more precise description of how the crossing happened. Morocco's security forces, which routinely deploy along the border in depth and stop crossings as a matter of standard procedure, had been 'sitting on their hands' since Wednesday. Ceuta's borders are among the most surveilled in the world. 60,000 people crossed them in three days. The fences did not fail. The people who operate the other side of them did not deploy. This is not a border crisis. It is a diplomatic instrument that happens to require human beings to function. Morocco has used it before. [In May 2021, approximately 8,000 people crossed into Ceuta](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021%5FMorocco%E2%80%93Spain%5Fborder%5Fincident?ref=diplopolis.com) in a matter of days following a diplomatic dispute between Rabat and Madrid over Spain's hospitalisation of the leader of the Polisario Front. Morocco's security forces sat on their hands that time too. Spain's Defence Minister accused Morocco of 'blackmail.' The crossing ended when Spain adjusted its position. Ceuta is one of Morocco's most consistent pieces of leverage — not because Morocco lacks the ability to prevent crossings, but because it retains the ability to allow them. The ability to open a border is as much a tool of state power as the ability to close one. The question is what the leverage was for this time. In the weeks before the crossing, Spain's Supreme Court had ruled that migrants intercepted at sea while attempting to reach Ceuta and Melilla could no longer be automatically returned to Morocco — a legal constraint that gave Morocco additional room to calculate the consequences of loosening border controls. Spain's recent foreign policy record provides the wider context, even if the causal link is unconfirmed. Spain refused to let a US-flagged cargo ship carrying weapons for Israel dock at Algeciras in 2024\. It called the US-Israel war on Iran illegal under international law. Its prime minister said it was a sovereign country that does not take part in illegal wars. In June, Pete Hegseth placed the Rota naval base under a six-month review and called Spanish allies 'shameful' for declining to support the war. Iran placed the Spanish prime minister in an orange prison uniform on its Hamshahri kill list. [Al Jazeera](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/2/why-has-the-eu-called-an-emergency-meeting-on-spain-migrants-surge?ref=diplopolis.com), covering the crossing, reported directly that some observers said Morocco may have orchestrated the incident under encouragement from Washington and Israel, both of which had openly criticised Spain. This has not been confirmed. What has been confirmed is that Morocco's security forces did not deploy, that Morocco has a documented history of using the Ceuta border as a pressure instrument, and that Spain is the European government most visibly at odds with Washington and Jerusalem on the war. Trump did not wait to see what the evidence said. On Friday, [he called the Ceuta crossing 'an invasion of a country'](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/31/spain-pm-to-visit-ceuta-after-19-migrants-die-breaching-border-from-morocco?ref=diplopolis.com) and told his cabinet at Camp David that the same thing would happen to the United States 'if the Republicans don't get elected, except worse, much bigger.' The US State Department raised its travel advisory for Ceuta to Level 3\. Whatever caused the crossing, its domestic political uses in Washington were immediate, specific and entirely predictable. The EU's response has been to call an emergency meeting about migration. 22 of 27 member states issued a joint letter calling for 'coordinated action and the strengthening of external borders.' Italy called for Spain's suspension from the Schengen zone. France quintupled police at its Spanish border. The emergency meeting is not about Morocco's decision to sit on its hands. It is not about whether a state actor may have deliberately opened a border to exert diplomatic pressure. It is about migration — which is to say, it accepts the premise that Spain's failure to control its border is the problem, rather than Morocco's deliberate failure to control the other side of it. [Karel Lannoo](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/2/why-has-the-eu-called-an-emergency-meeting-on-spain-migrants-surge?ref=diplopolis.com), CEO of the Centre for European Policy Studies, told Al Jazeera: 'There has been a concerted action by countries which are basically enemies to Europe to try to undermine European unity in one of the areas where Europe's unity is one of the weakest, migration, and where it's the easiest to exploit European disunity.' The 22 states who signed the emergency letter are meeting to discuss stronger fences. The stronger fence, in this case, is not on Spain's side of the border. Morocco already has the fence. It chose not to use it for three days. Spain said no to the war. It said no to the weapons ship. It said no to the illegal strikes. 72 people died crossing the water into Ceuta. The EU is meeting Tuesday about Europe's borders. Morocco is, as of Saturday, a reliable partner again — Spanish Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska said so himself. The hands have been picked up from where they were sitting. The instrument has been returned to its case. ### Rhodes Scholarship 2027: What the Selection Committee Actually Wants URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/rhodes-scholarship-2027-application-guide-selection-committee/ Last updated: 2026-07-31T20:00:12.000Z Last Saturday, this Dossier covered Chevening. If you read that piece, one distinction between the two scholarships matters more than any other: Chevening selects for what you will do — your career plan, your leadership record, your vision for impact at home. Rhodes selects for who you are. The committee is not investing in a project. It is investing in a person. That difference shapes every element of the application, and most guides about the Rhodes do not name it clearly enough for it to be useful. Applications for [the Rhodes Scholarship 2027](https://www.rhodeshouse.ox.ac.uk/scholarships/the-rhodes-scholarship/?ref=diplopolis.com) are open now. The India constituency closed on 23 July 2026 — if you are applying from India, this year's window has passed. Use this guide to prepare for the 2028 cycle. Most other constituencies remain open through August, September and October 2026, including Pakistan, Kenya, South Africa, Ghana and, for US applicants, through 7 October 2026\. Check your exact constituency date on the [Rhodes Trust eligibility checker](https://www.rhodeshouse.ox.ac.uk/scholarships/am-i-eligible/?ref=diplopolis.com) before reading further. This guide covers what the selection committee is actually evaluating, the specific mistakes that eliminate strong candidates, and what the other guides — written primarily for American applicants navigating a US campus endorsement system — do not tell you if you are applying from the Global South. ## What Rhodes Actually Is The Rhodes Scholarship is the oldest international postgraduate scholarship in the world, established in 1903 under the will of Cecil John Rhodes. Approximately [100 scholars](https://www.rhodeshouse.ox.ac.uk/scholarships/the-rhodes-scholarship/?ref=diplopolis.com) are selected annually from more than 60 countries for full-time postgraduate study at the University of Oxford. The scholarship covers all University and College fees, an annual stipend of £20,400 for the 2025-26 academic year, paid at £1,700 per month, two economy flights, the student visa fee, the International Health Surcharge and a settling-in allowance. For courses that extend to a DPhil, up to three years of fees and stipend is available. Rhodes is a leadership development programme with an extraordinarily long time horizon. The Trust is selecting the people it believes will become significant public figures over a 40-year career. It is not selecting the most academically accomplished graduates. It is selecting the graduates who demonstrate, through their academic record, their character and their engagement with the world around them, the qualities most likely to produce consequential lives. Rhodes Scholars include former US President Bill Clinton, former Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke, astrophysicist Edwin Hubble and several hundred other leaders across government, science, law, journalism and public life across every inhabited continent. The selection criteria have not changed since 1902\. They come directly from Rhodes's will: literary and scholastic attainment; energy to use one's talents to the full; truth, courage and moral force of character; and a commitment to making a positive difference in the world. These four criteria are assessed simultaneously across every element of the application. Understanding what they mean in practice, rather than as a checklist, is the difference between a formulaic application and a genuinely competitive one. ## What the Selection Is Actually Looking For Most applicants understand, intellectually, that Rhodes cares about character. Fewer understand what character means in this context. It does not mean a record of kindness or good intentions. It means evidence, across the full arc of the application, of a person who has engaged seriously with the world beyond their immediate obligations and who has done so from genuine conviction rather than résumé construction. The committee is specifically looking for intellectual curiosity that exceeds the demands of the academic programme. Your transcript tells the committee your grades. The personal statement is where you show them what your grades cannot: the questions that kept you engaged beyond your coursework, the research you pursued because you needed to understand something, the moment an idea changed how you think about your entire field. Candidates who treat academic excellence as the foundation and then build a leadership narrative on top of it are structurally misconfiguring their applications. Excellence and character are not separate requirements. They are expected to appear as expressions of the same underlying person. The committee is also specifically assessing what the Rhodes Trust calls 'energy to use one's talents to the full'. This is not about how much you have done. It is about how actively you have sought out situations that tested you. A candidate who graduated top of their class at a well-resourced institution and then immediately applied for the Rhodes has a weaker application than a candidate who graduated with equivalent marks and then spent two years doing something with those marks outside a classroom. This is not the same as Chevening's work experience requirement: there is no minimum hour count. It is an assessment of orientation. Are you someone who uses your abilities, or someone who accumulates credentials? ## The Personal Statement: The New Prompts and What the Committee Is Moving Away From The Rhodes Trust substantially revised its personal statement guidance following a review of applications going back to the 1930s. The review found that personal statements had become [increasingly formulaic over the past 10 to 15 years](https://uess.uoregon.edu/rhodes-trust-new-personal-statement-guidance?ref=diplopolis.com), with a growing genre of what the Trust called 'pathos' narratives: statements focused on overcoming adversity or performing heroic problem-solving. This was, the review noted, in marked contrast to earlier decades where candidates were more likely to write about what they hoped to learn at Oxford. The revised prompts ask applicants to reflect in three voices: self, others and world. Which Rhodes Scholar quality do you display most strongly, and how are other contexts and people helping you develop it? What do you hope to contribute to the world? The structure is intentionally designed to move away from the singular focus on the 'heroic self' that coaching culture has produced. What this means practically: if your personal statement is built around a narrative of adversity overcome, reconsider it. If your statement is built around a list of accomplishments delivered, also reconsider it. The committee wants to encounter a person who is thinking seriously about who they are, what has shaped them, what they owe to the people around them and how they intend to use what Oxford gives them. Humility and intellectual seriousness are not weaknesses here. They are the correct register. One requirement that separates the Rhodes personal statement from almost every other scholarship application is its strict stance on external assistance. While candidates are permitted to discuss ideas and seek broad feedback on clarity from mentors, no third party, nor any Generative AI tool, is permitted to edit, rewrite or draft any portion of the statement. Applicants must submit a formal statement of authenticity detailing any assistance or tools used. The committee reads the statement knowing it is unassisted, and they are reading for exactly the kind of authentic voice that coaching cannot produce. ## The Academic Statement: A Different Job From the Personal Statement Most constituencies require both a personal statement and an academic statement of study: a document explaining what you plan to study at Oxford and why. These are two different documents with two different functions, and applications that blur them are weaker for it. The academic statement should address three things with precision: what you plan to study, why Oxford specifically is the right place to study it, and how it connects to the work you intend to do in the world. The last of these is the most important and the most frequently omitted. Oxford is one of the world's great universities, but 'Oxford is excellent' is not a reason that distinguishes you as a candidate. What distinguishes you is the specific intellectual problem you are pursuing, the specific Oxford programme or supervisor whose work intersects with yours, and the specific way in which that research will inform what you do after Oxford. The personal statement and the academic statement should be coherent. A committee reading both should encounter the same person: the same values, the same intellectual interests, the same sense of what matters. Candidates who write a leadership-focused personal statement and then an academically detached study plan reveal that the two documents were written by different versions of the same person. The coherent application is the one where the course choice appears to follow naturally from who the candidate already is. ## The Interview: What to Expect and How to Prepare Shortlisted candidates are invited to [an interview of 20 to 25 minutes](https://www.karangupta.com/blog/rhodes-scholarship-from-india-selection-process-preparation-and-what-it-takes-to?ref=diplopolis.com) with a selection committee. In most constituencies, there is also an informal social event the evening before or on the day of the interview. Both are assessed. The way you engage with other candidates and committee members outside the formal interview is part of the evaluation. The formal interview is drawn directly from your application materials. The committee will probe the academic statement: expect rigorous questioning on your field that tests genuine understanding rather than rehearsed summary. They will probe the personal statement: expect questions about specific experiences you cited, asking for detail and reflection that goes beyond what you were able to include on the page. They will test current affairs relevant to your field and your region. And they will test how you handle challenge: a question framed to be provocative, a position pushed back against, an unexpected topic introduced to see how you think under pressure. The interview is not designed to catch you out. It is designed to find out whether the person they have been reading about in the application is the person sitting across the table. Candidates who fail the interview typically do so because their application contained claims the interview exposed as exaggerated or performed. The most effective interview preparation is not rehearsing answers. It is ensuring that the application is honest enough that any question about it can be answered by the person who wrote it. ## What Global South Applicants Specifically Need to Know Rhodes constituency allocations are small. [India has five scholarships annually](https://www.nriaffairs.com/rhodes-scholarship-2027-india/?ref=diplopolis.com). Pakistan, Kenya, South Africa and Ghana each have two to four. The US, with 32 scholarships, has a radically different competitive landscape: the 32 positions are spread across 16 regional districts, each selecting two scholars from a smaller pool than the national competition in most other constituencies. For a Global South applicant, the raw number of places is smaller than it appears in global coverage of the scholarship. The institutional endorsement requirement varies by constituency and this matters. US and Canadian applicants must be endorsed by their universities before applying to the Rhodes Trust: the institution's fellowships office is a gatekeeper, and many universities have internal deadlines months before the national deadline. Most other constituencies, including India, Pakistan and the African constituencies, allow direct application to the Rhodes Trust without institutional endorsement. If you are applying from a constituency where direct application is permitted, the absence of an institutional endorsement process means the application is entirely your own, which is both an opportunity and a responsibility. The age requirement is one of the sharpest constraints in the Global South context. Most constituencies require applicants to be 18 to 24 years old on 1 October of the application year. Some extend this to 27 for candidates who completed undergraduate study recently. The India constituency in the 2027 cycle requires applicants to be aged 18 to 23 on 1 October 2026, with an extension to 27 for those who completed their first undergraduate degree on or after 1 October 2025\. If you are 25 or older and are not covered by an age extension, you cannot apply through most constituencies. This is the single most common eligibility mistake in Global South applications, and it is irreversible: no appeal process exists. PIO and OCI cardholders are not eligible through the India constituency. If you hold such status but have studied or lived in another constituency, consult the Rhodes Trust eligibility checker to determine whether an alternative or Global route is available to you. You can apply a [maximum of two times in your lifetime](https://leapscholar.com/blog/rhodes-scholarship-for-india-eligibility-application-selection/?ref=diplopolis.com), and only within the same constituency. Treat each application deliberately. A Rhodes application prepared over three months is structurally weaker than one prepared over a year. The candidates who succeed are rarely the ones who applied fastest. They are the ones who gave the committee the most genuine access to who they actually are. ## What Rhodes Does Not Cover and What Chevening Does Three differences matter for any applicant comparing the two scholarships. The first is the return commitment: Chevening requires you to go home for two years after Oxford; Rhodes does not. If your career involves working internationally immediately after your degree, that distinction is worth thinking through before you decide which scholarship to prioritise. The second is coverage: Rhodes funds Oxford only, while Chevening covers any eligible UK university. If the programme or supervisor you want is at LSE, King's or Bristol, Chevening is the right scholarship and Rhodes is simply not applicable. The third difference is the one most guides omit entirely. Being selected as a Rhodes Scholar [does not automatically mean Oxford has admitted you](https://scholarshipscorner.website/rhodes-scholarship-application-guide/?ref=diplopolis.com). Following selection, you must apply to Oxford separately and satisfy their academic requirements independently. Not every selected scholar receives an offer for their first-choice course. Research Oxford's entry requirements for your intended programme before writing your academic statement, not after you have been selected. ## The Timeline for 2027 Entry **Applications open:** June 2026 (most constituencies — already open) **India constituency closed:** 23 July 2026 **US constituency closes:** 7 October 2026 at 23:59 Eastern Time **Canada closes:** 24 September 2026 at 23:59 Pacific Time **Most other constituencies:** August to October 2026 — confirm your exact date on [rhodeshouse.ox.ac.uk](https://www.rhodeshouse.ox.ac.uk/?ref=diplopolis.com) **Interviews:** October to December 2026 **Selections announced:** November to December 2026 **Oxford application deadline:** Following selection, applicants apply to Oxford with Trust support — check Oxford's individual programme deadlines, most of which fall January to March 2027\. This step surprises many selected scholars who assumed selection meant admission. It does not. **Studies begin:** October 2027 The scholarship cannot be deferred. If you are selected and cannot begin at Oxford in October 2027, you lose the scholarship. There are no exceptions. If you have military service obligations, a medical situation or another commitment that might prevent a 2027 start, think carefully about timing before you apply rather than after you are selected. The Trust has heard every reason. None of them change the rule. 🚧 **Scholarship terms, application dates and constituency eligibility requirements change each cycle. The India 2027 deadline has passed. All other deadlines in this guide should be verified on the official Rhodes Trust website at* [**rhodeshouse.ox.ac.uk*](https://www.rhodeshouse.ox.ac.uk/?ref=diplopolis.com)**. If you spot an error or an outdated detail in this piece, write to* [**editor@diplopolis.com*](mailto:editor@diplopolis.com) *and we will correct it promptly.* This Dossier piece is free to read. Future Dossier pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Unwinnable. Profitable. Expanding. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/unwinnable-profitable-expanding-iran-war-154-days/ Last updated: 2026-07-31T10:51:35.000Z Saudi Arabia's Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman [told JD Vance this week](https://www.axios.com/2026/07/29/saudi-arabia-iraq-strikes-vance-deescalation-iran?ref=diplopolis.com) that Riyadh favours de-escalation with Iran. That sentence requires a moment. Saudi Arabia has conducted joint strikes with the United States on Iranian proxy militias in Iraq. It has absorbed Houthi drone attacks on its oil facilities for months. Its Red Sea shipping workaround — built specifically because Hormuz was closed in February — has been destroyed by the Houthi maritime blockade. It is a country fighting on multiple fronts in a conflict it did not start and cannot stop unilaterally. And it told Washington's vice president: de-escalate. Prince Khalid also told Vance that Netanyahu was pushing for escalation while Saudi Arabia wanted de-escalation — the clearest public articulation yet of the gap between Washington's two most important regional partners on the question of how this war ends. [Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta](https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/30/world/video/iran-war-donald-trump-lead?ref=diplopolis.com) called it 'an unwinnable war' on CNN on Thursday — specifically that the US was 'locked into an unwinnable war' with Iran. He said this because the strategic geometry is precisely as unwinnable as it appears: the bombing cannot permanently destroy Iran's nuclear infrastructure because Iran rebuilds what is bombed, as satellite images confirmed this week. A ground war is impossible at current force levels and political will. Recognising Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz is politically unacceptable. Leaving achieves nothing. The word 'unwinnable' is not hyperbole. It is the precise military-strategic description of a situation in which no available path leads to the stated objective. Neither of these assessments — from a former defense secretary or from the country most exposed to the regional consequences of the war — will change the immediate trajectory of the conflict. The IRGC struck a Kuwaiti air base in the early hours of Friday morning. US forces have completed another overnight wave. The cycle continues its pattern: bombing, pause, bilateral statement, resumed bombing. What changes is the accumulation of voices outside that cycle declaring it cannot produce the result it was supposed to produce. The war reached Egypt on Thursday. [Two ships caught fire in the Egyptian port of Damietta](https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/30/world/live-news/iran-war-trump?ref=diplopolis.com), including a US-owned gas storage tanker, after what Egyptian authorities said appeared to be a drone attack. No party claimed responsibility. Trump said Iran was responsible. Egypt is not a combatant. It is a country of 104 million people through whose canal approximately 12 per cent of global trade passes. Hormuz was the first chokepoint closed by this war. The Red Sea was the second, targeted by Houthi missiles and drones. If Egypt's Damietta and the Suez Canal enter the conflict's targeting logic, the war will have closed or threatened three of the world's four most significant maritime corridors. The ship fires may have been incidental. They may be something else. Nobody knows yet. That uncertainty is itself the expansion. On Thursday, [Shell reported adjusted earnings of $9.84 billion for the second quarter](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/07/30/shell-2q-earnings-iran-war-oil.html?ref=diplopolis.com) — its second-highest quarterly profit on record, surpassed only by Q2 2022 when the Russia-Ukraine energy crisis sent prices higher. The Brent crude price has risen by nearly a third since February 28\. The war that has killed 18 Americans and thousands of Iranians, pushed six million people in Somalia, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka toward acute food insecurity, burned a child and her parents on Qeshm Island on Wednesday, and cost the Pentagon $37.5 billion in five months has been, for the oil industry, an exceptional quarter. The market records this without moral commentary. It is not wrong. The disruption of energy supply is profitable for those who supply energy. Shell's shareholders are not responsible for the war. The war is responsible for Shell's profits. Pakistan is 'doing the utmost' to revive US-Iran negotiations, Islamabad's Foreign Ministry said this week. Qatari mediators are still working. Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta says it is unwinnable. Saudi Arabia says de-escalate. The CENTCOM commander recommended stopping because the campaign had reached the limit of its effectiveness. The bombing doubled. Kuwait's air base was struck again this morning. Shell's profits are its second-highest ever. Unwinnable. Profitable. Expanding. These are the three adjectives that describe the Iran war on the morning of its 154th day. In April, Trump said it would be over in two to three weeks. The people who ran America's Pentagon have since supplied their own word. One of them said it on CNN. It has not appeared in any official statement. It has not needed to. ### The Fringe That Wasn't URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/pioneers-of-bashan-israel-syria-settlers-west-bank-template/ Last updated: 2026-07-31T06:27:26.000Z The Israeli army was preparing a nighttime strike on a group of men in southern Syria when the soldiers noticed the long curls dangling from the temples of their targets. [They held their fire](https://www.timesofisrael.com/fringe-settler-group-sneaking-into-syria-in-bid-to-claim-land-for-jewish-outpost/?ref=diplopolis.com). These were not Syrian militants attempting to breach Israel's border. They were religious Jews who had slipped into Syrian territory and were making their way back. The episode, first reported by Israel's Kan public broadcaster and confirmed to the Associated Press by the Israel Defence Forces, is the clearest image of what the Israeli settler movement has become. Soldiers in a theatre of active military operations, tasked with securing an occupied buffer zone, nearly engaged Jewish civilians because the operational environment no longer permits reliable distinction between an armed infiltration and a religious one. The settlers who caused the confusion are members of a group called the Pioneers of Bashan, and they are being described, across Israeli and international media, as fringe. Lebanese Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri has a response to that. Writing on X this week about attempts by a parallel settler group — Uri Tzafon — to enter Lebanon, Mitri noted that both groups are being called fringe and that the movement to settle the West Bank 'in its early days was a small group that faced some obstacles and difficulties.' It was called fringe. It was Gush Emunim. His observation applies with equal force to both groups. ## What the Pioneers of Bashan Are [The group was founded in April 2025, led by Amos Azaria](https://www.newarab.com/analysis/pioneers-bashan-israeli-settlers-eyeing-land-syria?ref=diplopolis.com), a computer science professor at Ariel University in the West Bank. Its name comes from the biblical region of Bashan, which encompasses what is now southwestern Syria — the governorates of Quneitra, Deraa and Suweida. Members number in the dozens. Their objective is to establish Jewish settlements inside Syrian territory currently held by the Israeli military. They have been crossing from Israel into Syria every few days in recent weeks. On August 18, 2025, the group held a cornerstone-laying ceremony beyond the Syrian border for a settlement they called 'Neve HaBashan.' Some participants planted an Israeli flag. The IDF detained a number of them and transferred them to police. Channel 12 has reported that no indictments have since been filed. On July 5, 2026, a video on the group's social media showed teenage members seated on the ground with their arms linked together as soldiers tried to separate them. A second video showed soldiers shoving activists and zip-tying their hands. An earlier video, from April, showed several dozen activists waving Israeli flags and chanting on the roof of a house on the outskirts of the Syrian village of Hader in Quneitra province, with Israeli soldiers watching on. The IDF has described the border crossings as [a 'serious criminal offence that endangers civilians and Israeli military forces'](https://www.timesofisrael.com/fringe-settler-group-sneaking-into-syria-in-bid-to-claim-land-for-jewish-outpost/?ref=diplopolis.com). It says it detains civilians caught crossing and hands them to police, expecting 'law enforcement authorities to bring those involved to justice.' Amos Azaria has explained the group's strategic aims without ambiguity. 'The entire Daraa district,' he said, 'must be cleared of the enemies seeking our destruction and instead be filled with Jewish settlement.' Azaria also said the group aims to establish a 'humanitarian corridor' from Israel to the Druze enclave of Suweida by depopulating adjacent Sunni-majority areas. The language of humanitarian purpose and the language of ethnic displacement are being used interchangeably. ## The Government They Have The word fringe implies distance from the political mainstream. The Pioneers of Bashan do not have that distance. [In April 2026, the Israeli cabinet passed legislation](https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/smart-borders-military-gates-land-seizure-Israel-encroachment-southern-syria?ref=diplopolis.com) to facilitate the relocation of approximately 3,000 settler families to the Golan Heights by 2030\. This is not the policy of a government hostile to the Pioneers of Bashan's ambitions. It is the adjacent policy — the legal, official, government-endorsed version of the same territorial project. The settler families moving to the Golan will be one side of the Syrian buffer zone. The Pioneers of Bashan want to be on the other. The group's social media accounts document meetings it has held with cabinet ministers Amichay Eliyahu of Otzma Yehudit, Ben-Gvir's party, and Shlomo Karhi of Likud. 'We have support from friends in the government and many members of the Knesset,' Azaria has said. This week, Defence Minister Israel Katz ordered the end of an administrative restraining order on a detained settler extremist, a gesture whose timing was noted by Israeli civil society groups monitoring settler violence. The IDF's insistence that it takes firm action against unauthorised crossings sits alongside the fact that no indictments have been filed against a group that has staged repeated illegal incursions into occupied foreign territory, nearly been shot by Israeli soldiers who could not identify them as civilians, and laid foundation stones on Syrian soil. The criminal justice system's response to the Pioneers of Bashan's activities, as of July 2026, is a consistent pattern of detention, release and repetition. There is also a parallel group operating in Lebanon. 'Uri Tzafon' — meaning 'Awaken, O North' — has staged incursions into southern Lebanon with a similar aim. Israel militarily occupies approximately 570 to 600 square kilometres of Lebanese territory. Settler activists have been crossing into it. The army removes them. They return. ## The Template and the Timeline The West Bank was not settled by government decree. It was settled by Gush Emunim. [Gush Emunim was founded in 1974](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gush%5FEmunim?ref=diplopolis.com) as a religious-nationalist movement dedicated to Jewish settlement across the biblical Land of Israel. In its early years it was precisely what Mitri described — a small group, measured in hundreds, that repeatedly attempted to establish illegal outposts and was repeatedly removed by Israeli military and civilian authorities. The government of Israel, at various points, opposed its activities, detained its members, demolished its structures and declared its settlements unauthorised. Today there are approximately 700,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, living in settlements that successive Israeli governments built, funded, connected to Israeli infrastructure and defended with Israeli military force. The process took five decades. It began with a fringe group that the army kept removing from hilltops. The relevance of this history to southern Syria is not an inference. It is what Lebanese Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri explicitly named this week, noting that the West Bank settlement enterprise 'in its early days was a small group that faced some obstacles and difficulties.' Mitri's point is structural: the question is not whether a group is currently small. The question is what the Israeli state does when the group's activities begin to align with the direction the state is already moving. The direction the Israeli state is moving in Syria has been documented since December 2024, when Israeli forces occupied 350 square kilometres of Syrian territory within 48 hours of Assad's fall and declared the 1974 disengagement agreement invalid. Israel has since built nine military bases in the buffer zone, a tenth reportedly under construction. Its forces have conducted regular raids, arrested young men at checkpoints, demolished homes and reportedly sprayed agricultural land with chemicals. Human Rights Watch [published a report in April 2026](https://www.hrw.org/report/2026/04/15/israel-targeting-syrians-occupied-territory?ref=diplopolis.com) documenting Israeli war crimes in the occupied Syrian Golan. [The New Arab published an analysis in February](https://www.newarab.com/analysis/israel-imposing-west-bank-style-occupation-south-syria?ref=diplopolis.com) asking whether Israel was imposing a 'West Bank-style occupation' on southern Syria. The answer to that question, as of July 2026, is: the architecture is in place. The settler movement is arriving. The cabinet has legislated for 3,000 families. The military is removing unauthorised civilians from unauthorised outposts and filing no charges. The government has ministers who meet with the pioneers. The word 'fringe' describes the current size of a group. It says nothing about the direction the group is moving, whether the institutional environment will harden against it or accommodate it, and whether the state whose military is the only thing standing between the group's ambitions and their realisation has the political will to maintain that position permanently. In the West Bank, the answer to all three questions took five decades to become clear. In Syria, the timeline appears to be compressed. The military occupation is fourteen months old. The settler incursions began within weeks of it. The cabinet passed legislation for Golan settlements within four months. The Pioneers of Bashan laid their first foundation stone within a year of being founded. Gush Emunim waited three years before its first foundation stone at Sebastia in 1974\. The Israeli government removed them. They went back. Eventually the government did not remove them. The rest is the map of the West Bank. ## The Question Nobody Is Asking Loudly Enough The international response to the Pioneers of Bashan's activities has been the Syrian government condemning Israeli military presence and calling for withdrawal, the Lebanese government focusing on Israeli military withdrawal from Lebanon, and periodic statements from UN agencies documenting abuses. The Pioneers of Bashan themselves are so clearly unauthorised that they do not require a formal international response — they are, after all, being removed by the Israeli army. The question that requires a response is not whether the Israeli army is removing them. It is whether removal, unaccompanied by prosecution, unaccompanied by the cabinet reversing its own settlement legislation, unaccompanied by any signal that the Israeli government's territorial ambitions in Syria differ in kind from those of a group it calls fringe — whether that removal means anything. Mitri's Gush Emunim warning suggests the answer. The IDF removed Gush Emunim from Sebastia in 1974\. It removed them from Kadum in 1975\. It removed them repeatedly across the following years. The removals produced photographs and statements and diplomatic reassurances. They did not produce a different outcome. What produced a different outcome was the Israeli government, over time, deciding that the settlers' vision of the territory and the government's vision were compatible enough to merge. Finance Minister Smotrich has declared territorial ambitions in Syria on the record. Netanyahu endorsed the Greater Israel vision on Israeli television in August 2025\. The cabinet approved Golan settlement legislation in April 2026\. Cabinet ministers have met with the Pioneers of Bashan. No member of the group has been charged with a crime. The nighttime almost-strike tells the story more plainly than any ministerial statement. Israeli soldiers in a military occupation of Syrian territory nearly fired on Jewish settlers because the operational environment has evolved to a point where the distinction between civilian and security threat requires identifying a religious man's sidelocks. The army is managing a situation the government has created. Whether the army will manage it indefinitely, or whether the government will eventually arrive at the conclusion it arrived at in the West Bank, is the only question that matters. Gush Emunim was a small group that faced obstacles and difficulties. The obstacles were real. The difficulties were genuine. The settlements are still there. This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### The Child Was Two. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-child-was-two-heavy-wave-strikes-iran-qeshm-july-30/ Last updated: 2026-07-31T05:33:56.000Z A couple and their two-year-old child were [killed when a US missile struck a residential building](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/30/us-launches-another-round-of-attacks-on-iran?ref=diplopolis.com) on Qeshm island on Wednesday night. Iranian state media confirmed the deaths. Two other children from the same family, aged seven and nine, were pulled from the rubble and hospitalised. They survived. They are now orphaned. US Central Command said it had 'successfully completed a heavy wave of strikes' against dozens of IRGC targets — military command centres, missile and drone facilities, coastal surveillance sites, maritime capabilities. CENTCOM did not mention the couple. It did not mention the child. The targets struck on Wednesday stretched across eight locations in southern Iran. Bandar Abbas, Kish, Abu Musa, Qeshm, Ahvaz, Abadan, Kazerun, Bushehr. Power outages in Ahvaz after strikes on the oil-rich Khuzestan province. Three IRGC personnel killed. Three civilians confirmed dead. A US official described the scale to the Jerusalem Post as 'about twice the size of the previous' bombardment. The five-day pause ended. The war resumed at double the previous intensity. The pattern now has a measurable shape. The first MOU lasted 19 days. The second pause lasted five. Each iteration of ceasefire produces a smaller gap before the next wave. CENTCOM's commander recommended stopping the campaign because it had reached the limit of its effectiveness. The campaign resumed at double the scale within 24 hours of the recommendation going unconsidered. The strikes were not only in Iran. [US and Saudi forces jointly struck militia bases in Iraq on Wednesday](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/29/saudi-arabia-us-carry-out-strikes-on-iran-backed-groups-in-iraq?ref=diplopolis.com) — the first time Iraqi territory was targeted in this wave. Twenty Hashed al-Shaabi fighters were killed. Five Iranian advisors were among the dead. AFP correspondents saw their coffins draped with Iranian flags. Iraq condemned what it called a dangerous escalation against an official security institution. Baghdad denied prior knowledge of the strikes, directly contradicting Trump's claim that they had been coordinated with the Iraqi government. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' Al-Sudani had visited both Washington and Tehran earlier this month. He visited them separately. The strikes hit the territory between them. The IRGC responded by announcing it had stopped three tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, insisting Iran has 'full control' of the waterway. Washington imposed new sanctions on entities it accused of extorting ships transiting the strait. The same week that Iran and the US both charged tolls for Hormuz passage and both dropped their tolls and both resumed their tolls and both resumed their bombing, the IRGC is now stopping individual tankers and asserting sovereign control over a body of water that international law defines as an international passage. Both sides are now claiming authority over the same waterway and conducting military operations to enforce that claim simultaneously. Tuesday's piece on this page covered what the Trump-Netanyahu meeting produced: the productive label, the mutual language, Iran's missiles on Jordan. What the meeting produced after that — the doubling of the bombardment, the Iraqi strikes, the Qeshm deaths — is what Tuesday became by Wednesday. Tuesday had a meeting. Wednesday had a heavy wave. The meeting was described as one of the best conversations Netanyahu and Trump had ever had. The wave was twice the size of the previous one. The [CNN assessment of Wednesday's events](https://edition.cnn.com/2026/07/30/us-iran-war-options-analysis/index.html?ref=diplopolis.com) applied precisely: the US war in Iran is in desperate need of new thinking. Trump has not shown he can bomb Tehran back to the negotiating table. The options remaining — a ground war or recognising Iranian control of the Strait — are so unpalatable that, as CNN noted, the phrase 'no good options' has become a cliché. The bombing doubled. The options narrowed. The phrase became slightly more accurate. The couple on Qeshm died in a residential building. Their two-year-old died with them. CENTCOM's statement listed the categories of targets struck. Residential buildings are not in the categories. They are in the strike zone. The heavy wave was powerful, CENTCOM said. It was successful. The child was two years old. ### The Battlefield Is Here URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/fifth-generation-warfare-armin-krishnan-review/ Last updated: 2026-07-30T19:23:05.000Z The human domain. The phrase appears in the subtitle of Armin Krishnan's [book](https://link.amazon/B02tcx9IF?ref=diplopolis.com) and it is worth pausing on before reading further. Military doctrine has always had a language for its objects: territory, sea lanes, airspace, cyberspace. Each expansion of the battlefield required a new vocabulary. The human domain is different. It does not describe a place where conflict happens. It describes the mind as terrain, belief as infrastructure and emotional life as a strategic asset to be captured, managed and turned against its owner. Once you accept that formulation, the implications do not stay inside military theory. They come home. They come home because the techniques required to dominate the human domain are not specialised instruments that disappear after deployment. They are learnable, scalable and transferable. Any government that acquires them for use abroad acquires them for use at home as well. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/07/Fifth-Generation-Warfare-Dominating-the-Human-Domain-by-Armin-Krishnan_BC.png)](https://link.amazon/B02tcx9IF?ref=diplopolis.com) [*Fifth Generation Warfare: Dominating the Human Domain by Armin Krishnan*](https://link.amazon/B02tcx9IF?ref=diplopolis.com) (Routledge, 2024) argues that contemporary conflict has moved decisively away from kinetic confrontation and toward a form of warfare waged at the societal level through perception management, narrative control, identity manipulation, disinformation, psychological operations and the adversarial use of norms. The fifth generation, in Krishnan's framing, is not simply more technologically sophisticated than its predecessors. It is ontologically different. It does not seek to defeat an enemy's army. It seeks to reorganise an enemy society's sense of reality, so that the population itself becomes the instrument of its own defeat. The soldier is replaced by the algorithm, the bomb by the forwarded video, the front line by the information feed. That is a serious argument and the book makes it seriously. Krishnan is not writing a polemic or a think-tank brief. He is attempting to describe a genuine shift in the grammar of conflict, drawing on a wide range of contemporary examples from the Arab Spring to Ukraine, from hybrid warfare in the Baltic states to grey zone operations across Asia. The framework he offers is analytically useful: fifth generation warfare operates through secrecy, proxy manipulation, disinformation, big data and psychological warfare, and it targets identity and culture as primary instruments rather than secondary effects. That is more precise than the usual conflation of hybrid warfare, information operations and grey zone conflict into a single undifferentiated category. The book's strongest insight is the move from information to identity. Propaganda is old. Disinformation is old. Psychological warfare is old. What makes Krishnan's frame colder is that fifth generation warfare is not simply about persuading people to believe a false thing. It is about reshaping the mental environment in which people decide who they are, who threatens them, who deserves protection and who no longer fully belongs to the political community. Once identity becomes a target, the civilian mind stops being collateral. The civilian mind becomes terrain. The aim is not merely to mislead citizens. It is to reorganise their emotional reflexes. The battlefield is not over there. It is the rumour, the forwarded video, the televised grievance, the suspicion planted so often that it starts to feel like memory. Krishnan's framework is developed primarily within the adversarial state-to-state frame. Fifth generation warfare, as he describes it, is what external actors do to each other's societies. That is where the doctrine lives in the book. It is also where the book underestimates its own argument. The techniques he identifies — identity manipulation, disinformation, proxy actors, big data, psychological warfare — do not respect the boundary between foreign and domestic politics. Once a state develops the capacity to dominate the human domain, it is an assumption rather than a conclusion that this capacity will be used only outward. Governments that learn to manage foreign populations will eventually discover that the same tools can be applied to their own citizens. The doctrine does not change. Only the target does. India makes this visible with uncomfortable clarity. Krishnan does not discuss India in detail, but his framework describes what has happened to Indian public discourse over the last decade with a precision that books written specifically about India often struggle to match. Not because India is formally at war with itself, but because the techniques fifth generation warfare identifies describe the political environment in which Indian public opinion has been reshaped so thoroughly that many citizens no longer recognise it as reshaped at all. Consider the elements. Godi media, the term critics use for television channels that function as government cheerleaders, turns governance into permanent mobilisation. The news cycle becomes an instruction in who to fear and who to hate. WhatsApp disinformation decentralises propaganda, making it feel like community knowledge rather than political messaging. The forwarded video arrives from a trusted contact and carries the authority of intimacy. The cow vigilante ecosystem fuses rumour, identity and intimidation into an everyday structure of fear that requires no central command. And the weaponisation of historical grievance creates a citizen who is always injured, always alert and always ready to punish. A Muslim neighbour becomes a demographic threat. A journalist becomes an enemy agent. A court verdict becomes civilisational betrayal. A historical wound becomes a daily command. What is left, after long enough exposure to this environment, is not a citizen capable of political judgement. It is a sensor permanently tuned to threat. Krishnan's framework gives these phenomena a common grammar. They are not separate pathologies or media failures or political miscalculations. They are components of a systematic reorganisation of the emotional world. The point is not that citizens are misinformed. It is that their capacity to trust, to doubt and to extend solidarity has been selectively rewired. That is what dominating the human domain looks like when it is applied domestically, and it is more politically durable than any external fifth generation operation, because the targets live inside the system that manages them and have no outside from which to observe it. This is where the book's most important implication sits, and where it does not go far enough. Krishnan treats the domestic application of fifth generation warfare as a risk, a possibility, a warning. The review would go further. For many societies the domestication of these techniques is not a future danger. It is the present condition. External enemies are episodic. Domestic populations are permanent. A government that masters the human domain as a theatre of foreign conflict will find, sooner or later, that the same mastery is available for governing its own citizens. The efficiency gains are considerable. The accountability costs are low. The results are visible. *Fifth Generation Warfare* is essential and disturbing reading. Read it for the doctrine, which is precisely described. Read it for the framework, which is genuinely useful. Then carry it home, apply it to the information environment you live inside and ask yourself whether the battlefield Krishnan describes is something you are watching from a distance or something you are already standing inside. The distinction matters less than you might hope. Krishnan's book is disturbing because it describes the future of war. It becomes more disturbing when one realises that, for many societies, the future has already been domesticated. This Book Review is free to read. Future Book Reviews will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Called It Productive. Iran Hit Jordan. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/called-it-productive-iran-hit-jordan-trump-netanyahu-meeting/ Last updated: 2026-07-30T18:36:01.000Z Trump went on Fox News hours before meeting Netanyahu on Tuesday and said something remarkable. Netanyahu had been arguing that Iran's Pickaxe Mountain nuclear facility represented an existential threat requiring resumed bombing. [Trump dismissed it](https://www.timesofisrael.com/trump-ahead-of-meet-with-netanyahu-i-dont-need-bibi-for-intel-on-pickaxe-mountain/?ref=diplopolis.com): 'I don't need Bibi to tell me that. Bibi's telling me that because he wants me to stay involved.' He saw through the strategy. He named it publicly. Then he walked into the Oval Office and spent more than an hour calling the meeting productive. It was their first face-to-face since February 28, the day they [launched Operation Epic Fury together](https://www.axios.com/2026/07/28/trump-netanyahu-oval-office-iran-war?ref=diplopolis.com). Netanyahu entered through a side entrance to the West Wing. No reporters were invited. Vance, Rubio, Hegseth and Witkoff sat in the room. Netanyahu posted on Instagram afterwards that it was one of the best conversations he and Trump had ever had. Trump's press secretary called it 'good and productive.' Netanyahu's communications director told reporters there was 'no truth' in the claim that Israel was pushing the United States in any direction on Iran. She said this having just watched Netanyahu fly to Washington specifically to argue against a deal with Iran. What Netanyahu brought to the meeting was not new intelligence. He brought what CENTCOM's own commander had already assessed and discounted: satellite images of Iran rebuilding its bombed sites and a case for increased pressure through what he called 'kinetic and non-kinetic means.' He expressed scepticism about the chance of a deal. He made no public case for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories in Gaza or Lebanon. Trump made no demand for one. The meeting produced a joint statement of alignment and a mutual commitment to preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. It produced nothing about how that commitment would be achieved differently from what had already been tried and had already reached, in Cooper's words, the limit of its effectiveness. The most significant sentence of Tuesday came before the meeting, not during it. Asked whether the decision to end the war would be his alone, Trump said: 'I think it's mutual — a little bit.' Mutual. The country whose security was the stated justification for launching the war now has a voice, at least 'a little bit,' in when it ends. Cooper recommended the bombing campaign be suspended. Netanyahu flew to Washington to argue against a permanent suspension. The CENTCOM commander and the Israeli prime minister are not equivalent actors in the American decision-making process. But Trump's word — mutual — suggests the gap between them is narrower than the chain of command implies. Several hours after the meeting concluded, Iran [launched multiple ballistic missiles](https://www.axios.com/2026/07/28/iran-missile-attack-us-base-jordan?ref=diplopolis.com) toward an American base in Jordan — what CENTCOM described as an 'attempted surprise attack.' All missiles were intercepted. It was Iran's first ballistic missile attack against a US base since Trump paused strikes on Friday to give diplomacy a chance. It was also Iran's reading of the productive meeting: Tehran watched Netanyahu enter the White House and determined that the pause was tactical rather than strategic, that the meeting represented an Israeli push for resumed escalation and that the appropriate response was to test whether the pause would survive contact with a provocation. It did not. Trump told [Fox News](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/07/29/us-iran-war-hormuz-centcom.html?ref=diplopolis.com): 'We'll be hitting them hard. They're going to get a beating.' Trump had called Netanyahu 'f---ing crazy' during a May phone call about Lebanon, [according to NPR and multiple reports](https://www.npr.org/2026/07/28/nx-s1-netanyahu-trump-meeting?ref=diplopolis.com). He expressed public frustration about Netanyahu's nuclear arguments on Fox News hours before the meeting. He then sat with him for more than an hour, called it productive, committed to no demand on territorial withdrawal, and said the war's ending would be mutual. The relationship between the two men has its own gravity. Trump vents his frustration, says the quiet part out loud, and then does what the alliance requires. Netanyahu knows this. 'He wants me to stay involved,' Trump said. He was right. Then he stayed involved. Iran struck Jordan the same evening. The missiles were intercepted. The productive meeting produced an attempted attack on an American base within hours. That is the pace at which this war moves. Tuesday had a meeting. Tuesday had a missile. The word for this is productive. ### Prosecutor Down URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/prosecutor-down-icc-karim-khan-removed-netanyahu-warrant/ Last updated: 2026-07-30T19:19:16.000Z At four in the afternoon on July 24, 2026, Päivi Kaukoranta, president of the International Criminal Court's Assembly of States Parties, read aloud the result of a closed-door vote at UN Headquarters in New York. The [Assembly had decided](https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/07/1168025?ref=diplopolis.com), by a majority of 82 of its 125 member states, that prosecutor Karim Khan had committed serious misconduct and a serious breach of duty, and had voted to remove him from office. Thirteen states voted against removal. Fifteen abstained. Khan had been elected to serve a nine-year term in 2021\. He was four years into it. No sitting ICC prosecutor had ever been removed. The announcement asked, formally, for the dignity and privacy of all those involved. Hours later, Israel's ambassador to the United Nations, Danny Danon, released a statement. 'Karim Khan believed that by launching a political witch hunt against Israel and issuing a politically motivated arrest warrant against Prime Minister Netanyahu, the world would ignore the grave sexual misconduct allegations against him,' [Danon said](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/north-america/icc-chief-prosecutor-removed-post-sexual-misconduct-allegations-rcna589139?ref=diplopolis.com). 'He was wrong.' The Netanyahu arrest warrant, issued by Khan in November 2024, remains active and unexecuted in The Hague. The man who issued it has been removed. The man named in it has not been touched. The International Criminal Court has spent twenty-four years building a record of seven convictions and thirty-four current cases. It has issued warrants for Vladimir Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu. It cannot arrest either of them. On July 24, it removed the only prosecutor it has ever had who tried to hold a Western ally's prime minister to account. That removal may have been justified. It may have been political. The specific facts of this case make it impossible to be certain of either, and the impossibility itself is the story. ## The Entanglement The misconduct allegations against Khan are real and serious. [The Associated Press reported in 2024](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/north-america/icc-chief-prosecutor-removed-post-sexual-misconduct-allegations-rcna589139?ref=diplopolis.com) that a female aide had accused him of coercive and non-consensual sexual behaviour over approximately a year, occurring at the ICC office, at Khan's home and during work trips. Khan categorically and consistently denied everything. Two court employees to whom the alleged victim had confided reported the misconduct to the court's independent watchdog in May 2024\. That was weeks before Khan formally sought arrest warrants against Netanyahu, his then-defence minister Yoav Gallant and three Hamas leaders. In the days before the Assembly vote, Khan's accuser appeared in a public interview with CNN's Christiane Amanpour — the first time she had spoken publicly about the allegations. The interview changed the political context of the vote. The Assembly had been scheduled to act regardless, but the public disclosure meant the vote took place in full view of the allegation rather than as a closed proceeding on a confidential matter. The ICC requested an external investigation by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services in November 2024\. In May 2025, Khan announced a leave of absence pending its conclusion. His deputy prosecutors assumed leadership of the Office of the Prosecutor. In March 2026, [a panel of three judges submitted its findings to the Assembly's oversight body](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/21/icc-chief-prosecutor-khan-cleared-of-sexual-misconduct-by-judges-report?ref=diplopolis.com). The panel had examined the full evidential record. Tayab Ali, leading Khan's legal team, [stated publicly that the panel had unanimously determined](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/24/icc-prosecutor-khan-removed-over-sexual-misconduct-allegations-sources?ref=diplopolis.com) that the OIOS findings 'did not establish misconduct or breach of duty by Mr Khan under the relevant legal framework.' The Assembly voted to remove him anyway. The Bureau of the Assembly, working from the OIOS report, the judicial panel's conclusions, the underlying evidence and written submissions, voted by a qualified majority in June 2026 to refer the matter to the full Assembly and suspend Khan immediately. On July 24, the Assembly voted 82 to remove him. Kaukoranta specifically stated, in response to Khan's legal team, that the Assembly had 'fully respected Khan's due process' and that 'the investigation did find evidence supporting the misconduct allegations.' Whether the Bureau and the Assembly reached a different conclusion from the judicial panel by weighing the evidence differently, or whether considerations other than the evidence shaped their calculus, the proceedings were closed. The question cannot be answered from outside. What can be said is that the proceedings concluded in an environment in which the United States government had sanctioned Khan personally, sanctioned nine other ICC officials including judges and deputy prosecutors, and made its political objection to the Netanyahu warrant explicit and public. [In August 2025, the UN General Assembly president described the American sanctions as 'a flagrant attack on judicial independence'](https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/08/1165691?ref=diplopolis.com). The UK's Bar Standards Board separately upheld a suspension of Khan's professional registration. Iva Vukusic, a researcher at Utrecht University who had been following the proceedings, told the AP that [political considerations had been 'folded into' the process](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/north-america/icc-chief-prosecutor-removed-post-sexual-misconduct-allegations-rcna589139?ref=diplopolis.com), particularly because it was 'the first time a prosecutor has pursued warrants against a Western ally.' The entanglement that Vukusic identified is not a conspiracy theory. It is a description of how a disciplinary process, legitimate in its origins, becomes impossible to separate from its political environment when that environment has been deliberately saturated with hostility by the world's most powerful government. The allegations against Khan may be true. A judicial panel concluded they were not established under the relevant legal framework. The Assembly removed him regardless. All of these things can be simultaneously true, and together they produce an outcome whose legitimacy is permanently contested. ## What the Court Inherits The ICC's Office of the Prosecutor is now run by its two deputies. One of them, Mame Mandiaye Niang, is under American sanctions. The other, Nazhat Shameem Khan, is not yet sanctioned but leads an office that has operated for more than a year under the shadow of American financial and travel restrictions on its senior staff. The court must elect a new chief prosecutor. The process for doing so will take months. During those months, the court's two most consequential open investigations, Gaza and Ukraine, will proceed under officials whose personal bank accounts and travel have been subjected to US government restriction specifically because of the work they are doing. The court that cannot make arrests without state support has now lost its most senior official while seven of its judges and multiple prosecutors remain sanctioned by the most powerful state that refused to join it. The relationship between those two facts is not subtle. In twenty-four years, the ICC has convicted seven individuals. Every one of them was African or from a country without the protection of a major power's political support. The court has opened investigations in Afghanistan, Palestine, Ukraine and elsewhere. It has issued warrants for Putin, Netanyahu and senior American-allied officials. It has collected none of them. It has convicted militia commanders from the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The pattern of who is collected and who is not is not a product of judicial neutrality. It is a product of power. [The UN Secretary-General's office affirmed on July 13](https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/07/1167932?ref=diplopolis.com) — eleven days before the Assembly vote — that the ICC remains 'a critical cog' in global justice efforts. That affirmation came as calls to abolish the court were already circulating. The vote to remove Khan has not helped the argument for its survival. Khan's defenders will say the removal was political. His critics will say the warrant for Netanyahu was political. The court sits in the middle of both arguments, unable to enforce either judgment. The Netanyahu arrest warrant was issued under Article 27 of the Rome Statute, which affirms that official capacity, including head of government, provides no immunity. That provision was the founding promise of the post-Nuremberg legal order — the specific commitment that power would not exempt itself from accountability. The warrant sits in The Hague. Netanyahu continues to govern. He attended a Knesset session this week. He appeared at a memorial ceremony. He has not been arrested and will not be. The man who issued the warrant has now been removed from the office that issued it. His deputy, who now holds that office, is sanctioned by a government that imposed those sanctions specifically to constrain the court's work. The Assembly that voted to remove Khan included states that voted for South Africa's genocide case in The Hague, states that marched at the UN for Palestinian rights, states that issued communiqués denouncing Israel's conduct in Gaza. Eighty-two of them voted to remove the prosecutor who charged Netanyahu with war crimes. Whether they voted to enforce procedural integrity or to relieve political pressure, or some combination of both, the result is identical: the court's most consequential prosecution has lost its author. Israel's ambassador celebrated. It would be too convenient to say that his celebration proves the removal was political. It would be equally convenient to say that the judicial panel's unanimous clearing of Khan proves it was not. The truth of what happened in the Bureau's deliberations will not emerge from public record. What has emerged is this: the ICC cannot reach Netanyahu. It cannot enforce its warrant. It cannot compel compliance from states that ignore its orders. It has now removed the prosecutor who was most associated with the attempt to reach him, under a process that a judicial panel concluded did not establish the legal basis for removal, in an environment saturated with political pressure from a government explicitly opposed to that prosecution. The court has seven convictions, thirty-four cases and no chief prosecutor. Its deputy is sanctioned. Its warrant is unexecuted. That is not the court failing. It is the court revealing, again, what it has always been: an institution whose reach extends as far as the political will of its members allows. That will was tested by its most consequential case. On July 24, 2026, it was found, again, to be insufficient. This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### He Came to Ask for More URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/he-came-ask-more-netanyahu-cooper-iran-war-operational-limit/ Last updated: 2026-07-28T04:49:14.000Z Netanyahu landed in Washington carrying two things: satellite images showing Iran rapidly rebuilding everything the US just bombed, and a request to resume bombing it. He flew to Tuesday's meeting knowing what he needed. He flew not knowing what Trump's own military commander had already told the president. Admiral Brad Cooper, the commander of US Central Command, [recommended stopping the bombing campaign](https://www.axios.com/2026/07/26/hormuz-bombing-pause-trump-iran?ref=diplopolis.com) around the Strait of Hormuz because it had reached the limit of its effectiveness. Cooper told Trump's advisers the campaign had destroyed roughly 80 per cent of its designated targets during Operation Epic Fury. The remaining 20 per cent — including hardened underground facilities and dispersed nuclear infrastructure — would require a qualitatively different military operation, not a resumption of the one already running. A senior US official told the New York Times something more specific and more damaging: the strikes had produced the opposite effect of what was intended. They kept Iran cohesive and allowed its leaders to focus public attention on an external threat rather than fracturing under internal pressure. The war was making Iran more unified, not less. Netanyahu's satellite images make the same point from the other direction. Iran is rebuilding. The sites struck at enormous cost in February and resumed strikes in July are being reconstructed. That is Netanyahu's argument for escalation: the pause is not peace, the work is unfinished, and Trump will be forced to escalate again. He also carries a second argument: [US intelligence has assessed](https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-intel-said-to-find-mojtaba-khamenei-far-more-inclined-than-father-to-seek-nukes/?ref=diplopolis.com) that Iran's new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei is far more inclined than his father to seek nuclear weapons. The war launched to prevent Iranian nuclear ambition has produced a Supreme Leader more committed to it. Netanyahu reads this as evidence that the war must go further. Cooper's advisers read it as evidence that the war cannot achieve its stated purpose by the same means. Both men are describing the same fact. The disagreement is what it means. The private deliberations before Trump paused the bombing also focused on the Pentagon's depleted inventory of Patriot interceptors and other air defences — the same munitions that Hegseth told Congress last week were at 50 per cent or below pre-war levels across four critical systems. [Ambassador Waltz pushed back publicly](https://www.newsnationnow.com/world/us-iran-strikes-bombing-limits-of-effectiveness/?ref=diplopolis.com) on reports that depleted stocks drove the pause, calling it a diplomatic gesture. The military's own assessment, per two sources, was operational: there were diminishing targets left and diminishing capacity to absorb Iranian retaliation. The pause was the intersection of those two limits. The most revealing development this weekend came not from Netanyahu's flight or Cooper's briefing, but from a quiet diplomatic disclosure. [The United States and the United Kingdom are planning a high-level meeting in London this week](https://www.axios.com/2026/07/24/hormuz-us-uk-conference-iran?ref=diplopolis.com) to convene a potential international coalition for maritime protection of the Strait of Hormuz. Two European diplomats and two other sources confirmed it. A White House official confirmed it. Several of the countries being invited have set a condition for their participation: the fighting must stop before they will join a maritime mission in the strait. The allies that Hegseth called 'shameful' in June for refusing to join the war are now being asked to join its aftermath. The countries whose base access was placed under a six-month Pentagon review for declining to bomb Iran are now being invited to a London conference to help protect the waterway the bombing was supposed to open. Six weeks is the interval between coercion and request. Netanyahu will make his case on Tuesday. Cooper has already made his. Both will be in the same building, speaking to the same president, about the same war. Netanyahu's argument is forward-looking: Iran is rebuilding, the new Supreme Leader wants the bomb, and this is the wrong moment to pause. Cooper's argument is operational: the campaign reached the limit of what the same campaign can achieve. One brings satellite images. The other reported what those images will eventually confirm — that the targets struck will be rebuilt, and bombing them again will not produce a different result. Trump will decide between the two assessments. He has not said which he finds more persuasive. He has said Tehran is getting serious. He has also said he is locked and loaded. In Washington, those two sentences can coexist indefinitely. ### The Ceasefire That Forgot Yemen URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/ceasefire-forgot-yemen-iran-us-pause-houthi-aramco-interceptors/ Last updated: 2026-07-27T04:30:19.000Z Iran had a peaceful night on Friday. That is what Iranian Health Ministry spokesperson Hossein Kermanpour posted on X on Saturday morning — no strikes had been reported overnight. For the first time in 13 consecutive nights, [US Central Command made no announcement of new operations](https://edition.cnn.com/2026/07/25/world/live-news/iran-war-trump?ref=diplopolis.com). A Department of Defense source told CNN that operations were 'on a hold.' The bilateral halt was real: unannounced, unsigned, existing only as a mutual silence between two governments that had spent nearly two weeks bombing and being bombed. CNN reported Sunday that [interceptor shortages were among the primary concerns](https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/25/politics/us-iran-strikes-operation?ref=diplopolis.com) in Trump's deliberations before the pause. Gen. Dan Caine told advisers that while major combat operations remained militarily feasible, renewed large-scale strikes could dangerously reduce the interceptors available to US Central Command — inventories already considered worryingly low after more than 1,200 Patriot interceptors were fired since the war began. Vice President JD Vance aligned with that caution. CBS News reported separately that Omani officials had travelled to Tehran on Friday for talks, and that the bombing was intentionally paused to allow the diplomacy to proceed. Both explanations are running simultaneously. The weapons reload and the diplomatic pause are not mutually exclusive. The pause is real. What generated it is contested. While Iran had its peaceful night, the Houthis were not pausing. Saudi Arabia had struck Houthi military targets in the port city of Hodeida earlier in the week, calling it a proportionate military response after Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea. At approximately 01:17 UTC on Saturday, [the Jizan refinery began burning](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/07/25/houthis-claim-attack-saudi-oil-refinery-iran-war-widens-red-sea/?ref=diplopolis.com). The Houthis claimed responsibility for missile and drone strikes on Saudi Aramco facilities at both Jizan and Yanbu, saying the attacks were retaliation for the Hodeida strikes. NASA's FIRMS satellite monitoring confirmed an abnormal temperature spike at the Jizan site. The Jizan refinery processes 400,000 barrels per day. Yanbu is Saudi Arabia's primary crude export corridor since the Hormuz closure. Brent crude had already crossed $100 on July 23\. After the Jizan fire it surged back above $100 before stabilising around $89 to $90 as traders awaited confirmation of sustained production losses. The Saudi-Houthi front, largely frozen since a UN truce in 2022, has been reopened. Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi denied any Iranian connection to the Houthi strikes. He called for dialogue. He said there was 'no military solution' to the Bab el-Mandeb situation and that the incidents were 'rooted in old disputes and issues between Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the countries of the region.' He said this while IRGC officers and missile equipment have been flowing into Yemen, according to intelligence sources cited by multiple outlets for months. The denial is the argument. Iran wants the bilateral pause with Washington while its proxy continues the war in the Red Sea. It wants the ceasefire to cover two parties. It does not want it to cover the theatre where the oil infrastructure burns. A bilateral ceasefire in a multilateral war is not a ceasefire. It is an agreement between two of the parties while everyone else continues. The Houthis have no ceasefire. Saudi Arabia has no ceasefire. The Strait of Hormuz remained largely closed. The bilateral silence covered 13 nights of bombing. It does not cover Yemen. It does not cover the Red Sea. It did not protect the Jizan refinery. Netanyahu [flies to Washington on Monday](https://www.timesofisrael.com/pms-office-says-hell-fly-to-dc-for-tuesday-meet-with-trump-graham-memorial-service/?ref=diplopolis.com) for a Tuesday meeting with Trump — his first Oval Office meeting with the president since the war began on February 28\. He is also attending the memorial service for Senator Lindsey Graham. Netanyahu will bring Israeli intelligence assessments on Iran's efforts to rebuild its ballistic missile and nuclear programme. Axios reported that Trump is considering resuming major combat operations against Iran and that Netanyahu's visit could be significant for that decision. Axios also noted that in previous escalation cycles, both the US and Israel issued statements about high-level visits as part of deception efforts ahead of military strikes. The pause may be a reload. The visit may be the order. There is one further fact that makes the pause look more like a pause than a turning point. The [New York Times reported Friday](https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-intel-said-to-find-mojtaba-khamenei-far-more-inclined-than-father-to-seek-nukes/?ref=diplopolis.com), citing US officials briefed on the intelligence, that US intelligence assessed Iran's new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei is 'far more' inclined than his father to pursue nuclear weapons. Officials noted that much of this assessment was based on intelligence collected before the current war — intercepted conversations and other material gathered prior to February 28\. The bombing killed the Supreme Leader who had issued a fatwa against nuclear weapons in the 1990s and maintained, at least publicly, that hesitation. His successor appears more committed to acquiring a warhead that could be miniaturised and mounted on a long-range missile. The stated objective of the war — preventing Iranian nuclearisation — has been made less achievable by the war itself. That conclusion will not appear on Tuesday's agenda. But it is the most significant fact available about whatever comes next. Iran had a peaceful night. The Houthis struck Aramco the same morning. Netanyahu is on a plane. The interceptors are being restocked. The ceasefire forgot Yemen. It also forgot what the war was for. ### Chevening Is Not a Merit Scholarship. Most Applicants Treat It Like One. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/chevening-scholarship-2027-application-guide-how-to-win/ Last updated: 2026-07-24T20:00:59.000Z Applications for the 2027/28 [Chevening Scholarship](https://www.chevening.org/scholarships/application-timeline/?ref=diplopolis.com) open on 4 August 2026 and close on 6 October 2026 at 11:00 UTC. The programme funds a fully-funded one-year master's degree at any UK university — tuition, monthly stipend, flights, visa costs, arrival allowance and a travel grant for Chevening events. Approximately 1,800 scholarships are awarded each year from more than 60,000 applications worldwide. The global acceptance rate is roughly 2 to 3 per cent — in the same league of selectivity as Harvard's undergraduate programme. If you are from India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Kenya or Bangladesh, the competition is significantly tighter. India receives between 1,100 and 1,200 applications annually and awards approximately 100 to 110 scholarships — an India-specific acceptance rate of around 8 to 10 per cent of a much smaller eligible pool than it first appears, because the 2,800-hour work experience requirement eliminates most applicants before the essays are even read. This guide covers what the selection committee is actually looking for, the specific mistakes that eliminate strong candidates, and the things about Chevening that most guides — written for a Western applicant with a straightforward professional trajectory — do not tell you if you are applying from the Global South. ## What Chevening Actually Is Chevening is a diplomatic instrument. It is funded by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and is explicitly designed to build a global network of future leaders with a connection to Britain. Every scholar is expected to return to their home country for at least two years after completing their degree. The selection committee is not primarily looking for the most academically brilliant applicant. It is looking for the applicant most likely to become influential in their home country and maintain meaningful ties to the UK. This distinction matters enormously for how you position yourself. A 9.2 CGPA from an IIT with three published papers and no evidence of leadership outside academic achievement will lose to a 7.8 CGPA applicant who led a community health initiative, built cross-sectoral partnerships and can describe in specific terms what problem they are returning home to solve. This is not hypothetical. It happens every cycle, and the [official reading committee feedback published by Chevening](https://www.chevening.org/news/reading-committee-feedback-for-applicants/?ref=diplopolis.com) confirms it: 'Very few applicants were able to combine successful leadership qualities with evidence. Some applicants focused on leadership examples from their early academic experiences, even their school experiences, rather than examples from their recent professional life.' The committee is assessing four things: leadership and influence, networking ability, the quality of your career plan, and the strength of your reason for choosing a specific UK university and course. All four require evidence, not assertion. All four are assessed by independent reading committees before the British embassy ever sees your application. ## The Four Essays: What They Are Testing The Chevening application has four essays. Each has a word limit. All four matter equally. Most guides tell you to be specific — they are right — but they do not tell you what specific means in each context. ### Leadership essay Chevening is not looking for management experience. It is looking for influence — situations where you changed the direction of something beyond your formal authority. A junior policy analyst who identified a problem, built a coalition of colleagues and external stakeholders, and changed departmental practice is a stronger Chevening leadership candidate than a mid-level manager who delivered on KPIs with a team of ten reporting to her. The committee wants to see the moment you acted outside your job description and something changed because you did. One strong specific example with measurable outcomes outperforms three vague examples with general claims. ### Networking essay This is the essay most applicants get wrong. Most write about networking as an abstract value — they are naturally collaborative, they believe in partnerships, they enjoy meeting people. The committee is not interested in disposition. It is interested in evidence. What network did you build? Who was in it? What did it produce? The most effective version of this essay names specific types of people you connected across organisations, sectors or disciplines, describes what problem the network solved, and explains what it produced. Researching specific Chevening alumni in your field and referencing the kinds of professional relationships you intend to build through the Chevening network is one of the single most effective things you can do to strengthen this essay. ### Career plan essay This is where most Global South applicants underperform, and the reason is structural. Many guides advise candidates to be ambitious. The committee wants you to be specific and credible. A career plan that says you will return to Nigeria and become a senior policymaker in ten years is not a career plan. A career plan that says you will return to the Central Bank of Nigeria's financial stability division, apply the macroprudential regulatory knowledge from your LSE master's to a specific gap in Nigeria's stress-testing framework, and build a public financial literacy programme in partnership with the Central Bank's existing community outreach infrastructure — that is a career plan. The more implausible the gap between your current position and your stated ambition, the less convincing the essay. ### Course choice essay Chevening does not want to know why you want a master's degree. It wants to know why you want this specific course at this specific university to address this specific challenge. 'The UK has world-class universities' is the fastest way to a low reading committee score. Name the professor whose research is directly relevant to your work. Name the module that addresses the gap in your current technical knowledge. Name the specific intellectual reason you cannot get the same training at a university in your home country. The university choice must appear inevitable given your career plan — not aspirational. ## The Eligibility Requirements Nobody Reads Carefully Two years of work experience means 2,800 hours post-graduation. Voluntary work and internships count if they are substantive and documented. Part-time roles count if you can verify the hours. Gaps and undocumented periods do not. The committee checks this requirement at the eligibility stage before your essays are read. If your work experience does not clearly reach 2,800 hours, address it proactively. You cannot apply if you have not yet graduated from your undergraduate degree — final-year undergraduate students are ineligible. Candidates already enrolled in a postgraduate programme or other non-undergraduate training may still apply, provided they meet all other criteria. You cannot apply if you have previously studied in the UK on a UK government scholarship. You cannot apply if you are a current employee of HM Government or a close relative of one. These disqualifications are automatic and irreversible. You must apply to three different eligible UK master's courses. You do not need an unconditional offer in hand when you submit your Chevening application in October — the deadline to upload at least one unconditional university offer is July 2027, after you have been selected. However, university applications must be made separately and in parallel with your Chevening application, not after it. Oxford, Cambridge and the London School of Economics have acceptance rates of 15 to 25 per cent for international applicants even with funding confirmed. Applying only to elite universities significantly increases your risk of not meeting the July offer deadline. A balanced list — one aspirational, one well-matched, one realistic — is the correct strategy. ## What the Reading Committee Process Means for You Your application is assessed by an independent reading committee before the British embassy sees it. The committee scores all essays against the four criteria. The British embassy reviews the ranked scores and produces an interview shortlist. The interview — 20 to 30 minutes, conducted by a panel of two to four including British diplomatic staff, Chevening alumni and sometimes academics — draws its questions directly from your application essays. The interview is not designed to catch you out. The panel is looking for reasons to award you the scholarship. Candidates who fail the interview typically fail because their essays contained claims the interview then exposed as exaggerated or vague. If your essay says you led a team of twenty to deliver a digital transformation, the interviewer will ask specific questions about that transformation. If the reality was more modest, the essay has done you damage. After interviews, panels submit assessments to the Chevening secretariat in London. Final decisions consider individual merit, cohort composition and strategic priorities alongside available scholarships per country. Approximately 15 to 20 per cent of shortlisted candidates receive an offer. Being shortlisted is a significant achievement. It does not guarantee selection. ## What the Other Guides Do Not Tell Global South Applicants The scholarship allocation is based on British diplomatic priorities, not solely on applicant quality or volume. This means the number of scholarships available varies by country each year based on UK foreign policy interests, not the strength of that year's applicant pool. A strong application in a year when your country's diplomatic allocation is reduced may not succeed regardless of essay quality. You cannot control this. You can apply more than once — many scholars applied two, three or four times before being selected. Your country's diplomatic context is relevant. If your career plan engages directly with areas of UK strategic interest — climate policy, public health systems, financial regulation, conflict recovery, digital governance — you are positioning yourself within the FCDO's stated priorities. This does not mean gaming your application to fit a brief. It means understanding that Chevening is a diplomatic instrument and that your genuine work, positioned clearly against the challenges your country faces, will read differently to the committee than a career plan that could apply anywhere. The strongest essays from Global South applicants name specific institutional problems at home. The clearest career plans explain not just what the applicant will do but what currently prevents it — what knowledge gap, regulatory gap or policy gap the UK master's addresses. The committee is investing in a solution to a named problem. The more specific and locally grounded your problem statement, the more compelling your investment case. ## The Timeline for 2027/28 **Applications open:** 4 August 2026 **Applications close:** 6 October 2026 at 11:00 UTC **Reading committee review:** October to December 2026 **Interview invitations:** February 2027 **Interviews:** March to April 2027 **Final selections announced:** June 2027 **University offer deadline:** July 2027 (at least one unconditional offer from an eligible UK university must be uploaded by this date) **Studies begin:** September to October 2027 Start your university applications now, before the Chevening portal opens. Begin drafting your essays in July. Share drafts with colleagues, mentors and Chevening alumni — multiple rounds of revision make a measurable difference. Submit at least 48 hours before the deadline. Applications submitted even one minute late are automatically and permanently rejected. ## What Chevening Funds Full tuition fees at any eligible UK university, with one exception: MBA programmes are subject to a strict £22,000 tuition fee cap. If your chosen MBA costs more than £22,000, you are personally responsible for funding the difference unless the university co-funds the remainder. For all other master's degrees, tuition is covered in full regardless of cost. A monthly living stipend standardised by geography: approximately £1,516 per month for those studying inside London or the M25, and approximately £1,215 per month for those studying outside London. These rates are subject to annual review. Return economy flights. An arrival allowance. A homeward departure allowance. The cost of one visa application. A travel grant to attend Chevening events in the UK. The two-year home return commitment is a condition of the scholarship and is taken seriously by the FCDO. Chevening provides no financial or pastoral support for dependants and will not endorse visa applications for family members. Scholars are formally advised not to bring dependants to the UK. 🚧 **Scholarship terms, application dates and eligibility criteria change each cycle. If you spot an error or an outdated detail in this piece, write to* [**editor@diplopolis.com*](mailto:editor@diplopolis.com) *and we will correct it promptly. The official source for all Chevening requirements is* [**chevening.org*](https://www.chevening.org/?ref=diplopolis.com)**.* This Dossier piece is free to read. Future Dossier pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Trump Set the Price. Iran Did the Math. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/trump-set-price-iran-did-math-bridge-power-plant-formula-tehran/ Last updated: 2026-07-24T07:22:57.000Z On Wednesday, Trump [posted his formula](https://www.axios.com/2026/07/22/trump-iran-bridges-power-plants-hormuz?ref=diplopolis.com) on Truth Social. 'From this point forward, any time the Islamic Republic of Iran shoots at a ship in the Strait of Hormuz, whether it be by Missile, Rocket, Drone, or any other device or weapon, the United States will bomb and destroy ONE BRIDGE OR POWER PLANT, including those located next to, or in, the Capital City of Tehran.' One ship attack. One piece of Iranian civilian infrastructure. Including Tehran. On the same day, Trump flew to Dover Air Force Base to attend the dignified transfer of four American service members killed in the war. The problem with this is not the threat. The problem is the arithmetic. Trump's formula converts deterrence into a pricing mechanism. Iran's military commanders can now calculate: is attacking a commercial vessel worth one bridge? Is disrupting shipping worth one power plant? Iran has attacked more than 30 commercial vessels since the war began in February, according to US military estimates. Thirty attacks. Thirty bridges or power plants, by Trump's formula. Iran's Revolutionary Guard has done this maths. It has concluded that the exchange rate is acceptable. The formula was announced to make ship attacks too costly to continue. It has instead told Iran precisely what each ship attack costs and invited Tehran to decide whether the price is right. This is not a new threat. In March, Trump gave Iran 48 hours to open the Strait or face obliteration of its power plants. The 48 hours passed. In April, he [announced 'Power Plant Day'](https://www.aol.com/articles/trump-again-threatens-bomb-irans-165818673.html?ref=diplopolis.com) with a Tuesday deadline. On the Sunday before that Tuesday he posted: 'Tuesday will be Power Plant Day, and Bridge Day, all wrapped up in one, in Iran.' Then: 'A whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again.' The civilisation did not die. The formula was updated, the deadline was extended and the threat was renewed. Iran's military planners have now watched this pattern three times. What they have learned is that the formula has a walk-back built into it. The threat travels to Tehran. The bombs, so far, have not. The formula also has a legal dimension the White House has not addressed. International humanitarian law [prohibits intentional attacks on civilian infrastructure](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/04/iran-president-trumps-apocalyptic-threats-of-large-scale-civilian-devastation-demand-urgent-global-action-to-prevent-atrocity-crimes/?ref=diplopolis.com). Agnès Callamard, Secretary General of Amnesty International, said in April that targeting Iranian power plants 'could amount to a war crime' under international humanitarian law, noting that 'power plants, water systems and energy infrastructure are indispensable to civilian life, underpinning access to clean water, medical care, hospital electricity, food supply chains, and basic livelihoods.' Their destruction causes blackouts that kill patients in hospitals, shut down water treatment and collapse food supply chains. Trump's formula — one power plant per ship attack — describes, in writing, an act that international law prohibits. The same administration dismantling the ICC is publishing its war crimes schedule on Truth Social. Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi responded to the formula by mirroring it. 'Our defense doctrine is clear: eye for an eye. Any aggression against Iran, including our infrastructure, will compel a powerful and decisive response. Those who contribute to such aggression, whatever the kind of support, will also be considered as legitimate targets.' Iran's IRGC warned that US strikes on Iranian infrastructure would produce 'power outages in other countries in the region that are US allies.' The threat is symmetrical. Trump offered a formula. Iran returned one. Tehran and Washington are now negotiating via infrastructure. [DiploPolis reported](https://www.diplopolis.com/second-chokepoint-iran-houthis-bab-el-mandeb-closure-red-sea) on July 17 that Iran had already told the Houthis to stand ready to close Bab el-Mandeb if the US bombed Iranian power infrastructure. That warning is now the standing response to the standing threat. The chain is complete and public: Trump announces formula. Iran announces mirror formula. Houthis prepare to execute the final link. The escalation has been published in full. [Axios reported](https://www.justsecurity.org/149109/early-edition-july-23-2026/?ref=diplopolis.com) that Trump is simultaneously considering both a ceasefire and a significant military escalation. Both are live options. The formula and the ceasefire consideration coexist. This is not contradiction in Trump's political logic — it is the same dual-track that has governed the entire war. Bomb and negotiate. Threaten and offer. The formula is the stick. The ceasefire is the carrot. The problem is that after three months, Iran has learned that the stick has a consistent walk-back and the carrot has conditions Tehran will not accept. Iran attacked 30 ships. Washington destroyed some bridges in the south. Trump announced a formula naming Tehran. Iran said eye for an eye. The formula has been running for three months. The Strait is still closed. Trump set the price. Iran decided it was worth paying. ### In the Mother of Democracy, Students Came With the Constitution. The Police Came With Batons. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/mother-of-democracy-students-constitution-police-batons-india-examined/ Last updated: 2026-07-23T11:00:22.000Z On July 9, 2026, Narendra Modi stood before 30,000 people at [Marvel Stadium in Melbourne](https://www.diplopolis.com/modi-diaspora-spectacle-press-conference-india-examined). Anthony Albanese stood beside him. The crowd had been assembled over months by more than 400 community organisations with seat-filling quotas. The footage went home to Indian television within hours as evidence of a nation the world admires — a civilisation whose time has come, a leader who fills stadiums on four continents because history has chosen him. Ten days later, in Auckland. Before that, Jakarta. Before that, Washington. Before that, Tokyo. The formula is consistent: a staged crowd, a host leader close enough to be photographed as an endorser, footage that travels home as proof of Vishwaguru. Teacher of the world. The Mother of Democracy, radiant on the global stage. On July 20, eleven days after Melbourne, Delhi Police used tear gas and batons against thousands of students who had marched on parliament demanding the resignation of Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan over a question paper leak that forced more than two million students to retake their medical entrance examinations. At the emergency ward of Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital that evening, [students arrived with bloodied bandages, stitched wounds and bruised and swollen limbs](https://www.outlookindia.com/national/broken-bones-bruises-and-stitches-scores-injured-as-lathi-charge-tear-gas-mark-cjps-march-to-parliament?ref=diplopolis.com). One protester, struck on the head with a police baton, lost consciousness in the crowd. Friends pulled him out and carried him to hospital. He was discharged hours later with two stitches. More than 150 were hospitalised in total. The government cut mobile internet across central Delhi. The videos went everywhere anyway. In one video that circulated widely, a young girl stood in the tear gas and pleaded with a police officer in Hindi: 'If your own children were here, would you treat them like this? Aren't we your children too? Please let us go. Don't use batons against us. Don't you feel any compassion for us?' The officer did not answer. The government has not answered. Modi has not answered. [The New York Times](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/20/world/asia/india-protest-cjp-cockroach-jantar-mantar.html?ref=diplopolis.com) reported 'chaotic scenes' on the streets of Delhi while 'a smiling Mr Modi' tried to project an image of calm inside Parliament. He did not address the protesters' specific demands. He said only that steps had been taken to prevent paper leaks. His image as a strongman, the Times noted, 'may also be showing cracks.' The stadiums said: is this not a country the world admires? Parliament street on July 20 said something else. ## What the CJP Is and Why It Matters On May 15, 2026, Chief Justice of India Surya Kant compared unemployed youth to 'cockroaches' and 'parasites of society' during a Supreme Court hearing. The remark was intended as a reprimand. What it produced was a movement. [Abhijeet Dipke](https://americanbazaaronline.com/2026/06/05/cjp-founder-abhijeet-dipke-heads-to-india-to-lead-neet-protest-482244/?ref=diplopolis.com) was studying at Boston University when it happened. On May 16, he posted a single line on X: 'What if all cockroaches come together?' The comment was meant as humour. Within 24 hours, the Cockroach Janta Party had 50,000 digital members. He flew back to India to lead the protest in person. What had begun as a meme became, over six weeks, the largest youth-led demonstration New Delhi had seen in years. At Jantar Mantar, the protest's physical home — the eighteenth-century observatory in central Delhi that has become the site the government permits demonstrations to occupy at a safe distance from parliament — the stage carried the faces of the dead. At least a dozen NEET aspirants had died by suicide in the days after the examination was cancelled. Their photographs were displayed on the protest stage. The CJP's demand was not only Dharmendra Pradhan's resignation. It was justice for students who had prepared for years, paid everything their families had, and died when they discovered the exam they had sacrificed for had been sold. The movement drew Sonam Wangchuk, the Ladakhi environmentalist and activist, who joined an indefinite hunger strike at Jantar Mantar in solidarity. On July 18, police forcibly removed him from the protest site and took him to hospital against his wishes, holding sheets to block the view of cameras as they carried him away. It was this act that turned the protest from a significant demonstration into a national confrontation. By July 20, the movement was no longer only students. Professionals, families and civil society organisations had joined. The [BBC described it](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg9w9dxd7lo?ref=diplopolis.com) as 'one of the most visible expressions of public dissent against Prime Minister Narendra Modi in recent years.' Amnesty International [issued a statement](https://www.amnestyusa.org/press-releases/india-crackdown-on-peaceful-protesters-in-new-delhi-raises-serious-human-rights-concerns/?ref=diplopolis.com) saying the images from Jantar Mantar show 'how peaceful dissent is being suppressed in India' and that the police response raises 'serious questions about whether their response met the requirements of legality, necessity, and proportionality under international human rights standards.' The government's response was a ten-minute meeting with Health Minister JP Nadda, after which a CJP spokesperson said: 'No commitments have been made so far.' The protesters had waited four hours for ten minutes. ## The Diplomatic Exposure In the six weeks before July 20, Modi stood on stages in Melbourne, Auckland, Jakarta, Washington and Tokyo. Each appearance was framed as evidence of India's global rise. Each produced the stadium footage that godi media ran as Vishwaguru vindication. Each generated diplomatic capital the government packages as civilisational recognition. The host leaders — Albanese, Luxon, Prabowo — were photographed beside him as endorsers of the proposition that India under Modi is a stable, democratic, rising partner. Every one of those leaders now owns a share of a question their domestic oppositions are asking. You stood beside this man. His police used batons on students who carried copies of the Constitution to parliament. They cut the internet to stop the videos and the videos went viral anyway. The photographs from RML Hospital emergency ward — students with stitched head wounds and broken bones — were in the same international news cycle as the Marvel Stadium footage. What do you say? The question is not hypothetical. The New Zealand Greens raised it in parliament. In Australia, independent Senator David Pocock asked Foreign Minister Penny Wong whether the government had made representations to India about the crackdown. In the United Kingdom, Labour backbenchers raised questions about the consistency of the government's human rights positions. None of these are diplomatic ruptures. They are the beginning of an inconvenience that compounds every time the government reaches for the stadium footage to answer a press freedom or human rights question. The [Financial Times](https://www.ft.com/content/7b19969f-3c3c-4e45-9eb4-aac02519ad46?ref=diplopolis.com) called the crackdown 'the biggest demonstration in the capital in years.' The [international press roundup](https://scroll.in/latest/1094423/smiling-modi-tried-to-project-an-image-of-calm-how-foreign-press-reported-on-cjp-protest?ref=diplopolis.com) confirmed that the NYT, BBC, Bloomberg, the Wall Street Journal and the Guardian all covered it as a significant challenge to Modi. India's [press freedom ranking of 157th](https://rsf.org/en/index?ref=diplopolis.com) out of 180 countries was cited across that international coverage. The foreign journalists who had asked in Oslo, Melbourne and Auckland why Modi does not hold press conferences now had a more specific answer to the question of what democratic accountability looks like in India. Democratic nations will not withdraw from engagement with India because of the CJP protests. Albanese will not cancel the uranium agreement. Luxon will not rescind the Strategic Partnership declaration. India's strategic weight — its Indo-Pacific position, its role as a counterbalance to China, its economic trajectory — does not change because of what happened at Jantar Mantar. The pragmatics of great power competition will keep Western governments at the table with Modi regardless of what his police do to students on parliament street. But the terms of the engagement change. Every meeting becomes more qualified. Every joint statement requires more careful drafting to avoid phrases about shared democratic values that now cut in two directions. The diplomatic conversation about India's strategic rise now has to absorb India's democratic regression in the same news cycle, eleven days apart, in the same month. ## What Is Growing Inside India This is what the stadium machinery was built to prevent the world from seeing. India is ranked [157th in the World Press Freedom Index](https://rsf.org/en/index?ref=diplopolis.com). The space for dissent has contracted, year by year, across twelve years of this government. Activists imprisoned. Journalists charged. Television anchors who function as government communications officers. The machinery of suppression is documented and real. What the CJP protests reveal is that it has not worked on the generation it was most precisely designed to suppress. These are the young people who were supposed to be too absorbed in competitive examination preparation to have time for politics. Too individually focused on advancement in a system the government promised was rising even as it failed them. The NEET leak ended that calculation. It told them the competition they were sacrificing their youth for had been corrupted. Twelve of them died. Their photographs were on the stage at Jantar Mantar. The survivors marched on parliament. The police met them with batons. [They came back the next day](https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/22/india/india-cockroach-party-protest-anger-intl-hnk?ref=diplopolis.com) — many showing the wounds from Monday — and sat down again under monsoon drizzle. The cockroach, as the Chief Justice inadvertently named them, does not leave. The anger building inside India is not visible in Modi's stadium footage. It is not visible in godi media's prime-time coverage. It is visible in the students at RML Hospital waiting with stitched head wounds to be discharged, in the crowd that returned to Jantar Mantar the morning after being beaten, in BJP workers who told Scroll.in that 'people's sympathy is now with the youth,' in the generation that has watched a dozen of their peers die and decided that the government responsible should answer for it. What Modi projects abroad and what his government produces at home have always been in tension. The Spectacle and the Silence was the argument DiploPolis made last week — that the stadiums and the press conference avoidance are the same strategy, one creating the image and the other protecting it. Parliament street on July 20 is what the image was protecting against. The students came with the Constitution. The police came with batons. The photographs from the emergency ward of RML Hospital on the evening of July 20 were the answer to every stadium the government has built on four continents — and to every democratic leader who stood on the stage and called it partnership. What is growing in India's streets is not yet a movement that threatens this government's hold on power. But it is a generation that has stopped believing the image. A government that has to beat its students in the streets of the Mother of Democracy to protect the image of the Mother of Democracy has already said more than any stadium ever could. This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Nobody Knows How to Get Out. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/nobody-knows-how-to-get-out-iran-war-37-billion-hegseth-congress/ Last updated: 2026-07-23T05:05:05.000Z Republican Senator John Kennedy told reporters on Tuesday that Congress needed 'straight answers' from the Pentagon. This was not a senator asking whether the war was right or wrong. Kennedy supports the president. His party controls the Senate. His question was simpler and more damning: he needed someone to explain why America went to war with Iran and how it was going to get out. Nobody at the hearing answered him. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told the Senate Appropriations Committee on Tuesday that the US-Israel war on Iran [has cost $37.5 billion](https://www.diplopolis.com/37-billion-seventeen-dead-hormuz-closed-iran-war-arithmetic/) so far. Up from $25 billion in April. Up from roughly $30 billion earlier this month. Up by approximately $1 billion every day since the war resumed on July 7\. Independent estimates compiled by a Brown University cost tracker put the total at more than $100 billion by mid-July when damage to American bases, reconstruction costs and long-term equipment replacement are included. Hegseth is asking for $67 billion more. The administration's requested 2027 defence budget — $1.5 trillion — would be the highest in American history. A 44 per cent increase in a single year. A generational investment, Hegseth called it. Senator Patty Murray called it something else. 'The American people want to see a quick and strategic end to this war,' she said, 'not $70 billion of their tax dollars sent to keep it going.' She noted that Trump had now told Americans [more than 40 times](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/22/iran-wars-37bn-price-tag-why-does-trump-want-67bn-more?ref=diplopolis.com) that a deal was near and the war would be over soon. In April, he said it would be over in ['two to three weeks.'](https://www.npr.org/2026/04/01/nx-s1-5769805/iran-war-trump?ref=diplopolis.com) It is July 23\. The war has just completed its 11th consecutive night of resumed bombing since the Versailles MOU collapsed. Eighteen Americans are dead. Five hundred have been injured since the strikes resumed this month. The war has two bills. The first is $37.5 billion and officially growing. The second is invisible in the defence supplemental request but has already been paid by American households: the [Brown University Iran War Energy Cost Tracker](https://iranwarcost.watson.brown.edu/?ref=diplopolis.com) estimates that Americans had paid more than $68 billion in extra petrol and diesel costs as of mid-July. That is more than $500 per household. The war that was supposed to open the Strait of Hormuz and bring petrol prices down has cost American families more than $500 each in fuel surcharges. The bill for the bombing is $37.5 billion. The bill at the pump is nearly double that. The second bill did not go to a Senate committee. It went to every American who filled a tank since February. The Global South paid a different price. The [World Food Programme](https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-warning-becomes-reality-millions-middle-east-crisis-pushes-poorest-families-further-hunger?ref=diplopolis.com) has confirmed that six million people in Somalia, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka have been pushed toward acute food insecurity by the Hormuz closure. The WFP needs $6 billion to close the global hunger funding gap it has identified since the war began. The US has spent $37.5 billion conducting the war that created the gap. That is six times the cost of feeding the people the war pushed toward starvation. The food bill exists. It will not be presented to Congress. It will be paid in Somalia, in Afghanistan, in Sri Lanka, in the bodies of children who had no relationship to the nuclear enrichment question that started this. What has $37.5 billion bought? The Iranian nuclear programme was not destroyed. It was dispersed and hardened. The Strait of Hormuz was not opened. [Iran is still charging](https://www.diplopolis.com/bombed-now-billing-iran-hormuz-toll-two-million) for passage through it. Iran's regional presence was not eliminated. Six Gulf states are under active missile attack. The weapons stockpiles that were used to bomb Iran are now at 50 per cent or less of pre-war levels on four key munitions, requiring billions more to replenish over months or years. Gen. Dan Caine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, told the committee that time is still on America's side. Kennedy, sitting in the same room, said he still could not explain why they went in or how they would get out. These are not contradictory positions. They are the two faces of a war that began with a clear statement of objectives and has since produced a bill, a body count and a question nobody has answered. Kennedy asked for straight answers. He will not get them today. The war cost $1 billion yesterday. It will cost $1 billion tomorrow. ### When the Enemy Becomes Necessary URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/polarization-international-politics-rachel-myrick-review/ Last updated: 2026-07-22T14:25:51.000Z In May 2025, after India launched retaliatory strikes against Pakistan following the Pahalgam terror attack, Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Adampur air base. Pakistan had claimed Indian aircraft were struck there. The visit was a rebuttal, a piece of visual evidence delivered directly to the camera. It was also something else: a performance of resolve staged as much for Indian television studios and the government's nationalist constituency as for any Pakistani audience. The strikes may have been a legitimate act of state policy. That is not the point. The point is what surrounded them: the saturation language of punishment, humiliation, muscular response and civilisational confidence that turned a security operation into a domestic political event. Rachel Myrick's [Polarization and International Politics: How Extreme Partisanship Threatens Global Stability](https://link.amazon/B003jmqOG?ref=diplopolis.com) (Princeton University Press, 2025), winner of the Best Book Award from the Conflict Processes Section of the American Political Science Association, does not discuss Operation Sindoor. It does not need to. Its central mechanism explains precisely why that language was necessary, why restraint would have been politically dangerous and why the foreign adversary had become, in a very specific sense, domestically useful. Myrick's argument is straightforward and genuinely important. Polarisation does not merely produce angry publics and dysfunctional legislatures. It reshapes the strategic environment in which democratic leaders make foreign policy. When domestic political competition becomes sufficiently intense, restraint looks like weakness, ambiguity looks like betrayal and diplomacy looks like softness. The credibility advantages that democracies have historically enjoyed in international relations, reliable commitments, stable alliances, consistent policy, erode when domestic fracture makes every foreign policy choice a battlefield in the internal political war. Leaders find themselves unable to make concessions because concession feeds the opposition's narrative. They find themselves compelled to project toughness because toughness is the only position that cannot be attacked from the right. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/07/When-the-Enemy-Becomes-Necessary_BC.png)](https://link.amazon/B0ameuCf8?ref=diplopolis.com) That mechanism is real and the book is right to take it seriously. The American evidence on which Myrick primarily builds her case is substantial. Polarisation has made United States foreign policy less predictable, less credible and more vulnerable to sudden reversal between administrations. Allies cannot be certain which America they are dealing with. Adversaries can wait. The democratic advantage in signalling commitment has been quietly hollowed out by the domestic instability behind the signal. This is an important corrective to the literature that treats polarisation mainly as a domestic problem. Myrick shows it has structural consequences for how the international system works. The review's more interesting task is to follow the argument beyond its American origin and see where it travels well and where it breaks down. It travels to India, but the mechanism operates differently. Indian polarisation does not primarily produce the policy instability that Myrick identifies in the American case: alternating administrations with opposed foreign policies, congressional obstruction, partisan reversals on alliances and agreements. What it produces instead is a compression of the space between national security and domestic political performance. Pakistan is not only a security problem for India. It is a reliable political symbol, a stage on which resolve can be performed for domestic audiences. The foreign enemy becomes necessary not only because it poses a real threat, but because it serves a recurring domestic political function. In this environment, any Indian leader who chose negotiation over confrontation after a terrorist attack would not merely be making a strategic choice. He would be handing his opposition the single most damaging accusation available in Indian politics: that he was soft on Pakistan. Myrick does not need to visit Adampur to explain why Modi did. Operation Sindoor illustrated that dynamic with unusual clarity. The line between deterrence and theatre did not disappear. It became very difficult to locate. The Israeli case is where Myrick travels most directly and most powerfully, and the analytical connection that matters most is war aims. In a less polarised political system, war aims can still be brutal, excessive or mistaken. But they are more likely to be debated as strategic questions: what is achievable, what is the cost, what is the exit, what comes after? In Israel, polarisation has made the war aim itself unstable. Is the goal to destroy Hamas, recover hostages, permanently reshape Gaza, preserve Netanyahu's governing coalition, prevent a Palestinian political future, reassure the Israeli public or satisfy the far right? The answer keeps shifting because the war is not only being fought against Hamas. It is being fought inside Israeli politics simultaneously. When Netanyahu faced far-right backlash as the United States pressed for an end to the Gaza war, with Ben-Gvir and Smotrich threatening coalition collapse over any arrangement that left Hamas in any form, the mechanism was visible in plain sight: the external policy choice was being constrained, in real time, by the requirements of internal political survival. The hostage families understood this before the analysts did. They watched their government make choices that could not be explained by military logic alone, choices whose real audience was a domestic coalition rather than a Hamas negotiating team. Myrick's framework names that dynamic with precision. A polarised state does not simply fight an enemy. It fights over the meaning of victory while the war is still unfolding. Pakistan is where the framework encounters its structural limit, and the review cannot pretend otherwise. Pakistan has polarisation. It has fractious civilian parties, intense political competition, mass mobilisation and the performance of nationalism that Myrick's framework predicts. But polarisation is not the deepest mechanism. The deeper mechanism is civil-military imbalance. Foreign and security policy, on India, Afghanistan, nuclear posture, relations with Washington and Beijing, are substantially shaped by the army, not by elected governments. Civilian parties compete, accuse, perform and mobilise, but the foreign policy ceiling is set elsewhere. When the analysis describes the military's handling of the 2025 conflict with India as a source of domestic consolidation and international attention for the institution itself, it is describing a dynamic that Myrick's framework of partisan polarisation cannot fully capture. The decisive actor is not an elected leader constrained by a polarised public. It is an institution that operates largely outside the electoral accountability that makes the book's central mechanism work. Pakistan's democracy is noisy at the surface and controlled at depth. That is a different political structure than the ones Myrick is explaining, and it requires a different analytical vocabulary. This is not a failure of the book. It is the honest limit of a framework designed to explain polarised democracies. Myrick's argument assumes a baseline of democratic functionality: parties compete, leaders face voters, institutions constrain, foreign policy choices can be punished or rewarded electorally, and the domestic political environment actually shapes what leaders can and cannot do in the international arena. In much of the world, that baseline does not exist cleanly. Pakistan is the test case, but it is not alone. The review should say this without dismissing the argument: her mechanism is real and travels further than most American political science manages to travel. But it travels best where elected leaders actually control the instruments whose instability she is trying to explain. Polarization and International Politics is essential reading for anyone trying to understand the present disorder of international relations. It explains why democratic foreign policy has become less predictable, why alliances have become less reliable and why adversaries have learned to wait out administrations rather than negotiate with them. Read it for the American evidence, which is thorough and persuasive. Read it for the framework, which is sharp and genuinely portable. Then test it against India, Israel and Pakistan, and notice where the framework illuminates and where the map runs out. Myrick has written a book that makes you see the international system differently. The cases it cannot fully explain are as revealing as the ones it can. In a world where domestic politics and foreign policy have become increasingly indistinguishable, that is not a minor achievement. This Book Review is free to read. Future Book Reviews will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### $37.5 Billion. Seventeen Dead. Hormuz Closed. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/37-billion-seventeen-dead-hormuz-closed-iran-war-arithmetic/ Last updated: 2026-07-22T13:51:43.000Z Pete Hegseth sat before the Senate Appropriations Committee on Tuesday and [told lawmakers](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hegseth-caine-senate-hearing-iran/?ref=diplopolis.com) the war with Iran has cost $37.5 billion. Two Democratic sources and a third source familiar with the matter told CBS News the actual cost is much higher, in part because the current estimate does not include military construction for US bases that have been damaged. The administration is asking Congress for a further $87.6 billion supplemental package, of which $67.1 billion goes to the Pentagon. Protesters interrupted Hegseth's opening remarks several times. RepThe Ledger, Iran, United States, Hegseth, Congress, Rubio, Strait of Hormuz, US-Israel War on Iran, War Cost, Freedom of Navigation, Middle Eastublican Senator John Kennedy told reporters Congress and the American people need 'some straighter answers' from the Pentagon. Democratic Senator Dick Durbin said Hegseth and General Dan Caine did not justify the cost of the war. 'They can't explain how this money is going to be spent,' he said. House Speaker Mike Johnson said at his weekly press conference: 'The commander in chief and the whole Department of War are working very hard to bring this to a resolution. There's a lot of questions about how that will be done.' The Department of War. Johnson used the phrase without apparent irony. The United States has not had a Department of War since 1947, when it was renamed the Department of Defence. The slip is instructive. Seventeen American service members have been killed in the war. More than 450 have been injured. The Pentagon on Tuesday identified Sergeant Angel S. Rampersad, 28, of Ozone Park, New York, previously listed as missing, as believed killed in action at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan on July 17\. On Wednesday morning, Iran struck Camp Doha in Kuwait, Al Azraq Air Base in Jordan and Sheikh Isa Air Base in Bahrain with drones. Kuwait, Bahrain and Jordan reported interceptions. The eleventh consecutive night of American strikes against Iran ended on Tuesday. The twelfth began on Wednesday. [Rubio said in Manila](https://www.yahoo.com/news/politics/articles/rubio-says-us-still-willing-032355077.html?ref=diplopolis.com) on Wednesday, at the sidelines of the ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting, that the US remains willing to negotiate but Iran is 'not serious about talks.' He said: 'If they're serious, we're serious. If they're not, then we will do what is necessary to protect our interest and also the interests of our allies.' He said the fundamental principle of freedom of navigation was at stake. He noted Iran did not have, under any existing legal mechanism, the right to control traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. This is the same Rubio who said on June 23 that no country is allowed to charge tolls on an international waterway. The same Rubio whose government charged a 20 per cent toll on July 14 and dropped it 25 hours later when Gulf kings made a better offer. The freedom of navigation principle has appeared in Rubio's statements with remarkable consistency. It has not determined a single decision. The Strait of Hormuz was fully open before the US and Israel attacked Iran in February. It remains closed. [Three oil tankers carrying Saudi crude to Asia reversed course in the Red Sea on Tuesday](https://tribune.com.pk/story/2619596/rubio-says-us-still-willing-to-negotiate-over-iran-crisis?ref=diplopolis.com), apparently in response to Houthi threats against Saudi shipping. The war that was launched to assert freedom of navigation has produced the closure of the waterway it was launched to open and a threat to close the second waterway that the Saudi bypass route depends on. $37.5 billion. Seventeen dead. Hormuz closed. Rubio is in Manila saying Iran is not serious. The Department of War is working very hard to bring this to a resolution. ### What Aoun Actually Asked For URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/what-aoun-actually-asked-for-lebanon-trump-small-state-diplomacy/ Last updated: 2026-07-22T12:42:49.000Z On July 21, 2026, [Lebanese President Joseph Aoun met Donald Trump in the Oval Office](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/07/21/lebanon-president-hezbollah-trump-aoun-israel/945ae628-84c1-11f1-9cec-0fb26676f07e%5Fstory.html?ref=diplopolis.com) for the first time. It was the first visit to the White House by a Lebanese head of state in nearly two decades. Aoun had spent four days in Washington, meeting Rubio on Sunday, attending bilateral sessions on Monday and Tuesday, and sitting at the table in the Oval Office where decisions about Lebanon's future had been taken without a Lebanese president present for seventeen years. He had one ask. He left with airline routes. This is not a critique of Aoun's diplomatic skill. The flattery was calculated and delivered with precision — 'such a great president,' 'your vision is peace,' 'this will be your legacy' — and it produced the warmth it was designed to produce. Trump smiled, said Aoun was handsome and knew how to get to him, and said Lebanon could have anything. The question is what anything turned out to mean, and what it reveals about the architecture of power that a sovereign head of state in a country that has been bombed for months, displaced a million of its citizens and lost 4,250 people since March came to Washington to ask a third government to move a fourth government's army off its territory. ## What Aoun Came to Ask The ask is specific and has been consistent since Aoun was elected in January. Lebanon wants Israeli forces to withdraw from the large swaths of southern Lebanon they have occupied since the autumn military operations of 2024 and 2025\. The June 26 framework agreement, brokered by Washington and signed by Israel and Lebanon, sets out a phased plan for Israeli withdrawal accompanied by Lebanese Army deployment and the disarmament of Hezbollah. Implementation was to begin in small pilot zones. The pilot zones have begun in the narrowest sense. [The State Department confirmed on Monday](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/21/lebanese-president-set-to-meet-trump-as-beirut-seeks-israeli-withdrawal?ref=diplopolis.com) that operations had begun in three villages — Froun, Srifa and Zawtar al-Gharbiya — part of the first pilot zone under the June 26 agreement. On Tuesday, as Aoun was in the Oval Office, Israeli forces [fired warning shots at Lebanese soldiers](https://www.timesofisrael.com/meeting-trump-in-dc-aoun-says-lebanon-will-end-hostility-with-israel-forever/?ref=diplopolis.com) deploying to Zawtar al-Gharbiya, saying the Lebanese soldiers had crossed into the buffer zone outside the actual pilot zone. The Lebanese military said Israeli troops fired at its forces as they were in the process of deploying. Three villages. Three weeks after the framework was signed. Israeli forces present in these villages, warning shots fired at the Lebanese Army attempting to replace them. Israel has stated its position with clarity. It will not withdraw until it is satisfied that Hezbollah no longer poses a threat. Hezbollah has rejected the framework agreement outright and said it will not disarm under the current terms. The Lebanese Army, the institution Aoun commands and led until his election, [cannot disarm Hezbollah by force](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/21/lebanons-joseph-aoun-to-meet-trump-what-to-expect?ref=diplopolis.com) without triggering a civil war that the army does not have the capacity to win. The sequence the agreement requires — Israeli withdrawal enabling Lebanese Army deployment enabling Hezbollah disarmament — contains a contradiction at every stage. Aoun knows this. He came to Washington to ask Trump to resolve the first step, which only Trump can do by pressuring Netanyahu, which Trump has not done and shows no immediate inclination to do. ## The Patron's Priorities The context in which Aoun's Washington visit took place deserves precision, because it explains what he received. Trump is managing the eleventh and twelfth consecutive nights of American strikes against Iran, a $37.5 billion war whose costs Hegseth disclosed to the Senate on the same day Aoun was in the Oval Office, a Hormuz closure that has driven US gas prices 34 per cent higher since February, a Houthi threat to impose a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia, a 10-day ceasefire proposal from mediators that Washington has downplayed, seventeen American dead and the prospect of striking Iranian nuclear facilities. Lebanon is not the primary concern. AP noted [with precision](https://fortune.com/2026/07/21/trump-moves-to-restore-direct-u-s-lebanon-flights-after-four-decade-hiatus/?ref=diplopolis.com) that 'the US has championed peace in Lebanon but also has been increasingly distracted by a new round of escalation with the war in Iran, which has destabilized much of the Middle East.' The distraction is structural. The Lebanon file, in American strategic attention, sits below the Iran nuclear file, below the Hormuz crisis, below the question of whether to strike Pickaxe Mountain, below the Hegseth supplemental budget request, below the seventeen Americans killed. Aoun arrived at a White House that was simultaneously managing what its Speaker has started calling the Department of War. His ask was heard warmly. It was not acted upon. What Aoun received: direct flights to Lebanon for the first time in more than forty years, reversing Ronald Reagan's 1985 suspension after the TWA Flight 847 hijacking. A presidential statement that Lebanon had been 'badly treated' and would be helped 'a lot.' A public declaration from Trump that he would be open to speaking directly with Hezbollah if Lebanon asked. The expression 'he can have anything.' No timeline for Israeli withdrawal. No commitment to pressure Netanyahu. No additional military support for the Lebanese Army beyond what was already in discussion. Massad Boulos told reporters: 'It's all about implementation. It's going to take time.' ## The Grammar of the Small State Aoun's visit is a case study in small state strategy applied under optimal conditions and producing limited results. He arrived with maximum legitimacy — elected by consensus, respected by Washington, untainted by Hezbollah association, trusted by Israel as a counterpart. He performed the diplomatic grammar correctly: flattery that gave Trump an entry, a legacy framing that connected Lebanon's request to Trump's self-interest, a forward-looking declaration that Lebanon would 'end hostility with Israel forever' that gave Trump a headline. He secured a meeting that his predecessors could not get for seventeen years. The result is instructive not because Aoun failed but because it illustrates the ceiling of small state strategy when the patron's attention is elsewhere. The Arab states moved Trump on Netanyahu, as DiploPolis reported last week, by speaking directly to his transactional interests in private presidential conversations. That method worked because the Arab states have leverage Trump wants: investment, oil flows, Abraham Accords expansion. Lebanon's leverage is moral and strategic, not transactional. It can offer Washington a stable southern flank, a Hezbollah disarmed, a peace with Israel. These are real and valuable. They require Israeli cooperation that Washington has not extracted and Hezbollah compliance that is not available. The framework agreement signed on June 26 was a genuine American diplomatic achievement. Its implementation is blocked at the first step by the same dynamic that has blocked every previous arrangement: Israel's security calculation and Hezbollah's refusal to disarm are structurally incompatible, and the United States has chosen, throughout this period, to prioritise its relationship with Israel over extracting the specific concessions from Netanyahu that would allow the framework to function. Aoun's visit did not change that choice. It confirmed it, politely, with airline routes as the consolation. ## What Comes Next The Rome talks last week produced no timeline. The pilot zones are active in three villages. The Lebanese Army is deploying where Israel permits. Hezbollah continues to fire. Israel continues near-daily airstrikes. The framework exists. The withdrawal does not. Trump's offer to speak directly with Hezbollah, [reported by Times of Israel](https://www.timesofisrael.com/meeting-trump-in-dc-aoun-says-lebanon-will-end-hostility-with-israel-forever/?ref=diplopolis.com), is the most significant thing he said in the Oval Office and the least noted in the coverage. Hezbollah is designated a terrorist organisation by the United States. Trump offering to speak directly with it represents a potential shift in the American posture toward the group that could, if followed through, accelerate the framework's implementation by creating a channel that bypasses the current impasse. Whether it is followed through is the question. Trump has made similar gestures toward Hamas, toward the Taliban, toward Iran itself. Gestures and follow-through have been inconsistent. Aoun declared Lebanon would end hostility with Israel 'forever.' The declaration is his to make on behalf of the Lebanese state. Hezbollah is not the Lebanese state and has not made it. Israel received the declaration warmly and fired warning shots at the Lebanese Army on the same day. The territory remains occupied. The ceasefire with Iran remains broken. The patron is distracted by a larger war. Aoun came to Washington with the right ask and the right approach at the wrong moment. The moment will not remain wrong indefinitely. When the Iran war finds its resolution, the Lebanon file will rise in American strategic attention. The framework agreement, if it survives until then, will be the vehicle for that resolution. Aoun's task between now and that moment is to keep the framework alive, keep the Lebanese Army credible, and keep Washington's interest sufficiently warm that when the moment arrives, Lebanon has a president in the room who has already been to the Oval Office and been promised anything. He got airline routes. The territory is still occupied. But he got the meeting. In Lebanon's circumstances, in this week, that is not nothing. This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### He Can Have Anything URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/he-can-have-anything-aoun-trump-lebanon-israel-withdrawal/ Last updated: 2026-07-22T11:05:19.000Z Joseph Aoun came to the White House on Tuesday to ask for one thing. He wanted the United States to pressure Benjamin Netanyahu to withdraw Israeli troops from southern Lebanon so the Lebanese Army could fill the vacuum, Hezbollah would lose its justification for remaining armed, and Lebanon could finally implement the framework agreement signed on June 26 after months of American mediation. He did not get that. What [he got](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog-july-21-2026/?ref=diplopolis.com) was this. He called Trump a great president. Trump smiled and said: 'He knows how to get to me. Now he can have anything.' He said Lebanon had been 'a very badly treated place and country' and that he was going to help it 'a lot,' without specifying how. He said Israeli forces were 'in the process of redeploying,' which is true only in the narrowest sense: three villages in one pilot zone, out of the large swaths of southern Lebanon that Israel currently occupies. After the meeting, Trump [posted on Truth Social](https://abcnews.com/Politics/wireStory/trump-direct-us-lebanon-flights-resume-time-40-134962506?ref=diplopolis.com) that he was directing his administration to allow US airline carriers to fly directly to Lebanon for the first time in more than forty years, reversing a ban imposed by Ronald Reagan in 1985 after the hijacking of TWA Flight 847. The State Department, on the same day, [strongly urged against travel to Lebanon](https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/us/2026/07/21/us-flights-lebanon-aoun-trump-us-israel/?ref=diplopolis.com) due to the security situation. The flights were announced. The warning remained active. Both are true simultaneously. This is the geometry of Lebanon's situation with precision. The country has a president who made it to the Oval Office — the first Lebanese head of state to do so since 2009, the first in nearly two decades to receive a formal White House meeting. He performed the required flattery with evident skill. Trump responded warmly and said he could have anything. What he received was a symbolic gesture about aviation routes to a country the State Department was simultaneously warning Americans not to visit, and a presidential statement that Israeli troops were redeploying that Israel has not confirmed. Massad Boulos, Trump's senior adviser on Arab affairs, told reporters after the meeting: 'It's all about implementation, it's going to take time. This is not easy. Nobody believes for a second that this is going to be an easy task in any way.' At least 4,250 people have been killed in Lebanon since fighting escalated in March. A million have been displaced. The two sides met in Rome last week for another round of US-mediated talks. No timeline for implementation emerged. In Zawtar al-Gharbiya on Tuesday, [Israeli forces fired warning shots at Lebanese soldiers](https://www.timesofisrael.com/meeting-trump-in-dc-aoun-says-lebanon-will-end-hostility-with-israel-forever/?ref=diplopolis.com) who were deploying to the first pilot zone. The IDF said the Lebanese soldiers had crossed into the buffer zone. The Lebanese military said Israeli troops fired at its forces. Both cannot be entirely right. Neither is redeploying. Aoun told Trump: 'Your vision is peace. Your vision is stability, and I think my vision coincides with your vision.' It is the grammar of the small state addressing the patron: converting Lebanon's need into Trump's legacy, hoping the translation holds. Rib-Hadda of Byblos tried the same approach with Egypt thirty-four centuries ago. He too was promised help. He too waited for troops. Hezbollah has [rejected the framework agreement outright](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/21/trump-vows-to-help-lebanon-but-offers-no-timeline-for-israeli-withdrawal?ref=diplopolis.com) and opposes disarming under the current terms. Israel has insisted it will not leave until it is satisfied Hezbollah no longer poses a threat. Trump said he might even speak directly with Hezbollah if Lebanon asked. The country that was promised everything left with direct flights and a warm handshake. The territory remains occupied. ### The Man They Pelted With Rocks URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-man-they-pelted-with-rocks/ Last updated: 2026-07-22T10:49:38.000Z Sometime during the six-day funeral for Ali Khamenei, a mob found Abbas Araghchi in the crowd and pelted him with rocks. The death chants called him a traitorous sellout. Araghchi is Iran's Foreign Minister. He negotiated the Versailles MOU. He is the man who has, more than anyone else in the Islamic Republic, kept the channel to Washington open across five months of war. He fled. On Monday morning, [mediators passed Iran a proposal](https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2026-07-20/mediators-propose-10-day-ceasefire-to-revive-iran-u-s-interim-deal-senior-iranian-official-tells-reuters?ref=diplopolis.com) for a 10-day ceasefire to find ways to revive the interim deal that Araghchi signed. The man the hardliners tried to stone is the man the diplomats need back at the table. This is not irony. It is a description of how the Islamic Republic has always functioned: two registers, one system. The Foreign Ministry says it wants to talk. The hardliners who filled Khamenei's funeral say talking is treason. Both are Iran. The question the ceasefire proposal cannot answer is which Iran has the authority to make an agreement hold. The hardline case, [reported by CNN](https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/18/middleeast/iran-hardliners-coup-warning-us-truce-intl-cmd?ref=diplopolis.com), is specific. Mojtaba Khamenei, named Supreme Leader after his father's killing in February, has been effectively invisible since the strikes. He has not appeared in public. He has issued no operational guidance. He has not endorsed the MOU, the negotiations, the ceasefire or anything that has happened since he was named to the position. In his absence, Ghalibaf, Pezeshkian and Araghchi have become the visible faces of post-war Iran. The hardliners have drawn the only conclusion available to them: the negotiators are running the country without the Supreme Leader's sanction. They are calling it a coup. 'Mojtaba's continued absence means that they don't have access to him and also that Ghalibaf and allies are effectively in charge of the country,' Iran expert Arash Azizi told CNN. 'The ultra-hardliners have thus accused Ghalibaf and Pezeshkian of plotting a coup against Mojtaba.' Whether Mojtaba is incapacitated, in hiding for his own security or deliberately invisible while others manage the consequences of the February strikes, the effect is the same. The men doing the negotiating have no visible supreme authority behind them. Every concession Araghchi makes can be characterised as unauthorised. Every ceasefire he signs can be repudiated as illegitimate. The hardliners threw rocks at him at a funeral and called for his death. That is not fringe behaviour in a moment of grief. It is a political statement about who has the right to speak for the Islamic Republic. The 10-day ceasefire proposal arrives into this. Mediators — Qatar and Oman — are proposing a pause long enough to find a path back to the MOU framework. Washington has [downplayed the prospect of Trump accepting it](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/07/21/us-iran-war-trump-hormuz-houthis.html?ref=diplopolis.com). 'Right now, President Trump is focused on making Iran pay for their violations of the MOU and their continued acts of terrorism in the Strait of Hormuz,' a US official said. The White House is not saying yes. Tehran's hardliners are not allowing yes. And the Supreme Leader, if he has a view, has not expressed it. The hardliners at the funeral were not simply mourning. They were conducting a political audit of the war's management. Their verdict: the men who negotiated in Washington signed away the revolution's commitments without the revolution's authorisation. Before the MOU was signed, one faction warned: 'If the leader's conditions are not fulfilled, it will be us, the blade and your throat.' That warning was not retracted when the MOU was signed anyway. Washington is proposing ten more days of ceasefire. Tehran's diplomats are receiving the proposal. The Supreme Leader has not been seen since February. The man the mediators need has rocks thrown at him in public. A ceasefire requires two parties. Iran has several. ### Ten Books That Teach You How Power Actually Works URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/ten-books-geopolitics-reading-list-2026-power-global-south/ Last updated: 2026-07-17T20:54:32.000Z Most geopolitics reading lists are written from the same place: a think tank office in Washington or London, by someone whose implicit question is what the great powers should do next. The books they recommend reflect that vantage point. They explain American strategy, Chinese ambition and Russian calculation with precision and authority. They are less useful for a reader who wants to understand how the world looks from Nairobi, Mumbai, Doha or Jakarta — from inside the system rather than at its controls. This list is built from a different question: what do you need to read to understand how power actually works, regardless of where you sit in the international order? The ten books below were chosen because each one teaches something the standard list does not. Some are classics that have earned their place through sustained accuracy. Some are recent enough to speak directly to what happened this week in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea. All of them will make you a more precise thinker about the events DiploPolis covers every day. They are arranged not by rank but by the order in which you should read them: from the structural to the specific, from the framework to the detail. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/07/Prisoners-of-Geography-----Tim-Marshall--2015-_BC.png)](https://link.amazon/B05MlENSe?ref=diplopolis.com) ## [Prisoners of Geography](https://link.amazon/B05MlENSe?ref=diplopolis.com) – Tim Marshall (2015) Start here. Before strategy, before economics, before ideology — geography. Marshall's argument is simple and important: the physical shape of the world constrains what states can do more than any leader's intentions or any policy document's ambitions. Mountain ranges, rivers, warm-water ports, chokepoints, landlocked borders — these are not background to geopolitics. They are geopolitics. Marshall writes as a foreign correspondent, not an academic, which means [the book](https://www.waterstones.com/book/prisoners-of-geography/tim-marshall/9781783962433?ref=diplopolis.com) is readable in a way that most geopolitics texts are not. Each chapter takes a region and shows how its geography has shaped its history, its conflicts and its strategic options. Russia needs warm-water ports and will do almost anything to secure them. China's eastern coast has no natural defensive depth. The Indian subcontinent is bounded by the Himalayas on one side and the Indian Ocean on the other, which explains both India's strategic autonomy and its persistent security anxiety. The chapter on the Middle East is the one to read first if you are following the Iran war. The Strait of Hormuz is twenty-one miles wide at its narrowest point. That geography did not change when the US-Israel strikes began in February. It will not change when the war ends. Marshall explains why this matters and why no amount of military power can make geography irrelevant. Read this if: You want to understand why Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and the South China Sea keep appearing in every geopolitical crisis. Its limitation: Marshall's framework is deterministic. The book is weaker on how states sometimes overcome their geographic constraints through diplomacy, technology or institutional creativity. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/07/The-Prize_-The-Epic-Quest-for-Oil--Money-and-Power-----Daniel-Yergin--1991-_BC.png)](https://link.amazon/B0f2eiDAu?ref=diplopolis.com) ## [The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power](https://link.amazon/B0f2eiDAu?ref=diplopolis.com) – Daniel Yergin (1991) Thirty-five years old and more relevant than anything published this year about energy. Yergin's history of the oil industry is the background document for the entire Hormuz crisis. Every decision being made in Washington, Tehran, Riyadh and Beijing about the Strait of Hormuz connects to the structure [Yergin maps](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/117018/the-prize-by-daniel-yergin/?ref=diplopolis.com) across eight hundred pages: how oil became the instrument of geopolitical power in the twentieth century, why the Gulf became the centre of that power, and why the dependence on a single narrow maritime corridor was created and why it cannot be easily dismantled. The book covers the discovery of oil in Pennsylvania, the rise of the Standard Oil empire, the transformation of the British Navy from coal to oil, the First World War's revelation that mechanised armies run on petroleum, the scramble for Middle Eastern concessions between the wars, the Second World War's dependence on Allied access to oil, the postwar creation of the Gulf state system and the oil shocks of the 1970s that remade the global economy. By the time you finish it, you understand that the Hormuz closure is not an anomaly in the history of oil geopolitics. It is the scenario that the entire postwar energy architecture was designed to prevent. Yergin received the Pulitzer Prize for this book. It has not dated because the underlying structure it describes has not changed. What has changed is that the guarantee is now contested. Read this if: You want to understand why the Hormuz closure matters beyond the immediate military conflict. Its limitation: Yergin is a consultant to the energy industry and his sympathies occasionally show. The book is less useful on the political economy of oil from the producing countries' perspective. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/07/The-Tragedy-of-Great-Power-Politics-----John-Mearsheimer--2001-_BC.png)](https://link.amazon/B0f2m6Qwv?ref=diplopolis.com) ## [The Tragedy of Great Power Politics](https://link.amazon/B0f2m6Qwv?ref=diplopolis.com) – John Mearsheimer (2001) The uncomfortable book on this list. Mearsheimer's offensive realism argues that the international system produces great power competition regardless of intentions, ideologies or institutions — that states pursue power because the anarchic international system gives them no choice, and that periods of cooperation are temporary accommodations within a permanent competition. The moral framework of international law, in Mearsheimer's account, is a constraint that operates only when great powers find it convenient. DiploPolis does not endorse Mearsheimer's framework as a description of what should happen. We include [this book](https://wwnorton.com/books/9780393349276?ref=diplopolis.com) because it is, watching the Iran war unfold, the most accurate descriptive theory available for what does happen. The ICJ provisional measures did not stop Israeli operations in Gaza. The UN Security Council resolutions were vetoed. The G7 communiqués were disregarded. The ICC arrest warrants sit unexecuted. Mearsheimer would not be surprised by any of this. Read Mearsheimer not to accept his argument but to understand its explanatory power. Read him alongside Acharya, who comes later in this list, to understand what the framework misses about the parts of the world that are not great powers. Read this if: You want to understand why the moral case for international law keeps losing to the strategic calculation of great power interest. Its limitation: Mearsheimer's framework is almost entirely focused on great powers. It has very little to say about how smaller states navigate the system he describes, which is where most of the world's population lives. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/07/Why-Nations-Fail-----Daron-Acemoglu-and-James-Robinson--2012-_BC.png)](https://link.amazon/B0eKcH8HQ?ref=diplopolis.com) ## [Why Nations Fail](https://link.amazon/B0eKcH8HQ?ref=diplopolis.com) – Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2012) The institutional argument for why the same external pressure produces regime collapse in some states and adaptation in others. Acemoglu and Robinson's central claim is that the difference between prosperous and failing states is not geography, culture or natural resources but the quality of their institutions — whether they are inclusive, distributing power and opportunity broadly, or extractive, concentrating power in the hands of a narrow elite. The Iran sanctions case is a live test of their thesis. Iran has been under comprehensive sanctions since 1979\. Additional layers were imposed after 2012, after 2018 and after 2024\. The country's economy has contracted severely. And yet the Islamic Republic has not collapsed. [Acemoglu and Robinson's framework](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/205414/why-nations-fail-by-daron-acemoglu-and-james-a-robinson/?ref=diplopolis.com) suggests an answer: extractive institutions are in some ways more durable under external pressure than inclusive ones, because the elite who control them have both the incentive and the means to prevent the kind of organised political opposition that would displace them. The book is also essential for understanding why the post-war order in the Middle East is unlikely to produce the democratic transformation that Western policymakers consistently predict. Institutions do not change because external pressure is applied. They change when the internal distribution of power shifts. Read this if: You want to understand why sanctions rarely produce regime change and why post-conflict reconstruction so often fails. Its limitation: The book's case studies are heavily drawn from Africa and Latin America. Its application to the Middle East and South Asia requires the reader to do additional work. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/07/A-World-Without-Islam-----Graham-Fuller--2010-_BC.png)](https://link.amazon/B02Q7tNaH?ref=diplopolis.com) ## [A World Without Islam](https://link.amazon/B02Q7tNaH?ref=diplopolis.com) – Graham Fuller (2010) The most important counter-factual on this list. Fuller — a former CIA station chief in Kabul and former vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council — asks a simple question: if Islam had never existed, would the Middle East be more peaceful? His answer, argued across three hundred pages of careful historical analysis, is no. The conflicts associated with political Islam — resistance to external domination, competition over resources, the struggle for sovereignty, the rejection of a subordinate position in a Western-led international order — predate Islam by centuries and would have expressed themselves through other frameworks had the religion not existed. [Fuller's argument](https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/graham-e-fuller/a-world-without-islam/9780316041218/?ref=diplopolis.com) is particularly important for readers following the Iran war because it reframes the conflict. The Islamic Republic is not fighting to impose religious law on the world. It is fighting to preserve its sovereignty against what it understands as a long history of external domination. The root cause is the same one that drove Iranian nationalism in 1951 when Mohammed Mossadegh nationalised the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, decades before the revolution. The religious framing is genuine but it is not the primary driver. Understanding this distinction changes how you read every statement from Tehran. Read this if: You want to understand the Iran war as a geopolitical conflict rooted in sovereignty and history rather than primarily a religious one. Its limitation: Fuller's argument sometimes smooths over genuine theological and political differences within Islam that do matter for understanding specific conflicts. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/07/Chokepoints_-American-Power-in-the-Age-of-Economic-Warfare-----Edward-Fishman--2025-_BC.png)](https://link.amazon/B0cGfqTmS?ref=diplopolis.com) ## [Chokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare](https://link.amazon/B0cGfqTmS?ref=diplopolis.com) – Edward Fishman (2025) The most important new geopolitics book in a decade and the one most directly relevant to the events DiploPolis has covered this week. Fishman — a former senior official at the US State Department and Treasury with direct experience designing sanctions — explains how the United States transformed the architecture of globalisation into a weapon system. Control over economic chokepoints: the US dollar, advanced semiconductor technology, critical minerals, energy supply chains — became the key instrument of American power in the twenty-first century without firing a shot. [The book](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/726149/chokepoints-by-edward-fishman/?ref=diplopolis.com) is essential for three reasons. First, it explains why the Rubio toll reversal happened so quickly: Trump discovered that charging money for Hormuz passage was economically destructive to the Gulf states whose investment he needed, which is exactly the kind of chokepoint logic Fishman maps. Second, it explains why Iran has proved so difficult to defeat economically despite decades of sanctions. Third, and most important for the DiploPolis reader, Fishman is honest about the system's limitations: overuse of economic chokepoints accelerates the very fragmentation it is meant to prevent. The Economist, Financial Times and Bloomberg named it a book of the year. The LSE called it a substantial, policy-driven and accessible analysis of economic statecraft. Paul Kennedy called it one of the most important books on economic warfare ever written. Read this if: You want to understand why the global economy is the real battlefield of the twenty-first century and how chokepoint control shapes every conflict you are reading about. Its limitation: Fishman writes from inside the American system. The book is less analytical about how the targets of American economic warfare have adapted and developed countermeasures. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/07/The-World-for-Sale-----Javier-Blas-and-Jack-Farchy--2021-_BC.png)](https://link.amazon/B07okhQHg?ref=diplopolis.com) ## [The World for Sale](https://link.amazon/B07okhQHg?ref=diplopolis.com) – Javier Blas and Jack Farchy (2021) The book that answers the question nobody asks loudly enough: who actually makes money from geopolitical disruption? Blas and Farchy — both Bloomberg commodity journalists — take the reader inside the commodity trading houses that sit between oil producers and oil consumers: Vitol, Trafigura, Glencore, Gunvor, Mercuria. These companies move the physical commodities that states fight over, and they profit from every disruption, shortage and crisis that makes prices volatile. [The book](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-world-for-sale-9780190078256?ref=diplopolis.com) is not a polemic against commodity trading. It is a reported account of how the industry works, who runs it and what role it plays in the geopolitical events that most analysis treats as purely political. When Iran's oil was under maximum sanctions pressure in 2019, someone was still moving it — through grey market networks, through ship-to-ship transfers, through shell company chains. When Russian oil became politically toxic after 2022, someone was still buying it at a discount and selling it to India at a margin. For the DiploPolis reader following the Hormuz closure: the price spike from the closure is generating extraordinary profits for every entity with access to oil stored outside the Persian Gulf. Understanding who those entities are and how they operate is as important as understanding the military situation. Read this if: You want to understand the economic actors who profit from the conflicts that international relations analysis treats as purely political or military. Its limitation: The book's most recent period of coverage ends in the early 2020s. The frameworks it provides apply directly to the Iran war but the specific events are not covered. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/07/The-End-of-the-World-Is-Just-the-Beginning-----Peter-Zeihan--2022-_BC.png)](https://link.amazon/B0a32GQht?ref=diplopolis.com) ## [The End of the World Is Just the Beginning](https://link.amazon/B0a32GQht?ref=diplopolis.com) – Peter Zeihan (2022) The most provocative book on this list and the one that requires the most critical reading. Zeihan argues that the era of American-enforced globalisation — cheap shipping, open trade routes, enforced rules — is ending, and that most countries are structurally unprepared for what replaces it. His analysis of deglobalisation, demographic decline and supply chain fragmentation is rigorous and frequently correct. His prescriptive conclusions are aggressively American in their assumptions about who wins and who loses in the transition. Read [Zeihan](https://www.harpercollins.com/products/the-end-of-the-world-is-just-the-beginning-peter-zeihan?ref=diplopolis.com) for his diagnosis, which is sharp. Be cautious about his prescription. The DiploPolis reading asks a different question: what does deglobalisation look like from the Global South? For India, which has spent seventy years building strategic autonomy, the end of American-enforced globalisation is not unambiguously a crisis. For the smaller economies of Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia that depend on open trade routes and commodity price stability, it is. Zeihan treats these as equivalent. They are not. The book forces the reader to think about the structural changes that are happening regardless of who is in the White House — the demographic, geographic and logistical forces reshaping the global economy at a pace that political analysis rarely captures. Read this if: You want to understand the structural forces pushing toward deglobalisation and why the rules-based international order is under pressure that predates Trump and will outlast him. Its limitation: Zeihan's framework has a pronounced American exceptionalism that distorts his analysis of the Global South. Read him in conversation with Acharya, who follows. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/07/The-Once-and-Future-World-Order_-Why-Global-Civilization-Will-Survive-the-Decline-of-the-West------Amitav-Acharya--2025-_BC.png)](https://link.amazon/B06xYxpcP?ref=diplopolis.com) ## [The Once and Future World Order: Why Global Civilization Will Survive the Decline of the West](https://link.amazon/B06xYxpcP?ref=diplopolis.com) – Amitav Acharya (2025) The essential corrective to every other book on this list. Acharya — a distinguished professor of international affairs at American University, born in India, who has spent his career working on Global South international relations — argues that the standard story of international order as a Western-built system now under challenge from China is fundamentally wrong. The world is not transitioning from a US-led order to a China-led one. Surveying five thousand years of global history, Acharya shows that world order existed long before the rise of the West — in ancient Sumer, India, Greece, medieval caliphates and Eurasian empires — and that the decline of Western dominance is not the end of order but potentially the beginning of a more equitable one. The book's multiplex framework is the tool for understanding why the Arab states could move Trump where the ICC could not. They were not operating within the liberal international order's framework. They were operating within a different order simultaneously — one built on Gulf investment, oil flows and bilateral relationships with the American president — and that order had levers that the liberal international order lacked. [Acharya's argument](https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/amitav-acharya/the-once-and-future-world-order/9781541604148/?ref=diplopolis.com) is also essential for understanding India's position in the Iran war: abstaining from UN votes, maintaining trade with Iran, deepening ties with the US, refusing to take sides. This is not incoherence. It is the behaviour of a civilisational state that has understood, long before Acharya articulated it, that multiple orders can be navigated simultaneously. Reviewed in the New York Times, Foreign Affairs and International Affairs. Named one of the top ten books of the year by International Affairs. The most important Global South contribution to international relations theory published in 2025. Read this if: You want to understand why the Global South's behaviour in great power conflicts consistently defies the binary choices that Western analysis expects. Its limitation: Acharya's framework is more convincing as a description of how the world works than as a prescription for how states should navigate it. The book is better on diagnosis than strategy. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/07/Small-States-in-World-Politics_-Explaining-Foreign-Policy-Behavior-----Jeanne-Hey--ed.---2003-_BC.png) ## [Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior](https://link.amazon/B089BlQOB?ref=diplopolis.com) – Jeanne Hey (ed.) (2003) The book that most geopolitics reading lists ignore entirely and that practitioners in small and middle powers most need to read. Hey and her contributors examine how states too small to impose their will on the international system navigate great power competition — through hedging, through careful alignment, through niche positioning, through the creative use of international institutions as leverage, through maintaining multiple relationships that great powers would find contradictory. Qatar is the case study that runs through every other entry on this list. Qatar hosts the largest US military facility in the Gulf. Qatar maintains working relationships with Iran, Hamas and the Taliban. Qatar funds Al Jazeera. Qatar brokers ceasefires between parties that consider each other enemies. Qatar is currently the back-channel through which Washington and Tehran communicate when direct communication becomes impossible. All of this is in [Hey's framework](https://www.rienner.com/title/Small%5FStates%5Fin%5FWorld%5FPolitics%5FExplaining%5FForeign%5FPolicy%5FBehavior?ref=diplopolis.com): the small state that makes itself indispensable to every party in the system by refusing to be captured by any of them. Jordan has played a version of the same game for seventy years. Rwanda has played it with extraordinary discipline for three decades. Singapore is the model that every Southeast Asian small state studies. Understanding small state strategy is not a peripheral interest for readers following international affairs. It is central to understanding the Middle East, Southeast Asia and most of Africa. Read this if: You want to understand how the majority of the world's states actually navigate a system designed by and for great powers. Its limitation: The academic register is drier than the other books on this list. It rewards patience but does not read quickly. ## How to Use This List Prisoners of Geography first. It takes two days and reframes everything else. Then The Prize if you are following the energy dimension of the Iran war and Chokepoints if you are following the economic warfare dimension. Mearsheimer and Acemoglu-Robinson together build the structural framework for understanding why international law keeps losing to strategic calculation. Fuller provides the historical depth on the Middle East that the news cycle cannot supply. Blas and Farchy and Zeihan cover the economic forces that political analysis tends to treat as background. Acharya and Hey are the corrective that makes the whole list Global South-relevant rather than a Washington reading group's recommendations with a new label applied. None of these books will tell you what happens next in the Iran war. That is not what books are for. What they will do is give you the frameworks to make sense of what happens, to recognise the patterns behind the events and to read the news with the kind of structural literacy that distinguishes analysis from commentary. The world is complicated. The books that make it less so are worth more than the ones that make it seem simple. ### The Second Chokepoint URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/second-chokepoint-iran-houthis-bab-el-mandeb-closure-red-sea/ Last updated: 2026-07-17T07:33:00.000Z Three sources [told Reuters on Thursday](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2651170/middle-east?ref=diplopolis.com) that Iran has instructed the Houthis to stand ready to close the Bab el-Mandeb if the United States strikes Iranian power infrastructure. A source close to the Houthis confirmed that missiles and drones have been deployed near the strait and are awaiting an order to begin. The detail that distinguishes this from prior Houthi threats: IRGC representatives already stationed in Yemen will control the timing of any closure, not the Houthis themselves. Command authority does not rest with the group. It rests with the Revolutionary Guard. Iran has built the same command structure at both chokepoints: Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb. The Bab el-Mandeb is the 30-kilometre passage between Yemen and Djibouti at the southern end of the Red Sea. Since Saudi Arabia's Hormuz bypass came fully online in March, [approximately 7 per cent of global energy supplies](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2651170/middle-east?ref=diplopolis.com) have been transiting this route, redirected through the Saudi East-West Pipeline, which runs from Abqaiq on the Gulf coast to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. The pipeline is rated at 7 million barrels per day but the Yanbu export terminals can load approximately 4.5 million barrels per day, creating a structural ceiling on exports. The bypass was designed to handle a short disruption. It has now been running at its operational limit for four and a half months. There is no expansion that can come online in any relevant timeframe. If the Bab el-Mandeb closes, the Saudi bypass route loses its exit. The pipeline crude reaches Yanbu and has nowhere to go. The Cape of Good Hope route adds roughly three weeks and 6,000 miles to voyage times. It can carry additional volume but cannot replace the current Red Sea flow within any timeframe that prevents a second price shock. The world's two main Middle East oil export routes would both be closed simultaneously, for the first time since both were constructed. Iran has decided the threat to civilian infrastructure crosses a threshold. Trump [said on Tuesday](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog%5Fentry/trump-threatens-to-knock-out-all-iranian-bridges-unless-they-negotiate-says-hes-saving-energy-targets-for-last/?ref=diplopolis.com) that power plants and bridges would be targeted next week if Iran did not return to negotiations. The UN human rights chief has said that deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure is a war crime. The Bab el-Mandeb instruction is Iran's response to that threat: if Washington destroys Iranian civilian infrastructure, Tehran will destroy global energy infrastructure. The logic is symmetrical. It is also, in terms of economic damage, not symmetrical at all. A Bab el-Mandeb closure does not primarily hurt the United States. It primarily hurts Europe, South Asia and East Asia, which depend on the Red Sea for energy and shipping. The operational capability is not theoretical. The Houthis [sank the MV Eternity C](https://www.foxnews.com/world/iran-calls-houthis-prepare-cut-off-red-sea-gateway-can-terror-group-do-it?ref=diplopolis.com) between July 7 and 9, killing four crew members and taking eleven hostage. The MV Magic Seas was sunk on July 6\. MARAD Advisory 2026-006 remains in effect, formally warning commercial vessels against transiting the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea. The Red Sea has not been closed. It has been made too dangerous for normal commercial traffic. The step from dangerous to closed is the IRGC representative in Yemen making one phone call. The Suez Canal connects the Red Sea to the Mediterranean. If Bab el-Mandeb closes, the canal loses its traffic. Egypt earns approximately $10 billion annually in canal revenue. A closure of the southern Red Sea entrance would strand that income. Cairo has been quiet about the war. It would not remain quiet about Bab el-Mandeb. The closure would produce a secondary diplomatic crisis involving a country that has stayed carefully out of this one. The question Trump's power plant threat has produced is not whether Iran will retaliate. It is which retaliation Iran considers proportionate. The Bab el-Mandeb answer is: whatever hurts everyone else's economy [the way Iranian sanctions have hurt Iran's](https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5296971-iran-reportedly-tells-houthis-stand-ready-close-bab-el-mandeb?ref=diplopolis.com). The IRGC controls both straits. It does not need to fire a weapon to demonstrate this. The Reuters report is the demonstration. ### The Language of Power URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-language-of-power-arab-leaders-trump-netanyahu-obstacle/ Last updated: 2026-07-16T13:02:46.000Z On July 15, 2026, [Arab diplomats told the Israeli news channel Kan](https://www.theyeshivaworld.com/news/israel-news/2575326/arab-leaders-to-trump-netanyahu-is-an-obstacle-to-regional-peace.html?ref=diplopolis.com) that their leaders had delivered a message to Donald Trump: Benjamin Netanyahu is the obstacle to regional peace. Those words, in that form, mark something that has not happened before in the current phase of American Middle East diplomacy. The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu in November 2024\. They sit unexecuted. The United Nations Security Council received resolutions demanding ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon. They were vetoed. The G7 issued communiqués. They were noted and disregarded. The International Court of Justice issued provisional measures in South Africa versus Israel. They were violated within weeks. None of those institutions, deploying every mechanism that international law and multilateral diplomacy possess, moved the American president's view of Netanyahu by a measurable degree. ## The Arab leaders moved it in a private conversation. The report specifies what the Arab states argued. Not that Israel was violating international law. Not that the ICC's arrest warrants should be honoured. Not that the provisional measures issued in The Hague required compliance. They argued that Netanyahu was obstructing Trump's vision for the region — his deals, his architecture, his legacy. They spoke to Trump in Trump's language, about Trump's interests, and [Trump began to view Netanyahu as 'an obstacle to realising his vision for the region,'](https://www.theyeshivaworld.com/news/israel-news/2575326/arab-leaders-to-trump-netanyahu-is-an-obstacle-to-regional-peace.html?ref=diplopolis.com) the diplomats said. The countries making that argument are now waiting quietly for Israel's October elections, working behind the scenes to shape Trump's view of what comes next, and declining to make any of this public in order to avoid the appearance of interfering in Israeli internal affairs. They have found the lever. They are applying it carefully. What the Arab states did this week is worth examining with more precision than the headline allows, because the method contains an argument about how power actually works in the current international environment — and the argument is not comfortable. ## What the Arab States Have Known [The Gulf states had urged Trump not to go to war with Iran](https://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/amphtml/World/2026/0305/trump-netanyahu-iran-israel?ref=diplopolis.com). Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE — all of them warned before February 28 that a military operation against Iran would produce Iranian retaliation against their territory, their infrastructure, their shipping. They were right. Iran fired missiles and drones at Kuwait and Qatar. Iranian proxies struck Saudi targets. The Strait of Hormuz closure disrupted energy markets on which Gulf state revenues depend. The war that Netanyahu presented to Trump in the Situation Room in February was sold as a decisive operation that would transform the regional order in Israel's favour; it produced instead a memorandum of understanding that changes nothing essential about Iranian nuclear capability, a Lebanon crisis that has consumed months of American diplomatic bandwidth, and a pattern of Israeli operations that Trump's own secretary of state has struggled to manage. [The Chatham House assessment published this month](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/07/netanyahu-caught-between-trump-and-hard-place?ref=diplopolis.com) is blunt: the Trump-Netanyahu relationship has reached an all-time low. Trump secured the Iran ceasefire not through Israeli cooperation but through Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and Pakistan. When the Islamabad Memorandum needed to be signed, Netanyahu was not in the room. When the Bürgenstock nuclear talks were postponed because Israeli strikes in Lebanon were threatening to collapse the negotiations, the administration's frustration landed publicly: Trump said Netanyahu 'needs to be more responsible' and 'I'm not happy' with Israel's Lebanon operations. On June 2, [Axios reported that Trump told Netanyahu he was 'f\*\*\*ing crazy'](https://www.axios.com/2026/07/04/trump-israel-netanyahu-white-house-meeting-iran?ref=diplopolis.com) and that Arab leaders 'don't want you there.' Netanyahu continued operations in Lebanon after the call. The Gulf states know this history in detail because they lived it. They were the countries Trump turned to when Israel became the obstacle to his own diplomacy. They absorbed the cost of a war they advised against. And they are now making a strategic calculation: the most efficient route to a post-war regional settlement runs not through The Hague or through the UN Security Council but through Trump's sense of his own legacy, applied directly against the leader who has most consistently undermined it. ## The Method and What It Reveals The Arab argument, as reported, has three components. First: Netanyahu is blocking Trump's vision, specifically the expansion of the Abraham Accords and a broader regional normalisation architecture that requires Saudi participation. [Saudi Arabia has made clear](https://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/amphtml/World/2026/0305/trump-netanyahu-iran-israel?ref=diplopolis.com) it will not normalise relations with Israel without a credible path to Palestinian statehood. Netanyahu's government, in which Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has made public statements about annexing Syrian territory and in which National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir has called for Israeli settlement in Gaza and Lebanon, and in which the prime minister publicly endorsed the Greater Israel vision on Israeli television in August 2025, is not producing that path. Saudi participation in the Abraham Accords is Trump's most significant potential foreign policy achievement. Netanyahu is the obstacle to it. Second: the October elections create a window. The Arab states are not asking Trump to force Netanyahu out. They are positioning themselves for a post-Netanyahu Israel, signalling to Washington that the problem is the man rather than the state, and that a different Israeli government might produce a different regional outcome. The diplomatic argument is carefully calibrated: it applies pressure on Netanyahu personally while preserving the US-Israel relationship institutionally. Third: there is the Qatar dimension. [Former Mossad official Dr. Udi Levy](https://www.theyeshivaworld.com/news/israel-news/2575248/former-mossad-official-qatar-reached-israels-decision-makers-just-like-the-mossad-reached-irans.html?ref=diplopolis.com) said on Tuesday that Qatar had reached Israeli decision-makers through back-channels — 'just like the Mossad reached Iran's,' he said. The Gulf states have demonstrated, across the past eighteen months, that they have access to every room in this conflict. They reached Tehran through Pakistan. They reached Washington through direct presidential conversations. They reached Jerusalem through channels that a former intelligence chief considers equivalent to covert operations. The moral voice of international law has no access to these rooms. The pragmatic voice of strategic interest does. What this method bypasses is important to name. The Arab states are not arguing for Palestinian rights. They are not citing the Genocide Convention, the ICC arrest warrants, the ICJ's provisional measures, or the UN resolutions that their own governments voted for. They are arguing that Netanyahu is bad for Trump's deals. The argument is correct as far as it goes. Netanyahu has derailed Trump's Iran diplomacy, blocked the path to Saudi normalisation, and produced an Israeli government whose public statements alarm every Arab capital in the region. The argument is also entirely transactional, entirely personal, and entirely divorced from the question of what Israeli policy toward Palestinians actually is and what it would need to become. [Lebanese President Joseph Aoun has refused to engage with Netanyahu](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog-july-15-2026/?ref=diplopolis.com) as long as Israeli troops remain in Lebanon. That position has moral and legal coherence. But the Arab states' broader argument to Trump is not Aoun's argument. It is the argument of governments that want regional stability, economic integration and American security guarantees — and have concluded that Netanyahu, specifically, is preventing all three. The Palestinians appear in this argument only as the Saudi condition, the two-state requirement without which Riyadh will not normalise. They are the price of the deal, not the subject of it. ## Whether the Lever Moves What It Appears to Move The history of American pressure on Israeli prime ministers is shorter than it is often assumed to be. The most serious confrontation was Eisenhower over Suez in 1956, when the American president threatened economic consequences and Ben-Gurion withdrew. The [Al Jazeera analysis of Trump-Netanyahu tensions](https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/6/18/trump-netanyahu-tensions-have-israeli-and-us-leaders-clashed-before?ref=diplopolis.com) notes that George Bush senior withheld loan guarantees from Shamir over settlements — and Shamir was replaced at the following election. In both cases, American pressure intersected with Israeli democratic processes to produce a change of leadership. In neither case did the change of leadership produce a fundamental shift in Israeli policy toward Palestinians. This is the question the Arab states' strategy leaves unanswered. It is possible that the October elections produce an Israeli government prepared to commit to a Palestinian state pathway, to withdraw from Lebanon and Syria, and to participate in a regional normalisation architecture that includes Saudi Arabia. It is also possible that the October elections produce a different Israeli government with the same strategic objectives and a more diplomatic manner of pursuing them. [Polls currently show Yashar narrowly ahead of Likud in seat projections](https://www.timesofisrael.com/poll-shows-eisenkot-with-significant-lead-over-netanyahu-for-pm-knesset-blocs-static/?ref=diplopolis.com), with Eisenkot leading Netanyahu by 43 per cent to 34 per cent as preferred prime minister. Eisenkot is not Smotrich. He is also not a figure whose commitment to Palestinian statehood has been the centrepiece of his political career. The Arab states have found the lever that moves Trump. They used it because eighteen months of international law failed to move him. They used it in the only language Washington currently understands, and they used it with precision and patience. The method worked because it bypassed the moral framework entirely and spoke directly to Trump's transactional interests. Whether it produces anything for the people whose situation prompted the argument depends on whether a post-Netanyahu Israel is actually a different Israel — which the history of this conflict gives no particular reason to assume. The ICC cannot reach Netanyahu. The UN cannot compel compliance. The G7 cannot enforce its communiqués. The Arab states, working through private presidential conversations, may be the only mechanism that has moved the needle. That is an indictment not of their pragmatism but of the international order they were forced to work around. This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Not a Principle. A Price. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/not-a-principle-a-price-trump-hormuz-toll-reversed-24-hours/ Last updated: 2026-07-16T04:30:20.000Z Trump announced the 20 per cent Hormuz toll on Monday. He [dropped it on Tuesday](https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/energy/2026/07/14/trump-abandons-20-hormuz-toll-in-favour-of-deal-with-gulf-states/?ref=diplopolis.com). The about-face took 25 hours. The reason, in Trump's own words, was that the region's kings and emirs called and said: 'We'd love to do it a different way. We'd love to invest in the United States with billions and billions of dollars.' Trump said he preferred that arrangement. 'I don't think anybody should be able to charge a fee for the strait,' he said. That sentence is correct. It is also the sentence Marco Rubio [used on June 23](https://www.diplopolis.com/rubio-said-illegal-trump-doing-it-hormuz-toll-freedom-navigation) to describe what Iran was doing. DiploPolis noted on Tuesday that Rubio had said 'no country is allowed to charge tolls or fees on an international waterway — that's existing international law.' Trump violated his own stated principle on Monday. He restored it on Tuesday. He used Rubio's words to do so. The principle was not the governing consideration on either day. What governed Monday was a calculation: charge 20 per cent of cargo and recover the cost of protecting 'a very rich portion of the world.' What governed Tuesday was a different calculation: drop the toll and receive billions of dollars in Gulf investment pledges. The freedom of navigation principle was correct on both days. It was also, on both days, subordinate to the transaction. The toll disappeared not because international law was remembered but because the kings and emirs made a better offer. This is not a new pattern. The US-Israel war on Iran has been governed by calculation from the beginning while deploying the language of principle. The war was launched to assert freedom of navigation and prevent Iranian nuclear proliferation. The ceasefire was calculated exhaustion. The Versailles MOU was a calculation of political timing ahead of midterm elections. The toll was a calculation of reimbursement. Its removal was a calculation of investment. Principle appears consistently in the language. It has not determined a single decision. Iran, watching this, has drawn the only reasonable conclusion. The [Revolutionary Guard Corps announced Wednesday](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202607156387?ref=diplopolis.com) that if Washington keeps trying to control the Strait, it will close all other regional oil and gas export corridors — the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, the Gulf of Oman — that benefit the US and its allies. 'Regional energy exports,' the IRGC said, 'are for everyone or for no one.' This too is transactional. Iran built a toll booth because it calculated the Strait was leverage. It threatens all routes because it calculates total closure is the only remaining bargaining chip. Both sides are negotiating through infrastructure. Both are calling it principle. Trump also threatened, in a [Fox News interview broadcast on Tuesday](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog%5Fentry/trump-threatens-to-knock-out-all-iranian-bridges-unless-they-negotiate-says-hes-saving-energy-targets-for-last/?ref=diplopolis.com), to strike Iran's bridges and power plants next week unless negotiations resume. 'Next week comes the bridges. We're gonna knock out all their power plants. We're going to knock out all their bridges unless they get to the table and negotiate.' He said he would 'save the energy targets for last.' The UN human rights chief Volker Türk has said that 'under international law, deliberately attacking civilians and civilian infrastructure is a war crime.' The country that dropped its toll because Gulf kings promised investment is simultaneously threatening to destroy civilian infrastructure if Tehran will not deal. The consistency is perfect: everything is a transaction, everything is leverage, everything is negotiable. The only non-negotiable element is the framing — that Washington acts from principle and Tehran does not. The Gulf kings who called Trump on Tuesday did not do so because of principle either. They called because Gulf investment pledges are worth more to them than a US toll regime that would have driven shipping through alternative routes, reducing Gulf port revenue and complicating their own calculations. The system has many participants. All of them are transacting. All of them are speaking the language of principle. Trump said he doesn't think anybody should be able to charge a fee for the strait. He said this 25 hours after charging one. The principle returned when the price was right. That is not principle. That is how the war is being run. ### The Grammar Has Not Changed URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/love-war-diplomacy-eric-cline-amarna-letters-review/ Last updated: 2026-07-15T11:00:10.000Z Sometime in the fourteenth century BC, a man named Rib-Hadda sat in the city of Byblos and wrote a letter to Egypt. He had written many letters before. He would write many more. The theme was consistent: Byblos was under pressure, rivals were circling, Egyptian protection was not arriving and Rib-Hadda needed help. He asked for soldiers. When soldiers were not sent, he asked for a ship so he could at least escape. The letters kept coming. The help largely did not. Rib-Hadda eventually lost his city, was expelled by his own brother and appealed one final time to the pharaoh for rescue. There is no record of a reply. Rib-Hadda wrote more letters into the Amarna archive than any other single ruler. He is not the most powerful figure in Eric H. Cline's remarkable book about the Amarna Letters, that cache of nearly 400 cuneiform tablets recovered from ancient Egypt and containing the diplomatic correspondence of the fourteenth century BC world. But he is the most modern. His letters do not feel like history. They feel like a diplomatic cable from last week: a small ally asking a patron whether alliance means anything once danger actually arrives. The loyal client has performed his loyalty. He has acknowledged hierarchy. He has written the required phrases and placed himself beneath the great king. Now he wants the return on that performance. The answer, when it comes at all, is silence. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/07/Love--War--and-Diplomacy-The-Discovery-of-the-Amarna-Letters-and-the-Bronze-Age-World-They-Revealed_BC.png)](https://link.amazon/B00YBIMNk?ref=diplopolis.com) What makes Rib-Hadda's correspondence so uncomfortable to read is not the desperation. It is the bureaucratic patience alongside it. He does not simply cry for help. He frames his requests carefully, situates them within the logic of Egyptian interest, reminds the pharaoh that a loyal Byblos serves Egypt's purposes, and presents abandonment as a strategic error rather than a moral failing. He is trying to make protection legible in terms a great power will find persuasive. He is arguing that his survival matters to them, not merely to him. This is the diplomatic grammar of the weak: convert your need into your patron's interest, and hope the translation holds. For Rib-Hadda, it did not. [Love, War, and Diplomacy: The Discovery of the Amarna Letters and the Bronze Age World They Revealed](https://link.amazon/B0bG4pq9Z?ref=diplopolis.com) (Princeton University Press, 2025) reconstructs the Amarna Letters and the world that produced them: a Bronze Age international system connecting Egypt, the Hittites, Babylonians, Assyrians, Mitanni and a network of smaller Levantine city-states through correspondence, marriage alliance, trade and mutual recognition. Cline brings genuine archaeological and historical authority to this material. The result is a book that does something more interesting than excavate the past. It reveals that the emotional grammar of international relations, the anxiety, the flattery, the status competition, the need to be seen and acknowledged and taken seriously, has remained essentially unchanged across three and a half millennia. The book's first and most important insight is that this world was genuinely international. The great powers of the Bronze Age did not merely dominate their neighbours. They managed them through a sophisticated system of diplomatic exchange that required constant maintenance. Royal marriages bound dynasties together and encoded political relationships in human bodies. Gifts of gold, lapis lazuli, horses and luxury goods moved between courts as instruments of rank and recognition. Messengers carried correspondence across thousands of miles, and the delay or mistreatment of a messenger was itself a diplomatic act, an insult legible to every party in the system. The tablets record complaints about delayed gifts, challenges to the correct form of address and negotiations over the terms of brotherhood between rulers who would never meet. What holds this world together is not simply military force. It is an elaborate shared performance of hierarchy. That is the book's second and deeper insight, and the one that justifies reading it as something other than ancient history. Protocol is not the decoration of power. It is one of the ways power becomes legible. The Amarna Letters do not permit the comfortable modern distinction between real politics, military pressure, territorial control, economic leverage, and ceremonial colour, gifts, titles, brotherly declarations, marriage alliances. In the Amarna world, these are not separable. A gift is a statement of status. Calling another ruler 'brother' is not affection; it is rank-management. Refusing the correct title is a geopolitical act. The theatrical and the material are not two registers of the same diplomacy. They are the same register, read from different angles. Cline understands this. The archive almost forces the point; no historian working seriously with these tablets can treat ceremony as mere background. But the DiploPolis reading pushes the argument further than Cline needs to go for his historical purposes. Theatre is not merely present in ancient diplomacy. It is one of power's oldest technologies, as essential as armies and as carefully maintained as alliances. States have always needed the performance to be credible before the protection becomes real. The credibility of power and the performance of power are not sequential; they are simultaneous. The contemporary resonance arrives without forcing it, which is the mark of a genuinely important historical argument. The relationship between the United States and its smaller security partners in West Asia illuminates the Amarna dynamic almost exactly. Gulf monarchies praise Washington, host bases, buy weapons, align rhetorically and perform strategic intimacy. They also hedge with Beijing and Moscow, cultivate alternative relationships and live with the persistent fear that when the crisis comes, American attention will be elsewhere. Jordan has performed this balancing act for decades, dependent on American support while navigating pressures from every direction that Washington does not always see clearly or respond to quickly. That is not cynicism or betrayal. It is the rational behaviour of a weaker ruler who has learned from experience that protection depends on the patron's priorities, not the client's need. Rib-Hadda of Byblos understood this before there was a word for geopolitics. He performed loyalty with meticulous consistency. He acknowledged Egyptian superiority in every letter. He asked for very little, just soldiers, just a ship, just acknowledgement that his correspondence had been received. What his letters reveal, over dozens of iterations, is the central anxiety of the smaller power inside a hierarchical system: the alliance is real until it becomes expensive. The brotherly relationship holds until the brother has more important business elsewhere. Rib-Hadda's tragedy is not that he was abandoned by a great power. It is that he was surprised by it. There is a phrase worth carrying away from Love, War, and Diplomacy, though Cline does not use it explicitly: diplomatic emotion. The tablets are not primarily a record of military campaigns or territorial negotiations. They are a record of feeling: pride, anxiety, insult, relief, suspicion, flattery and the specific loneliness of the small state writing into the silence of the large one. Rulers who had never met each other and never would expressed frustration over delayed gifts with the same irritability one might feel receiving an unanswered message today. A king wrote to complain that his messenger had been kept waiting in the sun. The complaint reads as comic until you recognise that the sun was the insult, the waiting the political act, and the letter the only instrument of redress available to a ruler too small to do anything else. Love, War, and Diplomacy is essential reading, and not primarily for those interested in the ancient world. It is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand why international politics looks the way it does: why recognition matters as much as resources, why ceremony cannot be separated from strategy, why the desire to be called a brother by a stronger power has never gone away, and why the fear of being abandoned by that power is just as old. The tablets are 3,400 years old. The grammar is still in use. This Book Review is free to read. Future Book Reviews will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Rubio Said It Was Illegal. Trump Is Doing It. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/rubio-said-illegal-trump-doing-it-hormuz-toll-freedom-navigation/ Last updated: 2026-07-15T04:30:47.000Z On June 23, Secretary of State Marco Rubio [stood in Abu Dhabi](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/watch-rubio-says-no-country-can-charge-tolls-in-strait-of-hormuz?ref=diplopolis.com) and delivered a clear statement of American legal principle. 'No country is allowed to charge tolls or fees on an international waterway,' he said. 'That's existing international law. That's the way it is in international waterways all over the world, and that's the way we expect it'll be here.' He was talking about Iran's tolling system. He described Iran's 'Persian Gulf Strait Authority' as unlawful and unsustainable. He added, specifically, that regardless of what it was called, fee, toll or donation, it was a toll, and no country was permitted to charge one. On Monday, [Trump announced on Truth Social](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/07/13/trump-iran-hormuz-strait-charge-reimburse.html?ref=diplopolis.com) that the United States would charge a 20 per cent toll on eligible cargo passing through the Strait of Hormuz. 'We're protecting a very rich portion of the world,' he said. 'We're spending money. And so, what we've done is, we are going to be reimbursed for protection.' CNN confirmed this was [an 'about-face' from Rubio's own position](https://edition.cnn.com/2026/07/13/politics/trump-hormuz-toll-rubio-contradiction/index.html?ref=diplopolis.com). The Associated Press called it ['upending hundreds of years of American policy supporting freedom of navigation'](https://apnews.com/article/trump-hormuz-toll-freedom-navigation-iran-2026?ref=diplopolis.com) across the globe. The International Maritime Organization, the United Nations agency that regulates maritime shipping, [issued a statement](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/07/13/trump-iran-hormuz-strait-charge-reimburse.html?ref=diplopolis.com) the same day: 'IMO stands firmly against charging fees for passage through straits used for international navigation. There is no legal basis through which to introduce mandatory tolls simply to transit through a strait.' That is the international legal body confirming what Rubio said and condemning what Trump did, in the same sentence. This happened on the same waterway, in the same week, while the same secretary of state's legal definition of what constitutes an illegal toll was still on the record. The freedom of navigation principle is one of the oldest continuously defended positions in American foreign policy. Washington invoked it in 1987 when it escorted Kuwaiti oil tankers through the Gulf under Iranian threat. It invoked it against Beijing's territorial claims in the South China Sea. It was the explicit stated basis for why Iran's control of the Strait of Hormuz was declared unacceptable in February, why the US-Israel war on Iran was launched, why ships were struck, why Oman was threatened with destruction for trying to negotiate a joint management arrangement. DiploPolis wrote in May about Iran's toll booth: 'The bombing did not break Iran's leverage over global energy. It formalised it.' The argument held for two months. Washington has now built its own toll booth on the same waterway. The symmetry is precise enough to be uncomfortable. Iran's government charges for passage and says the revenue compensates for security services it provides in waters it controls. The US government charges for passage and says the revenue compensates for security services it provides in waters it controls. Iran's Foreign Ministry [responded to Trump's announcement](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/13/trump-says-us-will-become-guardian-of-strait-of-hormuz-and-collect-tolls?ref=diplopolis.com) by saying Iran, not the US, controls the strait and deserves to 'be compensated for this service.' Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi added: '20% is of course too much. We will be fair.' Iran's foreign minister was undercutting Trump's price. Iran's Revolutionary Guard said the Strait of Hormuz is 'our territory, and we will not allow a rogue and child-killing army from the other side of the world to continue its illegal interference in it.' Washington says it does not control the strait and that Iran's claim is illegal. Both sides are now charging for the same waterway while contesting who has the right to charge for it. Rubio's definition applies to both simultaneously. Neither government appears to have noticed. Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei told journalists Monday that the Americans had, in this brief period, 'in one way or another, slaughtered' the fourteen clauses of the memorandum of understanding. He was talking about American violations of the deal. His government has simultaneously been attacking shipping, striking six Gulf states and asserting exclusive control over an international waterway. Both sides are building their legal case on a principle they are simultaneously violating. The MOU is fourteen clauses in. The legal argument has been dead for considerably longer. Trump called the agreement 'over' last week and said that 'when you're dealing with sleazebags, agreements don't mean much.' He was right about the last part. He was describing a process in which his own government has now claimed the right to charge tolls on an international waterway after going to war to prevent another government from doing so. The principle, Rubio said, was existing international law. The law exists. What has changed is who is breaking it. Rubio said no country was allowed to charge a toll. He said this on June 23\. His country is now charging one. The toll is 20 per cent of eligible cargo. The principle was several hundred years old. The about-face took 21 days. ### The Spectacle and the Silence URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/modi-diaspora-spectacle-press-conference-india-examined/ Last updated: 2026-07-14T11:00:33.000Z On the morning of July 11, 2026, in Auckland, a New Zealand journalist asked Rudrendra Tandon, Secretary (East) in India's Ministry of External Affairs, why Prime Minister Narendra Modi had not held a press conference during his visit to New Zealand. Tandon's [response](https://www.nriaffairs.com/modi-press-conference-mea-new-zealand-2026/?ref=diplopolis.com) began with a chuckle. 'Your question has that quality of déjà vu,' he said. He then explained that it would not be 'appropriate for me as a civil servant to question Mr Modi's political method,' before describing Modi as a 'quintessential Indian politician' and noting that Indian voters are 'predominantly rural folk' who 'don't like being spoken down to, and they don't like being spoken to through intermediaries.' MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal offered a briefer version: 'The Prime Minister has his own style of communication.' It was the third time in two months that a foreign journalist had put the same question to a Modi diplomat during an overseas visit. It was also, in one sense, the wrong question. The more important question is not why Modi avoids the press. It is what he does instead — and what the thing he does instead is actually for. ## The Machine The Auckland question made international headlines. The Melbourne event the week before had already been noticed, though for different reasons. On [July 9](https://southasianherald.com/thousands-fill-marvel-stadium-as-modi-albanese-headline-melbourne-meets-modi-reception/?ref=diplopolis.com), approximately 30,000 members of the Indian diaspora filled Marvel Stadium for a community reception attended by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Victorian Premier Jacinta Allan. It looked, to every camera present, like a spontaneous outpouring of affection for a visiting head of government. It was not spontaneous. The [Australia India Foundation had spent months](https://www.theaustraliatoday.com.au/australia-india-foundation-opens-registrations-for-melbourne-meets-modi-community-reception/?ref=diplopolis.com) enrolling community organisations as 'welcome partners,' circulating a message that listed their responsibilities explicitly: rallying community support and attendance, and 'ensuring allocated seats are used.' [More than 400 such organisations joined](https://www.indianlink.com.au/pm-modi-s-melbourne-visit-months-in-the-making/?ref=diplopolis.com), and 300 volunteers coordinated logistics across multiple cities, with attendees travelling from Perth, Darwin, Adelaide and Brisbane. The crowd was real. The infrastructure behind it was carefully constructed, and it was not new. Modi has been doing this since September 2014, when approximately 19,000 Indian Americans gathered at Madison Square Garden in New York for his first overseas diaspora event as Prime Minister. An elaborate procedure was worked out by Vijay Chauthaiwale, who led the BJP's foreign-policy cell: community organisations registered, were assigned seat quotas, and received entry passes in exchange for submitting their names, email addresses and passport details to the event committee. [Those details went to BJP headquarters in Delhi](https://thewire.in/politics/tamashas-like-wembley-are-part-of-modis-strategy-for-the-next-election?ref=diplopolis.com), where they built a database of overseas Indian supporters available for electoral mobilisation and donations. When 60,000 British Indians filled Wembley Stadium in November 2015, the same procedure applied. The Diplomat, reporting on the Melbourne 2026 visit, confirmed the formula remains intact: 'Such events are part of India's soft power projection, and a way for Modi's party, the BJP, to cultivate links within and attract donations from diaspora communities.' In Auckland, the same registration machinery applied. Organisers behind the 'Kia Ora Modi' event at [Spark Arena](https://awaaz.co.nz/new-zealand/narendra-modi-in-auckland-how-to-attend-community-gala-what-we-know-so-far.html?ref=diplopolis.com) sought to raise at least $1 million for the community reception and built the crowd through a community organisation registration procedure modelled on the same quota-based system used at Madison Square Garden and Wembley. The venue held approximately 13,000 people and sold out. Outside, more than 100 protesters gathered — Sikh separatists, anti-immigration activists and Free Palestine supporters — a detail that received less coverage than the crowd inside. What followed across twelve years was a systematic rollout of the same format across every major diaspora hub. London's Wembley 2015\. Houston 2019, where 50,000 people attended and Donald Trump stood on stage with Modi before a presidential election year. [Sydney 2023](https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/narendra-modi-australia-visit-melbourne/gnd0maltu?ref=diplopolis.com), where Albanese introduced Modi as 'the boss' before a crowd of 21,000, though the remark later drew backlash from human rights advocates and parts of the diaspora itself. Melbourne 2026\. Auckland 2026\. The formula is consistent: a venue filled by community-mobilisation infrastructure, a host-country leader present on stage as an endorser, footage that travels home to Indian television as evidence of global prestige. The agreements reached at the bilateral summits receive a fraction of the coverage the stadiums generate. The spectacle is not a sideshow to the diplomacy. For the audience it is designed to reach, it is the primary output. ## The Agreements Were Real The substance of the Indo-Pacific tour deserves acknowledgement before the performance is examined, because the performance critique only lands if the substance is granted. In Jakarta, Modi met President Prabowo Subianto and [signed agreements](https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news%5Fupdates/india-indonesia-joint-statement-on-the-state-visit-by-pm-of-india-to-indonesia/?ref=diplopolis.com) covering defence, critical minerals, digital commerce, space, agriculture and education. Indonesia agreed to procure BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles and air-to-air missiles worth approximately $630 million, a significant expansion of India's defence export footprint in Southeast Asia. He coined a new formulation for the relationship: the 'Ganga-Mahakam Vision.' Bilateral trade stands at $28 billion. He addressed the Indian diaspora at the Jakarta International Convention Center and visited Prambanan Temple in Yogyakarta to inaugurate a joint restoration project. By any conventional measure, a success. In Melbourne, [Modi signed agreements](https://thediplomat.com/2026/07/india-and-australia-are-reshaping-what-it-means-to-be-strategic-partners/?ref=diplopolis.com) on maritime security, civil nuclear energy, skill development, emerging technologies, science and technology and filmmaking. The uranium export arrangement, enabling Australia to supply India with uranium for peaceful purposes under the 2015 Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, was a substantive outcome. The bilateral relationship, upgraded to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2020, was deepened across multiple sectors. In Auckland, [the first Indian Prime Minister's state visit to New Zealand in four decades](https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20260710-modi-visits-new-zealand-as-trade-deal-sparks-india-pushback?ref=diplopolis.com) produced a Strategic Partnership declaration and a bilateral trade target of Rs 35,000 crore by 2030\. A free trade deal signed in April, which had already sparked debate in India under headlines about a ['butter chicken tsunami'](https://www.trtworld.com/article/f8f65eafa970?ref=diplopolis.com) of imported goods, formed the backdrop. The tour's strategic logic was coherent. Modi was reinforcing India's Act East Policy, deepening defence ties, securing critical mineral supply chains and calibrating relationships that matter as China asserts itself across the region. None of this was performance. It was genuine foreign policy, pursued with some consistency. The problem is what surrounds it — and what it is for. ## Oslo, Melbourne, Auckland The press conference question established its own pattern running parallel to the stadium pattern. In May 2026, during a five-nation European tour, Norwegian journalist Helle Lyng Svendsen positioned herself near the exit of a bilateral event and called out to Modi as he left: 'Prime Minister Modi, why don't you take some questions from the freest press in the world?' Modi did not respond and walked away. Lyng followed and asked: 'Do you deserve the trust of our government?' She received no answer. The video she posted on X, captioning it with Norway's number one World Press Freedom Index ranking against India's 157th, went viral across India within hours. What followed was not political debate. Lyng received death threats. Her Instagram and Facebook accounts were suspended after a mass-reporting campaign. MEA Secretary (West) Sibi George, cornered at a subsequent briefing, became visibly agitated and told her: 'This is my press conference.' In Melbourne on July 9, [a Seven News reporter observed on air](https://humanonline.org/news/india-pm-modis-media-style-sparks-debate-during-india-australia-summit-in-melbourne?ref=diplopolis.com) that Modi 'famously avoids unscripted news conferences, preferring more stage-managed appearances instead.' The observation circulated on Indian social media within hours and prompted outrage among BJP supporters. [Sky News host Danica De Giorgio](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DfCuvcgGF1k&ref=diplopolis.com) was less restrained, describing the rally as a 'rockstar reception' and criticising Albanese for being 'all over Modi like a rash.' She noted that a Victorian state election is due in November 2026, and that Victoria's Indian-Australian diaspora is a community Albanese and Jacinta Allan have reason to court. The warmth, she suggested, was not purely diplomatic. [SBS News](https://www.sbs.com.au/news/podcast-episode/fanfare-and-protests-as-modi-mania-comes-to-melbourne-morning-news-bulletin-10-july-2026/6iiu50f2k?ref=diplopolis.com) led its bulletin the same evening: 'Fanfare and protests as Modi mania comes to Melbourne.' The pattern from Houston 2019 to Melbourne 2026 holds at the host-country political level. Albanese introduced Modi as 'the boss' in Sydney 2023 before his own federal election. Trump appeared at Howdy Modi in Houston 2019 before his 2020 campaign. Albanese and Allan were both on stage at Marvel Stadium with a Victorian election approaching. Luxon attended Spark Arena for the 'Kia Ora Modi' event though it was not part of the formal state programme, explaining that he wanted to 'celebrate New Zealand's strong people-to-people ties with the Indian community.' The diaspora event produces photographs that serve the host government's domestic interests as much as India's foreign policy. What [Newsdrum correctly identified](https://www.newsdrum.in/analysis/from-oslo-to-auckland-why-modi-keeps-facing-press-conference-questions-abroad-12154294?ref=diplopolis.com) as a pattern of press conference avoidance across three countries is the visible surface of a deeper structure: the same trips that avoid the press produce spectacles that replace it. Modi has not held a solo unscripted press conference in India since taking office in May 2014\. Twelve years. Three election victories. He has given interviews to selected media, appeared at joint press statements with foreign leaders and participated in events controlled by his own team. In 2023 in Washington, Wall Street Journal journalist Sabrina Siddiqui asked him about the treatment of religious minorities in India. He responded that 'democracy is in India's DNA' and that India 'does not discriminate between people irrespective of their caste, creed or religion.' He did not take a follow-up question. That exchange remains among the closest Modi has come to unscripted media engagement during an overseas visit. India is [ranked 157th out of 180 countries](https://rsf.org/en/index?ref=diplopolis.com) in the 2026 World Press Freedom Index, six places lower than 2025, rated 'very serious' and below Gambia and Sierra Leone. The RSF notes that Modi 'does not hold press conferences, grants interviews only to journalists and YouTubers who cover him in a favourable light, and is highly critical of those who do not show allegiance.' Godi media, the term critics use for channels that function as government cheerleaders (from the Hindi word godi, meaning lap), is not a fringe description. It is the acknowledged operating reality of mainstream Indian broadcast news. Foreign journalists asking questions at bilateral summits are, to that ecosystem, an anomaly. They are doing something Indian television stopped doing years ago. ## What the Silence and the Spectacle Are For The two strategies — avoiding the press and staging mass spectacle — are not separate choices. They are the same choice expressed in two directions. The stadium event produces what the press conference would undermine. It generates images of adulation that travel back to Indian television as evidence of global prestige and domestic legitimacy. Modi before 60,000 at Wembley says: the world loves India and its Prime Minister. Modi before 50,000 at Houston says: even in America, even alongside its President, we are received as equals. Modi before 30,000 at Marvel Stadium says: Australia recognises what we are. Godi media runs all of it. The question of whether these crowds were mobilised through quota-based community organisation, whether the footage is the product of months of advance logistical work, whether the host-country leaders present on stage have their own domestic electoral reasons to be there — none of that travels home. The press conference would disturb this image. An unscripted question about religious minorities in India disturbs it. A Norwegian journalist asking about press freedom disturbs it. A New Zealand reporter asking why Modi does not speak directly to the press disturbs it. The answer to the press conference question — the answer Tandon could not give — is that the stadium event and the press conference avoidance are the same strategy. One creates the image. The other protects it. Tandon's 'quintessential Indian politician' formulation is more honest than he intended. A quintessential Indian politician, in this context, is one who understands that mass spectacle is more durable than media scrutiny, that an image of 30,000 people on their feet outlasts any question a journalist might ask, and that the machinery of mobilisation, carefully disguised as organic enthusiasm, has become one of the most effective tools of political communication available. It works. It has worked for twelve years. It has filled stadiums on four continents and produced footage that has played on Indian television across three election cycles. [Svendsen](https://www.siasat.com/meas-answer-on-why-modi-skips-press-meets-draws-mockery-3505577/?ref=diplopolis.com), interviewed after the Auckland incident, said being targeted by godi media anchors in May had felt worth it once Auckland confirmed the same question was being raised on the other side of the world. Rahul Gandhi put the political stakes plainly: 'What happens to India's image when the world sees a compromised PM panic and run from a few questions? When there is nothing to hide, there is nothing to fear.' The stadiums in Melbourne and Jakarta were full. The agreements were signed across all three capitals. The diplomatic credit is genuine. And at every stop on this tour, and every tour before it, the formula held: a venue filled by invisible machinery, a press conference declined by visible design, and footage heading home to an audience trained over twelve years not to ask why. This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Kill List. Nuclear Offer. Sunday. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/kill-list-nuclear-offer-sunday-iran-hamshahri-revenge-negotiation/ Last updated: 2026-07-14T04:30:41.000Z Hamshahri published the infographic on Saturday night. The newspaper is owned by the Tehran municipal authority and is [known for its provocative tone](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog%5Fentry/iran-newspaper-lists-trump-netanyahu-and-european-leaders-as-targets-for-revenge/?ref=diplopolis.com). The image was precise in its construction: Trump and Netanyahu in the top row, depicted in orange prison uniforms with sniper crosshairs drawn on their foreheads. Eleven others beneath them — Rubio, Hegseth, the CENTCOM commander Brad Cooper, US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee, the Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar, IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir, Starmer, Macron, Meloni and Merz — all depicted in orange prison uniforms, no crosshairs. The distinction is deliberate. It had no official endorsement. Mojtaba Khamenei, in the statement the newspaper published alongside it, did not disclose names. He said Iran had a list. Hamshahri supplied one. The infographic was published alongside [Mojtaba Khamenei's first public words](https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-written-message-mojtaba-khamenei-vows-revenge-for-slain-father-will-come-soon/?ref=diplopolis.com) since his father's six-day funeral procession ended in Mashhad last Thursday. The new Supreme Leader said vengeance was the will of the Iranian nation and must inevitably be carried out. Those responsible, he said, will take to their graves the wish of a peaceful death in their beds. These were his first words to the world. He chose them for the occasion. By Monday morning, Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesperson confirmed that [mediators are continuing their efforts](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog%5Fentry/iran-says-mediators-continuing-efforts-to-resolve-conflict-with-us/?ref=diplopolis.com) to resolve the conflict with Washington. Qatar and Oman are still working the phones. The diplomacy that produced the Versailles MOU, the agreement now in tatters after three weeks of mutual violation, has not formally ended. The kill list did not end it. The strikes did not end it. Both exist alongside the mediation and neither has cancelled the other. This is the observation the coverage is not making. Iran's political culture has always held these things simultaneously. The 2015 JCPOA was negotiated while Khamenei the elder was delivering speeches denouncing the United States in terms no American diplomat could repeat publicly. Hezbollah received its weapons during ceasefires. The proxies operated while the diplomats talked. The Supreme Leader's statements and the Foreign Ministry's statements occupied different registers of the same system. The kill list is the failure register. The mediation is the success register. Publishing the first does not preclude pursuing the second. Iran has never believed otherwise. The visual grammar of the list makes the argument more precise. Trump and Netanyahu are marked twice: crosshairs for killing, prison uniforms for trial. The other eleven, including American and Israeli officials alongside the European leaders, wear uniforms only. Iran is not drawing a simple line between the West and the rest. It is drawing a line between two people and everyone else. Trump and Netanyahu ordered the February 28 strikes. The others enabled, facilitated or failed to prevent them. The architects face the crosshairs. The enablers face the dock. For countries that spent months insisting they were not parties to this war, the distinction between a crosshair and a prison uniform is cold comfort. But it is a distinction. Iran has issued a verdict on complicity and calibrated its punishment accordingly. Trump responded by saying the United States would ['completely decimate and destroy'](https://www.timesofisrael.com/trump-says-us-will-completely-decimate-and-destroy-iran-if-it-attempts-to-kill-him/?ref=diplopolis.com) Iran if it attempted to kill him. He suggested a standing order to that effect. AP analysis noted that no such pre-authorised retaliation mechanism legally exists — any response to an assassination of the president would fall to his successor, JD Vance, to decide. The threat is real. The mechanism is more complicated than the post implied. What is clear is that Israel tipped off Washington about a specific plot against Trump's life during the NATO summit in Turkey, prompting him to leave Ankara on an older Air Force One rather than the new plane Qatar had gifted. The kill list is not purely rhetorical. The precautions against it are not either. The list did not appear in Hamshahri's print edition on Sunday. That detail is worth holding. The infographic was published online, in the register of social media and symbolic communication, not in the register of the permanent record. The newspaper supplied the names. The Supreme Leader supplied the principle. Both operate in the channel Iran uses for signalling, not the channel it uses for governing. The Foreign Ministry's channel, the mediators' phone calls, the Oman back-channel, the Qatar conversations, continues to run in parallel. Both channels are open. Iran is speaking through both. Mojtaba said those responsible will not die peacefully in their beds. His government's diplomats are still trying to find a deal that would make that unnecessary. The kill list and the phone call exist in the same political framework because, in the Islamic Republic, they always have. ### He Died the Morning Iran Struck Qatar URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/he-died-morning-iran-struck-qatar-sheikh-hamad-al-udeid-neutralityhe-died-the-morning-iran-struck-qatar/ Last updated: 2026-07-13T04:30:43.000Z Doha residents [received emergency alerts](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2650589/middle-east?ref=diplopolis.com) on their mobile phones just after midnight on Sunday telling them to remain indoors. AFP journalists in the capital watched missile interceptions light up the night sky. Kuwait activated its air defences. Sirens sounded in Bahrain. The UAE intercepted ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones across its airspace. Jordan's military shot down eight projectiles fired toward its territory. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps struck Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the largest US military facility in the Gulf, with ballistic missiles, claiming damage to its command and control centre and aircraft maintenance facility. By Sunday morning, Qatar announced four days of national mourning. Not for the attacks. For the death of its [former Emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/12/sheikh-hamad-bin-khalifa-al-thani-architect-of-modern-qatar?ref=diplopolis.com), who died at 74 having spent 18 years building the very infrastructure Iran struck while his country buried him. Sheikh Hamad came to power in 1995\. He found a small, quiet Gulf emirate and built it into something the world could not ignore. He developed Qatar's liquefied natural gas fields into the largest export operation on earth. He launched Al Jazeera, which gave Arab audiences a journalism that had no precedent in the region. He brokered ceasefires in Lebanon, Sudan, Darfur and Yemen. He granted Hamas a political bureau in Doha, maintained working channels with Iran, hosted the Afghan peace talks and simultaneously invited the United States to build Al Udeid Air Base on Qatari soil, the largest American military installation in the entire Gulf region, home to US Central Command's forward headquarters, the operational nerve centre from which America's wars in the region have been planned and executed for more than two decades. He built Qatar on the premise that you could talk to everyone. That a small, wealthy, well-connected country with no enemies and universal communication channels could be the permanent neutral ground of Middle Eastern diplomacy. The base that hosted US forces and the channels that reached Tehran could coexist. The bridge could carry traffic in both directions indefinitely. He believed it enough to stake the country's entire foreign policy identity on it. He handed his son, the current Emir Sheikh Tamim, a country whose principal value to the world was that nobody doubted Qatar's willingness to pick up the phone. Iran struck Al Udeid on Sunday. The IRGC said it targeted the base's command centre and maintenance facility. Qatar said its defences intercepted the missiles. The dispute over what was actually destroyed is almost beside the point. The strike itself is the message. Iran has declared that [any country hosting US military forces](https://www.euronews.com/2026/07/12/iran-launches-attacks-on-qatar-uae-bahrain-kuwait-following-us-strikes?ref=diplopolis.com) is a party to this war, regardless of that country's diplomatic posture or its role as a mediator. Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, the UAE and Oman said they were not in this war. All six received Iranian missiles on Sunday. Their offence, in Tehran's account, is that they signed bilateral defence agreements with Washington decades ago and allowed the United States to build facilities on their territory. They did not bomb Iran. They did not authorise the strikes. They hosted the infrastructure. Iran has decided that is enough. Bahrain's ambassador to the United Nations put the other side plainly at the Security Council on Friday: Iran was exploiting diplomacy to buy time while continuing military operations. He said the pattern was consistent, ceasefire, negotiation, violation, escalation. The Security Council listened and changed nothing. Trump declared the ceasefire 'over' at NATO, then said he remained open to negotiations. Iran declared the Strait of Hormuz closed 'until further notice.' Qatar's prime minister called Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi and urged restraint. The call took place while Doha's air defences were still tracking incoming projectiles. Sheikh Hamad built the bridge. He spent 18 years proving that small states could function as honest brokers if they were wealthy enough, connected enough and disciplined enough to never take a side. He built Qatar's institutions around that proposition. Al Jazeera reported on everyone's wars without becoming anyone's propaganda. Doha negotiated everyone's ceasefires without becoming anyone's proxy. Al Udeid housed America's forward command while Qatar's foreign minister took calls from Tehran. Iran has reviewed that proposition and rejected it. [The bridge he built](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/quatar/former-qatar-ruler-sheikh-hamad-modernizer-seized-power-died-rcna552727?ref=diplopolis.com) is now a target. The base he agreed to host made it one. He died on Sunday morning. The sirens were already going. ### How to Get Into the Diplomatic Service: Five Countries, Five Systems, One Honest Assessment URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/how-to-get-into-diplomatic-service-five-countries-guide/ Last updated: 2026-07-10T20:01:58.000Z In India, more than one million candidates [register for the UPSC Civil Services Examination](https://upsc.gov.in/?ref=diplopolis.com) each year. Approximately 50 to 55 of them will enter the Indian Foreign Service. In Brazil, [50 candidates](https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/instituto-rio-branco/noticias/inscricoes-para-o-concurso-de-admissao-a-carreira-de-diplomata-cacd-2025?ref=diplopolis.com) will pass an examination widely regarded as the most intellectually demanding public exam in the country, and those 50 will spend the next 18 months in a dedicated diplomatic academy before they are confirmed as Third Secretaries. In Indonesia, [37 diplomat positions](https://www.bursaloker.id/lowongan-kerja-kementrian-luar-negeri?ref=diplopolis.com) were advertised through the national civil service examination in 2025\. In Kenya, [123 Third Secretary Cadets](https://www.fsa.go.ke/training/?ref=diplopolis.com) received a three-month induction course in 2023 before their first posting. In Nigeria, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April 2025 [invited applications by email with a CV](https://saharareporters.com/2025/04/27/nigeria-launches-diplomat-recruitment-76-embassies-22-high-commissions-11-consulates?ref=diplopolis.com) for recruitment to 109 diplomatic missions worldwide. These are five different answers to the same question: what kind of person should represent this country abroad? Every diplomatic service examination is a mirror held up to how a government imagines its own foreign policy, and the distance between what these exams select for and what diplomacy actually requires is the most important thing an aspirant can know before they begin. This guide covers all five systems honestly: what they test, what they actually produce, how long they take, and what the career looks like on the other side. ## India — The Indian Foreign Service via UPSC The IFS is not a separate examination. That is the first thing most aspirants misunderstand. There is no IFS exam. There is the UPSC Civil Services Examination, taken annually by over a million candidates competing simultaneously for the IAS, IPS, IRS, IFS and some 20 other services. Your IFS candidacy depends on where you rank on a merit list built from the same papers as everyone else. The examination runs in three stages. The Preliminary is a qualifying stage of two objective papers; only the General Studies Paper I marks count toward selection. Those who clear the Preliminary sit the Mains, nine papers carrying 1,750 marks, including an essay paper, four general studies papers, two papers in an optional subject of the candidate's choice, and two qualifying language papers. The Interview carries 275 marks, making the total 2,025\. The merit list from these scores determines which service you enter. To enter the IFS in the General category, [a rank within approximately the top 100 to 115](https://www.pw.live/upsc/exams/indian-foreign-service-ifs?ref=diplopolis.com) is typically required. The numbers make the competition visible. About 1,056 total civil service vacancies were advertised in 2024\. IFS vacancies in recent cycles have run between 38 and 55\. The exam selects roughly [0.003 per cent of those who register for the Preliminary](https://www.pw.live/upsc/exams/indian-foreign-service-exam-2024?ref=diplopolis.com) for the IFS specifically. That is not a selection process. It is a culling. **Eligibility and attempts:** The age range for General category candidates is 21 to 32 years, with six attempts permitted. OBC candidates have nine attempts up to age 35\. SC/ST candidates face no attempt limit within the age ceiling of 37\. There is no language requirement for selection; fluency in a foreign language is not tested. Only Indian citizens are eligible; the requirement is stricter than for several other services. **The optional subject question:** The optional subject is the single decision with the highest impact on your score outside your General Studies preparation. Historically, candidates entering IFS have performed well with Political Science and International Relations, History, Geography, Sociology and Philosophy. Political Science and International Relations is the logical choice for an IFS aspirant given its content alignment, but the right optional is the one you know best, and paper II marks separate the top 200 candidates in any given year. **Training:** Officers selected for IFS begin at the Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration in Mussoorie alongside IAS and IPS officers before moving to the [Sushma Swaraj Institute of Foreign Service in New Delhi](https://byjus.com/free-ias-prep/indian-foreign-service-eligibility-criteria/?ref=diplopolis.com) for specialised diplomatic training. A language posting abroad, typically one year in a foreign capital assigned on the basis of Ministry of External Affairs requirements, follows before the first substantive assignment. **What the system selects for:** The UPSC CSE produces generalists of exceptional intellectual breadth. What it does not produce, through any component of the examination, is a diplomat specifically trained to read political situations, negotiate under pressure, or understand the economic interests of the countries where they will serve. Those skills come from the training that follows selection, not from anything the examination tests. India's diplomatic corps is regarded internationally with genuine respect. That respect is earned in service, not at the examination hall. **Timeline:** From first Prelims attempt to first overseas posting, the realistic timeline for a candidate who clears the exam in their second or third attempt is five to seven years. Many successful IFS officers attempt the exam three or four times before clearing it at the required rank. ## Brazil — The CACD via Instituto Rio Branco Brazil's approach is the opposite of India's at almost every point. [The Rio Branco Institute, founded in 1945](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rio%5FBranco%5FInstitute?ref=diplopolis.com), is the oldest government school in Brazil and the third oldest diplomatic training institution in the world. Graduation from the IRBr is the only possible entry point into the Brazilian diplomatic career; there is no alternative route. The Concurso de Admissão à Carreira de Diplomata (CACD) is considered [the most difficult public examination in Brazil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rio%5FBranco%5FInstitute?ref=diplopolis.com), and it is designed from the first question to the last to assess whether a candidate can think like a diplomat. The CACD runs in three phases. The first phase is an objective pre-selection exam covering Brazilian History, World History, Law, Economics, International Politics, Geography and Portuguese. The second phase requires extended written essays across the same subjects plus English and French, testing not just knowledge but the capacity for sustained analytical argument across multiple disciplines simultaneously. The third phase is an oral examination. Entry requires only a university degree and Brazilian nationality by birth; there is no upper age limit. The 2025 exam advertised 50 vacancies, with [20 per cent reserved for Black Brazilian candidates and 5 per cent for candidates with disabilities](https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/instituto-rio-branco/noticias/inscricoes-para-o-concurso-de-admissao-a-carreira-de-diplomata-cacd-2025?ref=diplopolis.com). This represents a genuine commitment to demographic diversity that India's reservation system addresses through different mechanisms. **Training:** Successful candidates enter the IRBr's 18-month Diplomat Training Course in Brasília. The curriculum covers History, Economics, Politics, Law, Foreign Policy, English, French, Spanish, Chinese, Russian and Arabic, producing officers with real multilingual competence before their first posting. Only on completion of the course and posting as Third Secretary does a Brazilian diplomat enter the formal career ladder. **The career ladder:** Brazilian diplomacy runs from Third Secretary through Second Secretary, First Secretary, Counsellor, Minister Counsellor and First Class Minister to Ambassador. Promotion to Ambassador requires completion of the IRBr's Higher Studies Course (CAE), a thesis-based programme evaluated by a board of senior diplomats. The system is unusually meritocratic at every stage. **What the system selects for:** The CACD is explicitly designed to select scholars of international affairs. The exam rewards breadth, analytical rigour, linguistic range and the capacity for sustained written argument. Brazil's diplomats are internationally regarded as among the most intellectually formidable in the world, a reputation earned by a selection system that takes intellectual formation seriously enough to make it the only way in. **Timeline:** Most successful candidates attempt the CACD between two and five times before passing. Given the exam's difficulty and the IRBr's own preparation programme, the realistic timeline from graduation to first posting runs to four to six years. ## Nigeria — Federal Civil Service via Ministry of Foreign Affairs Nigeria's foreign service selection system is the least structured of the five here, and describing it requires honesty about what that means. There is no specialised diplomatic examination. Entry is through the [Federal Civil Service Commission](https://recruitment.fedcivilservice.gov.ng/?ref=diplopolis.com), which advertises Foreign Affairs Officer positions at Grade Level 08, the entry grade requiring a degree in social sciences or humanities and completion of the National Youth Service Corps. What distinguishes Nigeria's system in practice is its episodic character. Rather than an annual examination producing a predictable cohort, Nigerian diplomatic recruitment has historically occurred in waves tied to specific government decisions. The most recent significant wave came in April 2025, when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, following President Tinubu's September 2023 recall of all serving ambassadors, launched [a recruitment drive for 109 diplomatic missions](https://saharareporters.com/2025/04/27/nigeria-launches-diplomat-recruitment-76-embassies-22-high-commissions-11-consulates?ref=diplopolis.com): 76 embassies, 22 high commissions and 11 consulates. Applications were invited by email. The honest assessment of the Nigeria system is that it conflates career diplomacy with political appointment more significantly than any other system on this list. Nigerian ambassadors are presidential appointees under the constitution, and the boundary between the career foreign service and the political diplomatic corps has historically been permeable in ways that affect what a career diplomat can expect from their trajectory. This does not mean a career in Nigerian diplomacy is without value. It means an aspirant needs to understand that the ladder they are climbing is partly meritocratic and partly navigated through a different kind of skill. **Training:** The Nigerian Foreign Service Institute provides induction and language training for career officers. The quality and consistency of this training has varied with the ministry's budget. **What the system selects for:** The Federal Civil Service Commission selects educated generalists. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs then provides the diplomatic orientation. The system produces officers who understand Nigerian government and its constituencies. It does not systematically select for the kind of strategic analytical depth that Brazil or India's systems reward. **Timeline:** Unpredictable. A candidate who applies during an active recruitment period and is selected can enter the service within months. Between recruitment drives, waiting periods can extend for years. ## Kenya — Foreign Service Act 2021 and the Foreign Service Academy Kenya's diplomatic service is the newest formally structured system of the five, having gained its legal foundation through the [Foreign Service Act 2021](https://mfa.go.ke/foreign-service-academy?ref=diplopolis.com), which became operational in December of that year. The act established the [Foreign Service Academy (FSA)](https://www.fsa.go.ke/?ref=diplopolis.com) as a semi-autonomous training institution for Kenyan diplomats and codified conditions of service, recruitment criteria and career progression in ways that did not exist in statute before. Entry into Kenya's diplomatic service comes through open competition for civil service positions advertised by the Public Service Commission. Third Secretary Cadets are the entry-level grade. The 2023 cohort of 123 cadets underwent a three-month induction programme at the Kenya School of Government in Nairobi before beginning their careers. A second cohort of 23 cadets received a similar programme in mid-2024. The constitutional architecture matters here: Kenyan ambassadors are appointed by the President under [Article 132(2)(e) of the Constitution](https://mfa.go.ke/foreign-service-academy-begins-training-newly-appointed-envoys?ref=diplopolis.com) and require parliamentary approval. This means that while the career service provides the professional foundation of Kenya's diplomacy, its senior representatives abroad are politically appointed. In December 2023, President Ruto appointed 41 ambassadors and consuls-general; a further 43 followed in May 2024\. Both cohorts received induction training at the Foreign Service Academy. Kenya oversees [70 diplomatic missions](https://mfa.go.ke/?ref=diplopolis.com) and hosts 148 intergovernmental and international organisations, a disproportionately large multilateral presence for a country of Kenya's size that reflects Nairobi's established role as the hub of East African and UN operations in the region. For a Kenyan career diplomat, this proximity to a dense multilateral ecosystem is a genuine professional advantage. **What the system selects for:** The Public Service Commission's civil service examination selects educated generalists with the analytical and administrative capacity for government service. The FSA then provides diplomatic orientation. What is not yet systematically selected for is the kind of specialist knowledge, including language, regional expertise, international law and economic negotiation, that the most rigorous diplomatic systems build into their examinations. **Timeline:** The establishment of a formal legal framework in 2021 and the creation of the FSA Council in 2024 represent a genuine structural maturation. A career diplomat entering the service now does so with clearer statutory protections and a more defined career progression than their predecessors. From application to first posting, the realistic timeline is one to two years. ## Indonesia — CPNS via Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kementerian Luar Negeri, or Kemlu) recruits diplomats through the national CPNS (Calon Pegawai Negeri Sipil — Civil Servant Candidate) examination, administered centrally by the National Civil Service Agency and run simultaneously across all government ministries. The diplomat entry position is Diplomat Ahli Pertama (First Expert Diplomat). The 2025 cycle opened [37 positions](https://www.bursaloker.id/lowongan-kerja-kementrian-luar-negeri?ref=diplopolis.com) at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, down from 100 in 2024\. The CPNS examination has three components: an administrative screening, a Basic Competency Test assessing state ideology knowledge, general intelligence and socio-cultural personality, and a Field Competency Test specific to the Ministry, conducted via Computer Assisted Test. The examination requires Indonesian citizenship, age between 18 and 35, a bachelor's degree in a relevant field, including international relations, law, history, economics, foreign languages or communications, and a minimum TOEFL score of 550 or IELTS 6.5\. A commitment to serve the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a minimum of [10 years](https://glints.com/id/lowongan/cpns-kemlu/?ref=diplopolis.com) is required at appointment. **Training:** Selected diplomats complete the [Sekdilu (Sekolah Dinas Luar Negeri)](https://www.inilah.com/cara-jadi-diplomat-indonesia?ref=diplopolis.com), a six to eight month training school for first-level diplomats before their initial posting. After returning from the first overseas assignment, officers continue with the Sesdilu (Sekolah Staf Dinas Luar Negeri). A third programme, the Sesparlu (Sekolah Pimpinan Luar Negeri), follows a second posting. The three-tier training structure reflects a deliberate approach to career-stage development that distinguishes the Indonesian system from Kenya's single-phase induction. Indonesia maintains [132 diplomatic and consular missions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ministry%5Fof%5FForeign%5FAffairs%5F%28Indonesia%29?ref=diplopolis.com) worldwide with a total Ministry staff of 3,349\. Its 'Bebas Aktif' (Free and Active) foreign policy doctrine, the principle of independence from great power blocs, gives Indonesian diplomacy a particular posture in multilateral forums that its training is designed to support. **What the system selects for:** The CPNS tests general cognitive capacity and commitment to national ideology rather than specialist diplomatic knowledge. The language requirement is the most explicit selection criterion connected to the actual work of diplomacy. What the system produces is a professional civil servant prepared for specialisation through the tiered training programme. Indonesia's recent accession to BRICS as its first Southeast Asian member in 2025 reflects a diplomatic ambition that the training system is increasingly calibrated to match. **Timeline:** The CPNS is held annually. From application to first posting, assuming immediate success, the timeline runs to approximately twelve to eighteen months. ## The Verdict Five systems, five theories of what a diplomat needs to be. Brazil's CACD believes a diplomat must first be an intellectual, a writer, a thinker, a polyglot, and structures its examination to select exactly that person. The result is a diplomatic corps regarded internationally as among the world's best-prepared. India's UPSC believes in selecting the ablest generalist and then making them a diplomat, with the examination doing everything except test diplomatic aptitude specifically. The result is a service of formidable intellectual breadth that is sometimes slow to develop the regional specificity that the most complex bilateral relationships require. Indonesia selects professional civil servants through a national examination and builds diplomatic expertise through a structured post-entry training ladder, which works well when the training is adequately resourced. Kenya has only recently formalised what was previously an ad hoc system, and the career diplomat entering the service now is the first generation with statutory clarity about what their career entitles them to. Nigeria runs a system in which the formal career service and political appointment coexist more visibly than in the others, and a career diplomat needs to understand both dimensions of that ecosystem before they enter it. The most important question an aspirant can ask before choosing which service to pursue is not which examination is hardest or which cadre is most prestigious. It is which system is most honestly designed to prepare you for the work you actually want to do. Brazil answers that question with the greatest institutional integrity. India answers it with the most rigorous filtering. Kenya and Indonesia are answering it in real time, with imperfect but improving systems. Nigeria answers it with a degree of ambiguity that a clear-eyed aspirant can navigate, provided they understand what they are navigating. Choose the system whose mirror shows you the diplomat you want to become. 🚧 **Examination details, vacancy numbers and eligibility criteria change annually. Verify all figures on official ministry and examination board websites before beginning your preparation. If you spot an error or an outdated link in this piece, write to editor@diplopolis.com and we will correct it promptly.* This Dossier piece is free to read. Future Dossier pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### A War Trump Is Stuck In URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/stuck-in-war-trump-iran-mou-collapse-july-2026/ Last updated: 2026-07-10T04:30:54.000Z On June 17, Donald Trump signed the Islamabad Memorandum at the Palace of Versailles and [told Axios](https://www.axios.com/2026/07/08/trump-iran-ceasefire-over-rhetoric-attacks?ref=diplopolis.com) it was probably unconditional surrender — Iran's. He called Iran's negotiating team the smartest group his administration had dealt with. He said America had defeated Iran totally militarily. He described the Iranian people as very smart people. The deal, he suggested, was a wall to a nuclear weapon. Obama's deal had been a road. His was a wall. On July 8, standing at a NATO summit in Ankara while Khamenei's coffin was moving through Najaf, he [called those same leaders](https://abcnews.com/International/trump-mou-calls-iranian-leaders-scum-latest-strikes/story?id=134576539&ref=diplopolis.com) scum, cuckoo and liars. He said the deal was over. He said his negotiators were wasting their time. He said: 'We may just do it without a deal, because it's easier.' Twenty-one days separated those two descriptions of the same people and the same agreement. The name-calling is not a diplomatic strategy. It is the sound of a man who oversold a deal, discovered what he had sold, and cannot afford to say so. The MOU that Witkoff and Kushner negotiated gave Iran the oil sanctions waiver before inspections resumed. It lifted the naval blockade before enrichment was verified. It created a 60-day negotiating window with no enforcement mechanism and no neutral arbiter. [CSIS called it horrifically lopsided](https://www.diplopolis.com/horrifically-lopsided-iran-deal-full-text-islamabad-memorandum). This publication said so on June 22, when the full text became public. Trump was still calling it unconditional surrender. What Iran did with the breathing space was predictable and predicted. It used the Strait of Hormuz not as a passage to reopen but as leverage to monetise: asserting control over shipping routes, directing vessels to pre-approved corridors, moving toward a toll system that would turn the world's most critical oil chokepoint into an Iranian revenue stream. That is not ceasefire compliance. It is a state using a ceasefire to consolidate the single most valuable gain of the war. The three ships struck on July 6 and 7 were not an escalation. They were a demonstration that Iran intended to keep what the MOU had given it room to build. CNN's analysis this week [described Trump's options](https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/09/politics/trump-iran-peace-deal-strait-analysis?ref=diplopolis.com) as not many and all bad. Walking away leaves Iran with permanent Hormuz leverage and enshrines what the analysis called an embarrassing defeat. Continuing to strike without a diplomatic framework produces exactly what is happening now: exchanges of fire that cost money, credibility and lives while solving nothing. The war that cost US taxpayers [$113 billion by mid-June](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026%5FIran%5Fwar?ref=diplopolis.com), that killed thousands of Iranians and displaced millions across the region, that closed the Strait and sent oil to $120 a barrel, produced a memorandum too vague to hold and too lopsided to build on. Iran [contacted Washington](https://www.timesofisrael.com/trump-iran-mou-is-over-well-hit-them-hard-again-tonight-but-talks-can-continue/?ref=diplopolis.com) after the latest strikes and asked for a new deal. Trump said he did not know if they were worthy of making one. The country being bombed is not negotiating from surrender. It is negotiating from the position of a state that still controls the Strait, still holds its enriched uranium in underground facilities the strikes did not destroy, and knows that Washington needs a deal more than Tehran does, because Washington is the one with stock indices to protect and an election cycle to manage. The smartest people he ever dealt with understood this before he signed. The name-calling is confirmation that he has understood it since. ### Lemkin's Funeral URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/lemkins-funeral-genocide-convention-icj-south-africa-israel/ Last updated: 2026-07-09T18:04:37.000Z On January 26, 2024, [Justice Dalveer Bhandari of India](https://www.icj-cij.org/index.php/node/4037?ref=diplopolis.com) sat among seventeen judges in the Peace Palace in The Hague and voted to apply the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide to the situation in Gaza. The vote was 15 to two. The two who voted against were Judge Julia Sebutinde, appointed by Uganda, whose government subsequently issued a statement repudiating her position, and Judge ad hoc Aharon Barak, appointed by Israel as its own representative on the bench. The fifteen who voted in favour came from across the court's membership: Germany, France, Lebanon, China, Suriname, Jamaica, Japan, Morocco, Slovakia, Australia and Brazil among them. And India. A judge from a country that was not in the room when Raphael Lemkin built the instrument being applied was now part of the majority applying it. Lemkin died 65 years before that vote, on August 28, 1959, having [collapsed in midtown Manhattan](https://newrepublic.com/article/114424/raphael-lemkin-unsung-hero-who-coined-genocide?ref=diplopolis.com). He was 59 years old, penniless, and alone. He left behind a bare rented room, some clothes, and an unsorted pile of papers. Seven people attended his funeral. The New York Times editor A.M. Rosenthal, who had been his friend, later wrote that Lemkin 'had no money, no office, no assistants.' He had, Rosenthal said, only himself, a briefcase, and a conviction. The conviction was that the world needed a word, and then a law, and then a court that could apply the law. He got all three. He did not live to see what the law, in the hands of the court, could and could not do. ## The Word and What It Cost Him Lemkin [coined 'genocide' in November 1944](https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/coining-a-word-and-championing-a-cause-the-story-of-raphael-lemkin?ref=diplopolis.com) in a book called Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The word came from the Greek genos, meaning race or tribe, and the Latin cide, meaning killing. Its construction was precise. Lemkin was a lawyer and a linguist, he spoke nine languages, and he chose the roots deliberately: he wanted a word that was clinical enough for a courtroom and resonant enough to force governments to reckon with what it described. 'New conceptions require new terms,' he wrote. He had been trying to get there since 1933, when as a young Polish lawyer he had proposed an international convention against 'barbarity' at a League of Nations conference in Madrid. He was rebuffed. By the time Axis Rule was published, the reason he had spent a decade trying to build an international legal category for the destruction of peoples had become unignorable. Forty-nine members of his family, including his parents, had been killed in the Holocaust, his mother and father gassed at Treblinka in 1943\. He learned of their deaths while working at the Nuremberg trials, where he was serving as an advisor to the chief US prosecutor, Justice Robert Jackson. He [got the word 'genocide' into the Nuremberg indictment](https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/defining-genocide-after-world-war-ii?ref=diplopolis.com), but it was not yet a legal crime with its own standing. The Nuremberg verdicts covered crimes committed in conjunction with an aggressive war. What Lemkin wanted was something that reached further: a convention that criminalised the destruction of groups as such, in peacetime as well as war, by any government against any people. He spent the next five years lobbying every delegation at the newly formed United Nations, drafting statements for thirty different ambassadors, persuading Cuba, India and Panama to co-sponsor the initial resolution. His unpublished autobiography, which he called Totally Unofficial Man, documents the cost: 'Poverty and starvation. My health deteriorates. Living in hotels and furnished rooms. Destruction of my clothes. Increased number of ratifications... The labors of Sisyphus.' On December 9, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly [adopted the Convention](https://www.facinghistory.org/resource-library/international-law-age-genocide?ref=diplopolis.com) on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by a vote of 55 to zero. It was the first legally binding human rights treaty in UN history. Lemkin was in the gallery. He wept. He then spent the remaining eleven years of his life lobbying countries to ratify a convention they had already unanimously voted to adopt, because he understood what unanimous votes without ratification were worth. By the time he collapsed in midtown Manhattan, sixty countries had ratified it. The United States had not. It would not for another twenty-nine years. The Convention Lemkin built defined genocide as acts committed with intent to destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, in whole or in part. The acts enumerated were specific: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm; deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the group's physical destruction; imposing measures to prevent births; forcibly transferring children. The definition was tight and the drafting was deliberate. But the requirement of intent, that the acts be committed with the intent to destroy, was the Convention's sharpest edge and its most contested one. To prove genocide, you must prove not just that people were killed or starved or displaced, but that they were killed or starved or displaced with the specific purpose of destroying the group as such. States accepted that definition partly because Lemkin insisted on precision and partly because they knew the intent threshold would be difficult to meet. A law that is hard to apply is easier to sign. ## What the Court Saw and What It Could Not Do South Africa [filed its application against Israel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South%5FAfrica%27s%5Fgenocide%5Fcase%5Fagainst%5FIsrael?ref=diplopolis.com) at the International Court of Justice on December 29, 2023\. In an 84-page document, it alleged that Israel's actions in Gaza were genocidal in character, intended to bring about the destruction of a substantial part of the Palestinian national, racial and ethnical group. It invoked the Genocide Convention and asked the court to issue provisional measures, binding interim orders requiring Israel to halt the conduct alleged while the case proceeded. Both South Africa and Israel are parties to the Convention, giving the court jurisdiction. The [court heard arguments](https://www.icj-cij.org/node/203447?ref=diplopolis.com) on January 11 and 12, 2024, and issued its order fifteen days later. The 15-2 majority found that South Africa had standing and that Palestinian rights under the Genocide Convention were plausible, not proven, but plausible enough to warrant provisional protection. The court ordered Israel to take all measures within its power to prevent acts falling under Article II of the Convention in relation to Palestinians in Gaza; to ensure its military did not commit such acts; to prevent and punish incitement to genocide; to allow humanitarian assistance; and to preserve evidence. It required Israel to file a compliance report within one month. The court did not order a suspension of military operations. It did not find that genocide had occurred. What it found was that the situation was serious enough, and the rights asserted plausible enough, that Israel was legally bound to take steps to prevent the worst outcome while the full case was argued. Justice Bhandari [wrote in his declaration](https://www.icj-cij.org/node/203450?ref=diplopolis.com) that 'the widespread nature of the military campaign in Gaza, as well as the loss of life, injury, destruction and humanitarian needs following from it, much of which is a matter of public record, are by themselves capable of supporting a plausibility finding with respect to rights under Article II.' He condemned the October 7 attacks. He voted for the measures. Israel filed its compliance report on February 26, 2024\. The court did not release it to the public. Within weeks, the UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese [reported that Israel appeared to be in breach](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South%5FAfrica%27s%5Fgenocide%5Fcase%5Fagainst%5FIsrael?ref=diplopolis.com) of the provisional measures, citing the killing of more than 1,755 Palestinians since the order was issued and the continued restriction of humanitarian aid. Amnesty International said Israel had failed to take the 'bare minimum' steps to comply. Human Rights Watch stated it was not complying with at least one measure. The court reaffirmed its orders in March and again in May 2024\. The measures remained in place. The compliance remained contested. The court had no enforcement mechanism. It could order. It could not compel. ## What He Would Have Built This is the question the ICJ's provisional measures place before Lemkin's legacy. The instrument worked: a court applied it to one of the most scrutinised conflicts of the contemporary era and found the threshold for provisional measures met. The law was precise enough to reach the situation. What it could not do was change the situation, because precision in law does not produce enforcement, and enforcement requires power, and power was on the other side. Lemkin knew this. His autobiography documents not just his poverty but his clarity, the 'labors of Sisyphus' is not an accidental metaphor. He understood that the Convention's survival depended on ratification by states that had every incentive to ratify and limited incentive to apply. He lobbied for ratification regardless, because he understood something about the architecture of accountability that the ICJ proceedings in The Hague have now confirmed: naming is the precondition for accountability, even when accountability is deferred. The Convention did not fail at The Hague. It performed exactly the function Lemkin designed it to perform. The ICJ found that South Africa's case was plausible under the Convention's terms. It applied the law to the facts before it and issued orders accordingly. What it could not do, what no legal instrument can do, is compel a state backed by a Security Council veto to comply. That is not a failure of drafting. It is the political architecture within which the drafting had to operate, and which Lemkin understood before he died in midtown Manhattan with seven people at his funeral. The question of whether he would have built it differently assumes that a different design was available. It was not. The Convention's intent threshold was the price of the signatures. The enforcement gap was the price of state sovereignty. The limitations were not oversights. They were the conditions under which the thing could be built at all. A Genocide Convention that states would not ratify was no Genocide Convention. Lemkin took what was achievable and made it as precise as possible within that constraint, because he understood that a flawed instrument that names the thing correctly is more valuable than silence: not because it stops the thing, but because it outlasts the political conditions that prevent anyone from stopping it. Justice Bhandari's vote on January 26, 2024 is what Lemkin was building toward. A judge from a country that had itself been colonised, whose independence had been extracted from the same imperial system that produced the Holocaust's legal impunity, applying the Convention to a situation that the states which built the post-war legal order were protecting from scrutiny. The Global South judge voted for the instrument the Global South was not asked to design. That is not a vindication of the system. It is proof that the instrument, flawed as it is, reached further than the system intended. Lemkin did not die defeated. He died having done the one thing that could not be undone. He gave the world a word, and a court that, seventy-six years later, would find that the word applied. This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### They're Scum URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/theyre-scum-trump-iran-ceasefire-over-khamenei-burial-2026/ Last updated: 2026-07-09T05:41:28.000Z A reporter asked whether the ceasefire was done and the MOU was dead. Donald Trump [answered from the NATO summit](https://www.npr.org/2026/07/08/nx-s1-5883929/trump-nato-iran-strikes-press-conference?ref=diplopolis.com) in Ankara. 'To me, I think it's over. I don't want to deal with them anymore. They're scum. You know what scum is? They're scum, they're sick people, they're led by sick people, and they're vicious, violent people. And if they had a nuclear weapon, they'd use it.' He said this while Khamenei was being buried in Mashhad. The ceasefire that Trump celebrated three weeks ago as bringing 'peace and security' to the region did not expire through a legal process. There was no neutral arbiter, no dispute resolution mechanism, no formal declaration of termination. It ended in a press gaggle at a NATO summit in Turkey, in a sentence that lasted eleven seconds, delivered by the same man who signed the document and is now calling the people he signed it with scum. The MOU was [nineteen days old](https://www.axios.com/2026/07/08/trump-iran-ceasefire-over?ref=diplopolis.com) when this publication described it as a framework for managing pain rather than ending the war. It lasted three days longer than that before both sides were accusing each other of material breach. It lasted twenty-two days before the president who signed it told reporters it was over and said he was not sure he wanted to make a deal at all. 'Let's just finish the job,' he said. The job, by Trump's own description at Mount Rushmore last week, is denuclearisation. The nuclear programme was not destroyed in February. It was dispersed and hardened. Analysts said at the time that the strikes would accelerate Iran's motivation to acquire a weapon rather than eliminate its capacity to do so. Trump is now [threatening to strike](https://thenationaldesk.com/news/americas-news-now/president-donald-trump-declares-iran-ceasefire-over-says-talks-negotiations-are-a-waste-of-time-strait-of-hormuz-commercial-ships-attacks-strikes-nato-summit-turkey-military-alliance?ref=diplopolis.com) Iran's electric and desalination plants and seize Kharg Island, the oil export terminal through which roughly 90 per cent of Iran's oil revenues flow. The naval blockade, lifted under the MOU as Iran's primary concession demand, has been reimposed. JD Vance told reporters in Milwaukee: 'The basic deal was we'll lift our blockade if you stop shooting at ships, but if you shoot at ships, we are going to knock the hell out of them.' Iran's IRGC has said retaliation in the coming days will be harsher. [Oil prices jumped 6 per cent](https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/us-iran-war-trump-says-ceasefire-over/?ref=diplopolis.com) on Trump's remarks. Brent crude is back above pre-war levels. The Strait of Hormuz, through which 20 per cent of the world's oil supply passes, is a conflict zone again. Khamenei was [buried today](https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10803646?ref=diplopolis.com) at the Imam Reza shrine in Mashhad, the city where he was born in 1939\. He was killed on February 28\. His son and successor Mojtaba Khamenei, believed to have been wounded in the same strike, did not appear at the burial. The man who now leads the country Trump called scum has not been seen publicly since the war began. The ceasefire lasted twenty-two days. The MOU lasted nineteen. Trump told reporters he would allow his negotiators to keep talking if they wanted to. 'I don't care,' he said. 'They can talk, but I think they're wasting their time. They're a bunch of lying guys.' Iran has not said the MOU is dead. Iran has not said talks are over. The country being called scum by the president of the United States at a NATO summit while burying its Supreme Leader is, for now, letting the other side do the talking. ### The Politics Beneath the Promise URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/existential-politics-jessica-green-climate-review/ Last updated: 2026-07-08T11:00:57.000Z Net zero. Carbon offsets. Nationally determined contributions. Emissions trading schemes. The vocabulary of global climate governance has expanded steadily for three decades while the atmosphere has continued to warm. Each new framework arrives with its own architecture of measurement, reporting, verification and market mechanism. Each one generates its own conferences, its own bureaucracies, its own experts and its own language of managed optimism. And each one has failed to do the one thing that matters: force a rapid and decisive break with the fossil economy. [Jessica F. Green's](https://link.amazon/B033zW7vW?ref=diplopolis.com) [Existential Politics: Why Global Climate Institutions Are Failing and How to Fix Them](https://link.amazon/B033zW7vW?ref=diplopolis.com) (Princeton University Press, 2025) is the most honest account I have read of why that failure is not accidental. It is structural. And the structure is political. Green's central argument is deceptively simple and genuinely radical. Climate governance has misdiagnosed its own problem. For decades it has treated the transition away from fossil fuels as a technical and administrative challenge: measure the emissions, set the targets, build the markets, price the carbon, report the progress. What it has consistently refused to do is name the political conflict at the heart of the crisis. Fossil asset owners, the oil and gas companies, the electric utilities, the petrostate governments, the financial institutions with trillions in exposure to stranded assets, face the loss or devaluation of their wealth in any serious energy transition. Green asset owners, the companies and investors positioned to benefit from the new economy, are fewer and politically weaker. Climate governance has been built on the fiction that these two sides can be gradually reconciled through dialogue, markets and shared frameworks. Green's book says they cannot. One side has to lose. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/07/Existential-Politics-Why-Global-Climate-Institutions-Are-Failing-and-How-to-Fix-Them_BC.png)](https://link.amazon/B033zW7vW?ref=diplopolis.com) That is a serious argument and it earns the book its place in the climate literature. The move from technical failure to political economy is not new in environmental scholarship, but Green makes it with unusual precision. She is not merely saying that politics gets in the way of climate action. She is saying that the architecture of climate institutions was designed, however unintentionally, to manage the conflict rather than resolve it. Carbon offsets allow fossil asset owners to continue operating while appearing to contribute to the transition. Net zero commitments push the burden of action into a future that current decision-makers will not be held accountable for. Measurement and reporting frameworks create the appearance of progress while the underlying asset structure remains intact. These are not failures of implementation. They are features of a system built around the wrong diagnosis. Green's prescription follows from the diagnosis. If the problem is asset conflict, the solution is institutional redesign that shifts the balance of power between fossil and green capital. She argues for deploying tax, finance and trade institutions, bodies with real coercive authority, to constrain fossil asset owners and accelerate the accumulation of green ones. That is a more muscular politics than climate governance has typically contemplated, and she is right to demand it. And yet the argument has a boundary, and the review cannot pretend otherwise. Green names a class position with analytical precision. What she gives the reader less of is a political story with names, offices, balance sheets and vetoes. Fossil asset owners is an exact category. But climate failure is not only systemic. Systems are protected by people: these companies, these utilities, these financiers, these petrostates, these ministries, these trade rules, these elected leaders and these courts. Green gives us the structure of obstruction. A fully prosecutorial politics of obstruction would make visible the specific actors who have spent specific decades and specific billions ensuring that the structure holds. The book approaches that argument. It stops short of making it. The more significant incompleteness is the Global South, and it is where the emotional pressure of this review sits most heavily. Green is honest about power inside the transition. She rejects the language of offsets and net zero as insufficient and sometimes actively distracting. She is right to do so. But she is less complete on power before the transition begins, and that asymmetry matters enormously. Poorer countries are not only participants in an energy transition. They are countries trying to industrialise after others grew rich by burning carbon. The atmospheric space was used up by the economies that built the wealth the world's richest societies now hold. The countries least responsible for that accumulation face the worst consequences of it: climate vulnerability, food insecurity, debt burdens that constrain their ability to invest in adaptation, and pressure to decarbonise under rules written largely in institutions where they remain structurally marginal. If Green's book treats them mainly as locations where green investment must be scaled, or as beneficiaries of reformed finance and trade, it misses the full political fact. They are also claimants. They are asking who used the atmospheric space, who built wealth from emissions, who now controls green capital, and who gets disciplined in the name of a transition they did not design. Green is very good on the politics of asset revaluation. The Global South requires something additional: a politics of historical accounting. Asset revaluation asks who loses value in the transition. Historical accounting asks who accumulated value before the transition, and who paid for it without receiving the wealth. Those are related questions with different answers, and a climate politics that addresses only the first while treating the second as a complication remains only half radical. The fully radical argument would say three things simultaneously. First, fossil capital must be made to lose. Not gradually accommodated, not compensated indefinitely, not allowed to relabel itself as transitional infrastructure. The old economy cannot be politely managed into moral behaviour. Second, green capital is not automatically just because it is green. A solar supply chain, a battery economy, a carbon market or a climate finance mechanism can reproduce hierarchy if the minerals, patents, finance, standards and profits remain controlled by the same centres of power that built the fossil economy. The geography of green extraction is already beginning to resemble the geography of every extraction that preceded it. Third, the Global South is not a victim category or an investment destination. It is a political subject. Climate justice means adaptation finance, debt relief, technology access, energy dignity and institutional voice. It means that the countries least responsible for the crisis cannot be reduced to project sites for the conscience of those most responsible. Green's book is powerful precisely because it refuses the technocratic comfort that most climate writing offers. It says climate failure is not a problem of insufficient data, inadequate frameworks or missing political will in the abstract. It is a problem of power, and power has owners. That is a more honest starting point than almost anything else in the mainstream climate literature, and it makes Existential Politics essential reading for anyone trying to understand why three decades of climate governance have produced so little. But the unfinished argument is this: climate justice is not only the defeat of fossil assets. It is the refusal to let the green transition become another name for an old hierarchy wearing new clothes. Green has written the book that names the disease. The prescription she offers is necessary. It is not yet sufficient. This Book Review is free to read. Future Book Reviews will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Not a Peace. A Pause. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/not-a-peace-a-pause-iran-mou-ceasefire-collapse-19-days/ Last updated: 2026-07-08T08:26:17.000Z Khamenei's body arrived in Najaf on Tuesday evening, still moving through the processions of a funeral that has taken his coffin through Tehran, Qom and now into the holy cities of Shia Islam. Iran's president had flown to Najaf to accompany the ceremonies. The talks between Washington and Tehran were on hold for the mourning period. The war, it turned out, was not. On Monday, Iran [struck three commercial vessels](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog-july-7-2026/?ref=diplopolis.com) in or near the Strait of Hormuz: a Qatar-flagged liquefied natural gas tanker that caught fire, a Saudi-flagged crude carrier hit by IRGC missiles and a third vessel confirmed by British maritime authorities. Iran said the ships had ignored designated routes and tampered with their tracking equipment. The US said the attacks were unwarranted, dangerous and a clear violation of the ceasefire. The US then [revoked the licence](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/07/07/us-strikes-iran-hormuz-ships.html?ref=diplopolis.com) authorising Iranian oil sales, a key provision of the memorandum of understanding signed in June, and launched [more than 80 strikes](https://www.cnbc.com/amp/2026/07/07/us-strikes-iran-hormuz-ships.html?ref=diplopolis.com) over four hours against Iranian air defence systems, command and control networks, coastal radar sites, anti-ship missile capabilities and 60 IRGC small boats. Iran responded by striking what it claimed were US military sites in Bahrain and Kuwait. Kuwait activated its air defences. Sirens sounded in Bahrain. Both sides have now accused the other of violating the memorandum of understanding. Iran's deputy foreign minister [cited Articles 1, 2 and 10](https://time.com/article/2026/07/07/fresh-attacks-in-the-strait-of-hormuz-shake-peace-talks/?ref=diplopolis.com): the strikes on southern Iran, the reimposition of oil sanctions and Israeli attacks in Lebanon respectively. The US said Iran's attacks on commercial shipping were a clear breach of the ceasefire's freedom of navigation commitments. Both accusations are substantively correct. When both parties to an agreement can credibly accuse the other of material breach 19 days after signing, the document was not a peace agreement. It was a framework for managing pain rather than ending the war. Iran's Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf said the era of bullying and extortion was over. 'We don't fold,' he wrote. Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi sent [a four-word message](https://time.com/article/2026/07/07/fresh-attacks-in-the-strait-of-hormuz-shake-peace-talks/?ref=diplopolis.com) to Washington that carries more than any legal brief: 'Honor your signature.' He also warned that final deal negotiations would not resume if US threats continued. The US response, through an official, was that the memorandum is ['entirely performance-based'](https://time.com/article/2026/07/07/fresh-attacks-in-the-strait-of-hormuz-shake-peace-talks/?ref=diplopolis.com) and that Iran will 'only reap benefits if they exhibit good behavior.' This is the description of a compliance mechanism without a neutral arbiter. When one party defines good behavior and decides unilaterally whether it has been exhibited, the other party has signed a document whose enforcement depends entirely on the goodwill of the enforcer. The ceasefire held briefly when both sides found the pain of continuation greater than the cost of restraint. The moment either recalculated, the document would not hold them. That moment arrived before the funeral was over. At the NATO summit in Ankara, Trump said he was ['very disappointed'](https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-us-war-strait-of-hormuz-trump-nato/?ref=diplopolis.com) with the alliance's response to the war. He described it as 'not even a war. It's a military operation, it's a denuclearization, that's really what it is.' If the denuclearization were complete, there would be no need for 80 strikes in the fifth month after it began. Iran's nuclear programme was not destroyed in February. It was dispersed and hardened, as analysts predicted it would be. The 60-day negotiating window the memorandum created was supposed to produce an agreement about its future. That window is open. What is flying through it, at the moment, are not diplomatic offers. An Iranian adviser told state television this week that it was 'quite clear that the US will lead the negotiations to failure.' He may be right. He may be describing a strategy rather than a prediction. Either way, the memorandum that analysts described as a framework for two exhausted parties to manage their mutual pain is now producing what such frameworks reliably produce when the pain becomes temporary: a test of whose nerve holds longer, conducted with missiles. 'Honor your signature,' Araghchi said. The signature is 19 days old. The body is still in Najaf. The war resumed while the funeral was moving. ### Modi's Trophy Cabinet URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/modi-trophy-cabinet-awards-knesset-seychelles-vishwaguru-india-examined/ Last updated: 2026-07-07T11:00:09.000Z The certificate was [flagged as AI-generated](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jul/03/narendra-modi-awards-honours-overseas-trips?ref=diplopolis.com). It misspelled 'republic' as 'repubblic' and 'Seychelles' as 'Seycheeles.' The award it accompanied, the Guardian of the Blue Horizon, had been created three days before Narendra Modi landed in Seychelles on June 28\. He is its first and only recipient. The Seychelles foreign ministry later said a 'working draft' had accidentally been circulated and that an authentic version had now been issued. The distinction, it insisted, is genuine. What the certificate revealed before it was corrected was something the corrected version cannot undo: the award existed because the visit was scheduled, and the visit was scheduled because the award was expected. This is not an isolated episode. It is a pattern with a domestic logic and an international cost. ## The Cabinet Modi has received [more than 33 foreign state honours](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%5Fof%5Fawards%5Fand%5Fhonours%5Freceived%5Fby%5FNarendra%5FModi?ref=diplopolis.com) since becoming Prime Minister in 2014, more than any other democratically elected serving head of government in history. The list spans Saudi Arabia, Russia, the United States, France, Brazil, Israel, Palestine, Ethiopia, Trinidad and Tobago, Papua New Guinea and Indonesia, whose President Prabowo Subianto [conferred the Bintang Adipurna](https://www.indiatvnews.com/news/world/indonesia-president-subianto-confers-nations-highest-honour-bintang-adipurna-on-pm-modi-2026-07-07-1047390?ref=diplopolis.com) on Modi this morning in Jakarta. The Bintang Adipurna was instituted in 1959 and was previously conferred on Jawaharlal Nehru. It is a genuine honour with diplomatic precedent. It is not the problem. The problem is a specific subset of the 33, and the problem is not embarrassment. It is what the awards reveal about how Indian foreign policy works and for whose benefit. In January 2019, Modi received the [first Philip Kotler Presidential Award](https://www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1559823&ref=diplopolis.com), presented by the World Marketing Summit for his 'outstanding leadership of the nation.' The press release described it as an annual award to be given to a leader of a nation. No other leader has since received it. The award's website lies dormant. The man who conferred it on Modi subsequently received the Padma Bhushan, one of India's highest civilian honours. In February 2026, Modi addressed the Israeli Knesset and [received the Medal of the Knesset](https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/netanyahu-accused-inventing-knesset-award-india-modi?ref=diplopolis.com) from Speaker Amir Ohana. The medal had not existed before Modi's visit. The Knesset's official website page announcing the award was not operational the morning after the ceremony. The Wikipedia page for the medal was created in the early hours of the same night. Opposition politicians in Israel described it as a non-existent honour invented to please Netanyahu's government. Modi is its first and only recipient. The timing of the Knesset visit warrants its own sentence. The [ICC had issued arrest warrants](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International%5FCriminal%5FCourt%5Farrest%5Fwarrants%5Ffor%5FIsraeli%5Fleaders?ref=diplopolis.com) for Netanyahu in November 2024 for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza. The ICJ was hearing South Africa's genocide case against Israel, a case in which Israel had already been ordered by the court to take all measures within its power to prevent genocidal acts. Modi addressed the Knesset, praised Israel's right to defend itself, received a medal created for his arrival and described the moment as 'a great honor.' India abstained on UN resolutions condemning Israeli conduct in Gaza. India's government called the Knesset Medal a proud moment for India's foreign policy. ## The Domestic Audience Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay, the author of a biography of Modi, [identified the logic precisely](https://newyorkmetropolitan.com/give-him-any-award-and-hell-come-running-narendra-modi-racks-up-honours-on-overseas-trips/?ref=diplopolis.com). 'The intention behind collecting these awards is to convey to supporters and potential converts that Modi is being honoured across the world over because of his greatness and that India's rising clout is because of Modi's personality,' he said. The awards are not primarily diplomatic. They are domestic. Each ceremony, each photograph, each headline in the Indian press saying 'Modi receives highest honour' is addressed to the Indian voter who understands the award as evidence of India's rising stature and its leader's personal greatness. The countries conferring the awards understand this too. An award created three days before Modi's arrival and presented on landing is not a diplomatic gesture. It is an invitation, accepted in advance, with the expected return being the visit itself: the trade deal, the defence agreement, the strategic partnership. Indonesia and India [signed 20 memorandums of understanding](https://www.thestar.com.my/aseanplus/aseanplus-news/2026/07/07/indonesia-awards-highest-state-honour-to-modi?ref=diplopolis.com) today, including a framework on critical minerals and a BrahMos missile supply agreement. The Bintang Adipurna and the agreements arrived together. This is not corruption. It is how bilateral diplomacy works. The award is the ceremonial register of the transactional relationship. Where the pattern becomes a problem is at the point where the transaction involves a government under active international legal proceedings for genocide. The Knesset Medal was not the price of a trade deal. It was the price of Modi's presence in Jerusalem at a moment when Netanyahu needed the legitimacy of a major democratic leader's visible support. Modi provided it. India's government called it a proud moment. ## The Vishwaguru's Claim India calls itself Vishwaguru — Sanskrit for teacher of the world. The concept implies moral authority: not merely economic weight or military capability but the standing to speak to the world from a position of wisdom rather than of interest. It is the frame within which India presents its foreign policy as principled non-alignment, its diplomacy as a voice for the Global South, its international conduct as guided by values rather than by transactions. The trophy cabinet does not disprove the claim. The Bintang Adipurna, the United Nations Champions of the Earth award, the Seoul Peace Prize, the many genuine honours from countries with which India has built real diplomatic relationships over decades: these are the record of a country that has exercised real influence in the world. The Nehru precedent in Indonesia is part of that record. What the cabinet also contains is the Knesset Medal, created at midnight for a visiting leader whose government was abstaining on genocide resolutions; the Seychelles certificate, produced by artificial intelligence with the host country's name misspelled; and the Philip Kotler Award, annually bestowed on the leader of a nation, whose website has been dormant for seven years because it was never given to anyone else. A teacher of the world accepts what it is offered and calls each receipt a proud moment. That is not teaching. It is collecting. The distinction matters when the thing being collected was created for the collection, and when the collection is the point. This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Every Verse Had an Address URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/every-verse-had-an-address-iran-khamenei-funeral-quran-diplomacy/ Last updated: 2026-07-07T09:39:17.000Z When the Saudi delegation stepped forward at Tehran's Grand Mosalla to pay its respects to the late Supreme Leader, the Quranic recitation that followed was Al Imran 3:13: the verse describing the [Battle of Badr](https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/irans-funeral-diplomacy-quran-verses-ranked-allies-rivals-and-message-saudi-arabia?ref=diplopolis.com), where a vastly outnumbered Muslim force routed a much larger army by the will of God. Badr was fought in what is today Saudi Arabia. The recitation was not random. Iran's seven-day funeral for Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, which concluded with his burial in Mashhad on July 9, was not a mourning ceremony. It was a foreign policy document written in scripture. For each delegation that attended, representatives from more than 100 countries including Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the leadership of every significant movement in Iran's resistance network, a specific Quranic verse was selected and recited. The selections were [precise,](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202607041849?ref=diplopolis.com) [intentional](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202607041849?ref=diplopolis.com) and, to anyone fluent in both Islamic theology and Middle Eastern geopolitics, transparent in their meaning. Iran used the funeral to tell every government in the room exactly where it stood. The hierarchy was legible. For Hamas, the verse described a people who had proved true to their pledge to God. For Hezbollah, it promised the upper hand to true believers and framed martyrdom as divine selection. The Houthis received a verse about loyalty, discipline and growth under pressure. Iraq's Hashd al-Shaabi was told that those who die in the cause of God are not dead but alive. Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Taliban received the opening of Surah Al-Fath: a clear triumph, past and future shortcomings forgiven. These were the movements Iran considers its frontline. Their verses said so. Russia received [a passage from Surah Al-Qasas](https://www.newarab.com/news/irans-quranic-messages-khameneis-funeral-decoded?ref=diplopolis.com): 'That home of the Hereafter We assign to those who do not desire exaltedness upon the earth or corruption.' The verse draws on the Quranic narrative of Moses and Pharaoh, contrasting humility and righteousness against arrogance and domination. Read in the context of Russia's positioning as a counterweight to American power, it was either a compliment or a caution: the distinction depending on how Moscow chooses to read itself. India received [Surah Aal-e-Imran 3:173](https://www.muslimnetwork.tv/quranic-verse-recited-as-saudi-delegation-honors-khamenei-at-funeral/?ref=diplopolis.com): 'Those to whom people said, Indeed, the people have gathered against you, so fear them. But it only increased them in faith, and they said, Allah is sufficient for us.' A verse about resilience under pressure, about a people warned that enemies had gathered against them who responded not with retreat but with increased conviction. For a country that has faced sustained international pressure over its studied neutrality on Gaza and its deepening relationship with Israel, the selection was pointed without being accusatory. Egypt received verses of righteousness and reward: those who believe and do good are the best of all beings, destined for gardens where God is pleased with them. These were the states that showed up, lent legitimacy and were thanked without being recruited. Turkey, Pakistan and China received recitations framed in [conciliatory language](https://www.newarab.com/news/irans-quranic-messages-khameneis-funeral-decoded?ref=diplopolis.com), reflecting Iran's emphasis on partnership and continuity of relations. Turkey's verse elevated those who strive with their wealth and lives above those who stay behind, a passage widely read as a reference to Ankara's cautious posture during the war. Pakistan received something different from all of them: Surah Al-Isra 17:80, a personal prayer. 'My Lord, grant me a truthful entrance and a truthful exit, and grant me from Yourself a supporting authority.' Islamabad spent four months as Washington and Tehran's indispensable intermediary. Iran acknowledged that service with a verse of petition, passage and dignity: a prayer for those who navigate difficult crossings on behalf of others. The Lebanese government received [the sharpest verse of all](https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/irans-quranic-messages-khamenei-funeral-1806926?ref=diplopolis.com). From An-Nisa, the passage described a people who would not obey even God's command to sacrifice themselves or abandon their homes, and observed that had they done what they were advised, it would certainly have been far better for them. Lebanon's official government maintained studied distance from both Hezbollah's strikes against Israeli forces and Israel's occupation of southern Lebanese territory. Tehran delivered its verdict through scripture, without a single direct accusation. Saudi Arabia received Badr. An outnumbered force routing its enemy by the will of God, fought on land that is today Saudi soil. Read generously, a reminder of shared civilisational memory. Read against the evidence of Riyadh's reported alignment with Washington during the war, it was something else: a pointed observation about who fought and who did not, delivered in the register of a 7th century victory that the kingdom's own geography witnessed. Iran chose July 4 to begin Khamenei's public ceremonies: the 250th anniversary of the United States. Authorities did not acknowledge the timing. They did not need to. At the podium, eulogist Mohammad Rasouli called for Trump's death, telling the crowd it was a disgrace not to kill the one who killed their Imam. As mourners chanted for revenge, Trump gave a speech at Mount Rushmore saying Washington had given Iran 'a week off' for a funeral because America is nice. The following day, he told Axios: 'They are all there. One shot and we can take them all out. But we are not going to do that because then we would have nobody to negotiate with.' Two heads of state. One funeral. Two entirely different registers of communication. Iran's new Supreme Leader [Mojtaba Khamenei](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State%5Ffuneral%5Fof%5FAli%5FKhamenei?ref=diplopolis.com) did not appear at his father's burial, reportedly still recovering from injuries sustained in the February 28 strikes. A state projecting strength from one of its most vulnerable moments chose, as its primary instrument, not a missile test but a seven-day sequence of scripture, procession and carefully assigned verse. Iran is simultaneously negotiating a nuclear deal with the country that killed its Supreme Leader, managing the Strait of Hormuz as a financial instrument, hosting the funerary rites of a 40-year leadership era and telling the world, in Quranic register, precisely where every government stands. Washington issues press releases and Truth Social posts. Tehran answers in scripture: the specific verse assigned to each delegation as it walked past the glass case containing the body of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, each selection a sentence in a document that required no translation for the audience it was written for. The funeral continues through July 9\. The nuclear talks are waiting. Iran has already said what it needed to say. Every verse had an address. ### We Gave Them a Week Off URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/we-gave-them-a-week-off-trump-iran-funeral-mount-rushmore-2026/ Last updated: 2026-07-06T04:30:03.000Z On the evening of July 3, standing at Mount Rushmore in South Dakota, Donald Trump made a brief mention of the Iran war. '[They're dying to settle](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/live-blog/america-250-celebration-trump-speech-mt-rushmore-live-updates-rcna352190?ref=diplopolis.com),' he said. 'They want to settle so badly. We gave them a week off for a funeral because we're nice.' Later that same night, he told Axios: 'They are all there. [One shot and we can take them all out](https://www.euronews.com/2026/07/05/eulogist-at-khamenei-funeral-in-iran-calls-for-death-of-donald-trump?ref=diplopolis.com), but we are not going to do that because then we would have nobody to negotiate with.' The man whose funeral it is was killed by a US-Israeli strike on February 28. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei led the Islamic Republic for thirty-four years. He was the supreme authority over a country of 90 million people, the commander of its armed forces, the final word on its nuclear programme. Washington killed him in the strike that opened the war. His body is currently [being carried through seven cities](https://www.businesstoday.in/world/us/story/ayatollah-ali-khamenei-funeral-trump-says-us-gave-iran-a-week-off-540982-2026-07-04?ref=diplopolis.com) in two countries, with an estimated 35 million Iranians expected to line the route. His son and successor has not appeared in public since the same strike wounded him. The funeral procession reaches Mashhad for burial on July 9. Trump described this as a week off. Given as an act of niceness. The two statements together are more revealing than either alone. 'We gave them a week off because we're nice' describes the pause in pressure as generosity. 'One shot and we can take them all out, but we are not going to do that because then we would have nobody to negotiate with' describes the calculation underneath the generosity. Washington is not pausing because it is nice. It is pausing because it needs someone alive to sign a document. The niceness is the packaging. The calculation is the policy. This is not how Iran understands the negotiation. [Tehran has paused diplomacy](https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/04/world/live-news/iran-khamenei-funeral-war-trump?ref=diplopolis.com) for the funeral and negotiators will not return until after July 9\. The 60-day window from the Islamabad Memorandum does not register in Tehran as a countdown gifted by Washington's benevolence. It registers as a deadline that Washington proposed and is already treating as flexible. Iran's parliament speaker has described the funeral as an occasion for the Iranian people to convey their call for avenging the Supreme Leader's blood. The crowds at the Grand Mosalla in Tehran this weekend carried red flags symbolising retribution. A eulogist called for Trump's killing. These are not the expressions of a country that is dying to settle. The Mount Rushmore remarks were not a diplomatic communication. They were thirty minutes of July 4 address to a crowd celebrating America's 250th anniversary, delivered in front of the carved faces of four presidents. The Iran reference lasted two sentences. It was received with loud cheers and what journalists in the crowd described as cheeky laughter. What it communicated was simple: we are winning, they are begging, we are being magnanimous. None of that is an accurate description of a nuclear negotiation whose two language versions still say different things about enrichment and whose 60-day clock is running down with the central question unresolved. In Mashhad, on July 9, Khamenei will be buried at the [shrine of Imam Reza](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/3/mapping-irans-ali-khamenei-funeral-where-mourners-will-gather-each-day?ref=diplopolis.com). Whether his son and successor attends his own father's funeral will depend on whether Iranian security can guarantee his safety. The man who now leads the country that Trump described as dying to settle has not been seen by his own people in four months. Washington is being nice. Iran is burying its dead. The 60-day clock does not know the difference. ### Think Tanks Ranked by Influence: Where Policy Actually Gets Made URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/think-tanks-ranked-influence-where-policy-gets-made/ Last updated: 2026-07-03T20:00:17.000Z In September 2014, the *New York Times* published an investigation that made uncomfortable reading for some of Washington's most respected research institutions. The story documented [foreign government donations](https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/us/politics/foreign-powers-buy-influence-at-think-tanks.html?ref=diplopolis.com) to American think tanks, among them a funding relationship between the Brookings Institution and the United Arab Emirates that ran to [$3.5 million in funding](https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/us/politics/foreign-powers-buy-influence-at-think-tanks.html?ref=diplopolis.com) between 2013 and 2016, documented through Foreign Agents Registration Act filings. During that same period, Brookings produced a stream of policy work on the Gulf. The institution maintained, as it always does, that donor funding does not shape research conclusions. The UAE maintained, as donors always do, that it expected nothing in return. Both statements may well be true. What the relationship demonstrates is something more fundamental than deliberate editorial interference: that the most influential think tanks in international affairs are organisations whose continued funding depends on remaining useful to the people and governments who pay for their work. A student reading a Brookings report on Gulf security, or a Chatham House paper on oil market governance, or a RAND analysis of defence procurement, deserves to understand that context before evaluating the conclusion. This is not a reason to dismiss the research. It is a reason to read it better. ## **How to Read a Think Tank** Four lenses determine how much weight any think tank output deserves. The first is the funding model. A think tank funded primarily by government contracts, like RAND, produces research within parameters set by the government agencies that commission it. A think tank funded by corporate membership, like Chatham House, is structurally accountable to the corporations that pay to belong. A think tank funded by a private endowment, like Carnegie, has more structural independence but reflects the ideological preferences of its founders and trustees. None of these funding models automatically compromises research quality; all of them shape research priorities. The second is ideological disposition. Think tanks are not neutral; they were designed to advocate, not merely to analyse. Knowing whether an institution leans toward liberal internationalism, realism, conservative nationalism or some other organising framework tells a reader what assumptions are built into the research before it begins. The third is proximity to government. Some think tanks have a revolving door with government — their researchers move into administrations and return with access, relationships and often classified knowledge that shapes their subsequent analysis. That proximity produces genuinely useful policy-relevant research. It also produces research that rarely contradicts the governments the researchers serve. The fourth is Global South record. The most consistently overlooked question about any Western think tank is what percentage of its research treats the Global South as a subject deserving of analytical seriousness rather than as a policy challenge to be managed. The answer varies more than the prestige rankings suggest. ## **Ten Institutions, Assessed Honestly** ### **Chatham House — London, 1920** [Chatham House](https://www.chathamhouse.org/?ref=diplopolis.com), formally the Royal Institute of International Affairs, is the oldest continuous international affairs institution on this list, [founded in 1920](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chatham%5FHouse?ref=diplopolis.com) as Britain consolidated its post-war global position. Its [funding donors as of 2025](https://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/our-funding/donors-chatham-house?ref=diplopolis.com) include BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell, Equinor, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the UK Ministry of Defence, HSBC, McKinsey and Reliance Industries. The [Transparify rated Chatham House](https://transparify.org/?ref=diplopolis.com) among the more transparent major think tanks in its 2018 global assessment, above most of its American peers. Its flagship journal *International Affairs* is among the oldest in the field. Ideological disposition: centrist internationalist, with a strong British foreign policy establishment frame. Research on Russia, Ukraine and NATO is authoritative. Research on the Gulf reflects, not always comfortably, the institution's funding from energy majors. The Chatham House Rule — under which participants in meetings may use information but not attribute it — was invented here and remains the institution's most globally recognised contribution to diplomatic practice. The Africa Programme deserves a note distinct from the parent institution. Where Chatham House's general funding includes energy majors and UK government departments with active interests in African resource extraction, the Africa Programme draws more heavily on philanthropic foundation support, including [MacArthur Foundation funding](https://www.macfound.org/grantee/chatham-house-39879/?ref=diplopolis.com) for research on Nigerian governance, corruption and social norms, giving the programme somewhat more independence on the questions most consequential for African governance. Its strength lies in convening African policymakers and civil society voices in spaces where their analysis reaches British and European governments. Its structural limitation is the one that afflicts all Western institutions covering the Global South: the analytical frame remains largely determined by what is considered credible and relevant in London. Career entry: a Chatham House junior research fellowship is among the most competitive positions for a British-educated early career researcher and provides genuine access to the UK policy establishment. ### **International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) — London, 1958** The [IISS](https://www.iiss.org/?ref=diplopolis.com) was [founded in 1958](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International%5FInstitute%5Ffor%5FStrategic%5FStudies?ref=diplopolis.com) by military historian Michael Howard and colleagues who wanted to study nuclear weapons and their implications for international relations. Its first director was the defence journalist Alastair Buchan; its first president was Clement Attlee. The annual *Military Balance*, published since 1959, is the world's most authoritative open-source assessment of military forces across more than 170 countries. *Survival* is among the most cited journals in security studies. The Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore is Asia's leading intergovernmental security conference, organised by the IISS. In 2016, [the Guardian reported](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International%5FInstitute%5Ffor%5FStrategic%5FStudies?ref=diplopolis.com) that the IISS had secretly received £25 million from the Bahraini royal family; subsequent reporting by Peter Oborne in *Middle East Eye* suggested the IISS may have received nearly half its total income from Bahraini sources during the 2010s. The institution carries Transparify's lowest transparency rating. Its annual budget runs to over £25 million. The IISS also offers strategic advice and political risk analysis to commercial clients. Career entry: the IISS's analyst positions attract defence and security specialists globally, and its data-led publications make it an unusually rigorous training ground for security researchers, provided they are comfortable with the institution's limited transparency on funding. ### **Carnegie Endowment for International Peace — Washington, 1910** [Carnegie](https://carnegieendowment.org/?ref=diplopolis.com) was [founded in December 1910](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carnegie%5FEndowment%5Ffor%5FInternational%5FPeace?ref=diplopolis.com) by Andrew Carnegie with a $10 million endowment. It is the oldest international affairs think tank in the United States and one of the few that can genuinely claim ideological breadth across its research teams. Its offices in Washington, Brussels, New Delhi, Beirut and Beijing — until the China programme was suspended — have produced researchers with genuine regional depth that is rare among Washington-based institutions. Publications include *Foreign Policy* (founded by Carnegie in 1970 and later sold), the Carnegie Papers series and a consistent output of country-specific research. The endowment structure gives Carnegie more intellectual independence than its government-contract-funded peers, and its research on nuclear policy, democratic backsliding and great power competition is consistently among the most analytically rigorous produced in Washington. The Global South coverage is better than Brookings or CFR, partly because Carnegie's researchers in New Delhi and Beirut engage their regions as participants rather than observers. Career entry: the Carnegie Junior Fellowship is the most prestigious entry-level position in Washington international affairs research, selecting approximately 15 fellows annually and providing genuine research access that translates directly to subsequent careers. ### **Brookings Institution — Washington, 1927** [Brookings](https://www.brookings.edu/?ref=diplopolis.com) was [formally established in 1927](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brookings%5FInstitution?ref=diplopolis.com) through the merger of three earlier research bodies and remains the largest think tank in the United States by budget and staff count. Its 2014 UAE funding relationship, its Qatari-funded Doha Center established in 2007 with an [initial $5 million donation](https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/senators-push-doj-on-fara-compliance-of-brookings-institution?ref=diplopolis.com) from Qatar's Ministry of Foreign Affairs with future funding contingent on agenda review, and subsequent FARA scrutiny by members of the US Senate represent the most thoroughly documented case of foreign government access to a prestige American think tank. Brookings severed its Saudi funding following Jamal Khashoggi's murder in 2018. Its *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* are among the most cited economic policy documents in Washington. Its domestic policy research is of consistently high quality. Its international affairs output is more uneven, reflecting the degree to which funding relationships have at different times shaped the prioritisation of research topics. It remains a major employment destination for American foreign policy professionals and a reliable pipeline from government and back. Career entry: a Brookings research position carries genuine prestige in Washington policy circles and offers access to a government network that few other institutions match, particularly for American-educated candidates interested in US domestic and foreign policy. ### **Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) — New York, 1921** The [CFR](https://www.cfr.org/?ref=diplopolis.com) was [founded in 1921](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council%5Fon%5FForeign%5FRelations?ref=diplopolis.com) and is less a think tank in the conventional research sense than a membership organisation for the American foreign policy elite. Its 5,000 members include a significant proportion of former secretaries of state, national security advisers, senior military officers and corporate chief executives. *Foreign Affairs*, published since 1922, is the most widely read journal in international relations globally. The International Affairs Fellowship, providing $120,000 for a one-year government placement, is designed to move researchers into the policy apparatus and back, and it achieves that aim consistently. The CFR produces its own research through Council Special Reports and task forces, but its primary function is convening. It is less a research institution than a forum through which the American foreign policy consensus is reproduced, debated and occasionally challenged. Its Global South coverage reflects the interests of its membership, largely American and Western European, and tends to treat developing countries as policy arenas rather than analytical subjects in their own right. Career entry: CFR positions are among the most relationship-intensive in Washington; the value of working there lies more in the network than the research, which is fine if that network is what the career requires. ### **RAND Corporation — Santa Monica, 1948** [RAND](https://www.rand.org/?ref=diplopolis.com) was [incorporated as nonprofit](https://www.rand.org/about/history.html?ref=diplopolis.com) on May 14, 1948, spun out of a research project within Douglas Aircraft Company funded by the US Army Air Forces. Its annual budget runs to approximately $350 to $400 million; government contracts account for more than 50 per cent of revenue in most years. It houses three federally funded research and development centres: RAND Arroyo Center for the Army, RAND National Defense Research Institute and RAND Project Air Force. Twenty-nine Nobel laureates have been staff members or advisers. RAND is the institution that invented systems analysis, contributed to nuclear deterrence doctrine, helped design the all-volunteer military force and contributed foundational concepts to internet architecture. It is also an institution whose analytical conclusions are systematically constrained by the interests of the clients who commission the research. Asking RAND to assess the value of a defence programme funded by the Pentagon is a structural conflict of interest that no research methodology can fully resolve. RAND produces excellent research. It produces that research within parameters set by the world's largest military budget. Career entry: RAND is the most analytically rigorous research environment on this list for quantitative policy analysis; a position there, particularly through the Pardee RAND Graduate School, is the strongest training ground in Washington for applied policy research, particularly for candidates with economics, mathematics or engineering backgrounds. ### **Observer Research Foundation (ORF) — New Delhi, 1990** [ORF](https://www.orfonline.org/?ref=diplopolis.com) was [founded in 1990](https://www.orfonline.org/about-us?ref=diplopolis.com) and is India's most internationally visible think tank. Its funding, [historically 95 per cent Reliance](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Observer%5FResearch%5FFoundation?ref=diplopolis.com) until 2009, now diversified across government grants, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Microsoft and others, raises legitimate questions about its analytical independence on issues where Reliance's business interests intersect with its research agenda. The Raisina Dialogue, co-organised with India's Ministry of External Affairs, draws thousands of attendees annually and has established ORF as the convening institution for India's G20-era foreign policy engagement. Its research on India's strategic autonomy, the Indo-Pacific, digital public infrastructure and climate finance carries the particular authority that comes from proximity to the Indian foreign policy establishment. For questions about what India's government thinks about its own strategic position, ORF is the most reliable public window available. Its coverage of South Asia and the Global South is genuinely substantive rather than condescending. Career entry: for an Indian or South Asian researcher, ORF is the most direct pipeline into India's foreign policy community and provides engagement with the government that no Delhi-based academic institution replicates. ### **South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) — Johannesburg, 1934** [SAIIA](https://saiia.org.za/?ref=diplopolis.com) is the [oldest on this list](https://saiia.org.za/about/our-history/?ref=diplopolis.com), founded in 1934, and the most serious Anglophone African institution working on continental foreign policy, governance and development. Based on the campus of the University of the Witwatersrand and [ranked third in Africa](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South%5FAfrican%5FInstitute%5Fof%5FInternational%5FAffairs?ref=diplopolis.com) in the 2020 Global Go To Think Tank Index, it publishes the quarterly *South African Journal of International Affairs* and maintains four research programmes covering foreign policy, African governance and diplomacy, economic resilience and climate and natural resources. SAIIA occupies a position that no Washington or London think tank can replicate: it produces African-generated knowledge for African decision-makers on African terms. Its funding base is more foundation-heavy than corporate, which limits the energy-sector conflicts of interest that affect its British peers. The constraint is geographic reputation: SAIIA carries authority in African Union corridors and Southern African Development Community processes that translates less directly to careers based outside the African governance ecosystem. Career entry: for an Anglophone African researcher focused on regional governance, development or security, SAIIA offers the most credible institutional home on the continent with the strongest international publication record. ### **The Stimson Center — Washington, 1989** [Stimson](https://www.stimson.org/?ref=diplopolis.com) was [founded in 1989](https://www.stimson.org/about/stimson/history/?ref=diplopolis.com) by Barry Blechman and Michael Krepon specifically to address nuclear proliferation and arms control in the twilight years of the Cold War. Named after Henry L. Stimson, who served as Secretary of War under two presidents and oversaw both the Manhattan Project and his own subsequent advocacy for nuclear abolition, the institution carries a particular moral seriousness about its research mandate. [2023 revenue of $12.7 million](https://www.influencewatch.org/non-profit/henry-l-stimson-center/?ref=diplopolis.com), with approximately 45 per cent from nonprofit foundations, 18 per cent from foreign governments and 17 per cent from the US government. It publishes an annual 'Top Ten Global Risks' and produces consistent, specific work on nuclear risks, arms trafficking, water security and environmental conflict. Stimson's transparency is its most distinctive institutional characteristic: it publicly discloses funding sources annually, received a top Transparify rating in 2015, and distinguishes itself from peers criticised in the 2014 *New York Times* investigation. Its Global South coverage, particularly on South Asia and Southeast Asia, is substantive. In 2026, the US Department of Defense barred service members from certain Stimson programmes as part of a broader Hegseth-era review of defence educational partnerships — a development that tells you something about Stimson's genuine independence. Career entry: Stimson is the most transparent and independently credentialed institution on this list and offers particularly strong training for researchers focused on nuclear policy, arms control and human security. ## **How to Use This Information** Reading any of these institutions' output with awareness of its funding model does not make a researcher cynical. It makes them accurate. A RAND report on defence procurement is not wrong because the US Air Force funded it. It is worth reading with specific attention to what its scope of analysis excludes, and what alternative recommendations a differently funded analyst might have reached from the same evidence. A Brookings paper on Gulf security is not propaganda because the UAE once provided funding. It is worth cross-checking against research produced by institutions with fewer Gulf ties. The practical application is simpler than it sounds. Before reading any think tank publication, spend two minutes on the institution's funding page. Look for which governments, corporations or foundations appear. Then ask whether the publication's conclusions serve those funders' interests. If they do, that does not automatically mean the conclusions are wrong. It means they deserve scrutiny that work produced without that funding relationship does not. ## **The Verdict** Independent thought in this ecosystem is not absent. It is concentrated in specific places: the Stimson Center, which genuinely discloses its funding and takes positions that have cost it government partnerships; Carnegie's New Delhi office, which produces South Asian analysis unconstrained by Washington patronage networks; SAIIA, which has the longest institutional memory of any African think tank and answers primarily to its African research community. The less-funded, more transparent institutions at the edges of the prestige rankings are often doing more genuinely independent work than the institutions whose names appear at the top. A young researcher entering this ecosystem should choose their employer knowing what kind of independence is available there. At RAND, analytical rigour within government-defined parameters. At CFR, network access with minimal research independence. At Stimson, genuine independence at a smaller scale. At ORF, proximity to one of the world's most consequential governments. None of these is wrong as a career choice. Every single one requires a researcher who knows what they are choosing, and why. ⚠️ Funding relationships and institutional profiles change. If you spot an error or an outdated link in this piece, write to [editor@diplopolis.com](mailto:editor@diplopolis.com) and we will correct it promptly. This Dossier piece is free to read. Future Dossier pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### While Iran Buries Its Dead URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/while-iran-buries-its-dead-khamenei-funeral-mojtaba-nuclear-talks/ Last updated: 2026-07-03T08:56:06.000Z Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's coffin [went on display in Tehran](https://abcnews.com/International/wireStory/funeral-burial-irans-supreme-leader-ayatollah-ali-khamenei-134434725?ref=diplopolis.com) this morning. He was killed on February 28 in the US-Israeli strike that opened the war. His funeral was postponed for four months while the war raged. It begins today, and it will take seven days, carrying his body through Tehran, Qom, the shrines of Najaf and Karbala in Iraq, and finally to Mashhad, where he will be buried on July 9 at the shrine of Imam Reza in his hometown. The Iranian government is hoping for 35 million mourners across the seven days. Officials from more than 30 countries have confirmed attendance. Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif will be there. India is sending its Bihar Governor and a Minister of State for External Affairs. Mojtaba Khamenei, appointed Supreme Leader on March 8, [may not attend his father's funeral](https://www.businesstoday.in/world/story/mojtaba-khamenei-unlikely-to-attend-father-ayatollah-ali-khameneis-funeral-iranian-representative-540690-2026-07-03?ref=diplopolis.com). He was wounded in the same strike that killed his father. He has not appeared publicly since February 28\. Security officials cannot guarantee his safety if he does. The man who now leads the Islamic Republic, who has been governing Iran through a war and a nuclear negotiation and a ceasefire dispute, has not been seen by his own people in four months. His first public act as Supreme Leader may be leading prayers at his father's burial — or it may not happen at all. The funeral is a test. Iran's theocracy needs crowds. Large crowds, visible to the world, to demonstrate that the Islamic Republic survived a war against two of the world's strongest militaries and still commands the loyalty of its people. The risk is that the crowds become catastrophic in the wrong direction. [Eight people died](https://abcnews.com/International/wireStory/funeral-burial-irans-supreme-leader-ayatollah-ali-khamenei-134434725?ref=diplopolis.com) and 11,000 were injured in the stampede at Khomeini's funeral in 1989\. At least 56 were killed in the stampede at Qassem Soleimani's burial in 2020\. Iran is planning for millions and hoping for order. The talks are on hold. [Iranian negotiators left Doha](https://thehill.com/policy/international/5951099-khamenei-funeral-massive-crowds/?ref=diplopolis.com) after indirect discussions with US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner that produced, in the language of the statement, 'positive progress.' Qatar said discussions through mediators will resume after the funeral ceremonies. The 60-day window from the Islamabad Memorandum does not pause for burial rites. Iran's Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf said this week that the Iranian people will use the funeral to convey their 'call for avenging the blood of the martyred leader.' Iran's army has [warned the US and Israel](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/3/mapping-irans-ali-khamenei-funeral-where-mourners-will-gather-each-day?ref=diplopolis.com) against launching strikes during the processions. The US has deployed a second Marine unit, typically numbering more than 2,000 personnel, to the Middle East. This is what a negotiated ceasefire looks like from the inside. The man the US and Israel killed is being buried across seven cities in two countries while his country's new, unseen Supreme Leader weighs whether it is safe to appear at his own father's funeral. The talks are paused. The clock runs. Washington is watching the crowds in Tehran for signs of what comes after. ### What India's Judges Saw URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/what-indias-judges-saw-muralidhar-bhandari-palestine-genocide-india-examined/ Last updated: 2026-07-02T11:00:05.000Z On the night of February 26, 2020, the Indian government [issued a transfer order](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S.%5FMuralidhar?ref=diplopolis.com) for Justice Srinivasan Muralidhar at close to midnight. He was a judge of the Delhi High Court. His bench had spent that day questioning the Delhi Police over its failure to register first information reports against three BJP leaders whose alleged hate speeches had preceded communal violence spreading through northeast Delhi, in what would become known as the 2020 Delhi riots. The notification came close to midnight. He was transferred to the Punjab and Haryana High Court. His colleagues, the legal community and the press widely interpreted the timing as punitive. Muralidhar gave a farewell address in which he described the sequence of events precisely and without accusation. He did not need to name it as retaliation. Everyone who read it understood. That judge [now chairs](https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/national/justice-s-muralidhar-named-chair-of-un-inquiry-into-israelipalestinian-violations?ref=diplopolis.com) the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory. On June 23, he presented a 100-page report to the Human Rights Council in Geneva. The report concluded that Israeli forces have deliberately targeted Palestinian children in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, constituting genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. '[The evidence shows](https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/06/1167790?ref=diplopolis.com) that Palestinian children have been deliberately targeted and killed by the Israeli security forces,' Muralidhar said. At least 20,179 children were killed between October 7, 2023 and March 31, 2026, roughly 30 per cent of all fatalities. The pattern of wounds, to the head and upper body, from snipers and quadcopter drones, indicated deliberate targeting rather than incidental harm. Even after the October 2025 ceasefire, children continued to be killed and seriously injured, Muralidhar said, with continued disregard by Israel for the ceasefire and for the protection owed to Palestinian children under international law. The commission had reached its genocide finding nine months earlier. In [September 2025](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independent%5FInternational%5FCommission%5Fof%5FInquiry%5Fon%5Fthe%5FOccupied%5FPalestinian%5FTerritory?ref=diplopolis.com), it concluded that Israel had committed four of the five genocidal acts defined under the 1948 Genocide Convention: killings, causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to destroy the group, and imposing measures intended to prevent births. The June report extended that finding to children specifically, adding forensic analysis confirming deliberate targeting across at least 35 documented instances. The report's full title carries its conclusion: 'The essence of childhood has been destroyed.' 'By targeting children,' [Muralidhar said](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/23/israels-deliberate-targeting-of-gaza-children-part-of-genocide-un-inquiry?ref=diplopolis.com), 'Israel is attacking the very capacity of the Palestinian people to exist and to determine their future.' The destruction of their health, education and development is irreversible. The commission called for genocide charges to be added to the International Criminal Court's existing arrest warrants for Israeli leaders. It submitted thousands of pieces of evidence to support those proceedings. That evidence is now in the hands of the ICC whose judges, as this publication reported on Tuesday, are being financially strangled by US sanctions for receiving it. Muralidhar is an Indian jurist of unimpeachable standing. He helped decriminalise homosexuality in India as part of the Delhi High Court bench that decided the Naz Foundation case in 2009\. He conducted a rare late-night hearing during the 2020 riots to ensure the safe evacuation of victims. He was transferred at midnight for questioning police inaction in communal violence. He is now chairing the world's most politically sensitive human rights commission and making the most consequential findings of his career. His government has not publicly stood behind those findings. ## The Other Indian Judge Justice Dalveer Bhandari has represented India on the International Court of Justice since April 2012\. When South Africa brought its case against Israel under the Genocide Convention, Bhandari was on the bench. On January 26, 2024, he [voted with the majority](https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/international-court-of-justice-israel-gaza-palestine-justice-dalveer-bhandari-indian-judge-genocide-247716?ref=diplopolis.com) when the ICJ issued binding provisional measures ordering Israel to take all steps within its power to prevent genocidal acts, ensure humanitarian aid reached Palestinians under siege, and preserve evidence of crimes committed. The measures were binding on Israel in international law. Israel continued its operations. The court had to issue further orders. On May 24, 2024, Bhandari [voted with the majority again](https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/world/icj-judge-bhandari-votes-in-favour-of-israel-forces-ending-rafah-assault-625024/?ref=diplopolis.com), this time ordering Israel to immediately halt its military offensive in Rafah, where more than a million displaced Palestinians had taken refuge after being told by the Israeli military to flee there from the north. He issued an 11-point statement noting that the widespread nature of Israel's military operations indicated the plausibility of genocide, and that the sheer scale of civilian deaths demanded the court act. His term runs until 2027\. He has not qualified his position or distanced himself from the majority judgments. Two Indian jurists, then, in two different international legal bodies, applying two different legal standards and two different evidentiary thresholds, have reached conclusions that point in the same direction. Bhandari found the evidence sufficient to order a halt to military operations. Muralidhar found the evidence sufficient to conclude that genocide against children was being committed and continuing past a ceasefire agreement. India placed one of them on the ICJ. The UN appointed the other to chair its commission. Both are doing what their roles require: following the evidence and naming what they find. ## The Government's Abstention India abstained from voting at the UN General Assembly on three consecutive resolutions concerning Gaza between October 2023 and June 2025\. In October 2023, when the UNGA [adopted a resolution](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/19/unga-resolution-against-palestine-occupation-will-it-change-anything?ref=diplopolis.com) demanding an immediate humanitarian truce by 121 votes to 14, India abstained among the 44\. In September 2024, when 124 countries voted against Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories, India abstained among the 43\. In June 2025, when [149 countries voted](https://m.thewire.in/article/diplomacy/india-abstains-unga-gaza-ceasefire-resolution-aid-access?ref=diplopolis.com) for an immediate and permanent ceasefire in Gaza condemning the use of starvation and the denial of humanitarian aid as a tactic of war, India abstained among the 19\. India's explanation was consistent across all three votes: conflicts could only be resolved through dialogue and diplomacy, and India's position was in continuation of its previous voting record. India [eventually voted yes](https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/explainers/why-india-broke-its-abstention-run-on-palestine-and-backed-a-un-resolution/?ref=diplopolis.com) on a later resolution in September 2025, when Israeli strikes extended beyond Gaza to target Hamas leadership in Qatar. That the threshold for India's yes vote was the expansion of military operations to a third country, rather than the findings of its own judge at The Hague or the 20,000 children documented by its own judge in Geneva, is its own statement about where New Delhi's calculation sits. The calculation has a context. In February 2026, Prime Minister Modi visited Israel and elevated the bilateral relationship to a Special Strategic Partnership, the highest designation in India's diplomatic lexicon. He became the first Indian prime minister to do so while an active ICJ genocide case was being heard against the country he was visiting. India and Israel have built substantial ties in defence technology, counterterrorism intelligence-sharing and agricultural cooperation over the past decade. Israel is one of India's most significant arms suppliers. The Middle East is India's largest source of energy imports and home to millions of Indian expatriates whose remittances form a significant part of India's foreign exchange inflows. These are not trivial interests. They explain, without excusing, why a government whose own judge found genocide against Palestinian children in Geneva maintained studied neutrality in New York throughout most of the conflict. The studied neutrality has a name in Indian diplomatic tradition. It is called principled non-alignment, the doctrine of retaining strategic autonomy and not being bound to the foreign policy choices of any bloc. It served India during the Cold War when choosing between Washington and Moscow carried genuine costs. Applied to Gaza, it has produced a situation in which India's stated position, abstention and dialogue and the two-state solution, sits in documented tension with the conclusions of its own judicial representatives in two of the world's most authoritative international bodies. The tension is not accidental. It is a choice made repeatedly, explained consistently, and maintained even as the evidence compiled by Indian judges grew more specific and more damning with each passing month. India calls itself Vishwaguru, a Sanskrit word meaning teacher of the world. It is the frame Prime Minister Modi has used most consistently to describe India's civilisational standing and its role in international affairs. The concept implies not merely economic or military weight but moral authority: the capacity to speak to the world from a position of wisdom rather than merely of interest. That authority is earned by the willingness to say, when the evidence is clear and documented by one's own judges across two international bodies, what the evidence shows. Muralidhar was transferred at midnight for following evidence about police inaction in communal violence to its documented conclusion. He brought the same instinct to Geneva, where he followed the evidence about the targeting of Palestinian children to its documented conclusion. Bhandari followed the evidence at The Hague to its documented conclusion and voted accordingly. The Vishwaguru's two most prominent judicial representatives in international law have both, in different proceedings, named what they found. The question the gap between their findings and their government's diplomatic position leaves open is not whether India has principles. The question is which ones it applies, to whom, and when. This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### The Word, When It Is Convenient URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-word-when-it-is-convenient-israel-armenian-genocide-icj-2026/ Last updated: 2026-07-02T04:30:45.000Z On June 28, Israel's Cabinet [unanimously recognised](https://www.npr.org/2026/06/29/g-s1-130772/israel-armenian-wwi-deaths-genocide?ref=diplopolis.com) the Ottoman massacre of Armenians during the First World War as genocide. Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar called it a moral obligation. Prime Minister Netanyahu said he certainly supported it. The decision still requires parliamentary ratification. The statement from Jerusalem described the Armenian Genocide as the subject of 'an institutionalised campaign of denial and minimisation, including a manipulative rewriting of history.' Israel, Sa'ar said, must stand against the erasure of historical truth. On January 26, 2024, the [International Court of Justice](https://www.icj-cij.org/node/203454?ref=diplopolis.com) found it plausible that Israel's acts in Gaza could amount to genocide. The court issued binding provisional measures ordering Israel to take all steps within its power to prevent genocidal acts, to ensure humanitarian aid reached Palestinians under siege, and to preserve evidence of crimes committed. The case, brought by South Africa, is ongoing. A final judgment will take years. The provisional measures have not been complied with in any meaningful sense. More than [73,000 Palestinians](https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/palestinian-death-toll-in-gaza-tops-73000-officials-say-as-israel-strikes-despite-ceasefire/article71101517.ece?ref=diplopolis.com) have been killed in Gaza. Over 1,000 have been killed under an active ceasefire. The ICJ has issued three separate rounds of emergency orders. Israel has continued its operations, expanded its territorial control and, last week, told the residents of two Lebanese cities to evacuate. Turkey said Israel's recognition was [politically motivated](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog%5Fentry/turkey-denounces-israels-political-recognition-of-armenian-genocide/?ref=diplopolis.com) — 'a malicious attempt' to cover up Israel's own crimes. 'The Israeli government, which systematically persecutes the Palestinian people in full view of the world and is being tried at the International Court of Justice for genocide against the people of Gaza, aims to cover up its own crimes,' the Turkish Foreign Ministry said. Turkey has a specific interest in preventing genocide recognition — Ankara has campaigned for decades to ensure the Armenian massacres are not designated as such, making the accusation of bad faith from the country doing the denying particularly layered. But Turkey's cynicism does not make the observation wrong. The timing of Israel's recognition is not a moral coincidence. The Cabinet did not vote on this in a neutral week. It voted in the same month that the UN independent experts it hosted accused Israel of deliberately shooting children in Gaza. The word genocide was coined by Raphael Lemkin, a Polish-Jewish lawyer, in 1944 — a direct response to the Holocaust and, specifically, to the Armenian massacres. Lemkin had been documenting the Ottoman campaign against the Armenians since the 1930s. He argued, long before the Holocaust was completed, that the systematic destruction of a group of people required a name, a legal category and a mechanism of prevention. Israel was founded, in part, in the shadow of that catastrophe. Its founding generation understood what it meant to be the target of systematic destruction. The state that [emerged from that history](https://www.euronews.com/2026/06/28/israels-government-formally-recognises-the-armenian-genocide-committed-during-world-war-i?ref=diplopolis.com) has now formally deployed the word genocide against the Ottomans, while simultaneously contesting its application to its own conduct before the world's highest court. This is not a new kind of argument. States have always used the vocabulary of atrocity selectively. Powerful countries recognise the genocides of others while insisting their own acts are different — more complex, more contextual, more legally ambiguous. The Armenians know this. They have been waiting for recognition from most of the world for over a century and have received it, when it came, primarily when it served someone else's diplomatic interests. That Israel has now added its recognition to the list is not meaningless. The Armenian Genocide happened. Recognising it is correct. The 1.5 million who died deserved a reckoning that took too long to arrive. What the [CBS News report noted](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/israel-armenia-genocide-world-war-one/?ref=diplopolis.com) — that this was 'driven by deteriorating relations with Turkey' — makes plain is that the recognition arrived when it was useful, not when it was only right. Sa'ar described it as a moral obligation. A moral obligation does not wait for the right diplomatic moment. It does not arrive simultaneously with an ICJ genocide case and the need to rebuke Ankara. This one did. The Armenian people have a right to see their history named for what it was. They have been fighting for that right for more than a hundred years and should not have to feel ambivalent about any country's recognition, whenever it arrives and for whatever reason. The recognition is right. The timing is Israel's own statement about how it understands the word. Lemkin spent his life arguing that genocide required a name because naming it was the first condition of preventing it. He died in 1959, largely unrecognised, having given international law its most important and most contested concept. He understood, better than most, that the word could be weaponised as easily as it could be honoured. He saw that too, in his time. ### Survival Is Not Legitimacy URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/global-governance-under-fire-carnegie-clark-review/ Last updated: 2026-07-01T11:03:52.000Z In June 2024, [protesters flooded the streets of Nairobi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenya%5FFinance%5FBill%5Fprotests?ref=diplopolis.com). The immediate trigger was a finance bill that proposed new taxes on bread, cooking oil and sanitary products. The deeper anger was at something harder to name. The Kenyan government had not invented the policy environment behind the bill in isolation. The IMF, whose programme Kenya was operating under, had shaped the fiscal conditions that made austerity the path of least resistance. The protesters knew this. Some of them said so explicitly. Their anger was not simply directed at their own parliament. It was directed at an institution headquartered in Washington that had never asked them anything and whose decisions arrived in their lives as school fees cut, subsidies withdrawn, public-sector jobs gone and the price of everything rising. That is not anti-institutionalism. That is memory. Allison Carnegie and Richard Clark have written, in [Global Governance Under Fire](https://amzn.to/4oYCSSv?ref=diplopolis.com) (Princeton University Press, 2026), a serious and analytically useful book about how international organisations survive pressure from populist governments and their constituencies. It makes a move that is more sophisticated than the usual lament about populists destroying the liberal order. It treats international organisations not as passive victims of political hostility but as strategic actors: institutions that appease, sideline, adjust, reframe, lower their visibility and court alternative coalitions in order to endure. That is a genuine contribution to how we understand the politics of multilateralism. It also stops well short of the harder question the book almost demands. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/07/WhatsApp-Image-2026-07-01-at-4.23.18-PM.jpeg)](https://amzn.to/4xXj06r?ref=diplopolis.com) Begin with what Carnegie and Clark get right. The typology of institutional response is analytically sharp. International organisations do not simply absorb pressure or collapse under it. They adapt. They change their language when the political climate shifts. They adjust procedural routes when frontal engagement becomes too costly. They accommodate hostile governments when accommodation is cheaper than confrontation and work around them when it is not. Treating this as strategic behaviour rather than passive endurance changes what questions are worth asking. The right question is not whether international organisations will survive populism. It is how they survive it, and what they become in the process. That reframing is valuable. But the doubt it leaves behind is equally important. Appeasement and sidelining are useful categories, but institutions do not always know what they are doing in real time. Sometimes what looks like strategic resilience from Geneva is improvisation, budget protection, donor management or headline avoidance. The same institutional act can read as pragmatic adaptation in Washington and as betrayal in Nairobi, Delhi or Buenos Aires. Carnegie and Clark explain institutional survival better than they explain institutional legitimacy. Those are not the same thing, and the gap between them is where the book's most significant limitation lives. The blind spot is the Global South, and the IMF is where it is most visible. Distrust of the IMF across Africa, Latin America and South Asia is not populist theatre. It rests on accumulated historical experience: structural adjustment programmes that cut public services, austerity conditionality applied precisely when countries were most economically vulnerable, currency crises managed in ways that protected creditors while punishing citizens, and governance structures in which borrowing countries remain systematically under-represented because voting shares are tied to economic size. [The United States holds roughly 16 per cent](https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2024/07/16/enough-voice-for-the-vulnerable-why-climate-vulnerable-countries-need-more-voting-power-within-the-international-monetary-fund/?ref=diplopolis.com) of IMF voting power; [the entire African bloc](https://thetricontinental.org/newsletterissue/global-north-imf-inequality/?ref=diplopolis.com), representing 54 borrowing countries with more active IMF lending programmes than any other continent, holds 6.5 per cent. An institution designed to stabilise the global economy reflects, in its very architecture, the power distribution of the moment it was built. That is not a conspiracy theory. It is a documented institutional history with a large academic literature behind it. The Kenya protests made this history political again with unusual directness. [Anger at tax increases and austerity](https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/10/kenyas-growing-youth-movement-for-fiscal-justice-rejects-imf-mandated-austerity/?ref=diplopolis.com) was aimed not only at the Kenyan parliament but at the institution many protesters understood to be shaping the policy environment from a distance. That connection, between a finance bill in Nairobi and programme conditionality agreed in Washington, is precisely the kind of link that Carnegie and Clark's framework struggles to process. Their typology classifies institutional responses to populist pressure. It is less equipped to ask whether the pressure itself contains a legitimate verdict. When the IMF later acknowledged that its programme projections for Kenya had been overly optimistic, the concession arrived after the tear gas. That sequencing is not incidental. It is the wound. This is the distinction the book does not quite make, and it matters. When Donald Trump attacks the World Trade Organization or the World Health Organization, much of that is nationalist grievance performing as sovereignty defence. When African, Latin American or South Asian publics distrust the IMF, they are often remembering something specific: school fees reinstated, subsidies removed, public-sector workers retrenched, food prices rising and the recurrent humiliation of being told that pain is reform. These are not the same kind of anger. Collapsing them both into the category of populist pressure on international institutions is analytically convenient and politically misleading. Carnegie and Clark seem aware that legitimacy matters. Their framing acknowledges the concern that international cooperation might survive the populist wave while losing the inclusiveness and effectiveness that gave it value. That is close to the anti-hypocrisy question. It is not quite the same. The anti-hypocrisy question is harsher: were some of these institutions attacked not because they failed to preserve the liberal order, but because they helped build an unequal one? Is the resentment directed at them always a pathology to be managed, or sometimes a verdict to be heard? If the book cannot fully ask that question, the argument tilts in a particular direction. Populism becomes the problem. Institutions become the threatened good. That is too clean. Some populists are bad-faith arsonists. Some institutions are genuinely worth defending. But an institution can be worth defending and simultaneously guilty of hierarchy, selectivity and hypocrisy. Carnegie and Clark's framework is well equipped to explain how institutions survive. It is less well equipped to ask whether survival, on these terms, is enough. Global Governance Under Fire is a useful and necessary book. Read it for the typology of institutional adaptation, which is genuinely illuminating. Read it to understand how multilateral organisations navigate political hostility without collapsing. Then read it against Nairobi, against the IMF's history in sub-Saharan Africa, against the voting structures that keep borrowing countries structurally marginal in the institutions that govern their economic lives. An institution that learns to manage anger without listening to the history inside it may preserve its machinery. It will not recover its moral claim. This Book Review is free to read. Future Book Reviews will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### No Longer Responsible URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/no-longer-responsible-venezuela-deportees-earthquake-dhs/ Last updated: 2026-07-01T04:30:29.000Z Daniel Núñez called his mother thirty minutes before the earthquake hit. He had just landed in Caracas, [deported after almost five years](https://www.npr.org/2026/06/30/nx-s1-5875287/venezuela-deportees-us-quakes?ref=diplopolis.com) working construction in Jacksonville, Florida. In four minutes he told her they were going to live in Venezuela together, that they were going to keep going. Then the call ended. Oswadeliz Núñez has not heard from her son since. On June 24, the United States [deported 146 Venezuelans](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/venezuela/venezuelans-deported-us-hours-earthquakes-hit-are-missing-confirmed-de-rcna352328?ref=diplopolis.com) on a single flight from Texas to Caracas. Nineteen women. Seven children. They were taken to the [Hotel Santuario La Llanada](https://www.npr.org/2026/06/30/nx-s1-5875287/venezuela-deportees-us-quakes?ref=diplopolis.com) in La Guaira, the coastal state housing Venezuela's main airport, to be processed. At 6:04pm local time, a [magnitude 7.2 earthquake struck](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026%5FVenezuela%5Fearthquakes?ref=diplopolis.com). Thirty-nine seconds later, a 7.5 followed, the strongest Venezuela has felt since 1900\. The hotel collapsed. The deportees were inside it. [Anderson Salcedo Lozano, twenty-two](https://abcnews.com/International/hotel-100-venezuelans-recently-deported-us-collapsed-deadly/story?id=134327448&ref=diplopolis.com), lost both legs when the building came down on him. [Angelo Mejía Meléndez, twenty-seven](https://www.npr.org/2026/06/30/nx-s1-5875287/venezuela-deportees-us-quakes?ref=diplopolis.com), died in the rubble; his mother identified his body by a pizza tattoo on his arm. [Víctor Guanipa Toyo, thirty-two](https://www.npr.org/2026/06/30/nx-s1-5875287/venezuela-deportees-us-quakes?ref=diplopolis.com), remains missing nearly a week later. His brother searches hospitals, shelters and morgues. The [death toll has passed 1,900](https://abcnews.com/International/live-updates/venezuela-earthquakes-updates/?id=134196335&ref=diplopolis.com) across Venezuela. Tens of thousands remain unaccounted for. Asked about the flight, [a DHS spokesperson said](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/venezuela/venezuelans-deported-us-hours-earthquakes-hit-are-missing-confirmed-de-rcna352328?ref=diplopolis.com) it 'safely reached Venezuela' and that all 146 people aboard 'had been returned home.' Once an individual is no longer in ICE custody, the spokesperson explained, ICE is no longer responsible for them. The sentence is accurate as a description of jurisdiction. It says nothing about what jurisdiction is for. These were not random deportees caught in a random disaster. They were detained, transported and delivered to a specific hotel on a coastline that geological history had marked as vulnerable to exactly this kind of event for more than a century. [Daniel Núñez's only infractions](https://www.npr.org/2026/06/30/nx-s1-5875287/venezuela-deportees-us-quakes?ref=diplopolis.com) were crossing the border without authorisation and a misdemeanour for driving without a licence. He was arrested on his way to work in May. Asked whether deportations to Venezuela would continue, [DHS did not respond](https://www.npr.org/2026/06/30/nx-s1-5875287/venezuela-deportees-us-quakes?ref=diplopolis.com). Oswadeliz Núñez put it plainly. 'Venezuelans are not animals. They are humans, not criminals. My son paid taxes.' She is still waiting for his body. Responsibility, in Washington's accounting, ended the moment the aircraft doors opened. Nine hours later, the hotel meant to process the people inside it fell on top of them. ### The Court They Built and Then Broke URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-court-they-built-and-then-broke-icc-sanctions-nuremberg-files/ Last updated: 2026-06-30T11:00:05.000Z Judge Reine Alapini-Gansou of Benin cannot use her credit card. She cannot access banking services. She cannot book travel through ordinary platforms, obtain health insurance through normal channels or use Amazon or Google. She is a sitting judge of the International Criminal Court in The Hague. She was sanctioned by the United States government in June 2025 for participating in the court's investigation into Israeli conduct in Gaza. Last week, alongside two colleagues, Judge Kimberly Prost of Canada and Judge Solomy Balungi Bossa of Uganda, she [sued in federal court](https://www.justiceinitiative.org/newsroom/icc-judges-sue-trump-administration-over-icc-sanctions?ref=diplopolis.com) arguing that the sanctions imposed on her are unlawful and designed to punish her for doing her job. She is asking the United States of America for the right to function as a judge. The lawsuit, the [first by sitting ICC judges](https://www.courthousenews.com/sanctioned-icc-judges-sue-trump-in-new-york/?ref=diplopolis.com), is a document of extraordinary historical significance. Not because of what it will produce — federal civil litigation against a sitting US administration moves slowly, and a final verdict, if one comes at all, is years away. But because of what it reveals about the condition of the accountability architecture the world built after 1945 and what the most powerful state on earth has spent the last two years systematically doing to it. ## What the United States Built The International Criminal Court did not emerge from the traditions of states that had nothing to do with American power. It emerged directly from the principles that American lawyers and statesmen helped articulate at Nuremberg in 1945 and 1946, codified into international law through decades of American-led multilateral effort, and finally given institutional form through negotiations in which the United States was a central participant. The Clinton administration sent [David Scheffer as chief negotiator](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/role-icc?ref=diplopolis.com) to Rome in 1998, where American officials participated actively in drafting the Rome Statute. The US delegation [drafted significant parts](https://www.pgaction.org/ilhr/rome-statute/united-states-and-international-criminal-justice.html?ref=diplopolis.com) of the final version. The principles that became the Rome Statute, specifically no immunity for heads of state, individual criminal responsibility for mass atrocity and the complementarity principle, trace directly to the Nuremberg Charter that Robert Jackson helped write in 1945 and to the UN General Assembly resolution affirming those principles in 1946, which was, as the ICC's own former president has noted, the [brainchild of the US Government](https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/itemsDocuments/191114-president-stat-us-and-icc.pdf?ref=diplopolis.com). The United States ultimately voted against the Rome Statute in 1998, citing concerns about American soldiers being subject to prosecution. Clinton signed it in December 2000 without submitting it for Senate ratification. George W. Bush [unsigned the Rome Statute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United%5FStates%5Fand%5Fthe%5FInternational%5FCriminal%5FCourt?ref=diplopolis.com) in May 2002 and passed the American Service-Members' Protection Act, which authorised military force to free any American detained by the court — legislation that became known in European capitals as the Hague Invasion Act. Obama re-established a working relationship. Biden [rescinded Trump's first-term sanctions](https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/02/07/us-trump-authorizes-international-criminal-court-sanctions?ref=diplopolis.com) against ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda and co-operated on Ukraine investigations. What the second Trump administration has done is qualitatively different from anything that preceded it. ## The Systematic Dismantling On February 6, 2025, Trump signed [Executive Order 14203](https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-14203-imposing-sanctions-the-international-criminal-court?ref=diplopolis.com), titled 'Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court.' The order declared ICC investigations targeting US nationals or nationals of allied states a national emergency, specifically 'an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.' It authorised asset freezes and travel bans against any foreign national who participated in or supported those investigations. The declared emergency was not a terrorist attack or a military crisis. It was judges doing their jobs. Within a week, Secretary of State Rubio sanctioned [ICC Chief Prosecutor Khan](https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250213?ref=diplopolis.com). In June 2025, Rubio added four ICC judges to the sanctions list, including Alapini-Gansou and Bossa, describing them as having 'actively engaged in the ICC's illegitimate and baseless actions targeting America or our close ally, Israel.' In August 2025, four more judges were sanctioned, including Prost, who had in 2020 authorised the court's investigation into US personnel in Afghanistan, a decision she made five years before being sanctioned for it. In December 2025, two more judges were added. By the time the three plaintiffs filed their Manhattan lawsuit in June 2026, the administration had sanctioned [at least 11 ICC officials](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive%5FOrder%5F14203?ref=diplopolis.com) including judges, prosecutors and deputy prosecutors. The sanctions regime is not targeted at specific acts of alleged misconduct. It is targeted at the exercise of judicial functions the court was designed to perform. Prost herself noted the absurdity with precision after her designation: 'I was somewhat surprised that I would be sanctioned for something I had done five years ago, particularly because sanctions are not about punishment, they're about changing your conduct, deterring you. And of course, none of that applies to me because the investigation is dormant.' The administration sanctioned a judge for a ruling she made in 2020, in a case that is no longer active, to send a message about what she might do in future cases involving Israel. The lawsuit describes what the sanctions actually mean for the judges in their daily lives. The complaint calls it the [financial death penalty](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/25/icc-judges-sue-trump-over-sanctions-call-measures-unlawful?ref=diplopolis.com): 'Due to the sanctions, Judges Prost, Bossa, and Alapini-Gansou are no longer able, among other things, to use credit cards; access banking services; use common online platforms, such as Amazon and Google; book travel; and in some cases, obtain health insurance.' This is the mechanism by which Washington is attempting to discipline the international judiciary: not through legal argument before the court, but through the practical strangulation of the judges' ability to live normal lives. ## The Indian Judges and the Indian Government Of the three plaintiffs, two are from the Global South. Bossa is Ugandan. Alapini-Gansou is Beninese. The court that was supposed to give countries like theirs a voice in international justice, accountability that colonial subjects never received and postcolonial states have rarely secured, is being dismantled by the most powerful state on earth. But the sharpest illustration of what that dismantling costs the Global South this week did not come from the three judges in Manhattan. It came from Geneva. On June 23, five days before the Manhattan lawsuit was filed, [Justice Srinivasan Muralidhar](https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/national/justice-s-muralidhar-named-chair-of-un-inquiry-into-israelipalestinian-violations?ref=diplopolis.com), former judge of the Delhi High Court, former Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court, now chair of the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, [presented a 100-page report](https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2026/06/statement-srinivasan-muralidhar-chair-commission-inquiry-occupied?ref=diplopolis.com) to the Human Rights Council. The report documented that Israeli forces had deliberately targeted Palestinian children, constituting genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 'The evidence shows that [Palestinian children deliberately targeted](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2648229/middle-east?ref=diplopolis.com) and killed by the Israeli security forces,' Muralidhar said. At least 20,179 children had been killed, representing roughly 30 per cent of all fatalities. At least 5,031 were under five. The commission [submitted 7,000 pieces of evidence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independent%5FInternational%5FCommission%5Fof%5FInquiry%5Fon%5Fthe%5FOccupied%5FPalestinian%5FTerritory?ref=diplopolis.com) to the ICC to support the investigation whose judges Washington is now financially strangling. Justice Muralidhar is Indian. He is not the first. Justice Dalveer Bhandari, India's representative on the ICJ since 2012, [voted with the majority](https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/international-court-of-justice-israel-gaza-palestine-justice-dalveer-bhandari-indian-judge-genocide-247716?ref=diplopolis.com) in January 2024 ordering Israel to take all measures to prevent acts of genocide, and [again in May 2024](https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/world/icj-judge-bhandari-votes-in-favour-of-israel-forces-ending-rafah-assault-625024/?ref=diplopolis.com) ordering Israel to halt its Rafah offensive. Two Indian jurists. Two international legal bodies. The same documented evidence. The Indian government has maintained studied neutrality throughout, [abstaining on UN resolutions](https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/explainers/why-india-broke-its-abstention-run-on-palestine-and-backed-a-un-resolution/?ref=diplopolis.com) condemning Israeli conduct across multiple votes. The administration's sanctions do not correct the ICC's historic selectivity toward African defendants. They make it permanent on a different axis. The judges being sanctioned are not being sanctioned for pursuing African leaders. They are being sanctioned for pursuing an American ally. The message to the Global South is not that the court will become more equitable. It is that the court will be prevented from functioning whenever its investigations point in a direction Washington finds inconvenient, and that the government of the Indian jurists documenting genocide in Geneva and The Hague will abstain rather than say so. ## The Manhattan Courthouse and What It Means The three judges filing in Manhattan are the fifth wave of plaintiffs to challenge Executive Order 14203 in US courts. The previous four lawsuits, brought by American human rights advocates and organisations, produced rulings that found the order unconstitutional as applied to Americans providing speech-based assistance to the court, a First Amendment argument that the judges themselves cannot make, being foreign nationals. [Four earlier courts ruled](https://www.justiceinitiative.org/newsroom/icc-judges-sue-trump-administration-over-icc-sanctions?ref=diplopolis.com) the order unconstitutional on these grounds. The administration has appealed and sought stays, and the litigation continues. The judges' lawsuit makes different arguments. They contend that Executive Order 14203 [exceeds IEEPA authority](https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/artc-icc-judges-sue-trump-administration-over-icc-sanctions?ref=diplopolis.com) because no genuine national emergency exists. They argue the measures are arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. They argue the Fifth Amendment's due process protections are being violated by the freezing of assets without adequate process. They are asking a US federal court to tell the US executive branch that it cannot use emergency economic powers to punish foreign judges for conducting judicial proceedings. This is the situation the accountability architecture has produced. Three judges, from Canada, Uganda and Benin, are suing the United States in a United States federal court for the right to function as international judges without being financially strangled. They have no other forum available. The ICC cannot compel US compliance. The UN Security Council, where the US holds a veto, cannot act. A Manhattan federal court is the only institution with any possibility of constraining the executive order. The architecture of accountability, when turned on itself, produces this: three judges asking the country that declared their work a national emergency for the right to buy groceries. ## The Architecture and Its Authors Robert Jackson returned from Nuremberg in 1946 having built something he believed would outlast him and outlast the specific crimes he had prosecuted. The principles he articulated, specifically individual criminal responsibility, no immunity for heads of state and the non-derogability of crimes against humanity, were affirmed by the UN General Assembly through a resolution the US government championed. They were developed over fifty years of multilateral work in which American lawyers and diplomats played central roles. They became the Rome Statute, which American negotiators helped draft, which the US ultimately refused to ratify, and which the US is now actively undermining from the outside. The distance between 1946 and 2026 is not simply a matter of changed administrations or shifted priorities. It is the distance between a state that believed accountability for mass atrocity was a universal principle and a state that believes accountability is a tool to be deployed against adversaries and withheld from allies. The US championed the Nuremberg principles when they applied to defeated German officials. It is sanctioning the ICC judges when those same principles are applied to an ally it has chosen to shield. The three judges who filed in Manhattan last week are asking a question that will take years to answer and may never receive one. What they have already demonstrated by filing it is this: the accountability architecture the world built after 1945, which the United States helped design, is now being defended in a US federal court by a judge from Benin who cannot book a flight, a judge from Uganda who cannot access her bank account, and a Canadian judge who was sanctioned for a decision she made five years before she was punished for it. The court they built is the court they are breaking. The judges filing in Manhattan know the difference. The question is whether the court hearing them does. This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Inspections First. Or Never. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/inspections-first-or-never-iran-nuclear-iaea-60-day-clock/ Last updated: 2026-06-30T04:29:59.000Z On June 23, JD Vance told reporters at Bürgenstock that Iran had [agreed to invite](https://www.timesofisrael.com/contradicting-vance-iran-says-no-plans-for-iaea-inspections-of-damaged-nuclear-sites/?ref=diplopolis.com) IAEA inspectors back into the country. Iran's foreign ministry contradicted him the same day. Spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said there was no framework for IAEA access to Iran's nuclear facilities and that Iran had not held any meeting with IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi in Switzerland. On Wednesday, Grossi made his firmest statement yet — speaking from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, he said inspections would happen. 'Whether this happens the day after tomorrow or in one week or in 10 days, it's important, but not essential. [This is going to happen](https://www.npr.org/2026/06/24/g-s1-129770/iran-nuclear-inspection?ref=diplopolis.com).' Iran's deputy foreign minister Kazem Gharibabadi contradicted him within hours, saying these issues would be resolved only within a final agreement. Three contradictions in 48 hours. Trump called it the 'highest level nuclear inspections long into the future (Infinity!!!).' Iran said it had agreed to no such thing. Both cannot be describing the same negotiation. They are not. The stakes are not abstract. Since Israel launched its 12-day war on Iran in June 2025, the IAEA has been [blocked from visiting](https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/analysis-of-iaea-iran-verification-and-monitoring-and-npt-safeguards-reports-june-2026?ref=diplopolis.com) Iran's enrichment sites. Iran is believed to hold enough highly enriched uranium, 60 per cent purity, 99 per cent of the way to weapons-grade, to potentially build as many as ten nuclear weapons. The IAEA cannot verify the stockpile's size or location. Without inspections there is no baseline. Without a baseline there is no verifiable deal — only a document that each side can interpret as it chooses. Grossi knows this. Washington knows this. Tehran knows this. Iran's position is that inspections are the reward for compliance with a final agreement, not the precondition for negotiating one. Washington's position is that inspections must precede further sanctions relief. The Islamabad Memorandum established a framework for the release of Iran's frozen assets, estimated at approximately $24 billion abroad, and left the nuclear stockpile untouched. The release mechanism is among the central questions being negotiated during the 60-day window. That window is running. The central question, inspections first, or after, has not moved. Trump told Fox News: 'They've agreed to it, they've agreed to the inspectors.' Iran's foreign ministry said it had not. The IAEA chief said inspections would happen. Iran said they would not happen until after a final deal. The 60-day clock does not pause for the argument. ### The Financial Death Penalty URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/financial-death-penalty-icc-judges-sue-trump-sanctions/ Last updated: 2026-06-29T04:30:16.000Z Judge Reine Alapini-Gansou of Benin cannot use her credit card. She cannot access banking services, book travel, use Amazon or Google, or obtain health insurance. She is a sitting judge of the International Criminal Court. On June 24, she [filed a lawsuit](https://www.justiceinitiative.org/newsroom/icc-judges-sue-trump-administration-over-icc-sanctions?ref=diplopolis.com) in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York alongside Judge Kimberly Prost of Canada and Judge Solomy Balungi Bossa of Uganda. Their argument: the sanctions the United States government imposed on them are unlawful, designed to punish them for doing their jobs, and amount to what the complaint calls a [financial death penalty](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/25/icc-judges-sue-trump-over-sanctions-call-measures-unlawful?ref=diplopolis.com). This is the [first time sitting](https://www.courthousenews.com/sanctioned-icc-judges-sue-trump-in-new-york/?ref=diplopolis.com) ICC judges have sued the Trump administration themselves. It is the fifth lawsuit challenging [Executive Order 14203](https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-14203-imposing-sanctions-the-international-criminal-court?ref=diplopolis.com), which Trump signed on February 6, 2025, declaring ICC investigations into US nationals and allied states a national emergency. Within a week, ICC Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan was sanctioned. By December 2025, [at least 11 ICC officials](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive%5FOrder%5F14203?ref=diplopolis.com) — judges, prosecutors, deputy prosecutors — had been added to the list. The declared emergency was not a terrorist attack or a military crisis. It was judges doing their jobs. The sanctions were imposed because the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in November 2024 and had previously opened an investigation into US personnel in Afghanistan. Secretary of State Rubio sanctioned Alapini-Gansou and Bossa in June 2025, describing them as having 'actively engaged in the ICC's illegitimate and baseless actions targeting America or our close ally, Israel.' Judge Prost was sanctioned in August 2025 for a ruling she made in 2020 authorising the Afghanistan investigation — five years before Washington decided to punish her for it. Prost noted the logic herself: sanctions are supposed to change conduct or deter future action. The Afghanistan investigation is dormant. There was nothing left to deter. Four previous courts found EO 14203 unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds as applied to Americans assisting the ICC. Those rulings did not help Alapini-Gansou. She is not American. She cannot make a First Amendment argument. What she can make — what the three judges are making in Manhattan — is that the order [exceeds the authority](https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/artc-icc-judges-sue-trump-administration-over-icc-sanctions?ref=diplopolis.com) granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, violates the Administrative Procedure Act and denies Fifth Amendment due process. She is asking a US federal court for the right to access her bank account for doing her job. The United States helped draft the Rome Statute. American negotiators were [key participants in Rome in 1998](https://www.pgaction.org/ilhr/rome-statute/united-states-and-international-criminal-justice.html?ref=diplopolis.com), assisting in drafting significant parts of the final version. The principles the court embodies — no immunity for heads of state, individual criminal responsibility for mass atrocity — trace directly to the Nuremberg Charter that American lawyers helped write in 1945\. Washington championed those principles when they applied to defeated German officials. It is sanctioning the judges when those same principles are applied to an ally it has chosen to shield. A judge from Benin is suing in Manhattan for the right to use her credit card. The US built the court. The US built the law the court applies. The US declared both a national emergency. ### Think Tanks of the Global South: The Institutions Shaping Policy Outside the West URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/think-tanks-global-south-institutions-shaping-policy-2/ Last updated: 2026-06-28T07:55:27.000Z When Indonesia held the chair of ASEAN in 2003, the concept of an ASEAN Political and Security Community — the framework that would eventually shape the bloc's approach to regional order for the next two decades — did not emerge from Brookings or Chatham House. It was developed largely through the work of [Rizal Sukma](https://www.csis.or.id/about-us/?ref=diplopolis.com), then executive director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, who advised Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda directly on the architecture of the community during Indonesia's chairmanship year. The paper that shaped the negotiating position came from a Jakarta think tank founded by Indonesian scholars. The government that adopted it was Indonesian. The ASEAN member states that eventually agreed to it were Southeast Asian. Western institutions analysed it after the fact. This pattern repeats across the Global South, and it is the pattern this guide is designed to illuminate. The institutions that matter most for Global South policy are not the ones that appear in Western rankings. They are the ones with direct access to the governments, regional bodies and civil society movements that Brookings and Chatham House can only observe from the outside. A researcher from New Delhi or Lagos or Jakarta who understands these institutions — their research priorities, their career entry points and their actual mechanisms of influence — holds an advantage that no amount of Washington networking can replicate. This guide covers 11 institutions across South Asia, Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America. For each one it tells you what the institution does, who funds it, how it exerts influence, and what a young researcher from the region should know before approaching it as a career destination. ## South Asia ### Observer Research Foundation — New Delhi, India [ORF](https://www.orfonline.org/?ref=diplopolis.com) was [founded in 1990](https://www.orfonline.org/about-us?ref=diplopolis.com) at the juncture of India's economic liberalisation, when a group of economists and policymakers decided the country needed an independent forum capable of critically examining the challenges it faced. For more than three decades it has served as India's most internationally visible think tank, producing hundreds of long-form publications annually and hosting the Raisina Dialogue — India's premier geopolitics conference, co-organised with the Ministry of External Affairs — which draws thousands of attendees each year. Its funding base has shifted from approximately [95 per cent Reliance Industries until 2009](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Observer%5FResearch%5FFoundation?ref=diplopolis.com) to a more diversified mix including government grants, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Microsoft and others, though Reliance remains a major domestic supporter. ORF's influence is exerted through three channels: direct research access to the Ministry of External Affairs, its convening role in international dialogues, and its Track 2 diplomatic engagement. It served as the anchor institution for the Think 20 (T20) process during India's G20 presidency in 2023, producing the research that fed into policy discussions on digital public infrastructure, climate finance and multilateral reform. A young Indian researcher here gains proximity to the foreign policy establishment that no Western posting offers. The honest caveat: questions about Reliance's residual influence on research independence are documented and worth understanding before joining. ### Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) — New Delhi, India [MP-IDSA](https://idsa.in/?ref=diplopolis.com) was [established on November 11, 1965](https://idsa.in/about?ref=diplopolis.com), in the aftermath of India's defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian war, when Defence Minister Yeshwantrao Chavan recognised that India had no institutional capacity for strategic thinking. The initiative came from the Defence Ministry itself, which modelled the institute on the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London — a choice that reveals both the aspiration and the limitation. [Funded entirely by the Indian Ministry of Defence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manohar%5FParrikar%5FInstitute%5Ffor%5FDefence%5FStudies%5Fand%5FAnalyses?ref=diplopolis.com), it publishes the bimonthly journal *Strategic Analysis* in collaboration with Taylor & Francis and trains civilian and military officers from across the Indian government. MP-IDSA's influence is exercised primarily through the government rather than around it. Its analysts contribute to India's defence policy deliberations on nuclear doctrine, border management, maritime strategy and the India-China-Pakistan triangular security dynamic. It is renamed after Manohar Parrikar, who served as defence minister from 2017 until his death in 2019\. For a researcher from South Asia interested in strategic studies and defence policy, this is the institution with the most direct access to India's security establishment — though that proximity to government funding means the institution exercises political discretion that independent think tanks do not. ### Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) — Islamabad, Pakistan [ISSI](https://issi.org.pk/?ref=diplopolis.com) was [founded in 1973](https://issi.org.pk/introduction-issi/?ref=diplopolis.com), originally called the Pakistan Institute of Strategic Studies, and is [funded by Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Institute%5Fof%5FStrategic%5FStudies%5FIslamabad?ref=diplopolis.com). It operates as an autonomous non-profit research organisation, meaning it maintains research independence within the boundaries set by its governmental relationship. Its flagship publication is *Strategic Studies*, a peer-reviewed quarterly recognised by Pakistan's Higher Education Commission. The institute has signed memorandums of understanding with international research organisations and provides a platform for Pakistan's strategic community to engage with counterparts from China, Russia, Turkey and the Gulf states in particular. ISSI's most significant recent work has tracked Pakistan's nuclear doctrine, the US-China strategic competition as it plays out in South Asia, and Pakistan-Russia energy ties — research that reflects Pakistan's foreign policy priorities directly. For a Pakistani researcher, this institution represents the most direct career entry point into the country's foreign policy research community, with internship programmes specifically designed for young researchers. Its independence is structurally constrained by government funding; its access to government is, precisely for that reason, unmatched. ## Africa ### South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) — Johannesburg, South Africa [SAIIA](https://saiia.org.za/?ref=diplopolis.com) is the oldest think tank on this list, [founded in 1934](https://saiia.org.za/about/our-history/?ref=diplopolis.com) in Cape Town by a bipartisan group of politicians, academics and newspaper editors. It has been based on the campus of the University of the Witwatersrand since 1944\. Its four research programmes — Foreign Policy, African Governance and Diplomacy, Economic Resilience and Inclusion, and Climate and Natural Resources — reflect both the breadth of its mandate and the African continental framing that distinguishes it from South African-focused institutions. [Ranked third among African think tanks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South%5FAfrican%5FInstitute%5Fof%5FInternational%5FAffairs?ref=diplopolis.com) in the 2020 Global Go To Think Tank Index and 85th globally, it is one of only five African think tanks in the global top 100. SAIIA's influence runs through its publication record — the quarterly *South African Journal of International Affairs* published via Taylor & Francis since 1993 — and through its direct engagement with AU policy processes, SADC deliberations and South Africa's bilateral diplomatic agenda. For a researcher from Southern or East Africa, SAIIA offers the most internationally credible African think tank credential, access to Johannesburg's diplomatic community and genuine proximity to the policy conversations shaping the continent's economic and security architecture. ### Institute for Security Studies (ISS) — Pretoria, South Africa [The ISS](https://issafrica.org/?ref=diplopolis.com) was [founded in 1991](https://issafrica.org/about-us/how-we-work?ref=diplopolis.com) as the Institute for Defence Policy by Jakkie Cilliers, and renamed in 1996 as it shifted its focus from South African civil-military relations to the full range of African human security challenges. It is [Africa's largest independent human security research organisation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Institute%5Ffor%5FSecurity%5FStudies?ref=diplopolis.com), headquartered in Pretoria with regional offices in Nairobi, Addis Ababa and Dakar. Its research covers transnational crime, maritime security, peacekeeping, conflict analysis, criminal justice and governance across the continent. The ISS exerts influence through direct research partnerships with the AU, SADC, IGAD, ECCAS and COMESA — a network of sub-regional relationships that Western think tanks cannot replicate without years of relationship-building. It has formalised memorandums of understanding with multiple African regional bodies and provides technical assistance and training to governments across the continent. For an Anglophone African researcher interested in security, governance or criminal justice, the ISS combines research credibility with practitioner access that makes it among the most useful career entry points on this continent. ### African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) — Durban, South Africa [ACCORD](https://www.accord.org.za/?ref=diplopolis.com) was [founded in 1992](https://www.accord.org.za/about-us/?ref=diplopolis.com) by Vasu Gounden in Durban on the principle that innovative solutions to conflict in Africa must come from African citizens. In September 2005, it became the [first African NGO in history to address the UN Security Council](https://www.devex.com/organizations/african-centre-for-constructive-resolution-of-disputes-accord-104871?ref=diplopolis.com), a distinction that captures its standing in the multilateral peacebuilding ecosystem. Since then it has trained tens of thousands of people in conflict management across government, military, police and civil society sectors. It works throughout Africa, from SADC in the south through the Great Lakes region to the Horn and West Africa. ACCORD's influence operates differently from the research-focused institutions on this list. It intervenes directly in conflicts through mediation and negotiation, training mediators and facilitating dialogue between parties at the request of governments and the AU. For a researcher whose interest is peacebuilding practice rather than policy analysis, ACCORD represents the most operationally embedded institution here — and an entry point into the continent's conflict resolution community that academic credentials alone cannot provide. ### Timbuktu Institute — African Centre for Peace Studies — Dakar, Senegal The [Timbuktu Institute](https://timbuktu-institute.org/?ref=diplopolis.com) was [founded in 2016](https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/interview-with-bakary-sambe-918?ref=diplopolis.com) by Dr Bakary Sambe as the institutional successor to the Observatory of Religious Radicalism and Conflicts in Africa, which Sambe established in 2012 in response to the destruction of mausoleums in Timbuktu. Based in Dakar with offices in Niamey and Bamako, it is the leading Francophone African institution studying violent extremism, counter-radicalisation and conflict prevention across the Sahel. Sambe designed and led advocacy for the G5 Sahel's Regional Cell for the Prevention and Counter-Radicalisation — known as CELLRAD — and has assisted in the development of national counter-terrorism strategies in Niger, Burkina Faso and the Central African Republic as an expert for the UN, EU and AU simultaneously. This is the institution that gives the Sahel a credible voice in global policy conversations about a region that Western analysts have consistently misread. Sambe's explicit purpose in founding it was to narrow the gap between international perception of Sahelian crises and local understanding of them — a purpose that goes to the heart of why Global South think tanks exist. A young Francophone researcher from West or Central Africa brings to this institution exactly the language, cultural and regional knowledge that its founding rationale demands. ## Southeast Asia ### Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS Indonesia) — Jakarta, Indonesia [CSIS Indonesia](https://www.csis.or.id/?ref=diplopolis.com) was [established on September 1, 1971](https://www.csis.or.id/about-us/?ref=diplopolis.com) by Harry Tjan Silalahi, Jusuf Wanandi, Hadi Soesastro and Clara Joewono as Indonesia's first non-government think tank. Within a year of its founding it was known in public policy circles across Jakarta and the region. Its role in shaping the ASEAN Political and Security Community concept, through Rizal Sukma's advisory work to the foreign minister during Indonesia's 2003 ASEAN chairmanship, represents the clearest single example in this guide of a Global South institution directly determining the outcome of a regional negotiation. It is a founding member of the ASEAN-ISIS network and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific. Its publications include the *Indonesian Quarterly*, running since 1974, and *Analisis CSIS* since 1971. CSIS Indonesia's research spans economics, politics and international relations with a consistent focus on ASEAN integration, Indonesia's bilateral relationships and the management of great power competition in Southeast Asia. For an Indonesian or broader Southeast Asian researcher, it is the most internationally connected domestic research institution in the region, with a fifty-year track record of producing analysts who move between the think tank and government without the institutional barriers that characterise Western academic-policy transitions. ### Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand) — Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok [ISIS Thailand](http://www.isisthailand.org/?ref=diplopolis.com) was [officially sanctioned by Chulalongkorn University in February 1982](http://www.isisthailand.org/about-us/?ref=diplopolis.com) and has since operated as a founding member of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific and a core member of the ASEAN-ISIS network. It conducts research on traditional and non-traditional security issues affecting Thailand, Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. Its university base distinguishes it from the other institutions on this list: the Chulalongkorn affiliation gives it access to the largest and most politically significant university in Thailand while preserving the research independence that government-funded institutions cannot always maintain. The institution's strength is in ASEAN studies, Thai foreign policy, the US-China competition in the Indo-Pacific and the domestic political determinants of regional security. For a Thai or Southeast Asian researcher interested in the intersection of academic rigour and policy access, ISIS Thailand offers a career path that runs through the university without being confined to it. ## Latin America ### Brazilian Centre for International Relations (CEBRI) — Rio de Janeiro, Brazil [CEBRI](https://cebri.org/?ref=diplopolis.com) was [founded in 1998](https://cebri.org/en/sobre/memoria?ref=diplopolis.com) by a group of ambassadors, intellectuals and businessmen committed to strengthening Brazil's international engagement. It is Brazil's only think tank dedicated exclusively to the country's global agenda, based in Rio de Janeiro with a network of more than 100 member organisations across all continents. Its recent work has tracked Brazil's simultaneous presidency of the G20 in 2024, the BRICS summit in 2025 and COP30 — a convergence of multilateral responsibility that has placed Brazilian foreign policy at the centre of global governance conversations in ways that no previous government has managed. CEBRI's research on Brazil's BRICS strategy, its 'active non-alignment' doctrine and its role in climate finance negotiations has fed directly into the government's multilateral positions. CEBRI's funding model — drawing on a diverse membership of companies from the economy's leading sectors alongside diplomatic representatives and individual members — gives it financial resilience and private sector relevance that purely government-funded institutions lack. For a Brazilian researcher, it is the institution where the country's diplomatic elite, business community and academic specialists intersect, and where a junior researcher's work reaches audiences that purely academic institutions cannot access. ### Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI), El Colegio de México — Mexico City, Mexico The [CEI](https://cei.colmex.mx/?ref=diplopolis.com) was [founded in 1960](https://cei.colmex.mx/sobre?ref=diplopolis.com) by Daniel Cosío Villegas, then president of El Colegio de México, specifically to train scholars of international relations capable of understanding Mexico's position in the world and conducting Mexican diplomacy with professional rigour. That founding purpose has never changed. El Colegio de México itself — [established in 1940](https://macmillan.yale.edu/foxfellowship/el-colegio-de-mexico-mexico?ref=diplopolis.com) as a refuge for Spanish Republican intellectuals fleeing the Franco regime — is Mexico's most prestigious social sciences institution, and the CEI is its international relations centre. The flagship journal *Foro Internacional*, running since 1960, is the most widely read political science journal in Spanish-language Latin America. The CEI's influence on Mexican foreign policy runs deep and long. Its graduates have consistently moved into Mexican government, academia and civil society, often after postgraduate study abroad. The institution trains the Mexican diplomatic corps through its BA and Masters programmes and provides the conceptual architecture for Mexican foreign policy debates on USMCA trade dynamics, North American security and Latin American regional governance. For a Mexican or Latin American researcher, it is simultaneously the most academically rigorous and the most policy-proximate institution in the region. ## What These Institutions Collectively Offer Western think tanks can analyse Pakistan's nuclear doctrine. ISSI can brief the Pakistani foreign ministry the same week. Western institutions can write papers on ASEAN centrality. CSIS Indonesia can convene the ministers who will vote on it. The distinction is not merely one of access; it is one of epistemic authority. An ORF analyst writing on the India-China border has analytical credibility that no Chatham House researcher writing on the same subject can match, because the ORF analyst's government reads the analysis and the government's decisions are the ones that matter. These institutions also understand the political constraints that outside analysts consistently misread. International relations scholarship, produced largely in Western universities, treats political constraint as a variable to be noted and then set aside in the pursuit of policy-optimal recommendations. The institutions in this guide treat it as the central fact of the analytical problem. CEBRI does not recommend what Brazil should do in an idealised world. It analyses what Brazil can do given the configuration of domestic politics, regional relationships and great power pressure that the government actually faces. That difference in analytical starting point produces work that is genuinely more useful to decision-makers than the work produced by institutions that do not share the constraint. ## The Verdict A young researcher from the Global South faces a genuine choice between the credential value of a Western institution and the proximity value of a regional one. The right answer is not universal. For a career aimed at international organisations or positions that require credibility with Western counterparts, the Western credential still matters. But for a career aimed at shaping the foreign policy of an India, a Brazil, a South Africa or an Indonesia, the proximity that these institutions provide is worth more than any name on a letterhead. The multilateral system is changing. BRICS has expanded. The African Union has adopted its own Agenda 2063 framework. ASEAN's political and security architecture was built by CSIS Indonesia, not by Georgetown. The next decade's most consequential policy decisions will be made in New Delhi, Brasília, Pretoria and Jakarta. The institutions that inform those decisions are the ones listed here — not the ones that appear at the top of the University of Pennsylvania's annual think tank rankings. Go where the decisions are made. That is where your research will matter. ⚠️ Institutional details, funding structures and research priorities change. If you spot an error or an outdated link in this piece, write to [editor@diplopolis.com](mailto:editor@diplopolis.com) and we will correct it promptly. This Dossier piece is free to read. Future Dossier pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Munir's Reward URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/munirs-reward-pakistan-bad-actor-designation-expired/ Last updated: 2026-06-26T23:24:02.000Z JD Vance arrived at the Bürgenstock Resort overlooking Lake Lucerne and paused before the cameras to make a joke. 'I have two very important people in my life,' [he told reporters](https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/how-asim-munir-made-pakistan-key-mediator-in-ending-us-iran-war/amp?ref=diplopolis.com). 'An Indian and a Pakistani. The Indian is my wife, and the Pakistani is Field Marshal Munir.' The assembled diplomats laughed. The joke landed precisely because of what it described: the army chief of a country Trump called nothing but 'lies and deceit' eight years ago had become Washington's indispensable man in the most consequential Middle East negotiation in a generation. [On January 1, 2018](https://justthenews.com/government/diplomacy/pakistan-gains-favor-trump-iran-mediator-history-raises-concerns-about-its?ref=diplopolis.com), Trump posted on X that the United States had 'foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies and deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools.' The post remains on the platform. Eight years later, [Trump told reporters](https://www.foxnews.com/politics/pakistan-americas-most-complicated-ally-why-trump-betting-again?ref=diplopolis.com) that Munir and Sharif had been 'absolutely great' and that the United States was 'grateful for Pakistan's efforts.' The gratitude was specific. Pakistan had produced something Washington had failed to produce in five decades: [direct talks between American and Iranian officials](https://www.cfr.org/articles/how-pakistan-became-the-iran-wars-unlikely-peace-negotiator?ref=diplopolis.com). What changed between 2018 and 2026 is not Pakistan. The institution that produced the bad actor designation is the same institution now occupying the mediator's chair. Field Marshal Asim Munir is a former ISI chief, the intelligence service that Western governments and their think tanks spent two decades documenting as the principal enabler of militant networks in Afghanistan and Kashmir. [Abdul Qadeer Khan](https://justthenews.com/government/diplomacy/pakistan-gains-favor-trump-iran-mediator-history-raises-concerns-about-its?ref=diplopolis.com), the architect of Pakistan's nuclear programme, admitted transferring centrifuge designs to Iran — the IAEA found records of a 1987 meeting between Khan and Iranian officials and evidence that Pakistani components reached Iran in 1994 or 1995\. The military establishment that sheltered and then pardoned Khan is the same establishment that Vance is now crediting with 'consistent efforts, perseverance and patience.' The question the joke at Bürgenstock did not answer is what Pakistan received in exchange. The [Stimson Center](https://www.stimson.org/2026/the-motives-and-constraints-behind-pakistans-mediation-between-the-us-and-iran/?ref=diplopolis.com) noted in April that Pakistan's domestic motives for the mediation were acute: it shares a 900-kilometre border with Iran, imports roughly 90 per cent of its oil through the Gulf, and has a Shia population of 15 to 20 per cent whose protests after the killing of Ayatollah Khamenei left at least 23 dead in street violence. Pakistan needed this war to end. The mediation was not charity. It was survival presented as statesmanship, and Washington accepted it as the latter because it needed the former. What it accepted alongside it was more complicated. In May, [CBS News reported](https://www.foxnews.com/politics/pakistan-americas-most-complicated-ally-why-trump-betting-again?ref=diplopolis.com), citing US officials, that Pakistan had allowed Iranian military aircraft including an RC-130 reconnaissance variant to park at Nur Khan airbase outside Rawalpindi during the April ceasefire period, potentially shielding them from American strikes. Pakistan denied it. Senator Lindsey Graham said he did not trust Pakistan 'as far as I can throw them' and questioned whether Washington should be looking for someone else to mediate. Trump said Pakistan had been 'great' the same day. The aircraft stayed where they were. [The CFR analysis](https://www.cfr.org/articles/how-pakistan-became-the-iran-wars-unlikely-peace-negotiator?ref=diplopolis.com) published in April noted the arc plainly: Pakistan's relations with the United States had turned sour within a decade of 9/11\. Its military was described in a 2011 *Atlantic* piece as the US 'ally from hell,' and Trump's first term was marked by the suspension of military aid. What restored the relationship was not reform. It was utility. Pakistan happened to have the right relationships, the right geography and the right incentives at the moment the United States needed a back channel to Tehran. The ISI's documented history of cultivating the very instability it was now being asked to resolve was not a disqualification. It was, in the logic of the transaction, exactly the qualification. Senator Graham's misgiving did not change the outcome. The Islamabad Memorandum was signed. Pakistan announced it on X before Washington did. Prime Minister Sharif said it was the greatest diplomatic achievement in Pakistan's history. Munir attended Bürgenstock alongside Vance and the Iranian delegation and received credit from both. The 2018 post about lies and deceit is still on the platform. Nobody is pointing at it. The bad actor designation expired the moment it arrived. Pakistan was useful. The Ledger, Pakistan, Iran, United States, Asim Munir, Islamabad Memorandum, AQ Khan, J.D. Vance ### The Distraction War URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-distraction-war-iran-ukraine-putin-june-deadline/ Last updated: 2026-06-25T13:50:38.000Z On June 16, [Trump met Zelenskyy at the G7 summit](https://www.courthousenews.com/at-g7-summit-trump-says-ukraine-war-has-no-impact-on-us/?ref=diplopolis.com) in Évian-les-Bains — their first face-to-face meeting in four months. The summit had been expected to mark a return of American attention to Ukraine, the war Trump once said he could end in 24 hours and had more recently told Zelenskyy he wanted settled by June. Instead, Trump told reporters: 'It has no impact on us, other than we sell weapons. We're thousands of miles away.' When asked whether he would now focus on Ukraine, he said he was focused on Iran. Later he added: 'This was the [war I thought](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/16/trump-zelenskyy-ukraine-war-iran-g7-summit.html?ref=diplopolis.com) was going to be the easiest to settle.' Four months earlier, on February 17 and 18, the [first trilateral talks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026%5FUnited%5FStates%E2%80%93Ukraine%E2%80%93Russia%5Fmeetings%5Fin%5FGeneva?ref=diplopolis.com) between American, Ukrainian and Russian delegations ended in Geneva without agreement on any key question — ceasefire modalities, territorial boundaries, the status of Zaporizhzhia, security guarantees. Trump had pressed Zelenskyy for a June deadline. A second round was scheduled for Abu Dhabi in early March. On February 28, the United States and Israel launched strikes on Iran. On March 3, the Kremlin cited the Iran war as the reason the Abu Dhabi talks could not proceed. The talks never took place. The June deadline that was supposed to end a war ran out without a replacement date, a resumed process or an explanation from the administration that had set it. The Iran war did many things. One of them was to give Vladimir Putin six months of relief from the American pressure that was supposed to be the mechanism for moving him toward a settlement he had no intention of reaching on his own. **The Architecture of Distraction** The Atlantic Council's [assessment from](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-security-guarantees-are-futile-without-increased-pressure-on-putin/?ref=diplopolis.com) January 2026 has been confirmed by every subsequent month. Putin is advancing in Ukraine. He retains the upper hand in a war of attrition that strongly favours Russia. Ukraine's military is suffering from increasingly acute manpower shortages, and the allies providing Kyiv with weapons are showing growing signs of weakening resolve. Putin remains confident of achieving a decisive breakthrough. Even if he did not believe that outright victory was within reach, he could not risk a compromise peace: the terms being offered — which would leave around 80 per cent of Ukraine beyond Kremlin control, free to pursue European integration — are terms that would threaten the stability of his own regime. He is not fighting for land. He is fighting for Ukraine itself, which is a different kind of war with a different kind of endpoint, and one that no June deadline was ever going to produce on its own. What the Iran war gave Putin was something he had not anticipated and could not have engineered: the simultaneous saturation of American diplomatic attention with a Middle East air campaign, an Iran deal, an Israeli-Lebanese ceasefire that was not holding, a NATO funding review and a domestic political environment that could not absorb another contested foreign commitment. The Kremlin's 'due to the war in Iran' statement on March 3, offered as the reason for standing down from Abu Dhabi, was not a pretext constructed to justify delay. It was an accurate description of a strategic window the Iran war had opened. An administration simultaneously managing a war in the Middle East and pressing for a peace deal in Eastern Europe does not have the concentration of leverage that either effort requires. Putin understood this before Washington acknowledged it. He waited, and the deadline passed, and he is now positioned to continue waiting. The June deadline mattered not as a firm commitment but as a signal of American seriousness. If Washington was pressing for June, it had to be prepared to impose consequences when June passed without agreement. The Iran war ensured no such consequences were forthcoming. The administration that set the deadline launched a war in the Middle East ten days before the next scheduled round of Ukraine talks, and never came back. The security guarantee problem beneath the Ukraine negotiations did not originate in February 2026\. It existed in January, when [35 countries assembled in Paris](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/6/ukraine-talks-in-paris-yield-significant-progress-on-security-pledges?ref=diplopolis.com) as the Coalition of the Willing and committed to deploying forces to Ukraine in the event of peace, establishing military hubs and providing long-term armament support. Britain and France committed to leading a reassurance force on the ground. The United States agreed to monitor any ceasefire with drones and satellites, stopping short of troops on the ground. The structure looked like progress. It contained the same circular flaw that would appear later in the Islamabad Memorandum's Lebanon clause: it committed to something the party whose agreement was required had already refused. Russia has categorically and publicly rejected any NATO country military presence on Ukrainian soil throughout the negotiations. The architecture the Coalition of the Willing built in Paris cannot be installed before a ceasefire. A ceasefire cannot be agreed before Russia accepts the guarantees. Russia has already refused the guarantees. The two requirements cancel each other. The 35 countries who assembled in Paris left having signed communiqués that depended on Russian consent they did not have and showed no sign of seeking honestly. **What Remains** [On May 9, Rubio said](https://www.npr.org/2026/05/09/nx-s1-5816478/trump-russia-ukraine-ceasefire?ref=diplopolis.com) that American mediation efforts had not led to a 'fruitful outcome' and had 'stagnated.' Hours later, Trump announced a three-day ceasefire for Victory Day, describing it as the 'beginning of the end.' The three days passed. Both sides reported violations. Nothing changed on the ground or in the negotiating position of either party. Rubio was being honest. Trump was being political. The gap between those two responses is the gap between what American diplomacy on Ukraine has actually produced since February and what the administration can bring itself to say it has produced. The front lines moved in Russia's favour through the period. Ukraine's manpower shortages deepened. European allies continued to extend security guarantee offers that Russia would not accept. The conditions that made a June agreement theoretically possible were precisely the conditions that eroded fastest during the months the administration was managing a different war. Trump at Évian told reporters: 'This was the war I thought was going to be the easiest to settle.' The remark encodes the failure precisely. Ukraine was not going to be the easiest. Putin's goal is not a ceasefire that leaves Ukraine sovereign. It is an outcome that removes Ukraine as an independent state from Russia's western border, a goal he has stated clearly and pursued consistently. No finite window of American pressure was going to move him from it, and the Iran war ensured that the window closed before any serious pressure was applied. When Trump met Zelenskyy in Évian, it was their first meeting in four months. The four months were not idle. They were the months that mattered most. Zelenskyy left without a commitment to renewed talks and without a replacement deadline. Putin left June having waited through the deadline he was told he had to meet, without having met it, and with the front lines in better condition than when Trump set the deadline in February. Putin did not start the Iran war. He did not need to. Someone else started it for him, and he watched the deadline pass from a comfortable distance. This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### The Lebanon Trap URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-lebanon-trap/ Last updated: 2026-06-26T23:30:09.000Z JD Vance cancelled his trip to Switzerland on Friday. The talks planned for Bürgenstock, designed to begin the 60-day nuclear negotiations mandated by the Islamabad Memorandum, were postponed without a new date. In southern Lebanon, [Israeli forces struck Qennarit](https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2026/6/20/us-envoy-headed-for-switzerland-israeli-strikes-on-lebanon-threaten-talks?ref=diplopolis.com) as a ceasefire was due to take effect, and [by the end of that day](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2647813/middle-east?ref=diplopolis.com) 47 people were dead — not in Iran, not in any theatre the memorandum Trump had signed at Versailles four days earlier was designed to govern, but in Lebanon, the country whose inclusion in that document has become the question on which everything else turns. The sequence has a quality that goes beyond the tactical. The American vice president cancels a flight. The first formal mechanism for implementing the deal suspends itself. Israeli aircraft operate in southern Lebanon at the exact hour a ceasefire was supposed to begin. The administration that brokered the memorandum issues no statement holding Israel to account, because the memorandum that mentions Lebanon was signed by parties who have no power to compel Israeli compliance, and those who do have that power signed a document that does not name them. [The Islamabad Memorandum's opening clause](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamabad%5FMemorandum?ref=diplopolis.com) calls for an immediate and permanent end to military operations on all fronts, explicitly including Lebanon. Israel did not sign it and was not present in Islamabad. The party whose military conduct in Lebanon will determine whether the ceasefire survives was not asked to make any commitment. This is the foundational problem with the architecture of the agreement, visible before the ink dried. The memorandum's problems do not come from unexpected complications or bad faith on Iran's part. It was designed with a missing signatory, and the missing signatory is the one whose behaviour the agreement most needs to constrain. [According to a senior Middle Eastern official](https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-us-war-talks-suspended-trump-mou-israel-lebanon-hezbollah-fighting/?ref=diplopolis.com) who spoke to CBS News, Israeli officials regarded the Lebanon clause not as a diplomatic achievement but as an American concession to Iranian demands — one made by Trump's own envoys while bypassing Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who had argued for months that keeping the Iran nuclear question and the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in separate diplomatic tracks was the only way to prevent Israel from acquiring an effective veto over any US-Iran agreement. Rubio was overruled. The envoys included Lebanon in the memorandum's opening clause because Iran would not sign without it. Iran got what it demanded in the text. Israel got to continue operating in Lebanon without having been asked to stop. The document committed the United States to a Lebanon ceasefire the United States does not control. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has left no interpretive room. The war ends in Lebanon too, he has stated, and any attack on Beirut will be treated by Tehran as a complete breach of the truce. Iran did not insert this condition as a late demand or a tactical manoeuvre. It is embedded in the first clause of the memorandum itself, the clause that defines what a ceasefire means. Iran signed a document that defines ceasefire as including Lebanon. Every Israeli strike in Lebanese territory is therefore, from Tehran's perspective, a ceasefire violation. On June 20, Iran made that argument concrete: [it closed the Strait of Hormuz again](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog-june-19-2026/?ref=diplopolis.com), citing Israeli strikes in Lebanon as a direct breach of the deal. The United States denied the closure was taking effect. The architecture that produced that dispute is the memorandum's first clause. What makes this a structural problem rather than a political one is that Iran cannot relent on Lebanon without undermining the entire logic of its position. Tehran entered the memorandum on the basis that Lebanon was included. To accept Israeli strikes while continuing to negotiate on nuclear terms would be to acknowledge that the memorandum's first clause means something different to Israel than it does to Iran, and to accept that discrepancy without consequence. This Tehran will not do. The logic is not merely political — it is written into the document that produced the 60-day clock now running. [Netanyahu and his government have stated explicitly](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog-june-19-2026/?ref=diplopolis.com) that Israel does not consider itself bound by the Lebanon provisions of the memorandum. Netanyahu himself has been direct: Israel has goals to complete in Lebanon, and will pursue them through diplomacy if possible, through military operations if not. An intelligence assessment circulating in Washington found his calculations derive from a settled view of Hezbollah as an existential threat that cannot be deferred to accommodate American diplomatic timelines. Netanyahu has concluded, on the basis of considerable experience, that Washington will absorb the diplomatic cost of Israeli operations in Lebanon rather than impose the consequences that would actually change the calculation. The pattern that supports that conclusion is documented. [Israel bombed Beirut twice](https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-us-war-talks-suspended-trump-mou-israel-lebanon-hezbollah-fighting/?ref=diplopolis.com) during the US-Iran negotiations, nearly derailing talks on each occasion. The ceasefire was announced. Strikes continued. Vance cancelled his flight. Talks were postponed. Each time, negotiations resumed. Each time, Washington reacted with concern and stopped short of consequences. Netanyahu's calculation that he can continue operating in Lebanon without breaking the American relationship is not irrational. It has been confirmed repeatedly by American conduct since February 28. [Vance told Time this week](https://time.com/article/2026/06/18/JD-Vance-Israel-Iran-Deal-Donald-Trump-Lebanon/?ref=diplopolis.com) that Israel needs to 'wake up and smell the reality.' He noted that two-thirds of Israel's defence weapons are built and paid for by Americans. The implication was the clearest public acknowledgement by a senior American official that leverage exists and is not being used. Trump, asked directly whether he had spoken to Netanyahu about a Lebanon ceasefire, called it 'a little icing on the cake' and declined to confirm a direct conversation. These two responses, taken together, describe the American position precisely: the vice president names the leverage; the president minimises the commitment the vice president's government made in writing four days earlier; the bombing continues. What this reveals is something more structural than a failure of nerve. The domestic political constraints that prevent meaningful American pressure on Israel now have a concrete consequence: they make it impossible for the United States to honour the first clause of an agreement it signed. Washington cannot discipline Israel on Lebanon. The memorandum's first clause depends on Washington disciplining Israel on Lebanon. [The talks that resumed in Bürgenstock](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/us-iran-talks-postponed-vance-cancels-trip-israel-strikes-lebanon-rcna350830?ref=diplopolis.com) ran for 80 minutes and did not address the nuclear programme. The first round of the 60-day technical negotiations that are supposed to close a gap neither side has moved since before the war — Iran's right to enrich uranium against Trump's demand for full surrender of enrichment — was consumed entirely by the question of Lebanon and MOU implementation. That is where the 60-day clock stands after its first week: the central question untouched, the opening clause contested, and Iran having already invoked Lebanese strikes as grounds to close the strait it was required to reopen. If those operations continue — and there is no mechanism currently in place to stop them — Iran holds the legal and political justification to declare the ceasefire broken and leave the negotiations. Araghchi has said this publicly. The architecture of the memorandum makes it true: Lebanon is in the first clause, Israel is absent from the signatories, and the clock started when Trump signed at Versailles. The question circulating in Washington, in Tehran and among the diplomats preparing for the next round is whether the Islamabad Memorandum can survive. The more precise question is whether the people who drafted its first clause believed it could. They knew Israel had not signed. They knew Iran's compliance depended on a Lebanon ceasefire that no signatory could enforce. They signed it anyway, at Versailles, with ceremony. Either they believed that American pressure on Israel would materialise in time, or they believed that signing any agreement was worth more than the agreement's capacity to hold. One of those beliefs will shortly be tested. The other already has been. ### Moving Faster Than Us URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/moving-faster-than-us-ebola-drc-outbreak-usaid-cuts-who-2026/ Last updated: 2026-06-25T06:41:32.000Z Vanisa Anifa was six months old. She died of Ebola in Bunia, in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, and was buried on June 19 at the Bigo Cemetery. She appears in the photographs as a small bundle, wrapped in cloth, carried by relatives through a graveyard filling faster than anyone anticipated. She is one of [277 people confirmed dead](https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/ebola-outbreak-democratic-republic-congo-and-uganda?ref=diplopolis.com) in an outbreak declared on May 15\. The outbreak has now produced 1,094 confirmed cases in 38 days. France confirmed its first imported case yesterday — a doctor who had been in the DRC on a humanitarian mission. The virus has left Africa. The figures require a moment. This is the [third largest Ebola outbreak in recorded history](https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/ebola/ebola-case-count-mounts-outbreak-hits-1-month-mark?ref=diplopolis.com), surpassed only by the 2014 to 2016 West Africa outbreak that killed more than 11,000 people across multiple countries. It is also, by the WHO's own assessment, the fastest-spreading first month of any Ebola outbreak ever recorded. The 2014 outbreak took 78 days to reach 250 deaths. This one took 37\. The causative agent is the Bundibugyo strain of the virus — the rarest of the major Ebola types, last seen in 2012, and covered by [no approved vaccine and no approved treatment](https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/06/1167786?ref=diplopolis.com). Both existing Ebola vaccines target the Zaire strain. Neither works for Bundibugyo. Health workers in a conflict zone, treating patients in a disease with a 25 per cent case fatality rate, have no pharmacological tools and no ability to vaccinate the exposed. Dr Abdirahman Mahamud, Director of Health Emergency Alert and Response Operations at the WHO, returned last week from a month in the DRC. He said six words that carry everything: 'The outbreak is moving faster than us.' It is moving faster in part because it was not caught in time. Officials do not know when the outbreak started. They do not know who patient zero is. Virus circulating in the community months before the May 15 declaration is the prevailing hypothesis — which means the outbreak was almost certainly present in February and March, the precise months when the surveillance infrastructure designed to detect it was being defunded. The [International Rescue Committee confirmed](https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/22/africa/ebola-us-aid-cuts-drc-uganda-intl?ref=diplopolis.com) that the Trump administration's cuts in March 2025 prompted a reduction in disease surveillance systems in the epicentre. Before those cuts, the IRC had funded outbreak preparedness activities across eastern DRC — hand-washing stations, isolation facilities, contact tracing networks, community health worker training. That funding ended in March 2025\. 'Everything stalled while the outbreak continued,' a former USAID official told CNN. A year later, almost everyone on the USAID team that managed the previous DRC Ebola outbreak has been fired. The US withdrew from the WHO in January 2025\. The WHO, deprived of its largest donor — which historically contributed 15 per cent of its total budget and 25 per cent of its health emergency programme — cut its own budget by $1 billion, a 21 per cent reduction. Its 10 major programme divisions have been consolidated to three. The agency that is supposed to coordinate the global response to exactly this kind of outbreak is running on a budget cut by the country that triggered this outbreak's delayed detection by defunding the surveillance system that would have found it first. Contact tracing is the core instrument available when no vaccine exists. [Only 55 per cent of exposed contacts](https://www.cdc.gov/ebola/situation-summary/index.html?ref=diplopolis.com) have been located and monitored. More than 35,000 people who came into contact with confirmed cases remain untraced. The gap exists partly because Allied Democratic Force fighters, an armed group affiliated with Islamic State, have cut off access to entire villages in Ituri Province, where the outbreak is worst. Partly because treatment centres have been attacked and burned by communities that distrust health authorities — on May 23, 18 suspected patients escaped a treatment centre in Mongbwalu after residents attacked and set it alight. Partly because people are avoiding hospitals, choosing to die at home rather than enter facilities they associate with isolation and death. 'Everyday life,' the International Organisation for Migration said, 'has become fraught with risk.' Three million children are in the outbreak zone. Two million displaced people — including 320,000 refugees — live in areas of active risk. [Uganda has confirmed local transmission](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ebola-hantavirus-outbreak-trump-health-agency-cuts/?ref=diplopolis.com) in Kampala, its capital. Germany received a medically evacuated American case earlier this month. France confirmed its case yesterday. The outbreak that began in a remote province of eastern DRC has now reached four countries and two continents. The global health architecture built after 2014 was designed for precisely this scenario — a fast-moving haemorrhagic fever in a conflict zone with a resistant community and limited state capacity. The surveillance systems that would have detected it earlier were cut in March 2025\. The agency that managed the previous outbreak's response has been effectively dissolved. The international body that coordinates global emergency response had its budget slashed. The country that provided the backbone of all three announced it was leaving. Vanisa Anifa was six months old. The outbreak was moving faster than the people trying to stop it before she was born. ### What the Frame Leaves Out URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/great-power-diplomacy-wess-mitchell-review/ Last updated: 2026-06-24T11:00:52.000Z In December 1971, Henry Kissinger was at the peak of his powers. The secret opening to China was complete. The triangular diplomacy that would reshape the Cold War was already in motion. Washington had repositioned itself between Beijing and Moscow with a strategic elegance that textbooks would later struggle to adequately describe. By any measure of great power statecraft, it was a masterclass. In Dhaka, meanwhile, the Pakistani army was [conducting what independent estimates would later place](https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/south-asia/2013-04-05/blood-telegram-nixons-white-house-and-forgotten-genocide?ref=diplopolis.com) among the worst atrocities of the twentieth century. Hundreds of thousands dead. Ten million refugees flooding across the border into India. A genocide proceeding with American knowledge and American acquiescence, because the channel to Beijing ran through Islamabad, and Islamabad's cooperation had a price. The diplomacy was brilliant. The cost was paid by people who were not invited to the table. This tension sits at the heart of A. Wess Mitchell's serious and important book about the history and practice of great power statecraft. [*Great Power Diplomacy*](https://amzn.to/4wcOGTT?ref=diplopolis.com) is not a manual. Mitchell is too historically serious for that. It is an argument: that diplomacy is a learnable discipline, that states and empires have historically used limited means to outmanoeuvre stronger rivals, and that the Western world has forgotten this art at precisely the moment it most needs to recover it. That argument is largely correct. It is also incomplete in ways that matter. Begin with what Mitchell gets right, because he gets the important things right. The book moves through long history — from Attila and Byzantium through Richelieu, Metternich and Bismarck to Nixon and Kissinger — to show diplomacy not as soft talk before hard power begins but as one of power's most sophisticated forms. The statesman who can convert geography, timing, alliance management and strategic patience into advantage without firing a shot is not avoiding the real business of international politics. He is conducting it at its highest level. That corrective is valuable, because the lazy view of diplomacy as mere decoration around military and economic power has caused real damage to states that abandoned the discipline. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/06/What-the-Frame-Leaves-Out_BC.png) **A review of* [Great Power Diplomacy: The Skill of Statecraft from Attila the Hun to Kissinger](https://amzn.to/4uRxJ04?ref=diplopolis.com) **by A. Wess Mitchell* Mitchell also understands something most commentary misses: great diplomacy is not the application of universal technique. It is the reading of specific circumstances. The cases he examines succeed not because their protagonists followed a formula but because they resisted the wrong formula at the right moment. Bismarck's restraint after 1871, deliberately not extracting maximum advantage from a defeated France, was not weakness. It was the strategic imagination to see that a humiliated France would become a permanent revanchist threat. That kind of judgement cannot be reduced to a lesson plan. Mitchell knows this, and the book is stronger for knowing it. Yet the danger of building an argument around successful diplomatic episodes is that statecraft begins to look more teachable than it is. Read a certain way, the book's message becomes: study Richelieu, recover Metternich, relearn Kissinger. That is partly right. But it risks turning statecraft into pattern recognition, history into a shelf of usable techniques. The deeper lesson, which Mitchell approaches but does not fully state, is that great diplomacy depends precisely on knowing which historical analogy does not apply. Timing, restraint and strategic imagination are not skills added to knowledge. They are the capacity to resist the wrong knowledge at the wrong moment. States may relearn the gestures of statecraft before they recover their judgement. Mitchell warns against diplomatic amnesia. He is less alert to the danger of diplomatic mimicry. The book's most significant limitation is not methodological. It is moral. And 1971 exposes it with clarity. From Washington and Beijing, the triangular diplomacy of that year can be told as a masterpiece: Nixon and Kissinger using the China opening to alter the Cold War balance, pressure the Soviet Union and transform the strategic geometry of an entire era. In Mitchell's kind of framework, that is precisely the sort of manoeuvre that matters: timing, secrecy, geopolitical imagination, the use of one rivalry to reshape another. But from Dhaka and New Delhi, the same moment looks different. It is not a masterclass. It is also the story of a genocide proceeding with great power knowledge and great power acquiescence, a refugee catastrophe that arrived at India's border not as a diplomatic variable but as a human emergency, and a liberation struggle whose outcome Washington opposed because it complicated a more important game being played elsewhere. That absence matters because it tests the moral completeness of the framework. Great power diplomacy often looks most elegant when the victims are kept outside the frame. The smaller power, the occupied people, the refugee, the breakaway nation forced into history by the decisions of larger states: these are not decorative details. They are the human terrain on which great power diplomacy operates. A theory of statecraft that admires strategic dexterity without adequately accounting for what that dexterity costs when smaller peoples become variables in someone else's design is incomplete in a way that the people of Dhaka would recognise immediately. Mitchell's framework does, however, travel usefully when applied to India's own diplomatic performance. India is a state with every raw material of statecraft: location, scale, market weight, military capacity, civilisational depth, diaspora reach and a long diplomatic tradition. Yet too much of its recent foreign policy confuses visibility with influence. India wants recognition as a rising pole, a Vishwaguru (Sanskrit for teacher of the world), a voice of the Global South. But statecraft is not the announcement of status. It is the accumulation of leverage. Mitchell's standard asks a simple and devastating question of Indian foreign policy: what did this summit, this visit, this slogan, this alignment, this abstention actually produce? Mitchell gives India a useful standard. He does not give the full explanation for why India so often falls short of it. India is not a classical European great power operating in a familiar balance-of-power theatre. It is a civilisational state, a postcolonial democracy, a developmental society, a nuclear power and a China-facing security actor simultaneously. Its diplomacy must manage not only rivals but memory, poverty, status anxiety and domestic political performance. Mitchell shows what statecraft requires. India shows what happens when a state wants the prestige of great power diplomacy before it has mastered the discipline of it. [*Great Power Diplomacy*](https://amzn.to/4wcOGTT?ref=diplopolis.com) is essential reading for anyone trying to understand why the world's most consequential decisions get made as they do, and why so many states make them so badly. Read it for the historical intelligence and the standard it sets. Then hold it against 1971, and ask yourself whether a theory of statecraft that cannot fully account for Dhaka has accounted for enough. This Book Review is free to read. Future Book Reviews will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Horrifically Lopsided URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/horrifically-lopsided-iran-deal-full-text-islamabad-memorandum/ Last updated: 2026-06-24T05:04:08.000Z The full text of the [Islamabad Memorandum](https://www.npr.org/2026/06/18/nx-s1-5863027/us-iran-trump-memorandum-of-understanding-full-text?ref=diplopolis.com) is now public. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies, [which reviewed it yesterday](https://www.csis.org/analysis/iran-won-negotiation-even-though-it-lost-war?ref=diplopolis.com), chose its words with precision: 'The deal itself is horrifically lopsided. Iran gets most of what it wants, and it gets it up front — before negotiations on a final deal even start. The United States gets very little. Israel gets even less.' CSIS does not usually say things like that. When it does, the text supports it. [The fourteen-point memorandum](https://time.com/article/2026/06/17/us-iran-peace-deal-agreement-leaked-draft-text/?ref=diplopolis.com) gives Iran the immediate end of the US naval blockade, with the American pullback required to be complete within 30 days. Iranian oil starts flowing. Cash starts flowing. An estimated [$24 billion in frozen Iranian funds](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/deal-reached-united-states-iran-war-rcna350039?ref=diplopolis.com) are to be unfrozen during the 60-day window, half before the final negotiations even begin. Iran also wins a pledge of American noninterference in its internal affairs. The country that fought a war partly described as creating conditions for regime change has now signed a document promising not to pursue it. What does the text not contain? [Iran's ballistic missile programme](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamabad%5FMemorandum?ref=diplopolis.com) is not mentioned. Its proxy network — Hezbollah, the armed factions across Iraq and Syria, the Houthis — is not mentioned. The 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 per cent, which was described in April as a non-negotiable element of any deal, stays in Iran; the text calls only for its dilution to reactor grade following a final agreement that has not been negotiated. The final agreement, to be reached within 60 days, is where every hard question now lives. The war that produced this text cost between $34 billion and $42 billion, according to CSIS's revised estimate. It killed more than 7,000 people. It closed the Strait of Hormuz, disrupted global energy markets, strained every American alliance in Europe and the Middle East, and produced a memorandum of understanding that a mainstream Washington think tank calls horrifically lopsided on the morning the full text becomes public. CSIS notes one piece of good news: both Washington and Tehran are publicly describing the same deal. Previous purported agreements in this conflict featured wildly different accounts of what had supposedly been settled — a classic tactic for backing an opponent into a corner by claiming public agreement they never actually made. This time, both sides agree on what they agreed to. That is a genuine signal that both sides want to be done with the fighting. CSIS calls it 'the only good news.' The deal has 'trap doors through which Iran can escape, or through which the whole thing can fall apart,' the CSIS analysis notes. The 60-day window for nuclear talks begins with both sides holding positions they have held since before the war: Iran insisting on its right to enrich uranium, America insisting on full surrender of enrichment. Those positions did not move during four months of bombing. The text does not explain how 60 days of diplomacy will close the gap that decades of diplomacy could not. What the text confirms is simpler. Iran receives money before it makes commitments. The commitments it makes are to talks, not to outcomes. The issues that were the stated reason for the war are deferred to a future agreement. Washington spent between $34 and $42 billion to arrive at an interim document that CSIS calls horrifically lopsided. The text is public now. Anyone can read it. ### What Guterres Saw URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/what-guterres-saw/ Last updated: 2026-06-23T10:57:33.000Z António Guterres [visited Port-au-Prince](https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/06/1167732?ref=diplopolis.com) on June 16\. His convoy sped past a capital that no longer belongs to its government — gutted car dealerships, abandoned homes, concrete walls pockmarked with bullet holes. Graffiti on a crumbling wall read: 'Down with Viv Ansanm, long live the police.' Viv Ansanm is the gang federation that controls an estimated 70 to 90 per cent of Port-au-Prince. The state controls what is left. 'What I saw will not leave me,' Guterres said at the end of his visit. 'Each day is a [fight to survive](https://www.npr.org/2026/06/17/g-s1-128536/un-chief-visits-haiti?ref=diplopolis.com).' He said something else. 'The biggest disgrace is indifference, the indifference of a world that has looked away.' The world was in Switzerland last week. Vance was meeting Iranian officials. Trump was posting on Truth Social. Oil markets were tracking the MOU. The cameras were pointed at the Bürgenstock Resort. [New UN statistics show Haiti has recorded 2,300 dead](https://www.npr.org/2026/06/17/g-s1-128536/un-chief-visits-haiti?ref=diplopolis.com) since January, 100 kidnapped and 1.5 million displaced. Among those kidnapped is James Boyard, cabinet director of the Defence Ministry, taken from one of the few areas of the capital still considered relatively safe. A country of nearly 12 million people has not had a president since Jovenel Moïse was shot dead in his bedroom in July 2021\. It has had no elections since 2016 and no functioning parliament since 2019. Guterres visited a makeshift shelter in a former school. He sat in a hot classroom with six women who told him they had no privacy even to shower. He listened to a man beat the metal siding of the building and shout: 'We want to go back home.' Clifford Lala is 31\. He fled his community, Solino, when gangs overran it. He told Guterres his neighbourhood was not ready for him to return. 'These families did not ask for my sympathy,' Guterres said. 'They are waiting for action.' The action on offer is the Gang Suppression Force — a UN Security Council-backed operation deploying Kenyan-led troops to take the fight directly to Viv Ansanm and the 25 other armed groups that between them [have fractured the Haitian state](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/haitis-troubled-path-development?ref=diplopolis.com). Fewer than 1,000 troops have deployed so far, from Jamaica, Chad, El Salvador and Guatemala. The force is underfunded, understaffed and not yet operational. Human Rights Watch, in a letter published the day before Guterres arrived, called for a full-fledged UN mission and said that even a fully staffed, fully resourced security operation would not be enough on its own. The gang-suppression force is a military response to a political collapse. Those are not the same problem. Haiti's collapse is not a mystery. It is the accumulated result of every decision the international community made for it over three decades and then abandoned. The 2010 earthquake killed more than 200,000 people. Billions in international aid followed. Most of it did not reach the people it was promised to. Reconstruction was mismanaged. Debt accumulated. When the UN's own stabilisation mission departed in 2017 after 13 years, it left behind a cholera outbreak it had introduced, a political system no stronger than the one it found, and a gang ecosystem that had expanded to fill every space the state vacated. The gangs that control Port-au-Prince today were armed and empowered by the political elite that the international community recognised and worked with throughout those thirteen years. Guterres called indifference the biggest disgrace. He is right. He is also the head of the institution that spent thirteen years in Haiti and left it in this condition. That is not a reason to look away again. It is a reason to look more honestly at what looking away actually costs. Then Guterres left. The cameras followed him to the airport. The world went back to watching the Iran deal. Haiti is still there — twelve million people, no president, no parliament, no elections since 2016 and gangs controlling most of the capital. Clifford Lala is still at the shelter. Solino is not ready for him to go home. --- **SEO Title:** What Guterres Saw: Haiti's 2,300 Dead and the Indifference of a World Watching Switzerland | DiploPolis **Meta Description:** Guterres visited Port-au-Prince as gangs control 90% of the capital, 2,300 people have been killed this year and 1.5 million are displaced. He called indifference the biggest disgrace. Then he left. **Focus Keyword:** Haiti gang violence Guterres UN 2026 **Secondary Keywords:** Haiti Viv Ansanm gang control Port-au-Prince · Guterres Haiti visit June 2026 · Haiti Gang Suppression Force · James Boyard kidnapped Haiti · Haiti no president elections 2026 · Haiti humanitarian crisis Global South **URL Slug:** what-guterres-saw-haiti-gang-violence-2026 **Tags:** The Ledger, Haiti, United Nations, Global South, Gang Violence, Humanitarian Crisis, Accountability, António Guterres, Viv Ansanm, Americas **Schema:** NewsArticle **Internal Links:** Link to The Gaza Template or What Iran Won at first reference to Switzerland and the Iran deal — the contrast between what the world was watching and what it was ignoring is the spine of this piece, and both of those pieces documented what the world was watching. One internal link, placed precisely, earns its keep here without feeling mechanical. **300-Character Excerpt:** Guterres visited Port-au-Prince as gangs control 90% of the capital and 2,300 Haitians have been killed this year. He called indifference the biggest disgrace. Then he left. The cameras followed him to the airport. Haiti is still there. **Social — Twitter/X Option One:** 'The biggest disgrace is indifference, the indifference of a world that has looked away.' Guterres said this in Port-au-Prince. Then he left. New Ledger — diplopolis.com **Social — Twitter/X Option Two:** 2,300 dead. 100 kidnapped. 1.5 million displaced. The world was in Switzerland watching the Iran deal. Haiti's cabinet minister was taken in broad daylight. Guterres visited, said what he saw would not leave him, and boarded his plane. New on DiploPolis — diplopolis.com **Social — LinkedIn:** The world was watching Switzerland last week. Vance was meeting Iranian officials. Oil markets were tracking the MOU. Haiti had 2,300 dead since January, 100 kidnapped, 1.5 million displaced and a cabinet minister abducted in broad daylight from one of the few safe areas left in Port-au-Prince. Guterres visited on June 16\. He called indifference the biggest disgrace. He is also the head of the institution that spent thirteen years in Haiti and left it in this condition. New Ledger on DiploPolis: What Guterres Saw. Link in comments. ### Not Bound URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/not-bound-israel-islamabad-memorandum-lebanon-ceasefire/ Last updated: 2026-06-22T04:30:53.000Z Forty-seven people in Lebanon were dead by Friday morning, according to the Lebanese health ministry, killed in Israeli airstrikes that [continued](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2647813/middle-east?ref=diplopolis.com) into the very hour a new ceasefire was due to begin. By Saturday, Israeli strikes had [killed dozens more](https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2026/6/20/us-envoy-headed-for-switzerland-israeli-strikes-on-lebanon-threaten-talks?ref=diplopolis.com), including in the southern village of Qennarit, even as Washington and Tehran prepared to send envoys to Switzerland to discuss the deal that was supposed to end exactly this. Israel was never going to be at that table. It has said so itself. The [Islamabad Memorandum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamabad%5FMemorandum?ref=diplopolis.com) that Donald Trump signed in Versailles last Wednesday calls for an immediate and permanent end to military operations on all fronts, Lebanon included. Israel is not a signatory. A senior Middle Eastern official told CBS News that Israeli officials [viewed the inclusion](https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-us-war-talks-suspended-trump-mou-israel-lebanon-hezbollah-fighting/?ref=diplopolis.com) of Lebanon in the memorandum as a concession to Iran made by Trump's own envoys, bypassing efforts by Secretary of State Marco Rubio to keep the Iran war and the Israel-Hezbollah conflict diplomatically separate. Netanyahu's government has said outright that Israel does not consider itself bound by the memorandum's Lebanon provisions. So Israel kept fighting. A ceasefire with Hezbollah was announced Friday at four in the afternoon, brokered by the United States and Qatar with Iranian backing. Israeli strikes were reported in southern Lebanon at the exact moment the truce was meant to take hold. By the time the guns paused, the Lebanese health ministry's emergency operations centre said rescue teams could not reach the wounded for hours, because the strikes had not actually stopped. The fighting was serious enough to derail the diplomacy built around it. Friday's planned talks in Bürgenstock [were postponed](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/us-iran-talks-postponed-vance-cancels-trip-israel-strikes-lebanon-rcna350830?ref=diplopolis.com), and JD Vance cancelled his trip to Switzerland after the new Israeli strikes in Lebanon cast doubt on the entire framework. Trump told NBC News he had personally asked Israel to agree to the ceasefire, calling it 'a little icing on the cake.' He would not say whether he had spoken to Netanyahu directly. Hezbollah's position has not moved. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has said Iran will treat any attack on Beirut as a complete breach of the truce, and that the war will not end on Iran's terms until it also ends in Lebanon. Iran has made Lebanon a precondition of its own compliance with the memorandum it just signed. Israel has made clear it considers Lebanon outside that document's reach entirely. Two parties to the same negotiation, holding two incompatible positions about the same clause, and neither one is wrong about what the document actually says, because Israel never agreed to be bound by it in the first place. Here is what the memorandum actually achieved on the question of Lebanon: nothing enforceable. Trump signed a document that names a country as a party to peace without that country's consent. Israel did not break a promise this week, because it never made one. The promise was made on its behalf, by an administration that does not control it, in a deal that requires Israel's restraint without requiring Israel's signature. Talks are now expected to resume in the coming days. Pakistan and Qatar will mediate. American and Iranian officials will sit at the table to discuss compliance with a memorandum whose central Lebanon clause is being violated, in real time, by the one government whose actions actually determine whether it holds. They will negotiate the terms of a peace that the country doing the bombing was never asked to accept. ### Languages That Actually Matter for an International Relations Career — Ranked Honestly URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/languages-international-relations-career-ranked/ Last updated: 2026-06-19T20:10:46.000Z Every careers adviser says the same thing: learn a language. Almost none of them say which one, for what job, or how long it will actually take to pay off. A student who spends three years reaching fluency in Mandarin for a UN career discovers, too late, that the UN's two working languages are English and French, and that Mandarin only matters there for a small number of language-specific posts. A student who spends a year on conversational French for a private sector geopolitical risk career discovers that the premium roles want Arabic, Mandarin or Russian, and that French alone barely moves the needle. The advice was not wrong. It was just never specific enough to be useful. The honest answer to 'which language should I learn' is always conditional on which of the twelve career tracks in international relations a student is actually building toward. This guide ranks seven languages against those tracks, using verifiable hiring data rather than received wisdom, so that the years a student spends on a language are years spent on the right one. ## Why the Conventional Advice Fails Most language advice for IR students draws on a single, flawed assumption: that international relations is one career with one set of requirements. It is not. A foreign service officer, a UN professional, a geopolitical risk analyst and an international lawyer face entirely different language economies, with different official requirements, different salary premiums and different timelines to competence. Treating them as interchangeable wastes exactly the years a serious career plan cannot afford to waste. The seven languages assessed here are French, Arabic, Mandarin Chinese, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian and Swahili. Each is ranked against the career tracks it actually serves, with the evidence behind the ranking made explicit, so a reader can see precisely why a given language earns its place rather than simply being told to trust the recommendation. ## French — The Quiet Default of Multilateral Diplomacy French remains, by a wide margin, the most structurally embedded language in international affairs. It is one of two working languages of the [United Nations Secretariat](https://www.un.org/sg/en/multilingualism/index.shtml?ref=diplopolis.com), alongside English, which means excellent command of French alone, without English, is sufficient to work for the UN. It is an official language of the African Union, the European Union, NATO, the International Olympic Committee and the majority of international courts and tribunals, including the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice, both of which conduct significant proceedings in French. What conventional advice gets wrong about French is the assumption that it matters mainly for European postings. Its real value lies in francophone Africa, which is the fastest-growing French-speaking region in the world and home to roughly half of all African Union member states. A candidate targeting African Union careers, West African regional diplomacy, or UN field postings across the Sahel and Central Africa needs French considerably more than a candidate targeting a desk job in New York. French also carries a structural advantage inside the UN system that few students understand before they enter the workforce: candidates assessed for UN language posts in one official language are typically required to add a second official language after joining, and French combined with English remains the strongest baseline combination across UN duty stations. *Time investment: 12 to 18 months to working proficiency for most learners, faster for those with prior Romance language exposure.* *Best for: Diplomacy and foreign service, international organisations, multilateral development finance roles based in francophone regions, and international law involving the ICJ or ICC.* ## Arabic — The Underrated Powerhouse Arabic is consistently the most undersupplied language relative to its demand across international affairs. It is an official UN language, spoken by [over 400 million people](https://nativespeakers.co/blog/most-in-demand-languages-2025?ref=diplopolis.com) across one of the wealthiest and most geopolitically consequential regions in the world, and it commands a measurable salary premium that almost no other language on this list matches. In private sector intelligence work, language capability in Arabic, Mandarin, Farsi or Russian adds 10 to 15 per cent above [baseline salary for roles](https://www.talent-gurus.com/geopolitical-risk-analyst?ref=diplopolis.com) requiring primary source intelligence analysis, a premium documented specifically in the executive protection and family office security sector, where the demand for this capability is most acute and best measured. The pattern is consistent with what mainstream geopolitical risk consultancies report anecdotally: Arabic sits at the top of the list precisely because so few Western-trained analysts have genuine fluency in it. Carnegie's Junior Fellows Programme requires strong Arabic reading fluency specifically for its Middle East programme placements, and the demand pattern repeats across think tanks, intelligence-adjacent roles and energy sector political risk work. The opportunity here is specific and underused. A candidate from South Asia or the Gulf diaspora who already has Arabic exposure, or who is willing to invest the years required to build genuine fluency, faces less competition for Middle East-focused roles than a French or Spanish speaker faces for roles in their respective regions, simply because fewer candidates clear the fluency bar. *Time investment: Two to three years to professional working proficiency for most learners, given Arabic's script and grammatical distance from English.* *Best for: Geopolitical risk consulting, think tanks and policy research with a Middle East focus, international law involving energy and trade disputes, and diplomacy or foreign service postings across the Gulf and North Africa.* ## Mandarin Chinese — High Cost, High and Narrow Return Mandarin is the language most frequently recommended by generic career advice and the one whose actual return is most frequently overstated for IR students specifically. It is genuinely valuable, but the value is concentrated in a narrower set of roles than the conventional advice suggests, and the time cost to reach useful fluency is the highest of any language on this list. For geopolitical risk and political risk consulting roles specifically focused on China, Mandarin is close to a hard requirement. Job listings for China [country risk analyst](https://www.indeed.com/q-china-country-risk-analyst-jobs.html?ref=diplopolis.com) positions explicitly require fluency in Mandarin alongside international relations or economics training, and Singapore-based geopolitical analyst roles covering the Asia-Pacific region list Mandarin as a named required skill far more often than any other language. Schwarzman Scholars, the most prestigious China-focused fellowship in the field, places its entire cohort at Tsinghua University in Beijing specifically to build this fluency in scholars who will go on to shape China-related policy and business decisions. What conventional advice omits: Mandarin is close to useless for UN headquarters careers, where it remains a working language in only a narrow set of specialist posts, and it adds little value for diplomacy careers outside a small number of China-specific postings. The time required to reach genuine professional fluency, typically two to three years of sustained study given the tonal system and character-based writing, is a serious commitment that only pays off if the career track specifically involves China. *Time investment: Two to three years for professional working fluency, among the highest of any language assessed here.* *Best for: Geopolitical risk consulting with an Asia-Pacific or China focus, international business and corporate affairs with China exposure, and academic or think tank careers specifically focused on China policy.* ## Spanish — Broad Utility, Modest Premium Spanish is the most broadly useful language on this list and the one that delivers the least career-specific premium. It is spoken across Latin America, much of the Caribbean and a significant population within the United States, which makes it valuable for almost any career track that touches the Western Hemisphere. It is an official UN language, widely used across the Organization of American States and Inter-American institutions, and a practical asset for development finance work at the Inter-American Development Bank. What Spanish does not offer is the salary premium that Arabic, Mandarin or Russian provide in geopolitical risk consulting. Spanish, Mandarin, Arabic, German and French remain the [most sought-after languages](https://preply.com/en/blog/b2b-how-learning-a-second-language-helps-with-jobs?ref=diplopolis.com) in the business world generally, but within IR specifically, Spanish's wide availability among candidates means it functions more as a baseline expectation than a differentiator. A candidate competing for a Latin America-focused role without Spanish is at a real disadvantage; a candidate with Spanish is simply meeting the entry requirement, not exceeding it. *Time investment: Six to twelve months to working proficiency for most learners, the fastest timeline on this list.* *Best for: Diplomacy and development careers with a Latin America focus, multilateral development finance at regional banks, and international trade policy involving Latin American markets.* ## Portuguese — The Most Undervalued Language on This List Portuguese deserves more attention than almost any IR career guide gives it, and the reasoning is specific rather than sentimental. Brazil is the dominant economic and diplomatic power in South America and an increasingly significant voice in BRICS and Global South multilateral coalitions. Portuguese is also the official language of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, placing it directly inside the lusophone African development corridor that multilateral development banks and Chinese and Gulf state investment are increasingly focused on. Political risk [recruiters note explicitly](https://lawsonchase.com/how-to-get-a-job-in-political-risk/?ref=diplopolis.com) that Spanish and Portuguese speakers are often encouraged to specialise in Latin America to make use of their research and communication ability in the local dialect, and that a strong language portfolio commands a premium price in the market. For a candidate targeting Brazil's CACD diplomatic examination track, lusophone African development work, or geopolitical risk coverage of the Brazil-Africa-Gulf investment corridor, Portuguese is a genuine differentiator precisely because so few non-native IR professionals invest in it. *Time investment: Six to twelve months to working proficiency for Spanish speakers given the languages' close relation; twelve to eighteen months for others.* *Best for: Multilateral development finance with a Brazil or lusophone Africa focus, diplomacy careers targeting Brazil specifically, and geopolitical risk coverage of South Atlantic trade and investment corridors.* ## Russian — Narrow but Real Premium Russian is the language most students dismiss prematurely and the one that, within a specific set of roles, commands a premium comparable to Arabic. It remains an official UN language and carries a salary premium of similar scale to that documented for Arabic, Mandarin and Farsi in executive protection and family office intelligence work, specifically when used for primary source intelligence analysis. Its relevance is concentrated in security studies, intelligence-adjacent policy roles, and any career track touching Eastern Europe, the Caucasus or Central Asia. The Boren Fellowship, funded specifically to build US national security capacity in critical languages, lists Russian and the Eurasian region among its priority areas, reflecting continued government demand. Carnegie's Junior Fellowship requires Mandarin specifically for its Asia programme but treats strong regional language skills as a genuine differentiator across its security-focused tracks more broadly. *Time investment: Eighteen months to two years to working proficiency, given the Cyrillic script and grammatical complexity.* *Best for: Geopolitical risk consulting and intelligence-adjacent policy roles, security studies academia, and diplomacy or foreign service postings across Eastern Europe and Central Asia.* ## Swahili — The Regional Specialist's Asset Swahili will not appear on any conventional list of top languages for international affairs, and that omission is precisely why it deserves inclusion here. It is the most widely spoken language across East Africa, an official working language of the African Union and the East African Community, and the practical language of business, development and diplomacy across Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and a significant portion of the Democratic Republic of Congo. For a candidate targeting African Union careers, regional development work through the African Development Bank, or NGO and humanitarian roles across East Africa, Swahili offers a level of access and credibility that no European or East Asian language can replicate in that specific region. It is also, notably, far faster to reach working proficiency in than Arabic, Mandarin or Russian, given its comparatively regular grammar and Latin script. *Time investment: Six to twelve months to working proficiency, among the fastest timelines on this list.* *Best for: Diplomacy and development careers focused on East Africa, regional African institution careers including the African Union and East African Community, and humanitarian and NGO work based in the region.* ## The Career Track Matrix For diplomacy and foreign service, the priority depends entirely on the posting region: French for francophone Africa and multilateral postings, Arabic for the Gulf and North Africa, Portuguese for Brazil specifically, Swahili for East Africa. For international organisations and the UN system, French is the single highest-value addition to English, given its status as a UN working language; Arabic and Russian add value for specific regional desks. For multilateral development finance, Portuguese is the most underused asset given Brazil's BRICS weight and the lusophone African development corridor; Spanish remains the baseline for Latin American regional bank work. For think tanks and policy research, Arabic and Mandarin both carry real institutional demand, visible directly in fellowship programme requirements at Carnegie and similar institutions. For geopolitical risk consulting, Arabic, Mandarin, Russian and Farsi all carry a documented salary premium in the intelligence and security segment of the market; this is the career track where language investment shows the clearest and most measurable financial return. For international law, French matters for the ICJ and ICC specifically; Arabic and Mandarin matter for trade and energy dispute work involving the Gulf and East Asia respectively. For climate and environmental diplomacy, French and Spanish both carry weight given the geographic spread of UNFCCC negotiations across francophone and Latin American host countries. For international business and corporate affairs, Mandarin and Portuguese both deliver measurable value given China and Brazil's weight in global trade and investment flows. ## The Verdict Stop asking which language to learn and start asking which career track you are building toward. A candidate aiming for geopolitical risk consulting should prioritise Arabic, Mandarin or Russian, where the salary premium is documented and real. A candidate aiming for UN or multilateral diplomatic careers should prioritise French, where it functions as a structural requirement rather than an optional asset. A candidate from the Global South with an interest in Brazil, lusophone Africa or East Africa should seriously consider Portuguese or Swahili, both chronically underused relative to the genuine demand building behind them as Global South multilateral coalitions grow in influence. The years a serious language commitment requires are too valuable to spend on vague advice. Choose the language that serves the career you are actually building, not the one that sounds most impressive at a dinner party. *Language requirements, fellowship criteria and salary data referenced in this guide change over time. Verify current requirements directly with the relevant institutions before making a multi-year language investment decision. If you spot an error or an outdated link in this piece, write to* [editor@diplopolis.com](mailto:editor@diplopolis.com) *and we will correct it promptly.* This Dossier piece is free to read. Future Dossier pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Shameful URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/shameful-hegseth-nato-3-review-europe-iran-war-spain/ Last updated: 2026-06-19T04:30:04.000Z That is the word Pete Hegseth used in Brussels on Thursday to describe what America's NATO allies did during the Iran war. European countries, 'too many of them,' he said, [refused US forces access](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/2/spain-refuses-to-let-us-use-bases-for-iran-attacks?ref=diplopolis.com) to their bases and airspace when Washington asked. For this, Hegseth called them shameful. He announced a [six-month Pentagon review](https://www.upi.com/Top%5FNews/World-News/2026/06/18/Brussels-Hegseth-announces-NATO-review/1171781780089/?ref=diplopolis.com) of all 80,000 US troops stationed across Europe. He said some countries would 'fail' the review and others would 'pass with flying colors.' He called the whole thing NATO 3.0\. He said it without apparent embarrassment, in the building where the alliance has met since 1967, to the ministers of the countries that helped build it. Let us be precise about what the Europeans actually did and why they did it. The United States and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury on February 28 without consulting NATO. The operation had no UN Security Council authorisation. It had no Article 5 basis; Iran had not attacked a NATO member. Several European governments concluded, independently and publicly, that the operation was illegal under international law. Spain's Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez [said precisely that](https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/presidente/news/Paginas/2026/20260325-appearance.aspx?qfr=121&ref=diplopolis.com): 'We are a sovereign country that does not want to participate in illegal wars.' Spain's government rejected every flight plan connected to the operation, including refuelling aircraft. The bilateral defence agreement governing US access to Spanish bases requires mutual consent for offensive operations. Spain was not consulted before February 28\. Its legal case for refusal is, by any reading of the treaty, coherent. Rota is not a peripheral installation. It is home to several Aegis ballistic missile defence destroyers, [central to NATO's missile shield](https://www.stripes.com/theaters/europe/2026-06-18/hegseth-nato-force-review-22003995.html?ref=diplopolis.com) across the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the North Atlantic. The base has been expanding its destroyer fleet for years under an agreement reached with Washington. If the review produces a withdrawal from Rota, the gaps in European air defence will not be filled by America's willingness to bomb its enemies. They will simply be gaps. The missile shield Hegseth is punishing Spain for hosting will be the one that no longer functions. The Europeans were not freeloading. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte noted on Thursday, in the same meeting where Hegseth was lecturing, that European allies spent [$90 billion more on defence](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/18/pentagon-chief-announces-review-of-us-forces-in-europe-slams-nato-allies?ref=diplopolis.com) last year, a 20 per cent increase over 2024\. They have pledged to reach five per cent of GDP on defence by 2035, more than double the previous target. This is the fastest expansion of European defence spending since the Cold War. They did not refuse to defend themselves. They refused to bomb Iran. Those are not the same thing. Hegseth is treating them as identical. The review Hegseth announced is not a security policy. It is a punishment structured as a bureaucratic process. Some countries will pass. Germany will pass; it gave access to its bases for Iran operations and has spent twelve years rebuilding its military. Romania will pass. Greece will pass. Poland will almost certainly gain troops. Spain will fail. Possibly France. The countries being penalised are those that exercised the sovereign right, enshrined in their bilateral agreements, consistent with international law, supported by their publics, to decline participation in a war they were not consulted about and did not believe was legal. [NPR reported](https://www.npr.org/2026/06/18/nx-s1-5862604/hegseth-nato-3-0?ref=diplopolis.com) that Hegseth also used the meeting to lecture European allies about gender equity and climate change consuming their defence budgets, precisely the rhetoric that has defined Washington's contempt for European governance since January 2025\. 'Instead of tanks and fighters and air defenses, the focus has been on gender equity and climate change and defense austerity,' he said. NATO's own figures show this is false. European defence budgets have risen sharply for three consecutive years. The facts did not interrupt the speech. NATO has survived 77 years because its members accepted that collective security meant shared decisions. The war on Iran was not a shared decision. It was announced. The Europeans were informed, not consulted. When they declined to support it, they were called shameful. When they spent more on their own defence than ever before, they were called freeloaders. When they exercised their treaty rights, they were told their troops would be reviewed. Spain said it was a sovereign country that did not wish to take part in illegal wars. For this, its naval base is now under threat. The alliance Washington built is being dismantled not by its enemies but by the country that built it, because its partners had the consistency to mean what they signed. ### What Iran Won URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/what-iran-won-mou-deal-trump-objectives-geneva/ Last updated: 2026-06-18T11:17:32.000Z On June 17, 2026, at the G7 summit in Évian-les-Bains, Donald Trump was asked whether the memorandum of understanding his administration had signed with Iran was final. [His answer](https://www.timesofisrael.com/trump-mou-with-iran-not-final-well-go-back-to-dropping-bombs-if-talks-fail/?ref=diplopolis.com): ‘No, it’s not final. It’s a memorandum of understanding, and if I don’t like it, we’ll go back to shooting at them, dropping bombs on their head. If I don’t like it, if they don’t behave, we’ll go right back to dropping bombs right smack in the middle of their head.’ That answer, delivered to assembled G7 leaders who had just applauded the deal, contains the entire story of the Iran war. The agreement is contingent on Trump’s mood. The Strait of Hormuz reopens on Iran’s schedule. The nuclear programme, the ballistic missiles, the proxy network and the government structure the United States spent four months trying to destroy remain intact. The world’s most powerful military fought a country with the GDP of Texas for nearly four months, [killed more than 7,000 people](https://www.britannica.com/event/2026-Iran-war?ref=diplopolis.com), disrupted global energy markets and signed a memorandum of understanding that changes nothing essential about Iranian power. The G7 leaders welcomed it. Trump called it ‘a great deal for a lot of reasons.’ It was. For Iran. ## What Was Promised The objectives were stated with precision. On March 4, 2026, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt [enumerated four of them](https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/04/president-trumps-clear-and-unchanging-objectives-drive-decisive-success-against-iranian-regime/?ref=diplopolis.com): destroy Iran’s ballistic missiles and raze its missile industry to the ground; annihilate the Iranian navy; sever the regime’s support for terrorist proxies; guarantee that Iran can never obtain a nuclear weapon. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated the objectives were clear and unchanging. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth described the campaign as dismantling Iran’s ability to threaten the United States and the free world. The name chosen was Operation Epic Fury. The language was categorical. Trump added a fifth objective depending on the day: regime change. He described the war at various points as creating ‘the conditions necessary for regime change in Tehran,’ said the regime was ‘largely decimated,’ and claimed that killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the opening strikes of February 28 constituted regime change in itself. The killing was real. The regime change was not. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the clerical council and the parallel state structures that have governed Iran since 1979 remained in place. The IRGC continued to operate. Hezbollah continued to fire rockets into northern Israel throughout the ceasefire. At the G7 summit, Trump was asked about regime change. [‘I never cared about regime change,’](https://newrepublic.com/post/211972/trump-drop-bombs-iran-head-outrage-deal?ref=diplopolis.com) he said. ## What the MOU Delivers [The memorandum of understanding](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/live-blog/live-updates-trump-iran-deal-end-war-reopen-hormuz-markets-israel-rcna350076?ref=diplopolis.com) does three things: it extends the existing ceasefire by 60 days, commits to the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and starts a 60-day negotiation period to address Iran’s nuclear programme. The text was not released publicly ahead of the Geneva signing. ‘Nobody knows what it is,’ Trump told the G7 press conference, ‘but it’s very strong, and most people seem to be very happy.’ US officials described the document as incredibly vague, mainly intended to create a more favourable environment for future talks. Iran’s semi-official Fars News Agency was more direct: Iran ‘has made no commitments in this agreement regarding handing over nuclear stockpiles, removing equipment, closing facilities, or even pledging not to build a nuclear bomb.’ This is not a dispute about interpretation. It is a description of what the document contains and what it does not. The MOU does not address Iran’s ballistic missile programme. It does not require the dismantling of IRGC proxy forces. It does not require the transfer of Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium — [approximately 440 kilograms](https://armscontrolcenter.org/irans-stockpile-of-highly-enriched-uranium-worth-bargaining-for/?ref=diplopolis.com) of material enriched to 60%, stored in facilities the IAEA cannot currently access. Asked about the uranium at the G7, Trump said: [‘You could make the case, why even bother?](https://newrepublic.com/post/211972/trump-drop-bombs-iran-head-outrage-deal?ref=diplopolis.com) It’s not very valuable stuff.’ This was the president who, four months earlier, had said one way or another Iran would have to relinquish its enriched uranium as a non-negotiable condition of any deal. The Strait of Hormuz, which Iran closed and which cost the United States its Strategic Petroleum Reserve stocks at nine million barrels a week, reopens under Iranian supervision. Multiple Iranian media outlets close to the IRGC reported the critical waterway would remain under Iranian control. Iran did not surrender that leverage. It agreed to allow shipping to resume. The distinction matters. A country that closes a strait and then agrees to reopen it on its own terms has demonstrated something about coercive power that every government in the world is now calculating. ## What Iran Kept The IRGC is intact. Hezbollah is still in Lebanon, still firing rockets, still insisting that any permanent deal require Israeli withdrawal as its price. Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, severely damaged, is being rebuilt. [Satellite imagery shows Iran accelerating construction](https://thebulletin.org/2026/03/analysis-iran-likely-transferred-highly-enriched-uranium-to-isfahan-before-the-june-strikes/?ref=diplopolis.com) at underground facilities near Natanz and Isfahan, including the Kūh-e Kolang Gaz Lā site — a tunnel complex buried under a mountain deeper than Fordow, the facility American bunker-busters struggled to reach in the June 2025 strikes. The 60-day nuclear talks beginning under the MOU will address what to do about the enriched uranium stockpile. Iran’s opening position is already known: sanctions relief first, everything else later, and the highly enriched uranium is ‘under the rubble’ and therefore no longer Iran’s problem to surrender. Iran kept its government. Khamenei died on February 28\. The system he led did not. The Islamic Republic was not established by one man and cannot be ended by one. The clerical council, the Revolutionary Guards, the parallel institutions of revolutionary governance, the ideological apparatus that has run the country since 1979 — these survived the most intensive American air campaign launched against any country since Iraq in 2003\. [The Chicago Council on Global Affairs assessed in April](https://globalaffairs.org/commentary/analysis/trumps-shifting-objectives-iran-and-how-war-could-end?ref=diplopolis.com) that the war was likely to produce a more hardline regime more determined to seek nuclear weapons than the one that preceded it. Nothing since has altered that assessment. Iran also kept the narrative. Tehran’s position throughout has been that it was defending itself against illegal aggression by two nuclear-armed states. The war killed more than 7,000 people, the overwhelming majority in Iran and Lebanon. More than a million Lebanese were displaced. Iranian cities absorbed strikes that destroyed infrastructure built across decades. Iran withstood that campaign, kept its government, held the Strait of Hormuz as leverage and signed a memorandum of understanding that requires 60 more days of negotiation before any hard question is answered. In the court of Global South opinion, which watched every development, that is not a defeat. ## The G7 and the Verdict The leaders of Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy and Japan assembled at Évian-les-Bains and [welcomed the US-Iran agreement](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog-june-17-2026/?ref=diplopolis.com). They had no role in negotiating it. They had not seen its text. They were applauding a document described by US officials as incredibly vague, whose most difficult provisions were explicitly deferred and whose central requirement — that Iran not build a nuclear weapon — is a restatement of Iran’s official position since the 1970s. The G7 also demanded an ‘immediate robust ceasefire’ in Lebanon. Israel said it would not withdraw from Lebanon, Syria or Gaza. Iran said Israeli withdrawal was a requirement for any permanent settlement. The G7 communié has no mechanism to close that gap. The leaders committed to diversifying energy supply routes to reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz — an acknowledgement that Iran demonstrated, conclusively, that it holds a chokepoint through which 20 per cent of the world’s oil passes and that no amount of military pressure eliminated that leverage. The response is to build pipelines. What the applause at Évian confirms is that the world’s wealthiest democracies needed this war to end, accepted the terms available and will call whatever emerged a success because the alternative is politically intolerable. The gap between the official narrative and the actual outcome is not subtle. It is the size of 440 kilograms of enriched uranium buried in a mountain. Every government without nuclear weapons is watching and calculating. [The lesson is not complicated](https://www.npr.org/2026/03/25/nx-s1-5759721/how-trumps-iran-war-objectives-have-shifted-over-time?ref=diplopolis.com). Iran was attacked by the two most militarily capable states in the world. It absorbed four months of strikes. It lost its supreme leader. It signed a memorandum of understanding that requires further negotiation on every hard question. Its nuclear programme is damaged and rebuilding. Its government is intact. Its proxies are intact. Its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz was demonstrated and then bargained away on its own terms. Contrast this with Libya in 2003, when Muammar Gaddafi surrendered his nuclear weapons programme under American pressure and received diplomatic recognition in return. In 2011, NATO bombed him from power. His country has been in civil war ever since. The lesson of Libya was already clear to most of the world before the Iran war began. The Iran war has made it explicit. Trump will call the Geneva signing a historic deal. The G7 will applaud. The Strait of Hormuz will open. And in Pyongyang, in Islamabad, in every capital currently calculating the costs and benefits of nuclear capability, the analysis will be the same: Iran fought the United States to a memorandum of understanding. The memorandum does not contain what the United States demanded when it started the war. That is the outcome. Everything else is ceremony. This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### The Critical Ally URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-critical-ally-pentagon-israel-counterintelligence-threat/ Last updated: 2026-06-18T04:30:25.000Z The Pentagon's Defence Intelligence Agency [raised the threat to 'critical'](https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2026/6/6/pentagon-said-to-raise-threat-level-on-israel-spying-to-critical?ref=diplopolis.com), upgrading its counterintelligence assessment of Israel from the previous 'high' designation, in recent weeks. The assessment, first reported by NBC News on June 6 and confirmed by the New York Times the following day, was built around a seven-page document rating Israel's human and technical intelligence-gathering capabilities at the highest possible level. The officials targeted by Israeli intelligence included [Steve Witkoff and Elbridge Colby](https://www.timesofisrael.com/pentagon-raised-threat-assessment-of-israeli-spying-on-us-to-critical-level-report/?ref=diplopolis.com): Witkoff is Trump's chief Iran negotiator, Colby the Pentagon's top policy official and Michael DiMino one of Colby's senior deputies. What Israeli intelligence was trying to learn was Washington's negotiating position in talks with Iran. Tomorrow, in Geneva, Witkoff will attend the formal signing of the agreement ending the war. The country that was listening to his phone calls is not at the table. Washington and Jerusalem have long maintained what officials describe as a tacit, mutually tolerated understanding: they spy on each other and neither makes too much noise about it. [Jonathan Pollard](https://gulfnews.com/world/americas/is-israel-spying-on-us-officials-pentagon-raises-threat-level-to-critical-1.500565877?ref=diplopolis.com) established the outer limits of that tolerance. He passed thousands of classified American documents to Israeli handlers in the 1980s, pleaded guilty and served thirty years in prison before Israel finally acknowledged it had run him as an agent. He became the reference point for every subsequent Israeli spying allegation, the benchmark for how far was too far. The Pollard case took thirty years to be officially acknowledged. The current assessment was circulated in weeks. This time, American officials say Israel [crossed the line](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/7/why-has-the-pentagon-raised-the-risk-of-israeli-spying-to-the-highest-level?ref=diplopolis.com). The New York Times quoted officials saying that an intensified Israeli effort to learn about US positions in talks with Iran had gone beyond what the relationship permits. The distinction matters. Both sides accept espionage as background noise. What exceeded tolerance was surveillance targeted specifically at America's attempts to make peace with a country Israel wanted Washington to keep fighting. The seven-page assessment was not produced because Israel had been caught spying. It was produced because the target of the spying was the peace process Israel was trying to prevent. Netanyahu publicly opposed the Iran deal. He called for military action to resume. He rejected the ceasefire framework while American diplomats were still at the table. And while those diplomats were there, Israeli intelligence was attempting to read their positions before they played them. The ally that went to war alongside the United States was running surveillance on the Americans who were trying to end that war. The intelligence sharing between the two countries continued on a daily basis throughout the same period. That last detail is the one worth sitting with. The United States and Israel were sharing intelligence daily while Israel was simultaneously targeting the American negotiators. Washington knew and continued. The relationship was conducting espionage and cooperation simultaneously, through the same channels, toward different ends. There is a word for that arrangement. It is not a flattering one. The DIA's 'critical' designation is not a rupture. It is a description. It describes a relationship in which one party uses the other's intelligence infrastructure, funds its military, absorbs its political costs and discovers, in the fine print, that the same partner has been reading its mail while the peace deal was being made. Washington calls this relationship a cornerstone of its Middle East policy. Its own intelligence agency calls it a critical threat. Both are correct. The question is which word applies when. ### The View from the Commanding Heights URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-age-of-ai-kissinger-schmidt-huttenlocher-review/ Last updated: 2026-06-17T11:00:32.000Z Somewhere in India, a woman applies for a microloan. The algorithm processes her file in seconds. It reads her transaction history, her location data, her social network, the postal code she lives in and the device she used to apply. It returns a decision. She does not know how it was reached. The institution that deployed it may not know either. The machine has spoken with authority. Whether it has spoken with understanding is a different question, and nobody in the room is authorised to ask it. This is the human future that the late Henry Kissinger, Eric Schmidt and Daniel Huttenlocher have written a serious and important book about. It is also, almost entirely, the human future they have not written about. [*The Age of AI*](https://amzn.to/4fR5pHq?ref=diplopolis.com) is alert to the civilisational stakes of artificial intelligence. It is less alert to the civilisational inequality embedded in how those stakes will be distributed. The gap between what the book sees and what it cannot bring itself to look at is where its most significant limitation lives. Begin with what the book gets right, because it gets important things right. The central argument is not that AI is a more powerful calculator. It is that AI enters the human chain of knowledge. It produces conclusions, classifications and recommendations that humans may act upon without fully understanding how the machine reached them. When a system’s reasoning cannot be inspected, authority shifts. Not merely technical authority. Epistemic authority. The authority to say what is true, what is likely, what is safe, what is risky, who qualifies and who does not. That is a civilisational change, and the book is genuinely alert to it. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/06/The-Age-of-AI.png)](https://amzn.to/43Glus1?ref=diplopolis.com) Its concern is not only operational risk, but the deeper question of what happens when a non-human intelligence begins to participate in the production of knowledge. The book moves across AI’s implications for discovery, strategy, network platforms, security, governance and human identity. Its proposed answer lies in stewardship, institutional adaptation, international dialogue and safeguards that preserve human agency. Kissinger brings the instinct of the strategist: AI will alter the balance of power between states in ways that existing diplomatic frameworks cannot contain. Schmidt sees it through the technologist’s lens: scale and innovation will outpace regulation, and institutions must adapt or become irrelevant. Huttenlocher, as the computer scientist and inaugural dean of MIT’s Schwarzman College of Computing, locates the deepest disruption at the level of epistemology rather than operations. Together they produce an argument that is serious, historically grounded and genuinely unsettling, at least within the world the authors have always inhabited. That world is the problem. Kissinger, Schmidt and Huttenlocher are men accustomed to systems being governable. Their fear of AI is real, but it is the fear of insiders who still believe that the right summit, the right commission, the right strategic doctrine and the right elite vocabulary can contain the disruption. They see the need for stewardship. They imagine stewards who look very much like the people already sitting near the controls. The book asks how humanity governs AI. It does not sufficiently ask which humans have been authorised to speak for humanity. This is not a criticism of bad faith. The authors are not cynics performing concern. The sharper criticism is that proximity to power shapes imagination in ways that are difficult to see from inside. The governing subjects of this book, humanity, leaders, societies, policymakers, states, sound universal. They are not. They hide hierarchy. They assume a kind of political subject that does not exist in equal measure across the world the book claims to address. The blind spot that reveals all the others is linguistic inequality. A world governed by AI will not merely privilege countries that own the chips, the platforms and the cloud infrastructure. It will privilege languages, idioms, archives and ways of reasoning that are already dominant in the machine’s training environment. Most of the world’s languages are data-poor. Most of the world’s knowledge traditions are not well represented in the corpora that train the systems now being deployed everywhere. The machine will process, classify and decide in idioms shaped by a fraction of humanity, then present its conclusions to the rest as objectivity. For an Indian reader, this is not an abstract concern. India is not outside the AI revolution; it is being absorbed into it at speed. English-speaking elites will use AI as amplification, a co-pilot that extends their reach and accelerates their output. The poor, the vernacular speaker, the person whose life is recorded in weak data and bureaucratic fragments, will encounter it differently. For them it arrives as a loan decision, a welfare eligibility check, a policing risk score, a migration screening or an employability assessment that does not know how to read a life lived outside the dominant data environment. The machine will speak with authority. It will not necessarily speak with understanding. This is where [*The Age of AI*](https://amzn.to/43Glus1?ref=diplopolis.com) most clearly shows the limits of its vantage point. The book worries about humanity. That is a grand word, and it is used with evident sincerity. But the human future will not arrive equally for all humans. AI will not disrupt a level world. It will accelerate an already tilted one. The question is not only how to govern AI. It is whether the governance frameworks being imagined will be built by and for the humans who already hold power, or whether they will be genuinely accountable to those who will be most affected by the decisions AI makes on their behalf. Kissinger, Schmidt and Huttenlocher recognise that AI may reorder the world. What they do not sufficiently reckon with is that the world being reordered was already unjust. That omission is not incidental to the book’s argument. It is structural. The book’s solutions, international agreements, institutional adaptation, elite stewardship and strategic doctrine, are precisely the instruments that have historically managed global disruption in ways that protected existing hierarchies while appearing to address universal concerns. There is no reason to assume AI governance will be different, and the book offers no serious argument for why it would be. None of this makes *The Age of AI* dispensable. The strategic and epistemological arguments are genuinely valuable. The book thinks seriously about a hard problem, and it largely succeeds on its own terms. Read it for what it understands: the depth of the epistemic shift, the inadequacy of existing regulatory frameworks, the urgency of the moment. Then read it against itself. Ask who is missing from the conversation it imagines. Ask whose future is being planned without their presence in the room. The disturbing argument that *The Age of AI* approaches but does not quite make is this: beyond challenging human reason, AI can industrialise deference. It can make obedience look like objectivity. The woman waiting for the algorithm’s verdict on her loan application already knows this. The book that claims to speak for her future has not yet found a way to hear her. This Book Review is free to read. Future Book Reviews will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Fall of the G7 URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/fall-of-the-g7-iran-deal-truth-social-jcpoa-trump/ Last updated: 2026-06-17T04:30:10.000Z 'The Deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran is now complete. Congratulations to all!' Trump wrote on Truth Social on Sunday evening. Then he boarded Air Force One and flew to the G7 summit in Évian-les-Bains, France, to inform the world's most powerful diplomatic club of what had been decided without it. The G7 — Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States — convened at a lakeside resort in the French Alps on Monday morning. The terms of a ceasefire agreement covering a three-and-a-half-month war had already been posted on social media. The deal had been negotiated between Washington, Tehran and Oman. [G7 allies spent Tuesday scrambling](https://www.npr.org/2026/06/16/g-s1-128325/g7-leaders-summit?ref=diplopolis.com) to restore Ukraine to an agenda the Iran deal had consumed entirely. French officials dropped plans for a sweeping final statement, settling instead for [narrower joint statements](https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-and-ukraine-loom-over-g7-as-france-hopes-trump-will-at-least-stay-for-duration/?ref=diplopolis.com) on critical minerals and drug trafficking. There was no joint G7 position on Iran. There was none to record. This is what the G7 has become. Not a coordinating forum but a venue where one member announces decisions and the others adjust. The club that once set the terms of the global economic order now receives briefings about wars it did not authorise, ceasefires it did not negotiate and agreements it did not sign. The other six leaders sat in Évian while Trump told reporters the deal was 'very powerful,' that Iran 'will not' be allowed to obtain a nuclear weapon and that Netanyahu needed to be 'more responsible with respect to Lebanon.' They nodded and asked about Ukraine. The deal itself deserves scrutiny that its celebratory announcement did not invite. The memorandum of understanding, due for formal signing in Geneva on Friday, ends the US blockade of Iranian ports, reopens the Strait of Hormuz and begins 60 days of nuclear negotiations. The full text has not been released. What it confirms, on Trump's own authority in a New York Times interview, is that Iran will be permitted low-level enrichment. That sentence has a history. In 2018, Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, the 2015 nuclear agreement negotiated under Obama, [calling it the worst deal ever](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/21/what-was-the-iran-nuclear-deal-trump-dumped-in-search-of-better-terms?ref=diplopolis.com). His objections were specific: it permitted enrichment, failed to address ballistic missiles and did not curb Iran's regional activities. The MOU he signed on Sunday permits enrichment. It allows IAEA inspectors back in. It offers sanctions relief. These are the three pillars of what he condemned in 2015\. [Obama told ABC News](https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5924343-obama-jcpoa-trump-iran-deal/?ref=diplopolis.com) before the announcement: 'It is doubtful that any agreement that arises is going to be significantly different from the deal that we had in the first place.' Trump flew to France to prove him right. This war began on February 28, 2026\. On that same morning, a Tomahawk missile struck the Shajareh Tayyebeh Primary School in Minab, a girls' school in southern Iran's Hormozgan province, during class hours. [At least 165 people were killed](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/3/questions-over-minab-girls-school-strike-as-israel-us-deny-involvement?ref=diplopolis.com), most of them schoolgirls aged between seven and 12\. The United States has not accepted responsibility. The Truth Social post announcing the deal's completion did not mention them. Congratulations to all. The G7 will issue its narrower statements on critical minerals, drug trafficking and supply chains. Nobody who was not in the room where the deal was made will have written a word of it. ### The Gaza Template URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/gaza-template-iran-deal-israel-ceasefire-pattern-2026/ Last updated: 2026-06-16T11:00:16.000Z On June 15, 2026, the day the United States announced a peace deal with Iran, Israel's National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir walked into a Knesset faction meeting and made a demand. He wanted Israeli soldiers to continue, in his own words, "the vital activity of demolishing homes, eliminating Hezbollah terrorists, and distancing residents from their homes" in southern Lebanon. The same day, Defence Minister Israel Katz issued a formal statement: the Israel Defence Forces would remain in their security zones in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza "without any time limit." Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich said Israel must not accept the ceasefire at all. Hours earlier, Donald Trump had posted his announcement on Truth Social. ["Ships of the World, start your engines. Let the oil flow!"](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/deal-reached-united-states-iran-war-rcna350039?ref=diplopolis.com) he wrote, authorising the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and the removal of the US naval blockade simultaneously. Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi, quoted by Iranian state media on Telegram, [described the same agreement](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/15/global-relief-as-iran-us-sign-deal-to-end-war?ref=diplopolis.com) as a victory in the face of foreign aggression. [Three Israeli cabinet ministers](https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-vows-to-stay-in-south-lebanon-if-iran-strikes-well-hit-it-with-full-force/?ref=diplopolis.com) rejected, qualified or demanded the reversal of a deal on the same day those two statements were made. The deal they were rejecting was signed by the United States. Israel was not at the table. Israel signed nothing. This is not the first time this sequence has played out. The pattern has a name and a documented record. Call it the Gaza Template. **What Happened Last Time** The template has been applied three times in eighteen months, and each iteration has followed the same structure. On November 27, 2024, a US and France-brokered ceasefire took effect between Israel and Lebanon. Under its terms, Israel was required to withdraw its forces from southern Lebanon within 60 days and Hezbollah was to remain north of the Litani River. [UN experts documented](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/10/un-experts-warn-against-continued-violations-ceasefire-lebanon-and-urge?ref=diplopolis.com) that Israel continued to strike Lebanese territory almost daily throughout the ceasefire period and kept its forces at five positions inside Lebanon in direct violation of the deal's terms, with the UN describing Israel's occupation of those positions as blatantly contradicting the agreement. The ceasefire was set to expire on March 2, 2026\. When it did, fighting resumed within days. On January 19, 2025, a Gaza ceasefire took effect following an agreement sealed on January 15\. Trump announced it as a historic achievement. The deal had three phases: a six-week first phase covering hostage releases and a phased Israeli withdrawal, followed by negotiations on harder questions. The ceasefire lasted 57 days. On March 18, 2025, Israel [renewed its campaign](https://www.britannica.com/event/Israel-Hamas-War/Ceasefire-and-hostage-exchange-January-March-2025?ref=diplopolis.com) with a fresh bombardment of Gaza, killing more than 400 people on the first day. The stated reason was Hamas non-compliance with hostage release terms. The framework that was supposed to produce a permanent settlement produced a two-month pause followed by a resumption of fighting that continued through the summer and autumn of 2025. By June 2026, a second Gaza ceasefire — announced in October 2025 — was technically in effect, though low-level operations and violations continued throughout the Iran war period. The pattern extends beyond ceasefires to the institutional architecture Trump builds around them. In January 2026, as the second Gaza ceasefire took hold, Trump announced the [Board of Peace](https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/us/2026/06/03/gaza-reconstruction-stalls-as-iran-war-diverts-focus-from-trumps-board-of-peace/?ref=diplopolis.com) to oversee Gaza's reconstruction and governance, appointing himself chairman and describing it as potentially the most consequential international body in history. Members included former British Prime Minister Tony Blair (in his personal capacity), Jared Kushner, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the World Bank president" to "Members included former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Jared Kushner, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and World Bank President Ajay Banga. There were no Palestinians on the Board. France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden and Spain declined invitations to join. As of June 2026, Gaza's reconstruction has stalled. The Iran war diverted international attention and donor funding. An official from an aid organisation operating in the territory described current measures as "a Band-Aid." The World Bank estimates reconstruction will cost 53 billion dollars. Trump has not published the Board's resolutions on its official website. The Board has held one formal meeting. The pattern across all three ceasefires and the institutional framework around them is consistent: a US announcement, a short initial compliance period, Israeli military actions the US does not publicly contest, and an eventual collapse or stall attributed to circumstances beyond Washington's control. **What the Ministers Are Saying** Ben Gvir's statement is the most precise. He does not object to the Iran deal on strategic grounds. He objects to it as a constraint on Israeli military activity. He wants houses demolished. He wants Hezbollah fighters eliminated. He wants residents distanced from their homes. He says the security of Israeli citizens stands above all other considerations and that Israel is "not bound by agreements that put an end to its ability to defend itself." Katz's statement is the most consequential. The Defence Minister controls the IDF. His position is not a party-political objection — it is a policy statement. He says the IDF will remain in its security zones in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza without time limit. He says those zones will be cleared of residents. He says all infrastructure, above and below ground, including houses in villages along the contact line, will be destroyed. He issued this statement on the same day the United States announced a deal that reportedly includes a ceasefire in Lebanon. Netanyahu's position sits between endorsement and qualification. He says he saved Israel from annihilation. He says he supports the deal. He also says Israel retains its freedom of operation in Lebanon. Those two positions are not compatible if the deal's terms are taken seriously. Netanyahu has found a way to say yes to Washington and yes to his coalition simultaneously. That is the same calculation he made in November 2024 and January 2025\. It produced the same result both times. **Hezbollah and the Missing Party** On June 4, eleven days before the US-Iran deal was announced, Israel and Lebanon agreed to a new ceasefire framework in Washington. [Hezbollah rejected it the same day](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/4/israel-and-lebanon-agree-to-conditional-ceasefire?ref=diplopolis.com). Naim Qassem, Hezbollah's leader, [called the negotiations](https://time.com/article/2026/06/04/hezbollah-rejects-israel-lebanon-ceasefire-agreement-strikes/?ref=diplopolis.com) "absurd, humiliating and insulting" and said the terms fulfilled "the enemy's objectives." His objection was specific: the ceasefire required Hezbollah to cease attacks and withdraw its fighters from parts of southern Lebanon while making no reciprocal demand on Israeli forces. Hezbollah told the Lebanese president it would not accept any ceasefire that did not begin with the withdrawal of Israeli forces from south Lebanon. "We have given no commitment to anyone," Qassem said. Iran's Revolutionary Guard commander Esmail Qaani stated that Israel must return to its pre-war positions as a first condition. Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi had said in April that ["the US must choose — ceasefire or continued war via Israel. It cannot have both."](https://www.foxnews.com/world/iran-threatens-end-ceasefire-over-hezbollahs-exclusion-from-truce-deal?ref=diplopolis.com) The June 15 deal supersedes the June 4 framework and reportedly includes Lebanon in its ceasefire terms. But Hezbollah's stated condition has not been addressed. Defence Minister Katz confirmed this on June 15: the IDF will remain in its security zones in southern Lebanon without time limit. The houses will be demolished. The residents will be distanced. Hezbollah demanded Israeli withdrawal as the precondition for any ceasefire acceptance. Israeli forces are not withdrawing. Hezbollah was not at the table on June 15 any more than it was on June 4\. The deal was announced. The condition Hezbollah set remains unmet. **The Structural Problem** The US-Iran deal has a 60-day negotiating window during which the parties are supposed to resolve the hard questions: enrichment levels, sanctions, Iran's stockpile of highly enriched uranium. During that window, the ceasefire is supposed to hold across all fronts including Lebanon. But the ceasefire's primary threat does not come from Tehran. Mojtaba Khamenei assumed the role of Supreme Leader on March 8, 2026, nine days after the US-Israeli strikes killed his father. He has not appeared publicly since the war began. His approval was required before Iran could sign. He gave it. Iran's Foreign Minister had already said, before the deal was announced, that Israel's attack on Beirut on June 14 proved that Washington lacked the will or ability to fulfil its commitments. The ministerial statements of June 15 suggest he was making an accurate prediction, not a diplomatic complaint. The United States has no enforcement mechanism over Israel that it is willing to use. It funds the Israeli military. It supplies the weapons. It provides the diplomatic cover at the UN Security Council. Withholding any of these is not a serious option within the current American political configuration. Trump posted on Truth Social on June 14 asking Israel not to blow the deal. Israel continued operations in Beirut regardless. The post was the full extent of American pressure. **The Template Applied** The Gaza Template works as follows. Washington announces a deal and claims a diplomatic victory. Israel accepts in principle while reserving the right to continue operations it deems necessary for its security. The operations continue. The other party to the deal points to continuing operations as evidence of bad faith. The deal's text is contested before it is implemented. Each side accuses the other of violations. The 60-day clock runs down. A second phase is announced or the deal collapses. A new escalation provides the next reset. The Board of Peace holds another meeting. The ceasefire in Lebanon has already been contested before implementation. The June 4 framework was rejected by Hezbollah within hours. The June 15 deal was rejected by three Israeli cabinet ministers within hours. Israel says it retains freedom of operation in Lebanon. Hezbollah says Israeli withdrawal is the precondition for any ceasefire acceptance. The deal says the ceasefire includes Lebanon. None of these positions are compatible. **What Changes and What Does Not** The deal does change things. The Strait of Hormuz — through which roughly 20 percent of the world's oil passes — is set to reopen, though Trump confirmed on Sunday that the waterway must first be cleared of mines before shipping resumes. The US naval blockade on Iranian ports is lifted simultaneously. Sanctions on Iranian oil and petrochemicals are suspended. Twenty-four billion dollars in frozen Iranian assets are to be released during the 60-day negotiating period. For the import-dependent economies of South Asia, East Africa and Southeast Asia — the countries that absorbed the cost of a war they did not choose — those are real and significant changes. What does not change is the military architecture that produced the war. Iran retains its nuclear programme, its missiles and its proxies. Israel retains its positions in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza. The Palestinian question is unaddressed. The Board of Peace has held one formal meeting. Hezbollah's weapons are intact. The structural conflict between Israeli military presence and Iranian-backed armed groups across the region continues. In January 2025, Trump announced a historic Gaza ceasefire. It lasted 57 days. In November 2024, the US brokered a Lebanon ceasefire. UN experts documented near-daily Israeli violations throughout its life before it expired. In January 2026, Trump announced the Board of Peace. Gaza's reconstruction has stalled. In June 2026, Trump announced a historic Iran deal. Three Israeli cabinet ministers rejected it on the day of the announcement while demanding the continuation of the military activity the deal was supposed to stop. Hezbollah, the armed group that controls the territory where the ceasefire is most immediately contested, was not party to the agreement and has not accepted its terms. The template does not guarantee failure. But it carries a record. And the record shows that American ceasefire announcements in this region have a consistent lifespan: approximately 60 days, contested throughout, collapsed when the harder questions arrive. "Ships of the World, start your engines. Let the oil flow!" Trump wrote on Sunday evening. By Monday morning, Israel's Defence Minister had announced the IDF would stay in Lebanon without time limit. The Strait will need to be cleared of mines before the oil can flow at all. This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) ### Names That Should Be in That Room URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/names-that-should-be-in-that-room-modi-trump-g7-indian-sailors/ Last updated: 2026-06-16T04:30:42.000Z Modi's bilateral with Trump, [confirmed for June 17](https://www.businesstoday.in/world/story/pm-modi-to-meet-trump-at-g7-on-june-17-first-face-to-face-talks-since-february-536760-2026-06-14?ref=diplopolis.com) on the sidelines of the G7 in Évian-les-Bains, covers trade tariffs, defence cooperation and the Indo-Pacific partnership. It does not mention Patnala Suresh, Aditya Sharma or Shivanand Chaurasia. It should. Those are the names of the three Indian sailors killed on June 10 in what the vessel's operator called an [unprovoked military action](https://www.thestatesman.com/world/uae-operator-of-mt-settebello-junks-us-navys-claim-says-american-forces-killed-indians-without-warning-1503604676.html?ref=diplopolis.com) against a civilian commercial vessel in international waters. Dubai-based IOS Marine, which manages the MT Settebello, says no warning was given before American forces struck, directly contradicting the US military's account. The International Maritime Organization's Secretary-General [condemned the attack](https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/pressbriefings/pages/imo-statement-on-settebello-attack.aspx?ref=diplopolis.com) as simply unacceptable. Legal analysts note the strike raises serious questions about the protection of [civilian merchant shipping](https://theprint.in/diplomacy/can-us-legally-attack-merchant-ships-strike-on-tankers-puts-to-test-law-of-armed-conflict-at-sea/2959326/?ref=diplopolis.com) under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Settebello was not an isolated incident. Three separate vessels carrying Indian crew have been struck by US forces in the Gulf of Oman since June 8: the MT Marivex on June 8, the MT Settebello on June 10 and the MT Jalveer on June 11, whose engine room was struck by two Hellfire missiles. [India has over 300,000 sailors](https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/12/india/india-seafarers-deaths-anger-analysis-intl-hnk?ref=diplopolis.com) in global shipping fleets. Manoj Yadav, General Secretary of the Forward Seamen's Union of India, has stated publicly that he refuses to believe the US did not know the nationalities of those on board. 'I absolutely refuse to believe that the US lacked information regarding the nationalities of the people on board those ships,' he said. His union has called for full accountability. India protested. Twice it summoned the US chargé d'affaires. Jaishankar called the actions 'not justified'. The [State Department's readout](https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/06/secretary-rubios-call-with-indian-external-affairs-minister-jaishankar-4?ref=diplopolis.com) of the same call did not use the words India, Indian, mariners or killed. It discussed compliance. It instructed a sovereign state that its vessels must obey American military orders in international waters. A country whose citizens were illegally killed was told, in return, to fall in line. What followed has been more troubling still. [The Indian government's own statements](https://thewire.in/politics/us-killing-indian-sailors-demolishes-modis-boast-of-strong-leadership-compromises-indias-strategic-autonomy?ref=diplopolis.com) have at points described the struck vessels as 'sanctioned ships', adopting elements of Washington's framing rather than contesting it. Aditya Sharma's father has one demand. 'I have only one demand,' Rajesh Sharma told an Indian news agency, 'that my son's remains be brought back.' Modi arrives in Évian carrying a particular self-description. In February he declared that India had evolved into a [confident voice of the Global South](https://www.newsonair.gov.in/pm-modi-says-india-has-evolved-into-confident-and-credible-voice-of-global-south?ref=diplopolis.com), shaping global conversations and contributing to a more balanced world order. He will repeat those words at Évian as a guest at the table of seven wealthy nations, invited as an outreach partner rather than a member. The test of those words is not rhetorical. It is whether he uses them in the room. If the bilateral produces anything on this question, the minimum standard is clear: a public acknowledgement from Washington that Indian citizens were killed, a commitment to an independent investigation and a stated assurance that vessels carrying Indian crew will not be targeted as long as India is not a party to the conflict. Anything short of that is a communiqué, not accountability. A joint statement that mentions cooperation and shared values without naming the dead is not a resolution. It is a burial. Every time a government of India absorbs an illegal act against its citizens in the interest of bilateral warmth, it confirms what that warmth is worth. India is a partner whose losses are manageable and whose protests are filed, not answered. A strategic partnership worth the name cannot silence India on the illegal killing of its own citizens. What exists instead is a hierarchy with better branding. Modi has built his political identity on the proposition that India has arrived. That the era of being lectured is over. On June 17 he will sit across from the man whose government struck civilian vessels carrying Indian workers without warning, whose military described those workers as participants in illegal activity and whose State Department [told India to comply](https://www.diplopolis.com/comply-indian-sailors-killed-us-strike-mt-settebello/) when India called to protest. The proposition will be tested in that room, not in the statement issued afterwards. The families of Patnala Suresh, Aditya Sharma and Shivanand Chaurasia are not in Évian. Their prime minister is. ### COMPLY URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/comply-indian-sailors-killed-us-strike-mt-settebello/ Last updated: 2026-06-15T04:30:36.000Z On the morning of June 10, [Bhargavi in Visakhapatnam](https://www.wionews.com/india-news/who-was-suresh-patnala-vizag-engineer-killed-in-us-strike-days-before-15th-anniversary-1781248576307?ref=diplopolis.com) waited for the message her husband sent every day. Patnala Suresh, 44, chief engineer aboard the [MT Settebello](https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2271901&ref=diplopolis.com), had not missed a morning in months. In his last phone call he had told her he was cancelling his contract and coming home by June 24 to celebrate their fifteenth anniversary. That day the message did not come. She waited, telling herself he was simply busy; at that hour he would not normally be on deck. The ship had been [struck by US forces](https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-attack-kills-three-indian-sailors-gulf-oman?ref=diplopolis.com) in the Gulf of Oman, precision munitions fired into the engine room after, Washington says, the crew repeatedly failed to comply with American directions. Suresh was killed alongside [Aditya Sharma](https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/himachal/family-of-deceased-himachal-seafarer-aditya-sharma-alleges-exploitation-and-negligence-in-mt-settebello-tragedy/?ref=diplopolis.com), 23, a deck cadet from Hamirpur in Himachal Pradesh and [Shivanand Chaurasia](https://aninews.in/news/national/general-news/three-indian-seafarers-confirmed-dead-after-attack-on-vessel-near-hormuz-deoria-family-mourns-loss-of-shivanand-chaurasia20260611125005/?ref=diplopolis.com), a fitter from Surauli village in Deoria and the sole earner for a family with two children. India [summoned the US chargé d'affaires](https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-summons-top-us-diplomat-second-time-protest-strikes-ships-off-oman-source-2026-06-12/?ref=diplopolis.com). Twice. Then Jaishankar called Rubio. His [statement afterwards](https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/commercial-shipping/jaishankar-speaks-to-marco-rubio-voices-strong-protest-over-death-of-indian-seafarers?ref=diplopolis.com) was precise: 'I reiterated India's strong protest at the attacks by the US Navy in the Gulf that killed three Indian mariners. Such lethal actions against commercial shipping are not justified.' He used the word mariners, named the problem and called it unjustified. Hours later, the [State Department issued](https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/06/secretary-rubios-call-with-indian-external-affairs-minister-jaishankar-4?ref=diplopolis.com) its own account of the same call. No mention of three dead Indians. No condolence. No acknowledgement that anyone had died. The readout did not use the words India, Indian, mariners or killed. According to principal deputy spokesperson Tommy Pigott, Rubio had 'stressed that all commercial vessels should immediately comply with orders from US forces.' He had also 'underscored that violations of the US blockade and the illicit transport of Iranian oil will not be tolerated.' Note the word illicit. India's foreign minister called to protest the deaths of Indian mariners. Washington's response described those mariners as participants in illegal activity and then instructed a sovereign state that its vessels must comply with American military orders in international waters. The United States has declared a unilateral blockade, defined what constitutes a violation and reserved the right to use lethal force against any vessel it deems non-compliant. Its message to the country whose citizens it just killed: ensure compliance. That is not a diplomatic exchange. It is a command, and Washington delivered it while India's foreign minister was trying to register a protest. The question India's response still does not answer is a simple one: what does New Delhi do when a friendly power kills its citizens and tells it to fall in line? The answer, so far, is to register a complaint, absorb a lecture about compliance and return to the architecture of the relationship. Which means the architecture remains undisturbed by the bodies. The government that has spent years marketing itself as a Vishwaguru, Sanskrit for teacher of the world, has produced a different lesson here. It has demonstrated that the United States can kill Indian civilian maritime workers in international waters, describe them as smugglers, instruct India to ensure its vessels obey American military commands and walk away without apology, accountability or any indication that a future Indian death would produce a different outcome. No foreign minister of a rising power should have to absorb that in silence. India has more than [300,000 sailors](https://www.businesstoday.in/india/story/rubios-remarks-will-further-inflame-anti-us-sentiment-american-expert-after-indian-sailors-deaths-536751-2026-06-14?ref=diplopolis.com) in global shipping fleets, close to 15 percent of the world's maritime workforce. Shivanand Chaurasia's [neighbour in Surauli](https://aninews.in/news/national/general-news/three-indian-seafarers-confirmed-dead-after-attack-on-vessel-near-hormuz-deoria-family-mourns-loss-of-shivanand-chaurasia20260611125005/?ref=diplopolis.com) said he had struggled to get the sea job and was gradually improving his family's situation. Three young men became casualties, the neighbour said. The more precise word for what they were is expendable: workers carrying other people's cargo through other people's wars, covered by a [passport that guaranteed](https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2026/06/12/suresh-patnala-death-visakhapatnam-mt-settebello-attack-andhra-pradesh.html?ref=diplopolis.com) very much less than they were told. Bhargavi's morning message never came. Washington's did. It said: comply. New Delhi registered the complaint and kept the relationship warm. Call that what you like. Do not call it a protest. ### When the Law Arrives Too Late: Twelve Books on International Justice URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/twelve-books-international-justice-nuremberg-icc-reading-list/ Last updated: 2026-06-12T20:00:21.000Z On November 21, 2024, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant. As of June 2026, neither has been executed. On February 6, 2025, President Trump signed an executive order sanctioning the court’s chief prosecutor and authorising asset freezes against court officials. In March 2023, the same court issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin. That arrest has not happened either. The crime Putin was charged with was the deportation of Ukrainian children, not the act of starting the war itself, which Robert Jackson — the American chief prosecutor at Nuremberg — called the supreme international crime. Since Nuremberg, no one has been successfully prosecuted for it. The international justice project is in one of its worst stretches since the Cold War halted the momentum of the Nuremberg trials. The court that was supposed to be the permanent embodiment of Nuremberg’s promise is being sanctioned by the state most responsible for creating that promise. The crime that Nuremberg treated as the foundation of the entire legal enterprise has effectively dropped off the ICC’s docket. And the warrants that have been issued for the leaders of ongoing conflicts sit in a filing cabinet somewhere in The Hague, unexecuted, while the wars continue. The books on this list were selected because they explain how the world arrived here. They cover Nuremberg and its aftermath, the ICC’s construction and its limits, the political conditions that make tribunals possible and the philosophical questions that no trial can fully answer. They do not share a single political position. Several argue directly against each other. What they share is a commitment to taking the accountability project seriously enough to examine it honestly, including its failures. This list is not a ranked order. It is a reading sequence. Begin with the most immediately readable and work toward the most theoretically demanding. By the end of the twelve, you will understand what international justice was designed to do, what it cannot do and why the distance between those two things is not a flaw in the system. It is the system. A note on the anchor. DiploPolis [recently interviewed](https://www.diplopolis.com/so-much-for-the-supreme-international-crime-lawrence-douglas-interview/) Lawrence Douglas, whose new book closes this list. The interview covers the belatedness problem, the Putin and Netanyahu warrants and what Douglas calls his tragic liberal faith in the accountability project. It is the best single starting point for a reader who wants to understand why these books matter in June 2026. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/06/The-Eichmann-Trial-----Deborah-Lipstadt.png)](https://amzn.to/4vNO6vC?ref=diplopolis.com) ****The Eichmann Trial — Deborah Lipstadt** ## **1\. The Eichmann Trial — Deborah Lipstadt** *Schocken Books, 2011* *The Eichmann Trial* is the shortest and most immediately accessible book on this list and the right place to begin. Deborah Lipstadt covers Adolf Eichmann’s capture by Israeli intelligence in Argentina in 1960, his transport to Jerusalem and the trial that followed in clear, engaged prose. The book is particularly strong on what the trial was actually designed to do. David Ben-Gurion’s decision to prosecute Eichmann in an Israeli court rather than hand him to an international tribunal was a deliberate act of political communication: this crime belonged to the Jewish people, the state of Israel existed to ensure it could never happen again, and the victims — who had been largely absent from the Nuremberg proceedings — would be heard. Lipstadt is also honest about the trial’s contradictions, including the kidnapping that made it possible and the legal questions about jurisdiction that it bypassed. Read this before Arendt, not after. Arendt’s argument only makes full sense once you know the trial she attended. Lipstadt will give you that. [Available from Amazon](https://amzn.to/4vNO6vC?ref=diplopolis.com) [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/06/Eichmann-in-Jerusalem_-A-Report-on-the-Banality-of-Evil-----Hannah-Arendt.png)](https://amzn.to/4xnkhDx?ref=diplopolis.com) ****Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil — Hannah Arendt** ## **2\. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil — Hannah Arendt** *Viking Press, 1963\. Revised and enlarged edition, Penguin, 1994* This is the most contested and most important book in the literature. Hannah Arendt attended the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem in 1961 as a correspondent for The New Yorker and produced an account that provoked furious controversy and has never stopped being discussed. The concept she introduced — the banality of evil — was widely misread as a claim that Eichmann was a small man rather than a monster. Arendt’s actual argument is more disturbing: that the most destructive crimes in modern history were committed not by demons but by bureaucrats who had suspended their capacity for independent moral judgement in favour of institutional loyalty and career advancement. Eichmann, in her account, was not evil in the conventional sense. He was something harder to condemn and harder to prevent: a man who had stopped thinking about what he was doing. The political argument of the book — about collective responsibility, about the role of Jewish leaders during the Holocaust, about what justice requires — provoked accusations that followed Arendt for the rest of her life. Read it knowing you will disagree with some of it. That is the point. [Available from Amazon](https://amzn.to/4xnkhDx?ref=diplopolis.com) [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/06/East-West-Street_-On-the-Origins-of-Genocide-and-Crimes-Against-Humanity-----Philippe-Sands.png)](https://amzn.to/4e5uPQj?ref=diplopolis.com) ****East West Street: On the Origins of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity — Philippe Sands** ## **3\. East West Street: On the Origins of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity — Philippe Sands** *Weidenfeld & Nicolson / Knopf, 2016\. Winner of the Baillie Gifford Prize for Non-Fiction* The most readable book in this collection and the one most likely to make a reader care about the legal vocabulary of international justice in a way that no textbook can. Philippe Sands is a British human rights lawyer who was invited to give a lecture in the Ukrainian city of Lviv and discovered, in the course of preparing for it, that his grandfather had been born there, that two of the men who created the legal concepts governing the Nuremberg trials had studied there, and that the Nazi official who had governed the city during the war was the father of a man Sands had been in conversation with. The book follows two lawyers — Hersch Lauterpacht, who gave the world the concept of crimes against humanity, and Raphael Lemkin, who gave it the word genocide — and weaves their biographies with his own family history. The words we use to describe the worst crimes in human history were invented by specific people in specific places in response to specific events. Sands makes this concrete in a way that most legal scholarship cannot. The book also contains one of the finest accounts of the Nuremberg trial itself, seen through the eyes of people who had personal stakes in its outcome. [Available from Amazon](https://amzn.to/4e5uPQj?ref=diplopolis.com) [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/06/A-Problem-from-Hell_-America-and-the-Age-of-Genocide-----Samantha-Power.png)](https://amzn.to/445B9kK?ref=diplopolis.com) ****A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide — Samantha Power** ## **4\. A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide — Samantha Power** *Basic Books, 2002\. Pulitzer Prize for General Non-Fiction, 2003* The book that changed how a generation of American policymakers thought about genocide, or should have. Samantha Power examined the American government’s response to every major genocide of the twentieth century, from the Armenian massacres through Cambodia, Iraq’s chemical attack on the Kurds at Halabja in 1988, Bosnia and Rwanda to Kosovo. Her central finding is not that American officials lacked information. They had the information. The pattern she documents is more damaging: a systematic preference for maintaining relationships with perpetrator states over defending the populations they were destroying, rationalised through bureaucratic language that kept the word genocide off official documents as long as possible. Power’s book is essential for anyone who wants to understand why the United States — the state most responsible for creating the Nuremberg framework — has been so inconsistent in enforcing it. She became the US Ambassador to the United Nations under Obama and later led USAID under Biden. Whether the book changed her own policy judgements is a question the book raises but cannot answer. The argument it makes about American political culture stands regardless. [Available from Amazon](https://amzn.to/445B9kK?ref=diplopolis.com) [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/06/Stay-the-Hand-of-Vengeance_-The-Politics-of-War-Crimes-Tribunals-----Gary-Jonathan-Bass.png)](https://amzn.to/3Qcbq76?ref=diplopolis.com) ****Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals — Gary Jonathan Bass** ## **5\. Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals — Gary Jonathan Bass** *Princeton University Press, 2000* The essential political science account of why war crimes tribunals get created. Gary Bass examined the history of international criminal proceedings from the failed attempt to prosecute the Kaiser after the First World War through Nuremberg and the post-Cold War tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda. His central argument is that war crimes trials are established when the victors are liberal democracies with domestic publics who demand accountability, and not otherwise. Non-liberal states that win wars do not build tribunals. Liberal states do, imperfectly, inconsistently and with significant political pressure from governments that would prefer to move on. This explains both why Nuremberg happened and why it was an exception rather than a rule. The book was published before the ICC existed, but its analytical framework applies directly to why the ICC’s docket is overwhelmingly African and why the permanent five members of the Security Council have consistently shaped the court to protect themselves. Read it alongside Bosco’s *Rough Justice* for the complete picture. [Available from Amazon](https://amzn.to/3Qcbq76?ref=diplopolis.com) [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/06/The-Anatomy-of-the-Nuremberg-Trials-----Telford-Taylor.png)](https://amzn.to/49RCNdd?ref=diplopolis.com) ****The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials — Telford Taylor** ## **6\. The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials — Telford Taylor** *Alfred A. Knopf, 1992* Telford Taylor was a Brigadier General in the US Army who served as Chief Counsel for the twelve subsequent Nuremberg trials — the American military tribunals that prosecuted doctors, lawyers, judges, industrialists, military officers and SS commanders in the years after the main Nuremberg proceedings concluded. He wrote this history more than four decades later. It is the most detailed insider account of what the trials actually were, how the prosecution constructed its cases and where the legal arguments succeeded and where they did not. Taylor was not uncritical. He acknowledged the procedural compromises, the political pressures and the inconsistencies in how charges were applied. But he believed in the project’s ultimate significance. The book is harder to find than most others on this list and more demanding to read, but it fills a gap that no other source fills: the direct testimony of someone who was inside the process and understood both its legal architecture and its political constraints. It is the foundation on which every serious subsequent analysis of Nuremberg rests. [Available from Amazon](https://amzn.to/49RCNdd?ref=diplopolis.com) [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/06/Rough-Justice_-The-International-Criminal-Court-in-a-World-of-Power-Politics-----David-Bosco.png)](https://amzn.to/49YmVFL?ref=diplopolis.com) ****Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court in a World of Power Politics — David Bosco** ## **7\. Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court in a World of Power Politics — David Bosco** *Oxford University Press, 2014* The book that Lawrence Douglas’s interview implicitly requires. Bosco examines the International Criminal Court from the perspective of the great powers and documents in methodical detail how the United States, China, Russia, France and Britain shaped the court’s structure and jurisdiction at the Rome Conference in 1998 to serve their strategic interests, limit the court’s authority over their own personnel and use it against their adversaries. The book was published in 2014, before Trump sanctioned the court’s officials and before warrants were issued for Netanyahu. But everything Bosco predicted about the fragility of the court’s position relative to the great powers has been confirmed by subsequent events. His central argument — that the ICC operates in a world of power politics and has always done so — is not a counsel of despair. It is a realistic account of what the court is and what it can actually do within the constraints it cannot escape. For readers who want to understand why the Africa-heavy docket is not an accident, this is the book. It names the mechanism. [Available from Amazon](https://amzn.to/49YmVFL?ref=diplopolis.com) [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/06/The-Ratline_-Love--Lies-and-Justice-on-the-Trail-of-a-Nazi-Fugitive-----Philippe-Sands-1.png)](https://amzn.to/4ggJutb?ref=diplopolis.com) ****The Ratline: Love, Lies and Justice on the Trail of a Nazi Fugitive — Philippe Sands** ## **8\. The Ratline: Love, Lies and Justice on the Trail of a Nazi Fugitive — Philippe Sands** *Weidenfeld & Nicolson / Knopf, 2020* Sands returns in a second book that takes up where *East West Street* ended. The ratlines were the escape networks that helped Nazi war criminals flee Europe after 1945\. Otto Wächter was the SS Governor of Galicia who oversaw massacres in Poland and Ukraine and escaped justice by hiding in Rome under the protection of a Catholic bishop before dying there in 1949\. Sands discovered Wächter’s son, Horst, who spent his life defending his father’s memory and engaged Sands in years of conversation about what his father had done. The book raises questions that no court can answer. What does justice mean when the perpetrator dies before prosecution? What is the moral responsibility of a son who knows what his father did and chooses to defend him? How should we understand the institutions, including parts of the Catholic Church, that protected war criminals from accountability? *The Ratline* works as a companion to *East West Street* and as a standalone account of the long aftermath of atrocity. The questions it poses about complicity and inherited responsibility are the ones the formal legal framework of international justice has least to say about. [Available from Amazon](https://amzn.to/4ggJutb?ref=diplopolis.com) [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/06/All-the-Missing-Souls_-A-Personal-History-of-the-War-Crimes-Tribunals-----David-Scheffer.png)](https://amzn.to/4eir3Su?ref=diplopolis.com) ****All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals — David Scheffer** ## **9\. All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals — David Scheffer** *Princeton University Press, 2012* David Scheffer was the United States Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues under President Clinton from 1997 to 2001, the first person to hold that role. He was involved in negotiating the Rome Statute that created the ICC, in establishing the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals and in the early design of special courts for Sierra Leone and Cambodia. This book is the insider account of how the international criminal justice architecture of the 1990s was built. Scheffer was a supporter of the ICC but the Clinton administration ultimately did not sign the Rome Statute, and the Bush administration then unsigned it. Scheffer explains both decisions with the candour of someone who was in the room and believed in the project. He also documents the specific ways in which the US shaped the Rome Statute to protect American personnel from its jurisdiction. The book lacks the literary quality of Sands and the analytical elegance of Bass, but it contains something the other books cannot: the direct record of the decisions that created the institutions we are now arguing about. [Available from Amazon](https://amzn.to/4eir3Su?ref=diplopolis.com) [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/06/Between-Vengeance-and-Forgiveness_-Facing-History-After-Genocide-and-Mass-Violence-----Martha-Minow.png)](https://amzn.to/49RuVbM?ref=diplopolis.com) ****Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and Mass Violence — Martha Minow** ## **10\. Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and Mass Violence — Martha Minow** *Beacon Press, 1998* The most thoughtful book on this list about what societies actually need after mass atrocity, as opposed to what the formal criminal justice framework can provide. Martha Minow, a Harvard law professor, examines the full spectrum of responses available to societies emerging from genocide and mass violence: criminal trials, truth and reconciliation commissions, reparations, lustration, collective memory projects, forgiveness. She is not opposed to criminal prosecution, but she is honest about its limitations. Criminal trials identify perpetrators and assign punishment. They do not restore communities, address the structural conditions that made atrocity possible or provide survivors with the reckoning they need. Truth commissions do some of those things but cannot deliver punishment. Reparations address material harm but not moral injury. There is no single response that does everything mass atrocity demands. Minow’s contribution is to map the landscape of responses and examine their respective strengths and failures without assuming that any one instrument is sufficient. The book was written in the context of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and before the ICC existed. It has only become more relevant since. [Available from Amazon](https://amzn.to/49RuVbM?ref=diplopolis.com) [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/06/Legalism_-Law--Morals-and-Political-Trials-----Judith-Shklar.png)](https://amzn.to/43PI0ip?ref=diplopolis.com) ****Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials — Judith Shklar** ## **11\. Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials — Judith Shklar** *Harvard University Press, 1964\. Reissued with new preface, 1986* The book that everyone in international criminal law argues with and nobody can ignore. Judith Shklar published *Legalism* in 1964, before the ICC existed and before the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals. Her argument is structural, not event-specific: the attempt to use criminal trials to resolve fundamentally political conflicts is a form of bad faith. Nuremberg, in her account, was a political act dressed in legal clothing. The allies had decided what they wanted to do with the Nazi leadership and constructed the legal framework to justify the decision. This does not mean Nuremberg was wrong. Shklar thinks it was right as a political act. Her argument is against the legalist ideology that presents it as a purely legal proceeding and against the broader belief that law is the appropriate instrument for every serious problem. When you apply legal categories to political events, you import all the constraints of legal procedure — the demand for individual guilt, the rules of evidence, the requirement of consistency — into situations that those constraints were not designed to handle. The result is a system that cannot prosecute aggression because aggression is too political to define legally, and that prosecutes atrocities inconsistently because political considerations determine who gets indicted. Shklar described this problem sixty years ago. It has not been resolved. [Available from Amazon](https://amzn.to/43PI0ip?ref=diplopolis.com) [![The Criminal State: War, Atrocity and the Dream of International Justice — Lawrence Douglas](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/06/The-Criminal-State_-War--Atrocity-and-the-Dream-of-International-Justice-----Lawrence-Douglas.png)](https://amzn.to/4eEaT76?ref=diplopolis.com) ****The Criminal State: War, Atrocity and the Dream of International Justice — Lawrence Douglas** ## **12\. The Criminal State: War, Atrocity and the Dream of International Justice — Lawrence Douglas** *Princeton University Press, 2026* The anchor of this list and the book that makes it timely in June 2026 specifically. Douglas is Professor of Law, Jurisprudence and Social Thought at Amherst College. His argument is that Nuremberg’s defining achievement was not the prosecution of atrocity crimes but the prosecution of aggression — the decision to wage war — and that everything that has happened in international justice since represents a retreat from that ambition. The ICC has virtually no jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. The court that was supposed to be Nuremberg’s permanent successor cannot prosecute the act that Nuremberg called the supreme international crime. Douglas traces how this happened through the legal history of the postwar period, the Cold War struggle to define aggression and the politics of the Rome Statute negotiations. He writes from what he calls a tragic liberal faith: the belief that the accountability project matters even when — and precisely because — it fails. The DiploPolis interview with Douglas, published earlier this week, covers the Putin and Netanyahu warrants, the Trump administration’s sanctions on the court’s officials and the structural question of whether international justice was ever designed to hold powerful states accountable. Read the interview first. Read this book after everything else on the list. It is the destination the sequence has been building toward. [Available from Amazon](https://amzn.to/4eEaT76?ref=diplopolis.com) Twelve books is not the complete literature. Ben Ferencz, the last living Nuremberg prosecutor, spent his career after the trials arguing for a permanent international criminal court and died in 2023 at the age of 103 having not seen the institution he helped create become what he believed it could be. His memoir, [*Parting Words: 9 Lessons for a Remarkable Life*](https://amzn.to/4eDG5Dy?ref=diplopolis.com) (2020), is worth reading for the biography of a man who spent eighty years trying to make aggression a prosecutable crime. Gary Solis’s [*The Law of Armed Conflict*](https://amzn.to/4eDCfKB?ref=diplopolis.com) is the standard textbook for anyone who wants the full legal framework rather than argued analysis. Michael Ignatieff’s [*The Warrior’s Honor*](https://amzn.to/3Qd6YVE?ref=diplopolis.com) examines what humanitarian intervention means and what its limits are in a way that connects the legal project to the question of military force that the legal project has always been trying to contain. The question these twelve books collectively ask is whether the dream of international justice is achievable or whether it is a useful fiction: a set of norms and institutions that change the vocabulary of world politics without being able to enforce it against the powerful. Douglas’s answer, the answer this reading list endorses, is that the question is not yet settled. The institutions are real. The norms have measurable effects. The accountability project has produced real convictions, real precedents and real constraints on what states can do without paying a reputational and sometimes a legal cost. Whether it can do more than that — whether it can, as Jackson promised at Nuremberg, hold even the most powerful states to account for the decision to wage war — remains the open question. These twelve books are the best available equipment for thinking about it. This reading list also sits within DiploPolis’s ongoing Nuremberg Files, our wider investigation into the promise of universal accountability, what it meant, what it became and what its failure costs the world. Readers who want the analysis pieces these books are in conversation with will find the series here. [Nuremberg Files ](https://www.diplopolis.com/tag/nuremberg-files/) This Dossier piece is free to read. Future Dossier pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) ### The Settlement That Isn’t URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-settlement-that-isnt-trump-iran-deal-2026/ Last updated: 2026-06-12T04:30:45.000Z On Thursday, Donald Trump told reporters in the Oval Office that the United States had reached ‘a great settlement of the war with Iran,’ with a signing possible this weekend, perhaps in Europe. The Dow rose nearly 2 per cent. The Nasdaq rose more than 2.5 per cent. Oil prices fell. Within hours, Iran’s foreign ministry said reports of a finalised agreement were [‘merely speculation’](https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/11/world/live-news/iran-war-trump-israel-hnk?ref=diplopolis.com) and that Tehran had not made a final decision on anything. This is not the first time. It is the fifth. On February 28, Trump [announced ‘major combat operations’](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026%5FIran%5Fwar?ref=diplopolis.com) against Iran and predicted swift victory. By early April he was setting deadlines: [ten to fifteen days](https://www.newsonair.gov.in/trump-warns-iran-to-strike-nuclear-deal-in-10-15-days-or-face-consequences?ref=diplopolis.com) to make a deal or face consequences. On April 4, in a profanity-laced Truth Social post, he told Iran to ‘[open the f—ing Strait](https://www.aol.com/articles/donald-trump-writes-praise-allah-143216214.html?ref=diplopolis.com)’ within forty-eight hours or face ‘Hell.’ Two days later, with the deadline expiring, he reversed course and announced a [two-week ceasefire](https://aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/7/trump-suspends-iran-bombing-for-two-weeks-following-dire-threats?ref=diplopolis.com), crediting Pakistani mediation, declaring the US had ‘already met and exceeded all military objectives.’ Oil fell nearly 16 per cent that day. The two-week ceasefire produced talks in Islamabad in April. The talks did not produce a deal. Trump extended the ceasefire indefinitely and maintained a naval blockade on Iranian shipping. Through May and into June he repeated that an agreement was close, that Iran wanted a deal ‘a lot more than I do,’ that total victory was, again, [two weeks away](https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/07/world/live-news/iran-war-trump-israel-lebanon?ref=diplopolis.com). On June 10, the US launched new strikes on Iranian targets. Trump told a Fox News correspondent that top Iranian officials had called him directly asking the bombing to stop. Hours later, US Central Command launched a second night of strikes. Iran said it had closed the Strait of Hormuz. An Iranian cargo vessel sank in the Gulf of Oman after a US attack. On June 11, Trump threatened to seize Kharg Island, which handles roughly 90 per cent of Iran’s crude exports, and said the US would hit Iran ‘very hard tonight.’ That evening, he announced the strikes were cancelled. ‘We just made a great settlement of the war with Iran,’ he told reporters, adding that markets were [‘up 1,000 points,’](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/live-blog/live-updates-us-strikes-iran-trump-hormuz-closed-rcna349554?ref=diplopolis.com) which ‘means they like the deal.’ He later clarified, unprompted, that what had been agreed was ‘a very strong memorandum of understanding that is a little conceptual.’ Israel, he said separately, was not a party to it, though he told Netanyahu the eventual agreement would require Iran to give up its enriched uranium, dismantle its enrichment infrastructure and end support for regional proxies. Netanyahu had not been consulted on those terms before they were announced. Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman said no final decision had been reached. Iran’s parliamentary speaker and chief negotiator, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, posted that ‘wrong strategies and impulsive decisions will reset the entire board for the worse,’ warning that further escalation would create ‘an endless quagmire.’ Each of the five announcements followed roughly the same shape. A deadline or a threat, then a reversal framed as victory, then a market reaction, then a gap between what was announced and what either side would confirm. Each time, the gap closed only when the next announcement arrived to replace it. Nobody appears to total the score. It would be easy to call this a failure of message discipline, a president whose promises keep outrunning the facts. But failure implies the goal was accuracy and the execution fell short. Look instead at what each announcement actually produced. A 16 per cent fall in oil prices on April 7\. A nearly 2 per cent rise in the Dow on June 11\. A news cycle, each time, in which Trump is the dealmaker rather than the person presiding over a war that has now passed its hundredth day and [killed more than 3,600 people](https://www.dropsitenews.com/p/israel-lebanon-doj-citizenship-trump-world-cup?ref=diplopolis.com) in Lebanon alone, and pushed six million people across three countries into acute hunger. Each announcement bought something real. None of them bought an ending. The market did not discount Thursday’s announcement for the four that came before it. Oil fell and stocks rose on a memorandum its own author called ‘a little conceptual,’ hours before the country it was supposedly made with said no such thing had been decided. That is not a communication failure. The communication worked exactly as it has worked four times before. What it has never done is end the war it keeps announcing the end of. ### What Lebanon Is: The Architecture of Powerlessness URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/what-lebanon-is-sovereignty-hezbollah-taif-resolution-1701/ Last updated: 2026-06-11T11:00:14.000Z Last week, Nawaf Salam stood before a humanitarian appeal conference in Beirut and described the war being fought on his country’s territory. The fighting, he said, is ‘not being fought for our sake, but on our land and at the expense of our people.’ He was raising money for Lebanese civilians displaced by the conflict while Israeli bombs fell on the city’s southern suburbs. The conference he was hosting was attempting to do what Lebanese governments have done for decades: manage the consequences of a war they did not start, cannot stop and have no legal authority to end. Salam is not a weak man or an ineffectual leader. He was until recently the [President of the International Court of Justice](https://www.icj-cij.org/court/current-composition?ref=diplopolis.com). He is the most credible figure to lead a Lebanese government in a generation, backed by a president, [Joseph Aoun](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanon-parliament-elects-army-chief-joseph-aoun-president-ending-two-year-2025-01-09/?ref=diplopolis.com), who was until January 2025 the commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Their administration came into office after a 26-month presidential vacancy, a period of institutional paralysis so complete that Lebanon had no head of state while the country was simultaneously dealing with economic collapse, the aftermath of a 13-month war with Israel and the destruction of its southern infrastructure. Salam and Aoun represent something genuinely new in Lebanese politics: a government with international legitimacy, reform credentials and a stated commitment to extending the Lebanese state’s authority over its own territory. They have been governing for sixteen months. Israeli bombs are still falling on Beirut. The gap between Salam’s credentials and Salam’s actual authority is the subject of this piece. It is not a gap that can be attributed to personal failure or political weakness. It is built into the structure of the Lebanese state at its constitutional foundations, compounded by three decades of institutional underfunding and calcified by the specific armed realities of 2026\. Understanding why Lebanon cannot assert sovereignty over its own territory requires going back to the document that defined Lebanon’s postwar political architecture, and being honest about what that document actually said. The [Taif Agreement](https://www.un.int/lebanon/sites/www.un.int/files/Lebanon/the%5Ftaif%5Fagreement%5Fenglish%5Fversion%5F.pdf?ref=diplopolis.com) was signed in the city of Taif in Saudi Arabia on October 22, 1989, ending fifteen years of civil war. It distributed political authority among Lebanon’s religious communities through a system of confessional power-sharing: the president would be Maronite Christian, the prime minister Sunni Muslim, the speaker of parliament Shia Muslim. This arrangement gave every major community a stake in the state’s continuation. It also required the dissolution of all Lebanese militias, whose members would be integrated into the national army or demobilised. Among the militias operating in Lebanon in 1989 was Hezbollah, which had [emerged in 1982](https://www.npr.org/2024/10/11/nx-s1-5134937/how-did-hezbollah-get-its-start-breaking-down-the-history-of-hezbollah?ref=diplopolis.com) following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon with Iranian support and formally announced its existence in an open letter in 1985, positioning itself as a resistance movement against Israel’s occupation of south Lebanon. Hezbollah was treated differently. It was permitted to keep its weapons as a national resistance force. The exception that Taif created for a specific political purpose in 1989 became the constitutional fact that has governed Lebanese politics ever since. Seventeen years later, following the 34-day Lebanon War of 2006, the United Nations Security Council passed [Resolution 1701](https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/581053?ln=en&ref=diplopolis.com). The resolution required an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from south Lebanon, the deployment of 15,000 Lebanese troops and an expanded UNIFIL peacekeeping force to the area south of the Litani River, and the establishment of a zone free of any armed forces other than the Lebanese military and UNIFIL. It required, specifically, the ‘full implementation’ of the Taif Accords’ provisions on armed groups, meaning Hezbollah’s disarmament. The resolution [passed unanimously](https://press.un.org/en/2006/sc8808.doc.htm?ref=diplopolis.com). Both the Israeli and Lebanese governments confirmed it. For the two decades since, it has been violated continuously by every party to it. Hezbollah did not disarm. It did not withdraw north of the Litani. It rebuilt its arsenal into what had become, by 2024, the largest stockpile of rockets and precision missiles held by any non-state actor on earth. Israel continued conducting hundreds of airstrikes annually in Lebanese territory, which the resolution also prohibited. UNIFIL documented the violations and issued statements. No enforcement action was ever taken. The Lebanese Armed Forces occupy a position in this architecture that is genuinely difficult to describe without sounding unkind, which is not the intention. They are a real institution with professional soldiers and a functioning command structure. They are also an institution whose enlisted personnel were, at the worst point of Lebanon’s economic collapse, earning approximately $80 a month in a country where the cost of living had not fallen proportionally. [The Qatar Fund for Development stepped in](https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1418942/lebanese-army-receives-20-million-from-qatar.html?ref=diplopolis.com) with direct payments of $100 per soldier per month, an arrangement that continued through 2025\. Qatar became, as one analysis put it, the de facto central employer of Lebanon’s national army. The army of a sovereign state was being paid by a foreign government with its own regional agenda. The army that Hezbollah was supposed to defer to was surviving on foreign charity while Hezbollah’s budget from Iran ran to hundreds of millions of dollars a year. [The 2025 defence budget](https://www.thepolicyinitiative.org/article/details/466/lebanon%E2%80%99s-sovereignty-battle-isn%E2%80%99t-just-over-arms?ref=diplopolis.com) illustrates the structural problem in numbers. Lebanon spent $800 million on defence. Sixty-seven per cent of that went to salaries. After operating costs, $24 million remained for training, modernisation and equipment. Israel, for comparison, spends more than $5 billion on military research and development alone. Per soldier, Lebanon spends $10,600 a year. Israel spends $273,560\. The Lebanese Armed Forces are not a credible deterrent against Hezbollah, which has far more firepower, far more money and far more experienced fighters. They are a state institution carrying out the functions of a national army, including border patrols, internal security and, since the November 2024 ceasefire, deploying 10,000 troops to south Lebanon under the Resolution 1701 framework — short of the 15,000 the resolution specified but more than at any point in decades. They do this with the resources of a collapsed economy and the institutional pressures of a profoundly divided society. The most important moment in Lebanon’s sovereignty story that received the least international coverage happened in [August 2025](https://www.thepolicyinitiative.org/article/details/466/lebanon%E2%80%99s-sovereignty-battle-isn%E2%80%99t-just-over-arms?ref=diplopolis.com). Lebanon’s cabinet voted to approve a five-phase roadmap tasking the Lebanese Armed Forces with drafting a plan to bring all weapons in Lebanon under state control by the end of the year. It was the first formal cabinet decision since the Taif Agreement to treat Hezbollah’s arsenal as a problem the Lebanese state was responsible for solving rather than a reality it was responsible for managing. Four Shia ministers walked out of the cabinet session. Hezbollah’s leadership described the vote as a ‘grave sin.’ The government’s decision stood. The army started drafting. Whether the plan could ever be implemented under fire was a different question, but the political fact was real: a Lebanese government had voted to reclaim its constitutional monopoly on the use of force for the first time in the country’s post-civil-war history. This is the part of the Lebanon story that the current escalation is most actively threatening to destroy. The period between January 2025, when Joseph Aoun became president, and June 2026 represents the most credible attempt at Lebanese state-building since the end of the civil war. New president. New prime minister with international credibility. A functioning government with a formal disarmament roadmap. LAF troops deployed in the south in greater numbers than at any point in decades. Real GDP [recording its first meaningful growth since 2019](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2026/01/22/lebanon-economic-rebound-marks-cautious-recovery-amidst-progress-on-reforms?ref=diplopolis.com). These are not small things. They are the preconditions for what sovereignty would actually look like in Lebanon if it were ever to exist. The June 7 Israeli strikes on Dahiyeh, which Hezbollah used as justification for rejecting the US-brokered ceasefire, and the June 8 exchange of fire between Iran and Israel that followed, have set all of this back in ways that are difficult to quantify but straightforward to describe. Every escalation reinforces Hezbollah’s argument that disarmament would leave Lebanon defenceless. Every Israeli strike on Lebanese territory reinforces the same argument. The sovereignty project requires the absence of the conditions that the current war is creating. Salam’s sentence from the humanitarian conference, that the fighting is not being fought for Lebanon’s sake but on its land, describes something more specific than the usual lament about proxy war. It describes the intersection of two specific problems: a Lebanese state that has taken its first serious steps toward genuine sovereignty in thirty years, and a regional conflict that is actively dismantling the conditions under which those steps could produce results. The June 7 strikes on Dahiyeh were not simply a continuation of a pattern. They fell on a country that had, eight months earlier, voted in cabinet to begin disarming the militia that Israel was bombing. Israel was bombing a militia whose disarmament the Lebanese government had formally committed to. Whether Israel’s strikes are designed to enforce that commitment or to undermine it by making Hezbollah’s security argument more credible is a question worth asking. What resolution would actually require is more than a ceasefire. Lebanon has had ceasefires. It has had Resolution 1701, which passed unanimously and was violated continuously. What is different now is that Lebanon has a government that is attempting to implement what 1701 requires. The practical obstacles to that implementation, the disarmament of an armed organisation that controls more territory, more weapons and more financial resources than the Lebanese state, are enormous. They do not disappear when the shooting stops. They become slightly more addressable. The difference between ceasefire and sovereignty is the difference between the absence of active fire and the presence of functional state authority. Lebanon has had plenty of the first. The second requires the regional conflict to stabilise long enough for the processes started in 2025 to develop roots. Every week of the current escalation makes that harder. This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) ### The Reckoning Does Not Come URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/strait-closed-food-ran-out-hormuz-wfp-hunger-global-south/ Last updated: 2026-06-11T04:30:37.000Z In March, the [World Food Programme warned](https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-warning-becomes-reality-millions-middle-east-crisis-pushes-poorest-families-further-hunger?ref=diplopolis.com) that if oil prices remained above $100 a barrel through July, as many as 45 million people could be pushed into acute hunger. The warning was reported. It was noted. It was filed. Oil has remained above $100 a barrel since early March. This week, the WFP said the warning has become reality. An additional 2.5 million people in Somalia are now unable to afford a basic food basket. A further 2.3 million in Afghanistan have been pushed into acute hunger. Another 1.3 million in Sri Lanka can no longer meet their basic food needs. Six million people, across three countries, none of them near the Strait of Hormuz, driven toward starvation by the closure of a waterway they cannot see, by a war none of them voted for, over a nuclear programme none of them benefit from. The mechanism is not complicated. The Strait of Hormuz carried roughly 20 per cent of the world’s seaborne oil before February 28\. Its closure has driven fuel costs sharply higher. [Fuel and food prices move together](https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/06/1167653?ref=diplopolis.com) in the world’s poorest countries — when energy costs rise, the cost of transporting food, producing fertiliser and running the cold chains that keep aid deliverable rises with it. WFP Acting Executive Director Carl Skau put it without euphemism: ‘When the price of food goes up 20 to 30 per cent, they eat 20 to 30 per cent less.’ In Somalia, supplies of nutritious food for children under five suffering from moderate malnutrition will run out as soon as July. The WFP faces an [89 per cent funding gap](https://www.dawn.com/news/2005553/middle-east-war-fuels-global-hunger-crises-wfp?ref=diplopolis.com) in the country. ‘We are running out of food,’ the agency said. Afghanistan is the sharpest case. It has no coastline. It has no oil. It has no stake in the Iranian nuclear question. Its [17.4 million people facing severe hunger](https://www.commondreams.org/news/wfp-iran-war-hunger?ref=diplopolis.com) in 2026 are there because the planting season is failing, because fertiliser shipments are disrupted, because fuel for the trucks that carry aid has become unaffordable. A war over uranium enrichment levels is destroying harvests in countries that do not grow uranium. This is not an unforeseen consequence. The WFP said in March, with specific numbers, that this would happen if the Strait remained closed. The Strait remained closed. The numbers arrived on schedule. What did not arrive was the policy response — from Washington, from the coalition conducting the war, from the governments whose decisions produced the closure. What arrived instead was a [Hormuz toll regime](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/26/tehranstollbooth-how-iran-picks-who-to-let-through-strait-of-hormuz?ref=diplopolis.com) charging ships $2 million a transit, a tentative nuclear deal still under negotiation, and [US government funding to the WFP](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2646047/world?ref=diplopolis.com) that has fallen from $4 billion in 2024 to $731 million in 2026\. The country that helped close the strait cut the food budget at the same time. The political language around the Iran war has been consistent: self-defence, regional security, rules-based order. These are not meaningless phrases. But they have a geography. They apply most forcefully to the countries conducting the war and the country being bombed. They do not reach Somalia’s children. They do not reach Afghanistan’s harvest. They do not appear in the WFP report. Neither does a plan. Skau noted that even if the Strait were to reopen tomorrow, the impact would continue to be felt. The food insecurity already created does not reverse when the ships start moving again. The children already malnourished do not recover when the fuel price drops. The damage accumulates. The reckoning does not. ### ‘So Much for the Supreme International Crime’ URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/so-much-for-the-supreme-international-crime-lawrence-douglas-interview/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T11:00:45.000Z The arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin was issued in March 2023\. The arrest has not happened. The arrest warrant for Benjamin Netanyahu was issued in November 2024\. The arrest has not happened. For issuing that warrant, the United States government sanctioned the court’s prosecutor and eight of its judges. Robert Jackson, the American chief prosecutor at Nuremberg, called the decision to wage war ‘the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.’ Since 1945, no one anywhere has been successfully prosecuted for it. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/06/Lawrence-Douglas_MS_15.jpg) Lawrence Douglas is Professor of Law, Jurisprudence and Social Thought at Amherst College Lawrence Douglas is Professor of Law, Jurisprudence and Social Thought at Amherst College. His previous books include *The Memory of Judgment*, a study of Holocaust trials, and *The Right Wrong Man*, on the Ivan Demjanjuk prosecution. His new book, *The Criminal State: War, Atrocity and the Dream of International Justice*, published by Princeton University Press in 2026, is the most rigorous recent account of how international criminal justice arrived at this moment: capable of naming crimes, incapable of prosecuting power. You can read DiploPolis’s view of the book [here](https://www.diplopolis.com/the-criminal-state-lawrence-douglas-review-international-justice/). Douglas agreed to respond to questions about the argument by email. This interview is that exchange. *A note on the form. Several of Douglas’s responses correct the framing of the questions put to him, most notably his challenge to the characterisation that the ICC ‘deliberately narrowed’ charges against Putin, which he identifies as a misreading of the court’s structural jurisdictional limits. These corrections are part of the record and they can be found in his answers.* **Q. You argue that Nuremberg’s primary achievement was not the prosecution of atrocities but the prosecution of aggression itself — the decision to wage war. Robert Jackson called it the supreme international crime. Yet the ICC has effectively shelved aggression as a practical charge, building its docket almost entirely around what happens within wars rather than the decision to start them. How did international justice make that retreat, and who benefited from it?** First, I would say that international courts since Nuremberg have not simply focused on ‘what happens within wars.’ It would be more accurate to say that these courts have focused on acts of atrocity — genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes — regardless of whether these acts were perpetrated during an international conflict. For example, the UN’s Rwanda tribunal dealt almost exclusively with atrocity crimes unrelated to any war. Even the UN’s Yugoslavia tribunal claimed jurisdiction over war crimes unconnected to any cross-border conflict. As you note, Nuremberg treated state aggression — the unprovoked resort to war — as the ‘supreme international crime,’ and sought to make the crime of aggression the centrepiece of a postwar system of international criminal law. As I describe in my book, *The Criminal State: War, Atrocity and the Dream of International Justice*, that effort failed for complicated reasons. For one thing, the jurists at Nuremberg neglected to define ‘crimes against peace’ — their term for criminal aggression. They insisted that a definition wasn’t necessary, arguing that irrespective of how one defined the crime, Nazi aggression would fit the bill. Post-Nuremberg jurists, however, did not enjoy this same luxury, and efforts during the Cold War to frame a workable definition of the crime of aggression failed. More generally, jurists struggled to explain why state aggression should even be considered criminal. Atrocity crimes — genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes — victimise people. The crime of aggression, by contrast, treats a state as a victim. But why should the violation of the territorial integrity or the political independence of a state be considered criminal? Does the criminalisation of aggression serve as a restraint on state sovereignty or as simply another more elaborate form of protection? These questions continue to vex jurists, diplomats and human rights advocates. **Q. You describe the belatedness problem as the wound at the centre of international criminal justice — the law consistently arrives after the violence has already run its course and the political conditions for prosecution have shifted. Is this structural or contingent? Is there any version of international criminal justice that does not depend on the defeat or isolation of the accused before the trial can happen?** I believe the belatedness problem is structural — it inheres in the nature of the beast. It is born of the recognition that any prosecutorial response to state-sponsored mass atrocities inevitably comes after the fact and highlights the dramatic insufficiency of any legally authorised punishment to fit crimes of mass atrocity. This is why I argue that the spectre of belatedness pushes in the direction of more muscular, interventionist responses to mass atrocities. That said, I argue that the ‘responsibility to protect’ and so-called ‘wars of humanitarian intervention’ carry moral hazards of their own. Our moral sense demands intervention to stop atrocities but the politics of intervention remain fraught. **Q. The enforcement problem looks different depending on which case you examine. In Ukraine the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Putin in March 2023 — for the deportation of Ukrainian children, not for the act of aggression itself, which is precisely the charge Nuremberg prioritised. In Gaza the ICC issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant in November 2024, and within months the United States had sanctioned the court’s prosecutor and eight of its judges for doing so. Two cases, two different failures — one where the charge was deliberately narrowed away from aggression, one where the enforcement machinery was actively dismantled by a state that claims Nuremberg’s legacy. What do these two cases together reveal about the structural condition of international justice — not as a political setback but as a matter of what the system is and is not designed to do?** I sometimes say, not entirely facetiously, that we can view the glass of international criminal justice as either nine-tenths empty or one-tenth full. Your question supports both perspectives. That said, I would challenge your characterisation that the ICC ‘deliberately narrowed’ the charges against Putin. It would be more accurate to say that the ICC has extremely limited jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. From the perspective of Nuremberg, that seems like a dreadful shortcoming; and yet we need to bear in mind that it took jurists decades to even frame a workable definition of the crime. So I suppose even limited jurisdiction is better than none at all. But there is something ironic about the fact that Putin was indicted for deporting Ukrainian children and not for waging a war marked by indiscriminate attacks on civilians. In the case of Netanyahu, I wouldn’t say the entire machinery of enforcement has been dismantled. Netanyahu must still be careful about his travels lest he find himself diverted to The Hague, and the Trump administration will not be around forever. I recall the early criticism of the UN’s Yugoslav tribunal: it will only prosecute the small fish, while the likes of Milosevic, Karadzic and Mladic will never be held to account. In the end, all three were tried, with Karadzic and Mladic given life terms. **Q. Staying with Ukraine specifically — Putin’s invasion is the most visible act of state aggression since the Second World War, the kind of crime Robert Jackson placed at the centre of the Nuremberg project. Yet the ICC indicted Putin for war crimes committed within the conflict rather than for the act of aggression itself. Is this the clearest recent demonstration of the shift from the Nuremberg framework to the atrocity paradigm? And what does it tell us about whether the supreme international crime, in any practically enforceable sense, still exists?** Your question well highlights the failure of jurists to make state aggression the centrepiece of the system of international criminal law. As I point out in my book, the trials conducted directly on the heels of Nuremberg — the Tokyo trial of Japanese leaders and the twelve trials staged by the US military of members and supporters of the Nazi state — were designed to build on Nuremberg’s focus on aggression but failed to do so. In fact, since the conclusion of these Second World War trials, no one anywhere has been successfully prosecuted for the crime of aggression. Saddam Hussein’s unprovoked attack on Kuwait in 1991 provoked an international military response, and yet Hussein’s aggression played no role in his trial. And as you suggest, if you could push a button and magically transport Putin from the Kremlin to The Hague, the ICC would still be unable to prosecute Putin for the crime of aggression because its jurisdiction over the crime is extremely limited. So much for the ‘supreme international crime.’ **Q. The ICC has spent most of its existence prosecuting leaders from the African continent. The first time it issued warrants touching a Western-aligned government’s conduct, the Western hegemon sanctioned the court’s officials. Is international criminal justice structurally selective — designed to discipline the weak while insulating the powerful — or is selectivity a contingent political failure that a reformed system could correct?** The critique you make could be directed to any domestic legal system — that despite the apparent generality of legal norms, they are selectively enforced in a manner that works to the benefit of the strong and to the detriment of the weak and vulnerable. But I think it goes too far to say that the international system of criminal law was designed to discipline the weak and insulate the powerful. That certainly was not the aim of the many talented jurists and officials who worked tirelessly and creatively to try to craft law that could restrain sovereign power. We can certainly bemoan the fact that the US, the nation most responsible for the Nuremberg trial and that contributed most generously to the creation of the Yugoslav tribunal — now, under Trump, works to undermine the ICC. But come 2029, the US might have a very different administration with a very different attitude toward international justice. **Q. You describe your own position as a form of tragic liberal faith — you believe the legal project matters because it changes the moral vocabulary of world politics, making certain crimes harder to deny even when it cannot make them impossible to commit. Both Ukraine and Gaza test that position directly. The crimes have been named. The warrants have been issued. The killing has continued. In Gaza the court’s officials have been sanctioned for naming the crime. Is changing the moral vocabulary enough when the moral vocabulary has no enforcement mechanism against those who choose to ignore it?** I think it’s an overstatement to say there is no enforcement mechanism. It’s true that we are unlikely to see the prosecution of the officials responsible for these atrocities anytime soon. But I would come back to the point that I made above about Milosevic, Karadzic and Mladic. Sometimes it’s hard to predict who will be held to account and when. Also, there are forms of ‘enforcement’ short of prosecution. Leaders of states that commit atrocities risk being shunned as pariahs. The status of pariah can have real consequences both internationally and domestically. Putin is not vulnerable to ouster by electoral means but who knows how secure his hold on power really is. Netanyahu, by contrast, may well be voted out of office, in part as a form of moral censure. Removing criminal leaders from their official positions may be less dramatic than prosecuting them, but it can be an important form of political and moral rejection. **Q. If the structural conditions for meaningful international accountability — a court with genuine enforcement power, a Security Council that cannot be used to shield allies from prosecution, member states that execute warrants regardless of political cost — do not exist and show no signs of emerging, what is the honest argument for the legal project continuing in its current form? Is there one? Or has the dream become, as you almost but do not quite say, a legitimising fiction for a system that protects the powerful while appearing to hold them accountable?** I don’t believe that a system that continually fails to demonstrate its even-handedness and efficacy can perform much of a legitimising function — its failures become too transparent. At some point, the system must demonstrate its bite. It did so at Nuremberg, and the Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals also notched their achievements. But given the absence of a world government, it’s unrealistic to expect international criminal law to enjoy the coercive force and normative consistency of a domestic system of criminal law. But dramatic failings notwithstanding, it’s still better to have a cup one-tenth full than one that is completely empty. **Q. The questions above press hard on what the current system cannot do. Let me ask you to look forward rather than backward. If the architecture of international criminal justice is structurally incapable of disciplining powerful states and their allies — and the evidence we have discussed suggests it is — what would a system that could actually do so look like? Not as an ideal. As a practical political question. What would have to change, who would have to agree to it and is there any realistic path from where we are to where accountability could actually mean something for everyone?** We should bear in mind that international courts are not the only tribunals capable of prosecuting state actors who commit international crimes. Domestic national courts can apply international criminal law, and courts in Germany, France, Belgium and Australia, among others, have done so. Indeed, the ICC is designed to serve as a court of last resort, authorised to act only when domestic national courts either are unwilling or unable to mount prosecutions of those alleged to have committed international crimes. More generally, I think it’s worth noting that healthy democratic states generally do not commit mass atrocities. Probably the best and most efficacious way to rid the world of aggression, crimes against humanity and genocide is not through a vigorous prosecutorial programme but through acts of domestic political reconstruction. It is crucial for the world’s most powerful nations to find a way toward democratic renewal. Only if the strong demonstrate a commitment to rule-based legality, both domestically and internationally, can a system of meaningful restraint exist. An international order dominated by autocratic, illiberal states is no order at all. --- *The Criminal State: War, Atrocity and the Dream of International Justice* by Lawrence Douglas is published by Princeton University Press, 2026\. The book traces more than a century of attempts to make sovereign power legally answerable, from the atrocities of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century through Nuremberg and the ad hoc tribunals of the 1990s to Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Douglas’s central argument, that the system has progressively narrowed its ambition from holding states accountable for starting wars to prosecuting atrocities committed within them, explains more about the current condition of international justice than most contemporaneous commentary does. It is a serious book, written from what Douglas calls, honestly, a tragic liberal faith: the belief that the legal project matters even when, and precisely because, it fails. It is [available here](https://amzn.to/4o1RvEa?ref=diplopolis.com). --- *Lawrence Douglas is the James J. Grosfeld Professor of Law, Jurisprudence and Social Thought at Amherst College. DiploPolis’s review of The Criminal State, ‘The Dream and Its Boundaries,’ is* [available here](https://www.diplopolis.com/the-criminal-state-lawrence-douglas-review-international-justice/)*.* This Interview is free to read. Future Interviews will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) ### Kim’s Leverage URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/kims-leverage-north-korea-china-xi-pyongyang-2026/ Last updated: 2026-06-10T04:30:40.000Z Days before Xi Jinping [arrived in Pyongyang](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/8/chinas-xi-jinping-arrives-in-north-korea-on-rare-state-visit?ref=diplopolis.com) for his first state visit in seven years, Kim Jong Un was at a factory. Not preparing for the visit — the visit did not need preparation, it had already been won. Kim was touring a plant that manufactures weapons-grade nuclear material, [telling engineers](https://edition.cnn.com/2026/06/04/asia/north-korea-nuclear-plant-kim-intl-hnk-ml?ref=diplopolis.com) he intended to expand North Korea’s nuclear forces at an exponential rate. The following day Xi arrived, his first overseas trip of 2026, and the two men inspected honour guards together and issued a communié about [strategic cooperation](https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/07/asia/china-xi-jinping-north-korea-kim-jong-un-intl-hnk?ref=diplopolis.com). The sequencing is the argument. Kim did not tour the factory as a performance for his incoming guest. He toured it because Xi’s arrival was itself the confirmation — proof that Kim’s leverage had grown to the point where he no longer needed to manage the relationship carefully. The message was not addressed to Xi. It was delivered with Xi watching. The road to that factory started in Ukraine. North Korea has supplied Russia with artillery shells, ballistic missiles and, according to the intelligence assessments of multiple governments, somewhere above 10,000 [troops since Russia’s war](https://www.npr.org/2026/06/05/g-s1-126481/xi-jinping-will-travel-to-north-korea-next-week-in-first-visit-since-2019?ref=diplopolis.com) expanded in 2022\. In return, Pyongyang has received Russian military technology, satellite launch cooperation and technical assistance with its weapons programme. The transaction was not complicated: Kim had surplus military production capacity, Russia had a war and neither party needed international approval to proceed. Neither asked for it. China has watched this partnership develop with competitive concern. North Korea depends on Beijing for [roughly 95 percent of its trade](https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2026/6/7/why-is-chinese-president-xi-jinping-visiting-north-korea-now?ref=diplopolis.com), a dependency that has been Beijing’s primary lever of influence over Pyongyang for decades. That lever functions when Kim has no alternative patrons. It loses its grip when Kim has spent three years building a military relationship with Russia that delivers what Beijing cannot easily provide: battlefield-tested weapons knowledge, space launch cooperation and a patron that is itself in open confrontation with Washington. Xi did not fly to Pyongyang as a gesture of friendship. He flew because the dependency Kim is supposed to have on China has become considerably more complicated than Beijing prefers. The international system spent twenty years constructing the architecture of North Korean isolation. Thirteen rounds of UN Security Council sanctions since 2006\. Coal export restrictions, oil import caps, bans on North Korean labourers working abroad, asset freezes, travel prohibitions on the leadership. The stated logic was that sustained economic pressure would eventually compel Pyongyang to negotiate a nuclear deal. What the pressure produced instead was a state leadership whose primary acquired skill is identifying what great powers need that they cannot easily source elsewhere, and a negotiating position that grew stronger each year the sanctions remained in place. The isolation was supposed to make Kim a supplicant. It made him a supplier. Consider what Kim has accumulated since 2022\. He delivered enough artillery to affect the course of a major European war and received military technology in exchange. He acquired a bilateral relationship with Moscow that gives him strategic insurance Beijing cannot cancel unilaterally. He forced China’s president to travel to see him, something Xi had not done in seven years, to reassert a seniority in the relationship that Beijing can no longer simply assume. All of this while running a gulag system the United Nations has compared to the camps of the Nazi period, conducting missile tests over the Sea of Japan and publicly announcing nuclear expansion programmes at press briefings. The international community called these acts violations. The international community is now sending heads of state. The joint statement described a [new historical starting point](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026%5Fstate%5Fvisit%5Fby%5FXi%5FJinping%5Fto%5FNorth%5FKorea?ref=diplopolis.com) for the relationship. What it described, in the language of actual events, is Beijing acknowledging that its influence over Pyongyang requires active maintenance rather than passive assumption. Kim has made himself indispensable to two of the three great powers that border him by being genuinely useful to one of them in a war the other opposed. The international system that was designed to isolate him has made him the most courted leader on the peninsula and across the surrounding region. He identified his leverage, built it patiently and used it at the right moment. The architecture constructed to contain him provided the conditions that made all of it possible. ### The Enemy in the Stadium URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/enemy-in-the-stadium-iran-world-cup-2026-united-states-war/ Last updated: 2026-06-09T11:00:07.000Z On Sunday (June 5, 2026) morning, a [chartered aircraft landed](https://www.aljazeera.com/sports/2026/6/7/irans-world-cup-squad-lands-in-mexico-amid-us-visa-row?ref=diplopolis.com) at Tijuana’s Abelardo L. Rodriguez International Airport at 5am local time. On board were 26 players from Iran’s national football team, some support staff who had cleared American visa processing, and a number of managerial personnel who had not. The players had received their visas the previous Friday, ten days before their first match, after a process that had stretched across three months, two base camp relocations and what can only be described as institutional improvisation at the highest levels of international sport. Iran had originally been assigned a training base in Tucson, Arizona. When the security and visa situation proved unworkable, it moved to Antalya, Turkey, where it spent weeks preparing. Then Tijuana, a bus ride from the stadium where it will play on June 15\. Iran takes on New Zealand that day in Inglewood, California. It plays Belgium on June 21 and finishes group play against Egypt in Seattle on June 26. The United States and Iran have been at war since February 28, 2026\. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, was killed in the joint US-Israeli strikes that opened the conflict. Iran’s sports minister Ahmad Donyamali said in March that it was ‘not possible’ for the national team to compete in a tournament hosted by the country that killed his country’s supreme leader. Iran’s football federation said ‘no one can exclude’ the team. The two positions coexisted for several weeks before institutional gravity pulled things toward participation. The visa situation is where the politics of all this became most visible. Iran’s federation president, Mehdi Taj, [was denied entry](https://www.aljazeera.com/sports/2026/6/5/iran-footballers-issued-us-visas-for-world-cup-says-white-house?ref=diplopolis.com) for the tournament draw in Washington in December because he is a former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which the United States designates as a terrorist organisation. Secretary of State Marco Rubio told lawmakers that the US would not allow anyone with ties to Iran’s military into the country for the tournament. Key administrative and managerial staff were refused entry even after the players were cleared in early June. Taj flew somewhere else. The players got on the Tijuana bus. The line the United States drew is not between Iran and not-Iran. It is between Iran-as-sport and Iran-as-state, and reading where that line falls tells you something that the diplomatic statements around this war do not. Trump’s own handling of the question moved through several registers over the preceding months. In March he [posted on Truth Social](https://www.foxnews.com/sports/trump-says-iranian-national-soccer-team-welcome-world-cup-sports-minister-signals-withdrawal?ref=diplopolis.com) that ‘The Iran National Soccer Team is welcome to The World Cup, but I really don’t believe it is appropriate that they be there, for their own life and safety.’ Later he told Politico ‘I really don’t care.’ When FIFA president Infantino went to the White House for a meeting, Trump apparently reiterated that Iran was welcome. None of this resolved the question of what he actually wanted, but it did establish that he was not going to take action to exclude the team. Iran’s players responded to his Truth Social post with a statement on their own Instagram that the country which ‘merely carries the title of host yet lacks the ability to provide security’ was the one that should face exclusion. There was a brief moment when it looked as though the question might be resolved by replacement. Paolo Zampolli, an Italian-American who serves as a US envoy for global relations, [told the Financial Times](https://www.aljazeera.com/sports/2026/4/23/italy-officials-say-replacing-iran-at-world-cup-2026-would-be-shameful?ref=diplopolis.com) that he had suggested to both Trump and FIFA president Infantino that Italy, who failed to qualify for the tournament for a third straight edition, should replace Iran. Italy’s sports minister Andrea Abodi rejected the idea, saying ‘you qualify on the pitch.’ The Italian economy minister called it ‘shameful.’ FIFA had already made its position clear: Infantino stood at the [FIFA World Congress in Vancouver](https://www.nbcnews.com/sports/soccer/iran-fifa-world-cup-united-states-soccer-rcna342964?ref=diplopolis.com) in May and said, with some force, ‘of course Iran will be participating at the FIFA World Cup 2026.’ The Italy episode is worth mentioning because it shows how far the disruption of the tournament was actually considered, and how completely it was foreclosed. The reason it was foreclosed has more to do with commercial logic than with principle. Pulling Iran from the draw would have meant voiding group stage match contracts, managing broadcaster and sponsor claims, and handling the institutional embarrassment of a World Cup host excluding a qualified team from competition. [Infantino attended](https://www.espn.com/soccer/story/%5F/id/48977850/iran-players-receive-us-visas-2026-world-cup?ref=diplopolis.com) Iran’s friendly against Costa Rica in Antalya in March and posted his support. He was protecting the product. The United States, having spent considerable effort winning co-hosting rights, was not in a position to blow up the tournament over a geopolitical situation that had not existed when those rights were awarded. American hegemony extends very far. It apparently does not extend to unilaterally pulling qualified nations from the World Cup when the commercial and institutional costs of doing so are high enough. Even hegemony has pricing. June 1998 offers an imperfect comparison that keeps being made anyway. The United States and Iran played each other at the World Cup in Lyon, France, during a period of cautious diplomatic warming under President Khatami. Iranian players gave their American counterparts white flowers before the opening whistle. Iran won 2-1\. The match was described at the time as the most politically meaningful sports fixture of the decade, and there was something genuine in the ceremony even if it was also choreographed. The 2026 encounter in Los Angeles carries none of that texture. There will be no flowers, no warming, no pre-match gesture toward reconciliation. The teams will play football. It is oddly possible that the 1998 match, staged during a ceasefire of sorts between the two countries’ foreign policies, carried more diplomatic weight than a 2026 match played while their militaries are actively engaged. War, it turns out, does not automatically make a football fixture more significant. It can also make it smaller, a routine sporting event that happens to involve two countries currently shooting at each other, squeezed in between other fixtures on the calendar. The Iranian diaspora in Southern California sits inside all of this in ways that are genuinely complicated to describe. The community known informally as Tehrangeles numbers several hundred thousand people, many of whom left Iran after the 1979 revolution and built lives in Los Angeles. They left a country whose supreme leader has now been killed by the government of the country they live in, and whose national football team is taking a bus from Tijuana to play in their adopted city. They are not a uniform political bloc. Some have spent decades opposing the Islamic Republic and may find the sight of the national team’s badge uncomfortable regardless of the quality of the football. Some have family in Iran whose daily lives are affected by the war in ways that cannot be addressed by whether a game ends 1-0 or 2-1\. Some are simply football supporters who will watch the match the way football supporters watch matches, which is to say with an investment in the result that briefly displaces everything else. The [flags people carry on June 15](https://www.nbclosangeles.com/world-cup/iran-world-cup-team-approved-visas/3900613/?ref=diplopolis.com) will say something, but what they say will depend on individual histories that no analysis of geopolitical structure can settle in advance. If both Iran and the United States advance as second-placed finishers in their respective groups, [they meet in Arlington, Texas](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026%5FFIFA%5FWorld%5FCup%5FGroup%5FG?ref=diplopolis.com) on July 3\. Nobody has moved the fixture. Neither government has formally requested that FIFA change the scheduling. The match would be played in an American stadium, in the middle of an active war, before a crowd whose political composition and emotional temperature it is genuinely difficult to predict. It would also be broadcast to hundreds of millions of people including in Iran, where football provides one of the few genuinely collective experiences that the state permits and does not fully control. A win for Iran in Arlington would register in Tehran in a way that is hard to measure but probably real. A loss would register differently. Whether either team gets there depends on group stage results that have not yet happened, and it is entirely possible that the fixture nobody moved will simply never occur because one side fails to qualify. But the fact that it exists in the bracket, unaddressed, is itself something. The US Ambassador to Turkey marked the visa approvals with a statement that [sports transcend borders](https://www.aljazeera.com/sports/2026/6/5/iran-footballers-issued-us-visas-for-world-cup-says-white-house?ref=diplopolis.com). The formula is diplomatic shorthand for a more specific truth: sports cross certain borders, determined by commercial agreements and the calculus of what any given government is prepared to lose, and decline to cross others. The borders here are not transcended. Mehdi Taj is not in the country. The IRGC commanders who coordinate operations in Lebanon are not attending the draw. The players took a bus through San Ysidro because that crossing was available to them and not to their colleagues. Reading the geography of those decisions is more useful than the ambassador’s phrase. The line between who gets in and who does not is the clearest available map of where this war actually runs, which is not the same as where the bombs are falling. This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) ### I Call The Shots URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/i-call-the-shots-trump-netanyahu-iran-war-june-2026/ Last updated: 2026-06-09T04:30:41.000Z On Sunday evening, after Iran launched missiles at northern Israel in response to the Dahiyeh strikes, Trump gave the Financial Times a quote that will define this week. '[I call the shots](https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5914563-donald-trump-israel-iran-ceasefire-deal/?ref=diplopolis.com),' he told the newspaper. 'I call all the shots. He doesn't call the shots.' He was speaking about Benjamin Netanyahu. Within hours, Israel struck military targets in Tehran, Tabriz and Isfahan. By Monday morning, the Israeli Air Force confirmed it had also hit a [petrochemical complex at Mahshahr](https://www.justsecurity.org/141615/early-edition-june-8-2026/?ref=diplopolis.com) in southwestern Iran. The shots had been called. In Jerusalem. The sequence of events across Sunday and Monday is the clearest possible statement of what this relationship is. Trump [told Netanyahu not](https://www.axios.com/2026/06/07/trump-netanyahu-israel-iran-strikes-call?ref=diplopolis.com) to retaliate. He said a deal was close, that he believed something good could happen as early as Monday. He called Netanyahu by phone. Israel struck Iran anyway. Iran [suspended its operations](https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/07/world/live-news/iran-war-trump-israel-lebanon?ref=diplopolis.com) and warned that any continuation of strikes on Lebanon would bring a more severe response. Netanyahu announced that Israel had halted its attacks on Iran, stopping short of calling it a ceasefire. Nobody called it a ceasefire because it is not a ceasefire. It is an interval. Today is the 100th day of the US-Israel war on Iran. The war that Washington called a limited operation has produced exactly the logic limited operations always produce: the definition of limited expands until it includes everything. What started as strikes on Iranian military infrastructure has become direct exchanges between Iran and Israel, Lebanese civilians dying in Dahiyeh, Houthi threats against Red Sea shipping and an American president announcing on television that his ally does not call the shots, immediately before his ally calls the shots. The question DiploPolis has been asking since April is not whether Netanyahu is defying American authority. [That is now settled](https://www.diplopolis.com/the-liability-state-israel-us-alliance-netanyahu/). The question is what Netanyahu is defying it for. The answer is becoming clear. He is methodically pushing the conflict beyond any boundary that a deal could contain. Every unilateral strike deepens the domestic pressure in Tehran to walk away from negotiations. Every new front opened, Lebanon, Iran's energy infrastructure, now the Strait, makes the map of any agreement larger and harder to draw. Netanyahu is making the deal that Trump wants structurally impossible. Whether that is the intention or the consequence is the only remaining question, and the answer does not change the outcome. Israel is pushing the envelope beyond what any American administration has historically absorbed without consequence. Strikes on Lebanon while ceasefire talks run. Strikes on Iran after Trump says stop. A [petrochemical plant](https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2026/06/08/770058/IRGC-targets-Haifa-industrial-sites-in-retaliation-for-Mahshahr-petchem-attack-?ref=diplopolis.com) in Mahshahr the morning after the president tells the world he controls what his ally does. Each step tests whether Washington will move from concern to cost. Each step has found the same answer: Washington will not. Trump told the FT that Netanyahu will have no choice but to accept whatever agreement Washington reaches with Iran. The framing reveals the problem. An agreement that Netanyahu has no choice but to accept is not an agreement that will hold. An Israeli prime minister who defies explicit American requests on the night of a major escalation has already calculated that the price of defiance is manageable. He has been paying it for a hundred days: phone calls, statements of concern and anonymous briefings to Axios that Washington was not informed in advance. It has proved affordable. The question is not what Netanyahu's war aims are. The question is what consequence Trump is prepared to impose for the war continuing on terms he did not choose. So far the answer is none. Until it changes, the shots will be called in Jerusalem regardless of what the president tells the Financial Times. ### Not Iran. Still Netanyahu. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/not-iran-still-netanyahu-israel-dahiyeh-beirut-june-2026/ Last updated: 2026-06-08T04:30:30.000Z On Sunday afternoon, six days after Trump told Netanyahu that Israeli escalation in Lebanon was endangering his Iran negotiations, the Israeli Air Force [struck Dahiyeh on Sunday](https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-898615?ref=diplopolis.com). The Lebanon ceasefire Washington brokered on June 1 lasted, in practice, until Netanyahu decided otherwise. This is not a new development. It is a confirmation. Every ceasefire in this conflict has been followed by Israeli strikes. Every moment of diplomatic progress has been accompanied by bombs. The obstacle to a lasting settlement has never been in Tehran. It has been in Jerusalem. The evidence is now beyond reasonable dispute. The [June 1 ceasefire](https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/01/world/live-news/iran-trump-lebanon-war-news?ref=diplopolis.com) was Washington's third attempt to halt the Lebanon dimension of the war. Lebanon's government agreed. Hezbollah initially indicated acceptance. Within a week, Hezbollah had fired into northern Israel. Within six days, Netanyahu had authorised Dahiyeh. The Israeli military stated the strikes were in response to Hezbollah's violations. The logic is circular and convenient: the ceasefire holds until the other side violates it, the other side always violates it, Israel always responds, the ceasefire always collapses and Washington always negotiates another one. Trump was furious with Netanyahu on June 1\. Sources told ABC News he was [angered by the escalation](https://abcnews.go.com/International/live-updates/iran-live-updates-irgc-claims-airbase-attack-after/?id=133475855&ref=diplopolis.com) and its potential to imperil the Iran negotiations. The anger produced a phone call. The phone call produced nothing. Six days later, Dahiyeh. The relationship between American anger and Israeli restraint is empirically established: there is none. This is the argument [DiploPolis has been making](https://www.diplopolis.com/washington-challenge-israel-netanyahu-not-iran/) since the day the US-Iran ceasefire was announced and Netanyahu's Air Force struck 100 Beirut targets within ten minutes. The question in this conflict has never been whether Trump can reach a deal with Iran. Iran has been at the table. Iran's officials have been in Islamabad. Iran has indicated terms. The question has always been whether Trump can reach a deal with Netanyahu. The answer is no. Not because Trump lacks the will. Because he has imposed no cost for the failure. American anger without American consequence is not diplomacy. It is theatre. Lebanon's Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said what his country's position has always been: [the fighting is](https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-us-war-israel-hezbollah-fighting-ceasefire-efforts/?ref=diplopolis.com) 'not being fought for our sake, but on our land and at the expense of our people.' He was addressing a humanitarian conference in Beirut while Israeli bombs were falling. The sentence is the most precise description of Lebanon's condition available: a country used as the battlefield for a conflict in which it is not a principal party, by an Israeli government that treats Lebanese sovereignty as irrelevant and by a Hezbollah that treats Lebanese civilians as its political shield. Iran has threatened a response to Sunday's strikes. The [IRGC's statement](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog-june-7-2026/?ref=diplopolis.com) was unambiguous: Dahiyeh was a violation of the ceasefire understanding that halted the war in April. If Tehran responds, the US-Iran negotiating track is at risk. If Tehran does not respond, Netanyahu has demonstrated he can strike Hezbollah at will without consequence from Washington or Tehran. Both outcomes serve the same purpose: the continuation of the war in Lebanon regardless of what happens in the broader diplomatic process. The war in Lebanon ends when Washington makes clear to Jerusalem that it does not. That clarity has not arrived. Until it does, every ceasefire is an interval. ### 12 Fellowships Worth Knowing — and What the Brochure Does Not Tell You URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/12-fellowships-worth-knowing-and-what-the-brochure-does-not-tell-you/ Last updated: 2026-06-05T20:00:29.000Z Pick up the brochure for almost any fellowship in international affairs and you will find the same language. Rigorous selection process. Commitment to diversity. Global reach. Outstanding candidates from all backgrounds. The language is genuine in its aspiration. What it does not advertise is the selection culture that has built up around these programmes over decades — the unspoken preference for candidates who already understand the idiom of the institutions doing the selecting, who have studied the right books at the right schools and whose applications arrive fluent in a particular dialect of ambition that was not designed in Lahore or Lagos or Chennai. That is not an argument for avoiding these programmes. It is an argument for understanding them clearly before you apply. Most prestigious fellowships in international affairs were designed by and for a specific kind of professional — Western-educated, English-fluent, connected to elite institutions. They have widened their stated criteria over the decades. They have not always widened their actual selection culture at the same pace. The 12 fellowships in this guide are genuinely worth knowing. Each offers something real: access, training, networks, time, money or some combination of all five. And each has an unstated logic that determines, as much as the official criteria, which candidates actually succeed. This guide is for the reader who needs to know both. ## **1\. Council on Foreign Relations — International Affairs Fellowship** The [CFR International Affairs Fellowship](https://www.cfr.org/fellowships/international-affairs-fellowship?ref=diplopolis.com) is among the most prestigious mid-career fellowships in US foreign policy and one of the most financially generous on this list, offering a stipend of $120,000 for 12 months as an independent contractor placement in either the US government or a leading international organisation. **Who it actually serves:** The CFR IAF is, in practice, a fellowship for American foreign policy professionals. Eligibility is limited to US citizens. The programme has more than 550 alumni who now populate the American foreign policy establishment — former secretaries of state, undersecretaries, ambassadors to NATO and the UN. Its institutional culture is that of Washington DC and New York’s foreign policy community, and its selection reflects it. **What it is selecting for:** Scholarly achievement combined with professional experience, a clear plan for how the fellowship year will bridge the gap between the candidate’s research and policy experience, and the kind of record that reads as credible to the CFR membership. The programme awards approximately 10 fellowships annually. What the selection is actually looking for is a candidate who can contribute to CFR’s current research priorities — RealEcon, China strategy, technology and climate — and who will strengthen the CFR network rather than merely benefit from it. **What a Global South applicant needs to know:** This fellowship is not open to non-US citizens. If you are not a US citizen, this programme is not accessible to you. Note it for what it tells you about the fellowship ecosystem: even the most prestigious awards in the field are, at their core, instruments of American foreign policy capacity development. That context is worth understanding when applying to any fellowship that does touch the Global South. **Practical details:** 12 months starting September. $120,000 stipend. Fellows are independent contractors and are not eligible for employment benefits including health insurance. Next cycle opens autumn 2026 for 2027–28\. US citizens only. Apply at [cfr.org/fellowships/international-affairs-fellowship](https://www.cfr.org/fellowships/international-affairs-fellowship?ref=diplopolis.com). ## **2\. Carnegie Endowment — James C. Gaither Junior Fellowship** The [Gaither Junior Fellowship](https://carnegieendowment.org/junior-fellows-program-faq?ref=diplopolis.com) places approximately 15 outstanding graduating seniors and recent graduates as research assistants to Carnegie’s senior scholars for 10 to 12 months in Washington DC, working across programmes covering democracy and governance, nuclear policy, technology and international affairs, the Middle East, and international security and South Asia. **Who it actually serves:** The programme is open to non-US citizens who attend US universities and are eligible to work in the United States for the full fellowship year. Applicants from participating universities outside the US must be US citizens. In practice, the intake tends to draw heavily from elite US universities — the programme requires nomination through a participating institution, and the list of participating universities reflects the US academic establishment. **What it is selecting for:** Exceptional academic quality and the research skills to contribute meaningfully to a specific Carnegie programme. The fellowship is programme-specific: applicants apply to work with a particular research team, and the selection assesses fit with that team’s current agenda as much as the candidate’s general ability. The South Asia programme specifically requires quantitative data analysis and GIS skills. The Middle East programme requires strong Arabic reading fluency. A candidate who precisely matches the technical and regional requirements of their chosen programme is significantly more competitive than a generalist with a strong transcript. **What a Global South applicant needs to know:** The nomination requirement means applicants must attend a participating US university. The South Asia and Middle East programmes are areas where candidates with genuine regional language skills and knowledge — something a candidate from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh or the Arab world possesses authentically — have a real advantage over American applicants who have studied the region from a distance. Apply to the programme that most precisely matches your specific expertise. The fellowship is not looking for generalists. **Practical details:** 10 to 12 months starting September 1\. $4,000 per month plus full benefits and up to $1,500 in relocation support. Deadline January 15\. Applications through participating universities only. Programme information at [Carnegie Junior Fellows FAQ](https://carnegieendowment.org/junior-fellows-program-faq?ref=diplopolis.com). Application portal: [carnegiegaitherjuniorfellows.embark.com](https://carnegiegaitherjuniorfellows.embark.com/?ref=diplopolis.com). ## **3\. Rotary Peace Fellowship** The [Rotary Peace Fellowship](https://www.rotary.org/en/our-programs/peace-fellowships?ref=diplopolis.com) funds master’s degree programmes at selected Rotary Peace Centres — Duke/UNC, the University of Bradford, Uppsala University, the International Christian University in Tokyo, Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok and Makerere University in Uganda — and one-year blended professional development certificate and postgraduate diploma programmes at additional centres including Bahçeşehir University in Istanbul and Symbiosis International University in Pune, India. **Who it actually serves:** This is the most genuinely global fellowship on this list. Since 2002, the programme has trained over 1,800 fellows from more than 140 countries, many of whom now serve in governments, NGOs, international organisations and peacekeeping forces worldwide. It has no citizenship restriction. Applications are processed through local Rotary clubs, which means access is determined by geography rather than institutional affiliation. The programme has a real presence in South Asia, Africa and the Middle East. **What it is selecting for:** A demonstrated commitment to peace through professional and community service, at least three years of relevant professional experience for the master’s track, and leadership potential as evidenced by the candidate’s record rather than by academic credentials alone. Rotary is a service organisation at its core: it is choosing people who have already shown they will act rather than people who are preparing to act at some future point. The selection process runs through three levels — local club, district and international — which means a relationship with a local Rotary club is essential, not optional. **What a Global South applicant needs to know:** The structure of the Rotary Peace Fellowship actively favours candidates who have done meaningful work in their own communities and regions rather than those who have accumulated elite Western academic credentials. A candidate from Nigeria who has spent three years in conflict prevention work, from Pakistan who has worked on community dialogue, or from Sri Lanka who has engaged in post-conflict reconciliation has exactly the kind of record this programme values. The new peace centre at Symbiosis International University in Pune opens a fully funded one-year postgraduate diploma route for mid-career peace and development professionals in Asia. Fellowship recipients may not study at a Rotary Peace Centre in their home country except in specified circumstances — check the current cycle guidance before applying. **Practical details:** Fully funded including tuition, room, board, return airfare and field study expenses. Up to 50 master’s fellowships and up to 120 certificate and diploma fellowships awarded annually. The 2027–28 application cycle is closed. The 2028–29 application is expected to open online in February 2027\. Check [rotary.org/en/our-programs/peace-fellowships](https://www.rotary.org/en/our-programs/peace-fellowships?ref=diplopolis.com) for the current cycle. Open to all nationalities. ## **4\. Fulbright Foreign Student Program** The [Fulbright Foreign Student Program](https://foreign.fulbrightonline.org/about/foreign-student-program?ref=diplopolis.com) is the most globally accessible fellowship in international affairs, funding graduate study and research across more than 160 countries for citizens of eligible nations. Administered through country-specific Fulbright Commissions or US Embassies, the programme funds approximately 4,000 international students per year for master’s and PhD study in the United States. **Who it actually serves:** Unlike the other primarily American fellowships on this list, Fulbright is explicitly structured as a two-way exchange: it also funds American citizens to study abroad. The Foreign Student Programme is specifically for citizens of other countries to study in the US. The programme is the most administratively decentralised on this list — administered locally in each country — which means the experience of applying, the profile of successful candidates and the level of support available varies dramatically by country. India, Nigeria, Pakistan and Egypt all have active Fulbright programmes with substantial scholarship allocations. **What it is selecting for:** Academic excellence combined with demonstrated civic engagement, community leadership and a credible plan for contributing to your home country on return. The research proposal or study plan must be specific — vague plans are among the most common reasons for rejection. Fulbright is a State Department foreign policy instrument, and its selection panels understand their role is to build long-term people-to-people relationships between the US and the applicant’s country. The candidate whose application tells a convincing story about what they will carry home and build with it is more competitive than the candidate whose application explains why American graduate school will benefit them personally. **What a Global South applicant needs to know:** Start with your country’s Fulbright Commission or US Embassy rather than generic application guides. The Fulbright-Nehru Fellowship for Indian students is administered through the United States-India Educational Foundation, with its own deadline typically in July — significantly earlier than most other country programmes. In high-volume countries, selection can be extremely competitive. Apply in the first cycle after you become eligible rather than waiting until you feel ready. The programme funds the professional it wants to help form, not the finished professional. **Practical details:** Full tuition, living stipend, airfare and health insurance. Package varies by country. Deadline varies by country — check your national Fulbright Commission. Apply at [foreign.fulbrightonline.org](https://foreign.fulbrightonline.org/about/foreign-student-program?ref=diplopolis.com). ## **5\. Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellowship** The [Scoville Peace Fellowship](https://scoville.org/?ref=diplopolis.com) offers six to nine months of full-time paid work at a nonprofit peace and security organisation in Washington DC, giving recent graduates direct practical experience in nuclear nonproliferation, climate and security, peacebuilding and conflict resolution, emerging technology threats and global health security. **Who it actually serves:** The Scoville Fellowship is a Washington DC programme, and its design reflects that geography. Non-US citizens living outside the United States are not eligible. US citizens are preferred; a fellowship to a non-US citizen residing in the US on a valid work visa is awarded periodically, but this is the exception rather than the rule. The programme is genuinely competitive — the selection looks for outstanding academic performance and a demonstrated commitment to peace and security through prior work, writing or advocacy. **What it is selecting for:** Prior public-interest activism or advocacy in peace and security is explicitly encouraged. The programme gives preference to candidates who have not had substantial prior public-interest or government experience in Washington — it is designed as an entry point, not a continuation. Fellows choose their host organisation from a list of more than two dozen participating nonprofits, which means the quality of the application depends partly on demonstrating genuine fit with the specific organisation chosen. The organisation match, not just the fellowship application, is what the selection panel assesses. **What a Global South applicant needs to know:** The eligibility restriction to US residents is a hard limit. If you are currently studying or working in the United States on an F-1 or equivalent visa and are eligible to work, you can apply. If you are outside the US, you cannot. For those who are eligible, the fellowship is a meaningful entry point into the Washington peace and security ecosystem that is otherwise very difficult to access from outside established networks. **Practical details:** Competitive monthly stipend plus partial health insurance and a $1,000 professional development allotment. Six to nine months. Check [scoville.org](https://scoville.org/?ref=diplopolis.com) for current stipend rate and upcoming deadlines. Preference for US citizens. ## **6\. Thomas R. Pickering Foreign Affairs Graduate Fellowship** The [Pickering Fellowship](https://pickeringfellowship.org/?ref=diplopolis.com), funded by the US Department of State and administered by Howard University and the Bureau of Global Talent Management, funds outstanding young Americans for two-year master’s degrees in preparation for careers in the US Foreign Service, with up to $42,000 annually covering tuition, room and board, books and fees plus an $18,000 academic year stipend. Fellows commit to a minimum five-year service in the US Foreign Service on completion of the programme. **Who it actually serves:** The Pickering is explicitly and exclusively for US citizens committed to Foreign Service careers. It is on this list not because it is accessible to most DiploPolis readers but because understanding it illuminates something important about how the US government approaches diplomatic training: it funds the degree, the internship and the path into service as a single integrated investment. The programme specifically seeks women, members of minority groups historically underrepresented in the Foreign Service, and students with financial need. **What it is selecting for:** An authentic commitment to a Foreign Service career, academic excellence, diversity of background, and the personal qualities that make a credible diplomat. The programme is honest about its purpose: it is building the diversity of the US Foreign Service rather than selecting the most conventionally credentialed applicants. A candidate from a background underrepresented in American diplomacy who can articulate a genuine and specific commitment to Foreign Service work is more competitive than a more conventionally credentialed candidate who cannot. **What a Global South applicant needs to know:** This fellowship is not accessible to non-US citizens. The [2026 application cycle has been postponed](https://pickeringfellowship.org/?ref=diplopolis.com) pending updates from the US Department of State. If you are a US citizen with interest in the Foreign Service, monitor the official website before planning your application timeline. **Practical details:** Up to $42,000 per year for two years. Minimum five-year Foreign Service commitment on completion. US citizens only. 2026 cycle currently postponed. Monitor [pickeringfellowship.org](https://pickeringfellowship.org/?ref=diplopolis.com) for updates. ## **7\. Boren Fellowship** The [Boren Fellowship](https://www.borenawards.org/?ref=diplopolis.com) funds US graduate students for language study and overseas research in world regions considered critical to US national security — sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, Eurasia, Latin America and the Middle East — in exchange for a commitment to work in a national security-related position in the US federal government after graduation. **Who it actually serves:** The Boren is a US-citizens-only fellowship that funds language immersion and overseas research. Its geographic coverage is genuinely Global South-oriented — the fellowship specifically prioritises regions and languages underrepresented in US national security: Arabic, Swahili, Hindi, Urdu, Turkish, Indonesian and similar languages receive more attention than European languages. This means the fellowship actively values the kind of regional expertise that a student with South Asian, African or Middle Eastern heritage can develop particularly rapidly. **What it is selecting for:** A credible proposal for how the overseas research or language study will contribute to US national security understanding, combined with the academic record to execute it. The service requirement — one year of national security-related federal employment — is binding and must be understood before applying: the Boren is an investment by the US government in its own national security capacity, and the selection reflects that purpose. **What a Global South applicant needs to know:** The Boren is not open to non-US citizens. However, it illustrates a pattern worth noting: the fellowships that best serve a Global South professional’s interest in their own region are often designed to fund other people’s study of that region. The demand for genuine expertise in South Asian languages, African political economy and Middle Eastern security from American institutions creates career opportunities for professionals from those regions who can serve as partners, counterparts and credibility sources. Understanding that demand is part of navigating the fellowship ecosystem strategically. **Practical details:** Up to $25,000 for overseas study and language immersion, with an optional additional $5,000 for summer domestic language study. One-year federal service requirement after graduation. US citizens in graduate programmes only. Deadlines vary by institution — typically January. Apply at [borenawards.org](https://www.borenawards.org/?ref=diplopolis.com). ## **8\. USIP Peace Scholar Fellowship** The [USIP Peace Scholar Fellowship](https://www.usip.org/grants-fellowships/fellowships/peace-scholar-fellowship-program?ref=diplopolis.com) funds approximately 18 doctoral candidates at US universities for 10 months of non-residential dissertation research on topics related to conflict management, peacebuilding and security studies, providing a stipend of up to $20,000 paid directly to the individual. **Who it actually serves:** This fellowship is open to non-US citizens enrolled as doctoral candidates at US universities, which makes it significantly more accessible than most US government-adjacent programmes. The USIP has funded over 400 scholars since 1988, many of whom have gone on to distinguished academic, policy and research careers. The programme explicitly encourages applications from members of groups traditionally underrepresented in the field of international relations, peace and conflict studies and diplomacy. **What it is selecting for:** High-quality, policy-relevant dissertation research with direct connection to USIP’s mission areas and the Minerva Research Initiative’s research priorities. The application must demonstrate that the dissertation will make an original contribution to understanding conflict management, peacebuilding or security — not merely that the researcher has an interesting academic question. The non-residential structure means the fellowship funds research rather than placement: candidates continue working at their own universities and research sites. **What a Global South applicant needs to know:** A doctoral student from India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Egypt or the Middle East researching conflict in their own region — Kashmir, the Sahel, Lebanon, the Horn of Africa — brings something to this fellowship that American doctoral students researching the same topics cannot bring: insider access, language depth and the analytical credibility that comes from having lived within the systems being studied. Name this explicitly in the application. The USIP is genuinely interested in perspectives that its predominantly Western research community does not have. **Practical details:** Up to $20,000 stipend, paid in three instalments over 10 months. Non-residential. Approximately 18 awards per year. Competition typically opens September annually — check current cycle. Applicants must have completed all PhD coursework and comprehensive exams. Open to non-US citizens enrolled at US universities. Apply at [usip.org/grants-fellowships](https://www.usip.org/grants-fellowships/fellowships/peace-scholar-fellowship-program?ref=diplopolis.com). ## **9\. International Geneva Peace Fellowship** The [International Geneva Peace Fellowship](https://www.interpeace.org/international-geneva-peace-fellowship-programme/?ref=diplopolis.com), a programme jointly organised by Interpeace and the Geneva Graduate Institute, offers 10 fellows a fully residential nine-month programme in Geneva from September to June, combining institutional placements, mentoring, applied research and direct engagement with the multilateral peace and humanitarian ecosystem of International Geneva. **Who it actually serves:** This programme is the most genuinely international on this list — open to candidates from all countries with no geographic restrictions, and explicitly designed to bring non-Western perspectives into the Geneva ecosystem. The 2026 intake of 10 fellows is drawn from recent graduates and junior to mid-career professionals. The programme is in its pilot phase, which means selection is both highly competitive and unusually consequential: the first rounds of fellows will shape the programme’s character for years. **What it is selecting for:** Leadership potential in peacebuilding and humanitarian diplomacy, alignment with the programme’s six thematic areas — new frontier of peacemaking, health and peace, ecumenical peacebuilding and faith-based diplomacy, youth participation in peacebuilding, protection of civilians, and women peace and security — and the genuine ability to contribute to practical initiatives rather than academic research. The fellowship is explicitly not a postdoctoral programme: it is a practice-oriented experience for professionals who want to work in peace and humanitarian systems, not researchers who want to study them. **What a Global South applicant needs to know:** The Geneva Peace Fellowship is the most significant new opportunity on this list for professionals from South Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Geneva is the centre of gravity for multilateral institutions, humanitarian organisations and diplomatic initiatives that shape the lives of people across the Global South. A professional from India, Kenya, Lebanon or Pakistan who can bring direct regional knowledge of the conflicts these institutions engage with has exactly the kind of credibility this programme needs. The fact that it is new and small — 10 fellows in its opening intake — means the competition is intense but the access it provides is exceptional. **Practical details:** Nine months, September 2026 to June 2027\. 10 fellows. Residential in Geneva. Fully funded including housing, institutional placements and professional development. The deadline for the 2026–27 programme closes June 7, 2026 at 11:59 pm CET — if you are reading this before Sunday night, apply immediately. Future applicants should monitor [interpeace.org](https://www.interpeace.org/international-geneva-peace-fellowship-programme/?ref=diplopolis.com) for the next cycle. Open to all nationalities. ## **10\. Diplomatic Innovation Project Fellowship** The [Diplomatic Innovation Project Fellowship](https://www.global-leaders.org/fellowship?ref=diplopolis.com), offered by the Center for Emerging Global Leaders, is a virtual fellowship for current undergraduate students interested in innovation in diplomacy, multilateralism and global governance. It is the most accessible entry point to the fellowship circuit on this list, removing the geographical barriers that restrict participation in Washington or Geneva-based programmes. **Who it actually serves:** This fellowship is open only to current undergraduate students — it does not accept early career professionals or postgraduate applicants. Its virtual format means participation does not require relocation, a US work visa or proximity to Washington. For an undergraduate student from the Global South who wants fellowship experience before applying to more competitive programmes after graduation, the Diplomatic Innovation Project offers a practical starting point. **What it is selecting for:** Interest in diplomatic innovation and emerging governance challenges, a clear sense of what the applicant wants to contribute to the programme, and the kind of initiative that characterises someone who applies before they feel fully qualified rather than after. The application is less demanding than the major programmes on this list, which makes the quality of the statement of purpose more decisive — there is less other material for the selection to weigh. **What a Global South applicant needs to know:** The virtual format is the point. For an undergraduate student in Lagos, Karachi or Colombo who cannot easily access Washington-based programmes, a virtual fellowship that builds professional networks, develops the habit of writing about policy and adds a fellowship credential to a CV before graduation opens real opportunities. Do not treat accessibility as a signal of diminished value — treat it as evidence that this programme was designed with your geography in mind. Note: this fellowship is for current undergraduates only. Early career professionals should look to the other programmes on this list. **Practical details:** Virtual. Runs September to May. Requires 10 to 15 hours per week. Open to current undergraduate students only. Applications close June 15, 2026\. Apply at [global-leaders.org/fellowship](https://www.global-leaders.org/fellowship?ref=diplopolis.com). ## **11\. Charles B. Rangel International Affairs Fellowship** The [Rangel Fellowship](https://rangelprogram.org/?ref=diplopolis.com), administered by Howard University’s Ralph J. Bunche International Affairs Center, funds graduate study, professional development internships and preparation for US Foreign Service careers, with up to $42,000 annually covering tuition, room, board, books and fees plus an $18,000 academic year stipend, focusing on bringing a broad range of perspectives and underrepresented voices into the US diplomatic corps. **Who it actually serves:** The Rangel is specifically for US citizens committed to Foreign Service careers. The programme was created in response to the documented underrepresentation of African Americans and other minority groups in US foreign policy leadership, and its institutional home at Howard University reflects that purpose deliberately. The fellowship is named after Congressman Charles Rangel, who championed diversity in US diplomacy for decades. **What it is selecting for:** Genuine commitment to a Foreign Service career, academic excellence, demonstrated leadership and community engagement, and the personal qualities that the State Department is specifically seeking to develop within underrepresented communities. The programme funds graduate study and includes a structured pathway into the Foreign Service examination process — it is not just a funding mechanism but an integrated career development programme. **What a Global South applicant needs to know:** The Rangel is not open to non-US citizens. However, for a DiploPolis reader who holds US citizenship from a South Asian, African or Caribbean background, the Rangel Fellowship is worth specific attention. Its emphasis on diversity is genuine rather than performative, its institutional home at Howard University signals a specific cultural commitment, and the pathway it provides into the Foreign Service is as structured as anything the US government offers. Like the Pickering, the 2026 application cycle has been postponed pending State Department updates. **Practical details:** Up to $42,000 per year for two years. US citizens only. 2026 cycle postponed pending State Department updates. Monitor [rangelprogram.org](https://rangelprogram.org/?ref=diplopolis.com) for updates on the next available cycle. ## **12\. Open Society Foundations Fellowship** The [Open Society Fellowship](https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/grants/open-society-fellowship?ref=diplopolis.com) funds independent projects, including journalism, research, policy analysis, advocacy and creative work, by public intellectuals working on the pressing challenges facing open societies. The most recently announced group of fellows each received a grant of $120,000, plus a project support budget, for one year. **Who it actually serves:** A recent group of fellows was drawn from seven cities: Beirut, Buenos Aires, Colombo, Dar es Salaam, Jakarta, Lagos and Taipei. This is the fellowship on this list that most explicitly centres the Global South — not as a target beneficiary but as the geographic location of its intellectual community. The programme funds writers, analysts, researchers and activists whose work is grounded in their own societies, and whose projects advance understanding of human rights, social justice, climate, inequality and open society values. **What it is selecting for:** Intellectual ambition, heterodox thinking, genuine originality and the ability to complete or significantly advance a specific project during the fellowship year. The selection panel is external and distinguished. What it is looking for is not the conventional academic or government-track professional that most fellowships prize, but the thinker whose work does not fit neatly into institutional categories — the journalist investigating a story no one else will fund, the analyst building a framework that challenges received wisdom, the writer whose project requires time and resources that no other programme provides. **What a Global South applicant needs to know:** The Open Society Fellowship is the most directly relevant programme on this list for the DiploPolis readership — independent analysts, journalists and public intellectuals working on international affairs from a non-Western vantage point. The seven focus cities signal exactly who the programme wants to hear from. A writer based in Lagos analysing West African security architecture, or an analyst in Colombo examining how post-civil-war societies build democratic institutions, or a journalist in Jakarta investigating Chinese investment patterns in Southeast Asia — these are the projects this fellowship funds. The stipend is transformational for a professional based in any of these cities, and the network of fellow public intellectuals it builds is genuinely global. **Practical details:** $120,000 grant per fellow, plus project support budget for one year. Funding structure and application windows may change — check [opensocietyfoundations.org/grants](https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/grants/open-society-fellowship?ref=diplopolis.com) and the Submittable portal for the current call. Open to public intellectuals in designated global cities. ## **The Honest Advice** There are four things no fellowship brochure will tell you, and every applicant on this list needs to know all four. Understand what the programme is actually for before applying. Every fellowship has an unstated purpose beyond its stated mission. The CFR International Affairs Fellowship is partly about building the relationships between the academy and government that serve American foreign policy interests. The Fulbright is partly about building a network of future leaders who carry a positive relationship with the United States back to their home countries. The Rotary Peace Fellowship is partly about building cross-cultural understanding through personal contact. The Open Society Fellowship is partly about creating independent intellectual voices that challenge authoritarian and illiberal tendencies in public life. None of this disqualifies these programmes. A candidate who understands the unstated purpose will write a significantly stronger application than one who only reads the official criteria — because the personal statement that speaks to what the fellowship is actually trying to accomplish is the one that rises to the top of every pile. The Global South applicant’s genuine advantage is specific and should be named explicitly. Readers from India, South Asia, Africa and the Middle East bring something that Western applicants often cannot: direct experience of the systems, conflicts and institutions these fellowships are ostensibly designed to improve. Direct field knowledge, language depth and institutional familiarity built from lived experience can be genuine advantages when tied to a strong, specific proposal. Name this in your application. Do not apologise for it or dilute it to sound more universally palatable. The fellowships that claim to want global perspectives mean it. Give them one. The personal statement is not about you. It is about the programme. The most common mistake in fellowship applications is a statement that explains why the fellowship would benefit the applicant. The most competitive statements explain why the applicant would benefit the programme — what they will bring to the programme, what they will contribute to the mission, what they will do with the credential that serves the fellowship’s larger purposes in the world. The selection panel is not a scholarship committee awarding a prize for achievement. It is an investment committee deciding which people will generate the highest return on their programme’s mission. Write accordingly. Apply earlier in your career than you think you should. The single most common regret among unsuccessful fellowship applicants is waiting until they felt ready. Fellowship selection panels are not choosing the finished professional. They are choosing the professional they want to help form. Apply before you feel fully qualified. That is precisely when these programmes are most interested in you. 🚧 **Fellowship deadlines, values and eligibility criteria change. Verify all details on official programme websites before applying. If you spot an error or an outdated link in this piece, write to* [editor@diplopolis.com](mailto:editor@diplopolis.com) *and we will correct it promptly.* This Dossier piece is free to read. Future Dossier pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) ### The New Central Asia URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/new-central-asia-kyrgyzstan-un-security-council-russia-rare-earths-2026/ Last updated: 2026-06-05T04:30:39.000Z On June 3, [Kyrgyzstan won a sea](https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/06/1167636?ref=diplopolis.com)t on the United Nations Security Council for the first time in its 34-year history as an independent state. Two weeks earlier, Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin filed a complaint about losing Central Asia's rare earths to Washington. Both things happened in the same fortnight. One is a celebration. The other is a tell. Kyrgyzstan defeated the Philippines across four rounds of voting to take the Asia-Pacific seat for 2027 to 2028\. President Sadyr Japarov had framed the campaign as a bid to give voice to countries that have never held a seat — landlocked, mountainous, specific in their security and climate challenges. The campaign worked. It is the first time Central Asia has had representation on the Council since Kazakhstan served in 2017 and 2018. On May 20, [Galuzin told Izvestia](https://www.mining.com/web/russia-is-concerned-by-us-eu-rare-earth-activity-in-central-asia-media-reports?ref=diplopolis.com): 'We are concerned by the intensity with which Washington is pushing agreements on critical minerals and rare earth metals.' Then the line that gives the game away: 'This is not merely about economic competition, but about an attempt to push Russia out and create a Western-controlled infrastructure in the immediate vicinity of our borders.' That is not a warning. It is an admission. Russia considers Central Asia — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan — its sphere of interest. The five nations sit on deposits of rare earth metals, critical minerals and energy reserves that G7 nations want as a counterweight to China's dominance in global supply chains. Trump [hosted all five Central Asian presidents](https://www.mining.com/web/russia-is-concerned-by-us-eu-rare-earth-activity-in-central-asia-media-reports?ref=diplopolis.com) at the White House in November, calling critical minerals a key priority. The EU has been pursuing its own agreements. Russia, watching both, filed a complaint — because complaining is what you do when you have run out of capacity to act. The arithmetic of Central Asian allegiances has shifted visibly. Kazakhstan, Russia's closest partner in the region, pointedly refused to send troops to Ukraine and has been expanding trade routes that bypass Russian territory. Kyrgyzstan froze its participation in the [Collective Security Treaty Organisation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collective%5FSecurity%5FTreaty%5FOrganization?ref=diplopolis.com), Moscow's regional military alliance. The organisation Russia built to keep Central Asia in its orbit has become the clearest measure of how far the orbit has drifted. Meanwhile China has deepened its presence across all five nations — rail lines, cement plants, technology parks, financial institutions — while the US and EU now compete with Beijing for the very minerals that will power the clean energy transition. Central Asia is not watching this competition from outside. It is running it. A sphere of interest requires the capacity to enforce it. Russia's army is in Ukraine. Its economy is under sanctions. Its energy leverage over Central Asia is diminishing as the region diversifies. The Central Asian states are watching all three great powers, calculating and playing each against the others as they have done for 30 years. The five countries of Central Asia have a phrase for this. Multi-vector foreign policy. It means maintaining relationships with Russia, China, the US and the EU simultaneously, extracting what each has to offer while committing fully to none. It is a strategy born of geography and necessity. Landlocked, resource-rich and surrounded by powers that have historically treated them as objects rather than subjects, they have learned to make competition work for them. Kyrgyzstan's Security Council seat is the most visible expression of that strategy this week. The seat does not give Bishkek a veto. It gives it a platform, a voice and two years of legitimacy at the table where the great powers who want its rare earths also argue about the rules of international order. Among the issues Kyrgyzstan will now help deliberate: Afghanistan, counterterrorism, water security and the transnational dynamics that define Central Asian life. The Council's most powerful members have spent decades treating these as peripheral concerns. Kyrgyzstan will have something to say about that. Russia calls the region its backyard. The backyard just won a Security Council seat. ### The Liability State URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-liability-state-israel-us-alliance-netanyahu/ Last updated: 2026-06-04T11:00:26.000Z On June 1, 2026, [Axios reported](https://www.axios.com/2026/06/01/trump-netanyahu-lebanon-israel-bomb-beirut?ref=diplopolis.com) that President Donald Trump told Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu he was ‘fucking crazy’. The exact words, cited by two US officials and a third source briefed on the call, were these: ‘You’d be in prison if it weren’t for me. I’m saving your ass. Everybody hates you now. Everybody hates Israel because of this.’ Trump was furious because Israel’s escalation in Lebanon, comprising strikes on Hezbollah positions in Beirut’s southern suburbs and an expanding ground operation in the south, was directly threatening to collapse the negotiations he had spent months building to end the US-Israel war on Iran. He steamrolled Netanyahu, according to the officials. Israel agreed to pause the Beirut strikes. Within hours, [Netanyahu’s office confirmed](https://www.timesofisrael.com/trump-said-to-yell-at-netanyahu-youre-fking-crazy-youd-be-in-prison-if-not-for-me/?ref=diplopolis.com) that Israel would continue its military operation in southern Lebanon as planned. The ceasefire announcement produced a social media post and a night of continued fighting. National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir [publicly told Netanyahu](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/article-898056?ref=diplopolis.com) to tell Trump ‘no’. ‘This is the time to tell our friend, President Trump — no,’ he wrote. Not a fringe voice. A cabinet minister. In public. Iran briefly suspended nuclear talks over Israel’s actions in Lebanon. Trump said talks continue at a rapid pace. By June 3, Trump [confirmed to Fox News](https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-confirms-crazy-netanyahu-clash-questions-mount-over-push-hold-fire-hezbollah-terrorists?ref=diplopolis.com) that he had been ‘a little bit perturbed’ and told Netanyahu ‘we gotta stop this.’ IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir visited the Haifa Naval Base the same day and [told his forces](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog%5Fentry/idf-chief-says-no-ceasefire-for-our-forces-in-lebanon/?ref=diplopolis.com) that in Lebanon, ‘there is no ceasefire for our forces.’ Israel and Lebanon [announced a renewed ceasefire](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/israel-lebanon-ceasefire-hezbollah-trump-netanyahu-iran/?ref=diplopolis.com). The patron screamed. The ally conceded the minimum. The patron declared victory. The ally continued. This is the liability state. Not a patron that has lost control of its ally. A patron that has concluded it cannot afford to regain it, and an ally that has read that conclusion correctly and is acting on it. ## **The Pattern** There is a recognisable arc in the history of great power patronage, and it runs consistently. Patrons tolerate liability until the strategic cost of the relationship exceeds the strategic benefit. When that calculation tips, the patron finds a mechanism for distance. The mechanism varies. The pattern does not. Pakistan is the clearest precedent. The United States supported Pakistan across four decades as a frontline state: a supply route for Afghanistan, a nuclear counterweight and an intelligence partner against Soviet and then jihadist expansion. The liability accumulated quietly. Abdul Qadeer Khan transferred nuclear centrifuge designs to Iran, Libya and North Korea throughout the 1990s. Pakistan’s security services maintained relationships with Taliban factions that were killing American soldiers. [Bin Laden lived in Abbottabad](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death%5Fof%5FOsama%5Fbin%5FLaden?ref=diplopolis.com), a short drive from Pakistan’s premier military academy, until American forces killed him there in 2011\. The United States registered each of these as a liability and sustained the relationship regardless, because Pakistan remained strategically indispensable. The cost of the relationship was real. The cost of ending it was higher. The calculation held. South Vietnam broke differently. The Ford administration ended military support in 1975 not because the relationship had become strategically worthless but because Congress refused further funding and the domestic political cost of sustaining the war had become untenable. The patron’s domestic politics produced a policy change that its strategic calculation, left alone, might not have. The liability arc completed. Apartheid South Africa completed the arc through a different mechanism: legislative override. The Reagan administration resisted sanctions for years on the grounds of strategic value. Congress [overrode Reagan’s veto](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comprehensive%5FAnti-Apartheid%5FAct?ref=diplopolis.com) in 1986 to impose the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. The domestic political cost, the moral weight of protecting an apartheid state, finally exceeded the strategic benefit the administration calculated. The pattern is consistent. Liability accumulates. A triggering mechanism, whether domestic politics, legislative revolt, public opinion or the sheer weight of strategic damage, eventually produces a policy change. The question in every case is not whether the liability will eventually be addressed. It is what tips the calculation, and when. Israel has crossed into liability territory under the current government. The evidence is specific, public and accumulating. Netanyahu defied a direct presidential statement in real time. Trump announced a ceasefire on social media. Israel said it would continue operations as planned. Eight more Lebanese were killed overnight. Ben-Gvir’s public call for Netanyahu to tell Trump ‘no’ is not an aberration from Israeli government policy. It is a reading of it. If the government believed the United States would impose meaningful consequences for defiance, Ben-Gvir would not have published that statement. [Netanyahu told Israeli television](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/26/what-is-greater-israel-and-how-popular-is-it-among-israelis?ref=diplopolis.com) in August 2025 that he subscribes ‘absolutely’ to the vision of a Greater Israel, with biblical borders from the Nile to the Euphrates encompassing parts of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has announced territorial intentions in Lebanon and Syria. These are not theological musings. They are public ministerial statements from members of a government that Washington is arming, funding and defending at the United Nations. [The United States has vetoed](https://globalaffairs.org/commentary-and-analysis/blogs/how-us-has-used-its-power-un-support-israel-decades?ref=diplopolis.com) more than 45 Security Council resolutions critical of Israel, more than half of every veto Washington has ever cast. In February 2025 the Trump administration [sanctioned the ICC’s chief prosecutor](https://www.jurist.org/news/2025/12/us-imposes-sanctions-on-two-icc-judges-after-rejecting-israeli-challenge-in-war-crimes-case/?ref=diplopolis.com) for issuing arrest warrants against Israeli officials. Subsequent rounds have targeted more than nine ICC judges and prosecutors because they applied international law to a US ally. Washington is not merely shielding Israel from accountability. It is punishing the institution that sought accountability. And through all of it, Israel’s escalation in Lebanon has directly undermined the Iran nuclear negotiations. Tehran has made clear that any deal requires stability in Lebanon. The ally is not merely being a liability. It is actively destroying the patron’s primary diplomatic objective. ## **Why This Is Different** The liability arc that cut South Vietnam loose and ultimately isolated apartheid South Africa cannot produce the same outcome with Israel. The reason is structural, not strategic. South Vietnam had no domestic political constituency in the United States capable of sustaining congressional support against the weight of public opinion. Apartheid South Africa had strategic value but no moral constituency; the churches, the civil rights movement and eventually mainstream Republican opinion turned against the relationship. When the domestic politics shifted, the policy followed. Israel retains genuine strategic utility. Intelligence cooperation, military technology, the Abraham Accords framework and Israel’s role as the only reliable military partner in a region of unstable states have not evaporated. They have been complicated by the current government’s conduct. They have not disappeared. But the decisive difference is the domestic political architecture. AIPAC’s influence on congressional elections is not incidental; it is structural, bipartisan and durable across administrations. The evangelical base’s theological commitment to Israeli statehood is not a political preference. It is a religious conviction held by millions of voters who form a core component of the coalition that elected Trump and will determine the composition of the next Congress. These constituencies do not moderate their position because a cabinet minister publicly defied a presidential statement. The political mechanism for acting on the liability calculation simply does not operate the same way. This is the trap. The liability is real and visible. The mechanism for addressing it is constrained to the point of paralysis. The patron can scream on a phone call. It cannot impose consequences that its own political coalition would not tolerate. ## **What Paralysis Produces** When a patron cannot cut a liability and cannot discipline it, three things happen, and all three are visible now. The patron’s credibility with other allies erodes. If Washington cannot control Tel Aviv, if a sitting Israeli cabinet minister can publicly instruct his prime minister to tell the American president ‘no’ without consequence, then the value of American assurances to Riyadh, Ankara, New Delhi or Seoul must be reassessed. The assurance is only as credible as the patron’s demonstrated capacity to enforce its commitments. The patron’s diplomatic capacity is constrained. Every negotiation Washington enters is now shadowed by the question of whether Israel will undermine it. The Iran nuclear talks are the immediate case. Future negotiations in the region will carry the same shadow. The patron’s word is only as good as its ability to deliver its ally’s compliance, and that ability is visibly compromised. And the ally, reading the patron’s paralysis correctly, escalates further. Ben-Gvir’s ‘no’ is not a slip. It is a strategic assessment. The Israeli far right has concluded, with considerable evidence, that Washington will absorb almost any amount of defiance without imposing the consequences that would actually constrain Israeli conduct. That conclusion is driving the escalation that is driving the damage accumulating in the liability ledger. The events of June 1 to June 3 confirmed all three simultaneously. Netanyahu threatened to bomb Beirut. Trump screamed at him. Netanyahu postponed the Beirut strikes and said Lebanon operations would continue as planned. The IDF chief told his forces there was no ceasefire for their forces. A renewed ceasefire was announced. Iran suspended talks. Trump said talks continue. The credibility of American assurances took another measurable hit. The Iran deal lost another week of momentum. And Ben-Gvir’s calculation, that defiance produces no meaningful consequences, was confirmed again. Three days. The pattern, documented in real time. ## **The Verdict** Ben-Gvir is not defying the United States despite American power. He is defying it because of American paralysis. Netanyahu did not continue operations in southern Lebanon in spite of Trump’s anger. He continued them because Trump’s anger has, across two administrations, produced no consequences that change the calculation. The United States has not lost control of Israel. It has decided, repeatedly and deliberately, that it cannot afford the cost of regaining it. In that gap, the most destabilising government in Israeli history has found its operating space, and it is using it. This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) ### Make Armenia Great Again URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/make-armenia-great-again-trump-putin-pashinyan-election-june-2026/ Last updated: 2026-06-04T04:30:34.000Z On May 27, Donald Trump posted on Truth Social that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has his ['COMPLETE and TOTAL Endorsement'](https://www.euronews.com/2026/05/28/trump-endorses-pashinyan-ahead-of-armenias-high-stakes-historic-elections?ref=diplopolis.com) for re-election on June 7\. He called him a great friend and leader, said Pashinyan completely shares his vision of peace and prosperity, and announced they would soon break ground together on the 'Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity' — an energy corridor through Armenia giving American companies access from Central Asia to the United States. The post ended with 'Make Armenia Great Again — MAGA.' Armenia has not been great again in the way Trump means. It lost Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 and again in 2023, when Azerbaijan retook the enclave in 24 hours and 100,000 Armenians fled in a single day. Its borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan remain closed. It is landlocked, small and almost entirely dependent on Russia for its gas, oil and rough diamonds at below-market prices. Up to half a million Armenian citizens live and work in Russia. Pashinyan has spent eight years since his Velvet Revolution trying to loosen that dependence. He [diversified Armenia's military procurement](https://kyivindependent.com/pashinyan-heads-to-vote-with-trumps-support-moscows-hostility/?ref=diplopolis.com) away from Russia through contracts with India, France and other partners, froze Armenian membership of Moscow's CSTO military alliance in 2024 and signed a historic peace agreement with Azerbaijan at the White House last August. He is, by any measure, the most genuinely pro-Western leader Armenia has ever had. Russia's response has been methodical and escalating. Since Trump's endorsement, Moscow has [banned Armenian produce imports](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/05/28/russia-ramps-up-pressure-on-armenia-with-produce-import-ban-a92871?ref=diplopolis.com), threatened gas price hikes, warned of suspension from the Eurasian Economic Union and raised the possibility of cutting off the cheap energy supplies that keep the Armenian economy functional. Putin, at the EAEU summit in Astana, which Pashinyan conspicuously did not attend, drew explicit parallels between Armenia and Ukraine. The message was precise and familiar: this is what happens to countries that choose the wrong direction. Analysts tracking the election have noted that Russia is [employing influence operations](https://www.zois-berlin.de/en/publications/zois-spotlight/russia-and-armenias-2026-parliamentary-elections?ref=diplopolis.com) similar to those used earlier in Moldova and Georgia, a systematic effort to shape Armenia's political and information environment from outside its borders. The Trump endorsement is genuinely unusual. Trump has backed Viktor Orbán in Hungary and pro-Kremlin forces across Russia's neighbourhood. [Pashinyan is the exception](https://www.thearmenianreport.com/post/rubio-russia-wants-pashinyan-to-lose-armenia-s-election-over-growing-u-s-ties?ref=diplopolis.com) — not because Trump has become a champion of liberal democracy in the South Caucasus but because American energy companies need the corridor Armenia would provide. The Trump Route is not a foreign policy vision. It is a pipeline pitch with a flag attached. The election on Sunday is not genuinely competitive. Pashinyan's support has [fallen to around 32 per cent](https://eurasianet.org/commentary-breaking-down-key-dynamics-of-armenias-2026-parliamentary-elections?ref=diplopolis.com) among all respondents, rising to 38 per cent among likely voters, a sharp decline from his post-revolution highs. But the opposition is weaker and more divided. Three main blocs challenge Civil Contract: the Strong Armenia alliance, backed by Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan; the Armenia Alliance led by former President Robert Kocharyan, who advocates [deeper ties with Russia](https://sovanews.tv/en/2026/05/31/whos-who-in-armenias-2026-parliamentary-elections/?ref=diplopolis.com); and the Prosperous Armenia party. Among decided voters Civil Contract leads with nearly 65 per cent. Pashinyan is an unpopular frontrunner running against an opposition that cannot agree on what it wants except to reverse the direction he has set. What is genuinely competitive is the pressure being applied to the country from both sides simultaneously. Russia is threatening its gas. Washington is offering a corridor. Neither is asking what Armenia actually needs. The country is three million people, landlocked, historically besieged and now the object of superpower attention not because the superpowers care about Armenia but because Armenia sits between things they want. The choice Armenia faces on Sunday is not really between Pashinyan and his opponents. It is between two kinds of dependency, one of which has stopped pretending to be a partnership. The Trump Route will transform the South Caucasus, Trump said. Armenia, which has survived three decades of blockade, one genocide in living memory and two wars over the same mountain enclave, will be transformed whether it wants to be or not. The superpowers have decided. The corridor must be built. ### The Dream and Its Boundaries URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-criminal-state-lawrence-douglas-review-international-justice/ Last updated: 2026-06-03T11:00:49.000Z A review of [*The Criminal State: War, Atrocity, and the Dream of International Justice*](https://amzn.to/4o1RvEa?ref=diplopolis.com) by [Lawrence Douglas](https://www.amherst.edu/people/facstaff/lrdouglas?ref=diplopolis.com) Princeton University Press · 2026 In October 1945, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg did something that international law had never quite managed before. It said, in terms that could not be easily unmade, that the state itself could be the criminal. Not merely the soldier who pulled the trigger. Not merely the official who signed the order. The state, its leaders, its apparatus and its sovereign authority, could stand in the dock. That was the dream. Seventy years later, the International Court of Justice issued provisional measures ordering Israel to prevent genocidal acts in Gaza. The measures were binding. The killing continued. The dream, it turns out, has boundaries. The question Lawrence Douglas's important and sombre book forces us to ask is whether those boundaries are a temporary failure of political will, or a permanent feature of what international justice is actually able to do. Douglas traces the legal imagination's attempt to confront radical state violence across more than a century, from Leopold's Congo through Nazi aggression to Putin's war in Ukraine. The Criminal State is not a work of cynicism. It is something harder to write and more honest to read: a work of tragic faith. Douglas takes the legal project seriously precisely because he understands how badly it has failed. He is interested in how law has tried to name atrocity, pierce sovereignty and hold power accountable, and in why that attempt, despite its spectacular partial successes, has never quite become the permanent architecture of world order that Nuremberg seemed to promise. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/06/The-Dream-and-Its-Boundaries_BC.png)](https://amzn.to/4o1RvEa?ref=diplopolis.com) The emotional centre of the book is Nuremberg itself. The tribunal made sovereign criminality legally speakable. It created a vocabulary. It opened a door. What Robert Jackson, the United States Chief Prosecutor, called 'the supreme international crime' was not the massacre or the camp. It was aggression itself — the decision to wage war. 'To initiate a war of aggression,' the tribunal's judgment declared, 'is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.' That formulation was meant to be the foundation of a new legal order. What followed instead was the structural disappointment that Douglas is too historically serious to avoid. Nuremberg does not become the foundation of a new legal order that disciplines power regardless of who holds it. It becomes a precedent, selectively invoked, feared when inconvenient, narrowed when powerful states are implicated. Douglas is particularly attentive to what he identifies as the shift from Nuremberg's focus on aggression to what he calls the atrocity paradigm: the gradual narrowing of international criminal accountability from the crime of launching wars to the crimes committed within them. That shift matters more than it might appear. Nuremberg prosecuted the decision to wage war. The International Criminal Court, by contrast, has built its docket almost entirely around atrocities committed within conflicts — war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide. The architects of wars that kill hundreds of thousands remain largely beyond reach. The commanders who carry out massacres within those wars are more exposed. It is a distinction that has quietly protected the powerful while appearing to advance accountability. The most consequential decisions in modern warfare — the decision to invade, to blockade, to bomb — remain the hardest to prosecute. There is a phrase in the book that carries more weight than its technical framing suggests: the belatedness problem. Atrocity trials almost always come after. After the dead have been counted. After the displaced have lost everything. After the political conditions that permitted the crime have shifted enough that prosecution becomes possible. Consider the cases that defined international criminal justice after Nuremberg — Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, Darfur. In each instance, the tribunals arrived into the ruins of violence that had already run its course. The architects of the Rwandan genocide were prosecuted after 800,000 people had been killed in a hundred days. Slobodan Milosevic died in his cell before a verdict could be delivered. Omar al-Bashir evaded arrest for fifteen years while the court that indicted him watched powerless. Belatedness is not a scheduling inconvenience. It is the wound at the centre of international criminal justice. The law arrives. But it arrives into a world that has already absorbed the damage. ## When the Dream Was Tested On November 21, 2024, the ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber unanimously issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Gaza. For the first time in the court's history, an arrest warrant had been issued for the sitting leader of a Western-aligned state. It was the moment the dream seemed to arrive on time rather than after the fact. The belatedness problem, for once, appeared to have been avoided. The response was immediate and structural. On February 6, 2025, President Trump signed Executive Order 14203, imposing sanctions on the ICC's Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan and authorising asset freezes and travel bans against court officials and others supporting its work on investigations of American citizens or allies. Secretary of State Rubio subsequently expanded the sanctions to eight ICC judges. The UN described it as an attack on the global rule of law. The United States — the country whose chief prosecutor Robert Jackson called aggression the supreme international crime at Nuremberg in 1945 — was now sanctioning the judges of the court built on Nuremberg's promise for attempting to hold a US ally accountable. The circle was complete. Hungary provided the test case of what that environment produces in practice. When Netanyahu visited Budapest in April 2025, Hungary — an ICC member state legally obligated to arrest him under the Rome Statute — gave him a red carpet welcome instead. Prime Minister Orbán invited him, assured him of his safety and announced Hungary would withdraw from the ICC the same day. The ICC initiated proceedings against Hungary for non-compliance. Hungary did not reverse course. When Netanyahu visited again in March 2026 for a conference, the ICC had already found Hungary in breach of its obligations. Netanyahu walked in and out without consequence. The warrant existed. The world watched. The arrest did not happen. These are not anomalies in Douglas's framework. They are its fulfilment. International justice disciplines power when politics permits it. Politics permits it most readily against the defeated, the isolated, the inconvenient or the no longer useful. The law disciplines power when power allows it. When power does not allow it — when the accused is sanctioned by Washington, welcomed by Budapest, and shielded by a Security Council veto — the law speaks into silence. That silence is not accidental. It is maintained by specific actors with specific interests in maintaining it. ## The Stress Test Gaza makes this visible in ways that Douglas's book, ending as it does with Ukraine, does not fully confront. That is not a criticism of his scholarship. Books have cut-off points. But for this particular book, Gaza is not simply another omitted current event. It is the stress test of the argument. Gaza asks whether international justice still has the courage of its own vocabulary when the accused is protected by the architecture of Western power. The ICC issued the warrants. Washington sanctioned the court's officials for issuing them. An ICC member state refused to execute the warrants and withdrew from the court in protest. The Security Council cannot act because one permanent member — the same state whose prosecutor called aggression the supreme international crime at Nuremberg — uses its veto to protect the accused. The structural accountability that Nuremberg promised has not merely failed to materialise. It has been actively dismantled at the precise moment it was most visibly needed. Douglas has written a book about the dream of international justice at precisely the moment Gaza forces us to ask whether that dream still belongs to everyone, or only to those whose suffering does not embarrass power. His book does not answer that question. It may not have intended to. But it has written the most honest account of why the question is so hard to answer: because the dream was always struggling inside politics, and politics has never been neutral about whose crimes get named. ## The Honest Verdict Douglas, as I read the architecture of his position, stands inside the tragic liberal faith of international law. He knows its failures. He knows its dependency on political consent. But he still believes the legal project matters because it changes the moral vocabulary of world politics, because it makes certain crimes harder to deny even when it cannot make them impossible to commit. That is not a naive position. It is a serious one. But it may not be serious enough. International justice does not merely depend on political will in the abstract. It depends on whose political will, and in whose interest that will operates. The law disciplines power when politics permits it. And on that battlefield, not everyone fights on equal terms. The Criminal State is essential reading. Not because it resolves the tension between law and power. Because it refuses to pretend the tension does not exist. Read it alongside the ICC docket. Read it alongside the news from Gaza. Read it alongside the executive order that sanctioned the court's prosecutor for trying to do his job. Read it as a record of what humanity has learned to say after atrocity, and ask yourself, when you finish, whether saying it has ever been enough. This Book Review is free to read. Future Book Reviews will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### The Bible Is Not a Border URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/bible-not-border-israel-lebanon-incursion-greater-israel/ Last updated: 2026-06-03T04:30:10.000Z On Sunday, Israeli forces [captured Beaufort Castle](https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/05/31/israel-says-military-captures-beaufort-castle-in-southern-lebanon/?ref=diplopolis.com) in southern Lebanon — a medieval Crusader fort perched on a mountain ridge overlooking the south of the country and northern Israel. It was Israel's deepest ground penetration into Lebanese territory in 26 years. An Israeli military spokesman said soldiers were 'writing a new chapter by planting their flag at Beaufort Castle.' Defence Minister Israel Katz said troops would remain there as part of Israel's permanent security zone. The last time Israel seized Beaufort Castle, it held it for 18 years. This is not about the castle. It is about what the castle represents. [More than 3,000 Lebanese have been killed](https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-war-us-trump-strikes-ceasefire-lebanon-israel/?ref=diplopolis.com) since March. Over a million have been displaced. Israel has ordered residents of Nabatiyeh — one of the largest cities in southern Lebanon — to evacuate, alongside the residents of Tyre, Lebanon's fourth-largest city. Both cities remain standing. Neither is in Israel. Israel is telling their populations to leave anyway. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has declared that Israel's northern border 'must be the Litani River' and announced what he called a [territorial expansion into Lebanon and Syria](https://novaramedia.com/2026/04/10/israeli-minister-announces-border-expansion-in-palestine-lebanon-and-syria/?ref=diplopolis.com). In August 2025, a right-wing Israeli talk show host gave Netanyahu a piece of jewellery shaped to the borders of Greater Israel — stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates — and asked if he connects to the vision. Netanyahu said [Absolutely](https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/netanyahu-spells-out-vision-for-greater-israel/?ref=diplopolis.com). He told Israeli media the same week that he feels a deep connection to the Greater Israel vision and described it as 'a historical and spiritual mission.' The Arab League condemned the remarks. Jordan called them a serious provocative escalation. Washington did not respond. The Greater Israel project is not fringe ideology. It is government policy, stated publicly, by the prime minister and the finance minister, with reference to biblical borders that stretch from the Nile to the Euphrates. Israeli soldiers have been [photographed wearing patches](https://www.nepm.org/national-world-news/2026-05-31/israel-is-extending-its-footprint-through-war-for-some-its-part-of-a-greater-plan?ref=diplopolis.com) with Greater Israel maps. Israeli activists have [filmed themselves dancing in Syria](https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/national-international/israel-captures-strategic-castle-in-lebanon-deepest-incursion-in-26-years/6507262/?ref=diplopolis.com) after crossing from Israeli-controlled territory. Settlement infrastructure is being built in Gaza, buffer zones are hardening in Lebanon and Israeli forces have conducted ground incursions into Syria deeper than any since 1967. The UN Security Council — every member except the United States — [called for Israel to withdraw](https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-war-us-trump-strikes-ceasefire-lebanon-israel/?ref=diplopolis.com) from southern Lebanon. The resolution failed because Washington vetoed it. The Security Council exists to enforce international law. The United States exists to shield Israel from it. These two facts have coexisted for decades. What is different now is that the language of annexation is no longer euphemistic. It is explicit. Biblical. Ministerial. Prime ministerial. A country that uses sacred texts as title deeds is not making a security argument. It is making a theological one. International law has no jurisdiction over Genesis. That is precisely the point. On Monday evening, Trump [posted on Truth Social](https://www.axios.com/2026/06/01/trump-netanyahu-lebanon-israel-bomb-beirut?ref=diplopolis.com) that he had spoken with Netanyahu and that Israeli troops would not go to Beirut and all shooting would stop. Netanyahu said publicly that strikes would continue as planned. Eight more Lebanese were killed overnight. The ceasefire Trump announced lasted approximately as long as the post. Washington cannot veto its own ally's army. The castle fell on Sunday. The flag went up. The troops will stay. For Netanyahu, the Bible is the mission. ### Modi's India: Vishwaguru Abroad, Bulldozers Back Home URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/modis-india-vishwaguru-abroad-bulldozers-back-home/ Last updated: 2026-06-02T11:00:43.000Z In May 2026, Narendra Modi stood in Oslo alongside the Norwegian Prime Minister and a journalist asked him a question. Not a hostile question. Not a trick. A simple, direct question from Helle Lyng of the Norwegian newspaper [Dagsavisen](https://www.outlookindia.com/international/this-is-my-job-and-duty-norwegian-journalist-defends-tough-questions-after-modi-press-freedom-row?ref=diplopolis.com): why does he not take questions from the world's freest press? Modi did not respond. He walked away from the podium. The moment went viral because it touched something that twelve years of carefully managed messaging had been built to avoid. The export version of India under Prime Minister Modi cannot survive unscripted contact with the international community he tries to impress. What followed was more revealing than the walk away. BJP IT Cell chief Amit Malviya called Lyng a ['delinquent journalist'](https://www.latestly.com/india/news/who-is-norwegian-journalist-helle-lyng-meet-the-reporter-whose-viral-pm-narendra-modi-question-triggered-an-mea-face-off-7437400.html?ref=diplopolis.com). BJP supporters labelled her a foreign plant, a spy and a Chinese proxy. Her X account had been verified only days before Oslo, which the BJP's online apparatus used to question her motives. Her Instagram and Facebook accounts were [subsequently suspended](https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/norwegian-journalist-viral-question-modi-diplomatic-tensions-1798061?ref=diplopolis.com) after the coordinated trolling campaign. She had to publicly clarify she was not a foreign spy of any sort. The Indian Embassy in Norway invited her to a separate briefing where the MEA Secretary responded to her questions with a lecture on India's civilisational heritage, yoga, chess and vaccine diplomacy. She briefly walked out of that briefing on camera. NDTV anchor Gaurie Dwivedi then [invited Lyng for an interview](https://www.freepressjournal.in/india/enjoying-curry-doing-yoga-doesnt-qualify-indian-anchor-roasts-norwegian-journo-helle-lyng-who-questioned-pm-modi?ref=diplopolis.com) and asked her what she knew about India. Lyng said yoga and curry. The clip went viral in India, celebrated as a demolition. This is Indian mainstream media in the Modi era — not a check on power but its most reliable international defender. Modi has not held a single solo press conference on Indian soil since taking office in May 2014\. The one televised appearance alongside Home Minister Amit Shah produced his signature pattern: [every substantive question deflected](https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/narendra-modis-decade-without-press-conferences/?ref=diplopolis.com) to Shah, every difficult moment managed by proximity to someone else. When elections approach, he grants access to anchors whose questions, the opposition has consistently alleged, are agreed in advance. In 2024 he gave [80 such interviews](https://www.business-standard.com/elections/lok-sabha-election/pm-modi-notches-up-over-200-rallies-80-interviews-as-ls-poll-campaign-ends-124053001352%5F1.html?ref=diplopolis.com) to national channels and regional newspapers — averaging more than one daily during the campaign period — choreographed appearances in which one anchor asked him how he managed to work so hard at his age. Between elections he communicates through Mann Ki Baat, a radio monologue broadcast to millions in which no one can ask anything. Abroad, the story is no different. The one [joint press conference he attended](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/white-house-blasts-harassment-reporter-asked-modi-human-rights-record-rcna91251?ref=diplopolis.com) — alongside Joe Biden at the White House in June 2023 — produced one of the most revealing moments of his career. A Wall Street Journal reporter, Sabrina Siddiqui, asked what steps his government would take to improve the rights of Muslims and other minorities. Modi replied through a translator that India lives democracy as laid out by its constitution, that there is absolutely no space for discrimination. He said he was surprised by the question. His supporters launched an immediate harassment campaign against Siddiqui, questioning her religion and her motives. The White House condemned it. Modi said nothing. At the international podium, Modi sells India's civilisational values — democracy, the ancient wisdom of [non-violence and peaceful coexistence](https://www.sentinelassam.com/more-news/editorial/peace-is-the-path-indias-vision-for-a-troubled-world?ref=diplopolis.com), the universal brotherhood of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam. India, he says, is not merely the world's largest democracy. It is the mother of democracy. But when the Wall Street Journal's Sabrina Siddiqui asked what democracy means for Muslims and minorities in India, what she heard back from India was a lynch mob. The mob back home is not a contradiction Modi manages. It is a system he has built. Internationally, he has no choice but to hard sell the values India is known for — whether or not they are available at home. ## The India Being Built at Home India's domestic reality is not something New Delhi will be proud of showing to an international audience. Since the BJP came to power in 2014, [mob lynchings under the pretext of cow protection](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/30/it-was-his-birthday-muslim-lynched-over-beef-in-western-india?ref=diplopolis.com) have risen steadily. The victims are overwhelmingly Muslim. Eight vigilantes convicted of lynching a 45-year-old Muslim meat trader were [garlanded by a Union Minister](https://www.huffpost.com/archive/in/entry/union-minister-jayant-singh-garlands-cow-vigilantes-convicted-for-lynching-a-muslim-trader-in-jharkhand%5Fin%5F5c10c971e4b09dcd67fc5b02?ref=diplopolis.com) in Modi's cabinet. A cow vigilante [received](https://www.thenewsminute.com/karnataka/how-cow-vigilante-rose-become-bjp-candidate-udupi-176512?ref=diplopolis.com) an election ticket from the BJP in Karnataka. The BJP government at the centre told parliament in 2022 that it [does not maintain data](https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/no-separate-data-for-mob-lynching-says-government-1928056-2022-03-22?ref=diplopolis.com) on mob lynchings. If you do not count the bodies, the bodies do not exist. The pattern of intimidation goes beyond the mob. During Hindu religious processions across India, [hate-filled songs calling for violence](https://www.voanews.com/a/in-india-hate-filled-songs-are-a-weapon-to-target-muslims-/6540788.html?ref=diplopolis.com) against Muslims are blared from loudspeakers as marchers pass through Muslim neighbourhoods and outside mosques. The processions have repeatedly turned violent. Muslim homes and mosques have been torched. Most mob attacks against Muslims follow this pattern — a large procession, provocative music, and then the violence that follows. The central government has declined to address it as a systemic issue. The love jihad laws — enacted across multiple states — criminalise interfaith relationships under the guise of preventing forced conversion. The theory behind them, promoted by Hindu nationalists and BJP leaders, is that Muslim men systematically lure Hindu women into marriage to convert them to Islam. An independent 2024 assessment found that love jihad accusations were the second [most common motivator](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45303?ref=diplopolis.com) for communal violence targeting Muslims, accounting for 18 per cent of such incidents from mid-2019 to mid-2024\. Since 2020, when Uttar Pradesh [enacted](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/lucknow/conversions-in-up-835-cases-registered-1682-arrested-in-4-years/articleshow/112385144.cms?ref=diplopolis.com) its anti-conversion law, 835 cases have been registered and 1,682 arrests made. As of mid-2024, [not one case had produced a conviction](https://www.trtworld.com/article/8a4b492500b6?ref=diplopolis.com) while hundreds of Muslim men spent months or years in pretrial detention. The BJP frames the Citizenship Amendment Act of 2019 as a humanitarian gesture — protection for persecuted religious minorities fleeing Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan. [The Act offers that protection](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2020/03/india-un-experts-urge-india-review-citizenship-amendment-act?ref=diplopolis.com) to Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Christians. It excludes Muslims. India's minorities law has no room for India's most persecuted minority. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights called it fundamentally discriminatory. India's government dismissed the observation. The bulldozer has become the BJP's [signature](https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/01/07/bulldozer-symbol-modi-india/?ref=diplopolis.com) instrument. State governments led by the party have used demolition orders to raze the homes and properties of Muslims accused of crimes, in some cases before any trial, in others after protests that the government found inconvenient. The Supreme Court eventually issued guidelines limiting the practice. Several BJP governments continued it anyway. India's press freedom ranking was 140th of 180 countries when Modi took office in 2014\. By 2026 it had [fallen to 157th](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/20/modi-avoids-norway-media-how-that-led-to-storm-over-indias-press-freedom?ref=diplopolis.com), placing India in the very serious category according to Reporters Without Borders. The country that in May 2026 asked the question Modi refused to answer — Norway — ranks first. The distance between those two numbers is the distance between what India claims to be in the world and what it is. ## 'India' Made for Export At the 2023 G20 summit in New Delhi, whose motto was Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam — the world is one family — Modi presented India to the world as the voice of the Global South, the civilisational bridge between East and West, the teacher whose ancient wisdom the fractured modern world requires. The same philosophy invoked at his first address to the United Nations General Assembly in 2014\. The same framing deployed at every multilateral gathering since. One Earth, One Family, One Future. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/06/Modi-s-India-Vishwaguru-Abroad--Bulldozers-Back-Home--2-.png) Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi joins world leaders at Rajghat to pay homage to Mahatma Gandhi on September 10, 2023, during the New Delhi G20 Summit. **(Source: Narendra Modi via X)* This export version of India works because the inheritance is genuine. Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam is not a BJP invention. It comes from the [Maha Upanishad](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vasudhaiva%5FKutumbakam?ref=diplopolis.com), composed centuries before the RSS existed. The Non-Aligned Movement, the Panchsheel principles, the constitutional commitment to secularism and equal citizenship — these are Nehruvian achievements that the BJP has spent twelve years quietly dismantling at home while loudly deploying abroad. The ideals have survived not because of the BJP but despite it. Modi is spending down an inheritance he did not build and is not replenishing. The India Modi preached and the India he practised were not the same country. Principled foreign policy costs something precisely because it is principled. Under Modi, foreign policy has a transactional logic. State visits create relationships. Relationships create contracts. Nehru went abroad to build a world order. Modi goes abroad to build a balance sheet. Abroad, Modi lays wreaths at Gandhi's statue because Gandhi is the only Indian the world recognises as a moral authority. At home, BJP members of parliament have [called Gandhi's assassin a patriot](https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/asia/outrage-over-bjp-candidate-s-praise-for-mahatma-gandhi-s-assassin-1.862618?ref=diplopolis.com) — in parliament, on record, without lasting consequence. The BJP has spent over a decade trying to erase Nehru from India's story. It has renamed roads, revised textbooks and built an alternative nationalist pantheon. But the erasure is selective and the irony is structural. The BJP abhors the India that Nehru and Gandhi built. It has simply not found a replacement the world will listen to. So it borrows their language, lays their wreaths and speaks their values at every international podium — because these are the only words that open doors abroad. Gandhi and Nehru are the export version's most essential props. The BJP's contempt for them is strictly for domestic consumption. ## The Geometry of the Contradiction This is where the BJP diverges from every comparable hard right movement in the world. Viktor Orbán does not moderate his message for Brussels. He exports the illiberalism as the product, openly and proudly. Marine Le Pen, Giorgia Meloni, the AfD — all of them present broadly the same ideological face at home and abroad. The nativist, the exclusionary, the anti-Muslim: this is what they sell everywhere. Modi cannot do this. The Hindutva project — Hindu nationalism, Muslim othering, the conversion of citizenship into a Hindu entitlement — cannot survive being the export version because it would destroy the international legitimacy that insulates the domestic project from external pressure. The moment the world sees the bulldozers alongside the Sanskrit, the brand collapses. So there are two versions. One for the base. One for the world. And a press conference is the room where both versions would have to exist simultaneously, which is why there is no press conference. The domestic and international versions of BJP India are not in tension. They are in symbiosis. The Hindutva consolidation at home creates the stable political base that gives Modi the authority to project international ambition. The international legitimacy and the Vishwaguru brand insulate the domestic project from external interference. Each makes the other possible. The man who presides over the lynchings and the demolitions needs the G20 podium. And the G20 podium needs the man who has consolidated enough domestic power to claim he speaks for 1.4 billion people. What holds this architecture together is control of the image. Mann Ki Baat instead of press conferences. A media pool composed of government-aligned outlets who have agreed their terms of access, not independent journalists who might ask an unscripted question. Friendly anchors in carefully arranged studios. And when a journalist in Washington or Oslo asks the question that the export version cannot answer — the question about Muslims, about press freedom, about the gap between the constitution Modi invokes and the India his government is building — the answer is a long-winded assertion about democracy being in India's DNA, then silence, then a walk away from the podium. In 2007, when Modi was still Chief Minister of Gujarat, journalist Karan Thapar sat down with him for an interview and began asking about the 2002 Gujarat riots, in which over a thousand people, mostly Muslims, were killed. Modi ended the interview within minutes. He removed his microphone. He said, in Hindi, dosti bani rahe — let friendship remain. And he walked away. Nineteen years later, in Oslo, the microphone comes off at a different podium, the language is silence rather than Hindi, and the friendship being maintained is with a world that has not yet decided to look at what is being built behind the export version. Jawaharlal Nehru visited Norway in June 1957\. The Norwegian president introduced him to the press as a leading statesman of the world and urged journalists to avail of the rare opportunity of asking questions to such an acclaimed personality. Nehru [told the Norwegian press](https://m.thewire.in/article/history/nehru-press-conference-1957-modi-visit-norway-2026?ref=diplopolis.com): I shall leave myself in your hands to be dealt with, I hope, gently and kindly. Sixty-nine years later, his successor walked away from a Norwegian journalist who asked a single question. The distance between those two moments is not the distance between two prime ministers. It is the distance between two ideas of what India is. ## What the Inheritance Costs India's democratic and civilisational traditions are deep enough to survive twelve years of a government systematically working against them. The Constitution has been tested. The Supreme Court has sometimes held. The opposition exists. The press, diminished and pressured, has not been extinguished. The India before Modi was not a perfect democracy. But it was a serious one, with institutions that took their own principles seriously. What the BJP has done is not destroy those institutions. It has hollowed them out while using their language. The courts still sit. The elections still happen. The Constitution is still invoked. But the content has been slowly replaced. The secular state speaks the language of Hindu civilisation. The world's largest democracy has a prime minister who has not faced a press conference in twelve years. The government that calls itself the voice of the Global South refuses to count its own lynching victims. The export version is still working. The world still buys it. The G20 chair, the BRICS convener, the voice of the Global South, the Vishwaguru of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam — all of it still lands at international podiums with the weight of genuine civilisational depth behind it, because the inheritance is real even when the inheritor is not. But inheritances are not infinite. Every lynching that goes uncounted, every journalist who loses accreditation, every Muslim man held in pretrial detention on a love jihad charge that will never produce a conviction, every family watching its home fall to a bulldozer on a charge never tested in court — these are withdrawals from the account. The balance is still positive. The brand still travels. Modi still walks away from the podium and the world still invites him back. The question is not whether India's democratic inheritance can survive this government. It probably can. The question is what it will look like when this is over, and whether the export version will still have something genuine behind it, or whether it will have already become what it is becoming — a performance increasingly disconnected from the reality it claims to represent. --- *This Analysis is part of* [*India Examined*](https://www.diplopolis.com/india-examined/) *— DiploPolis's ongoing analysis of Indian foreign policy since 2014\. What India claims to be in the world. What it actually is. And what the gap between those two things costs.* Previously in this series: [The Vishwaguru the World Never Knew](https://www.diplopolis.com/vishwaguru-india-diplomacy-operation-sindoor-bjp/) This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) ### The Flag and the Castle URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/israel-beaufort-castle-lebanon-flag-security-zone-june-2026/ Last updated: 2026-06-02T04:30:57.000Z The Israeli flag is flying over [Beaufort Castle](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/1/what-is-lebanons-beaufort-castle-and-why-has-israel-captured-it?ref=diplopolis.com). It flew there before. Israel captured the 12th century Crusader fortress in 1982, held it for 18 years and withdrew under pressure in 2000\. It is flying there again now, raised by Israeli soldiers as part of what Defence Minister Israel Katz called a security zone in Lebanon. Our heroic soldiers have captured Beaufort once again, he said. And will remain there. The castle sits on a cliff overlooking the Litani River in southern Lebanon. It has been used by the Crusaders, Saladin's army, the Mamluks, the Ottomans, the French Mandate, the Palestine Liberation Organization and now Israel — twice. In 2024, as Israel's previous war with Hezbollah escalated, [UNESCO granted it provisional enhanced protection](https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/31/middleeast/israel-captures-beaufort-castle-lebanon-intl-hnk?ref=diplopolis.com) — the highest level of immunity against military use available under international law — as part of a package covering 34 Lebanese cultural properties. The castle had already sustained significant damage during the first occupation. Now Israeli troops are inside it again, and Katz says they intend to stay. This is the deepest Israeli ground incursion into Lebanon in 26 years. [More than 3,300 people have been killed](https://www.npr.org/2026/05/31/g-s1-125056/israel-seizes-medieval-beaufort-castle-southern-lebanon?ref=diplopolis.com) since Israel's offensive in Lebanon began in March 2026, about 20 per cent of them women, children and first responders. More than 1.2 million have been displaced. Entire villages have been demolished. France has called the campaign unjustifiable and requested an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council. Lebanon's Prime Minister Nawaf Salam described it as a scorched-earth policy. Netanyahu's response was to order troops [beyond the Litani River](https://www.outlookindia.com/international/israel-captures-iconic-beaufort-castle-in-biggest-lebanon-advance-in-25-years?ref=diplopolis.com) — the exact line the April ceasefire was meant to establish as a buffer — and plant a flag on a medieval castle that the international community had specifically protected from this. There is a ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon. It has existed since April. Israel has violated it continuously since the day it was announced. As of January 2026, before the current escalation, Israel had already accumulated more than 2,000 documented ceasefire violations in Lebanon. The April agreement changed the name of what is happening. It did not change what is happening. Israeli troops remain in large swaths of southern Lebanon. Hezbollah continues to fire. The Lebanese state watches from Beirut while a foreign army demolishes its southern villages and names the ruins a security zone. The Beaufort Castle is not a military objective in any conventional sense. Drone warfare has reduced but not eliminated the tactical value of elevated positions. What the castle offers Israel today is what it has always offered whoever holds it — a vantage point, a symbol and a message. In 1982 the message was that Israel could reach as far as it chose. In 2000 the message of withdrawal was that Hezbollah had forced a limit. The message today, with the flag raised again at a ceremony attended by the Defence Minister at a memorial for soldiers killed in the 1982 war, is that the limit no longer applies. Iran's foreign ministry noted this week that any ceasefire breach in Lebanon breaks the broader ceasefire framework. Tehran has made its position clear throughout — a deal on the Iran war that does not include Lebanon is not a deal. Washington has been trying to negotiate the Iran ceasefire while its closest ally expands a ground war in a third country simultaneously, destroys villages, occupies a UNESCO-protected castle and announces it intends to stay. [Secretary of State Marco Rubio](https://www.ms.now/news/israeli-army-captures-strategic-castle-lebanon?ref=diplopolis.com) spoke to Lebanese and Israeli leaders over the weekend to keep negotiations going. Israel kept advancing. The last time Israel flew its flag over Beaufort Castle it stayed for 18 years. When it finally left in May 2000, residents returned and briefly removed an Israeli flag from the walls. The images went around the world. Now the flag is back. The Defence Minister says the soldiers will remain as part of the security zone. The castle has been occupied by many armies across nine centuries. None of them called it permanent either. ### Not Final. Not Determined. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/trump-iran-deal-final-determination-situation-room-june-2026/ Last updated: 2026-06-01T04:30:15.000Z On Friday morning, Donald Trump announced on Truth Social that he was entering the White House Situation Room to make a 'final determination' on a memorandum of understanding to extend the ceasefire with Iran and reopen the Strait of Hormuz. He listed what he required. Iran must never possess a nuclear weapon. The Strait must be immediately open with no tolls. The naval blockade in the Gulf of Oman would be lifted. The terms were clear. The moment was final. [The meeting lasted two hours](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/05/29/trump-iran-deal-hormuz-nuclear-war.html?ref=diplopolis.com). Trump made no determination. The White House issued a statement saying the president would only make a deal good for America and satisfying his red lines. The Situation Room emptied. The war continued. The word final had done its work and meant nothing. By Saturday, the picture was complete. [Trump had sent the deal back](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/31/trump-tightens-terms-on-iran-war-deal-us-media-say?ref=diplopolis.com) to Iran with tougher terms. Officials said he pushed for harder language on Iran's nuclear commitments and the reopening of the Strait. Tehran said it may take days to respond. Iran's chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, re-elected as parliament speaker, said his country would achieve its rights not through dialogue but with missiles and would judge Washington by its actions rather than its words. This is the pattern the Trump administration has established for three months. The ceasefire of April 8 was announced by the United States Secretary of State before Iran had said a word. It was violated within hours. The Doha talks of May 26 were held while Washington bombed southern Iran and called it self-defence. Oman was threatened with destruction for exploring arrangements for the Strait. And now a Situation Room meeting billed as a final determination that determined nothing, followed by tougher demands that Iran must now absorb and respond to, probably within days, possibly within a week, possibly longer. [Iranian state media pushed back immediately](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/05/29/trump-iran-deal-hormuz-nuclear-war.html?ref=diplopolis.com) after Trump's Friday morning Truth Social post. The Strait of Hormuz toll-free clause does not appear in the text of the agreement, Fars News Agency reported, citing informed sources. The draft contains no reference to Iran dismantling or destroying its nuclear materials. The two sides are not describing the same document. They are not describing the same negotiation. A deal reached under these conditions is not an agreement between parties. It is terms presented to a country that has been bombed for three months and told to sign. [The deal under discussion would extend the ceasefire by 60 days](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/trump-meeting-with-aides-to-make-final-determination-on-moving-forward-with-iran-deal?ref=diplopolis.com) while new talks began on Iran's nuclear programme. Among the first issues to be negotiated during that period would be what happens to Iran's highly enriched uranium. Trump has said Iran would not receive sanctions relief in exchange for giving up that uranium. Iran has said there are no negotiations on its nuclear programme underway. Both cannot be describing the same deal. They are not. Final is a word the Trump administration uses the way it uses ceasefire, as a description of intent rather than outcome. Trump has made final determinations before. He said Iran was negotiating on fumes at his cabinet meeting last Tuesday. He entered the Situation Room on Friday prepared to decide. He emerged two hours later having decided nothing. He then sent tougher demands. A senior US official [told Axios](https://www.axios.com/2026/05/31/trump-iran-deal-changes-nuclear?ref=diplopolis.com) that Iran's negotiators were literally in caves and not using email. There will be a deal, the official added. The imminence of it, we will see. The war goes into its fourth month with the same architecture it had in its first — a ceasefire in name, strikes in practice, demands on one side and refusals on the other, and a Situation Room that produces statements rather than decisions. Trump did not make a final determination on Friday. He made another demand. In this war those have always been the same thing. ### 12 Best Scholarships for International Relations Students — A Global Guide 2027 URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/best-scholarships-international-relations-students-2027/ Last updated: 2026-05-29T20:00:18.000Z Every year, the same five names appear in every scholarship guide written for IR students. Chevening. Fulbright. Rhodes. Gates Cambridge. Commonwealth. They appear in that order, or some variation of it, in every blog post, every university careers page, every well-meaning email from an academic adviser. The list is not wrong. These are genuinely prestigious awards. But it is incomplete in ways that cost applicants real opportunities — and it is read the wrong way by almost everyone who reads it. Every major scholarship for international relations students is looking for a different thing, and the student who applies to all of them as if they were the same will win none of them. Scholarship applications are not expressions of need. They are arguments for selection. The best scholarship is not the most famous one. It is the one whose selection criteria most precisely match who you are, what you have done and what you intend to do with the support. This guide covers 12 scholarships — the five that appear on every list, and seven that should appear but do not. For each one, it tells you what the scholarship is actually choosing for, what a competitive application looks like, what the award provides, and what a student from the Global South needs to know before they apply. ## Before You Apply: Three Principles That Apply to All Twelve The scholarship landscape rewards preparation, specificity and self-knowledge. Three principles apply regardless of which award you pursue. First: apply to the scholarship that fits you, not the one with the highest name recognition. A Chevening application from a candidate who genuinely embodies leadership and has a clear vision for how a UK Masters will advance their impact at home is competitive. A Gates Cambridge application from a candidate who genuinely wants to pursue academic research and can demonstrate an intellectually compelling reason for doing so at Cambridge is competitive. The same candidate trying to sound like both of these things simultaneously will win neither. Second: these are multi-year processes, not single-deadline events. Successful Chevening scholars typically apply more than once before winning. Fulbright applications take months to build well. Rhodes finalists have usually been preparing their portfolios for years before the application opens. Start earlier than feels necessary. Third: every scholarship on this list requires you to return to your home country after your studies, or to demonstrate a commitment to contributing to your home community. This is not a bureaucratic condition — it is the entire point. The scholarships that fund Global South students are investments in leadership that donor governments and private endowments believe will serve their foreign policy and development interests as much as the recipient's ambitions. Write your application knowing that. ## 1\. Chevening Scholarship **Funder:** UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) **Value:** Full tuition fees, monthly living allowance, return airfare, visa costs and travel grant **Number of awards:** Approximately [1,800 per year](https://www.chevening.org/?ref=diplopolis.com) **Duration:** One year — taught Masters only **Deadline for 2027 entry:** Applications open August 2026, close October 7, 2026 **Who can apply:** Citizens of [Chevening-eligible countries](https://www.chevening.org/resource-hub/guidance/eligibility/?ref=diplopolis.com) with at least 2,800 hours of postgraduate work experience Chevening is the UK government's flagship international scholarship and the one most IR students encounter first. It is also the one most frequently misunderstood. Chevening is not an academic scholarship. The selection criteria make this explicit: the award prioritises leadership and influence, networking ability, a clear career plan and the quality of the study proposal. Strong academic results are necessary but not sufficient — the programme is choosing future leaders who will maintain long-term relationships with the United Kingdom, not the highest-scoring applicants in a cohort. The two-year work experience requirement exists for exactly this reason: Chevening wants candidates who have already demonstrated meaningful professional impact. What a competitive Chevening application looks like: a candidate who can name specific instances where they influenced decisions, built networks or drove change in their professional context; a course choice that connects directly and convincingly to a specific career ambition; and essays that contain concrete personal examples rather than general statements of aspiration. The application cycle reduced essay word limits to 300 words, making specificity more important than ever. The two-year return-home clause is binding. Candidates who cannot commit to returning to their home country for two years after the award ends are ineligible. Chevening tracks compliance and non-return can affect a country's future scholarship allocations. **What Global South applicants need to know:** Chevening allocations vary significantly by country. Research your country's allocation and the profile of recent scholars through the Chevening website. The selection is conducted by British embassies and high commissions in your home country, and the profile of successful candidates varies by geography. ## 2\. Fulbright Foreign Student Program **Funder:** US Department of State **Value:** Full tuition, living stipend, airfare, health insurance — specific package varies by country **Number of awards:** Approximately [4,000 per year globally](https://foreign.fulbrightonline.org/about/foreign-student-program?ref=diplopolis.com) **Duration:** One to two years — Masters and PhD **Deadline for 2027 entry:** Varies by country; typically February to October 2026 **Who can apply:** Citizens of over [160 eligible countries](https://foreign.fulbrightonline.org/apply?ref=diplopolis.com); administered through Fulbright Commissions or US Embassies Fulbright is the world's largest international exchange scholarship programme. Its stated purpose is mutual understanding between the United States and other countries — and that purpose is not rhetorical. Fulbright is a foreign policy instrument funded by the US State Department, and its selection reflects that. What Fulbright is choosing for: academic excellence combined with demonstrated civic engagement, community leadership and a credible plan for contributing to your home country on return. The research proposal or study plan must be focused and specific — vague proposals are a common reason for rejection. Applications that hint at any intention to remain in the United States are viewed unfavourably. Acceptance rates vary significantly by country. [Some high-volume countries see rates as low as 5 to 10 per cent](https://www.globaladmissions.com/scholarship/fulbright-scholarship?ref=diplopolis.com). The Fulbright-Nehru Fellowship for Indian students is a bilateral variant worth specific attention: it funds Masters, research and senior scholar awards and is administered through the United States-India Educational Foundation (USIEF), with [application deadlines typically in July](https://www.usief.org.in/fulbright-fellowships/fellowships-for-indian-citizen/?ref=diplopolis.com). **What Global South applicants need to know:** Fulbright administration is local — the experience of applying, the profile of successful candidates and the level of support available varies dramatically by country. Start with your country's Fulbright Commission or Embassy, not with generic guides. ## 3\. Rhodes Scholarship **Funder:** Rhodes Trust (private endowment) **Value:** Oxford University and college fees, annual living stipend of approximately [£19,000 to £20,000](https://onsa.asu.edu/scholarship/rhodes-scholarship?ref=diplopolis.com), return airfare **Number of awards:** Approximately [100 globally per year](https://uraf.harvard.edu/rhodes-scholarship?ref=diplopolis.com) with constituency-specific allocations **Duration:** Two to three years at the University of Oxford **Deadline for 2027 entry:** Varies by constituency — typically July to October 2026 **Who can apply:** Citizens of [Rhodes constituencies](https://www.rhodeshouse.ox.ac.uk/scholarships/applications/?ref=diplopolis.com) including most Commonwealth countries; age limits apply The Rhodes Scholarship is the oldest and arguably the most prestigious international scholarship in the world. Understanding what it is actually choosing for matters because it is different from every other scholarship on this list. Rhodes is not looking for the most academically accomplished applicant. It is looking for the person most likely to become a significant public figure — to hold leadership roles that shape societies and institutions over a forty-year career. The four criteria drawn from Cecil Rhodes's original will — intellectual curiosity, energy and use of talent, truth and moral force of character, and commitment to service — have guided selection since 1902\. The personal interview is decisive, and what interviewers are assessing is character. A Rhodes application from a strong academic candidate with a conventional record of achievement is unremarkable. A Rhodes application from a candidate who has done something genuinely distinctive — built an organisation, driven policy change, led a movement — and who can speak about it with intellectual depth and personal conviction is the kind of application that wins. Note: the Global Rhodes Scholarships, which previously allowed applicants from countries without a constituency to apply, have been suspended by the Rhodes Trust. Check the [Rhodes Trust website](https://www.rhodeshouse.ox.ac.uk/?ref=diplopolis.com) for the current list of eligible constituencies. **What Global South applicants need to know:** If you are from India, Pakistan, South Africa, Kenya, Ghana, Jamaica or another Commonwealth country with a Rhodes constituency, you are eligible. The selection committees in your constituency assess you against candidates from your own country — not against the US pool. ## 4\. Gates Cambridge Scholarship **Funder:** Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (endowment to the University of Cambridge) **Value:** Full Cambridge tuition fees, annual maintenance allowance of [£21,000](https://www.gatescambridge.org/?ref=diplopolis.com), return airfare, visa costs, health surcharge, up to £2,000 academic development funding and family allowances **Number of awards:** Approximately [80 per year globally](https://www.gatescambridge.org/?ref=diplopolis.com) **Duration:** One year Masters to four years PhD **Deadline for 2027 entry:** October 2026 for US citizens; December 2026 or January 2027 for all other international applicants **Who can apply:** Citizens of any country outside the United Kingdom Gates Cambridge is the most academically prestigious scholarship on this list and the most explicitly oriented toward intellectual ambition. The four selection criteria — outstanding intellectual ability, reasons for the course, commitment to improving the lives of others, and capacity for leadership — weight academic seriousness more heavily than Chevening or Fulbright. Approximately two-thirds of awards go to PhD students. What the Gates Cambridge selection is actually looking for: intellectual curiosity that goes beyond academic performance, a genuinely compelling reason for choosing Cambridge specifically, and a vision for how the candidate's work will contribute to improving the world. The most common mistake: candidates who write about commitment to improving the world in general terms without demonstrating the specific intellectual contribution they intend to make. The scholarship is selecting future researchers and thinkers whose work will produce genuine intellectual and social value — not philanthropists with good intentions. **What Global South applicants need to know:** With 80 awards available to citizens of every country outside the UK, Gates Cambridge is the most globally accessible of the elite scholarships on this list by geography. The competition is global and fierce; the typical successful candidate combines outstanding academic results with a research proposal that is both intellectually compelling and clearly grounded in a commitment to broader impact. ## 5\. Commonwealth Scholarship **Funder:** UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) through the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission (CSC) **Value:** Full tuition and examination fees, monthly living allowance of [£1,378 per month (or £1,690 for London universities)](https://cscuk.fcdo.gov.uk/scholarships/commonwealth-masters-scholarships/?ref=diplopolis.com), return airfare, thesis grant and study travel grant **Number of awards:** Over [800 per year](https://registryservices.ed.ac.uk/student-funding/postgraduate/international/other-funding/commonwealth?ref=diplopolis.com) **Duration:** One year Masters or up to four years PhD **Deadline for 2027 entry:** Applications for the 2027/28 cycle expected to open September 2026 **Who can apply:** Citizens of [developing Commonwealth countries](https://cscuk.fcdo.gov.uk/scholarships/commonwealth-masters-scholarships/?ref=diplopolis.com) classified as low and middle-income by the OECD — must be unable to afford UK study without scholarship support The Commonwealth Scholarship is the most explicitly development-focused scholarship on this list and the one most directly designed for students from the Global South who could not otherwise access UK postgraduate study. What the Commonwealth selection is choosing for: academic merit combined with a clear development rationale. The CSC evaluates applications against six themes — science and technology for development, strengthening health systems, promoting global prosperity, strengthening global peace and security, strengthening resilience and response to crises, and access, inclusion and opportunity. A course and career plan that connects directly to one of these themes significantly strengthens an application. The application route is important: most Commonwealth Scholarships are applied for through [national nominating agencies](https://www.scholars4dev.com/4900/commonwealth-scholarships-for-developing-commonwealth-countries/?ref=diplopolis.com) in your home country rather than directly to the CSC. Research the nominating agency and its own internal deadline, which is often several months before the CSC deadline. **What Global South applicants need to know:** This is the scholarship most deliberately designed for you. If you are a citizen of a developing Commonwealth country — India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Ghana and over 50 others — with a strong academic record and a genuine development rationale, the Commonwealth Scholarship deserves the same attention as Chevening. It funds PhD study as well as Masters, which no other scholarship on this list does as broadly. ## 6\. DAAD Helmut Schmidt Programme — Public Policy and Good Governance **Funder:** German Federal Foreign Office through the DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service) **Value:** Full tuition, monthly stipend, health insurance, travel allowance — comprehensive funding **Duration:** 12 to 24 months depending on degree **Deadline for 2027 entry:** [Applications open June 1 to July 31, 2026](https://www.h-brs.de/en/sv/daad-helmut-schmidt-stipendium?ref=diplopolis.com) **Who can apply:** Citizens of developing countries with a Bachelor's degree in economics, political science, international relations, law or related fields The DAAD Helmut Schmidt Programme — formally the Public Policy and Good Governance scholarship — is the most specifically relevant scholarship on this list for IR students whose interests centre on governance, public administration and democratic development. It is also the most overlooked by students outside the German academic ecosystem. What makes this scholarship valuable: Germany's approach to public administration and international development is distinct from the Anglo-American frameworks that dominate most IR curricula. The Helmut Schmidt programme exposes scholars to European models of governance, continental multilateral institutions and professional networks that are genuinely different from those built through UK or US scholarships. The selection criteria are explicit — the programme is looking for candidates who have already demonstrated commitment to public service and who can articulate a clear plan for returning to contribute to governance in their home countries. Most successful applicants have two to five years of professional experience in government, NGOs or international organisations. **What Global South applicants need to know:** This scholarship is open to applicants from developing countries with IR, political science or related backgrounds — and the competition, while serious, is considerably less intense than Chevening or Fulbright simply because fewer people know it exists. Apply. ## 7\. Erasmus Mundus Joint Masters Scholarship **Funder:** European Union — Erasmus+ programme **Value:** Full tuition fees, monthly contribution of [€1,400 for up to 24 months](https://www.gla.ac.uk/postgraduate/erasmusmundus/edumah/scholarships/?ref=diplopolis.com) (maximum €33,600 total), travel and installation allowances **Number of awards:** Approximately 2,600 globally across all disciplines per year **Duration:** Two years across at least two European countries **Deadline for 2027 entry:** [Varies by programme](https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/opportunities/opportunities-for-individuals/students/erasmus-mundus-joint-masters?ref=diplopolis.com) — typically October to January **Who can apply:** Citizens of any country for most programmes The Erasmus Mundus Joint Masters Scholarship is structurally different from every other award on this list. It funds a two-year programme delivered jointly by a consortium of European universities, with scholars spending time at a minimum of two institutions in different countries. For an IR student, moving between Paris and Warsaw, or Brussels and Ljubljana — studying alongside students from across the world in programmes that no single institution offers — is an education in European politics that no single-country programme can replicate. [India has been the single largest beneficiary of Erasmus Mundus scholarships globally since the programme's inception](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/india/146-indian-students-awarded-erasmus-mundus-scholarships-2024%5Fen?ref=diplopolis.com), with 146 Indian students awarded in 2024 alone — a fact that the scholarship's relative obscurity in Indian career guidance does not reflect. The relevant Erasmus Mundus programmes for IR students include joint Masters in international relations, European politics, global studies and peace and conflict studies. The [Erasmus Mundus programme database](https://www.eacea.ec.europa.eu/scholarships/erasmus-mundus-catalogue%5Fen?ref=diplopolis.com) lists all currently funded programmes with their specific deadlines and eligibility criteria. **What Global South applicants need to know:** Erasmus Mundus is the most geographically distinctive scholarship experience on this list. For an IR student from India or Nigeria who wants European expertise and European networks, it is underused and undervalued. ## 8\. Australia Awards Scholarships **Funder:** Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) **Value:** Full tuition, return airfare, Overseas Student Health Cover, living allowance, establishment allowance and pre-course English language training where required **Duration:** Typically two to four years — full Masters or PhD programmes **Deadline for 2027 entry:** Applications opened February 1, 2026; country-specific deadlines apply **Who can apply:** Citizens of [Indo-Pacific priority countries](https://www.dfat.gov.au/people-to-people/australia-awards/australia-awards-scholarships?ref=diplopolis.com) as specified by DFAT The Australia Awards are among the most comprehensive scholarship packages available anywhere in the world — tuition, airfare, health cover, a living allowance and an establishment allowance — built with serious acknowledgement of what it actually costs to relocate and study abroad. For students from South and Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands and eligible African countries, the Australia Awards offer something no UK or US scholarship does: study at institutions with genuine Indo-Pacific expertise, in a country geographically and culturally closer to home, with networks directly relevant to careers in the region. The ANU, the University of Melbourne and the University of Sydney all have research programmes in Southeast Asian politics, Pacific development and Asian security that are not replicable in London or Washington. The selection assesses academic merit alongside demonstrated leadership, community contribution and a credible plan for contributing to development in the home country after returning. The programme is explicitly a foreign policy instrument designed to build long-term people-to-people links between Australia and the Indo-Pacific countries central to Australian strategic interests. **What Global South applicants need to know:** Check your country's eligibility on the Australia Awards website first — the programme is not universal. If your country is on the priority list and your career goals are oriented toward the Indo-Pacific, this scholarship is the most practically useful on this list. ## 9\. Schwarzman Scholars **Funder:** Stephen A. Schwarzman (private endowment) — Tsinghua University, Beijing **Value:** Full tuition, accommodation, airfare, health insurance and a personal stipend of [$4,000](https://scholarshiproar.com/schwarzman-scholarships/?ref=diplopolis.com) **Number of awards:** Up to [200 per year globally](https://www.scholars4dev.com/15830/schwarzman-scholars-program-at-tsinghua-university/?ref=diplopolis.com) **Duration:** One year — Masters in Global Affairs **Deadline for 2027 entry:** August to September 2026 — varies by applicant region **Who can apply:** Applicants from any country aged 18 to 28 with a Bachelor's degree and strong English proficiency Schwarzman Scholars is the most geopolitically significant addition to this guide and the one most absent from conventional scholarship advice. Established in 2015 by Blackstone CEO Stephen Schwarzman, the programme funds a one-year Masters in Global Affairs at Tsinghua University in Beijing — one of China's most prestigious institutions — with concentrations in public policy, economics and business, and international studies. What Schwarzman is choosing for: leadership potential, academic excellence and a demonstrated interest in understanding China's role in the world. The programme explicitly describes itself as the first scholarship created to respond to the geopolitical landscape of the twenty-first century. It is not looking for sinologists — it is looking for future leaders in government, business and civil society who will navigate a world in which China is a central actor. The interview process is exceptional in its rigour. [Finalists are interviewed by panels that include CEOs, former heads of state, university presidents and senior journalists](https://scholarshipscorner.website/schwarzman-scholars-programme/?ref=diplopolis.com). What the interviewers are assessing is not academic knowledge but the qualities that will matter in leadership over decades: curiosity, judgment, the ability to listen and engage across difference. **What Global South applicants need to know:** Approximately 35 per cent of the cohort comes from countries other than the US and China — [around 70 places](https://www.scholars4dev.com/15830/schwarzman-scholars-program-at-tsinghua-university/?ref=diplopolis.com) from the rest of the world. For a student from India, Nigeria, Brazil or Indonesia whose career will intersect significantly with China's growing presence in their region, a year at Tsinghua building genuine relationships with Chinese and American peers is an investment that no Western scholarship offers. ## 10\. Aga Khan Foundation International Scholarship **Funder:** Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) **Value:** Tuition fees and living expenses on a [50% grant, 50% interest-free loan basis](https://www.scholars4dev.com/2467/aga-khan-international-scholarships-for-developing-countrie/?ref=diplopolis.com) — travel costs not included **Duration:** Full duration of Masters; first two years of PhD **Deadline for 2027 entry:** Applications open early 2027; typically closes March to April 2027 **Who can apply:** Outstanding postgraduate students from [selected developing countries](https://akf.org/international-scholarship-programme/?ref=diplopolis.com) including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Madagascar, Mozambique, Pakistan, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania and Uganda. Keep an eye out if the AKF expands its focus countries in late 2026. The Aga Khan Foundation International Scholarship is one of the most underknown awards on this list and one of the most genuinely accessible for students from a specific set of developing countries. Unlike every other scholarship here, it funds study at any reputable postgraduate institution in the world — not a specific country or university — giving recipients genuine choice over where they study. The 50-50 grant-loan structure requires honest acknowledgement: half of the award must be repaid with an annual service charge of 5 per cent. This is not a gift — it is a subsidised loan attached to a grant. For a student who genuinely has no other means of financing postgraduate study abroad and can demonstrate financial need clearly, it remains transformational access. For a student who could secure funding elsewhere, the repayment obligation matters. What the AKF is choosing for: outstanding academic records, genuine financial need, demonstrated leadership potential and a clear commitment to contributing to development in the home country. The Foundation gives priority to Master's level courses and prefers candidates under 30 with professional commitment and community engagement visible in their record. **What Global South applicants need to know:** Applications are obtained from Aga Khan Foundation or Aga Khan Education Board offices in your country of residence — not submitted online centrally. This local administration means the experience of applying varies significantly by country. Contact your national AKF or AKEB office early in the year. ## 11\. Japanese Government MEXT Scholarship **Funder:** Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), Japan **Value:** Full tuition fees, monthly living stipend of approximately [¥143,000 per month](https://www.scholardigger.com/post/mext-japan-scholarships-2027-now-open-complete-guide?ref=diplopolis.com) for postgraduates, round-trip airfare, preparatory Japanese language training **Number of awards:** Approximately [8,000 to 10,000 new scholars per year](https://www.globaladmissions.com/scholarship/mext-scholarship?ref=diplopolis.com) across all categories **Duration:** Two to three years Masters; three to four years PhD — plus an initial research student period **Deadline for 2027 entry:** Varies by country — typically May to June 2026 for embassy route **Who can apply:** Citizens of countries with diplomatic relations with Japan; age limits typically apply The MEXT Scholarship is the most chronically under-applied to award on this list among students from South Asia and Africa, and one of the most generous in what it provides. Since 1954, the programme has funded over 140,000 international students from nearly every country — [a scale that makes it one of the longest-running government scholarship programmes in the world](https://www.globaladmissions.com/scholarship/mext-scholarship?ref=diplopolis.com). For IR students, Japan is a frequently overlooked study destination with genuine relevance. Japanese universities — the University of Tokyo, Kyoto University, Osaka University, Waseda and Keio — have strong programmes in international relations, East Asian security, development studies and international law. Japan's unique position in the Indo-Pacific security architecture, its history of Official Development Assistance and its relationships with both the United States and China make it a genuinely instructive context in which to study international affairs — different from anything available in Washington, London or Geneva. The MEXT Research Student category — the most relevant for postgraduate IR study — places scholars as research students at a Japanese university for an initial period before progressing to a Masters or PhD programme, and requires identifying a potential supervisor in advance through the embassy route. This prior supervisor contact is a practical hurdle that requires early research; many applicants underestimate it. **What Global South applicants need to know:** The MEXT Scholarship is applied for through the Japanese embassy in your home country, not through universities directly (for the embassy recommendation route). Competition and acceptance rates vary significantly by country. Japanese language ability is not required for English-medium postgraduate programmes but adds meaningful value. ## 12\. Chinese Government Scholarship (CSC) **Funder:** Ministry of Education, People's Republic of China — administered by China Scholarship Council (CSC) **Value:** Full tuition, accommodation on campus, comprehensive medical insurance and monthly living stipend — amounts vary by programme and institution **Number of awards:** One of the largest scholarship programmes in the world by volume; thousands of awards annually **Duration:** Two to three years Masters; three to four years PhD **Deadline for 2027 entry:** Typically December 2026 to March 2027 — varies by route and institution **Who can apply:** Non-Chinese citizens from countries with diplomatic relations with China; age limits apply (under 35 for Masters, under 40 for PhD) The Chinese Government Scholarship is the least discussed but one of the most significant scholarship opportunities in international education today. China has invested heavily in its international scholarship programme as an instrument of soft power and people-to-people diplomacy — the same logic that drives Chevening, Fulbright and the Australia Awards — but at a scale and with a geographic reach that none of those programmes matches. The CSC scholarship funds study at Chinese universities across all disciplines, in programmes delivered in both English and Mandarin. For IR students, the opportunity is specific: China is the most consequential actor in international affairs of the next fifty years. Understanding China from the inside — studying at Peking University, Fudan, Renmin, Tsinghua or the China Foreign Affairs University — is not the same as studying about China from a distance. The networks, the language exposure and the first-hand understanding of Chinese institutions and society that a CSC-funded degree provides are not replicable from any Western institution. There are four application routes: the Bilateral Programme (through your country's dispatching authority), the Chinese University Programme (directly to Chinese universities), the ASEAN Programme and the Great Wall Programme. For most applicants, the Bilateral Programme or Chinese University Programme are the most accessible. Check the [CSC official website](https://www.csc.edu.cn/?ref=diplopolis.com) and your country's dispatching authority for country-specific quotas and deadlines. **What Global South applicants need to know:** China is actively expanding its scholarship allocations to African, South Asian and Southeast Asian countries as part of its broader Belt and Road Initiative engagement. A student from Nigeria, Kenya, Pakistan, Indonesia or Bangladesh may find CSC quotas for their country more generous than equivalent Chevening or Fulbright allocations. The credential from a top Chinese institution carries growing weight in regional and international employers. And Mandarin acquired during a CSC scholarship is a career asset of a kind that no other language on earth currently matches for long-term geopolitical relevance. ## The Verdict Apply to the scholarship that fits you. Not the most famous one, not the one your classmate applied to, not the one at the top of the Google results. Chevening fits candidates with professional leadership experience and a specific vision for how a UK Masters advances a defined goal. Gates Cambridge fits candidates with a compelling research agenda. The Commonwealth Scholarship fits candidates from developing Commonwealth countries with a development rationale for their studies. Princeton’s School of Public and International Affairs — not on this list but worth noting — funds every admitted student in full. Refer our [20 Best Masters Programmes in International Relations — A Global Guide for 2027 Intake](https://www.diplopolis.com/best-masters-international-relations-top-20-global-guide-2027/) for more details. Schwarzman fits candidates who understand that China is the defining international affairs challenge of their career. MEXT and CSC fit candidates who recognise that East Asia has become the gravitational centre of international affairs and who want to understand it from the inside rather than from a desk in Washington. Every application should be written for one scholarship, not adapted from a template that tries to be everything to everyone. The selection committees have read thousands of applications. They recognise generic ambition immediately and discount it. What they remember — what wins — is a candidate whose application could not have been written by anyone else. Start earlier than feels necessary. Apply more than once if you do not succeed. And choose the scholarship that is looking for exactly who you are. 🚧 Scholarship values, deadlines and eligibility criteria change annually. Every figure and deadline in this guide are accurate as of May 2026 but should be verified on the official scholarship website before you apply. If you spot an error or an outdated link in this piece, write to [editor@diplopolis.com](mailto:editor@diplopolis.com) and we will correct it promptly. This Dossier piece is free to read. Future Dossier pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) ### Blow Them Up URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/blow-them-up-trump-threatens-oman-strait-hormuz-mediator/ Last updated: 2026-05-29T04:30:40.000Z At a cabinet meeting on Wednesday, a reporter asked Trump whether he would accept a short-term deal allowing Iran and Oman to jointly control the Strait of Hormuz. Trump's answer was eleven words: ['Oman will behave just like everybody else, or we will have to blow them up.'](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/27/trump-appears-to-threaten-oman-with-bombing-over-strait-of-hormuz-impasse?ref=diplopolis.com) The State Department put the quote on social media within the hour. By Thursday, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent had followed up with a formal [sanctions threat against Oman](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/28/us-treasury-threatens-oman-with-sanctions-over-hormuz-strait?ref=diplopolis.com), warning Washington would 'aggressively target' any actors facilitating Iran's tolling system in the waterway. Bombs first. Sanctions second. For an ally. Oman is not a bystander in this war. It is the reason Washington has been able to talk to Tehran at all for the past fifteen years. The back channel that produced the 2015 JCPOA — the most significant arms control agreement of the modern era — began in Muscat, in secret, in 2012, when Iranian officials [passed a message through Oman](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202504179736?ref=diplopolis.com) suggesting a meeting with the Obama administration. CIA Director William Burns, then a State Department official, flew to Muscat to begin the talks. The head of Omani intelligence greeted both delegations. A nuclear agreement followed three years later. Obama praised Oman. Trump withdrew from it. Oman stayed at the table anyway. It stayed at the table in 2023, [helping facilitate the release](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/18/five-americans-land-in-doha-after-release-in-us-iran-prisoner-swap?ref=diplopolis.com) of five Americans wrongfully imprisoned in Iran — a deal Biden thanked Oman personally for helping to broker. It hosted Trump's own pre-war diplomacy with Tehran in February 2026, the [last diplomatic contact](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/28/why-has-trump-threatened-to-bomb-oman-amid-iran-war-escalation?ref=diplopolis.com) between Washington and Tehran before the bombs fell on February 28\. Oman did not start this war. It tried to prevent it. When that failed, it tried to contain it. Now, because it is exploring whether a joint Oman-Iran arrangement for the Strait might break the deadlock that is costing the Global South $100 billion in energy surcharges, it has been threatened with military force and economic ruin by the country it has served as an intermediary for three decades. The audacity of it is worth naming. Not the audacity of a powerful country threatening a small one — that is routine. The specific audacity of threatening the one country in the region that has earned both sides' trust, the one capital both Washington and Tehran will take a call from, the one mediator with a track record of actually producing agreements. Muscat is five million people in an arid country slightly larger than Italy. It has no oil wealth to compare with its Gulf neighbours, no military projection, no geopolitical ambition beyond quiet competence. What it has is relationships — carefully built, scrupulously maintained, never weaponised. Until Wednesday, when Washington weaponised them instead. The Strait of Hormuz runs through both Iranian and Omani territorial waters. Any arrangement for the strait that Iran can accept will require Omani involvement. This is not ideology. It is geography. Washington knows this. The threat to blow up Oman is therefore not a strategic miscalculation. It is a deliberate signal — that the terms of any Hormuz arrangement must be acceptable to Washington first, and Washington is not acting alone. Washington is not acting alone. The condition that Iran have no institutional role in the Strait has Israeli fingerprints on it. Washington has adopted it as its own. The Gulf is paying the price of it. Oman is now being told it will pay that price in bombs and sanctions if it tries to find a way out. Every US-Iran nuclear agreement in history passed through Muscat. The one being negotiated now — whatever emerges from the language points JD Vance says remain outstanding — will need Oman too. Trump has just told Oman what its cooperation is worth to him. And Oman, small and careful and relentlessly diplomatic, is now deciding what to do with that information. The mediator has been threatened. The strait remains closed. The war goes on. ### Refugees the West Made URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/refugees-the-west-made-colonialism-displacement-bill/ Last updated: 2026-05-28T11:00:45.000Z In the winter of 1884, representatives from fourteen European powers gathered in Berlin to divide a continent. [No African was present](https://www.trtafrika.com/english/article/4fb2a0dabfdf?ref=diplopolis.com). No African was consulted. The men in that room drew lines across a map they had never walked, splitting ethnic groups that had lived together for centuries, forcing traditional enemies into single states, severing ancient kingdoms from their own land. They called it the Scramble for Africa. History should call it what it was: the opening entry on a bill that the Global South is still paying and the West has never presented to itself. The displacement crisis that Western governments call a refugee problem did not begin in Baghdad in 2003, or Kabul in 2001, or Tripoli in 2011\. It did not begin with the Arab Spring or the War on Terror or the collapse of the Soviet Union. It began in the centuries of colonial extraction, arbitrary borders and deliberate state destruction that built Western wealth on Global South ruin. It ran through the Nakba of 1948 and the seventy-eight years of Palestinian dispossession that followed. It accumulated through Cold War proxy wars fought on other people's soil, through sanctions that killed children before the bombs arrived, through interventions that removed dictators and installed chaos. And it is compounded today by a climate crisis that the West created and the Global South is paying for in floods, droughts, failed harvests and forced movement. The bill has never been properly presented. This is it. ## Cartographers of Catastrophe The Berlin Conference of 1884 to 1885 [cut through 190 cultural groups](https://www.trtafrika.com/english/article/4fb2a0dabfdf?ref=diplopolis.com). Ancient kingdoms were split apart. Traditional enemies were locked inside the same borders. Communities that shared language, custom and kinship were separated by lines that meant nothing to them and everything to their colonial administrators. A Nigerian newspaper at the time called it a robbery on so large a scale that it beggared description. That was 1885\. The robbery has not stopped. The arbitrary borders drawn across Africa, the Middle East and Asia by European powers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are not a historical curiosity. They are the foundation of nearly every contemporary conflict that produces the refugees the West now refuses. The tensions between Hutus and Tutsis that produced the Rwandan genocide were shaped by Belgian colonial classification systems that hardened fluid social categories into fixed racial identities. The conflict between Kurds and the states that contain them — Türkiye, Iraq, Iran, Syria — exists because the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 divided the Middle East between Britain and France with no regard for the Kurdish people's existence as a distinct nation. The instability of the Democratic Republic of Congo, one of the world's largest producers of refugees, [traces directly to](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berlin%5FConference?ref=diplopolis.com) Belgian colonialism — the state King Leopold II built on mass murder and forced labour. This is not ancient history deployed as excuse. This is causation. States built on colonial violence, with borders drawn for colonial convenience, with economies designed for extraction rather than development, with institutions imposed rather than grown — these states are structurally more prone to the conflicts that produce displacement. The West built those structures. The West is surprised by the consequences. ## Balfour Catastrophe and Its Unending Sequel On November 2, 1917, British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour wrote a letter expressing His Majesty's Government's [support for a Jewish homeland](https://www.britannica.com/event/Balfour-Declaration?ref=diplopolis.com) in Palestine. The letter was sixty-seven words long. Its consequences have lasted more than a century and show no sign of ending. In 1917, Jewish people represented approximately [six per cent of Palestine's population](https://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Lecture-by-Prof.-Rashid-Khalidi-100-years-since-Balfour-Decl-UN-2Nov2017.pdf?ref=diplopolis.com). The declaration offered that minority a national home while offering the Arab majority — described only as non-Jewish communities — civil and religious rights. Not political rights. Not national rights. Not the right to the land they had lived on for generations. A colonial power, governing a territory it had seized from the Ottoman Empire, promised that territory to a people who largely did not live there, while denying the political rights of the people who did. Between 1947 and 1949, more than [750,000 Palestinians were expelled](https://imeu.org/resources/resources/quick-facts-the-palestinian-nakba-catastrophe/142?ref=diplopolis.com) or fled their homes as the state of Israel was established. More than 400 Palestinian towns and villages were destroyed to prevent their return. The refugees and their descendants now number approximately 8.36 million, scattered across Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and beyond, denied their internationally recognised [legal right of return](https://www.un.org/unispal/about-the-nakba/?ref=diplopolis.com) for seventy-eight years. The Palestinian displacement is not merely the world's longest-running refugee crisis. It is the world's most nakedly Western-manufactured refugee crisis — created by a British promise, sustained by American protection, compounded by decade after decade of Israeli settlement expansion that the West funds, arms and diplomatically shields. The Nakba did not end in 1948\. It is ongoing. More than 100,000 Palestinian homes have been demolished since 1948, excluding [the ongoing wars in Gaza](https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/5/23/the-nakba-did-not-start-or-end-in-1948?ref=diplopolis.com). The current war in Gaza has displaced the overwhelming majority of its 2.3 million people, many of them multiple times. The West that expresses humanitarian concern about this displacement is the same West that provided the weapons, the diplomatic cover and the Security Council vetoes that made it possible. ## Proxy Wars and Their Refugees The Cold War was not cold for the Global South. It was a series of wars fought on other people's territory, with other people's lives, in service of a superpower competition that had nothing to do with the interests of the people caught in the middle. The United States [overthrew Mohammed Mossadegh](https://www.britannica.com/event/1953-coup-in-Iran?ref=diplopolis.com) in Iran in 1953, restoring the Shah and setting in motion the chain of events that produced the 1979 revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, and the regional instability that has generated displacement across the Middle East ever since. It overthrew Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, beginning a [cycle of military rule](https://www.bbc.com/news/av/stories-48638209?ref=diplopolis.com) and civil war that produced hundreds of thousands of refugees whose descendants are still making the journey to the American border that the United States is now militarising against them. It backed the Khmer Rouge against the Vietnamese-aligned government in Cambodia in the 1970s. It funded the mujahideen in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union in the 1980s, arming and training the fighters who became the Taliban. Afghanistan has now produced one of the [largest refugee crises in history](https://www.unhcr.org/publications/global-trends-2023?ref=diplopolis.com) — a third generation of Afghan children born in exile. By 2023, 6.4 million Afghan refugees were living in other countries and 3.2 million remained internally displaced within their country. Iran and Pakistan — both Global South nations — host the overwhelming majority. The West that launched the war resettled a fraction. The United Kingdom's record is no cleaner. [The partition of India in 1947](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partition%5Fof%5FIndia?ref=diplopolis.com) — conducted in haste by a departing empire with no regard for the consequences — produced approximately fourteen million displaced people in the space of a few months, the largest forced migration in human history. The violence that accompanied it killed hundreds of thousands. Britain had ruled India for two centuries. It left in seventy-three days after the partition plan was announced, with borders drawn by a lawyer who had never visited India, leaving communities to manage a catastrophe that took two years to execute and generations to absorb. France's exit from Algeria left a legacy of violence and displacement that shaped North African politics for decades. Belgium's exit from the Congo left a state with no functioning institutions, no trained administrators, no infrastructure for self-governance — and a resource wealth that immediately became the prize for a series of proxy conflicts that have displaced millions. These were not natural disasters. They were the predictable consequences of deliberate colonial choices, made in European capitals, that the people of the Global South were left to survive. ## War on Terror's Permanent Refugees The 2003 invasion of Iraq produced no weapons of mass destruction. It [produced four million displaced Iraqis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Refugees%5Fof%5FIraq?ref=diplopolis.com) — internally displaced within the country and externally as refugees in Jordan, Syria and beyond. The United States invaded on the basis of intelligence its own officials knew to be false, destroyed the Iraqi state, disbanded its army, unleashed a sectarian conflict that it did not understand and could not control, and then spent a decade managing the consequences while the displaced waited in camps and apartments in neighbouring countries for a stability that did not come. When the Islamic State emerged from the power vacuum the invasion had created, it produced a second wave of displacement that dwarfed the first. Afghanistan was invaded in 2001 with the stated goal of destroying Al-Qaeda and removing the Taliban. Twenty years later, the United States withdrew, the Taliban returned to power within days, and the country reverted almost entirely to the conditions that had existed before the invasion. What had changed was the scale of destruction, the depth of dependency on foreign aid that instantly evaporated, and the number of people who had built their lives around an international presence that departed as rapidly as it had arrived. Libya was not invaded in the same way. It was bombed into chaos under [NATO's 2011 intervention](https://refugees.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/From-Libya-to-Syria.pdf?ref=diplopolis.com), justified as a humanitarian mission to protect civilians, executed in a manner that removed the government and left nothing coherent in its place. The state collapsed. The country fractured into competing militias. Libya became, almost immediately, one of the primary transit routes for refugees from sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East seeking to reach Europe — a route marked by drowning, enslavement and indefinite detention. The West that created the chaos then built border fences to keep out the people the chaos had produced. Syria: [more than 13 million displaced](https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/syria/?ref=diplopolis.com). The conflict that began in 2011 was shaped by Western-backed rebel groups, by weapons flows that the West supported and then lost control of, by a climate-driven drought that preceded the uprising and was itself a consequence of the emissions that Western industrialisation produced. The Syrian refugee crisis produced the European migration crisis of 2015, which produced the political backlash against refugees that empowered right-wing governments across the continent. The chain of causation runs directly from Western emissions to Syrian drought to Syrian war to Syrian displacement to European politics — and the West, at each step, treated the crisis as something that was happening to it rather than something it had helped to create. ## Climate Surcharge Every calculation about displacement must now include the climate. In 2022 alone, [weather disasters triggered 32.6 million](https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/climate-change-and-displacement-myths-and-facts?ref=diplopolis.com) internal displacements globally, of which 98 per cent were caused by floods, storms, wildfires and droughts. Weather-related disasters forced [a quarter billion people to flee](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/10/un-warns-of-millions-displaced-by-climate-change-as-cop30-opens-in-brazil?ref=diplopolis.com) their homes in the last decade, according to UNHCR. [Over 70 per cent of refugees](https://www.unhcr.org/us/news/press-releases/unhcr-launches-fund-shield-refugees-and-other-displaced-people-climate-shocks?ref=diplopolis.com) and asylum-seekers come from countries that are among the most vulnerable to climate change. The Sahel is desertifying. Bangladesh floods with greater frequency and severity. Pacific island states are disappearing beneath rising seas. The Horn of Africa faces droughts of increasing length and intensity. These are not random disasters. They are the measurable consequences of greenhouse gas emissions that the industrialised West has been producing since the nineteenth century — the same period in which it was colonising the countries now facing the worst consequences. The West promised in the 2015 Paris Agreement to limit warming and to provide climate finance to the most vulnerable nations. It has consistently failed to deliver the finance. It has consistently failed to meet its own emissions targets. Under President Trump, the United States — historically the world's top donor to UNHCR — [slashed foreign aid](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/10/un-warns-of-millions-displaced-by-climate-change-as-cop30-opens-in-brazil?ref=diplopolis.com) and cut funding to the agencies managing the displacement crisis. The country most responsible for cumulative global emissions is now most aggressively withdrawing from the mechanisms designed to manage the consequences. ## Presenting the Bill The West did not create poverty. It organised it. It created the conditions — colonial extraction, imposed borders, destroyed institutions, proxy wars, climate destruction — in which poverty and displacement are the predictable outcomes. And then it built a system for managing the human consequences that is now collapsing under the weight of the crises it was never designed to resolve. [More than 117 million people](https://www.unhcr.org/publications/global-trends-2023?ref=diplopolis.com) around the world are forcibly displaced from their homes. The countries hosting the majority of them are not in the West. Türkiye, Pakistan, Iran, Uganda, Sudan, Colombia — these are the nations carrying the weight of a displacement crisis whose causes sit primarily in decisions made in Washington, London, Paris and Brussels. Jordan has been hosting Palestinian refugees since 1948\. Pakistan has been hosting Afghan refugees for four decades. Lebanon hosts more refugees per capita than any country in the world, in a state already on the edge of collapse. The Global South did not create this crisis. It is managing it while the West lectures about border security and controlled migration. That is the audacity at the centre of this story. The West that drew the borders, started the wars, backed the dictators, armed the militias, funded the groups that became the terrorists, abandoned the states it had promised to rebuild, produced the emissions that are drowning coastlines and desiccating farmlands — that West now presents itself as the victim of a migration crisis and demands that the Global South do more to stop people from coming. The bill has been presented many times, in many forms, by many voices from the countries that are paying it. It has never been accepted. It has barely been acknowledged. What comes instead are border policies, detention centres, deals with authoritarian governments to stop the movement, and the occasional humanitarian gesture — a resettlement programme here, an aid package there — that addresses the symptom while carefully avoiding any reckoning with the cause. The refugee the West made is not an abstraction. She is a woman from Gaza displaced seven times in eighteen months. He is an Afghan man whose family spent four decades in Pakistani camps waiting to return to a country that no longer exists in the form they left it. She is a Malian farmer whose land the Sahara has swallowed. He is a Syrian child who grew up in a Lebanese camp, stateless, waiting for a resolution that his parents were also waiting for. These are the people on the bill. The West knows their names. It has photographed them extensively. It has written about them with considerable feeling. What it has not done is pay. This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) ### 200 Dead. No Names. No Evidence. No Trial URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/us-boat-strikes-caribbean-pacific-200-dead-operation-southern-spear/ Last updated: 2026-05-28T04:30:12.000Z Jhonny Sebastian Palacios is a fisherman from Manta, Ecuador. He does not go to sea anymore. In March, a US-flagged vessel [struck his boat](https://www.kunc.org/2026-05-26/ecuador-fishermen-claim-u-s-strike-destroyed-boats-and-crew-detained?ref=diplopolis.com) in international waters, then struck it again — what survivors describe as a double-tap attack designed to ensure no one swims away. He and other survivors were hooded, handcuffed, taken by ship to El Salvador, and returned to Ecuador weeks later. He was not charged with anything. He was not identified as a narco-trafficker. He was not named in any US government statement. He simply stopped going to sea. Washington calls [Operation Southern Spear](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United%5FStates%5Fstrikes%5Fon%5Falleged%5Fdrug%5Ftraffickers%5Fduring%5FOperation%5FSouthern%5FSpear?ref=diplopolis.com) a drug enforcement campaign. Since September 2025, US forces have conducted more than 50 strikes on boats in the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean, killing nearly 200 people. These are unilateral American operations on international waters — not joint operations, not invited interventions, not operations Ecuador was informed about or consented to. Ecuadorian fishermen were among the dead. When Ecuador's President Daniel Noboa was asked about their cases at a Washington forum earlier this month, he questioned the fishermen's motivations rather than demanding answers from the country that killed them. He is a close Trump ally. He did not say whether Ecuador had asked Washington for information about the strikes. Not one victim has been publicly named. Not one piece of evidence has been presented in any court. Not one of the dead has been formally identified as a narco-trafficker by any legal process that carries due process. Washington announces the strikes. SOUTHCOM posts the footage. The boats burn. The bodies sink. The press releases go out. No names. No charges. No trial. The Trump administration's position is consistent and simple: these are narco-terrorists, the operations are lawful, and anyone questioning them is running cover for drug smugglers. The White House called UN criticism 'ridiculous.' When the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights [called the strikes unlawful](https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/12/16/qa-us-military-operations-in-the-caribbean-pacific?ref=diplopolis.com) and demanded they stop, the response from Washington was that the UN had 'failed at everything from operating an escalator to ending wars.' When the ACLU and the Center for Constitutional Rights brought the case to the [Inter-American Commission](https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/legal-experts-underscore-illegality-of-u-s-boat-strikes-at-inter-american-commission-on-human-rights-hearing?ref=diplopolis.com) on Human Rights in March, US representatives attended and decried the attempt to hold them accountable. The legal consensus outside Washington is not ambiguous. Human Rights Watch has concluded the strikes constitute extrajudicial killings — unlawful killings by state authorities without legal justification or process. The UN Special Rapporteur on counterterrorism said those ordering and carrying out the strikes should be investigated and prosecuted for homicide. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights said countering drug trafficking is a law enforcement matter, not a military one, and that none of the targeted individuals appeared to pose the kind of imminent threat that justifies lethal force under international law. Two Trinidadian men — Chad Joseph and Rishi Samaroo — were [killed in October 2025](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/14/us-military-kills-3-in-latest-attack-on-boat-in-caribbean?ref=diplopolis.com) travelling by boat from Venezuela to their homes. They were not drug traffickers. Washington has never explained the strike. This is the same government bombing Iran in self-defence. Blockading Cuba in the name of democracy. Boarding humanitarian flotillas in international waters off Cyprus. Conducting joint military operations inside Ecuador at the invitation of a government whose own fishermen it was killing in international waters. Demanding consequences for Russian violations of ceasefire agreements. The architecture of accountability Washington deploys against its adversaries — international law, due process, rules-based order — has a consistent blind spot. It applies everywhere except in the Eastern Pacific, the Caribbean and wherever else Washington decides the rules do not apply this week. Palacios says he does not want to go to sea anymore. His boats are gone. His crew was taken to another country and returned without explanation. The US government has not named him, charged him or acknowledged his existence. He is one of the lucky ones. Nearly 200 people in international waters since September 2025 were not. Nobody named them either. ### They Were at the Table. Washington Struck Anyway. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/us-strikes-iran-doha-talks-self-defence-ceasefire/ Last updated: 2026-05-27T04:30:50.000Z Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf [landed in Doha on Monday](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/26/us-military-launches-strikes-on-southern-iran-amid-talks-in-qatar?ref=diplopolis.com) for peace talks with Qatari mediators. They were Iran's most senior negotiators. The talks were the most substantive since the ceasefire — Iran's nuclear stockpile was on the table, with officials working to iron out key sticking points in a proposed memorandum to halt the violence. Hours later, US Central Command [announced strikes](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/26/us-military-launches-strikes-on-southern-iran-amid-talks-in-qatar?ref=diplopolis.com) on missile launch sites and boats in southern Iran. The military called it self-defence. [Trump posted on Truth Social](https://www.irishtimes.com/world/middle-east/2026/05/26/rubio-says-iran-deal-could-take-days-as-us-launches-fresh-strikes/?ref=diplopolis.com) that negotiations were 'proceeding nicely.' Both things happened on the same day. Washington struck Iran and called it restraint. Washington struck Iran and called it a ceasefire. Washington struck Iran while Iran's foreign minister was at a table in Qatar trying to end the war. There is a word for a negotiation in which one party bombs the other mid-session. It is not diplomacy. Iran said the United States had violated the ceasefire. Rubio said that negotiating a deal to halt the conflict could take a few days. The bombs fell. The talks continued. The language held. Iran's IRGC threatened to retaliate. Deutsche Bank analysts wrote that the strikes were 'clearly a warning shot' but that optimism for a deal remained 'elevated.' Markets measured optimism. Southern Iran measured the craters. The official CENTCOM statement was a masterpiece of simultaneous contradiction. The strikes were conducted 'in self-defence.' The military was 'using restraint during the ongoing ceasefire.' The targets included missile launch sites and Iranian boats [attempting to emplace mines](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/26/us-military-launches-strikes-on-southern-iran-amid-talks-in-qatar?ref=diplopolis.com) — active threats, CENTCOM said, posed by Iranian forces. Every sentence was individually defensible. Together they described a country conducting a military campaign it was calling a ceasefire. Rubio, speaking from New Delhi on Tuesday, delivered the underlying message without packaging. The Strait of Hormuz will be open, he said, 'one way or the other.' What is happening there is 'unlawful, illegal, unsustainable for the world, unacceptable.' No country supports Iran's tolling system. Not Russia. Not China. Not anyone. 'One way or the other' is not a negotiating position. It is an ultimatum with a ceasefire painted over it. The pattern has been consistent since February 28\. Washington bombed Iran and called it the elimination of threats. Washington announced a ceasefire and called it peace. Iran built a toll booth on the Strait and Washington called it illegal. Washington struck Iran again and called it self-defence. Trump said he would only sign an agreement 'if we get everything we want.' With each passing day, Iranian and US officials are raising their demands, hostilities are flaring between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, and civilians are being killed — raising the stakes of negotiations that were never designed to produce equality between the parties. Now there is a new development that makes the Doha session more significant than it first appeared. Trump is expected to gather his Cabinet at Camp David on Wednesday for a meeting at a high-stakes moment for the US war with Iran. A Camp David Cabinet session the day after strikes on Iran during active peace talks is either a coincidence or a sequence. Given the pattern of the past three months it is almost certainly a sequence. Washington strikes. Washington talks. Washington meets at Camp David. The diplomacy and the military action are not competing tracks. They are the same track. Iran's negotiators stayed in Doha after the strikes. That tells you something about the calculation Tehran is making — that leaving the table is more dangerous than staying at a table where the other side is bombing you. It also tells you something about what kind of agreement is being negotiated. A deal reached under these conditions is not a settlement between parties. It is terms dictated to the weaker side while the stronger side demonstrates, with missile strikes on southern Iran, exactly what refusal costs. Trump said he wants Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt and Jordan to join the Abraham Accords as part of any deal. He is using a ceasefire negotiation to reshape the entire regional order simultaneously. The strikes on Monday were not a disruption to the diplomacy. They were part of it — a reminder, delivered in southern Iran, of who sets the terms and who signs them. The negotiators stayed at the table in Doha. They did not have a better option. That is what this negotiation is. ### The Vishwaguru the World Never Knew URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/vishwaguru-india-diplomacy-operation-sindoor-bjp/ Last updated: 2026-06-01T18:57:34.000Z On June 21, 2025, Pakistan [nominated Donald Trump](https://edition.cnn.com/2025/06/21/asia/pakistan-trump-nobel-peace-prize-nomination-intl?ref=diplopolis.com) for the Nobel Peace Prize. The nomination cited his role in ending the war India had started. India had struck nine terror sites across Pakistan in Operation Sindoor. India had called it a counter-terror operation, a precision response, a message delivered. And yet six weeks later it was Pakistan sending the thank-you note to Washington. Pakistan's army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, sat in the Oval Office and was received with what Trump himself called extraordinary warmth. The ceasefire that ended the fighting had been announced not by New Delhi, not by Islamabad, but by the United States Secretary of State, at 5:37 PM IST on May 10, 2025, [before India had said a word.](https://www.outlookindia.com/national/congress-questions-indias-post-operation-sindoor-diplomacy-cites-us-role-in-ceasefire?ref=diplopolis.com) India had a name for what it was becoming in the world. The BJP had given it that name twelve years ago and repeated it so often it had begun to feel like fact. Vishwaguru — Sanskrit for teacher of the world, a civilisational claim rooted in India's ancient philosophical inheritance. ## World India Actually Built The BJP's foreign policy project was built on performance — the deliberate staging of India's global arrival through summits, hugs, optics and civilisational claims. It is worth remembering what India looked like to the world before that performance began, because the BJP's narrative required that memory to be erased. Erasing it was not incidental to the project. It was the project. You cannot sell arrival if the audience remembers you were already there. When Jawaharlal Nehru stood [at the 1955 Bandung Conference](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Non-Aligned-Movement?ref=diplopolis.com) alongside Gamal Abdel Nasser, Josip Broz Tito, Kwame Nkrumah and Sukarno of Indonesia, he was not performing leadership. He was exercising it. Twenty-nine newly independent nations gathered in Indonesia to assert, for the first time, that the world was not simply a stage for American and Soviet competition. The Global South had a voice. India had shaped that voice. The term non-alignment itself was [coined by](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India%5Fand%5Fthe%5FNon-Aligned%5FMovement?ref=diplopolis.com) India's V K Menon at the United Nations in 1953 and given form by Nehru's Panchsheel principles — five commitments to peaceful coexistence that became the philosophical foundation of a movement representing the majority of humanity. The Non-Aligned Movement was [formally established](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Non-Aligned-Movement?ref=diplopolis.com) at the 1961 Belgrade Conference. India was among its 25 founding members. Nehru was among its intellectual architects. This was not a rotation that came to India in alphabetical order. This was not a summit India hosted because it was its turn. This was genuine moral authority earned through genuine intellectual labour, recognised across Asia and Africa and Latin America by nations that had watched India choose principle over alignment in a world that punished principle. The prestige it produced for India was real because the position behind it was real. Indira Gandhi's 1971 war requires no mythology. It stands on its own terms. India's military and diplomatic conduct that year produced an independent Bangladesh, split Pakistan and demonstrated a strategic nerve that made the world take New Delhi seriously as a state that could project power and deliver a result. The Simla Agreement that followed was India's agreement, negotiated on India's terms, anchoring the subcontinent's post-war order around Indian strategic interests. The world noticed. Henry Kissinger, who despised Indira Gandhi and had worked against her, noticed. This is the India that existed before 2014\. Not perfect. Not without failures. The 1962 war with China was a humiliation. The Emergency was a democratic catastrophe. Non-alignment frayed as the Cold War deepened and India drifted towards Moscow in ways that complicated the purity of its position. But the standing was real. The authority was earned. When India spoke in multilateral forums, the Global South listened, because India had spent decades speaking for it rather than about it. The BJP did not build on this inheritance. It buried it, because the Modi narrative required India to have been small before he arrived. ## Fiction That Replaced It The [G20 presidency came to India](https://www.business-standard.com/india-news/g20-explained-details-on-the-global-bloc-its-history-india-s-presidency-123082500616%5F1.html?ref=diplopolis.com) on December 1, 2022\. It came the way it comes to every member: through rotation. Indonesia had held it. India held it. Brazil took it next. The sequence is determined by mutual convenience among members. It is not awarded. It is not earned. It passes, as Congress leader Jairam Ramesh [pointed out](https://www.deccanherald.com/amp/story/india%2Fg20-presidency-rotational-govt-indulging-in-high-voltage-drama-congress-1167818.html?ref=diplopolis.com) at the time, the way a baton passes in a relay. None of the previous holders staged the drama India staged. UNESCO heritage sites were [lit up](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/100-asi-sites-to-be-lit-up-bear-g20-logo-from-dec-1-7-as-india-assumes-its-presidency/articleshow/95898942.cms?ref=diplopolis.com) with the G20 logo. The summit was branded as a civilisational moment. A rotation was sold as destiny. This was not statecraft. This was stagecraft. And stagecraft had become the BJP's primary foreign policy instrument from the moment Narendra Modi took office in 2014. The hugs were televised. Every bilateral meeting became a visual event — Modi and Obama, Modi and Xi, Modi and Macron, Modi and Trump, Modi and Meloni. The images were produced for domestic consumption and consumed enthusiastically. A leader who could stand comfortably beside the world's most powerful leaders in the world was, the narrative insisted, a leader who had elevated India to a position where such comfort was natural. What the images did not show was what was being agreed in the meetings, what India was conceding, what India was gaining, what India's actual leverage was in each relationship. The images showed proximity. They were sold as power. The civilisational confidence was performed daily. Ancient India had given the world yoga, mathematics, philosophy and spiritual wisdom. Modern India, under Modi, was reclaiming that inheritance and offering it back to a grateful world. Vishwaguru. The teacher had returned. The claim was never tested against the evidence of what the world was actually learning from India, or whether the world had enrolled in the class. This is the logic that a packet of Melody toffees confirmed in May 2026\. The week before flying to Rome, Prime Minister Modi had [asked Indians](https://www.outlookindia.com/national/pm-modi-lands-in-rome-to-meet-italian-pm-meloni-2?ref=diplopolis.com) to use less petrol, skip foreign trips and avoid buying gold — an austerity appeal from a government facing a current account deficit that analysts [warned could more than double](https://www.business-standard.com/economy/news/economists-see-fy27-cad-widening-as-oil-shock-remittance-risks-mount-126051101327%5F1.html?ref=diplopolis.com) in 2026-27, with foreign exchange reserves [falling from $728 billion to $698 billion](https://thefederal.com/category/business/iran-war-forex-reserves-fall-by-usd-30-bn-will-it-increase-indias-challenges-237021?ref=diplopolis.com) within three weeks of the West Asian conflict beginning. Then Modi flew to Rome. He gifted Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni [a packet of Melody](https://www.businesstoday.in/india/story/narendra-modi-giorgia-meloni-melodi-melody-toffee-air-india-blinkit-swiggy-instamart-zepto-india-post-dtdc-yes-madam-532576-2026-05-21?ref=diplopolis.com) toffees. The video crossed 100 million views within hours. Retail investors [piled into the wrong Parle](https://pressinsider.com/news/modis-melody-gift-to-meloni-sends-wrong-parle-stock-higher/?ref=diplopolis.com). Parle Products, the unlisted Mumbai company that actually makes Melody, does not trade on any stock exchange. Parle Industries — a listed company with no connection to the toffee — surged 15 per cent across three days as day-traders bought shares in a company they had confused with the one in the video. Brands queued to associate themselves with the moment. The austerity appeal disappeared from the national conversation. As one commentator observed, what chance does any serious issue stand in front of the [cringe glamour](https://kathmandupost.com/columns/2026/05/21/flaws-in-pm-modi-austerity-appeal-timing-method-onus?ref=diplopolis.com) of the country's prime minister presenting a pack of toffees to his Italian counterpart? The images showed proximity. They were sold as power. They always are. ## Media That Sold It None of this fiction survives without a distribution system. India has one. Godi media — the term critics use for television channels and outlets that function as cheerleaders for the government, derived from the Hindi word *godi* meaning lap — did not merely report the BJP's diplomatic performance. It amplified it, validated it, and attacked anyone who questioned it. Anchors who should have been asking what India gained from a bilateral meeting instead competed to celebrate the optics of it. Journalists who should have been interrogating the substance of the G20 presidency instead narrated its spectacle as though spectacle were the point. The effect on public understanding was profound and deliberate. A generation of Indian news consumers grew up watching a version of their country's global standing that bore no relationship to how that standing was being assessed outside the country. Foreign correspondents writing about India's diplomatic limitations, international analysts questioning India's strategic depth, regional commentators noting India's shrinking influence in its own neighbourhood — none of this penetrated the domestic media ecosystem. What penetrated was the image. The hug. The podium. The flag. When Operation Sindoor happened, the same ecosystem performed the same function. The strikes were celebrated as national triumph. The military achievement was real — nine terror sites, precision strikes, a message delivered. What was not interrogated was what came next. Who announced the ceasefire. Who received the credit. Who went to Washington and came back with warmth. The questions that any honest press corps would have pressed — why was the first ceasefire announcement American, why was Pakistan's army chief in the Oval Office weeks later, what precisely did India's operation achieve diplomatically — were not asked at volume. They were asked at the margins, by the outlets that godi media had spent years teaching its audience to dismiss as anti-national. ## When the Fiction Met Reality India [launched Operation Sindoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025%5FIndia%E2%80%93Pakistan%5Fconflict?ref=diplopolis.com) on the night of May 6-7, 2025, striking nine terror-linked sites in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir in response to the Pahalgam attack that had killed 26 civilians. The operation was real. The military competence it demonstrated was real. India deployed domestically developed systems — BrahMos missiles, Akashteer air defence, loitering munitions — and struck with precision. The targets were degraded. The message, militarily, was delivered. The diplomacy that followed belonged to someone else. Pakistan logged [nearly 60 interactions](https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/insight/fara-records-show-pakistan-lobbied-us-during-operation-sindoor/gm-GM8429280B?ref=diplopolis.com) with US lawmakers, congressional aides, defence officials, Treasury officials and journalists between May 6 and May 9 alone, according to filings under the United States Foreign Agents Registration Act. While India struck, Pakistan worked Washington. While India insisted it was conducting a bilateral counter-terror operation that required no external involvement, Pakistan was ensuring that the external involvement would come and would come in Pakistan's favour. It came. JD Vance [called Modi](https://m.thewire.in/article/diplomacy/the-unexplained-op-sindoor-ceasefire-that-gave-pakistan-a-diplomatic-escape?ref=diplopolis.com) on the night of May 9\. Vance made four calls. Modi, in a meeting with military officials, missed them. When the conversation happened, the pressure was clear. The ceasefire followed. Its announcement, at 5:37 PM IST on May 10, came from Marco Rubio in Washington, attributed to Trump's intervention. India insisted the ceasefire was bilateral. Pakistan immediately [credited Trump](https://thediplomat.com/2026/05/a-year-after-operation-sindoor-pakistan-is-in-trouble-at-home-basks-in-glory-abroad/?ref=diplopolis.com), nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize, and watched as Islamabad's relationship with Washington warmed to a temperature India had spent twelve years trying to achieve for itself. Pakistan's army chief was [promoted to Field Marshal](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025%5FIndia%E2%80%93Pakistan%5Fconflict?ref=diplopolis.com) on May 20, 2025, a rank previously held in Pakistan only by Ayub Khan. He was received by Trump in the Oval Office. He was praised by the American military establishment. Pakistan — which India had gone to war against for sheltering the infrastructure of terror — emerged from the conflict with a better relationship with Washington than it had entered it with. This is not a failure of military execution. India's strikes achieved their immediate objectives. This is a failure of strategic vision — the inability to translate military action into political consequence, the absence of a diplomatic architecture capable of consolidating what the armed forces had built. Twelve years of performance diplomacy had not built that architecture. It had built an image. Images do not convert military success into diplomatic leverage. Relationships do. Credibility does. The kind of standing in the world that takes decades to accumulate and cannot be manufactured with a summit logo or a televised embrace. ## What the World Actually Saw The world that watched Operation Sindoor and its aftermath did not see the Vishwaguru. It saw a country that struck hard and then watched Washington manage the outcome. It saw a country whose narrative of the ceasefire was contradicted by the American president on social media and whose contradiction produced no consequence. It saw Pakistan's general in the Oval Office while India's diplomatic establishment insisted, accurately but irrelevantly, that the ceasefire had been bilateral. The Atlantic Council [noted](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025%5FIndia%E2%80%93Pakistan%5Fconflict?ref=diplopolis.com) that Operation Sindoor resulted in Pakistan having a diplomatic advantage over India regarding Trump's involvement. The Diplomat reported a year later that Pakistan's international profile had improved while India's effort to isolate Pakistan as a terror state had not produced the isolation it sought. India's response to the diplomatic vacuum was to send [59 parliamentarians to 32 countries](https://www.diplopolis.com/fifty-nine-lawmakers-zero-answers-operation-sindoor-one-year/) in a coordinated outreach effort. The delegations flew, the meetings were held, the press releases were issued. What they could not produce was the one thing the outreach was designed to demonstrate — that India controlled the narrative of what had happened. Pakistan's army chief in the Oval Office settled that question without a press release. The pattern has not changed. When Washington's Secretary of State Marco Rubio arrived in New Delhi in May 2026 on a three-day visit, analysts described the trip as a [repair mission](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/22/marco-rubio-visits-india-whats-at-stake-with-trump-modi-ties-strained?ref=diplopolis.com) — Washington attempting to mend bilateral ties battered by trade tensions, immigration friction and the warming of US relations with both Pakistan and China. India received the visit as a diplomatic win. Modi was invited to the White House. The narrative of sustained progress in the bilateral partnership was repeated on social media. What the narrative did not say was that Washington had come to repair a relationship it had itself damaged — by treating Pakistan as the indispensable Iran mediator, by settling with Beijing in a G2 framework that excluded New Delhi, by imposing 50 per cent tariffs on Indian goods while China imported Russian crude freely. ## Admirers Who Were Not Watching Nehru did not need to claim the title of Vishwaguru. The world came to India because India had something real to offer — a principled position in a polarised world, a voice for the newly independent, a refusal to be pulled into alignments that served other powers' interests. That offer was genuine. It attracted genuine followers. The standing it produced was India's own, built over decades of patient engagement, of showing up in the rooms that mattered with arguments that mattered. What replaced it was performance. Twelve years of staging arrival at a world stage India had already occupied. Twelve years of marketing rotation as destiny, proximity as power, optics as diplomacy. Twelve years of a domestic media ecosystem so captured by the performance that it could not tell the audience when the performance had ended and the reality had begun. When reality arrived, in the form of a Pakistani general in the Oval Office and a Nobel Peace Prize nomination sent from Islamabad to Washington, the performance had no answer for it. Vishwaguru requires admirers. The admirers, it turned out, had not been watching. --- *This Analysis is part of* [*India Examined*](https://www.diplopolis.com/india-examined/) *— DiploPolis's ongoing analysis of Indian foreign policy since 2014\. What India claims to be in the world. What it actually is. And what the gap between those two things costs.* This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) ### He Signed the Treaties. Then He Bombed Kyiv. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/putin-signed-treaties-bombed-kyiv-oreshnik-beijing/ Last updated: 2026-05-26T04:30:50.000Z Putin left Beijing on Wednesday evening having called his partnership with Xi Jinping a 'key [stabilising force](https://www.diplopolis.com/putin-beijing-russia-china-dependency-sovereignty/) in international affairs.' He had [signed 20 agreements](https://www.wionews.com/world/putin-xi-jinping-meeting-russia-china-sign-20-agreements-for-stronger-ties-details-inside-1779263000719/amp?ref=diplopolis.com). He had quoted Chinese proverbs. He had embraced his dear friend. By Sunday, he had launched the [largest bombardment of Kyiv](https://kyivindependent.com/russian-attack-may-24-2026/?ref=diplopolis.com) in four years of war. Six hundred drones. Ninety missiles. An Oreshnik hypersonic ballistic missile — nuclear-capable, uninterceptable by any existing air defence — [fired at Bila Tserkva](https://www.kyivpost.com/post/76743?ref=diplopolis.com), a city of 200,000 people fifty miles south of the capital. Four dead. A hundred injured. Thirty residential buildings destroyed or damaged. A school struck while people sheltered inside. Every district of Kyiv hit. The largest single attack on Ukraine's capital since the invasion began. The Oreshnik is not a routine weapon and its use is not routine. Putin [first fired it in November 2024](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/ukraine/ukraine-capital-kyiv-hit-massive-missile-drone-attack-rcna346673?ref=diplopolis.com), against Dnipro. The second time was January 2026, against Lviv. Sunday was the third — against a target fifty miles from the capital, in a city of 200,000 people. Each use is a calibrated signal: that Russia's nuclear-capable arsenal is now a regular instrument of the war, not a last resort. The escalation is not accidental. It is a message, delivered three times now, to anyone who might be considering consequences. The word for what Putin called his partnership with Xi is 'stabilising.' It is worth sitting with that word for a moment. Five days before the attack, [Xi told Trump](https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/xi-told-trump-putin-might-121449414.html?ref=diplopolis.com) — according to multiple people familiar with the Beijing summit — that Putin may ultimately regret invading Ukraine. Xi offered this assessment privately, to the American president, as a signal of moderate intent. The Chinese Foreign Ministry denied it. Trump denied it. The Financial Times stood by it. Then Putin flew home and fired 600 drones at a capital city. The sequence is its own verdict. Xi's reported remark — if true — was not leverage. It was not restraint. It was a message managed for Western consumption while the military relationship between Beijing and Moscow continued undisturbed. Reuters revealed this week that roughly 200 Russian troops attended [secret training exercises](https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/russians-covertly-trained-by-china-return-fight-ukraine-sources-say-2026-05-19/?ref=diplopolis.com) in China in late 2025, learning drone warfare tactics that some carried directly back to the Ukrainian battlefield. China trains Russian soldiers. China denies it influences Russian decisions. Both things are true simultaneously and neither cancels the other out. Ukraine has watched all of this from a position of deepening isolation. Trump's negotiators [promised to visit Kyiv](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/trump-s-special-envoys-eye-ukraine-visit-1775323110.html?ref=diplopolis.com) after Easter. They never came. No new date was given. No explanation was offered. The peace process has [stalled since February](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/ukraines-falling-confidence-in-us-mediation/?ref=diplopolis.com) — Ukraine was the priority until the Iran war made it inconvenient. Zelensky [called for consequences](https://abcnews.com/International/russia-launches-severe-deadly-missile-attack-kyiv-zelenskyy/story?id=133263804&ref=diplopolis.com) after Sunday's attack. He received a statement of condemnation. The world's diplomatic capital is in Tehran, Beijing and Islamabad. Kyiv absorbs what is left. Putin does not need Xi's permission to bomb Kyiv. That is the point. The 'no limits' partnership has always been constructed so that Xi retains maximum deniability while Russia retains maximum operational freedom. Beijing provides the economic lifeline, the technology supply chain, the diplomatic cover. Moscow provides the military action. The arrangement is stable precisely because it is never formalised, never written down, never acknowledged. A stabilising force, in the language of the joint statement. An alibi, in the language of what actually happens. A 74-year-old Kyiv pensioner told the Kyiv Independent he felt the blast before he understood it. The flames. The brief loss of consciousness. Then, the detail that stays: he was not scared. Kyiv residents, he said, are [already used to this](https://kyivindependent.com/russian-attack-may-24-2026/?ref=diplopolis.com). Their emotions have become a little dulled. Four years of a stabilising force, felt from below. Putin called it a partnership. Xi called him a dear friend. The Oreshnik travels, as Putin once said, like a meteorite. Nobody in Bila Tserkva was consulted about the friendship. ### The Playbook. Again URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/cuba-us-playbook-raul-castro-indictment-uss-nimitz/ Last updated: 2026-05-25T04:30:01.000Z On May 20 — Cuban Independence Day, chosen deliberately — the United States Department of Justice [unsealed an indictment](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/raul-castro-indicted-us-cuba/?ref=diplopolis.com) charging former Cuban President Raúl Castro with four counts of murder, conspiracy to kill American nationals and destruction of aircraft. The charges relate to the 1996 shootdown of two civilian planes flown by Cuban-American exiles. Castro is 94 years old. He has not left Cuba in years. He will never appear in a Miami courtroom. The indictment was not designed to produce a trial. It was designed to produce a justification. The USS Nimitz [arrived in the Caribbean](https://thehill.com/policy/defense/5888335-uss-nimitz-caribbean-cuba-trump/?ref=diplopolis.com) the same day. Washington has run this sequence before and recently. Fuel blockade. Economic collapse. CIA deadline. Criminal indictment of the head of state. Carrier group. Each step is individually explicable — the blockade targets Venezuelan oil, the indictment addresses a genuine 30-year-old crime, the carrier group is described as maritime exercises. Together they form a [pre-conflict playbook](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/whats-happening-between-u-s-and-cuba-heres-a-timeline-of-recent-tensions?ref=diplopolis.com) that CNBC, not known for alarmism, described in those precise words on Friday. The Trump administration has been running it since January, when US forces captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro — Cuba's primary economic lifeline — and the oil stopped flowing. Washington has [imposed over 240 sanctions measures on Cuba](https://www.cubaheadlines.com/articles/328853?ref=diplopolis.com) since January, including an effective oil embargo that has slashed Cuban fuel imports by 80 to 90 per cent. Seven oil tankers heading to the island have been intercepted. Cuba says it is out of oil and diesel. The dollar has hit a record on the informal black market. Blackouts are nationwide and ongoing. CIA Director John Ratcliffe flew to Havana in person and told Cuban officials the window for talks would not stay open indefinitely. Trump said on camera: 'It looks like I'll be the one that does it.' Rubio said force remained an option. The acting Attorney General held a press conference in Miami. The Nimitz is in the Caribbean. The indictment is 30 years late and will never be enforced. Its purpose is not legal. It is sequential. In the logic Washington is building, Cuba's government is not merely authoritarian — it is criminal, its former head of state a named murderer, its continued existence therefore not a political question but a law enforcement one. This is how interventions are prepared in the modern American playbook. Not with a declaration of war. With a criminal filing. Cuba has [promised fierce resistance](https://www.foxnews.com/politics/cuban-ex-president-raul-castro-indicted-charges-murder-conspiracy-kill-us-nationals?ref=diplopolis.com). It has also pardoned 2,010 prisoners in the past week — the largest such release in years — a signal that Havana is calculating rather than simply defying. The Cuban government knows the difference between a bluff and a sequence. It is watching the sequence complete itself step by step and responding with the only leverage it has: the cost of occupation. Cuba is not Iran. It does not have a strait to toll or a nuclear programme to negotiate. It has 11 million people, a history of surviving American pressure and a government that has outlasted ten US presidents. The eleventh is threatening to be the one that finally acts. He may be right. Or the sequence may stall, as it has stalled before. But the playbook is open. Every page is visible. And nobody who has watched Washington run it before should be surprised by what comes next. ### The 20 Best Masters Programmes in International Relations — A Global Guide for 2027 Intake URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/best-masters-international-relations-top-20-global-guide-2027/ Last updated: 2026-05-22T19:57:20.000Z Every year, the same list circulates in groups across Mumbai, Lagos, Jakarta and Cairo. LSE. Sciences Po. Fletcher. Georgetown. Columbia. The names travel faster than the tuition figures that follow them, and much faster than the more uncomfortable question nobody in those groups tends to ask: built by whom, for whom, and to explain whose world? That question matters. International relations as an academic discipline was constructed in the early twentieth century by British and American scholars who wanted to understand, and manage, a world order that their countries had built. The frameworks that still dominate the curriculum at the world's top programmes — realism, liberalism and constructivism — were developed in institutions in London, Oxford, New York and Washington. They treat sovereignty, the balance of power and the liberal international order as the natural architecture of global politics. They treat the colonial period, if they treat it at all, as background rather than causation. A student from the Global South can spend $120,000 acquiring expertise in frameworks designed to explain a world in which their country was the object of great power competition, not an actor in it. That is not an argument against studying at these institutions. Some of them are genuinely excellent. It is an argument for knowing what you are choosing and why. This guide covers the 20 best Masters programmes in international relations, ranked by aggregating three major polls and subject rankings from the past two years. It tells you what each one delivers, what it costs, what the rankings miss, and which one is right for which kind of student. ## How This List Was Built Three sources, all published between 2024 and 2026, were aggregated to produce the ranking below. The [Foreign Policy / TRIP Project Survey (2024)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/07/30/international-relations-school-rankings-university-undergraduate-masters-phd-programs/?ref=diplopolis.com) is the most authoritative Masters-specific ranking in existence. Conducted by the Teaching, Research and International Policy Project at William and Mary's Global Research Institute, it surveyed 979 IR scholars, 294 think tank staff and 291 policymakers, asking each group to name the five best Masters programmes in the world. It is the only ranking that asks practitioners directly, and its results carry genuine weight in hiring decisions across government, international organisations and think tanks. Its limitation is structural: the respondents are overwhelmingly American, which inflates American programmes and understates the best European alternatives. The [QS World University Rankings by Subject 2026 — Politics](https://www.topuniversities.com/university-subject-rankings/politics?ref=diplopolis.com), published March 2026, evaluates 400 institutions globally on academic reputation, employer reputation, research citations and faculty-to-student ratio. It corrects for the American bias in FP/TRIP by drawing on a genuinely international pool of academic respondents. Oxford ranks second here, Sciences Po third — positions that the FP/TRIP survey, dominated by American academics, does not reflect. The [Times Higher Education World University Rankings by Subject 2026 — Social Sciences](https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2026/subject-ranking/social-sciences?ref=diplopolis.com), published January 2026, evaluates teaching environment, research output, research influence and international outlook across 2,000 institutions. It provides a third data point that neither of the other two rankings captures in the same way. The final list aggregates all three, weighted to reflect what a student — rather than a scholar or a hiring manager — actually needs to know. | # | Programme | Location | Duration | Best For | | -- | ------------------------------------ | ---------------------- | --------- | ----------------------------------------------- | | 1 | Georgetown MSFS | Washington DC, USA | 2 years | Washington DC policy careers | | 2 | Harvard Kennedy School MPA/MPP | Cambridge, USA | 2 years | Global brand value, all sectors | | 3 | Johns Hopkins SAIS MAIR | DC + Bologna + Nanjing | 2 years | International economics, security | | 4 | Oxford MPhil International Relations | Oxford, UK | 2 years | Academic careers, senior civil service | | 5 | Sciences Po PSIA | Paris, France | 2 years | Global South students, equitable fees | | 6 | Columbia SIPA MIA | New York, USA | 21 months | Quantitative focus, UN proximity | | 7 | Princeton SPIA MPA | Princeton, USA | 2 years | Fully funded — apply if you can get in | | 8 | LSE MSc International Relations | London, UK | 1 year | London ecosystem, IR theory | | 9 | Fletcher School MALD | Medford, USA | 2 years | Flexible interdisciplinary depth | | 10 | Stanford MIP | Stanford, USA | 2 years | Technology policy, cyber, climate finance | | 11 | Yale Jackson MA | New Haven, USA | 2 years | Yale brand, flexible curriculum | | 12 | GWU Elliott School | Washington DC, USA | 2 years | DC proximity, lower cost than Georgetown | | 13 | Cambridge MPhil IR and Politics | Cambridge, UK | 1 year | PhD pathway, Commonwealth careers | | 14 | Geneva Graduate Institute | Geneva, Switzerland | 2 years | Multilateral careers, best cost-to-career ratio | | 15 | King's College London MA IR | London, UK | 1 year | Security studies, defence policy | | 16 | American University SIS | Washington DC, USA | 2 years | Development policy, environmental governance | | 17 | ANU Crawford School | Canberra, Australia | 2 years | Indo-Pacific careers, ASEAN students | | 18 | NUS Lee Kuan Yew School MPP | Singapore | 2 years | Asian governance, ASEAN policy careers | | 19 | University of Denver Korbel | Denver, USA | 2 years | Human rights, peace and conflict studies | | 20 | University of Michigan Ford School | Ann Arbor, USA | 2 years | Quantitative policy, development economics | ## What Thirteen American Programmes Tell You Thirteen of the 20 programmes on this list are American. Four are British. One is French, one Swiss, one Australian and one Singaporean. That is not an accident of quality; it is an accident of who builds the polls and who answers them. The FP/TRIP survey asks American scholars, American policymakers and American think tank staff. They name the programmes they know, the ones they attended, the ones they hire from. The result is a ranking that accurately reflects American IR establishment preferences and should be read as such. A student from the Global South reading this list should understand two things. First, the American programmes dominate because of genuine quality and genuine network value — the Washington and New York ecosystems these schools plug into are real, and the careers they enable are real. Second, the list is not the world. The best programme for a student planning a career in Singapore's foreign ministry is not Georgetown. The best programme for a student planning to work at the UN in Geneva is not Columbia. Geography, career intent and the size of your student loan are all variables the rankings do not account for. Read the list with that understanding. ## The Top 20 — Assessed ### 1\. Georgetown University — Master of Science in Foreign Service (MSFS) **Washington DC, USA | 2 years | #1 FP/TRIP (all three groups)** [Georgetown's MSFS](https://sfs.georgetown.edu/ms-foreign-service/admissions-tuition/?ref=diplopolis.com) has topped the FP/TRIP Masters ranking across every edition that included international programmes. The reason is straightforward: it is located in Washington DC, its alumni populate the US foreign policy establishment, and IR scholars, policymakers and think tank staff all know its graduates well. The 48-credit programme covers international politics, international economics, global security and science and technology in international affairs. The tuition structure runs at approximately [$2,758 per credit](https://sfs.georgetown.edu/ms-foreign-service/admissions-tuition/?ref=diplopolis.com) for graduate study, placing the full MSFS at roughly $132,384 in tuition before fees, health insurance and Washington living costs. Total cost of attendance for two years in DC exceeds $180,000 for an international student without scholarship support. Merit scholarships are available at the time of admission; 30 to 40 per cent of incoming students are non-US citizens. The honest question for a Global South applicant: does a Georgetown network pay off if your career is in Nairobi or Jakarta rather than Washington? The reputational value travels. The relational value does not. Apply if you have funding. Apply with a scholarship strategy before you apply at all. ### 2\. Harvard University — Kennedy School of Government (MPA/MPP) **Cambridge, USA | 2 years | #1 QS 2026; #3 FP/TRIP faculty** [Harvard Kennedy School](https://www.hks.harvard.edu/educational-programs/masters-programs?ref=diplopolis.com) offers the MPA and MPP with international and global affairs concentrations. Its faculty list reads like a roll call of the last thirty years of American foreign policy thinking. Its alumni run international organisations, governments and think tanks on every continent. The Harvard name is the most portable credential in this guide: it opens doors in Washington, Geneva, London and Singapore alike. The programme is also, in a fact its promotional materials downplay, expensive. Total costs for two years in Cambridge — including tuition, fees and living expenses — exceed $220,000 for most international students. Harvard does offer need-based financial aid, but it is competitive and does not approach the generosity of Princeton. Apply with a clear financial plan and external scholarship applications running in parallel. ### 3\. Johns Hopkins University — School of Advanced International Studies (MAIR) **Washington DC and Bologna, Italy | 2 years | #2 FP/TRIP faculty** [SAIS](https://sais.jhu.edu/?ref=diplopolis.com) is the programme that practitioners most consistently rank second after Georgetown, and for good reason: its combination of Washington DC policy proximity and its SAIS Europe campus in Bologna offers something no other programme on this list does. Students can spend their first year in Bologna — in the oldest university city in Europe, steps from a $100 million-endowed campus — and their second year in DC, or combine the DC year with a year at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center in China. The three-campus architecture makes SAIS the most genuinely international programme among the top American schools. Full-time tuition at the DC campus runs to [$66,995 per academic year](https://sais.jhu.edu/admissions-aid/tuition-and-aid/tuition-and-fees/cost-of-attendance?ref=diplopolis.com) for 2026-27, with total direct costs including health insurance reaching $71,160 and full cost of attendance including living expenses approaching $99,304 — comparable to Georgetown and Columbia. SAIS institutional scholarships are awarded without regard to citizenship, and the school has a reasonable record of supporting international students. Its strength is in international economics and security studies; students seeking a more theoretical IR grounding will find LSE or Oxford more suited to their purposes. ### 4\. University of Oxford — MPhil in International Relations **Oxford, UK | 2 years | #2 QS 2026; #17 FP/TRIP faculty** The gap between Oxford's position in QS (second globally) and FP/TRIP (17th in the Masters ranking by IR faculty) tells you everything about the difference between academic prestige and policy-world name recognition. Oxford's MPhil is a research-intensive two-year programme that produces graduates who go on to academic careers, senior civil service positions and international organisations in numbers that no American programme can match outside the Ivy League. The programme's weakness, from a policy-career perspective, is its lack of proximity to the Washington DC ecosystem that American employers draw from so heavily. Its strength, from an intellectual perspective, is precisely that distance: Oxford produces thinkers rather than operators, and the credential carries weight in every English-speaking country and most non-English-speaking ones. International student tuition runs to approximately £35,000 per year; living costs in Oxford add substantially to that figure. ### 5\. Sciences Po — School of International Affairs (PSIA) **Paris, France | 2 years | #3 QS 2026; #15 FP/TRIP faculty** [Sciences Po's PSIA](https://www.sciencespo.fr/psia/admissions/?ref=diplopolis.com) ranks third globally in QS and 15th in FP/TRIP — the same gap as Oxford, reflecting the same structural bias in the American-surveyed ranking. The programme offers eight specialised two-year Masters covering international security, international economic policy, international development, human rights and humanitarian action, and regional tracks including Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. The most important fact about Sciences Po that other guides routinely omit: its fee structure is the most equitable on this list. [Non-EEA students pay €20,640 per year](https://www.sciencespo.fr/en/admissions-and-financial-aid/tuition-fees/?ref=diplopolis.com); EEA students pay on a sliding scale from zero to the same maximum based on household income. On average one in three Sciences Po students pays zero tuition fees — a proportion no American institution on this list comes close to matching. The Emile Boutmy Scholarship offers meaningful fee reductions for outstanding international students. For a student from the Global South who needs genuine intellectual depth, a curriculum that treats European, African and Asian perspectives as more than footnotes, and a cost structure that does not require a decade of loan repayments to justify, Sciences Po is the most honest investment on this list. ### 6\. Columbia University — Master of International Affairs (SIPA) **New York, USA | 21 months | #4 FP/TRIP faculty; #5 think tanks** [Columbia SIPA](https://www.sipa.columbia.edu/office-financial-aid/tuition-and-fees?ref=diplopolis.com) is the quantitatively rigorous programme on this list. The 21-month MIA requires 54 credits and expects students to engage seriously with economics and data analysis — a genuine differentiator from Georgetown and Fletcher, which are more qualitatively oriented. Its location in New York provides proximity to the UN, the Council on Foreign Relations and the global financial institutions that make the city relevant to international careers. Total cost of attendance for one year — including tuition, fees and New York living costs — [runs to approximately $109,704 for 2025-26](https://admit-lab.com/blog/columbia-mia/?ref=diplopolis.com), placing the full 21-month programme well above $200,000\. [The acceptance rate runs to single digits or low teens.](https://admit-lab.com/blog/columbia-mia/?ref=diplopolis.com) SIPA's scholarship programme is competitive and rarely covers full costs. A student arriving without funding needs a realistic plan for how those costs get recovered — and that plan looks different if your career takes you back to Accra rather than staying in New York. ### 7\. Princeton University — School of Public and International Affairs (MPA) **Princeton, USA | 2 years | #5 FP/TRIP faculty; #4 QS 2026** Princeton belongs higher on this list for one reason that most applicants discover too late: [it fully funds every admitted student](https://spia.princeton.edu/graduate-admissions/master-public-affairs/financial-aid?ref=diplopolis.com). Not some students. Not students who apply by a special deadline. Every admitted student receives 100 per cent of tuition and required fees covered — no separate essay, no additional application, no loan — plus a need-based living stipend that the vast majority of students qualify for in full. [Tuition and health plan fees for 2024-25 stood at $65,910](https://spia.princeton.edu/graduate-admissions/master-public-affairs/financial-aid?ref=diplopolis.com), all of which Princeton covers without exception. This makes Princeton categorically different from every other institution on this list. The only cost is getting in, and admission is extraordinarily competitive — approximately 57 students admitted per year from a global applicant pool. The programme is quantitatively demanding and oriented toward public service careers. If you have the profile to be admitted, apply. The financial model is the most honest commitment to access in international affairs education. ### 8\. London School of Economics — MSc International Relations **London, UK | 1 year | #9 FP/TRIP faculty; #5 QS 2026** [LSE's Department of International Relations](https://www.lse.ac.uk/study-at-lse/graduate/msc-international-relations?ref=diplopolis.com), founded in 1927 and home to the English School tradition in IR theory, offers a one-year MSc that is both the programme's greatest practical advantage and its most significant intellectual limitation. One year is enough for a student who arrives knowing exactly what they want. It is not enough for a student still finding their focus. [Tuition stands at £32,500 for 2026-27](https://www.lse.ac.uk/study-at-lse/graduate/msc-international-relations?ref=diplopolis.com), applicable to all students regardless of nationality. London's cost of living adds substantially: a realistic full-year budget runs to £55,000 or more. The LSE advantage is London itself — the think tanks, international organisations and embassies that a student can actually engage with during the degree. Admissions are rolling; apply before January 2027. ### 9\. Tufts University — Fletcher School, Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy (MALD) **Medford, USA | 2 years | #7 FP/TRIP faculty and policymakers** [The MALD](https://fletcher.tufts.edu/academics/masters-programs?ref=diplopolis.com) is the programme that practitioners consistently recommend above those with higher name recognition, and for good reason. Fletcher's interdisciplinary two-year structure allows students to build a genuinely personalised programme across fields including international security, international environment and resource policy, human security and international business — a flexibility that Georgetown and SIPA do not offer in the same way. Its weakness is visibility. Georgetown graduates are in Washington when the internships appear. Columbia graduates are in New York when the international organisation positions open. Fletcher graduates work harder to establish themselves in those ecosystems. The programme's location in Medford, outside Boston, reflects a real trade-off between intellectual depth and career proximity. Total costs are comparable to Columbia and Georgetown; [tuition and financial aid details](https://fletcher.tufts.edu/admissions/financing-your-education/tuition-expenses?ref=diplopolis.com) are published on the school's website. The fellowship support for international students is stronger than Columbia's track record. ### 10\. Stanford University — Master of International Policy (MIP) **Stanford, USA | 2 years | #11 FP/TRIP faculty; #6 QS 2026** [Stanford's MIP](https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/master-international-policy?ref=diplopolis.com) is the smallest programme on this list — a cohort of approximately 25 students across four specialisations: cyber policy and security, energy and natural resources, governance and development, and international security. That scale is the programme's defining characteristic: it produces graduates who know each other and their faculty deeply, and who benefit from Stanford's unparalleled connections to the technology sector, the venture capital industry and the Silicon Valley institutions that increasingly shape global governance. The programme costs are comparable to the other elite American schools, and Stanford's proximity to San Francisco rather than Washington means the career ecosystem it plugs into is different from Georgetown or SAIS. For a student whose interest in international affairs includes technology policy, climate finance or digital governance, Stanford is the most relevant programme on this list. For a student oriented toward traditional diplomacy or multilateral organisations, it is less directly useful. ### 11\. Yale University — Jackson School of Global Affairs (MA) **New Haven, USA | 2 years | #13 FP/TRIP faculty; top 10 THE 2026** [Yale's Jackson School](https://jackson.yale.edu/?ref=diplopolis.com) was established in 2022 and is the newest institution on this list. Its MA in Global Affairs allows students to design their own four-course structure across a flexible curriculum. The Yale name carries weight that the school's youth does not yet fully justify in terms of alumni networks and placement outcomes — those take decades to build. Apply knowing you are investing in the brand as much as the programme, and that the brand is considerable. ### 12\. George Washington University — Elliott School of International Affairs **Washington DC, USA | 2 years | #6 FP/TRIP faculty and think tanks** [The Elliott School](https://elliott.gwu.edu/?ref=diplopolis.com) is the largest IR school in the United States by faculty count, and its DC location provides the same policy proximity as Georgetown at a lower cost and a lower profile. Its strength is in international security studies and development policy; its weakness is that in a city where Georgetown dominates the hiring conversation, Elliott graduates work harder to distinguish themselves. For an applicant with strong qualifications who cannot secure Georgetown admission or funding, Elliott is a serious alternative rather than a consolation prize. ### 13\. University of Cambridge — MPhil in International Relations and Politics **Cambridge, UK | 1 year | #21 FP/TRIP; strong QS and THE** Cambridge's MPhil is a one-year research-intensive programme oriented toward students heading to PhD study or senior civil service careers. Its intellectual rigour is exceptional; its policy-career utility is more limited than Oxford's, given Oxford's stronger tradition of producing practitioners alongside academics. The Cambridge credential carries prestige in British and Commonwealth hiring contexts that it does not carry in the same way in Washington. ### 14\. Geneva Graduate Institute — Master in International Relations/Political Science (IHEID) **Geneva, Switzerland | 2 years | #20 FP/TRIP faculty** [The Geneva Graduate Institute](https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/?ref=diplopolis.com) was established in 1927 — the same year as LSE's IR department — as the first institution in the world devoted entirely to the study of international relations. Its founding purpose was to train the diplomats and international civil servants who would make the League of Nations work. That purpose has not changed. Tuition for international students runs to approximately [8,000 CHF per year](https://borderless.so/stories/getting-my-fully-funded-masters-degree-in-international-relations-from-the-geneva-graduate-institute?ref=diplopolis.com) — far lower than any American institution on this list — and Geneva's location places students walking distance from the UN, the WTO, the WHO and over 200 other international organisations. For a student whose career goal is a multilateral institution role rather than a Washington policy position, the Geneva Graduate Institute is the most direct investment on this list. The career-to-cost ratio is unmatched. ### 15\. King's College London — MA International Relations **London, UK | 1 year | #21 FP/TRIP; solid QS** [King's](https://www.kcl.ac.uk/study/postgraduate-taught/courses/international-relations-ma?ref=diplopolis.com) is the War Studies school — its strength in defence, security and strategic studies is recognised across NATO militaries and the British intelligence community. For a student specialising in security studies, conflict analysis or defence policy, King's is the most relevant London alternative to LSE. For a student with broader international affairs interests, LSE's curriculum and network remain stronger. ### 16\. American University — School of International Service (SIS) **Washington DC, USA | 2 years | #8 FP/TRIP faculty** [AU's SIS](https://www.american.edu/sis/?ref=diplopolis.com) is the largest IR faculty in the United States and offers a DC location at a lower cost than Georgetown. Its placement in the FP/TRIP ranking — eighth among IR faculty — reflects genuine academic respect. Its practical limitation is the same as Elliott's: in a city where Georgetown sets the hiring benchmark, AU graduates compete for a smaller share of the top positions. Strong for students focused on development policy, environmental governance and international communication. ### 17\. Australian National University — Crawford School of Public Policy, Master of International Affairs **Canberra, Australia | 2 years | Strong QS and THE for Asia-Pacific** [ANU Crawford](https://crawford.anu.edu.au/study/master-programs/master-international-affairs?ref=diplopolis.com) is the only programme on this list built around an Indo-Pacific rather than an Atlantic worldview. For a student whose career will be in Southeast Asia, the Pacific or the Australia-China-India triangle, Crawford provides regional expertise, faculty connections and alumni networks that no American or British programme can match for that geography. Its global brand recognition outside the Indo-Pacific is limited; within it, the ANU credential carries genuine weight. For a student from ASEAN or the Pacific Islands, Crawford deserves serious consideration over institutions ranked above it. ### 18\. National University of Singapore — Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (MPP) **Singapore | 2 years | Strong QS; top 10 Singapore** [The Lee Kuan Yew School](https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/?ref=diplopolis.com) at NUS offers a two-year Master in Public Policy with a strong Asia governance focus — or for those seeking a more compressed option, a one-year Master in International Affairs covering similar ground. Singapore's position as a financial hub and a neutral diplomatic venue gives the school genuine practitioner access that Canberra cannot match. For a student interested in Asian governance, urban policy or the China-US competition for regional influence, the LKY School combines intellectual rigour with a location at the intersection of the forces it studies. Fees are competitive by American standards; scholarship support for ASEAN students is meaningful. ### 19\. University of Denver — Korbel School of Global Affairs **Denver, USA | 2 years | #12 FP/TRIP faculty; #19 policymakers** [The Korbel School](https://korbel.du.edu/?ref=diplopolis.com) is named after Madeleine Albright's father, Josef Korbel, who founded it. It consistently appears in FP/TRIP rankings above schools with higher general name recognition — a reflection of genuine programme quality rather than institutional prestige. Denver's distance from Washington and New York is a practical limitation for students whose career goals require those networks; for students interested in international development, human rights and peace and conflict studies, Korbel offers substantive depth at a lower cost than the elite East Coast alternatives. ### 20\. University of Michigan — Ford School of Public Policy **Ann Arbor, USA | 2 years | #21 FP/TRIP faculty** [The Ford School](https://fordschool.umich.edu/?ref=diplopolis.com) consistently appears at the edge of the top tier in FP/TRIP surveys across multiple editions. Its strength is in quantitative policy analysis and international development economics; its weakness is distance from the DC and New York ecosystems. A strong programme for students whose career goals prioritise rigour over proximity. ## The Verdict Princeton is the most important programme on this list for applicants who can be admitted, because it is the only one that removes cost as a variable entirely. If your profile is competitive for Princeton, you apply. The student loan-free degree in a policy-focused environment with a generous living stipend is a different proposition from every other institution here. For a student from the Global South who needs a Western credential and cannot secure Princeton admission, Sciences Po offers the most equitable combination of intellectual depth, curriculum diversity and financial accessibility. Its fee structure is honest about inequality in a way that no American institution matches. For multilateral institution careers, the Geneva Graduate Institute delivers the best career-to-cost ratio on the list, at a fraction of the American tuition. For careers in the Indo-Pacific, ANU Crawford and NUS Lee Kuan Yew both outperform what their global ranking positions suggest, for students whose professional geography is Southeast Asia, the Pacific or the India-China-Australia triangle. For the Washington policy establishment, Georgetown remains the most direct investment. The network is real. So is the student loan. Neither fact cancels the other. The polls that built this list surveyed American scholars, American policymakers and American employers. Thirteen of the 20 programmes are American. The list is accurate as a map of where the American IR establishment studied and where it hires from. It is incomplete as a map of where the world's best international relations education happens. Use it accordingly. --- *Georgetown, Columbia, SAIS and Fletcher all have December to early January application deadlines for merit scholarship consideration for 2027 intake. Sciences Po's 2027 admissions open in October 2026\. Princeton's MPA deadline is December 15, 2026\. Geneva Graduate Institute applications for 2027 open in autumn 2026\. Verify all deadlines on official programme websites before applying.* 🚧 Fees, deadlines and programme details change. The figures in this guide are accurate as of May 2026 but should be verified independently before making any application or financial decision. If you spot an error or an outdated link in this piece, write to [editor@diplopolis.com](mailto:editor@diplopolis.com) and it will be corrected promptly. This Dossier piece is free to read. Future Dossier pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) ### Bombed. Now Billing. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/bombed-now-billing-iran-hormuz-toll-two-million/ Last updated: 2026-05-22T04:30:31.000Z The United States went to war on February 28 to break Iran. Three months later, Iran is charging $2 million per ship to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, collecting payment in Chinese yuan and Bitcoin, and [J.P. Morgan estimates](https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-896582?ref=diplopolis.com) Iran could earn between $70 and $90 billion annually if the system holds. The bombing did not break Iran's leverage over global energy. It formalised it. The [Persian Gulf Strait Authority](https://www.theweek.in/news/middle-east/2026/05/11/explained-how-irans-new-persian-gulf-strait-authority-runs-the-hormuz-toll-transit-process-for-vessels.html?ref=diplopolis.com) — Tehran's new regulatory body for the strait — launched its official social media account last week. The tone was bureaucratic and deliberate. Ships wishing to transit must submit ownership details, insurance records, crew manifests and cargo declarations to [info@PGSA.ir.](mailto:info@PGSA.ir.) A permit is issued after the fee is paid. Some vessels have already paid. The IRGC coordinates clearances over VHF radio. The strait that carried [20 per cent of the world's seaborne oil](https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/5/21/maths-behind-hormuz-toll-is-paying-iran-for-transit-cheaper-than-blockade?ref=diplopolis.com) before February 28 is now a checkpoint — and Iran is the checkpoint operator. The choice of currency is not incidental. Payment in Chinese yuan means every transaction bypasses Western banking infrastructure, every dollar earned is invisible to US Treasury sanctions enforcement, and every ship that pays is quietly acknowledging Beijing's financial architecture as the alternative to Washington's. Iran is not just charging a toll. It is building a parallel monetary system one tanker at a time, denominated in the currency of the only major power still buying its oil at scale. Washington's response is a dilemma it cannot resolve cleanly. Sanctioning the shipping operators who pay the toll risks halting the only active oil channel through the strait — which would send energy prices higher, hurt the Global South further and hand Iran a propaganda victory. Not sanctioning them means accepting that the PGSA is a functioning institution, that the toll is a legitimate cost of doing business, and that Iran has successfully converted the world's most important shipping lane into a revenue stream. The [economics favour Iran](https://windward.ai/blog/irans-hormuz-transit-toll-mechanism-and-what-it-means/?ref=diplopolis.com) at every point: it costs more to keep a ship anchored indefinitely than it does to pay the toll and sail. India understood this before the argument was finished. Six Indian-flagged vessels [transited the strait on May 18](https://windward.ai/blog/hormuz-becomes-a-holding-queue/?ref=diplopolis.com) as a coordinated cluster, following bilateral engagement with Tehran outside the US-led coalition framework. India did not announce this. It did not explain it. It simply negotiated a carve-out and moved its ships. New Delhi's position on the Iran war has always been that its energy interests come first and Washington's coalition comes second. The Hormuz toll made that calculation explicit. This is what the war has produced at the three-month mark. A ceasefire that keeps killing in Gaza. A G2 settlement in Beijing that nobody else voted on. A Russian president in Beijing quoting proverbs to Xi. And a toll booth at the world's most critical energy chokepoint, run by the country that was bombed, denominated in the currency of the country doing the buying, processing applications at [info@PGSA.ir](mailto:info@PGSA.ir). The US went to war to establish consequences. Iran established a revenue stream. The consequences, it turns out, flow in both directions. ### The Master Is Here. He Must Be Punished. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-master-is-here-he-must-be-punished-ben-gvir-nuremberg-2026/ Last updated: 2026-05-21T12:57:25.000Z On Wednesday morning, Israel's National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir [posted a video](https://www.timesofisrael.com/ben-gvir-posts-video-of-himself-taunting-bound-and-detained-gaza-flotilla-activists/?ref=diplopolis.com) on his social media account. In it he walks among dozens of activists from the Global Sumud Flotilla — humanitarian aid workers who had attempted to deliver food and medicine to Gaza — kneeling on the ground at Ashdod Port, blindfolded, hands bound behind their backs. Israel's national anthem plays over a loudspeaker. Ben-Gvir waves a large Israeli flag above them and shouts in Hebrew: 'Welcome to Israel. We are the masters here.' He then approaches a bound woman who attempts to speak and shouts 'Am Yisrael Chai' directly at her face. He filmed it himself. He posted it himself. He waited for the responses. > ככה אנחנו מקבלים את תומכי הטרור > > Welcome to Israel 🇮🇱 [pic.twitter.com/7Hf8cAg7fC](https://t.co/7Hf8cAg7fC?ref=diplopolis.com) > > — איתמר בן גביר (@itamarbengvir) [May 20, 2026](https://twitter.com/itamarbengvir/status/2057046925417824697?ref%5Fsrc=twsrc%5Etfw&ref=diplopolis.com) They came. Germany's ambassador called it wholly unacceptable and incompatible with the [basic values of our countries.](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog-may-20-2026/?ref=diplopolis.com) Britain's Foreign Minister said she was truly appalled. France, Italy, the Netherlands and Canada summoned Israeli ambassadors. The UN Human Rights Council convened an emergency session. Netanyahu criticised the optics. Israel's own foreign minister called it out. Then Washington spoke. The White House and State Department issued [no immediate statement.](https://www.jns.org/news/israel-news/israels-washington-envoy-rebukes-ben-gvir-over-flotilla-detainee-treatment/?ref=diplopolis.com) The response, when it came, was left to Mike Huckabee — the US Ambassador to Israel — who posted on social media that Ben-Gvir had 'betrayed the dignity of his nation.' That [condemnation](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/20/us-condemns-israels-ben-gvir-while-sanctioning-gaza-flotilla-organisers?ref=diplopolis.com) arrived one day after the United States Department of the Treasury had sanctioned the flotilla organisers themselves — the people Ben-Gvir was filmed taunting while they knelt blindfolded on the ground. Washington sanctioned the victims. Then it condemned the man who filmed himself humiliating them. This is not contradiction. This is policy. The world that expressed outrage on Wednesday already knew what Ben-Gvir had been doing for three and a half years. The documentation exists in primary reports from institutions whose credibility is beyond question. B'Tselem's January 2026 report, [Living Hell,](https://www.btselem.org/press%5Freleases/20260120%5Fliving%5Fhell?ref=diplopolis.com) documents a prison system under Ben-Gvir's direct oversight in which approximately 9,200 Palestinians are held — including 350 children — in conditions the organisation describes as torture camps. Based on 21 testimonies from Palestinians released under the October 2025 prisoner exchange, the report describes not individual failures but institutional policy, designed from above and implemented systematically. The UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese submitted her report — [Torture and Genocide](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/un-expert-warns-torture-has-become-state-doctrine-israel-making-prisons?ref=diplopolis.com) — to the Human Rights Council in March 2026, drawing on more than 300 testimonies. She found that Israel's detention system has 'degenerated into a laboratory of calculated cruelty.' She named Ben-Gvir specifically as having advanced a deliberate 'prison revolution' designed to institutionalise degradation. 'What once operated in the shadows,' she wrote, 'is now practised openly — a regime of organised humiliation, pain and degradation, sanctioned at the highest political levels.' What that regime involves, documented in her report and corroborated by multiple independent human rights organisations, includes the following. Starvation — the deliberate reduction of food and water as policy. Denial of medical treatment, leading to the deaths of nearly 100 detainees in custody. Removal of access to lawyers and the Red Cross. Beatings, breaking of bones and teeth, burning. Sexual violence — rape with bottles, metal rods and knives. Detainees being spat upon, urinated upon and [attacked by trained dogs.](https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/un-report-systematic-sexual-violence-israeli-detention-1792474?ref=diplopolis.com) Detainees photographed and filmed naked in humiliating positions. More than 18,500 [Palestinians detained](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/un-expert-warns-torture-has-become-state-doctrine-in-israel-making-prisons-instruments-of-genocide-and-torture/?ref=diplopolis.com) since October 2023, including at least 1,500 children. Thousands without charge or trial. Many forcibly disappeared. Ben-Gvir's response to this documentation has been consistent. He [brags about it](https://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files/publications/202601%5Fliving%5Fhell%5Feng.pdf?ref=diplopolis.com). He invites Israeli media into the facilities for what his office calls 'rare glimpses' — television pieces that put the abuse on display with the minister's full participation. He posts videos. He films himself stomping on prisoners during raids. The documentation of his conduct exists not because journalists uncovered it but because he produced and distributed it himself, for a domestic audience meant to feel pride rather than shame. This is the correct moment to place Ben-Gvir's conduct within the history it belongs to. Two men from the Nazi regime are relevant here. They were convicted for different categories of crime. Ben-Gvir commits both. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/05/Oswald-Pohl--left--and-Julius-Streicher--right-.png) Oswald Pohl (left) and Julius Streicher (right) [Julius Streicher was not a general.](https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/julius-streicher?ref=diplopolis.com) He did not command troops, design concentration camps or order deportations. He was a politician and publisher of Der Stürmer — a newspaper built on the deliberate public degradation of Jews for mass nationalist consumption. For twenty-five years, week after week, month after month, [he infected the German mind with the virus of antisemitism](https://www.facinghistory.org/resource-library/julius-streicher-publisher-der-sturmer-stands-trial-nuremberg?ref=diplopolis.com) and incited the German people to active persecution, as the Nuremberg tribunal stated in its judgment. The International Military Tribunal convicted him not of ordering deaths but of crimes against humanity — specifically for making the humiliation of a people into spectacle, for producing the degraded image of the other that nationalist pride required, for building the psychological infrastructure that made persecution feel righteous to those who watched. He was hanged for the newspaper. For the spectacle of dehumanisation produced and distributed for a domestic audience that was meant to feel power rather than shame. Streicher was convicted for what he did to Jews. The state built in the name of those Jews now employs a minister doing the same thing to Palestinians. [Oswald Pohl was the head of the SS Main Economic and Administrative Office](https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/subsequent-nuremberg-proceedings-case-4-the-pohl-case?ref=diplopolis.com) — the organisation responsible for the administration of the Nazi concentration camp system. He was not convicted for ordering individual killings. He was convicted for designing and running the administrative machinery of deliberate starvation, medical neglect, forced labour and systematic abuse that produced mass death as a consequence of institutional policy rather than explicit order. The Nuremberg tribunal found that the natural [death rate in camps](https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/open4.asp?ref=diplopolis.com) under his administration averaged nearly 10 per cent per month in the latter half of 1942 — deaths produced not by gas chambers alone but by the deliberate withholding of adequate food, medical care and humane conditions as a matter of administrative design. He was hanged in 1951 for what his office administered. Ben-Gvir is the National Security Minister of Israel. He oversees the Israel Prison Service. Under his administration, nearly 100 Palestinian detainees have died in custody. The UN Special Rapporteur has documented starvation, denial of medical treatment, sexual violence and deaths as the product of deliberate institutional policy — not individual failure. A February 2024 [report from Physicians for Human Rights](https://dawnmena.org/sanction-israeli-minister-ben-gvir-and-other-officials-for-severe-abuses-against-palestinian-prisoners/?ref=diplopolis.com) concluded that the various prohibited measures utilised across the entire prison system indicate that the prisons are not acting independently but rather in accordance with directives from above. Streicher was hanged for the spectacle. Pohl was hanged for the administration. Ben-Gvir is both. He films the spectacle himself and posts it for nationalist consumption. He administers the system that produces starvation, sexual violence and deaths in custody as institutional policy. He is not a bystander to these crimes. He is their architect and their publicist simultaneously. The UN Special Rapporteur has called on the [ICC Prosecutor to investigate and pursue arrest warrants for Ben-Gvir specifically.](https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/un-report-systematic-sexual-violence-israeli-detention-1792474?ref=diplopolis.com) The court has the documentation. It has the testimonies. It has the reports. It has the videos Ben-Gvir made and posted himself. What it does not have is the political support of the powers whose approval it requires to function. The United States has spent three years vetoing every UN resolution that would have created accountability for the conduct documented above. Washington funds the government that employs Ben-Gvir. Washington arms the military that detains the children. Washington sanctions the people trying to deliver food to those children. Washington then posts on social media that Ben-Gvir has betrayed the dignity of his nation. The Nuremberg promise was never meant to be universal. It was announced by four victorious powers who were simultaneously conducting colonial violence across Asia, Africa and the Middle East that would never face a tribunal. The court was built to prosecute the defeated. It was never designed to reach the allied. It has not changed. Ben-Gvir is not a surprise. He is a destination. The destination of a system that promised universal justice and delivered selective justice, that built a court to prosecute the spectacle of dehumanisation and funds the government of the man producing it, that hanged Streicher for the newspaper and Pohl for the administration and writes cheques to the state of the man who is both. Itamar Ben-Gvir should be in a dock at The Hague. The documentation exists. The testimonies exist. The legal precedent exists — Nuremberg established it specifically for this category of conduct. The videos exist — he made them himself. What does not exist is the political will of the states powerful enough to put him there. The master is in his cabinet. The court is in The Hague. The United States is writing the cheques. The distance between those three facts is the measure of everything the Nuremberg promise was always worth. --- *The* [*Nuremberg Files*](https://www.diplopolis.com/tag/nuremberg-files) *is DiploPolis's ongoing investigation into the promise of universal accountability — what it meant, what it became and what its failure costs the world.* *Previous in the series:* [*The Nuremberg Paradox*](https://www.diplopolis.com/the-nuremberg-paradox-icc-israel-international-law-accountability/) *— The court that cannot collect. The promise that was never universal. The architecture of selective justice.* This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) ### Putin Won the War. Xi Won Putin. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/putin-beijing-russia-china-dependency-sovereignty/ Last updated: 2026-05-21T04:30:06.000Z In February 2022, Putin flew to Beijing and declared a partnership with China that had 'no limits.' He flew home and invaded Ukraine. The invasion was an act of sovereignty — Russia breaking free from NATO encirclement, from Western financial architecture, from an international order Moscow had decided was a cage built to contain it. Putin called it liberation. The West called it catastrophe. Both were right. Neither noticed what it actually was. It was a transfer of dependence. From West to East. From Brussels and Washington to Beijing. This week Putin returned to the [Great Hall of the People](https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2026/5/20/chinas-xi-jinping-and-russian-president-vladimir-putin-meet-in-beijing?ref=diplopolis.com). The military band played. Children waved flags on the red carpet. He [quoted](http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/79783?ref=diplopolis.com) Xi a Chinese proverb — 'not seeing you for one day feels like being apart for three autumns' — and signed [20 agreements](https://www.wionews.com/world/putin-xi-jinping-meeting-russia-china-sign-20-agreements-for-stronger-ties-details-inside-1779263000719/amp?ref=diplopolis.com) covering energy, technology, film and scientific research. He renewed the friendship treaty. He called the partnership a stabilising force. Xi called him a dear friend. Trump had left the same hall five days earlier. That detail is not incidental. It is the entire story. Beijing hosted the American president and the Russian president in the same week, on the same red carpet, in the same ceremony. Xi gave them both what they came for. Neither got everything they wanted. Both got enough to justify the journey. One analyst [told Al Jazeera](https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/5/19/neutral-superpower-china-why-putin-visit-to-beijing-after-trump-matters?ref=diplopolis.com) what Putin's position now looks like from Beijing: cap in hand. China holds all the cards. The numbers explain why. Russia accounts for roughly four per cent of China's total international trade. China accounts for the survival of the Russian economy. Moscow is now [sourcing more than 90 per cent](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/19/putin-meets-xi-why-russia-and-china-need-each-other?ref=diplopolis.com) of its sanctioned technology imports from China — drone components, military hardware, the industrial inputs Western sanctions cut off. Russian oil exports to China grew 35 per cent in the first quarter of 2026 alone. Beijing buys that oil at a discount. Moscow accepts the discount because it has no one else to sell to. This is what the free market looks like when you have one customer. The pipeline tells the rest of the story. Putin came to Beijing hoping to finalise the Power of Siberia 2 — a 2,600-kilometre project that would send [50 billion cubic metres of Russian gas](https://www.euronews.com/2026/05/20/putin-xi-meeting-3-things-you-need-to-know?ref=diplopolis.com) annually into China through Mongolia. It would replace the European market Russia destroyed when it invaded Ukraine. Beijing has been negotiating the price for three years. Moscow needs the pipeline. Beijing does not need it quite as urgently. That asymmetry is the relationship. Putin knows this. The proverb was not affection. It was the language of a man negotiating from weakness — warmth deployed where leverage is unavailable. Xi received it as a senior partner receives deference: warmly, without conceding anything that matters. China does not want Russia humiliated. A collapsed Russia is a problem on Beijing's border. But China does not want Russia strong either. A junior partner that requires Chinese technology, Chinese buyers and Chinese diplomatic cover to survive is precisely the partner Beijing finds most useful. The 'no limits' declaration has limits. They are written in Beijing, in ink Moscow cannot read. Putin called their cooperation a key stabilising force in international affairs. He warned against a return to the law of the jungle. He said this in the city that now sets the price of Russian oil, supplies the components of Russian weapons and decides whether Russia's gas pipeline gets built. He went to war for sovereignty. [Beijing is what he found](https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/5/19/neutral-superpower-china-why-putin-visit-to-beijing-after-trump-matters?ref=diplopolis.com). The law of the jungle did not end. It moved. And Putin flew to it, quoted it a proverb and called it a dear friend. ### Occupation Has a Peace Plan URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/gaza-occupation-peace-plan-hamas-disarmament-board-of-peace/ Last updated: 2026-05-20T04:30:33.000Z Trump's [Board of Peace filed its report](https://www.wsls.com/news/world/2026/05/19/board-of-peace-will-ask-the-un-security-council-to-press-hamas-to-disarm/?ref=diplopolis.com) to the United Nations Security Council today. The principal obstacle to peace in Gaza, it says, is Hamas. Not the 856 Palestinians killed since October's ceasefire. Not the 60 per cent of Gaza now under Israeli military control, more than the agreement ever permitted. Not the aid restrictions, the struck police stations, the tent camps holding two million people without running water. The obstacle, the report states with diplomatic precision, is Hamas. Specifically, its weapons. This is the peace plan. Hamas disarms. Israel withdraws. Reconstruction begins. A new Palestinian government forms. Nickolay Mladenov, the Board's lead envoy, has [said it plainly](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/13/board-of-peaces-mladenov-says-gaza-ceasefire-hinges-on-hamas-disarmament?ref=diplopolis.com): disarmament is 'not negotiable' and every other element of the plan waits behind it. 'Reconstruction cannot commence where weapons have not been laid down.' The sequence is orderly. It is also entirely designed by and for one side. Consider what has happened while the disarmament argument has been advanced. Since October, [Israeli strikes on Gaza have increased by 35 per cent](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/13/israeli-attacks-on-gaza-increased-by-35-since-iran-ceasefire-report?ref=diplopolis.com) from the month before the [ceasefire](https://www.diplopolis.com/gaza-ceasefire-that-keeps-killing-israel-haddad-strikes/). Israel now controls 60 per cent of Gaza's territory, more than the agreement allocated. It has struck the police stations a post-ceasefire Palestinian administration would need to function. It has restricted aid to a fraction of what was promised. The Board's own report acknowledges 'near-daily ceasefire violations' with 'human consequences — civilians killed, families living in fear.' That language sits in the same document asking the Security Council to press Hamas to hand over its weapons. Hamas's refusal is not difficult to understand. It is being asked to disarm while the party it is negotiating against expands its military footprint, breaks the agreement's terms and destroys the infrastructure that any successor government would require. Surrendering the only leverage available, to a party openly violating the agreement that disarmament is supposed to serve, is not a peace process. It is the end of one. Israel has been explicit about its objectives since October 7, 2023\. Every hostage home. Hamas destroyed. The first has been achieved. The Board's disarmament demand is the instrument of the second, packaged in the language of the first. A framework that requires one party to give up its weapons while the other [expands its occupation](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/gaza/disease-hunger-israeli-strikes-six-months-trumps-ceasefire-gaza-rcna341013?ref=diplopolis.com) is not a path toward peace. It is a path toward the formalisation of defeat. The Security Council meets Thursday. It will hear the arguments. It will note the violations on both sides with appropriate gravity. It will change nothing, because the framework it is being asked to endorse was not designed to end the occupation. It was designed to consolidate it under diplomatic cover. Eight hundred and fifty-six people dead into a ceasefire. Sixty per cent of the territory taken. And the obstacle, according to the Board of Peace, is the side being asked to give up the only thing it has left. The occupation has a peace plan. The occupied are being asked to fund it. ### The Nuremberg Paradox URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-nuremberg-paradox-icc-israel-international-law-accountability/ Last updated: 2026-05-21T12:58:06.000Z On April 3, 2025, Benjamin Netanyahu landed in Budapest. [An ICC arrest warrant had existed for him since November 21, 2024](https://www.icc-cpi.int/defendant/netanyahu?ref=diplopolis.com), issued by the International Criminal Court's Pre-Trial Chamber for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Gaza. Hungary is a state party to the Rome Statute. Under Article 86 of that statute, member states are legally required to cooperate with the court's arrest procedures. Viktor Orbán, Hungary's prime minister then, gave Netanyahu a red carpet reception at Buda Castle and announced during the visit that Hungary would withdraw from the ICC entirely. The court, in response, referred Hungary to its Assembly of States Parties. The Assembly noted the finding. Nothing changed. Netanyahu returned home. This sequence — warrant issued, warrant ignored, state withdraws from court, court issues a finding, finding produces nothing — is not the story of a system breaking down. It is the story of a system functioning precisely as its architects designed it to function. The International Criminal Court was built to look universal. It was never built to be universal. The distinction is everything, and Israeli actions in Palestine have made it impossible to look away from. The Nuremberg Paradox is this: the framework of universal justice was born from the Holocaust. It was demanded by survivors who had watched the world do nothing while their people were systematically destroyed. They built it for everyone. And now a Jewish state sits beyond its reach, and the court can do nothing but write reports about countries that refuse to cooperate. That is not a failure. That is the design. ## What Nuremberg Actually Was It is worth being precise about what the Nuremberg Tribunal of 1945 was and what it was not, because the mythology has by now almost entirely displaced the history. The Nuremberg Charter was [signed by four states](https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp?ref=diplopolis.com): the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. It created a tribunal to try the leaders of a defeated enemy. The Allies could convene this tribunal because they had won the war. They could compel the appearance of the accused because Germany had surrendered unconditionally. The Charter's language about individual criminal responsibility regardless of official capacity was [genuinely revolutionary](https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/international-military-tribunal-at-nuremberg?ref=diplopolis.com). The principle that no head of state could hide behind sovereignty when facing judgment for crimes against humanity was new in international law. But the court's power derived entirely from military victory. Without that victory, there was no tribunal. The universalism was in the language. The enforcement was in the armies. The men who wrote that language knew this. They wrote it anyway, because the language mattered even when the enforcement was selective. If you could establish in international law that individuals are responsible for crimes against humanity regardless of the orders they followed or the office they held, you had at least created a standard against which future conduct could be measured. Nuremberg could not try Allied commanders for [firebombing Dresden](https://www.britannica.com/event/bombing-of-Dresden?ref=diplopolis.com). It was never intended to. But it established, in principle, that such conduct was measurable against a standard that existed above the power of any single state. This is the foundation on which the survivors built. And it is important to understand what they were building toward, because the current moment cannot be understood without it. ## What the Survivors Demanded The survivors who insisted most forcefully on universal accountability after 1945 were not asking for protection. They were asking for a principle. They had just lived through the consequences of a world in which no principle bound the powerful. They knew that international law without enforcement meant nothing. They knew that appeals to human decency meant nothing. What they demanded was a system in which the principle of accountability would eventually develop teeth, in which the standard established at Nuremberg would become binding rather than aspirational, in which no state — including, explicitly, the state being built in their name — could exempt itself from the law that governed all. This is the detail that gives the current moment its particular weight. Survivors did not argue for Jewish protection. They argued for universal protection, rooted in the understanding that the only guarantee against another Holocaust was a law that worked the same way for everyone. Their reasoning was precise: if the law applies only to the defeated and the weak, it is not law. It is victor's justice with better paperwork. For it to mean anything, it had to bind the powerful as much as the powerless. It had to reach governments regardless of their military strength or their geopolitical alliances. They were, in this, entirely right. And they failed entirely to secure it. ## Architecture of Selective Justice When the International Criminal Court was [established in 2002 through the Rome Statute](https://www.icc-cpi.int/publications/core-legal-texts/rome-statute-international-criminal-court?ref=diplopolis.com), it appeared to answer the central criticism of Nuremberg. There would be no single victor. The court would be permanent. Its jurisdiction would extend to ongoing situations, not merely to history. The Rome Statute declared explicitly that no official capacity — not head of state, not minister, not commander — [would exempt any individual from criminal responsibility](https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/rome-statute-international-criminal-court?ref=diplopolis.com). On paper, the survivors had finally won. The architecture of failure was built into the same document. The court has jurisdiction, but no enforcement power. Member states are obliged to cooperate, but there is no mechanism to compel that cooperation. The United States signed the Rome Statute and [never ratified it](https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/23426.htm?ref=diplopolis.com). When the ICC began investigating American actions in Afghanistan, the Trump administration [sanctioned](https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/14/us-sanctions-international-criminal-court?ref=diplopolis.com) ICC officials directly. The message required no interpretation: Washington would decide for itself when international law applied to American conduct. No consequences followed. No member state imposed sanctions. No alliance fractured. Power made its position clear, and the court accepted it. Russia and China never joined. The United States never ratified. India never joined. Three permanent members of the Security Council — the body with the power to refer situations to the ICC — sit outside the court's jurisdiction entirely. The Security Council veto means that any investigation touching a permanent member's core interests [can be stopped before it begins](https://www.icc-cpi.int/palestine?ref=diplopolis.com). The architecture was designed, from the beginning, to protect the powerful while providing the appearance of universal reach. Israel is not a permanent Security Council member. It has no veto. What it has is something more reliable: the unconditional support of a state that does. The United States has vetoed Security Council resolutions concerning Israeli conduct in Palestine more times than any other subject in the council's history. American protection is worth more to Israel than ICC membership ever could be. Israel does not need to join the court. It needs Washington's assurance that the court will never reach it, and that assurance has been delivered reliably for decades. ## Specific Weight of Jewish History There is a particular kind of discomfort that settles over honest analysis of this moment. It is not the discomfort of antisemitism, which is the charge deployed to suppress the analysis. It is the discomfort of a genuine historical paradox, and it deserves to be named directly. The post-war legal order was built, in significant part, because of what happened to Jews. Survivors and their advocates were among the most insistent voices for universal accountability. The principle that no state could commit atrocities against a people without answering to an international standard was not abstract to them. It was the lesson written in six million deaths. When they argued for that principle, they were not arguing for a system that would protect Jews. They were arguing for a system that would protect anyone, because they knew what happened when no such system existed. A Jewish state now claims exemption from that system. The Israeli government has characterised the ICC's jurisdiction over Israeli nationals as [illegitimate, describing the court's process as political rather than judicial](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/benjamin-netanyahu/article-880480?ref=diplopolis.com). This is not an unusual argument — it is the same argument the United States made, the same argument Russia makes, the same argument every powerful state deploys when the court becomes inconvenient. Israel is not claiming a Jewish exception. It is claiming a power exception. The irony is that the power exception Israel claims is precisely what the survivors fought to eliminate. The unbearable quality of the paradox is that both things are true simultaneously. The survivors were right that universal accountability was necessary. And the system they fought for cannot deliver it, because the system was never designed to constrain power — only to manage the appearance of constraining it. ## What Cannot Be Collected The ICC's [arrest warrant for Netanyahu remains active](https://www.icc-cpi.int/defendant/netanyahu?ref=diplopolis.com). He is listed on the court's own records as at large. The warrant is real. The obligation on member states to arrest him if he enters their territory is real. What is not real is any mechanism to enforce that obligation. When Hungary [refused to arrest Netanyahu](https://www.timesofisrael.com/icc-refers-hungary-to-oversight-body-for-not-arresting-netanyahu-during-state-visit/?ref=diplopolis.com) during his April 2025 visit and Orbán announced withdrawal from the ICC, the court referred the matter to its Assembly of States Parties. The Assembly considered the finding at its annual session. No sanctions were imposed. Orbán was not expelled from any international body of consequence. Hungary's [withdrawal](https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/06/16/hungary-orban-government-withdraws-from-icc?ref=diplopolis.com), if it proceeds, removes one more state from the court's reach. This is how the system ends — not in a single dramatic confrontation, but in the slow accumulation of unenforceable warrants and unreported violations. The court can indict. It cannot collect. States know this. The powerful states have always known this. The weaker states that have submitted to the court's jurisdiction — the African states that account for a disproportionate share of ICC prosecutions — know it too, and the knowledge is doing something to the legitimacy the court was built on. The African Union has long [complained that the ICC functions as a court for Africa](https://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/explore-international-criminal-court-africa-icc?ref=diplopolis.com) and not for the powerful. That complaint now looks like a precise description rather than political grievance. Of the individuals convicted by the ICC, the overwhelming majority are African. The court has opened investigations in European and Middle Eastern theatres, but convictions remain elsewhere. The powerful are investigated. They are not collected. The weak are collected and tried. The court has become what Nuremberg always risked becoming: a mechanism that creates the appearance of universal accountability while delivering selective accountability. It documents. It investigates. It issues warrants. It writes stern letters to oversight bodies. But it cannot reach the powerful because it was never given the tools to reach the powerful. Those tools would have required states to surrender sovereignty they had no intention of surrendering. ## Verdict the Evidence Demands The question that honest engagement with this history produces is not whether the ICC should be reformed or whether its mandate should be strengthened. Those are reasonable questions with reasonable answers. The question the evidence demands is whether universal justice — the kind the survivors fought for, the kind in which accountability reaches power as readily as it reaches weakness — is possible within the international system as currently constituted. The answer the evidence gives is no. Not because it is philosophically impossible, but because it is politically impossible. Universal justice requires enforcement. Enforcement requires power. Power does not enforce rules that constrain itself. The powerful states that sit on the Security Council will not surrender the veto that protects them from accountability. The powerful states outside the ICC will not join a court that might reach their leaders. The powerful states inside the ICC will ignore their obligations when those obligations become inconvenient, and the court will write findings that produce nothing. Israel has not broken this system. Israel has revealed it. Netanyahu's Budapest visit, his [plane's careful detours](https://edition.cnn.com/2025/09/25/middleeast/netanyahu-flight-war-crimes-intl?ref=diplopolis.com) around French and Spanish airspace to avoid states that have said they would execute the warrant, the red carpet at Buda Castle, Orbán's announcement of withdrawal — all of this is simply the moment when the gap between the universalist promise and the selective reality became too large to close with diplomatic language. The survivors who demanded universal law understood what they were asking for. They were asking for something that did not yet exist and might never exist — a world in which power submitted to the same standards it enforced on the powerless. They fought for it because the alternative was a world in which they had already seen what happened to those without protection. They were right about the necessity. They were wrong about what was possible. The framework they built could never transcend the power of the states that built it, because law does not transcend power. Law is what the powerful agree to impose on themselves and others, and when the powerful withdraw that agreement, law collapses into the paper it is written on. Eighty years after Nuremberg, a sitting prime minister under an ICC arrest warrant for war crimes and crimes against humanity attended a state dinner in a member country, watched that country announce its withdrawal from the court, and flew home. The court issued a finding. The finding produced nothing. The warrant remains active. The man it names remains free. That is not a failure of the court. That is the court telling the truth about what it is. The survivors built it to say something else. They were building something the world was not ready to become. --- *The* [*Nuremberg Files*](https://www.diplopolis.com/tag/nuremberg-files/) *is DiploPolis's ongoing investigation into the promise of universal accountability — what it meant, what it became and what its failure costs the world.* *Next in the series:* [*The Master Is Here. He Must Be Punished.*](https://www.diplopolis.com/the-master-is-here-he-must-be-punished-ben-gvir-nuremberg-2026/) *— Ben-Gvir, two Nuremberg convictions and the distance between the promise and the present.* This Analysis piece is free to read. Future Analysis pieces will be available to registered DiploPolis members first. Free registration takes 30 seconds. No credit card required. [Become a free member → ](#/portal/signup) ### Ceasefire That Keeps Killing URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/gaza-ceasefire-that-keeps-killing-israel-haddad-strikes/ Last updated: 2026-05-19T04:30:08.000Z Israel [killed Izz al-Din al-Haddad](https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/15/middleeast/israel-gaza-hamas-strike-latam-intl?ref=diplopolis.com) in a residential building in Gaza City on Friday. His wife died alongside him. So did his 19-year-old daughter. Israel called it a precision strike. It called al-Haddad an architect of October 7\. It said the operation was significant. It said nothing meaningful about the ceasefire. That ceasefire has been in place since October 2025\. It has now [killed more than 850 Palestinians](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/13/israeli-attacks-on-gaza-increased-by-35-since-iran-ceasefire-report?ref=diplopolis.com). The official charged with implementing it, Nikolay Mladenov, the director-general of the Gaza Board of Peace, acknowledged last week that it is ['far from perfect'](https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/14/middleeast/gaza-israel-ceasefire-permanent-division-intl?ref=diplopolis.com). The count of Israeli violations since October runs to 139 and climbing. None of this received much attention because the world's attention was in Tehran, then in Beijing. Gaza continued. In April, after Israel halted its joint bombing of Iran, [Israeli strikes on Gaza increased by 35 per cent](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/13/israeli-attacks-on-gaza-increased-by-35-since-iran-ceasefire-report?ref=diplopolis.com) compared to the month before. The military capacity freed from one war was redirected into the other. Al-Haddad was the last senior commander of Hamas's al-Qassam Brigades still alive. Israel had spent two years killing its way through Hamas's military leadership — Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Sinwar, Mohammed Deif, and now al-Haddad. Each killing was described as significant. Each was carried out under a framework Israel called a ceasefire. Each produced the same statement from Jerusalem: a precision strike, an architect of October 7, a significant operation. The language has become a liturgy. The killing continues beneath it. A ceasefire means the fighting stops. Not that it pauses while one side works through its list. Under this one, Palestinian families are [still living in tents on barren land](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/gaza/disease-hunger-israeli-strikes-six-months-trumps-ceasefire-gaza-rcna341013?ref=diplopolis.com) along the Gaza coastline. Aid enters at roughly a fifth of what the agreement requires. Israel occupies more than half of Gaza's territory and the line marking that occupation is shifting westward toward the sea, cramming two million people into an ever-narrower strip. Mladenov said plainly last week: 'Gaza is gone' if the status quo holds. The status quo is holding because nobody is demanding otherwise. A Palestinian American businessman close to the Trump administration told NBC News what happened to Gaza once Iran became the story: 'Once the war ended and Hamas agreed to the ceasefire and the hostages were released, that was the priority of the US administration. Then the Iran war came and nobody talks about Gaza as a result.' The Trump administration flew to Beijing last week. It is meeting on May 19 to discuss potential military action against Iran. Gaza is not on the agenda. Eight hundred and fifty people killed into a ceasefire. Strikes up 35 per cent since the other war paused. The last senior Hamas military commander dead in a residential building alongside his wife and daughter. And the man charged with overseeing the peace saying, quietly, from Jerusalem, that it is far from perfect. The word 'ceasefire' has been doing a great deal of work in Gaza. It has meant: the cameras moved elsewhere. It has meant: the dying is slower now, and less reported. It has meant whatever needs to be meant on a given day. On Friday, it meant a precision strike on a residential building. ### What Washington Called a War, Beijing Called a Bargain URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/trump-xi-beijing-g2-settlement-iran-oil-global-south/ Last updated: 2026-05-18T04:30:05.000Z Trump flew home from Beijing on Friday weighing whether to [lift sanctions](https://www.thestar.com.my/aseanplus/aseanplus-news/2026/05/16/trump-spoke-with-xi-about-lifting-sanctions-on-chinese-companies-that-buy-iranian-oil?ref=diplopolis.com) on Chinese companies that buy Iranian oil. The country whose military infrastructure the United States has spent two and a half months destroying will now continue to fund the relationship Washington just spent two days repairing. That single fact contains the entire logic of the Beijing summit. It was not a diplomatic event. It was a property settlement between two powers who had separately decided that the war had served its purpose. The official account is warmer, naturally. Xi Jinping and Donald Trump agreed to forge a ['constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability'](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-xi-jinping-meeting-china-beijing-trade-tariffs-taiwan-iran/?ref=diplopolis.com). Trump flew home with [200 Boeing jets](https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/5/15/trump-says-china-to-buy-200-boeing-planes-much-lower-than-expected?ref=diplopolis.com) and the promise of more. Boeing shares fell four per cent. In 2017, the last time a US president visited Beijing, [China bought 300](https://www.foxbusiness.com/fox-news-world/trump-announces-china-buy-200-boeing-jets-after-xi-talks-a-lot-jobs?ref=diplopolis.com). Eight years and one war later, the number has gone down by a hundred planes and up by a tacit agreement to keep Iranian oil flowing to Chinese refineries. The [summit's outcome](https://www.euronews.com/2026/05/15/underwhelming-summit-outcome-in-china-brings-trump-back-to-reality?ref=diplopolis.com) was described, charitably, as underwhelming. It was something more precise than that. It was a carve-up with the paperwork still pending. This is the G2 in its mature form. Not two rivals, not two competitors, but two powers with a structural interest in managing their rivalry at everyone else's expense. Washington gets Chinese cooperation on the Strait of Hormuz and a commitment that Xi will not arm Iran. Beijing gets its refineries unsanctioned and its crude supply intact. The stability they agreed to is real. The question is whose stability, and at whose cost. That answer is not difficult to find. The [World Bank](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2026/04/28/commodity-markets-outlook-april-2026-press-release?ref=diplopolis.com) has described the closure of the Strait of Hormuz as the largest oil supply shock on record. Energy prices are projected to surge 24 per cent this year. If disruptions persist, up to 45 million more people could be pushed into acute food insecurity. From [Bangladesh to Sri Lanka](https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/3/25/from-pakistan-to-egypt-iran-war-drives-up-fuel-prices-in-the-global-south?ref=diplopolis.com), countries that import the vast majority of their energy from the Gulf are rationing fuel, closing shops early and watching their currencies weaken. Sri Lanka, which imports 63 per cent of its energy, declared every Wednesday a public holiday. Bangladesh, which imports 95 per cent of its oil, saw petrol pumps run dry. These are not peripheral effects. They are the war's most consistent outcome, distributed across the Global South with complete indifference to who started it or why. None of these countries were consulted when the bombs fell on February 28\. None were represented in Beijing last week. None will benefit from the G2 bargain now concluded. They paid the price of the confrontation. They will pay the price of the reconciliation. Washington bombed Iran's military infrastructure in the name of regional security. It is now prepared to waive sanctions on Chinese refineries buying Iranian crude in the name of bilateral stability. The principle, it turns out, was never the principle. The principle was the calculation. The Global South was not collateral damage in this war. It was the currency. ### The Thucydides Question URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/thucydides-question-trump-xi-beijing-summit-2026/ Last updated: 2026-05-15T04:30:27.000Z At the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Thursday morning, Xi Jinping asked Donald Trump whether the [two countries could avoid](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-administration/live-blog/trump-china-trip-xi-live-updates-rcna344529?ref=diplopolis.com) the [Thucydides Trap](https://amzn.to/438HlYK?ref=diplopolis.com) — the theory, derived from ancient Greek history, that a rising power and an established power are structurally destined for conflict. 'Whether the two countries can transcend the so-called Thucydides Trap and pioneer a new paradigm of major-country relations,' is how Xi put it, according to the official CCTV broadcast. It was a question that Xi had clearly prepared. It was also a question that answered itself. A country that needs to ask whether it is a rising power is not asking from a position of anxiety. It is asking from a position of arrival. The Thucydides Trap was [popularised](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-05-14/what-is-the-thucydides-trap-and-why-did-xi-raise-it-with-trump?ref=diplopolis.com) by Harvard political scientist Graham Allison in the early 2010s, drawing on the ancient Greek historian's account of the war between Sparta and Athens. His argument: when a rising power challenges an established one, conflict is the structural tendency rather than the exception. Allison found this pattern repeated across sixteen cases in five centuries of history. Xi has raised it with American presidents before, dating back to 2014\. The fact that he raised it again in 2026 — this time with Trump in Beijing, on Chinese soil, with an elaborate ceremony of cannons and school children waving flags — is not a repetition. It is a reclassification. In 2014, China raised the Thucydides Trap as a warning against American overreach. In 2026, it raises it as a description of a transition that has already happened. Trump's response to the question was characteristically unencumbered by its implications. He told Xi that their relationship was going to be '[better than ever before](https://www.ms.now/news/trump-offers-platitudes-xi-warns-possible-confrontation-during-china-summit?ref=diplopolis.com)', praised him as a 'great leader' and said it was an 'honour to be your friend'. When asked about the talks by reporters during a visit to Beijing's Temple of Heaven, he said: 'It's great. Great place, incredible. China is beautiful.' The contrast between Xi's dark opening — a carefully constructed warning about structural conflict — and Trump's breezy warmth was not incidental. It was the summit in miniature. Xi warned that [mishandling the Taiwan issue](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-administration/live-blog/trump-china-trip-xi-live-updates-rcna344529?ref=diplopolis.com) would cause 'clashes and even conflicts, putting the entire relationship in great jeopardy.' There was no mention of Taiwan in the American readout, which focused on trade and the Iran war. The asymmetry of what each side chose to report is the most informative data point from the first day of the summit. Beijing is watching the existential question. Washington is watching the midterm elections. The distance between those two frames of reference is not a misunderstanding. It is the relationship. China comes into this meeting [far more confident](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/05/14/trump-xi-beijing-summit-trade-taiwan-ai-iran-rare-earths-tariffs.html?ref=diplopolis.com) than in 2017, when it feared even a small rise in US tariffs, according to Scott Kennedy, senior adviser at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. 'In the last year, Xi has been able to push back and neutralise much of Trump's actions.' The US contingent in Beijing included Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and a delegation of American business executives — Elon Musk, Tim Cook and Jensen Huang among them. The presence of the CEOs signals that Washington is in Beijing primarily to do business. The presence of Xi's Taiwan warning in Beijing's readout signals that Beijing is in this meeting primarily to establish terms. The Iran question — the reason Trump needed this summit — produced a single White House official's statement that [both sides agreed](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/05/14/trump-xi-beijing-summit-trade-taiwan-ai-iran-rare-earths-tariffs.html?ref=diplopolis.com) the Strait of Hormuz must remain open and that Xi expressed interest in buying more American oil to reduce China's dependence on the strait. That is not a breakthrough on Iran. It is a statement of shared interest in the abstract, unaccompanied by any concrete commitment from Beijing to pressure Tehran. Rubio said Trump would make the case for Beijing to [exert its influence on Iran](https://www.ms.now/news/trump-offers-platitudes-xi-warns-possible-confrontation-during-china-summit?ref=diplopolis.com). Trump told reporters he had downplayed suggestions that he would ask Xi to pressure Iran at all. The Secretary of State and the President were not describing the same mission. Both of them were in the same building. The Donald Trump who arrived in Beijing on Thursday is not the Donald Trump who arrived in 2017\. In 2017, he came to Beijing as the leader of an unquestioned global superpower to negotiate with a rising competitor. In 2026, he came carrying a war he cannot finish, a strait he cannot reopen and an Iran problem he cannot solve without Chinese cooperation that Beijing is not obliged to provide. The ceremony was the same — the red carpet, the military band, the state banquet, the school children with the flags. The underlying relationship had changed. What the Beijing summit has produced so far is the management of a relationship between two countries that have agreed to manage their competition rather than resolve it. That is not nothing. Managed competition is better than unmanaged escalation. But it is not the breakthrough that the diplomatic language of strategic stability implies. The strait is still closed. Iran is still at war. Taiwan is still watching the readout for clues about what was traded in the room that was not put in the communiqué. Xi asked the Thucydides question. It was not really a question. A rising power that invokes Thucydides is not asking whether conflict can be avoided. It is telling the other side that the transition is already underway and asking whether it has noticed. Trump said China was beautiful. Xi asked whether two great powers could rewrite history. One of those answers will define the century. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Eleven Books That Explain the World Watching the Iran War URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/eleven-books-iran-war-international-relations-dossier-diplopolis/ Last updated: 2026-05-14T06:24:48.000Z The Iran war did not arrive without a library. Every development since February 28 — the ceasefire that is not a ceasefire, the Security Council vetoes, the Global South absorbing costs it did not vote for, the ICC unable to reach the powerful, Pakistan indispensable again, Europe sermonising without authority — has been explained, predicted or at least anticipated by books written years and decades before the first strike. The problem is not that we lacked the intellectual tools to understand what was coming. The problem is that we rarely read them before the fact. These eleven books did not all arrive at my desk simultaneously. Some I have read. Some I know through years of following the arguments they contain — through reviews, author interviews, the ideas that have entered the broader conversation about power and international order. What connects them is not my personal annotation of each page but their direct relevance to the questions DiploPolis has been arguing since February 28\. Consider this a curated brief rather than a reading diary. This list is not a general introduction to international relations. It is a specific reading list for a specific moment — eleven books that illuminate what DiploPolis has been arguing since the war began. Each one earns its place not by reputation but by relevance. Some are canonical. Some are underread. All of them make the current crisis more legible. Read them in any order. The argument connecting them is the world you are already living in. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/05/The-Anarchical-Society-----Hedley-Bull--1977-.png)](https://amzn.to/436jDMN?ref=diplopolis.com) ### [**The Anarchical Society**](https://amzn.to/436jDMN?ref=diplopolis.com) **— Hedley Bull (1977)** Bull explains the central fraud of international order: rules exist, but enforcement depends on power. That is why ceasefires collapse, red lines move and the weak are told to trust agreements nobody intends to police. The anarchical society is not chaos — it is order maintained without a sovereign, which means maintained only for as long as the powerful find it convenient. DiploPolis has returned to this argument again and again, especially in the ceasefire pieces. Every time Washington announced a pause and Tehran announced a violation and neither side paid a consequence, Bull's central insight was being demonstrated in real time. The book is half a century old. It has not aged a day. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/05/Governing-the-World-----Mark-Mazower--2012-.png)](https://amzn.to/49Godoz?ref=diplopolis.com) ### [**Governing the World**](https://amzn.to/49Godoz?ref=diplopolis.com) **— Mark Mazower (2012)** Mazower gives the institutional memory behind today's paralysis. The Security Council was not built to deliver justice; it was built to manage power. When China and Russia veto action on Iran, they are not breaking the system. They are using it exactly as designed. Mazower's history of international institutions — from the League of Nations through the United Nations to the present — is essential reading for anyone trying to understand why the machinery of international response keeps failing at the precise moments it is most needed. The machinery was never designed for justice. It was designed for stability. Those are different objectives, and the gap between them is where the dead accumulate. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/05/The-Retreat-of-Western-Liberalism-----Edward-Luce--2017-.png)](https://amzn.to/4uS292J?ref=diplopolis.com) ### [**The Retreat of Western Liberalism**](https://amzn.to/4uS292J?ref=diplopolis.com) **— Edward Luce (2017)** Luce captures the decay DiploPolis keeps finding in Europe and the wider West: the language of liberal order remains, but the confidence behind it has gone. Bulgaria, the EU's eastern fractures and Europe's hesitant response to war all belong to this story. France criticised the strikes and opened its airbases. Germany stayed quiet and offered Ramstein. Spain said the same thing it said last month. The sermon continues; the authority has left the room. Luce wrote this in 2017 about domestic politics in Britain and America. He was describing something that has since metastasised across the entire Western institutional framework. The book is more useful now than it was when it was published. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/05/The-Wretched-of-the-Earth-----Frantz-Fanon--1961-.png)](https://amzn.to/4dFj6Ye?ref=diplopolis.com) ### [**The Wretched of the Earth**](https://amzn.to/4dFj6Ye?ref=diplopolis.com) **— Frantz Fanon (1961)** Fanon is not background reading. He is the moral weather system behind much of what DiploPolis argues. The Global South does not distrust Western power because it misunderstands liberalism; it distrusts Western power because it remembers what liberalism looked like when it arrived with guns, debt and lectures. The Wretched of the Earth is not a comfortable book and it is not meant to be. It is an argument about the psychology of colonial power and the psychology of those subjected to it — an argument that has not been superseded by decolonisation because the structural relationships it described have not been superseded either. When the Global South watches the ICC reach African leaders but not Western ones, Fanon is the intellectual framework through which that observation becomes an argument rather than a grievance. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/05/The-Jakarta-Method-----Vincent-Bevins--2020-.png)](https://amzn.to/4uMSOsU?ref=diplopolis.com) ### [**The Jakarta Method**](https://amzn.to/4uMSOsU?ref=diplopolis.com) **— Vincent Bevins (2020)** Bevins explains why the phrase 'rules-based international order' lands so differently outside the West. For much of the Global South, the order was not rules, but disappearances, coups and convenient massacres. DiploPolis's scepticism of Western institutional virtue sits directly inside this history. Bevins documents the United States-backed campaigns of mass political violence across Indonesia, Latin America, Africa and Asia during the Cold War — violence that was not the exception to American foreign policy but its instrument. This is not ancient history. The governments installed through that violence, and the relationships built around it, shape the regional architecture that the Iran war is now destabilising. The Jakarta Method is the most important recent book for understanding why Washington's credibility problem in the Global South is structural rather than reputational. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/05/India-After-Gandhi-----Ramachandra-Guha--2007-.png)](https://amzn.to/438ko80?ref=diplopolis.com) ### [**India After Gandhi**](https://amzn.to/438ko80?ref=diplopolis.com) **— Ramachandra Guha (2007)** Guha is essential because India's foreign policy cannot be understood without India's domestic argument with itself. The Vishwaguru claim rests on civilisational confidence; the reality is messier, more fragile and more unfinished. Operation Sindoor and its aftermath expose that gap with brutal clarity. India struck harder than it had since 1971, sent 59 parliamentarians to 32 countries to isolate Pakistan and watched Trump announce the ceasefire, Pakistan thank him and the world move on. That outcome is not explained by foreign policy analysis alone. It is explained by the distance between what India believes itself to be and what its actual strategic weight in the current international order allows it to do. Guha's thousand-page history of independent India is the foundation for understanding that distance. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/05/The-Dispensable-Nation-----Vali-Nasr--2013-.png)](https://amzn.to/4dai7iK?ref=diplopolis.com) ### [**The Dispensable Nation**](https://amzn.to/4dai7iK?ref=diplopolis.com) **— Vali Nasr (2013)** Nasr shows how Washington repeatedly misreads South Asia and the Middle East, then calls the consequences instability. Pakistan's return as an indispensable bad actor fits that pattern exactly. The actor is not rehabilitated; the requirement has changed. Nasr, a former senior State Department official, wrote this book about the Obama administration's failures in Afghanistan and Pakistan. What he described — Washington's inability to understand the region it was operating in, its tendency to reward the behaviour it claimed to be punishing, its confusion of tactical necessity with strategic alignment — applies with equal force to the Trump administration's routing of Iran diplomacy through Islamabad. Pakistan seeded the nuclear crisis Washington is now trying to resolve. The phone number that works in both directions belongs to the man India spent four days trying to break. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/05/The-Trial-of-Henry-Kissinger-----Christopher-Hitchens--2001-.png)](https://amzn.to/4d9plU1?ref=diplopolis.com) ### [**The Trial of Henry Kissinger**](https://amzn.to/4d9plU1?ref=diplopolis.com) **— Christopher Hitchens (2001)** Hitchens understood the great exemption: accountability is for defeated men, weak states and enemies of the moment. Kissinger's career is the ICC's Iran problem in human form. The crime is not that the law failed once; the crime is that everyone knew it would. Hitchens wrote this as a legal brief, not a polemic — documenting specific acts by a specific man that met the legal definition of war crimes, and then documenting the complete absence of accountability that followed. The argument is not that Kissinger was uniquely evil. The argument is that the system was designed to let him be. That design has not changed. The ICC can issue an arrest warrant for Benjamin Netanyahu. It cannot collect him. The distance between those two facts is the distance Hitchens spent a lifetime measuring. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/05/Justice-Among-Nations-----Stephen-Neff--2014-.png)](https://amzn.to/4uguIqK?ref=diplopolis.com) ### [**Justice Among Nations**](https://amzn.to/4uguIqK?ref=diplopolis.com) **— Stephen Neff (2014)** Neff gives DiploPolis the long view of international law's central contradiction. Law claims to restrain power, but power has always helped write the law. That does not make law useless; it makes the question sharper — who is law for when the powerful are in the dock? Neff's history of international law from antiquity to the present is the most intellectually honest account available of the gap between what the law promises and what it delivers. It is not a cynical book. It is a precise one. The precision is what makes it useful. Understanding that international law has always been a contested rather than a settled field — that its authority has always depended on the willingness of the powerful to submit to it — is the prerequisite for understanding why the current moment looks the way it does. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/05/Lawfare-----Orde-Kittrie--2016-.png)](https://amzn.to/4npFVT0?ref=diplopolis.com) ### [**Lawfare**](https://amzn.to/4npFVT0?ref=diplopolis.com) **— Orde Kittrie (2016)** Kittrie explains the modern theatre of legal language. States no longer reject law outright; they weaponise it, quote it, reinterpret it and discard it when jurisdiction arrives at their own door. That is why Israel, the US and Russia speak like litigants while behaving like sovereigns above judgement. Lawfare — the use of law as a weapon of conflict rather than a constraint on it — is the defining legal phenomenon of the current era. Every statement by Israeli or American officials framing their actions in the language of self-defence, proportionality and lawful military necessity is an act of lawfare as much as it is a legal argument. Kittrie wrote the manual. Reading it makes the theatre harder to mistake for substance. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/05/Nuclear-Showdown-----Gordon-Chang--2006-.png)](https://amzn.to/4uJJK7U?ref=diplopolis.com) ### [**Nuclear Showdown**](https://amzn.to/4uJJK7U?ref=diplopolis.com) **— Gordon Chang (2006)** North Korea's lesson is the one every vulnerable state has absorbed: surrendering deterrence is an act of faith, and faith is not a security doctrine. After Iran, the message travels faster. The world did not see a rogue state problem. It saw an insurance policy being cancelled. Chang wrote this book about North Korea two decades before the Iran war. The argument it makes — that a state which surrenders its nuclear programme based on international assurances learns, sooner or later, the cost of that trust — has been dramatically validated by February 28, 2026\. Iran gave up its nuclear weapons programme under the JCPOA. The JCPOA was abandoned. Iran was bombed. The governments watching this sequence are not drawing the conclusion Washington wants them to draw. These eleven books do not predict the future. They explain the present by illuminating the structural forces that have always been underneath it. Read them not as comfort but as equipment. The world DiploPolis covers every day is the world these writers saw coming. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Country Builder Comes to Beijing URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/country-builder-beijing-trump-xi-summit-chuan-jianguo-2026/ Last updated: 2026-05-14T04:33:56.000Z As Donald Trump's plane touched down in Beijing on Wednesday evening, the hashtag [#WelcomeTrumpToChina](https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/13/politics/live-news/trump-china-visit-arrival-ceremony-hnk?ref=diplopolis.com) was the top trending topic on Weibo, China's largest social media platform. Three hundred children in blue and white uniforms lined the tarmac waving American and Chinese flags. A military band played. A red carpet was rolled out. Chinese Vice President Han Zheng, Xi Jinping's designated envoy for ceremonial occasions, was there to receive him. The welcome was elaborate, choreographed and entirely on Beijing's terms. Then the Weibo users named him. The nickname circulating on Chinese social media for Donald Trump is 'Chuan Jianguo.' It translates literally as 'Trump the Country Builder.' [The implication, according to the users spreading it](https://www.irishstar.com/news/politics/donald-trump-china-nickname-translation-37151662?ref=diplopolis.com), is sardonic and specific: Trump's confrontational foreign policy, his tariffs, his trade wars and his isolationism have done more to build China's power than anything Beijing's own planners could have designed. He is not the country builder of America. He is the country builder of China. The mockery arrived before his plane did. It is, as insults go, unusually precise. The tariffs Trump levied on China [drove it toward self-sufficiency](https://www.themirror.com/news/us-news/savage-hidden-meaning-new-chinese-1835056?ref=diplopolis.com) in technology, energy and food security at a pace that years of Chinese government planning had failed to achieve. The pressure to find alternatives to the American market pushed China to secure new partners in Southeast Asia and Africa, reducing its dependence on Washington and expanding its commercial footprint across the Global South. The attempt to weaken China produced a more resilient China. The name is not flattery. It is a verdict. Trump came to Beijing carrying a request he cannot make openly and an agenda he cannot control. The Council on Foreign Relations [put it bluntly](https://www.cfr.org/articles/at-the-trump-xi-summit-china-will-have-the-upper-hand?ref=diplopolis.com) in its pre-summit assessment: China will have the upper hand. Xi has told Communist Party cadres for years that 'the East is rising and the West is declining' and that 'time and momentum' are on China's side. The Beijing summit does not contradict that claim. It illustrates it. The last time Trump visited China, in 2017, Xi staged a state visit-plus — a private dinner in the Forbidden City, a parade through Tiananmen Square, $250 billion in business deals unveiled for the cameras. This time Trump arrives as a supplicant, not a peer, and both governments know it. The Beijingers CNN spoke to outside the summit venue [reflected that awareness](https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/13/politics/live-news/trump-china-visit-arrival-ceremony-hnk?ref=diplopolis.com). 'China has always stayed neutral,' said one resident. 'If they want to fight, that's their business, it has nothing to do with us.' The sentiment was not hostile. It was something more deflating — indifference with confidence behind it. The population of the country being asked for a diplomatic favour was not particularly interested in providing one. What Trump wants from Beijing is specific. He wants Xi to press Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and agree to a peace deal that allows him to declare the war over before the midterm elections. CSIS [described the likely outcome](https://www.csis.org/analysis/trump-xi-summit-beijing-managing-worlds-most-important-relationship?ref=diplopolis.com) as 'a relatively modest step toward greater stability' — the language of managed expectations rather than breakthrough diplomacy. China has already given Washington one concession in the lead-up to the summit: a high-level assurance from Beijing that it would not send weapons to Iran, specifically ruling out surface-to-air missiles. Washington received the assurance and called it progress. Beijing gave away nothing it had planned to do anyway. What Xi wants from Trump is less publicly stated but widely understood. Taiwan is the price. American officials have [expressed concern](https://www.csis.org/analysis/trump-xi-summit-beijing-managing-worlds-most-important-relationship?ref=diplopolis.com) that Trump will negotiate on arms sales to Taiwan, undermining decades of carefully worded American policy to get what he needs on the strait. Taiwan, which had no seat at the table and no vote on the Iran war, is watching from outside the room while its security may be traded inside it. The countries that cannot attend the Beijing summit will live longest with whatever is agreed there. The architecture of the visit tells the story as clearly as any communiqué will. Beijing rolled out the red carpet, played the military band and put 300 children on the tarmac. Washington sent a president carrying a war he cannot finish, a strait he cannot reopen and a request that requires the cooperation of the country he spent four years trying to weaken. The Weibo users named him correctly before the ceremony began. He is not here as the leader of the indispensable nation. He is here as the country builder — the man whose choices made the country he came to pressure stronger than when he started pressing. The summit runs through tomorrow. The readout will speak of candid and constructive dialogue. The strait will remain largely closed. The nickname will remain on Weibo. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Pick a Side URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/pick-a-side-israel-iron-dome-uae-abraham-accords-iran-war-2026/ Last updated: 2026-05-13T04:30:49.000Z Nobody asked Abu Dhabi. That is the detail that matters most in yesterday's revelation that Israel has [deployed Iron Dome batteries and military personnel](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/12/israel-sent-iron-dome-anti-missile-batteries-and-personnel-to-uae-us-envoy?ref=diplopolis.com) to the United Arab Emirates — disclosed not by a whistleblower or a leaked document but by United States Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee at a public conference in Tel Aviv. It is the first publicly acknowledged deployment of Israeli military forces to the Emirates. It was announced as a compliment. Huckabee framed it as [one of the benefits](https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-895897?ref=diplopolis.com) of the Abraham Accords, the 2020 normalisation agreements under which the UAE and Bahrain established formal diplomatic relations with Israel. 'Look at the benefits,' he said. 'Israel just sent them Iron Dome batteries and personnel to help operate them.' He then added that every country in the region would have to make a choice — whether it was more likely to be attacked by Iran or by Israel. It was a recruitment pitch dressed as a security briefing. The Abraham Accords were sold as a peace deal. They were, it turns out, a down payment on a military alliance. The UAE's experience of that alliance is worth examining precisely. The [UAE has faced Iranian missile and drone fire](https://www.newarab.com/news/huckabee-israel-sent-iron-dome-personnel-uae-amid-iran-war?ref=diplopolis.com) even after the ceasefire was reached last month. The ceasefire was between Washington and Tehran. The UAE had no seat at that negotiating table. The war that began on February 28 was not declared on the UAE. The UAE did not vote for it, did not choose it and was not consulted about it. It is absorbing the consequences of a conflict decided by others, hosting military forces from a third country on its soil and being told by an American diplomat that it must now pick a side. Iran had [repeatedly warned](https://www.npr.org/2026/05/12/nx-s1-5819174/israel-sent-iron-dome-uae?ref=diplopolis.com) throughout the war that the UAE was playing an active role in the aggression by hosting US and Israeli military presence on its territory, providing intelligence and making its airbases available for attacks against Iran. Those warnings were dismissed as Iranian propaganda. Huckabee's remarks at the Tel Aviv University conference confirmed their essential accuracy. The UAE was not a neutral bystander who happened to be caught in the crossfire. It was a participant — one that chose its side in 2020 and has been living with that choice ever since, with the difference that the choice has now become visible. [Kuwait's experience](https://www.npr.org/2026/05/12/nx-s1-5819174/israel-sent-iron-dome-uae?ref=diplopolis.com) adds a further dimension. Kuwait accused Iran of launching a failed attack on Bubiyan Island — home to the Mubarak Al Kabeer Port, which is under construction as part of China's Belt and Road Initiative — on May 1\. A Revolutionary Guard team attempted to infiltrate the island, was disrupted by Kuwaiti forces and four men were detained. Kuwait is not a member of the Abraham Accords. It has not normalised relations with Israel. It did not pick a side. Its port was attacked anyway. The war does not ask about your paperwork before it crosses your border. Huckabee said he was 'very optimistic' that additional countries in the region would soon join the Abraham Accords. The US Ambassador to the United Nations made [similar comments](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-security/2026-05-12/ty-article/.premium/u-s-ambassador-says-israel-sent-iron-dome-batteries-to-uae-during-iran-war/0000019e-1c01-d618-adde-1c73778c0000?ref=diplopolis.com) around the same time, suggesting the disclosure was coordinated rather than accidental. The message being sent to Gulf states is straightforward: join the Accords and receive Iron Dome. Do not join and receive nothing — except, possibly, the same Iranian missiles, without the Israeli defence system to intercept them. The Abraham Accords were presented in 2020 as a historic breakthrough for regional peace. What they actually created was a two-tier Gulf security architecture: states that normalised with Israel receive military protection, states that did not are left to manage alone. Iran's willingness to strike UAE soil during and after the ceasefire period has made the implications of that architecture impossible to ignore. The choice Huckabee is describing — pick a side — is not a new choice. It is the choice the Accords always encoded, now made explicit by a war that removed the diplomatic language obscuring it. The Abraham Accords were presented as a normalisation deal — trade, diplomacy, tourism, technology. Those things are real. What Huckabee's disclosure confirms is that the Accords also contained a security architecture against Iran that was always present and largely unspoken. The Iron Dome deployment is not a betrayal of the Accords' original spirit. It is the logical conclusion of the security logic embedded within them from the beginning. The war did not create this military alliance. It made it impossible to ignore. The UAE signed the Abraham Accords to secure its future. It has Israeli soldiers on its soil and Iranian missiles in its skies. Abu Dhabi picked its side. The benefits are arriving on schedule. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Xi Only Has to Not Lose URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/xi-only-has-to-not-lose-trump-xi-summit-2026/ Last updated: 2026-05-12T21:02:46.000Z On Thursday, Donald Trump flies to Beijing to meet Xi Jinping for the first time since 2017\. He arrives carrying a war he cannot finish, a strait he cannot reopen, a ceasefire he cannot enforce and a request he cannot make publicly: please help me with Iran. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent [has confirmed](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/05/08/iran-focus-at-trump-xi-summit-may-delay-progress-on-tariffs-rare-earths.html?ref=diplopolis.com) that the Iran war will be on the agenda and has urged China to join what Washington is calling an international operation to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. The most powerful country in the world is flying to Beijing to ask for a favour. Beijing did not need to do anything to earn this moment. Washington created it. The summit was originally [scheduled](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026%5Fstate%5Fvisit%5Fby%5FDonald%5FTrump%5Fto%5FChina?ref=diplopolis.com) for March but was delayed by Trump due to the Middle East conflict. The delay is its own signal. Trump could not go to Beijing while the war was going well because the optics of asking China for anything mid-campaign would have undermined the narrative of American strength. He is going now because the war has stopped going well and the optics no longer matter as much as the outcome. The strait remains largely closed. The Iran war is [likely to take](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/05/08/iran-focus-at-trump-xi-summit-may-delay-progress-on-tariffs-rare-earths.html?ref=diplopolis.com) centre stage at the summit, leaving less scope to resolve issues like tariffs and rare earth supplies. Washington came to Beijing wanting to talk trade. It will spend most of the summit talking about a war it started without consulting Beijing and cannot end without Beijing's help. China feels confident [enough to stand up](https://www.csis.org/analysis/trump-xi-summit-beijing-managing-worlds-most-important-relationship?ref=diplopolis.com) to Trump on many key issues — sanctions, technology controls, critical minerals and Iran. That confidence is not accidental. It is the product of a specific sequence of events that Washington set in motion. The US sanctioned Chinese companies for buying Iranian oil. China instructed those companies to continue. The US and Israel vetoed — and China and Russia blocked — successive UN Security Council resolutions on the war. China hosted Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Beijing on May 6 for the first time since the war began, positioning itself as the indispensable interlocutor between Washington and Tehran. Beijing has spent ten weeks watching Washington exhaust its options. It arrives at this summit knowing that Trump needs this meeting more than Xi does. The [agenda spans](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/05/11/trump-xi-summit-beijing-global-leaders-iran-war-taiwan-strait-of-hormuz-.html?ref=diplopolis.com) trade, technology, rare earth export controls, Taiwan, the Iran war and artificial intelligence. Each of those items represents a domain in which China holds meaningful leverage. Rare earth export controls affect every advanced economy. Technology restrictions on Chinese access to semiconductors are a persistent source of friction. Taiwan's status is Beijing's most sensitive demand. Taiwan will be [watching](https://www.csis.org/analysis/trump-xi-summit-beijing-managing-worlds-most-important-relationship?ref=diplopolis.com) closely for any changes in how the United States describes the cross-strait relationship, particularly worried that Beijing will persuade Trump to express support for peaceful unification. The countries that cannot attend the Beijing summit — Taiwan, the Gulf states, Europe — are the ones who will live longest with whatever is agreed inside it. Xi may seek to use Trump's [weakened negotiating](https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2026/05/10/donald-trump-heads-to-beijing-as-iran-war-casts-shadow-over-xi-jinping-summit-scott-bessent-confirms-agenda/?ref=diplopolis.com) position to extract concessions on Taiwan's status, US restrictions on Chinese access to advanced technology and tariffs on Chinese goods. This is the structural reality of the summit that the diplomatic language of mutual benefit and constructive dialogue will not change. Trump wants one thing from Beijing that only Beijing can deliver — enough pressure on Tehran to reopen the strait and allow him to declare the war over before the midterms. Xi wants several things from Washington that only Washington can deliver. The negotiation has a clear shape. The question is what Trump gives away to get what he needs. The irony is structural and worth naming plainly. Washington spent three months sanctioning China for being too close to Iran. It is now flying to Beijing to ask China to use that closeness. Washington launched a war predicated on the assertion that the rules-based international order must be defended against state sponsors of terrorism. It is now asking the country that vetoed every resolution defending that order to clean up the mess. Neither diplomatic appeals nor economic pressure has moved Beijing on Iranian oil purchases, and analysts remain sceptical the summit will yield a breakthrough on Iran. Trump flies to Beijing on Thursday. The strait is still largely closed. The nuclear question is unresolved. The ceasefire is disputed. Xi Jinping does not need to win this summit. He only needs to not lose it. That is already a stronger position than the one Trump is arriving with. ### Ask China URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/ask-china-washington-iran-hormuz-sanctions-diplomacy-2026/ Last updated: 2026-05-11T10:20:07.000Z On Monday, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told Fox Business that China has been buying 90 per cent of Iran's energy exports and is therefore 'funding the largest state sponsor of terrorism.' On the same day, Bessent urged China to 'step up with some diplomacy' and use its leverage over Tehran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. The United States Treasury Secretary accused China of financing terrorism in the morning and asked China for a diplomatic favour in the afternoon. Both statements were made in the same interview. This is not a contradiction Washington is embarrassed about. It is a contradiction Washington is hoping nobody notices. The US has spent the past three months [sanctioning Chinese companies](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/4/us-official-says-china-is-funding-iran-urges-beijing-to-help-open-hormuz?ref=diplopolis.com) accused of purchasing Iranian oil. Beijing responded by instructing Chinese companies not to comply with the sanctions. China and Russia then vetoed the US-backed resolution at the United Nations Security Council aimed at condemning Iran's actions in the Strait of Hormuz. Washington's position throughout has been that China's economic relationship with Iran is a problem requiring punitive action. That position is now being quietly set aside because Washington needs the relationship it spent three months trying to destroy. Secretary of State Marco Rubio was [more direct](https://www.euronews.com/2026/05/06/top-trump-advisers-urge-china-to-leverage-iran-ties-to-reopen-strait-of-hormuz-to-global-t?ref=diplopolis.com) about the ask. Speaking at a White House briefing, Rubio called on Chinese officials to use Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi's visit to Beijing to press Tehran on the strait. 'I hope the Chinese tell him what he needs to be told,' Rubio said. Araghchi met Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing on Wednesday. Wang told him that a comprehensive ceasefire 'brooks no delay' and urged Washington and Tehran to reopen the strait 'as soon as possible.' China's public position is neutral mediation. Its actual position is more complicated. Beijing has vetoed two Security Council resolutions, sanctioned Chinese companies were instructed to continue purchasing Iranian oil and Chinese foreign policy has consistently refused to validate Washington's framing of the war as a counter-terrorism operation. The timing of all of this is [not accidental.](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/6/araghchi-in-beijing-how-china-could-shape-the-direction-of-the-us-iran-war?ref=diplopolis.com) Trump is due to meet President Xi Jinping in Beijing on May 14 and 15 — the first visit by an American president to China since Trump's first term. Bessent said Iran would be high on the agenda. The summit gives Washington a formal channel to ask Beijing to deliver what American military force has so far failed to deliver — a reopened strait and a negotiated end to the war. The irony is structural. Washington launched a war that has closed the world's most important oil chokepoint. It cannot reopen that chokepoint by force. It cannot reach a negotiated settlement without going through Pakistan. And now it cannot apply sufficient diplomatic pressure on Tehran without asking the country it accused of funding terrorism to do the diplomatic work America's own sanctions made impossible. China imports approximately half its crude oil and nearly a third of its [liquefied natural gas from the Middle East.](https://www.euronews.com/2026/05/06/top-trump-advisers-urge-china-to-leverage-iran-ties-to-reopen-strait-of-hormuz-to-global-t?ref=diplopolis.com) Rubio's argument — that it is therefore in China's interest to help reopen the strait — is correct as far as it goes. China is losing as much as anyone from the closure. But the argument elides a more fundamental point. China's leverage over Iran exists precisely because of the economic relationship Washington spent three months trying to punish. You cannot sanction a relationship into weakness and then ask it to perform on your behalf. The Yemen Press Agency identified the [core paradox accurately](https://en.ypagency.net/392332?ref=diplopolis.com): Washington has combined military escalation with diplomatic appeals to the country it has declared its primary adversary. Project Freedom — the US Navy's escort operation through the strait — was announced on May 4 and paused on May 6 because of 'great progress' toward a possible agreement. The aircraft carrier and the diplomatic phone call are being deployed simultaneously toward the same objective. One is not working. The other depends on Beijing's goodwill, which Washington has spent considerable effort eroding. China's answer to all of this will become clear when Trump lands in Beijing on May 14\. Wang Yi told Araghchi that China supports a comprehensive ceasefire. He did not say China would deliver one. The distance between those two positions is where the war currently lives. Washington built this crisis on the premise that China's relationship with Iran was the problem. It now needs that relationship to survive the crisis it created. The sanctions were the price of a war Washington started. The diplomacy is the cost of a war Washington cannot finish. ### Spy Who Came In From the Cold — and Ran for Parliament URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/jonathan-pollard-knesset-spy-israel-parliament-2026/ Last updated: 2026-05-08T04:30:13.000Z Jonathan Pollard landed in Tel Aviv on December 30, 2020, kissed the tarmac and was greeted personally by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He had just spent 30 years in an American federal prison for selling the United States' most classified secrets to Israel. He received a hero's welcome. This week, he announced he is [running](https://www.npr.org/2026/05/07/nx-s1-5812527/former-u-s-analyst-once-jailed-for-spying-for-israel-to-run-for-israeli-parliament?ref=diplopolis.com) for the Knesset on a platform calling for the forcible removal of all Palestinians from Gaza and the annexation and repopulation of the territory by Israelis. The Pollard story is not about one man's choices. It never was. Pollard was [arrested](https://www.timesofisrael.com/ex-spy-jonathan-pollard-says-hes-entering-politics-slams-netanyahu-and-bennett/?ref=diplopolis.com) in 1985 after passing thousands of classified US military documents to Israeli intelligence — an amount he estimated could fill a room ten feet by six feet by six feet. The material included reconnaissance photographs of Israel's enemies, signals intelligence and highly sensitive assessments of Soviet military capabilities. US officials said the damage to American national security was severe and lasting. A federal judge in 1987 agreed, sentencing Pollard to life imprisonment. The CIA's damage assessment, classified for decades, described the intelligence he delivered as among the most harmful ever extracted from the American system. Israel's response to all of this was to [grant Pollard citizenship in 1995](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jonathan%5FPollard?ref=diplopolis.com) while he was still serving his sentence in a North Carolina prison. Netanyahu visited him in 2002 and pledged, if re-elected, to secure his release. Successive Israeli governments lobbied Washington for clemency across three decades. In 2015, when Pollard was released on parole, he was required to remain in the United States for five more years. The moment those restrictions expired, he emigrated. The prime minister was at the airport. None of this produced a diplomatic crisis. No Israeli government was sanctioned. No relationship was downgraded. No American administration made Israel pay a political price for treating a convicted spy against the United States as a national hero deserving of citizenship, lobbying and a prime ministerial welcome. Washington absorbed the insult, as it has absorbed every insult from Jerusalem that would have ended any other bilateral relationship in a generation. This is the architecture that Pollard's Knesset candidacy illuminates. The same architecture that allows Israel to reject ICC jurisdiction, ignore ICJ provisional measures, continue strikes through ceasefire [announcements](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10637/?ref=diplopolis.com) and now field as a parliamentary candidate a man convicted of one of the most damaging acts of espionage in American history. The impunity is not incidental. It is structural. It is the product of decades of Washington deciding that the relationship is too important to be subjected to the normal rules that govern every other relationship. Pollard's platform is worth examining precisely because it has now entered mainstream Israeli politics rather than existing at its fringes. He told Channel 13 that he favours 'the forcible removal of all current residents of Gaza, and the annexation of Gaza and its repopulation by us.' He told NPR he was sorry for his crime, then explained that he had assumed Israel's abandonment of him was an exception to the rule — until October 7 showed him that the entire country had been 'betrayed and abandoned.' He called Netanyahu's [claims of military victory](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-politics/2026-05-06/ty-article/.premium/ex-spy-jonathan-pollard-to-run-for-knesset-on-far-right-agenda/0000019d-fd09-d12b-af9f-ff9996e70000?ref=diplopolis.com) 'a cold-blooded lie.' He said that if Netanyahu wins the election anyway, 'I believe in the democratic process and we'll have to support him.' He is [running alongside](https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/426646?ref=diplopolis.com) Nissim Louk, the father of Shani Louk, who was murdered at the Nova music festival on October 7\. The new party is attempting to fuse the grief of the hostage families with the far right's annexation agenda. Whether it succeeds electorally is a question the Israeli voters will answer in October. Whether it is remarkable that a man convicted of espionage against the United States is a credible political candidate in the country he spied for is apparently not a question that Washington is asking. The Pollard case has always been the clearest illustration of what the special relationship actually is when stripped of its diplomatic language. It is not a relationship of equals. It is not a relationship governed by the same norms that govern America's other alliances. It is a relationship in which one party can grant citizenship to a convicted spy against the other, lobby for his release across three decades, give him a prime ministerial welcome on the tarmac and then watch him run for parliament — and the other party will say nothing, do nothing and sanction nothing. The Eastern Herald noted that Pollard's [re-emergence](https://easternherald.com/2026/05/07/jonathan-pollard-sold-us-secrets-israel-knesset/?ref=diplopolis.com) has reignited debate over Israel's long and controversial history of espionage operations inside the United States. It has. But the debate is narrower than it should be. The real question is not whether Israel ran espionage operations against its closest ally. The real question is why running those operations produced no lasting consequence — and what that tells you about every other consequence that has also failed to materialise. Pollard kissed the tarmac in Tel Aviv. Netanyahu was waiting. Nobody in Washington said a word. Five years later, he is running for parliament. The architecture holds. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Operation Sindoor: Fifty-Nine Lawmakers. Zero Answers. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/operation-sindoor-fifty-nine-lawmakers-zero-answers/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T15:29:11.000Z India sent seven multi-party [parliamentary delegations](https://www.indiatvnews.com/news/india/india-operation-sindoor-delegations-for-diplomatic-outreach-check-who-going-where-full-list-latest-updates-2025-05-18-990771?ref=diplopolis.com) — 59 members, 32 countries and the European Union headquarters in Brussels — to make one argument: Pakistan is a state sponsor of terrorism and the world must say so. They went to London, Paris, Berlin, Riyadh, Tokyo, Seoul, Jakarta, Doha and Johannesburg. The most ambitious parliamentary outreach India had mounted in a generation. They carried dossiers, gave press conferences and delivered the same message in thirty-two capitals. Not one government said what India asked them to say. One year ago today, India had launched [Operation Sindoor](https://ddnews.gov.in/en/operation-sindoor-anniversary-a-year-after-india-reflects-on-a-defining-military-response/?ref=diplopolis.com) in retaliation for a terrorist attack in Pahalgam on April 22, 2025, that killed 26 civilians, including tourists. Indian forces struck nine terror sites across Pakistan, the deepest military action since 1971\. The headquarters of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed were destroyed. Pakistani airbases were hit. Pakistan's army sought de-escalation through the DGMO hotline. Speaking at an event in New Delhi ahead of the first anniversary, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh called Operation Sindoor a golden chapter in the country's military history. All of that is true. What the anniversary commentary conveniently leaves out is everything else. India's Deputy Chief of Army Staff Lieutenant General Rahul Singh [stated on July 4, 2025](https://www.outlookindia.com/national/congress-questions-indias-post-operation-sindoor-diplomacy-cites-us-role-in-ceasefire?ref=diplopolis.com), that China provided Pakistan with critical equipment, ammunition, live intelligence inputs, satellite imagery and real-time targeting support during the conflict. Chinese satellite imagery and cyber tools were extensively made available to Pakistan to monitor Indian activity. Pakistan utilised a sophisticated command and control system created by China, integrating radars, fighter aircraft and airborne control aircraft into a cohesive automatic response system. Over the past five years China has supplied 81 per cent of Pakistan's [imported weapons.](https://www.indiasentinels.com/diplomacy/operation-sindoor-chinas-covert-military-support-to-pakistan-emerges-as-major-concern-for-india-6833?ref=diplopolis.com) As India fought Pakistan, it also absorbed the battlefield consequences of China's decision to support its ally in real time, without firing a single shot and without attracting a single diplomatic consequence. At 5:37 PM on May 10, [the ceasefire was announced](https://www.business-standard.com/india-news/pak-not-isolated-like-after-mumbai-attack-cong-on-op-sindoor-anniversary-126050700316%5F1.html?ref=diplopolis.com) by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who attributed it to intervention by President Trump. Trump has [claimed credit](https://newsable.asianetnews.com/world/trump-reiterates-claim-of-settling-2025-indiapakistan-conflict-articleshow-6s0z6t2?ref=diplopolis.com) for the ceasefire over 80 times since May 10\. He said he threatened 200 per cent tariffs. He said he saved 30 to 50 million lives. He said he settled a nuclear war. Pakistan's prime minister publicly thanked him. Pakistan nominated Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize. India's defence minister called the claims baseless. The US President repeated the claim without ever being refuted once by his good friend Prime Minister Narendra Modi. From a state-sponsored terrorism question, Trump had reframed the crisis into a [nuclear standoff requiring American management.](https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/operation-sindoor-one-year/how-trump-reshaped-pakistans-image-from-terror-state-to-war-mediator/?ref=diplopolis.com) India's central argument — that Pakistan must be named and isolated — did not survive that reframing. The world did not come away from Operation Sindoor thinking about Pakistan's terror infrastructure or China's military support. It came away thinking about Trump's peacemaking and two irrational nuclear neighbours who needed an adult in the room. The 59 lawmakers who visited 32 countries were asking the world to see Pakistan as a terrorist state. The world instead watched Trump announce the ceasefire, heard Pakistan thank him and moved on. Pakistan [promoted Asim Munir to Field Marshal](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025%5FIndia%E2%80%93Pakistan%5Fconflict?ref=diplopolis.com) ten days after the ceasefire. His army emerged domestically stronger. Washington embraced him — not as the head of a terrorism-sponsoring state but as the indispensable broker whose phone number worked when America needed Iran brought to a table. And China, which had provided Pakistan with the satellite eyes and the weapons systems that complicated India's military operation, faced no diplomatic consequence from New Delhi whatsoever. The Indus Waters Treaty [remains in abeyance.](https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/the-indus-waters-treaty-a-year-after-the-pahalgam-terror-attack/?ref=diplopolis.com) A court of arbitration has [ruled it](https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/hague-ruling-on-indus-waters-treaty-revives-legal-debate-but-trust-cannot-flow-when-terror-does-10124396/?ref=diplopolis.com) cannot be unilaterally suspended and reaffirmed its jurisdiction. India rejected the ruling. The rivers still flow at the same volume into Pakistan. A threat not carried through does not deter. It reassures. Seven delegations. Fifty-nine parliamentarians. Thirty-two countries. One golden chapter. One year later. India got nothing. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### God Does Not Listen URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/pope-leo-trump-lie-iran-wa/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:13:17.000Z On April 12, Donald Trump wrote on Truth Social that he did not want a pope who thinks it is [acceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapon](https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2026/apr/13/donald-trump/Pope-Leo-nuclear-weapon-Iran-Trump/?ref=diplopolis.com). He has repeated the claim in interviews and in a second post days later. The claim is false. Pope Leo XIV has never said Iran should have a nuclear weapon. He has said the opposite, in writing, on video and from the altar, repeatedly. In March he said: 'May the nuclear threat never again dictate the future of humanity.' In June 2025 he called for 'a world free from nuclear threat.' In July he said nuclear weapons 'offend our shared humanity.' The record is unambiguous. The lie is deliberate. What followed the lie is the more instructive story. Marco Rubio, a practising Catholic and the United States Secretary of State, is [flying to Rome](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/05/05/trump-rubio-pope-leo-rift/?ref=diplopolis.com) this week. Not to correct his president. To manage the consequences of his president's words. Rubio told reporters Trump does not understand why anyone would think it a good idea for Iran to have a nuclear weapon — a framing that accepts the false premise rather than names it. Italy's prime minister Giorgia Meloni, a long-time Trump ally, pushed back on the Pope comments and was promptly criticised by Trump in return. Italy's foreign minister called the remarks 'neither acceptable nor helpful.' Nobody in the administration said the simplest, most obvious, most necessary thing: that what Trump claimed about the Pope is not true. Trump also wrote that if he were not in the White House, Leo would not be in the Vatican. The papacy, in his account, is a reaction to Donald Trump. This is the psychology of a man who believes the world arranges itself around him. It also reveals why the Pope is worth attacking. Leo is not a minor irritant. He is a problem. The lie was allowed to stand. It is standing still. This matters because of what Leo has actually been saying, and why it is apparently threatening enough to require fabrication. Since the [US-Israel war on Iran](https://www.euronews.com/2026/05/06/trump-renews-feud-with-pope-leo-xiv-days-ahead-of-planned-marco-rubio-visit-to-the-vatican?ref=diplopolis.com) began in February, the Pope has done something no head of state, no secretary-general and no international body has managed with any consistency: he has told the truth about the war. He called Trump's threat to destroy Iranian civilisation 'truly unacceptable.' He said the war fails the basic criteria for moral justification: diplomacy was not exhausted, civilian harm is disproportionate, there is no clear objective oriented toward peace. On Palm Sunday he said: 'Jesus is the king of peace, who rejects war, whom no one can use to justify war' — a direct response to Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth's repeated invocation of scripture to frame the bombing as divinely sanctioned. When asked if he fears the White House, Leo said: ['I have no fear of the Trump administration or speaking out loudly of the message of the Gospel.'](https://www.cnn.com/2026/04/12/politics/trump-pope-leo-criticism-hnk-intl?ref=diplopolis.com) Washington Archbishop Robert McElroy said last week that there is 'no prophetic moral voice in the world at this time, other than Pope Leo.' He is right. The observation is not a compliment to Leo. It is an indictment of everyone else. The leaders watching this war — in Europe, across the Global South, in the permanent seats of the Security Council — have issued statements, registered abstentions and moved on. The institutions designed precisely for moments like this have produced language and little else. The Pope commands no army, controls no oil supply, holds no veto and governs a city smaller than many Indian residential colonies. He is the only figure on the world stage saying plainly that this war is wrong, that threats against civilians are wrong, that invoking God to justify bombing is wrong. Trump cannot ignore Leo because moral authority, even stripped of every material instrument of power, is still authority. It shapes opinion, names reality, provides the language people reach for when official discourse has been exhausted. The lie was an attempt to neutralise that authority by attributing to the Pope a position so extreme that anyone who agrees with him becomes indefensible. It failed. Leo simply asked to be criticised truthfully. Nobody with power is doing that. The silence of everyone who could is the verdict. ### European Waters, Israeli Rules URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/european-waters-israeli-rules/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:11:05.000Z The interception happened 600 miles from Gaza. Not at the edge of the blockade zone. Not in contested waters off the Palestinian coast. Six hundred miles away, near the Greek island of Crete, in the eastern Mediterranean, where Greek search-and-rescue law applies and EU treaty obligations nominally govern. Israel sent warships and drones. It seized 22 of the 58 vessels of the Global Sumud Flotilla on the night of April 29\. It [detained 175 activists at gunpoint](https://www.timesofisrael.com/2-gaza-flotilla-activists-to-be-questioned-in-israel-as-remainder-released-in-greece/?ref=diplopolis.com), transferred the majority to Greece where 36 required medical attention, left one boat sinking, and took two men — Saif Abukeshek, a Spanish-Swedish national of Palestinian origin, and Thiago Ávila, a Brazilian national — to [Shikma Prison in Ashkelon](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/3/who-are-the-two-gaza-flotilla-activists-abducted-by-israel?ref=diplopolis.com). Neither has been charged with anything. Lawyers from the Israeli legal rights organisation Adalah [visited Abukeshek and Ávila](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/3/gaza-flotilla-activists-appear-in-israeli-court-allege-torture-in-custody?ref=diplopolis.com) in Shikma on Saturday and reported testimony of severe physical abuse amounting to torture. Ávila told his lawyers he had been dragged face-down across the floor of the military vessel and beaten until he lost consciousness twice. Abukeshek was kept hand-tied and blindfolded from the moment of seizure. Released activists said they could hear him screaming from below deck during the voyage. Both men declared a hunger strike. An Israeli court extended their detention. Today is the date set for the next decision. Israel's justification is familiar. Abukeshek is accused of affiliation with a terrorist organisation. Ávila is accused of illegal activity. The United States State Department [threatened consequences](https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/04/united-states-condemns-the-pro-hamas-global-sumud-flotilla?ref=diplopolis.com) against any port that hosted the flotilla's ships, casting the mission as pro-Hamas. On the basis of these designations, European citizens were seized by a foreign military in European waters, transported to a foreign prison, subjected to what lawyers documented as torture, and held without charge while a court in a country they had not travelled to extended their detention on a schedule convenient to their captors. This is not the beginning of the story. In 2010, the Mavi Marmara was boarded by Israeli forces in international waters and [nine activists were killed](https://theconversation.com/is-israels-interception-of-the-gaza-freedom-flotilla-legal-258511?ref=diplopolis.com). The UN Human Rights Council found the raid illegal and the force deployed against civilians disproportionate and brutal. Nothing changed. In 2025, the first Global Sumud Flotilla was intercepted closer to Gaza. The world condemned it. Israel arrested and deported more than 450 participants, including Ávila himself, who reported abuse in custody that time too. Israel denied it and moved on. This time, the interception happened further from Gaza and closer to Europe. The jurisdiction expanded. The silence was the same. The mechanism is the terrorism designation. Once applied, the law withdraws. Jurisdiction dissolves. The right to be charged before being detained disappears. The obligation of European governments to protect their citizens from the armed forces of a foreign state, in European waters, is suspended. Adalah argued before the Israeli court that there is no legal basis for the extraterritorial application of Israeli criminal law to foreign nationals in international waters. The court [extended the detention anyway](https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israel-extends-detention-tortured-gaza-flotilla-activists?ref=diplopolis.com). [Spain's Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez called it an abduction](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/2/spain-demands-israel-release-arrested-gaza-flotilla-crew-member?ref=diplopolis.com). Spain's foreign minister called it a kidnapping and demanded Abukeshek's immediate release. Italy opened a prosecutorial investigation after the vessels were found to be flying Italian flags. Eleven countries, including Brazil, South Africa, Pakistan and Colombia, issued a joint statement describing the operation as a flagrant violation of international law. The UN Special Rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territories called it an abomination. And Greece, in whose search-and-rescue zone the interception took place, facilitated the transfer of the majority of activists to shore and let the two designated targets go to Ashkelon. This is the part that matters. Not what Israel did. Israel has done this before. Israel will do it again. What changed this time is where. Europe was not a bystander to this interception. Europe was the location. Israeli warships operated inside Greece's search-and-rescue zone. The activists seized were nationals of EU member states. The vessels boarded were flying Italian flags. And the European response was statements, vigils and a prosecutor's letter that will take years to go anywhere, if it goes anywhere at all. Abukeshek has three children. The youngest is one year old. Ávila has a daughter who is 18 months old. Whether they are released today or held again, the verdict is already written. Israel has established, through repetition and the reliable acquiescence of the international community, that the Mediterranean falls within its operational jurisdiction. Every condemnation that produces no consequence teaches that lesson. Every statement issued and forgotten moves the interception point a little further from Gaza and a little closer to the ports of Europe. The blockade holds. The 600 miles was already the provocation. Next time, the number will be smaller. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Terminated: War That Ended Without Ending URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-war-that-ended-without-ending-trump-iran-war-powers-2026/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:08:53.000Z Donald Trump has notified Congress that the Iran war has been 'terminated' under the War Powers Resolution, the legal mechanism requiring him to halt military operations within 60 days of their commencement unless legislators authorise the conflict to continue. On the same day, [the US Navy announced](https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/03/world/live-news/iran-war-news?ref=diplopolis.com) it would begin guiding commercial ships through the Strait of Hormuz starting Monday, deploying guided-missile destroyers, more than 100 aircraft and 15,000 service members. A tanker was struck by unknown projectiles in the strait hours later. Iran's senior official Ebrahim Azizi called the naval escort plan a violation of the ceasefire. The war is terminated. The Navy is deploying. A vessel was hit. The ceasefire is being violated. All of this happened on the same day. The War Powers Resolution notification is a legal formality with significant political consequences. By telling Congress the war is terminated, Trump satisfies the 60-day clock and avoids a congressional vote he may not win. What he does not do is end the conflict. The [blockade of Iranian ports continues](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portal:Current%5Fevents?ref=diplopolis.com). Iran's 14-point proposal sits unresolved on the negotiating table. The nuclear question — the stated cause of the war — remains entirely open. JPMorgan Chase analysts estimate that OECD oil inventories will begin running out between May 9 and May 30\. The war is terminated on paper. In the Strait of Hormuz it is running on schedule. There is something worth understanding about the legal architecture Trump has used. The War Powers Resolution was passed in 1973 specifically to prevent presidents from conducting indefinite military operations without congressional authorisation. Its termination notification clause was designed to signal the end of hostilities, not to provide legal cover for their continuation under a different operational description. What Trump has done is use the mechanism designed to constrain executive war-making as a tool to sustain it. The war is over because he said so. The Navy is still there because he said so. Both statements are simultaneously true. Iran submitted a [14-point proposal to Pakistan](https://www.npr.org/sections/news/?ref=diplopolis.com) for onward transmission to Washington on Saturday. Trump said on Truth Social that he was reviewing it and that discussions were 'very positive'. On the same Truth Social account, 24 hours earlier, he had written that he 'could not imagine' Iran's proposal would be acceptable because Iran had 'not yet paid a big enough price for what they have done to Humanity'. The proposal had not changed between Saturday and Sunday. Trump's description of it had. This is not diplomacy. It is mood management at the expense of everyone trying to understand what Washington actually wants. The first Japanese oil tanker to transit the Strait of Hormuz since February 28 [completed its crossing on Sunday](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portal:Current%5Fevents?ref=diplopolis.com). The Idemitsu Maru's passage was confirmed by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. One tanker. Sixty-five days after the strait closed. The cost of that crossing — in insurance premiums, naval escort fees, diplomatic capital, economic damage and human life — will be calculated for years. The reopening of the strait is not a sign that the crisis is over. It is a sign that one government was desperate enough to attempt the passage and one navy was prepared to protect it for reasons of its own. The war that Trump has declared terminated has killed, according to [preliminary figures](https://www.aljazeera.com/?ref=diplopolis.com), 3,375 people in Iran and 2,509 in Lebanon. The Pentagon's comptroller told Congress the cost of US operations has reached $25 billion. American petrol prices stand at $4.45 a gallon, up 49 per cent since February 28\. None of these numbers change because a legal notification was filed. A war ends when both sides have agreed it is over. One side's paperwork is not a peace. It is a filing. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Annexation That Hides in Plain Sight URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/annexation-that-hides-in-plain-sight-west-bank-israel-2026/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:07:28.000Z Bezalel Smotrich told the *Jerusalem Post* last week that Israel's West Bank settlement expansion proceeds with ['full coordination and full backing'](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/article-893861?ref=diplopolis.com) from the Trump administration for everything related to construction, regulation and security. He named names: Trump personally, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Ambassador Mike Huckabee. And then, on whether the world still bothers to object: 'In the past, even building 50 housing units would lead to condemnation. Today it is very different.' He was not wrong. It is very different. What changed is not Israel's behaviour. What changed is the permission structure around it. Look at what the West Bank looks like right now. In early April, Israel's security cabinet [approved the establishment of 34 new settlements](https://www.timesofisrael.com/government-formally-approves-34-new-settlements-as-it-acts-to-deepen-hold-on-west-bank/?ref=diplopolis.com) in a single classified meeting, the largest single-session approval in Israel's history. That figure is nearly six times the number formally approved in the entire 30 years following the Oslo Accords. The government has, since taking office in 2022, established or retroactively legalised 103 settlements in total. This is not expansion. Expansion implies the existence of borders it is pushing against. There are no borders here. There is only direction. In February, the security cabinet [rewrote land registration law](https://www.timesofisrael.com/security-cabinet-okays-dramatic-west-bank-policy-overhaul-deepening-israeli-control/?ref=diplopolis.com) to allow West Bank land to be declared Israeli state property unless Palestinians could prove ownership, a reversal of the evidentiary burden that has stood for decades. Israeli enforcement authority was simultaneously extended into Areas A and B, territory that falls under Palestinian Authority civil and security control under the Oslo framework. The cabinet did this, by the government's own account, while Israeli citizens were running to bomb shelters during the war with Iran. The urgency was not the bombs. The urgency was the land. The numbers on the ground are not abstract. In the first ten weeks of 2026 alone, [more than 1,500 Palestinians were displaced](https://jstreet.org/maximum-territory-with-minimum-arabs-how-israels-far-right-government-uses-settler-violence-to-pave-the-way-for-annexation/?ref=diplopolis.com) in the West Bank and eight were killed by settlers. A [UN Human Rights Office report from March](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/israels-settlement-expansion-drives-mass-displacement-west-bank-un-report?ref=diplopolis.com) documented 1,732 incidents of settler violence in a single 12-month reporting period, making it difficult, the report said, to distinguish between state and settler violence. In April, Israel [celebrated the reestablishment of Sa-Nur](https://www.timesofisrael.com/west-bank-settlement-of-sa-nur-reestablished-21-years-after-its-evacuation/?ref=diplopolis.com), a settlement in the northern West Bank evacuated in 2005, with cabinet ministers, Knesset members and settler activists in attendance. Smotrich, at the ribbon cutting, called it 'killing the idea of a Palestinian state.' He was describing government policy. None of this is hidden. That is the point. Smotrich's governing principle for the West Bank is, in his own words, ['maximum territory with minimum Arabs.'](https://jstreet.org/maximum-territory-with-minimum-arabs-how-israels-far-right-government-uses-settler-violence-to-pave-the-way-for-annexation/?ref=diplopolis.com) He has said it to audiences, in parliament, to newspapers. He has described the E1 corridor plan, which would physically sever the West Bank in two, as ['Zionism at its best.'](https://www.commondreams.org/news/smotrich-west-bank?ref=diplopolis.com) The [UN has raised concerns of ethnic cleansing](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/02/ethnic-cleansing-concerns-gaza-and-west-bank-amid-intensified-violence-and?ref=diplopolis.com). Eighty-five countries issued a joint condemnation of Israel's West Bank measures in February. The condemnation changed nothing. The settlements continued. The violence continued. The displacements continued. Condemnation, it turns out, is the international community's preferred substitute for consequence. The world's attention is on Hormuz. On enrichment percentages and Islamabad talks and the ceasefire that keeps almost-holding. Those things matter. But while everyone watches the strait, Smotrich is building roads and electricity infrastructure for settlements whose populations do not yet exist, on land whose Palestinian residents are being removed from it daily, systematically and without cost. The strategy does not require secrecy. It requires only time, and a world that is looking the other way. Smotrich himself explained why today is different from yesterday. He does not have to hide what he is doing. He is doing it with American backing, in classified cabinet meetings, in press conferences, at ribbon cuttings attended by government ministers. He calls it sovereignty. The rest of the world calls it expansion and moves on. The difference between those two words is a Palestinian state. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Negotiation and the Threat URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/negotiation-and-the-threat-us-cuba-2026/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:06:33.000Z Washington is negotiating in Havana. Washington is also threatening Havana with military action. Both of these things are true at the same time, and neither of them is diplomacy. The United States sent delegations to Cuba for high-level talks even as Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a warning that would not be out of place in a gangster film. 'If I lived in Havana, and I was in the government, I'd be [concerned, at least a little bit,'](https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5671259-rubio-warns-cuba-maduro-capture/?ref=diplopolis.com) he said. This is not the language of a mediator. It is the language of a man who has already demonstrated that he is willing to act, and who wants the other side to remember it. The demonstration happened on [January 3, 2026](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026%5FUnited%5FStates%5Fintervention%5Fin%5FVenezuela?ref=diplopolis.com). US Delta Force troops and CIA operatives struck Caracas in an operation codenamed Absolute Resolve, captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, and flew them to New York to face narco-terrorism charges. The operation killed at least 80 people, including [32 Cuban military and intelligence personnel](https://www.npr.org/2026/01/05/nx-s1-5666190/cuba-venezuela-monroe-doctrine-trump?ref=diplopolis.com) who were stationed in Venezuela protecting Maduro. Cuba declared two days of national mourning. The world largely moved on. Washington called it a law enforcement action. Cuba has not forgotten. It cannot afford to. The Venezuelan relationship was not merely political; it was the economic oxygen that kept the island alive. For decades, Caracas supplied Havana with subsidised oil in exchange for Cuban medical workers and security personnel. That arrangement is now finished. Cuba is already deep inside a severe economic crisis, with prolonged blackouts, food shortages and a rationing system that can no longer guarantee the basics. The collapse of Venezuela did not just remove an ally. It removed the fuel on which the Cuban state runs. Into this moment of maximum vulnerability, Washington has sent negotiators. The talks are framed as diplomacy. They are not diplomacy. They are a demand issued by a government that just proved it is willing to destroy a neighbouring administration and extract its leader in handcuffs. The message embedded in the negotiations is not 'let us find common ground.' It is: you saw what happened in Caracas; what comes next is your choice. [Rubio's own logic makes the goal transparent](https://www.cnn.com/2026/01/04/americas/cuba-uncertain-future-after-venezuela-strike?ref=diplopolis.com). Analysts close to the administration have described his ambition plainly: use Venezuela's collapse to sever Cuba's oil lifeline, deepen the existing crisis and hope that economic desperation triggers the political unrest sufficient to end sixty years of communist rule. It would be, as one researcher at the University of Havana's Center for Hemispheric and US Studies put it, Rubio's 'coronation.' The negotiations in Havana are not a conversation between parties seeking a resolution. They are a countdown. The Monroe Doctrine, that 200-year-old declaration that the Western Hemisphere belongs inside the American sphere and that no foreign power has business there, was always a doctrine of domination dressed as a doctrine of protection. The Trump administration has revived it [without embarrassment](https://www.csis.org/analysis/beyond-venezuela-and-cuba-us-militarys-future-operations-western-hemisphere?ref=diplopolis.com). The seizure of Maduro was its first act in this era. Cuba is its declared next frontier. The logic is imperial and the tools are modern, but the project is the same one that sent US-backed paramilitaries to the Bay of Pigs in 1961 and has kept the island under sanctions for more than six decades since. What makes the present moment different is that Washington no longer feels the need to pretend. Venezuela removed the ambiguity. The United States is willing to use military force against sitting governments it finds inconvenient, anywhere in the hemisphere, and it is willing to call that action law enforcement. The negotiations in Havana are conducted in the long shadow of that precedent, not independent of it. Every concession Cuba considers, it considers knowing what refusal looked like in Caracas. This is what coercive diplomacy actually looks like when the coercion is no longer dressed up. One side brings proposals to the table. The other brings the memory of a capital city under fire. Cuba is not negotiating with a partner. It is negotiating with a gun that has already been fired. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Weapon That Turned Around URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/weapon-that-turned-around-iran-oil-storage-hormuz-2026/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:04:50.000Z When Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz on February 28, the logic was simple and the leverage was real. Twenty per cent of the world's oil passes through that narrow waterway. Close it and you impose costs on everyone who depends on it — which is to say, everyone. Washington would feel the pressure at the petrol pump. Allies would feel it in their energy bills. The global economy would feel it in its growth projections. Iran's calculation was that the pain of closure would be distributed widely enough, and fall on enough American political constituencies, to force a negotiated exit from the war. It was a rational calculation. It is now turning around on the country that made it. According to [Bloomberg, citing Kpler](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-27/iran-s-unused-oil-storage-shrinks-to-22-days-or-less-kpler-says?ref=diplopolis.com), Iran has between 12 and 22 days of unused crude oil storage capacity remaining. Iranian crude exports, which averaged 1.85 million barrels a day in March, have [collapsed to 567,000](https://www.business-standard.com/world-news/iran-s-unused-oil-storage-shrinks-to-22-days-or-less-amid-us-blockade-126042800114%5F1.html?ref=diplopolis.com) barrels a day — a fall of roughly 70 per cent since the US naval blockade took hold in early April. Kpler has not observed a single tanker successfully evading the blockade. When the storage runs out, which could happen before the end of May, Iran will be forced to cut daily oil output by a further 1.5 million barrels per day. It has already curtailed 2.5 million barrels per day, according to [Goldman Sachs](https://investinglive.com/commodities/iran-has-22-days-of-storage-left-as-naval-blockade-drives-exports-to-near-collapse-20260428/?ref=diplopolis.com). A country that closed a strait to inflict economic pain is running out of places to put its own oil. The irony is structural, not incidental. Iran's entire Hormuz strategy depended on being able to sustain the closure long enough for the political costs to accumulate on the other side. What it did not fully account for was the simultaneity of two blockades — its own closure of the strait to outbound tankers, and Washington's naval blockade of Iranian ports. The combination has created a trap with no clean exit. Iran cannot reopen the strait without appearing to capitulate on its most significant source of leverage. It cannot keep it closed without watching its own oil infrastructure seize up from the inside. There is a detail in the Kpler analysis that complicates the picture further. Despite the storage crisis, Iran is unlikely to feel the full financial impact for another three to four months. Iranian crude cargoes typically take two months to reach Chinese ports, the primary destination for sanctioned Iranian oil, often routed through opaque intermediaries designed to circumvent Western restrictions. Buyers then have a further two months to settle payments. The revenue from March's exports — when Iran was still shipping 1.85 million barrels a day — has not yet fully arrived. This lag gives Tehran some financial breathing room even as its physical infrastructure approaches crisis. It also means the negotiating pressure that Washington expects the storage crisis to generate may not materialise as quickly as the raw data suggests. Which brings us to today's diplomacy, such as it is. Iran has put a new proposal on Trump's desk: reopen Hormuz, end the war, defer nuclear talks to a later phase. Trump's national security team met this morning to discuss it. Marco Rubio said it was better than expected but fell short of Washington's red lines. Trump told reporters Iran had submitted something 'much better' without specifying what changed. The White House press secretary declined to get ahead of the President. Meanwhile Araghchi flew to St. Petersburg to brief Putin, who says he received a personal message from Iran's new Supreme Leader — a man who has not been seen publicly since he was announced as his father's successor. The diplomacy is moving. The storage is running out. The two timelines are not aligned. The deeper question the Kpler data raises is about the nature of the weapon Iran chose. The Strait of Hormuz is the most powerful economic lever a mid-sized power has ever held over the global economy. Iran has deployed it. The deployment has imposed real costs — the [Dallas Federal Reserve](https://www.dallasfed.org/research/economics/2026/0320?ref=diplopolis.com) estimated it removed 20 per cent of global oil supplies and knocked 2.9 percentage points off annualised global GDP growth in the second quarter. Brent crude is at $108 per barrel. The Global South is rationing fuel. The UN Secretary-General has warned of a food emergency. The weapon worked. It is simply also destroying the arsenal it was fired from. Iran did not miscalculate that closing the strait would hurt Washington. It did. What it may have miscalculated is how long it could sustain the closure before the instrument of pressure became a source of existential damage to itself. Twelve to 22 days of storage is not a negotiating position. It is a countdown. And when the countdown ends, the question will not be whether Iran opens the strait. It will be whether anyone in Washington was paying attention to the clock. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Pause Without Peace: How the US-Iran Ceasefire Was Built to Fail URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/us-iran-ceasefire-pause-without-peace/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:03:51.000Z As of this morning, Trump's national security team is reviewing an [Iranian proposal](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/28/trump-reviews-iranian-proposal-aimed-at-reopening-strait-of-hormuz?ref=diplopolis.com) to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, halt the war and defer all nuclear programme discussions to a later date. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has already indicated the [offer is insufficient](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/04/27/trump-iran-war-strait-of-hormuz-rubio.html?ref=diplopolis.com). Trump has said it is "much better" without explaining what changed. Brent crude is trading at [$108 per barrel](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/iran-offers-to-reopen-strait-of-hormuz-if-u-s-lifts-its-blockade-and-the-war-ends-officials-say?ref=diplopolis.com), nearly 50 per cent above its pre-war level. The ceasefire is in effect. The blockade is in place. The two sides are, technically, not at war — which is a description that does not bear close examination. The question worth asking is not what will happen next. It is whether what exists right now was ever designed to produce something different. The ceasefire was [announced on April 8](https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/04/1167264?ref=diplopolis.com) and [extended](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/21/trump-announces-extending-iran-ceasefire-but-says-blockade-remains?ref=diplopolis.com) on April 21 at the request, Trump wrote, of Field Marshal Asim Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif of Pakistan. It is structured around two phases. Phase one is the immediate halt to hostilities. Phase two is a negotiated permanent settlement to be reached within 45 days. The [Islamabad Talks](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/13/how-the-us-iran-talks-in-islamabad-unfolded?ref=diplopolis.com) of April 11 and 12 were meant to bridge those two phases. They lasted 21 hours. JD Vance [left saying](https://www.diplopolis.com/why-the-islamabad-talks-were-doomed-before-they-began/) the US had put forward its [final offer](https://www.npr.org/2026/04/12/nx-s1-5782538/u-s-iran-peace-talks-islamabad-collapse?ref=diplopolis.com). Iran's parliament speaker said trust had not been established. Both descriptions were accurate. They were not describing the same negotiation. What Washington wanted was an affirmative Iranian commitment to abandon uranium enrichment, surrender its stockpile of highly enriched uranium and accept constraints on its missile programme. What Iran refused to discuss was its missile programme. What its parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf called non-negotiable was Iran's right to enrich uranium for civilian purposes. Iran's new proposal, now on Trump's desk, removes the nuclear question from the table entirely — offering to reopen Hormuz and end the war in exchange for the US lifting its blockade, with nuclear talks deferred to a later phase. From Tehran's perspective this is a practical offer: give Washington the one thing it needs most — open oil lanes before the midterms — while preserving the nuclear programme. From Washington's perspective it is a proposal to remove the one condition it went to war to resolve. The [core gap](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10637/?ref=diplopolis.com) has not narrowed. It has been repackaged. This is not a negotiation moving toward resolution. It is a negotiation moving in circles, with each circle costing the global economy several billion dollars and the Gulf region several weeks of strangled trade. Trump cancelled the planned second round of talks in Islamabad — "too much time wasted on traveling, too much work" — even as Araghchi was already in Pakistan waiting. The sequence that followed was characteristic: a presidential endorsement of the new Iranian offer, a swift rebuttal from [Rubio](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/04/27/trump-iran-war-strait-of-hormuz-rubio.html?ref=diplopolis.com), and a [White House confirmation](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-27/iran-suggests-interim-deal-to-us-to-reopen-hormuz-axios-says?ref=diplopolis.com) that the national security team was reviewing an offer the Secretary of State had already deemed insufficient. The structural reality underneath the diplomatic noise is unchanged. Ship transits through the Strait of Hormuz [dropped from](https://unctad.org/news/hormuz-disruption-deepens-global-economic-strain-across-trade-prices-and-finance?ref=diplopolis.com) approximately 130 per day in February to just six in March, a collapse of roughly 95 per cent. The ceasefire did not reopen the strait. Iran has mined sections of the passage and lost track of some of the mines, according to reports. Trump has ordered the Navy to shoot and kill any boat laying mines. The US Navy is simultaneously running mine-clearance operations and enforcing a blockade of Iranian ports. Iran is charging tolls of over $1 million per vessel for ships that do transit. The [Dallas Federal Reserve](https://www.dallasfed.org/research/economics/2026/0320?ref=diplopolis.com) estimated that the strait's closure removes close to 20 per cent of global oil supplies from the market, lowering global real GDP growth by an annualised 2.9 percentage points in the second quarter — costs that have already fallen hardest on developing nations, as this publication examined in [The Blockade Is the War](https://www.diplopolis.com/the-ledger/us-naval-blockade-iran-ceasefire-cover). The reason Washington has extended the ceasefire rather than resuming the bombing is domestic political calculation rather than diplomatic confidence. American voters feel oil prices at the petrol pump, not in geopolitical briefings. A resumption of strikes, with crude at $108 and no deal in sight, would be politically costly in a midterm election year. Trump's advisers have privately warned him that alleviating pressure could allow Iran to drag out negotiations indefinitely. Both warnings are simultaneously true. The ceasefire is the holding position of an administration that cannot afford to resume the war and cannot afford to settle it on Iran's terms. Iran's constraints are equally real and equally binding. One Iranian official has [cited $270 billion](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/15/iran-says-270bn-war-loss-must-be-compensated-as-fresh-talks-with-us-loom?ref=diplopolis.com) in direct and indirect damages. President Pezeshkian has said reparations are the only way to end the conflict. Iran has stated it will not accept any further temporary ceasefires. The government maintaining this pause has not renounced retaliation — a message in the name of the new Supreme Leader, read on state television after the first ceasefire was announced, promised revenge. The ceasefire is being maintained by a government that has promised to resume the war. That is not a foundation. It is a timetable. The historical parallel is not the JCPOA, though Trump's evident determination not to be seen replicating Obama's nuclear deal shapes every American position. The parallel is the Korean Armistice of 1953, which ended active fighting without resolving the underlying conflict, created a demilitarised zone patrolled by tens of thousands of soldiers and left the peninsula technically at war for more than seventy years. What Trump has built in the Gulf is an armistice without the structure — a pause maintained by mutual exhaustion and [Pakistani diplomatic effort](https://www.diplopolis.com/pakistan-iran-mediation-the-indispensable-bad-actor/), with no signed document, no demilitarised zone and no international framework. The Korean Armistice at least specified what it was. This one has not. The core questions that produced this war remain entirely open. Iran's right to enrich uranium is not accepted by Washington. Washington's right to impose a naval blockade is not accepted by Tehran. Lebanon's inclusion in any arrangement is disputed by Israel, the US, Iran and Lebanon simultaneously — the same pattern of selective international law application that [this publication examined](https://www.diplopolis.com/the-shield-is-cracking-israel-icj-genocide-accountability/) in the context of Gaza and the ICJ. Iran's new proposal does not resolve any of these questions. It proposes to open the strait, end the immediate war and argue about everything else later. Washington's problem is that 'everything else later' is precisely the negotiating environment in which Iran's leverage declines once the economic pressure on America lifts. Trump's national security team is reviewing a proposal this morning that would give him the one thing he most needs before the midterms: lower oil prices. It would give Iran the one thing it most needs: an end to the blockade and a breathing space for its shattered economy. The nuclear question — the stated reason for the war — would be deferred to a later negotiation that both sides know will be harder to conclude once the immediate crisis has passed. That is not a peace deal. It is the management of a conflict neither side has concluded, between parties who have not agreed what conclusion looks like, purchased with a deferral that both sides will find reasons to resist when the time comes. The pause will hold until it does not. The question is not whether the guns will resume. It is whether the proposal on Trump's desk this morning is the beginning of a genuine settlement or simply the next phase of the same war, conducted at a lower temperature while both sides recover. On the evidence of the past three weeks, the answer is the second one. The architecture was never designed to produce peace. It was designed to produce a pause long enough for both sides to call it a victory. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Alliance by Coercion, Racket by Design URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/alliance-by-coercion-racket-by-design/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:02:23.000Z The United States has a rule for the world: sovereignty is inviolable. Borders do not move because the powerful decide they should. Territorial claims are not diplomatic currency. Washington has spent three years saying precisely this about Russia and Ukraine. Last week, it threatened to do the opposite to Britain. An [internal Defence Department email](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/04/24/us-pentagon-email-nato-spain-uk-falkland-islands-iran/?ref=diplopolis.com), first reported by Reuters and circulated at senior Pentagon levels, laid out punitive options against NATO allies that have refused to grant the United States access, basing and overflight rights for the Iran war. The options included reconsidering Washington's long-standing recognition of British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and suspending Spain from NATO. Britain and Argentina [fought a ten-week war over the Falklands in 1982](https://www.britannica.com/event/Falkland-Islands-War?ref=diplopolis.com). 255 British soldiers died. Washington backed London then. The price of that backing is now in question, because Keir Starmer declined to authorise American aircraft to launch offensive strikes on Iran from British bases. Starmer did eventually permit what Downing Street called defensive operations. It was not enough. The Pentagon's definition of a good ally, it turns out, is one that does not ask questions. Spain said no earlier and more firmly. From the first week of the war, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez refused to permit US forces to use the naval base at Rota or the air base at Morón for offensive operations, [describing the strikes as 'unjustified and dangerous military intervention'](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/04/24/pentagon-considers-suspending-spain-from-nato?ref=diplopolis.com). Nothing has changed in Madrid's position. What changed is Washington's patience. The Pentagon email, [according to Al Jazeera](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/24/us-weighs-retaliation-against-nato-allies-over-iran-war-divisions-reuters?ref=diplopolis.com), characterises European allies as exhibiting 'a sense of entitlement.' Read that again. The government threatening to strip a long-standing ally of its territorial rights for following its own laws is the one complaining about entitlement. The NATO threat is legally empty. [The North Atlantic Treaty](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official%5Ftexts%5F17120.htm?ref=diplopolis.com) contains no mechanism for suspending or expelling a member state. The email reportedly acknowledges this, noting that suspension would carry 'symbolic weight with little operational consequence.' Symbolic weight is precisely the point. This is not a legal instrument. It is a signal: compliance is the price of protection. That is not an alliance. That is a protection racket. What makes this episode alarming is what it exposes. Washington's justification for the Iran war has rested on the language of international order: the rules-based system, the imperative of stopping a rogue state from acquiring nuclear weapons, the moral necessity of defending open seas. That argument demands the United States present itself as the defender of norms, not their negotiator. The Falklands gambit destroys the framing entirely. You cannot defend territorial sovereignty in one ocean while threatening it in another. The logic is not selective. It is incoherent. Spain's response was surgical. ['We do not work off emails,'](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/04/24/us-pentagon-email-nato-spain-uk-falkland-islands-iran/?ref=diplopolis.com) Sánchez said. 'We work off official documents and government positions.' Britain's position on the Falklands is 'unchanged' and 'will remain the case,' a Downing Street spokesperson said. Both governments absorbed the threat and declined to move. That is worth registering. The United States deployed its most aggressive coercive instrument short of direct military action against two of its oldest allies, and both stood still. The toolkit is not working. An empire that threatens the territory of its allies to compel obedience has not demonstrated strength. It has demonstrated that it has run out of arguments. The Falklands threat is not a negotiating tactic. It is a confession. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### The Bet That Didn't Pay Off URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-bet-that-didnt-pay-off-mali-bamako-attack-2026/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:01:32.000Z At 6am on Saturday, explosions and sustained gunfire erupted near Modibo Keita International Airport in Bamako. Helicopters circled. Flights were cancelled. The defence minister's house was destroyed. The army declared the situation under control and then spent the next twelve hours fighting to make that statement true. By nightfall, the governor of Bamako had imposed a three-day curfew. In Kidal, the Tuareg-led Azawad Liberation Front claimed to have taken the city. Mali's military government, which seized power in 2021 promising to restore security, was fighting for its capital. This is the result of a choice. Not a failure of international attention. Not a consequence of the Gulf war consuming the Security Council's bandwidth. A deliberate choice, made by a junta that decided the West had failed Mali and that Russia would succeed where France had not. The junta's logic was not irrational. French forces had been in Mali since 2013, fighting a jihadist insurgency that only spread. MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali), the UN peacekeeping mission, deployed 15,000 troops for ten years and could not stop the advance of [JNIM](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/islamic-militants-and-separatists-attack-several-locations-in-malis-capital-and-other-cities?ref=diplopolis.com) (Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin) the al-Qaeda affiliate that claimed responsibility for Saturday's attacks on the airport and four other cities. Malians had genuine grievances. The colonial framework of French military presence felt to many like occupation dressed as assistance. When the junta expelled France in 2022 and asked MINUSMA to leave in 2023, there was real popular support for both decisions. What replaced them was [Africa Corps](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/25/mali-army-says-armed-groups-launch-nationwide-attacks-gunfire-near-airport?ref=diplopolis.com), the rebranded successor to Wagner Group, operating under direct Kremlin control. Russia's pitch was simple: we deliver results, we ask no questions about governance or human rights, we are partners not patrons. The junta accepted. Africa Corps fighters embedded with Malian forces, fought alongside the army across the Sahel and were present in Kidal and Gao, where the insurgency was strongest. According to witnesses cited by Al Jazeera, Russian mercenaries were fighting near the airport on Saturday morning. They were there. The airport burned anyway. There is a detail in the reporting that deserves more attention than it has received. Africa Corps has been stretched. The demands of the Ukraine front have pulled Russian military capacity eastward. Fighters have been [withdrawn from Mali](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026%5FMali%5Fattacks?ref=diplopolis.com). The security architecture the junta built on Russian partnership is operating with fewer Russian partners than it was a year ago. The junta bet on a patron whose own war has made Mali a lower priority. That is not a failure of the international order. It is a failure of the bet. JNIM has been fighting in the Sahel since 2017\. The Azawad Liberation Front has been contesting Malian sovereignty in the north for longer than that. Neither group became more dangerous because the world was watching the Gulf. They became more capable because the security vacuum in the Sahel deepened every year, through every iteration of external military partnership and every coup that promised stability and delivered more of the same. Saturday's [coordinated attacks](https://www.npr.org/2026/04/25/nx-s1-5799439/mali-hit-by-wave-of-coordinated-attacks-from-armed-groups?ref=diplopolis.com) are not a sudden escalation. They are the logical conclusion of fourteen years of compounding failure. The junta told Malians that sovereignty meant choosing their own partners. It was right about that. Sovereignty does mean choosing your own partners. What it does not mean is immunity from the consequences of those choices. Mali chose Africa Corps over MINUSMA. It chose Assimi Goita's five-year mandate over elections. It chose to be governed by a military council that has now been unable to prevent its capital from being attacked at dawn, its defence minister's house from being destroyed and its northern city from being seized. The West did not fail Mali on Saturday. Mali's choices failed Mali on Saturday. That is a harder verdict than blaming a distracted Security Council. It is also the honest one. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### The Right Words, the Wrong Room URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/pope-leo-equatorial-guinea-obiang-resource-curse/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:00:52.000Z On Tuesday, Pope Leo XIV stood before President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo in the capital of Equatorial Guinea and delivered the [most honest speech](https://abcnews.com/Business/wireStory/pope-blasts-colonization-minerals-equatorial-guinea-headed-africas-132237246?ref=diplopolis.com) about Africa's resource curse that anyone has given anywhere this year. The proliferation of armed conflicts, Leo said, is often driven by the colonisation of oil and mineral deposits, occurring with no regard for international law or the self-determination of peoples. The crowd cheered. Obiang received it with the composure of a man who has been in power for 47 years and has heard worse. Obiang came to [power in 1979](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-63770351?ref=diplopolis.com) by overthrowing and executing his own uncle. He has governed Equatorial Guinea ever since. His son Teodorin, now the country's vice president, was [convicted in France](https://www.occrp.org/en/news/french-court-convicts-equatorial-guinea-princeling-of-graft?ref=diplopolis.com) of embezzlement, money laundering and abuse of trust\]. French courts confiscated [€150 million worth of assets](https://www.transparency.org/en/press/teodorin-obiang-conviction-asset-recovery-equatorial-guinea-france?ref=diplopolis.com) Teodorin had accumulated while serving as agriculture minister: a €107 million Paris mansion, a fleet of Bugattis and Ferraris, a Rolls-Royce Phantom, suits bought from Parisian tailors with suitcases of cash. The Court of Cassation upheld the conviction in 2021\. The verdict is final. Teodorin is still vice president. Equatorial Guinea has [the highest GDP per capita](https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/equatorialguinea/publication/equatorial-guinea-economic-update-2025-managing-equatorial-guinea-wealth-for-sustainable-growth-and-development?ref=diplopolis.com) in sub-Saharan Africa. [More than half its population lives in poverty](https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/central-africa/equatorial-guinea/equatorial-guinea-economic-outlook?ref=diplopolis.com). The oil wealth is real. It simply does not reach the people. This is not a failure of policy. It is the policy. Leo spent 11 days crossing Africa making the most pointed statements of his young papacy. He called Trump's deportation policy 'extremely disrespectful'. He prayed at an Angolan slave shrine. He arrived in Equatorial Guinea for the final leg of the tour and said the things that needed saying: natural resource extraction drives war, violates international law and denies nations the right to determine their own future. These were the right words. This was the wrong room. The colonisation Leo described is not a historical condition. It is present tense. Equatorial Guinea is one of several African nations that have [accepted payment from the Trump administration](https://abcnews.com/International/wireStory/highlights-pope-leo-xivs-trip-africa-132314782?ref=diplopolis.com) to receive migrants deported from countries that are not even their own. Washington generates its political inconveniences and pays governments to absorb them. Obiang takes the deal. Teodorin buys the mansion. The Pope calls this colonisation. He is correct. He then shook the hand of the man who demonstrates the model in practice. There is something precise that happens when moral clarity arrives as a guest. It becomes testimony rather than indictment. It gets politely received, noted in the communiqué and filed away. Obiang has governed for 47 years. He has endured condemnation from Washington, from Paris, from human rights bodies that have documented his family's conduct in meticulous detail. None of it has cost him power, because in Equatorial Guinea, accountability is not a domestic political risk. The Pope's words will be quoted and forgotten by the time the papal plane lifts off from Malabo. This is not a criticism of Leo, whose instincts throughout this trip have been correct and whose courage in naming these things has been real. It is a description of the room. The most honest speech about the resource curse delivered anywhere in 2026 was delivered inside the resource curse itself, before its primary beneficiary, in a building paid for by the oil he controls. Obiang has governed for 47 years. He has heard worse. He is still there. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Until Such Time As URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-war-designed-not-to-end/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T05:59:16.000Z On Tuesday, Donald Trump announced on Truth Social that the United States would extend its ceasefire with Iran [indefinitely](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/04/21/trump-iran-war-ceasefire.html?ref=diplopolis.com), 'until such time as' Tehran's leaders submit a 'unified proposal' to end the war. There is no date. There is no deadline. There is no condition that can actually be satisfied while the other conditions remain in place. There is only a war that is now being openly managed rather than decisively concluded. Notice what was announced alongside that ceasefire extension: the naval blockade of Iranian ports continues. Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has called the blockade ['an act of war'](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/22/iran-war-whats-happening-on-day-54-as-trump-extends-ceasefire?ref=diplopolis.com). Iran says it will not negotiate under the shadow of threats or while the blockade is in place. The two-week ceasefire that began on April 8 was already being violated before it could take hold. Israel launched [Operation Eternal Darkness](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026%5FIran%5Fwar?ref=diplopolis.com)) in Lebanon, killing at least 357 people and injuring more than 1,200 others, the largest strikes since the war began. The ceasefire that is not a ceasefire has now been extended into a ceasefire with no end date. This is the architecture of a war designed to continue. It did not start with this language. When Israel and the United States launched nearly [900 strikes on Iran](https://www.britannica.com/event/2026-Iran-war?ref=diplopolis.com) on February 28, 2026, the stated objectives varied by the hour. The Trump administration offered, according to Congress's own Congressional Research Service, ['diverse and inconsistent explanations'](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IN12662?ref=diplopolis.com) for starting the war: to forestall Iranian retaliation, to stop an imminent threat, to destroy Iran's missile capabilities, to prevent a nuclear weapon, to seize Iran's oil resources, and to achieve regime change. A war that cannot settle on a reason for existing cannot settle on a reason for ending. The IDF was more precise about duration if not about purpose. In March, military officials confirmed the army was preparing for at least three more weeks of operations, with ['thousands of targets ahead'](https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-planning-3-more-weeks-of-operations-to-systematically-degrade-irans-defense-industry/?ref=diplopolis.com) across Iran. The IDF said it would not spare a single facility used by Iran to develop weapons, along the entire production chain. The logic of that formulation is not the logic of an operation with an endpoint. Systematically and completely destroying an adversary's entire defence industry is a generation of work. That is not a campaign. That is an occupation by another name. The template for this was not invented in 2026\. The United States Congress passed the [2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authorization%5Ffor%5FUse%5Fof%5FMilitary%5FForce%5Fof%5F2001?ref=diplopolis.com) in the days after the September 11 attacks, a 60-word document authorising military action against those who 'planned, authorised, committed, or aided' the attacks. That authorisation has not been revoked. It has been applied, stretched and reinterpreted across more than two decades, across Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia and beyond, against groups and in countries that Congress never contemplated. What was authorised as a specific response to a specific attack became the legal infrastructure for a war with no borders, no timeline and no political endgame. The war on terror did not end because it was never designed to end. It was designed to be managed. Gaza confirmed what Afghanistan had already established. After October 7, 2023, Israel described its operation as a response with the explicit goal of destroying Hamas. Eighteen months later, with tens of thousands of civilians dead and the territory reduced to rubble, no political framework for what comes after had been proposed, debated or agreed. The operation continued because ending it required answering questions that nobody in Jerusalem or Washington was willing to answer. Now Iran. Netanyahu said, announcing [Operation Rising Lion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twelve-Day%5FWar?ref=diplopolis.com) in June 2025, that the operation would continue 'for as many days as it takes.' That phrase returned when the larger war began in February. No endgame was articulated then. No post-conflict architecture was proposed. Even analysts who believed the campaign was strategically coherent conceded that 'a verification regime, a diplomatic settlement or a sustained enforcement' mechanism [did not yet exist](https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/3/16/the-us-israeli-strategy-against-iran-is-working-here-is-why?ref=diplopolis.com). Trump's ceasefire extension on Tuesday makes the logic explicit. The United States, Trump said, is 'raring to go.' The blockade continues. The talks may or may not happen. The ceasefire has no end date because the war has no political conclusion that anyone has agreed to reach. This is not drift. Wars drift when the people fighting them lose focus, or run out of money, or grow tired of dying. This war is not drifting. The targets are listed. The industries are mapped. The language of 'permanent degradation' has entered the official vocabulary of both governments. What is described as temporary, as a ceasefire, as a pause for talks, is a continuation of operations by other means. The question that nobody in Washington or Jerusalem has answered, because answering it would require a political decision rather than a military one, is simple: what does the end of this war look like? Not the cessation of strikes. The end. A political settlement, a framework, a future that someone has actually envisioned and committed to. The answer to that question determines whether the people of Iran, Lebanon and the wider region live in peace or merely in the intervals between managed destruction. Until such time as that question is answered, there is no ceasefire. There is only a war deciding how long to pause before it resumes. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Japan Chose Its Lesson URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/japan-weapons-export-ban-scrapped-postwar-pacifism/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T05:58:11.000Z Eighty years ago, Japan was bombed into pacifism. On Tuesday, it voted itself out. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's Cabinet approved the [scrapping of Japan's ban](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/04/21/japan/politics/japan-lethal-weapons-export-rules-eased/?ref=diplopolis.com) on lethal weapons exports, clearing the final legal hurdles for Tokyo to sell fighter jets, missiles and destroyers to the world. The postwar order's most sincere convert has decided it no longer believes. The timing is not incidental. The [US-Israel war on Iran](https://www.diplopolis.com/pakistan-iran-mediation-the-indispensable-bad-actor/) has been raging for nearly two months. The world has watched the most powerful military alliance in history reduce Iranian infrastructure to rubble, seize civilian cargo ships during a ceasefire and threaten to bomb bridges and power plants if talks fail. Washington calls this diplomacy. Tokyo has drawn its own conclusions. For eight decades, Japan maintained one of the most unusual commitments in the history of international relations. [Article 9](https://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb%5Fenglish.nsf/html/statics/english/constitution%5Fe.htm?ref=diplopolis.com)) of its postwar constitution renounced war as a sovereign right and prohibited the maintenance of war potential. For most of that period, Japan meant it. Arms exports were restricted to five narrow, non-lethal categories: rescue, transport, alert, surveillance and minesweeping. When Tokyo sent anything to conflict zones, it sent flak jackets and gas masks. It sent civilian vehicles to Ukraine, not tanks. That restraint ends now. The new guidelines [approved at Tuesday's Cabinet meeting](https://www.npr.org/2026/04/21/g-s1-118178/japan-ban-lethal-weapons-exports?ref=diplopolis.com) allow Japan to export warships, combat drones and next-generation fighter jets. Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara told reporters the policy would 'ensure safety for Japan and further contribute to the peace and stability in the region and the international society as the security environment around our country rapidly changes.' That sentence deserves to be read carefully. Japan's government is arguing that selling lethal weapons to multiple countries will contribute to peace. This is not a new argument. It is, in fact, the oldest argument the arms industry has ever made. The commercial logic is already in motion. [Australia signed a deal](https://www.npr.org/2026/04/21/g-s1-118178/japan-ban-lethal-weapons-exports?ref=diplopolis.com) on Saturday for delivery of Mogami-class frigates built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, welcoming Tokyo's new policy as a step toward a deeper defence partnership. The Philippines, Indonesia and New Zealand have all expressed interest in Japanese defence equipment. Southeast Asia is shopping. Europe is watching. Japan's defence industry, long a backwater catering only to the Self-Defence Force, is now classified as one of 17 strategic growth sectors under the Takaichi government. Last week, tens of thousands of Japanese citizens [gathered outside the National Diet](https://zurich.china-consulate.gov.cn/det/fyrth/202604/t20260420%5F11895636.htm?ref=diplopolis.com) in Tokyo opposing Prime Minister Takaichi's push for constitutional revision, holding placards reading 'No to war' and calling for the protection of Article 9\. The government noted the protest and proceeded anyway. This, too, is a lesson: that democratic governments in a remilitarising world will do what they judge necessary, regardless of what their citizens judge wise. The argument Tokyo offers is security realism. China is assertive. North Korea is armed. Russia is at war in Europe. The US-Israel war on Iran has reminded every government watching that military capability is the only currency that reliably purchases safety. Japan looked at Tehran's ruins and decided it needed to be on the other side of the transaction. The tragedy is not that Japan is wrong about the threat. The tragedy is what it chose to learn. The country that survived Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that wrote pacifism into its constitution as an act of civilisational conscience, has concluded that the lesson of 1945 was not the horror of war. It was the horror of losing one. That is the lesson the Iran war is teaching every government that can afford to buy it. Japan just decided it would rather sell. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### The Black Sea Just Got Complicated URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/black-sea-just-got-complicated-bulgaria-radev-nato/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T05:57:07.000Z One week after [Hungarian voters ended sixteen years of Viktor Orbán](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/12/hungary-election-early-results-show-magyars-tisza-ahead-of-orbans-fidesz?ref=diplopolis.com), Bulgaria handed a landslide to Rumen Radev. His Progressive Bulgaria party took [44.7 per cent of the vote](https://www.cnn.com/2026/04/20/europe/bulgaria-election-radev-wins-pro-russian-intl?ref=diplopolis.com), enough to govern alone. Radev, a former fighter pilot, two-term president and committed Eurosceptic, campaigned on resuming Russian gas flows, opposing arms for Ukraine and ending what he called the 'oligarchic' capture of the Bulgarian state. Brussels congratulated him. The Kremlin did too. The temptation is to read the two elections as cancelling each other out. Budapest moves west, Sofia drifts east, Europe muddles through. That reading is wrong. The reason is not ideology. It is geography. Hungary is landlocked. Bulgaria is on the Black Sea. The [2006 US-Bulgaria Defence Cooperation Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulgarian%E2%80%93American%5FJoint%5FMilitary%5FFacilities?ref=diplopolis.com) gives Washington shared use of four military facilities across Bulgarian territory, including Bezmer Air Base, described by *Foreign Policy* as one of the six most strategically important overseas United States Air Force installations, partly for its proximity to the Middle East, and Novo Selo training range, where V Corps rotates armoured and airborne units within 200 miles of Crimea. A [planned United States rotation of 625 personnel was moving through Varna port nine days before the election](https://sofiaglobe.com/2026/04/10/bulgarias-defence-ministry-planned-rotation-of-us-military-at-novo-selo-training-ground-underway/?ref=diplopolis.com). A Radev government is not legally required to terminate these arrangements. It does not need to. Political friction alone is enough to make them expensive. Then there is the pipe. Since Russian gas transit through Ukraine ended on 1 January 2025, [TurkStream has been the only pipeline through which Russia directly supplies Europe](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TurkStream?ref=diplopolis.com). It enters the European Union at the Turkish-Bulgarian border and feeds Serbia, Hungary, Greece and Slovakia. [A record 63.2 million cubic metres a day now flows through the Bulgarian network](https://altanalyses.org/en/2025/02/26/time-to-capitalize-on-bulgarias-role-as-the-eus-only-gateway-for-russian-pipeline-gas/?ref=diplopolis.com), generating an estimated $12 billion annually for Gazprom and its intermediaries, while Sofia collects roughly $250 million in transit fees. Radev has said plainly that he wants to protect this arrangement, not restrict it. Every molecule of Russian gas reaching Europe now passes through a country whose incoming prime minister calls EU energy sanctions self-defeating. On March 30, Bulgaria's outgoing caretaker government signed a [ten-year security agreement in Kyiv](https://sofiaglobe.com/2026/03/30/bulgaria-ukraine-sign-10-year-defence-cooperation-agreement/?ref=diplopolis.com) covering joint drone production, ammunition manufacturing, intelligence sharing and Black Sea maritime security. Radev [denounced it as 'a risk to national security'](https://balkaninsight.com/2026/03/31/bulgarias-security-agreement-with-ukraine-draws-pro-russian-backlash/bi/?ref=diplopolis.com). A caretaker deal carries no binding obligation on a successor government with a parliamentary majority. The agreement, signed three weeks before the election, may already be finished. This is the situation in which Brussels must now find unanimity on the [€90 billion Ukraine financing package](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/12/hungary-election-early-results-show-magyars-tisza-ahead-of-orbans-fidesz?ref=diplopolis.com) that Orbán had blocked for months. Budapest's obstruction is gone. Sofia's is arriving. Moscow did not lose a veto point inside the European Union. It traded one for another, and the replacement sits on the sea where the actual war is being fought. Washington is not watching. The Trump administration is managing a [collapsing ceasefire in the Gulf](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/19/what-to-know-about-us-iran-standoff-over-the-strait-of-hormuz?ref=diplopolis.com), a naval blockade of Iranian ports and a second round of talks in Islamabad. Nobody in the administration is talking about Bulgaria. And this is where the argument gets uncomfortable for Brussels. Radev won cleanly, in [the most stable election Bulgaria has held in five years](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/04/19/bulgaria-votes-as-pro-russian-former-president-leads-the-polls.html?ref=diplopolis.com), with a mandate that is not seriously disputed. Bulgarians voted this way. Treating the result as a Kremlin operation rather than a genuine verdict on energy prices, euro adoption costs and the perceived burden of Ukraine commitments is precisely the kind of condescension that produced the result in the first place. The EU's eastern problem is not an information war it is losing to Moscow. It is a legitimacy problem it is losing to its own citizens. When the flag changes over the harbour at Burgas, the question is not whether Radev is a Russian asset. The question is whether anyone in Brussels noticed in time that the Black Sea flank just changed hands at the ballot box. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### The Blockade Is the War URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/us-naval-blockade-iran-ceasefire-cover/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T05:56:04.000Z On April 17, Iran did the one thing Washington had demanded as the price of peace. It [opened the Strait of Hormuz](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026%5FStrait%5Fof%5FHormuz%5Fcrisis?ref=diplopolis.com). Within 24 hours, it [closed it again](https://time.com/article/2026/04/18/iran-strait-of-hormuz-trump-attacks-blockade-lebanon-ceasefire/?ref=diplopolis.com). Not because Iran changed its mind. Because the United States refused to lift a naval blockade that its own military described as having ["completely" halted Iran's seaborne trade](https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/4/15/us-military-says-blockade-of-iran-ports-completely-halts-economic-trade?ref=diplopolis.com), the trade that powers roughly 90 per cent of Iran's economy. The ceasefire was agreed on April 8\. Its central term was the reopening of the Strait. Iran agreed, attempted to comply, then closed the Strait again because the blockade made compliance meaningless. There is a specific word for a peace agreement whose terms cannot be met because one party is simultaneously destroying the other's capacity to meet them. The word is not diplomacy. The blockade took effect on April 13, [after talks in Islamabad collapsed](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/04/12/iran-us-talks-ceasefire-vance/?ref=diplopolis.com). It [costs Iran $400 million a day](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval%5Fblockade%5Fof%5FIran?ref=diplopolis.com) in lost revenue. If it persists until April 26, it threatens the permanent damage or destruction of Iranian oil wells — not temporary disruption but structural, irreversible economic destruction. Iran's security council was direct: the blockade [constitutes a breach of the ceasefire](https://time.com/article/2026/04/18/iran-strait-of-hormuz-trump-attacks-blockade-lebanon-ceasefire/?ref=diplopolis.com), and Tehran would prevent any conditional reopening of the Strait so long as it continued. Washington's answer was to keep enforcing it. The architecture of this situation is not complicated. Iran cannot accept an open Strait while a naval siege bleeds its economy at $400 million a day. Washington will not lift the siege until Iran accepts nuclear terms it has not clearly articulated. The ceasefire's central condition and the blockade's continued existence are mutually exclusive. Someone in Washington knows this. The question is whether that was the point from the beginning. Trump confirmed as much, [posting on Truth Social](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026%5FStrait%5Fof%5FHormuz%5Fcrisis?ref=diplopolis.com) that the Strait was completely open — while simultaneously announcing the blockade would remain in place until negotiations concluded. Both statements cannot be true. The Strait is not open to a country whose every departing and arriving vessel is turned back by the United States Navy. What Trump described as an open waterway is, for Iran, a sealed one. The language of peace is being used to administer a siege. There is supporting evidence that the design preceded the announcement. [Satellite imagery captured on April 10](https://www.cnn.com/2026/04/14/world/live-news/iran-war-blockade-us-trump?ref=diplopolis.com), during the ceasefire, showed Iranian engineering crews clearing rubble from missile base tunnels near Khomeyn, restoring access to facilities American strikes had tried to seal. Sam Lair of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies [told CNN](https://www.cnn.com/2026/04/14/world/live-news/iran-war-blockade-us-trump?ref=diplopolis.com) this was entirely expected: a ceasefire requires accepting that the adversary will reconstitute some of what you destroyed. Iran is rebuilding. Washington is blockading. Neither is negotiating in good faith. Meanwhile, the people paying the highest price for this choreography are not the parties to it. The [IMF cut its global growth forecast](https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/4/14/imf-cuts-global-growth-forecast-during-hormuz-blockade?ref=diplopolis.com) to 3.1 per cent for 2026\. According to Capital Economics, [Qatar's economy is projected to shrink by 13 per cent this year, the UAE's by 8 per cent, Saudi Arabia's by 6.6 per cent](https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2026/0415/saudi-gulf-oil-avoiding-hormuz-iran-threat?ref=diplopolis.com). These are Washington's partners in the region, not its adversaries. Bahrain, already among the world's most indebted states, [saw its aluminium and oil exports collapse](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic%5Fimpact%5Fof%5Fthe%5F2026%5FIran%5Fwar?ref=diplopolis.com), its government revenue devastated. They are absorbing the consequences of a war launched without consultation and a blockade maintained without resolution. This is what economic warfare looks like when it wears a ceasefire as a costume. Tehran suffocates. The Gulf contracts. Pakistan mediates in good faith between parties where one is negotiating and the other is strangling. The IMF revises its forecasts downward. And Washington frames all of it as a path to peace. The ceasefire did not fail. It was never meant to succeed. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Lost in the Bargain URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/ukraine-lost-in-the-bargain-iran-war-russia/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T05:55:01.000Z On March 17, 2026, Volodymyr Zelensky stood before the British Parliament and called Russia and Iran '[brothers in hatred](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c15xeyny73wo?ref=diplopolis.com).' He was asking Europe not to look away. The appeal had the quality of a man who already knew the answer. He was right to be afraid. The US-Israel war on Iran, now in its seventh week, has done what four years of Russian bombardment could not. It has pushed Ukraine off the table. Not with a decision. Not with a declaration. With something quieter and more consequential: a change in what Washington considers urgent. The arithmetic is brutal. The Pentagon is [considering diverting weapons originally earmarked for Ukraine](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/03/26/us-iran-war-ukraine-missile-defense/?ref=diplopolis.com) to the Middle East as the Iran war depletes critical munitions. The interceptor missiles being eyed for redirection are the same Patriot systems that form Ukraine's backbone defence against Russian ballistic missiles. Russia knows this. In February 2026, it launched some of its [highest-intensity missile salvoes in four years of war](https://www.fpri.org/article/2026/03/from-tehran-to-donbas-what-the-iran-war-means-for-russia-and-ukraine/?ref=diplopolis.com), with up to 30 ballistic missiles in a single overnight wave. Ukraine is being hit harder at precisely the moment its air defences are being looked at for parts. Bloomberg has reported that Ukraine could [run out of money](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-27/ukraine-is-running-out-of-cash-to-pay-for-the-war-as-aid-falters?ref=diplopolis.com) entirely by June. Not ammunition. Money. The kind that pays soldiers. Meanwhile oil trades above $84 a barrel. Russia's 2026 budget needed $59 Urals crude to balance. It is getting considerably more. The Iran war, which shut the Strait of Hormuz and sent energy prices surging, has handed Moscow a windfall it could not have manufactured on its own. Asian buyers who relied on Gulf oil are turning to Russia. Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said it plainly: 'Russian oil is in demand. We will sell it if it is purchased.' The sanctions architecture that was supposed to strangle Russia's war economy is being quietly undermined by a war Washington chose to fight on a different front. This is not accident. It is consequence. None of it was designed to help Russia. Washington did not go to war with Iran in order to rescue Moscow's budget or strip Kyiv of air defences. But intentions are not outcomes. The effect is the same regardless of the intention behind it. Zelensky has spent the weeks since February 28 doing what small nations do when the powerful lose interest: making himself useful. He [toured Gulf states in late March](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine%5Fin%5Fthe%5F2026%5FIran%5Fwar?ref=diplopolis.com), selling Ukrainian drone expertise to countries suddenly desperate to defend against Iranian Shaheds. Two hundred Ukrainian specialists were deployed to Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE to coordinate air defences alongside American personnel. He offered to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz, drawing on Ukraine's experience securing the Black Sea corridor. He positioned Ukraine as a partner in Washington's new war, hoping that proximity to the priority would keep the aid flowing for his own. The spectacle of a country fighting for its survival moonlighting as a defence contractor for the Gulf is not a strategy. It is an act of desperation dressed as diplomacy. It is a dignified performance under the circumstances. It should not have been necessary. The cruelty is in the timing. Ukraine was not losing before February 28\. It was not winning either, but it was holding. The war had settled into something painful and sustainable. Then Washington opened a second front, and the logic of finite resources did the rest. There is a name for what happened to Ukraine. It is called being lost in the bargain. No one voted to abandon it. No president announced a change in policy. Washington simply found something it wanted more. And Ukraine, which had done everything asked of it, discovered that doing everything asked is not the same as being indispensable. Russia did not defeat Ukraine on the battlefield. Washington's priorities did. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### No One Left to Veto URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/no-one-left-to-veto-israel-diplomatic-isolation-2026/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T05:53:13.000Z A Polish lawmaker [held up an Israeli flag defaced with a Nazi symbol](https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-parliament-polish-mp-calls-israel-new-third-reich-waves-israeli-flag-with-swastika/?ref=diplopolis.com) inside parliament. Not online. Not anonymous. Inside the chamber. It was Holocaust Remembrance Day. At Auschwitz, survivors were marching. The same day, [Italy moved](https://www.timesofisrael.com/italy-suspending-defense-agreement-with-israel-amid-mideast-conflict-pm-meloni-says/?ref=diplopolis.com). Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, one of Israel's most reliable defenders in Europe and a political ally of Donald Trump, [announced the suspension of Italy's defence cooperation agreement with Israel](https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/04/14/italy-suspends-defense-agreement-with-israel/?ref=diplopolis.com). She cited Israeli warning shots fired at Italian UN peacekeepers in Lebanon. Israel's foreign ministry dismissed the move as [inconsequential](https://decode39.com/14331/why-italy-is-suspending-its-defence-cooperation-framework-with-israel/?ref=diplopolis.com), calling the agreement a memorandum 'that never contained any substantive content.' The response is now a reflex. When Germany [halted arms exports](https://www.habtoorresearch.com/programmes/an-isolated-israel/?ref=diplopolis.com), Israel called it manageable. When Spain and Ireland recognised Palestine, Israel called it symbolic. When 142 countries [voted at the UN General Assembly](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/snapshot-israels-deepening-diplomatic-isolation-comparing-key-unga-votes-2017-2025?ref=diplopolis.com) for Palestinian statehood, Israel dismissed the count. When [15 Western-oriented states](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/snapshot-israels-deepening-diplomatic-isolation-comparing-key-unga-votes-2017-2025?ref=diplopolis.com) that had once abstained on or opposed such resolutions voted in favour, Israel said nothing had changed. Everything has changed. The diplomatic architecture that once insulated Israel from accountability is dismantling piece by piece. The EU-Israel Association Agreement, which governs trade between Israel and its largest economic partner, [faces unprecedented scrutiny](https://ofacblockedfundslawyers.com/international-sanctions-against-israel-in-2025/?ref=diplopolis.com). Of the 193 UN member states, [145 now recognise Palestinian statehood](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/israel-needs-a-fundamental-shift-in-its-foreign-policy/?ref=diplopolis.com). Five European countries withdrew from Eurovision rather than share a stage with Israel. Netanyahu has responded to each development by calling for Israel to become a [self-reliant 'super-Sparta](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/16/netanyahu-super-sparta-vision-israel-economic-future-isolation?ref=diplopolis.com).' The posture holds only if the isolation is temporary. The evidence now suggests it is structural. But the deeper exposure is in Washington, and the Iran war has made it visible in a way no previous episode managed. A [Pew Research Center survey](https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2026/04/07/negative-views-of-israel-netanyahu-continue-to-rise-among-americans-especially-young-people/?ref=diplopolis.com) conducted in late March found that 60% of Americans hold an unfavourable view of Israel, up nearly 20 points since 2022\. The 'very unfavourable' figure has almost tripled over the same period. Among Americans under 50, majorities in both parties now rate Israel negatively. Among Republicans under 45, [61% say they would prefer a candidate who reduces support for Israel](https://www.imeupolicyproject.org/polls/iran-israel-2026?ref=diplopolis.com). That number, inside the party of Trump, is not a protest figure. It is a signal. [Only 24% of Americans](https://www.ipsos.com/en/global-opinion-polls/the-iran-conflict?ref=diplopolis.com) believe the decision to strike Iran has been worth it. A Reuters/Ipsos poll from March found 43% in outright opposition. The CIA director reportedly described Netanyahu's pitch to Trump for regime change in Tehran as ['farcical'](https://thehill.com/opinion/international/5824300-unfavorable-view-israel-americans/?ref=diplopolis.com). Secretary of State Marco Rubio was more colourful. General Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, [summarised the dynamic plainly](https://thehill.com/opinion/international/5824300-unfavorable-view-israel-americans/?ref=diplopolis.com): 'They know they need us, and that's why they're hard-selling.' Trump sided with Netanyahu anyway. That is the real consequence of the Iran gamble, and it stretches far beyond Trump. The war has demonstrated, for any American politician paying attention, that Israeli objectives and American interests are not the same thing. It has shown what it costs domestically to commit to a war that most Americans see as a war of choice, not necessity. The next president who considers standing unconditionally beside Israel in a military confrontation will calculate that cost. And the one after that. No future president will make the same offer Trump made. Israel has answered every rebuke with contempt and every warning with dismissal. It is running out of things to dismiss. The room is turning. And there is no one left to turn it back. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### The Slow Siege URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-slow-siege-china-arunachal-pradesh-renamed-places/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T05:52:04.000Z China has [renamed 23 places in Arunachal Pradesh](https://thewire.in/security/mischievous-attempts-says-india-on-china-assigning-new-names-to-locations-in-arunachal-pradesh?ref=diplopolis.com) it does not control. Again. On April 10, Beijing's Ministry of Civil Affairs published its sixth list of what it calls 'standardised' names for locations in a state it does not administer, does not police and does not govern. Each entry comes with a name in Chinese characters, Tibetan script and pinyin, with precise GPS coordinates. India's ministry of external affairs [responded on April 12](https://aninews.in/news/world/asia/false-claims-cannot-alter-reality-india-dismisses-chinas-attempt-to-rename-places-in-arunachal-pradesh20260412175706/?ref=diplopolis.com), calling it a 'mischievous attempt' to introduce 'fictitious names' and 'baseless narratives' that 'cannot alter the undeniable reality' on the ground. China, for its part, insists Arunachal Pradesh is [Zangnan, or southern Tibet](https://www.tibetanreview.net/china-releases-more-names-to-assert-its-tibet-claim-on-arunachal-pradesh/?ref=diplopolis.com), and that the renaming falls within its sovereignty. It is absurd. That is precisely why it works. These names are not about geography. They are aimed at time. China is not trying to convince anyone that Arunachal Pradesh suddenly belongs to it because a civil affairs ministry published a document. It knows who governs there, who votes there, who builds roads and collects taxes. This is not an attempt to replace reality. It is an attempt to surround it. The mechanism is slow and deliberate. Names become records. Records become maps. Maps become references. References become documents. Documents become positions. Over decades, what was once indisputable begins to acquire qualifiers. Not settled, but 'disputed'. Not administered, but 'claimed'. The language shifts first. The argument follows. [Since 2017, Beijing has published six such lists](https://www.indiasentinels.com/diplomacy/why-china-keeps-renaming-places-in-arunachal-pradesh-and-why-india-cant-ignore-it-7289?ref=diplopolis.com), covering six locations, then 15, then 11, then 30, then 27, now 23 more. [The total now stands at 112 renamed locations](https://www.tibetanreview.net/china-releases-more-names-to-assert-its-tibet-claim-on-arunachal-pradesh/?ref=diplopolis.com). It does this without urgency and without spectacle. It does not need immediate control. It needs permanence of claim. The timing is rarely accidental. [The first list in 2017 came days after the Dalai Lama visited Tawang monastery](https://www.businesstoday.in/latest/economy-politics/story/china-renames-6-places-in-arunachal-pradesh-claims-the-state-as-south-tibet-80132-2017-04-19?ref=diplopolis.com), a visit Beijing had condemned. [The 2024 batch arrived after Prime Minister Modi inaugurated the Sela Tunnel](https://www.eurasiareview.com/03042024-china-renames-30-places-in-indian-controlled-arunachal-pradesh/?ref=diplopolis.com), the all-weather high-altitude link that improves troop access to Tawang. The sixth list arrives during a period of active diplomatic engagement between New Delhi and Beijing. That is not a coincidence. It is a signal. China has done this in other theatres too, [renaming islands and reefs](https://www.rfa.org/english/special-reports/scs-80/?ref=diplopolis.com) in the South China Sea to normalise claims it cannot enforce on the ground. The pattern is consistent. Changing a map is the tribute vice pays to virtue. Beijing cannot alter the reality, so it works to alter the description of that reality instead. India reacts episodically. A statement, a rejection, a dismissal, then silence until the next list appears. The assumption is that absurdity cancels itself out, that a claim so detached from reality cannot accumulate weight. That assumption is the vulnerability. A claim dismissed once is an absurdity. A claim dismissed six times begins to sound like a position. A claim that enters international databases, academic papers and foreign maps — however inaccurately — becomes part of the conversation. And once something enters the conversation, it becomes negotiable. There is a difference between a settled border and a debated one. The first is defended. The second is managed, qualified and eventually traded. China is not playing for acceptance today. It is playing for argument tomorrow. The sixth list is not a provocation. It is an instalment. India is right to call it fictitious. It would be wiser to understand what the fiction is for. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### God, Israel and the Rest of Us URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/trump-pope-leo-iran-war-israel/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T05:50:36.000Z On Sunday night, Donald Trump [posted an AI-generated image](https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-79-posts-himself-as-christ-after-bonkers-pope-attack/?ref=diplopolis.com) of himself as Jesus Christ, robed in white, hand glowing, healing a man in a hospital bed, American flags and bald eagles filling the sky around him. He did this one hour after calling the Pope weak. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/05/Trump-AI-Jesus.jpg) The sequence matters more than the image. Earlier that evening, Trump had [attacked Pope Leo XIV on Truth Social](https://time.com/article/2026/04/13/trump-pope-leo-war-iran/?ref=diplopolis.com) in a 334-word rant, declaring him 'WEAK on Crime, and terrible for Foreign Policy.' Leo's offence was hosting a prayer vigil for peace the previous evening, during which he had [denounced](https://www.wionews.com/photos/trump-shares-ai-image-of-himself-as-jesus-christ-after-slamming-pope-leo-as-weak-terrible-how-the-feud-began-1776051410819?ref=diplopolis.com) what he called a 'delusion of omnipotence' fuelling the war in Iran. The Chicago-born pontiff, the first American ever to lead the Catholic Church, had also said that God rejects the prayers of those who wage war. Trump took this personally. Then he posted himself as God. The image was [deleted on Monday morning.](https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/trump-pope-leo-comments-iran-9.7161252?ref=diplopolis.com) [Even Marjorie Taylor Greene called it blasphemy.](https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-79-posts-himself-as-christ-after-bonkers-pope-attack/?ref=diplopolis.com) Trump has been collecting enemies since February 28, 2026, when the US-Israel war on Iran began. [Spain closed its airspace](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/30/spain-closes-airspace-to-us-planes-involved-in-war-on-iran?ref=diplopolis.com) to American military planes, calling the conflict 'profoundly illegal and profoundly unjust.' [France refused overflight support for Israeli resupply missions. Italy denied landing access at Sigonella.](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/1/how-are-nato-allies-pushing-back-against-trumps-iran-war-demands?ref=diplopolis.com) [Britain this morning declined to join](https://www.npr.org/2026/04/13/nx-s1-5783445/iran-war-updates?ref=diplopolis.com) Trump's naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. Trump called NATO a ['paper tiger,'](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/1/how-are-nato-allies-pushing-back-against-trumps-iran-war-demands?ref=diplopolis.com) [threatened to withdraw from the alliance](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/8/trump-administration-says-it-is-mulling-nato-withdrawal-after-iran-war?ref=diplopolis.com) and told its secretary general Mark Rutte, face to face, that allies had been ['tested and failed.'](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/9/trump-slams-nato-over-iran-after-meeting-rutte-renews-greenland-threat?ref=diplopolis.com) The White House [considered moving US troops](https://www.axios.com/2026/04/03/nato-trump-iran-war?ref=diplopolis.com) out of countries it deemed insufficiently loyal. He has picked a fight with every institution, alliance and moral authority that declined to serve as a supporting actor in somebody else's military campaign. One name sits at the intersection of every decision that has produced this result: Israel. The US-Israel war on Iran is Trump's war in name only. Every objective the campaign was designed to serve — the elimination of Iran's nuclear programme, the destruction of its missile capacity, the removal of the one military force in the region capable of threatening Israeli territory — belonged to the Israeli government's agenda long before it belonged to his. NATO partners who refused to play along were not protecting Iran. They were declining to be conscripted into a war of choice that was not theirs. The Pope who called for peace was not naive about geopolitics. He was doing what popes do when governments invoke God to justify bombing campaigns. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth [prayed at a Pentagon service for violence 'against those who deserve no mercy.'](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/watch-hegseth-wont-say-if-u-s-will-send-ground-troops-into-iran?ref=diplopolis.com) Military commanders [reportedly told troops](https://www.military.com/daily-news/2026/03/06/lawmakers-want-dod-hegseth-investigated-biblical-armageddon-claims.html?ref=diplopolis.com) that Trump had been 'anointed by Jesus to light the signal fire in Iran.' The war that the White House has dressed in scripture is a war fought for Israeli objectives, at the cost of American alliances, at a price paid most heavily by countries that had nothing to do with starting it. The oil that stopped flowing through the Strait of Hormuz did not belong to the nations now paying the highest prices for its absence. In that context, the Jesus image is not a surprise. It is a confession. An administration that has wrapped a war in the language of divine mandate, that has alienated every significant ally in the course of prosecuting it, and that has now declared the head of the world's [1.4 billion Catholics](https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/trump-pope-leo-comments-iran-9.7161252?ref=diplopolis.com) an enemy of the state has revealed exactly what this war has always been about. Leo said on Monday, [aboard the papal plane to Algeria](https://www.npr.org/2026/04/13/nx-s1-5783008/trump-pope-leo?ref=diplopolis.com), that he had 'no fear of the Trump administration.' He will keep speaking against war. He is flying to a Muslim-majority country to talk about peace and coexistence while the president he left behind poses as the Messiah. Israel has a patron. The rest of us have a problem. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### What Tehran Already Knew URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/why-the-islamabad-talks-were-doomed-before-they-began/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T05:35:12.000Z Iran walked into the Islamabad talks knowing the Americans could not deliver. For 21 hours on Saturday and into Sunday morning, American and Iranian negotiators sat in the Serena Hotel in Pakistan's capital, conducting the first face-to-face talks between Washington and Tehran [since the Obama administration negotiated](https://www.npr.org/2026/04/12/nx-s1-5782538/u-s-iran-peace-talks-islamabad-collapse?ref=diplopolis.com) the nuclear deal in 2015\. Vice President JD Vance arrived with Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, the men who delivered the Gaza ceasefire that never quite held, and presented Iran with what he called a 'final and best offer.' Iran's parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf had signalled, on arrival in Islamabad, exactly what he thought of American good faith. ['We have goodwill,' he said, 'but we do not have trust.'](https://www.bostonglobe.com/2026/04/11/world/us-iran-fail-to-reach-peace-agreement-after-marathon-talks/?ref=diplopolis.com) He was not being rhetorical. [As the talks were under way in Islamabad](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/11/israeli-strikes-kill-at-least-18-people-across-southern-lebanon?ref=diplopolis.com), Israeli warplanes struck south Lebanon. Israeli strikes killed ten people in the Nabatiyeh district, among them a member of Lebanon's civil defence and two paramedics, emergency workers, while the United States was presenting itself as a broker of regional peace. Israel was not party to the Islamabad negotiations. Nobody asked it to stop. Iran had made its position clear before the talks began. A [ceasefire in Lebanon](https://www.diplopolis.com/ceasefire-that-wasnt-lebanon-israel-iran-us/) was a precondition for any serious dialogue, not a side request. The United States could not deliver one. Benjamin Netanyahu said, as negotiations proceeded, that [Israel's campaign against Iran](https://www.diplopolis.com/washington-challenge-israel-netanyahu-not-iran/) was [not over and that his country had more](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/12/us-and-iran-fail-to-reach-peace-deal-after-marathon-talks-in-pakistan?ref=diplopolis.com) to do. He was not being rhetorical either. The Americans asked Tehran to commit to peace at a table where they demonstrably could not restrain their own partner. That is not a negotiating failure. It is a structural exposure of American power in this war: Washington cannot act as a peace broker in a conflict it is actively prosecuting alongside an ally it will not restrain. The demand that Tehran trust the United States was, in practice, indistinguishable from the demand that Tehran trust Benjamin Netanyahu. Tehran saw no reason to do that. There is a particular kind of diplomatic blindness that mistakes American sincerity for Iranian reassurance. Vance described the US approach as 'quite flexible' and 'quite accommodating.' He may have believed it. What he could not see, or would not acknowledge, was what accommodation looks like from the [other side of the table](https://www.diplopolis.com/islamabad-talks-truce-without-agreement/): a government asking for Tehran's trust while its partner bombed Lebanese emergency workers outside any ceasefire framework. [Vance's framing on departure was instructive.](https://www.npr.org/2026/04/12/nx-s1-5782538/u-s-iran-peace-talks-islamabad-collapse?ref=diplopolis.com) 'They have chosen not to accept our terms,' he told reporters, as though the collapse were an Iranian decision rather than the consequence of a condition no sovereign state could accept. Those terms included the complete abandonment of Iran's nuclear programme, not a cap, not a monitored rollback, but full surrender of its nuclear infrastructure, tabled in the opening session of the first direct talks since a war began that [has killed more than 2,000 Iranians](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/12/us-and-iran-fail-to-reach-peace-deal-after-marathon-talks-in-pakistan?ref=diplopolis.com) by Tehran's own count. This, from a government whose ally was bombing Lebanon while the ceasefire held in name only. Within hours of Vance boarding Air Force Two, Trump announced on Truth Social that the [US Navy would begin blockading the Strait of Hormuz.](https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-war-trump-strait-of-hormuz-israel-ceasefire-talks/?ref=diplopolis.com) The two-week ceasefire, already disputed between the parties over whether it applied to Lebanon, now has no agreed framework and no clear timeline for what follows. A naval blockade is not a peace proposal. It is what comes after one fails. Tehran's delegation left having confirmed what they had believed before they boarded their plane. The United States negotiates with conditions, not compromises, and with an ally it cannot restrain. The mistrust Ghalibaf named on arrival was not a bargaining position. Islamabad proved him right. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### A Table in Islamabad URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/islamabad-talks-truce-without-agreement/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T05:33:43.000Z Iran's Supreme National Security Council accepted the ceasefire on Wednesday with a statement that was, in its honesty, [more revealing](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/irans-supreme-national-security-council-says-it-has-accepted-two-week-ceasefire-in-the-war?ref=diplopolis.com) than any diplomatic communiqué. 'This does not signify the termination of the war,' it said. 'Our hands remain upon the trigger, and should the slightest error be committed by the enemy, it shall be met with full force.' Trump has issued a similar warning. In a social media post, he wrote, US forces will remain in and around Iran until 'real agreement' is reached and compliance is enforced. ![](https://www.diplopolis.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/image-5.png) Trump's post in Truth Social warning Iran That is the posture both delegations will carry into Islamabad on Saturday: ready to talk, and prepared to walk away. Not the language of powers preparing to make concessions. In Islamabad, the table is set for talks. The US delegation will be led by Vice President JD Vance, with Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. Iran’s will be led by Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. After forty days of war, two countries that were bombing each other until last week will now sit in the same room. That matters. But what they will discuss in that room is far from certain. There are [several proposals](https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/us/2026/04/08/what-is-in-irans-10-point-peace-plan/?ref=diplopolis.com) on the table and neither side appears to know who is reading what. Iran's [original 10-point proposal](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/7/whats-irans-10-point-peace-plan-that-trump-says-is-not-good-enough?ref=diplopolis.com) — which Trump called 'not good enough' — demanded Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz, the right to enrich uranium, the lifting of all primary and secondary sanctions, compensation for the war, a full withdrawal of US combat forces from the region, and a [ceasefire covering Lebanon](https://www.diplopolis.com/washington-challenge-israel-netanyahu-not-iran/). Washington found it fundamentally unserious and walked away. Then came a [revised Iranian counterproposal](https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20260408-what-we-know-about-iran-10-point-plan-for-ending-war-with-us-israel?ref=diplopolis.com) which Trump called 'a workable basis on which to negotiate' — the document that is believed to have led to the ceasefire. But apparently, this proposal has multiple versions. In the [Farsi version](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog%5Fentry/us-nuclear-weapons-expert-says-irans-farsi-version-of-its-10-point-plan-includes-extra-phrase-demanding-the-acceptance-of-irans-uranium-enrichment/?ref=diplopolis.com) circulated by Iranian state media the phrase 'acceptance of enrichment' appeared. However, in the English version shared with international journalists, the phrase [was missing](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/08/iran-10-point-plan-ceasefire-donald-trump-us?ref=diplopolis.com). No explanation was offered. Iran was saying different things to different audiences. Washington has been doing the same. Trump declared the ceasefire represented ['total and complete victory'](https://edition.cnn.com/2026/04/08/middleeast/us-iran-ceasefire-explainer-war-intl-hnk?ref=diplopolis.com) and that Iran had agreed to 'almost all' points of contention. Vance described the ceasefire as a 'fragile truce'. The US 15-point proposal demands the dismantling of Iran's nuclear programme, the surrender of its enriched uranium stockpile, limits on missile capabilities, an end to regional proxy support, and reportedly an acknowledgment of Israel's right to exist. Iran previously called these demands 'largely excessive, unrealistic and unreasonable.' Neither side has explained how 'almost all points agreed' and 'completely unreasonable demands' describe the same negotiation. The ceasefire had already been violated before a single handshake was exchanged. On its [very first day](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/israeli-strikes-kill-more-than-180-in-central-beirut-saying-iran-truce-doesnt-apply?ref=diplopolis.com), Israel launched its largest wave of strikes on Lebanon since the war began — 100 targets in 10 minutes, killing more than 300 people. Iran's President Pezeshkian said the strikes rendered the Islamabad talks ['meaningless'](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/9/israels-netanyahu-ready-for-talks-with-lebanon-as-soon-as-possible?ref=diplopolis.com). Under pressure from Washington, Netanyahu announced he would open [direct negotiations with Lebanon](https://www.axios.com/2026/04/09/israel-lebanon-negotiations-ceasefire?ref=diplopolis.com) — while simultaneously vowing to continue bombing it. The Strait of Hormuz remains largely closed. On Thursday, Trump himself complained on social media that Iran was doing a 'very poor job' reopening the waterway — the same day his delegation was boarding its flight to Islamabad. A ceasefire that is already disputed before the parties meet is not a ceasefire. The fighting has paused. The argument has not. Iran's own delegation [arrived under a cloud](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/9/us-iran-talks-in-pakistan-whos-attending-whats-on-the-agenda?ref=diplopolis.com) — the Iranian Ambassador to Pakistan deleted a social media post confirming their arrival within hours of posting it. No explanation was given. Yet a deal is not impossible. Exhaustion sometimes achieves what reason cannot. But exhaustion without clarity about what each side will accept is not diplomacy. In war, it means more death and destruction. The table is set in Islamabad. Nobody agrees what is on it. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### The Ceasefire That Wasn't URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/ceasefire-that-wasnt-lebanon-israel-iran-us/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T05:31:02.000Z In the early hours of April 8, Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced a ceasefire '[effective immediately everywhere, including Lebanon and elsewhere](https://www.diplopolis.com/washington-challenge-israel-netanyahu-not-iran/).' By morning, Israel had struck Beirut [contradicting](https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2026/04/08/netanyahu-contradicts-pakistans-claim-of-wider-truce-between-us-iran-says-lebanon-fighting-will-continue?ref=diplopolis.com) Islamabad's claim. At 1.30 am, minutes before Washington and Tehran declared a two-week ceasefire, Israel [struck a crowded stretch](https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/04/08/lebanon-reels-as-israel-expands-strikes-despite-ceasefire/?ref=diplopolis.com) of Beirut’s corniche, killing eight people. By morning, the ceasefire already felt hollow. Israel hit more than 100 targets across the city in what it called its largest attack of the war. Tyre received a fresh evacuation order. The Israeli military said it was continuing targeted ground operations. The ceasefire did not include Lebanon. Benjamin Netanyahu had made that clear. ![](https://www.diplopolis.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/image-3.png) Post on X by the Israeli Prime Minister's Office supporting President Trump's decision but going on to clarify that the two-weeks ceasefire does not include Lebanon. Netanyahu's office issued a statement hours after Sharif's announcement. Israel, it said, supported Trump's decision to suspend strikes on Iran for two weeks. ['The two-week ceasefire does not include Lebanon.'](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/8/netanyahu-says-us-iran-ceasefire-does-not-include-lebanon?ref=diplopolis.com) No explanation. No acknowledgment that Pakistan's prime minister had just told 1.2 million displaced Lebanese people they could come home. This is not a misunderstanding. It is a method. Israel has used the same architecture for years: a pause in one theatre that permits a war in another, a ceasefire whose terms mean something specific to the party that wrote them and something entirely different to everyone else. The November 2024 Lebanon ceasefire followed the same logic. Netanyahu [violated its terms repeatedly](https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/3/11/the-israel-hezbollah-ceasefire-was-built-to-fail?ref=diplopolis.com), kept Israeli forces in southern Lebanon beyond every agreed withdrawal date and absorbed no diplomatic cost. The pattern did not change this time. It scaled. What changed is who got humiliated. Pakistan brokered a ceasefire between the United States and Iran, a genuine feat that gave Sharif a moment of international standing he has rarely enjoyed. He announced it to the world. Iran confirmed the truce covered all fronts, including Lebanon. Hezbollah said it had been notified and [would honour it](https://cyprus-mail.com/2026/04/08/hezbollah-pauses-attacks-under-us-iran-ceasefire-sources-close-to-group-say?ref=diplopolis.com)but Israel struck Beirut [without warning](https://www.military.com/daily-news/2026/04/08/israel-strikes-central-beirut-without-warning-after-saying-iran-ceasefire-doesnt-apply-there.html?ref=diplopolis.com). According to Lebanese authorities, more than 1,500 people have been [killed since March 2 and over 1.2 million displaced](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0j6d538l6qo?ref=diplopolis.com). These are not incidental figures. They are the cost of a war that the international conversation has consistently treated as a footnote to the US-Israel war on Iran. Lebanon did not choose this war. Hezbollah's entry in March brought Israeli air and ground operations down on a country whose government had no say in the decision and has no leverage in any of the negotiations that followed. Every ceasefire that leaves Lebanon out of the room confirms that arrangement. Netanyahu reportedly asked Trump [not to proceed with the ceasefire](https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-said-to-ask-trump-not-to-move-forward-with-iran-ceasefire-at-this-stage/?ref=diplopolis.com) at this stage. Trump overruled him. Israel's opposition leader Yair Lapid said Israel had never faced such a political disaster, that it was 'not even at the table when decisions were made concerning the core of our national security.' ![](https://www.diplopolis.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/image-4.png) Israel's opposition leader Yair Lapid post on X blaming Netanyahu for failing to meet any of the goals he set for himself. Lapid is right about the disaster. He is wrong about the cause. Netanyahu was not shut out of the room. He ran a separate war in Lebanon while the world's attention moved to Islamabad, and trusted that nobody would stop him. Nobody has. There is a further irony. The pause Washington is celebrating is the permission slip Tel Aviv wrote for itself. By suspending the Iran front, the ceasefire does not constrain Israel. It frees it. Every aircraft, every artillery battery, every ground division that was pointed at Iran can now be pointed at Lebanon. The Islamabad talks on April 10 will address Iran's nuclear programme, the Strait of Hormuz and the terms of a lasting agreement. Lebanon is not on the agenda. It was not on the agenda when Sharif announced the ceasefire. It was not on the agenda when Israel violated it within hours. It is the country that gets bombed between the paragraphs. Pakistan called this a sagacious gesture. Trump called it a total and complete victory. Netanyahu called Lebanon a separate matter. They are all correct. That is precisely the problem. A ceasefire that every party can define on its own terms is not a ceasefire. It is a licence. And Israel is already using it. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### Not Iran. Netanyahu. URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/washington-challenge-israel-netanyahu-not-iran/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T05:29:33.000Z Nobody won. That is the first thing to understand about the ceasefire that [came into force Tuesday night](https://www.axios.com/2026/04/07/iran-2-week-ceasfire-trump-pakistan?ref=diplopolis.com), brokered by Pakistan and announced by Donald Trump on Truth Social in his customary register of triumphalism and capital letters. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/05/image-7.png) Iran didn't surrender. The Strait of Hormuz didn't open because Washington broke Tehran's will to fight. It opened because both sides ran out of appetite for what was to come next: the destruction of power plants and desalination infrastructure on both sides and the deliberate killing of civilians on an industrial scale. What was coming forced a reckoning that five weeks of war did not. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/05/image-1-1.png) So the guns went quiet. For two weeks, at least. The question now is what holds, and who threatens to break it first. The answer is not Iran. Before the ink was dry on Trump's Truth Social post, [Israeli missiles were still hitting Iranian targets](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog%5Fentry/israel-continuing-to-strike-in-iran-despite-ceasefire-announcement-security-official-tells-toi?ref=diplopolis.com). That was the immediate tell. The deeper one came a day earlier, when it emerged that [Netanyahu had called Trump on Sunday](https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-said-to-ask-trump-not-to-move-forward-with-iran-ceasefire-at-this-stage/?ref=diplopolis.com) — ostensibly to congratulate him on the rescue of two downed American airmen — and used the call to warn against agreeing to a ceasefire at this stage. A senior Israeli official told Channel 12 that Netanyahu believed a truce carried "significant risks." Trump, for his part, told him a ceasefire was possible if Iran met American demands, and moved on. Netanyahu did not move on. The same day, Netanyahu told his own officials that [Israeli operations against Hezbollah](https://en.yenisafak.com/world/netanyahu-tells-us-any-iran-deal-wont-stop-israels-lebanon-war-report-says-3716514?ref=diplopolis.com) in Lebanon would continue regardless of whatever Washington and Tehran agreed. He wasn't asking. He was informing. This is the shape of the problem going forward. Washington's real challenge now is not managing Iran — Tehran has just handed the Americans two weeks of diplomatic space and demonstrated, whatever else you think of the Islamic Republic, its functional interest in not being bombed. The challenge is managing Israel. Specifically, keeping Netanyahu on a tight leash. Netanyahu's political survival is fused to the Iran threat in ways that have no clean diplomatic resolution. [He has spent decades building his career](https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2026/01/the-israel-iran-detente-wont-last.html?ref=diplopolis.com) on the singular proposition that Iran is an existential danger and that he alone understands it clearly enough to confront it. A durable ceasefire — let alone a negotiated settlement that leaves the Islamic Republic intact and governing — is not just a policy setback for him. It is a biographical one. His far-right coalition partners, meanwhile, opposed the ceasefire that ended last June's Twelve-Day War and will oppose this one too. Israel's National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir does not want a deal. He wants a different Middle East. Calling the conflict an “absolute necessity”, Ben-Gvir [considers the war](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog%5Fentry/ben-gvir-defends-iran-war-as-absolute-necessity-at-site-of-haifa-strike?ref=diplopolis.com) a “once-in-a-lifetime opportunity” to prevent the “Nazi regime” in Tehran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Trump, for all his noise, actually does want a deal. The ceasefire language — "[we have already met and exceeded all military objectives](https://www.axios.com/2026/04/07/iran-2-week-ceasfire-trump-pakistan?ref=diplopolis.com)" — is the language of a man looking for an exit that doesn't look like an exit. He called Israel his "little brother" last week and downplayed its role in rescuing the downed American pilot. Netanyahu responded by reframing the call as a celebration of Israeli strength. The two men are not reading from the same script. They haven't been for a while. [Early in the war, Netanyahu was quietly asking](https://www.axios.com/2026/03/04/iran-netanyahu-trump-white-house-talks?ref=diplopolis.com) White House officials whether the Americans were conducting secret talks with Iran behind Israel's back. The White House denied it. Islamabad talks are now scheduled for Friday, April 10\. Vice President Vance is [expected](https://www.axios.com/2026/03/27/vance-iran-peace-talks?ref=diplopolis.com) to lead the American delegation. Netanyahu is not invited and there is [confusion](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2026/4/7/iran-war-live-trump-warns-of-devastating-attacks-as-deal-deadline-nears?ref=diplopolis.com) on Tehran's demand to extend the ceasefire to Lebanon, where Israel has stressed that the fight with Hezbollah is “independent” from the war on Iran. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/05/image-2-1.png) Peace talks have a way of clarifying who the principals are. Washington and Tehran are talking, with Pakistan in the room. Israel is on the outside of that conversation, and Netanyahu knows it. The next two weeks will test whether the ceasefire is a pause or a turning point. Iran has its own hardliners who think any deal with Trump is a humiliation. The Strait is not yet fully open. Missiles were still flying hours after the announcement. The ground is not stable. But the fundamental dynamic has shifted. The United States has its off-ramp. The question is whether Netanyahu lets Washington take it — or whether he finds a way to blow it up first. He has done it before. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. ### The War Pakistan Made URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-war-pakistan-made/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T05:28:14.000Z 'Our patience has reached its limit,' Khawaja Asif, Pakistan’s Defence Minister [said in a social media post on](https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20260226-pakistan-vows-immediate-response-after-afghanistan-launches-retaliatory-attacks?ref=diplopolis.com) February 27, 2026, declaring what he called an 'open war.' The statement was dramatic. The situation it described was not. Pakistan has been at war with the Taliban for years. The only thing open about it is the pretence that Islamabad did not see it coming. Pakistan [created the Taliban](https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/afghan2/Afghan0701-02.htm?ref=diplopolis.com). This is not contested history. Through the 1990s, the Inter-Services Intelligence funded, trained, and armed the movement that would [take Kabul in 1996](https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ex-president-hanged-by-taliban-after-fall-of-kabul-1.90501?ref=diplopolis.com). The calculation was strategic — a friendly government in Afghanistan, strategic depth against India, a proxy force that served Islamabad's regional ambitions without requiring Pakistani boots on the ground. It worked, until it did not. The [Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan](https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/ttp.html?ref=diplopolis.com) was the bill arriving. Born from the same ideological infrastructure that produced the Afghan Taliban, the TTP turned the apparatus inward. The safe houses, the recruitment networks, the theological justifications for violence; all of it came home. Pakistan had spent decades building a machine. The machine had its own ideas about who to point it at. Now Islamabad is formally [blaming Kabul](https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-says-afghan-based-terrorists-increasingly-use-us-arms-for-cross-border-attacks-/7957275.html?ref=diplopolis.com) for sheltering TTP commanders. The Afghan Taliban, Pakistan's oldest client, is harbouring Pakistan's most wanted enemies. The irony is so complete it almost requires admiration. Pakistan spent thirty years cultivating a relationship with Afghan militants and is now discovering that militants do not honour the terms of relationships. They honour the terms of ideology. And ideologically, the TTP and the Afghan Taliban share more with each other than either share with Islamabad. The deeper problem is not the TTP. It is that Pakistan has never resolved the fundamental contradiction at the heart of its security establishment. The belief that militant proxies can be managed indefinitely, that you can run a controlled fire in someone else's house without eventually burning your own. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. Afghanistan burned. Now the embers are back across the [Durand Line](https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/how-centuries-of-strife-shaped-modern-afghanistan?ref=diplopolis.com) and they are not cooling. Khawaja Asif's declaration of open war is the sound of a policy finally collapsing under its own weight. Pakistan cannot bomb its way out of a problem it ideologically created. Military operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the tribal belt have been running for years and [Operation Azm-e-Istehkam](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/24/azm-e-istehkam-can-new-pakistani-military-operation-curb-armed-attacks?ref=diplopolis.com), meaning Resolve for Stability in Urdu, is only its latest iteration. The TTP meanwhile, remains capable of spectacular violence inside Pakistani cities and military installations. The Pakistani Taliban's resilience is not a failure of military firepower. It is a failure of strategic imagination that stretches back decades and implicates every government, civilian and military, that has held power in Islamabad since 1979. The Afghan Taliban's position is worth understanding clearly. Kabul has its own reasons for tolerating the TTP. Sheltering them is leverage, a reminder to Islamabad that the relationship runs both ways, that [clients can become creditors](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2021-07-22/pakistans-pyrrhic-victory-afghanistan?ref=diplopolis.com). Every time Pakistan pressures Kabul on border management or trade or diplomatic recognition, the TTP's continued sanctuary in Afghan territory is the unspoken reply. Pakistan built that dynamic. It cannot now complain that Kabul is using it. The surprise is not that Pakistan is at war with the Taliban. The surprise is that anyone in Islamabad is surprised. When you spend thirty years building something: funding it, arming it, giving it theological cover and operational freedom, you do not get to be astonished by what it becomes. You especially do not get to declare open war on it as though it arrived uninvited. Pakistan did not inherit this war. It constructed it, carefully, over decades, with [considerable American funding](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/03/23/from-us-the-abcs-of-jihad/d079075a-3ed3-4030-9a96-0d48f6355e54/?ref=diplopolis.com) and Chinese acquiescence. Khawaja Asif's patience may have reached its limit. The patience of the TTP, fighting on terrain it knows, for a cause it believes in, with sanctuaries its patrons cannot eliminate, shows no such signs. Islamabad is now at war with its own policy. That war was always going to come. The only question was when Islamabad would stop pretending otherwise. ### The Loudest Critic in the Room URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/american-dissent-wartime-brian-mcginnis-us-foreign-policy/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T05:27:10.000Z On March 4, 2026, Brian McGinnis walked into a Senate Armed Services Subcommittee hearing in full Marine Corps uniform and did something that would be unthinkable in most democracies. He stood up and shouted at the people running the war. "America does not want to send its sons and daughters to [war for Israel](https://www.military.com/feature/2026/03/05/brian-mcginnis-removed-senate-hearing-after-protest-over-us-policy-toward-israel.html?ref=diplopolis.com)." Capitol Police moved immediately to restrain and remove him from the room as he refused to stop speaking. Senator Tim Sheehy of Montana, a Republican and former Navy SEAL, left his seat to help the police drag McGinnis out. As they pulled him through the doorway his arm caught in the frame. There was an audible snap as McGinnis broke his bone in the hallway of the United States Capitol. McGinnis is 44 years old. Having [served in Iraq](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/brian-mcginnis-war-veteran-mom-tim-sheehy-b2933465.html?ref=diplopolis.com) in 2003 he now works as a firefighter in Raleigh and his wife is Palestinian. He is running for Senate in North Carolina on the Green Party ticket. He is now charged with three counts of assaulting a police officer and three counts of resisting arrest. A GoFundMe [started for him](https://www.wral.com/news/local/north-carolina-man-charged-protesting-iran-war-senate-armed-services-hearing-assault-police-officer-wednesday/?ref=diplopolis.com) raised nearly $45,000 in days. This is a violent image. It is also an image of profound hope. Consider what happened in that hallway. A citizen - a veteran, a firefighter, a man who wore the uniform of the country whose policy he was opposing - walked into the room where the readiness of the US military was being reviewed and confronted it directly. He was removed by force. He was injured. He was charged. And then tens of thousands of Americans sent him money within 48 hours. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. This is what real opposition to Washington’s foreign policy looks like. Not a diplomatic note. Not a statement from a rival capital. An ordinary man in a hallway, screaming until his arm breaks. The United States goes to war often. But it also argues over those wars with a ferocity that few other powers can survive. Vietnam did not end because of a single battlefield defeat. It collapsed because the American public withdrew its consent. Iraq proceeded despite millions in the streets, but those streets created the political cost that eventually forced a withdrawal. The pattern is consistent. American power is durable. American patience is not. And American domestic politics — messy, furious, ungovernable — is the most reliable check on American foreign policy that exists. Now consider the contrast. In India, dissent during war does not survive long enough to be debated. It is [branded anti-national](https://www.newslaundry.com/2025/07/31/operation-sindoor-debate-credit-for-modi-blame-for-nehru?ref=diplopolis.com). As space for dissent closes, criticism becomes sedition and debate becomes betrayal. The rally of national sentiment is total and instant. A Brian McGinnis equivalent in an Indian parliamentary hearing is unimaginable. The system does not just silence dissent. It ensures most never attempt it. In the United States, that same space does not close. It gets louder. The spectacle of a veteran being dragged from a Senate hearing by his own government's police, is not a sign of institutional failure. It is evidence of a system mature enough to allow the confrontation to exist. Dissent during wartime is treated not as betrayal but as participation. Noisy, inconvenient, sometimes violent participation. But participation nonetheless. The real pressure on Washington never comes from the outside. Not from the UN General Assembly. Not from rival capitals. Not from the statements of governments that lack the standing to lecture. It comes from within. From the veteran in the hallway and the [student](https://www.instagram.com/p/DVr3WHjCQKn/?ref=diplopolis.com) on the lawn, the official who decides their [conscience](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cg4g66r3z40o?ref=diplopolis.com) is worth more or the one who chose [prison over silence](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/13/daniel-ellsberg-interview-pentagon-papers-50-years?ref=diplopolis.com). Messy. Inconsistent. Frequently ignored. But it ensures that American power is never fully insulated from the people it claims to represent. The loudest challenge to American foreign policy is American. In most of the world, that would be called a luxury. In the United States, it is called Tuesday. ### The Price of Impunity URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/iran-war-us-isolation-washington-allies-israel/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T05:25:21.000Z Pete Hegseth stands at the Pentagon podium and likens the decapitation of a sovereign state to a [football game](https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4421037/secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff-gen-dan/?ref=diplopolis.com) where the opponent has lost the script. He speaks of blitzes and drives while the White House releases SpongeBob and Nintendo Wii [memes to explain](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/11/arts/television/iran-war-trump-memes-social-media-videos.html?ref=diplopolis.com) Operation Epic Fury to a bewildered public. There is no strategic gravity in the room; there is only the rehearsed subservience of a middle manager desperate to please a demanding principal. Hegseth credits his boss for every tactical shift and told reporters at the Pentagon — [addressing Trump directly](https://www.foxnews.com/media/hegseth-defends-trump-iran-strikes-demands-media-get-right?ref=diplopolis.com) —'They no longer have a navy, Mr. President,’ he said. ‘Their naval commander was killed overnight in operations.’ Washington is now governed by men who have traded the heavy lifting of statecraft for the easier work of applause. This shift is more than a matter of style; it is a collapse of institutional integrity. Earlier American administrations were staffed by secretaries who carried the weight of their office independently. [James Mattis resigned](https://edition.cnn.com/2018/12/20/politics/james-mattis-resignation-letter-doc/index.html?ref=diplopolis.com) rather than execute an order he considered strategically indefensible. Colin Powell presented intelligence he [privately doubted](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/powell-calls-un-speech-painful/?ref=diplopolis.com) because he believed in the institution he represented. That era is over. A government of sycophants cannot conduct serious foreign policy because serious foreign policy requires the ability to say things the principal does not want to hear. Washington is now blinded by its own momentum and genuinely surprised to find that the world is not following its lead. Find this piece interesting? Dispatches by DiploPolis delivers sharp analysis and pointed commentary on power, politics, diplomacy, and world affairs — directly to your inbox. No neutrality. No noise. Just argument. This internal rot has produced a momentous miscalculation in the Middle East. The Trump administration assumes the old rules of diplomatic cover will hold forever regardless of the cost in blood. It is wrong. On February 28, 2026, a US strike hit the Shajareh Tayyebeh girls' school in Minab, killing [at least 168 people](https://www.justsecurity.org/134898/iran-school-strike-us-investigation/?ref=diplopolis.com). By conducting this war with such casual disregard for civilian life, Washington has inadvertently liberated its oldest allies from their historical obligations. That liberation did not begin with Iran. It began in Gaza. Seventy thousand Palestinians killed, an entire civilian infrastructure destroyed, famine used as a weapon of war — and through all of it, European governments provided diplomatic cover, abstained from votes, and looked away. The Iran war simply made looking away impossible. The Minab girls' school was one atrocity too many, in a war too obviously illegal, for governments that had already exhausted their capacity for silence. For decades, European capitals have operated under the heavy moral weight of the Holocaust. This historical guilt functioned as a yoke; it compelled them to provide unconditional diplomatic cover for Israeli actions. That yoke is being discarded in the face of the reality of 2026\. [Spain has closed its airspace and its bases](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/30/spain-closes-airspace-to-us-planes-involved-in-war-on-iran?ref=diplopolis.com); Italy has refused to allow its territory to be used for offensive strikes. The memory of the 20th century is no longer sufficient to justify the horrors of the 21st. The isolation is not theoretical; it is operational. Australia pointedly noted it had not been consulted before the conflict began, and NATO allies have refused to [help reopen the Strait of Hormuz](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/confrontation-between-united-states-and-iran?ref=diplopolis.com). Trump's response has been to call them cowards and tell them to get their own oil via Truth Social. The transactional nature of this administration has stripped away the last veneers of the rules-based order. European governments now recognise that the diplomatic cover they provided to Israel no longer buys them any leverage in Washington. They are watching a superpower stumble under the burden of its own ego and are finding no reason to remain in its shadow. Nowhere is the irony sharper than in the sudden rehabilitation of Pakistan. Donald Trump, who once accused Pakistan of [nothing but lies and deceit](https://edition.cnn.com/2018/01/01/politics/donald-trump-2018-pakistan?ref=diplopolis.com), now publicly refers to Army Chief Asim Munir as his ['favourite Field Marshal'](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/31/how-pakistans-asim-munir-became-trumps-favourite-field-marshal?ref=diplopolis.com). With the region's traditional mediators Qatar and Oman [incapacitated by Iranian strikes](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/11/qatars-foreign-minister-says-keeping-strait-of-hormuz-open-is-critical?ref=diplopolis.com), Islamabad is the only bridge left for the 15-point peace plan Washington is desperate to deliver to Tehran. The state Washington spent a decade shunning is now the only one it trusts to pass its notes. While the United States might eventually recover its senses under a future leader, Israel's situation is different in kind. Its standing was built on a unique moral foundation that is now dismantling itself. The diplomatic immunity that Israel enjoyed for decades relied on European memory of the Holocaust and American authority. Both have been destroyed. The Iran war has not just cost Washington its allies; it has cost Israel the cover that made its conduct possible. Neither Washington nor Jerusalem has yet understood what they have lost. Washington has lost its moral authority. Jerusalem has lost the only thing that made its survival a global consensus; it has lost the world's willingness to look away. That willingness, once gone, does not return on request. ### Spain Shows Spine URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/spain-shows-spine-us-bases-iran-war/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T05:24:12.000Z Donald Trump called Spain 'terrible'. He threatened to cut off all trade. He told the world the United States could 'just fly in and use it; nobody is going to tell us not to use it'. Spain's answer came the same week. No bases. No airspace. No exceptions. Washington was forced to [relocate 15 aircraft](https://thecsrjournal.in/fifteen-us-military-aircraft-exit-spain-bases-after-madrid-bars-use-in-iran-conflict/?ref=diplopolis.com), including critical Boeing KC-135 refuelling tankers, from the Rota and Morón military bases in southern Spain. These installations have served as key American logistical hubs for operations across Europe, Africa and the Middle East for decades. By [denying access](https://www.euractiv.com/news/spain-bans-us-iran-war-flights-from-its-airspace/?ref=diplopolis.com), Madrid did more than make a political statement; it severed the primary logistical artery for the US-Israel war on Iran. The practical cost to Spain was real. The political cost was higher. Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that NATO arrangements would have to be '[re-examined](https://www.eurotopics.net/en/355573/rubio-lashes-out-at-nato-partners-will-the-alliance-break?ref=diplopolis.com)' if allies denied basing rights while expecting American defence guarantees. The ultimatum from Washington was unambiguous: comply or lose your shield. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez [did not comply](https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/pedro-sanchez-europes-only-anti-war-prime-minister/article70797237.ece?ref=diplopolis.com). 'We are not going to be complicit in something that is bad for the world and is also contrary to our values and interests; just out of fear of reprisals from someone'. This was not a diplomatic negotiation; it was a rejection of the transactional logic. Europe says it opposes this war. It does not. Europe opposes Iran's response to this war. That distinction was visible from the earliest days of the conflict. Governments across the continent rushed to condemn Iranian retaliation with urgency, precision and unified language. On the American and Israeli strikes that triggered it, those same governments went quiet, or hedged, or found reasons to wait. They had concerns. They lacked positions. Under pressure, some are finally moving. [Italy denied US aircraft access](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/31/italy-denies-sicily-airbase-us-planes-carrying-weapons-iran-war?ref=diplopolis.com) to its base in Sicily, a decision made while Italy's own Defence Minister was being evacuated from Dubai as the war began. France restricted overflight rights for aircraft carrying military supplies to Israel, then quietly allowed American refuelling tankers displaced from Spain to operate from French territory. This is not opposition; it is managed discomfort. Spain did not need to recalibrate, because it never moved. Pedro Sánchez had already [suspended arms sales](https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240207-spain-suspends-arms-exports-to-israel-reiterates-need-for-palestine-statehood/?ref=diplopolis.com) to Israel over Gaza, one of the first European leaders to do so. He had already called the war on Iran illegal before the first week was out. This is not a government that discovered its conscience under pressure. Spain's refusal of the bases was stated on the first day of the conflict and has not shifted since. When Washington turned up the pressure with trade threats, NATO warnings and public contempt, Spain said nothing it had not already said. Even after Donald Trump took to Truth Social to [label allies as 'COWARDS'](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/03/31/europe-allies-trump-iran-war-opposition/?ref=diplopolis.com) for their refusal to assist in the regional firestorm, Madrid’s position remained firm. Defence Minister Margarita Robles [was direct](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/amp/world/spain-closes-airspace-to-u-s-planes-involved-in-iran-war?ref=diplopolis.com): the war is 'profoundly illegal and profoundly unjust', and that position was 'made perfectly clear to the US armed forces from the beginning'. Consistency is what makes Spain the exception. It is not about ideology or rhetoric. Every European government carries the same constraints Spain does; they have bases to protect, alliances to preserve and economies too large to risk casually. Spain carries all of it and still held its position. The difference is that it chose to treat international law as a principle rather than a convenience, something you uphold when it costs you, not just when it does not. Every other European government is now searching for a position it can defend to its citizens, its allies and to history. Spain already has one. It had one before the war started. In a continent where strategic autonomy has been debated for years as an aspiration, Spain enacted it quietly, at cost and without waiting for the rest of Europe to catch up. That is what sovereignty looks like when it means something. ### Weaponising the Law: When Discrimination Becomes Statute URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/israel-death-penalty-palestinians-discrimination-statute/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T05:23:03.000Z Itamar Ben-Gvir, Israel's national security minister, walked into the country's parliament, the Knesset, on Monday wearing a small metal noose on his lapel. It was a fitting image for a government that has made contempt for international norms its defining characteristic. In May 2024, Israel's UN Ambassador Gilad Erdan stood at the General Assembly podium and [fed a replica](https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-68994032?ref=diplopolis.com) of the UN Charter through a paper shredder — a protest against a vote on Palestinian rights. Four months later, Prime Minister Netanyahu returned to the same podium and [called the United Nations](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/israel-pm-remarks-un-ga-79-27sep24/?ref=diplopolis.com) an "antisemitic swamp" and a "contemptuous farce." Scores of diplomats walked out as he spoke. Defying international pressure, the Knesset on Monday passed legislation making death by hanging the default sentence in Israeli military courts for Palestinians convicted of deadly attacks against Israelis. The law is structured so that it cannot be applied to Jewish extremists convicted of similar crimes. The distinction is not incidental. It is architectural. Palestinians in the West Bank are tried in military courts with a conviction rate of over 99 percent. Israeli settlers who commit violence against Palestinians are tried in civilian courts, where judges retain far greater discretion. Under the new law, execution must be carried out within 90 days of sentencing. There is no right of appeal. That contempt has not been limited to symbolic gestures and invectives. Israel's own ministries and military officials have repeatedly warned that the death penalty bill could breach international law and expose Israeli commanders to arrest warrants abroad. Ben-Gvir dismissed those concerns. He [described hanging](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/25/israels-death-penalty-bill-for-palestinian-prisoners-moves-to-final-vote?ref=diplopolis.com) as "one of the options" for carrying out executions, adding that alternatives could include the electric chair or what he called "euthanasia." He said doctors had volunteered to participate, telling him: "Just tell us when." > Today, the State of Israel has taken a historic and necessary step in the global fight against terrorism. > > The passage of the law allowing for the death penalty for terrorists who commit premeditated, nationalistically motivated acts of murder sends a clear message: those who… [pic.twitter.com/5al3vgDU6j](https://t.co/5al3vgDU6j?ref=diplopolis.com) The United Nations — the institution that played a pivotal role in the creation of the state of Israel — has called the death penalty law a [violation](https://www.tbsnews.net/world/rights-groups-slam-israels-new-law-approving-use-death-penalty-against-palestinians-1398576?amp&ref=diplopolis.com) of international law. The question is not whether Israel is listening. It simply is not. Audacity of this scale does not come from nowhere. It comes from the certain knowledge that nothing will follow. Impunity is not just the absence of consequences. It is the confident expectation that there will be none — and that those who seek to enforce international law will face reprisal for the attempt. Consider the Trump administration's [sanctions](https://www.reuters.com/world/rubio-says-us-sanctioning-icc-judges-targeting-israel-2025-12-18/?ref=diplopolis.com) on ICC judges — punished for issuing arrest warrants against Israeli leaders for alleged war crimes in Gaza. The foreign ministers of Germany, France, Britain, Australia and Italy had urged Israel to abandon the bill before the vote, calling it "de facto discriminatory." Israel passed it anyway — 62 to 48\. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel immediately [filed a petition](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog%5Fentry/civil-rights-org-files-petition-against-death-penalty-law-calls-it-unconstitutional-discriminatory/?ref=diplopolis.com) with the Supreme Court, calling the law "discriminatory by design." The international community objected. Israel noted the objection and ignored it. Ben-Gvir campaigned for this law for years, making it a condition of his party's participation in Netanyahu's coalition. On Monday, Netanyahu came to the Knesset in person to cast his vote in favour of the bill. After the result was announced, Ben-Gvir [celebrated](https://www.newarab.com/news/champagne-knesset-israel-passes-racist-death-penalty-law?ref=diplopolis.com) with champagne, calling it a day of justice. Israel calls itself the only democracy in the Middle East. Democracy is not only about elections being held. It is also how a state values equality before the law. A state that mandates death for one people and exempts another has not failed that standard quietly or accidentally. It has written the failure into statute — and called it justice. The last person Israel executed by hanging was Adolf Eichmann in 1962 — a Nazi war criminal. That is the only precedent for the noose in Israeli legal history. Ben-Gvir wore it on his lapel as a badge of pride. The symbolism was not accidental. It was the point. As for the international community: condemnation without consequence is not opposition. It is permission. And when discrimination becomes statute, silence becomes complicity. ### When the Tyrant Has a Point URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/when-the-tyrant-has-a-point-to-north-korea-nuclear-deterrence-iran-war/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T05:21:52.000Z "Today's reality clearly [demonstrates](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/23/world/asia/north-korea-kim-iran-nuclear.html?ref=diplopolis.com) the legitimacy of our nation's strategic choice and decision to reject the enemies' sweet talk and permanently secure our nuclear arsenal." The man saying this [runs concentration camps](https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/north-korea?ref=diplopolis.com), starves his own people, and has never permitted a free election in his life. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, speaking to the country's Supreme People's Assembly on March 23, 2026, pointed at the US-Israel war on Iran to [justify his decision](https://edition.cnn.com/2026/03/25/asia/north-korea-nuclear-weapons-justified-iran-war-intl-hnk?ref=diplopolis.com) to keep and expand his country's nuclear weapons arsenal. "We now possess the power to pose a threat if necessary," he told the Assembly. "The nuclear shield firmly guarantees the development of all sectors of the country." A few days later, Kim oversaw the [testing of an upgraded solid-fuel engine](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/north-korea/north-korea-conducts-engine-test-missile-capable-targeting-us-mainland-rcna265656?ref=diplopolis.com) for missiles capable of reaching the American mainland. The speech and the missile test were not separate events. They were the same message, delivered twice. Kim's argument rests on a historical pattern he did not manufacture. Iraq had no nuclear weapons when the [United States invaded](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/longform/2023/4/5/iraq-war-20-years-on-visualising-the-impact-of-the-invasion?ref=diplopolis.com) in 2003, alleging Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) stockpiles that did not exist. Libya's Gaddafi [surrendered his nuclear programme](https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/chronology-libyas-disarmament-and-relations-united-states?ref=diplopolis.com) under American assurances of normalised relations, only to be killed by NATO-backed rebels eight years later. These are the cases Kim did not need to name. Every government watching this war already knows them. North Korea openly claims nuclear status and seeks recognition from Washington as a nuclear-armed state. Iran is the opposite case. Tehran signed the [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty](https://www.iaea.org/topics/non-proliferation-treaty?ref=diplopolis.com) (NPT) in 1968, ratified it in 1970, and has maintained that its programme is for peaceful purposes, with IAEA inspectors present. And yet US and Israeli forces [struck Iran on February 28](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/29/us-israel-war-on-iran-whats-happening-on-day-30-of-attacks?ref=diplopolis.com), claiming a preemptive campaign to eliminate imminent threats. A month into the war, with nearly two thousand Iranians dead and the country's civilian infrastructure, [universities](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/30/world/middleeast/iran-universities-strikes.html?ref=diplopolis.com) and research facilities under bombardment, Iranian politicians are [pushing to exit the NPT](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/28/lawmakers-push-npt-exit-as-us-israel-hit-irans-nuclear-sites-steel-plants?ref=diplopolis.com) entirely. The programme the war was launched to stop may be replaced by something far less constrained. The cure is accelerating the disease. The treaty designed to prevent nuclear proliferation is now, paradoxically, a casualty of a war fought in its name. In the process it has stripped Washington of the moral authority it claimed to defend. Here is the paradox Kim is counting on the world to notice. North Korea has missiles that can reach the American mainland. Iran did not. By any conventional logic of threat and deterrence, Pyongyang was always the more urgent target. Yet Iran was attacked and North Korea was not. The difference is not military capability. Iran sits on the [world's fourth largest oil reserves](https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/IRN?ref=diplopolis.com) and controls the Strait of Hormuz. North Korea has neither. Washington may also have calculated that a post-strike Iran, like [post-Maduro Venezuela](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/01/16/venezuela-oil-takeover-us-shipment-trump-.html?ref=diplopolis.com), could be reshaped into a compliant partner — regime change dressed as denuclearisation. Venezuela's oil fields are now being managed from Washington. Iran's, one suspects, were next on the list. The weapons were the pretext. The prize was always something else. Whether that calculation proves correct is another matter. That it was made at all is the point. Kim Jong Un is not reasonable. His regime is a monument to human cruelty, and nothing he says should be mistaken for wisdom. But a monster can state a fact. The fact is that the Iran war has demonstrated, with brutal clarity, that in American strategic thinking, countries are attacked not because of what weapons they have, but because of what Washington wants from them. This is the lesson Pyongyang is broadcasting, and it is the lesson every government without a nuclear arsenal is quietly absorbing. Iran's own politicians are arriving at the same conclusion from inside the rubble. Kim didn't need to make the argument. Washington made it for him. ### The Indispensable Bad Actor URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/pakistan-iran-mediation-the-indispensable-bad-actor/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T05:15:36.000Z Pakistan, not long ago, was a bad actor. Not anymore. Today it is indispensable. On Sunday morning, Pakistan's foreign minister Ishaq Dar hosted his counterparts from Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt in Islamabad to discuss what he called ['possible ways](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-hosts-regional-powers-iran-talks-with-focus-hormuz-proposals-2026-03-29/?ref=diplopolis.com) to bring an early and permanent end to the war in the region.' The foreign ministers were briefed on a potential framework for US-Iran talks. Their purpose, in short, was to consolidate a [diplomatic track](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/29/pakistan-hosts-four-nation-bid-to-encourage-us-iran-towards-diplomacy?ref=diplopolis.com) that has placed Islamabad at the centre of efforts to end the US-Israel war on Iran, relaying proposals between Washington and Tehran that neither side will deliver directly to the other. > Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Senator Mohammad Ishaq Dar received H.H. Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs today. The two sides will engage in comprehensive consultations on the evolving… [pic.twitter.com/9HpnJcyXXE](https://t.co/9HpnJcyXXE?ref=diplopolis.com) > > — Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Pakistan (@ForeignOfficePk) [March 29, 2026](https://twitter.com/ForeignOfficePk/status/2038306930758987818?ref%5Fsrc=twsrc%5Etfw&ref=diplopolis.com) 'Bad actor' is the language of American foreign policy, applied to states that operate outside accepted norms. Washington has had occasion to use it about Pakistan with some regularity. In January 2018, President Trump [terminated all military aid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistan%5Fand%5Fstate-sponsored%5Fterrorism?ref=diplopolis.com) to Islamabad, lamenting that over fifteen years the United States had handed Pakistan more than $33 billion and received nothing but "[lies and deceit](https://www.reuters.com/article/world/trump-says-us-has-gotten-nothing-from-pakistan-aid-idUSKBN1EQ114/?ref=diplopolis.com)" in return. His grievances were not without foundation — but they omitted an inconvenient history. The Taliban emerged from the mujahideen networks that Washington and Islamabad built together during the Soviet-Afghan war, funded by the CIA and managed by Pakistan's ISI. In 2011, Osama bin Laden was [found living in Abbottabad](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/pakistans-osama-bin-laden-report-was-pakistan-clueless-or-complicit-in-harboring-bin-laden/?ref=diplopolis.com), less than a mile from the country's premier military academy, after years as the world's most wanted man — whether Pakistani intelligence knew and chose silence, or simply failed to notice, neither answer reflects well. But it is a third fact that connects most directly to the war being mediated today. In February 2004, Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear programme, [confessed on live television](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004-04/features/closing-pandoras-box-pakistans-role-nuclear-proliferation?ref=diplopolis.com) to having transferred nuclear weapons technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea over the course of two decades. President Musharraf pardoned Khan the following day. When asked about the pardon, the US State Department spokesperson [replied](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004-04/features/closing-pandoras-box-pakistans-role-nuclear-proliferation?ref=diplopolis.com): "I don't think it's a matter for the United States to sit in judgment on." That statement has aged poorly. The centrifuge designs and components that [Pakistani scientists supplied](https://isis-online.org/publications/southasia/nuclear%5Fblack%5Fmarket.html?ref=diplopolis.com) to Iran's secret enrichment programme form the foundation of the nuclear capability that is used as a justification for the strikes that began on February 28\. Pakistan seeded the crisis that Pakistan is now being relied upon to resolve. Today, the United States is routing a [15-point peace framework](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/29/pakistan-hosts-four-nation-bid-to-encourage-us-iran-towards-diplomacy?ref=diplopolis.com) through Islamabad. Pakistan's army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, has built a working relationship with President Trump. Pakistan's foreign minister announced that Iran had agreed to allow twenty Pakistani-flagged ships through the Strait of Hormuz, a first confidence-building measure in a war that has now [killed](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/28/how-the-us-israel-war-on-iran-unfolded-in-its-first-four-weeks?ref=diplopolis.com) nearly two thousand Iranians and drawn in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. The Wall Street Journal, reporting on Pakistan's current mediation role, called it '[a remarkable return](https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/pakistan-trump-iran-war-84b8248e?mod=WSJ%5Fhome%5Fmediumtopper%5Fpos%5F2&ref=diplopolis.com) to the White House's confidence' for a country Trump had dismissed as a bad-faith actor. The Journal noted that Pakistan's return to American favour was less a matter of geopolitical rehabilitation than deliberate cultivation; it was deals involving Trump's inner circle, cryptocurrency, and critical minerals that propelled Islamabad back into Washington's good graces. None of this is to say the mediation will fail. A ceasefire, if it comes, will matter more than who arranged it. But the ease with which the bad actor designation is set aside when Washington needs something from Islamabad should give pause. Pakistan has not transformed. Its record has not been expunged. What changed is the calculation of need. ### The Shield Is Cracking URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-shield-is-cracking-israel-icj-genocide-accountability/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T05:11:56.000Z On March 19, 2026, Germany quietly did something it had loudly promised it would never do. It walked away from Israel’s defence at the International Court of Justice. Two years earlier, Berlin had stood before the world and called [South Africa’s genocide case against Israel](https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192?ref=diplopolis.com) baseless — political instrumentalization of the Genocide Convention, it said. Germany, of all countries, would not allow the Holocaust’s memory to be weaponised against the Jewish state. It would intervene. It would defend. It would stand firm. It did not stand firm. When the deadline arrived this week to formally file that intervention, [Germany was absent](https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260319-germany-withdraws-legal-backing-for-israel-in-icj-genocide-case/?ref=diplopolis.com). The explanation was procedural — Berlin is now itself a defendant at the ICJ, sued by Nicaragua for arming Israel, and felt it could not intervene on Israel’s behalf without compromising its own legal defence. Sensible lawyers had prevailed over solemn promises. But read the subtext. Germany — Israel’s second largest weapons supplier, the country whose entire post-war identity was constructed around the obligation to protect Jewish survival — has decided that defending Israel at The Hague is now too legally toxic to risk. Not morally wrong. Legally toxic. That is a different calculation entirely. And it tells you everything about how much the ground has shifted. The case at The Hague is no longer a distant legal abstraction. The [International Court of Justice](https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192?ref=diplopolis.com) — the highest court of the United Nations, which resolves disputes between states — has already issued [binding provisional measures](https://www.icj-cij.org/node/203447?ref=diplopolis.com) ordering Israel to prevent genocidal acts, ensure humanitarian aid reaches Gaza, and preserve evidence of what has occurred. These are not recommendations. They are legally binding orders. Israel has been accused by multiple human rights organisations and UN bodies of repeatedly violating them. A final ruling on whether Israel has breached the [1948 Genocide Convention](https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide-convention.shtml?ref=diplopolis.com) — the treaty written in direct response to the Holocaust — could come as late as 2028\. The court has not yet delivered that verdict. But it has seen enough to act. On the same day Germany was quietly retreating from The Hague, Benjamin Netanyahu was scheduled to appear in Budapest. Netanyahu is not a free man in the eyes of international law. The [ICC issued an arrest warrant for him on November 21, 2024](https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-state-palestine-icc-pre-trial-chamber-i-rejects-state-israels-challenges?ref=diplopolis.com) — for the war crime of starvation as a method of warfare and crimes against humanity including murder and persecution. Every one of the 125 ICC member states is legally obligated to arrest him if he sets foot on their territory. Hungary is still, for another 73 days, one of those states. He was scheduled to speak in person at CPAC Hungary — the annual conservative conference hosted by Orbán in Budapest. He [cancelled his in-person appearance](https://hungarytoday.hu/cpac-hungary-2026-to-feature-high-profile-conservative-leaders/?ref=diplopolis.com), citing security concerns related to the ongoing Iran war, participating instead only remotely. But this was not an isolated incident. It was the latest in a pattern. In January 2026, Netanyahu [skipped the World Economic Forum in Davos](https://www.newarab.com/news/netanyahu-skips-davos-over-fear-arrest-gaza-war-crimes?ref=diplopolis.com) after Switzerland confirmed it would arrest him — missing even the signing ceremony for Trump’s own Gaza ‘Board of Peace,’ of which Netanyahu was a named member. The warrant has not put him in a courtroom. But it has put him under house arrest on the world stage. The only ICC member state Netanyahu has physically entered since the warrant was issued is Hungary — the one country whose leader celebrated his arrival rather than arresting him. In [April 2025](https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/03/20/hungary-arrest-netanyahu-if-he-visits?ref=diplopolis.com), Netanyahu visited Hungary and was not arrested. The ICC found Hungary in formal non-compliance. The Assembly of States Parties noted the finding. Nobody acted. The reason Hungary will not arrest him is not legal confusion. It is deliberate political choice. Orbán did not merely ignore the warrant. He celebrated it. During Netanyahu’s last visit he announced [Hungary’s withdrawal from the ICC](https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/03/20/hungary-arrest-netanyahu-if-he-visits?ref=diplopolis.com) — a gesture so contemptuous of international law it amounted to a public declaration that the court’s authority ends wherever political friendship begins. Trump went further. He [sanctioned the ICC judges personally](https://www.commondreams.org/news/netanyahu-icc-arrest-warrant?ref=diplopolis.com) — the individuals who signed the warrant — using the economic power of the United States government to punish jurists for doing their jobs. The message from Washington and Budapest is not subtle: issue warrants against our allies and we will come for you. > **What we are witnessing is not the failure of international justice. It is its active sabotage by the very powerful nations that once championed it.** And yet the court still stands. The case still proceeds. The warrant still has Netanyahu’s name on it. That is because of a different set of countries entirely. The nations leading the charge at the ICJ are not the western powers that built the post-war legal order. They are [South Africa](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South%5FAfrica%27s%5Fgenocide%5Fcase%5Fagainst%5FIsrael?ref=diplopolis.com) — a country that lived under apartheid while western governments looked away and called it an internal matter. They are Nicaragua — small, poor, with no obvious geopolitical stake in the conflict — which filed a separate case against Germany itself for arming Israel, and in doing so forced the world’s most Holocaust-haunted nation to abandon Israel’s legal defence. They are [Colombia](https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192/intervention?ref=diplopolis.com), one of the earliest to file a declaration of intervention, calling the Genocide Convention “a cardinal instrument of international law.” They are [Bolivia](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/9/bolivia-joins-south-africas-icj-genocide-case-against?ref=diplopolis.com), which told the court that “Israel’s genocidal war continues, and the Court’s orders remain dead letters to Israel.” They are [Chile](https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192/intervention?ref=diplopolis.com), whose president announced the intervention in his annual address to Congress. They are [Ireland](https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192/intervention?ref=diplopolis.com), which overcame its own hesitation rooted in Holocaust memory to file its declaration in January 2025\. And they are [Namibia](https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-defends-israel-new-icj-interventions-south-africa-genocide-case?ref=diplopolis.com) — which carries the memory of its own genocide at German hands, committed between 1904 and 1908, and which filed its ICJ declaration in March 2026 drawing that parallel explicitly, while also blocking a vessel carrying military shipments bound for Israel. Together with Belize, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Senegal, South Africa and Malaysia, Namibia also helped form [The Hague Group](https://www.newarab.com/news/nine-states-launch-legal-action-against-israel-over-gaza-war?ref=diplopolis.com) — a formal coalition of Global South nations created specifically to defend the legitimacy of international legal institutions against the pressure being brought to bear by the United States. On March 12, 2026, the same day Namibia filed its declaration at the ICJ drawing the parallel to its own genocide, [the United States and Hungary filed their own declarations](https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-defends-israel-new-icj-interventions-south-africa-genocide-case?ref=diplopolis.com) — on Israel’s behalf, arguing the Genocide Convention should be interpreted narrowly and that Israel is not committing genocide. Hungary, which that same month was hosting Netanyahu in defiance of his ICC arrest warrant, was simultaneously filing legal papers defending him at The Hague. The United States, which has sanctioned the ICC judges who issued that warrant, was fighting Israel’s legal battles in the civil court while punishing the criminal court for doing its job. The shield does not merely endure. It is being actively reinforced. As of March 2026, [more than eighteen countries](https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192/intervention?ref=diplopolis.com) have filed declarations at the ICJ in support of South Africa’s case — among them Colombia, Bolivia, Chile, Ireland, Namibia, Mexico, Spain, Turkey, Cuba, Belgium, Brazil, Iceland and the Netherlands. Three countries have filed in Israel’s defence: the United States, Hungary, and Fiji. The numbers speak for themselves. The irony is precise and painful. The countries with the least power in the international system are using its legal instruments most faithfully. The countries with the most power are either sabotaging those instruments or retreating from them when the cost becomes too high. **The shield is cracking. Not because the powerful have found courage. Because the powerless have refused to be silent.** History does not always move in the direction of justice. But sometimes, unexpectedly, it moves because of the people who have the least reason to believe it will. South Africa did not have to file that case. Nicaragua did not have to sue Germany. Namibia did not have to speak. These are not powerful countries. They do not have vetoes at the Security Council. They cannot sanction judges or withdraw from treaties without consequence. They have no protection if the powerful decide to retaliate. They acted anyway. Because they have seen this before. Because they know what it looks like when the world decides that some lives are worth less than others, that some crimes are too inconvenient to prosecute, that some perpetrators are too important to hold accountable. They have lived that story. And they have decided they will not be silent witnesses to its repetition. The shield that protected Israeli state conduct from accountability for seven decades was not built from stone. It was built from guilt, from geopolitical interest, from the quiet agreement among powerful nations that certain questions would not be asked. It is cracking now — not because those nations have found courage, but because smaller, braver ones have refused to accept the agreement. The questions they are forcing into the open are not comfortable ones. They cut to the heart of what international law is actually for — whether it exists to protect the powerful from accountability or to hold all states equally to the principles the world agreed upon in the ruins of the Second World War. Those principles have a name. They were established at a place called [Nuremberg](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuremberg%5Ftrials?ref=diplopolis.com). And the full story of what they demand, of who has been shielded from them, and why, and for how long, is a reckoning the world can no longer avoid. ### The Dignity Deficit: When Leaders Stopped Being Serious URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-dignity-deficit-when-leaders-stopped-being-serious/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T05:10:58.000Z On August 9 and 10, 1941, two men sat across from each other aboard the U.S.S. Augusta in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, and decided the shape of the world to come. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill had not yet won the war. The outcome was far from certain. And yet they produced, in those few days at sea, a document — the [Atlantic Charter](https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/atlantic-conf?ref=diplopolis.com) — that would become the foundation of the post-war international order. What strikes you, looking back, is not just what they agreed. It is how they carried themselves. There was an understanding, unspoken but absolute, that the moment demanded everything they had. A Briton watching Churchill in those years felt something that went beyond politics. They felt pride. Pride in the office, in the bearing, in the sense that their country was represented by someone equal to the gravity of the hour. Fourteen years later, on the other side of the world, Jawaharlal Nehru stood before twenty-nine newly independent nations in Bandung, Indonesia. It was a [landmark gathering](https://www.nytimes.com/1955/04/18/archives/asiaafrica-unity-hailed-as-parley-opens-in-bandung-asiaafrica-unity.html?ref=diplopolis.com) — and its vision of the world order belonged neither to Washington nor to Moscow. It insisted that the voices of Asia and Africa had as much right to shape the future as the great powers of the West. The politics were different. The tradition was different. The side of history was different. And yet the quality of the moment was the same. An Indian watching Nehru at Bandung felt exactly what a Briton felt watching Churchill at sea — pride. The pride of seeing your leader rise to meet the weight of what history was asking. Churchill and Nehru agreed on almost nothing. One fought to preserve an empire, the other devoted his life to dismantling it. But both understood something that seems to have gone missing from the world's leading democracies — that leadership is not merely about power. It is about the authority that comes from being taken seriously. It is about gravitas. On March 19, 2026, in the Oval Office of the White House, a Japanese reporter asked President Donald Trump why the United States had not informed its ally Japan before launching strikes on Iran. It was a fair and important question. Japan depends on the Strait of Hormuz for a significant portion of its energy supplies. The war had begun without warning, without consultation, and with consequences the world was still struggling to absorb. The reporter said the decision had "confused" the Japanese. Trump's answer was a joke. *"We wanted surprise. Who knows better about surprise than Japan? OK? Why didn't you tell me about Pearl Harbor?"* Seated beside him was [Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-pearl-harbor-meeting-japanese-prime-minister/?ref=diplopolis.com), visiting Washington for the first time since her landslide election victory. She had come to discuss trade and security in the middle of a war her country had not been consulted about. Hearing Trump's response, she stiffened. Her eyes widened. On the American side, Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and other senior officials laughed. On the Japanese side, there was silence. Pearl Harbor is not a historical footnote. It is a wound, on both sides, that took generations to heal. In 2016, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made a solemn visit to the Pearl Harbor memorial alongside President Barack Obama, offering what he called sincere and everlasting condolences. It was a moment of extraordinary diplomatic care — two leaders, representing countries that had once been at war, choosing gravity over convenience. Nine years later, his successor sat in silence while the American president made it a punchline. There was a time when the world listened when an American president spoke. Now it watches to see what he will say next. Trump is not alone in this. Across the democratic world a new style of leadership has emerged that mistakes performance for statecraft, volume for authority, and visibility for power. Nowhere is this more visible than in India, where Prime Minister Narendra Modi has elevated the embrace to an instrument of foreign policy. The hugs are legendary. Bear hugs, back-slapping embraces, lingering clasps that seem to catch their recipients visibly off guard. World leaders have been pulled into Modi's arms at summits, at bilateral meetings, on the sidelines of multilateral forums. The Indian media, and the ecosystem of ministers and officials that surrounds him, presents each embrace as evidence of India's rising global stature — proof that the world's leaders seek Modi out, that India is now a country others come to rather than overlook. But there is a difference between being sought out and being grabbed. And there is a difference between warmth and theatre. The hug that is photographed, captioned, and shared across a hundred government social media accounts within minutes is not diplomacy. It is content. And content, however viral, does not build alliances, resolve disputes, or construct the patient architecture of trust that serious international relationships require. [Boris Johnson](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-kingdom/how-brexit-and-boris-broke-britain?ref=diplopolis.com) understood the performance instinct — and weaponised it deliberately. The dishevelled hair, the bumbling manner, the jokes at inopportune moments — Johnson cultivated an image of loveable chaos that his supporters read as authenticity. On the international stage it was something else entirely. [Two former British Prime Ministers from opposite parties](https://globalnews.ca/news/7331909/uk-leaders-boris-johnson/?ref=diplopolis.com), John Major and Tony Blair, jointly accused him of “shaming” the country. European counterparts found themselves genuinely uncertain when Johnson was being serious — an uncertainty that was not an asset during the Brexit negotiations but a liability that Britain is still paying for. As Foreign Affairs concluded, far from achieving the promised “Global Britain,” Johnson left the country without a stable relationship with Europe and barely present in much of the developing world. The persona that played so well domestically was, internationally, a slow and costly erosion of trust. In each of these cases, the inner circle around the leader tells its own story. When six American soldiers were killed in the Iran war and reporters asked difficult questions, Secretary of War [Pete Hegseth](https://newrepublic.com/post/207957/pete-hegseth-thank-donald-trump-iran-war?ref=diplopolis.com) did not grieve publicly or reflect seriously on the cost of war. He stood at a Pentagon briefing and declared that the world, Europe, and even the American press should be saying one thing to Donald Trump — thank you. Not for a policy achievement. Not for a diplomatic success. Simply for being Trump. In India, Modi’s ministers compete on television to attribute every foreign policy development, however small, to the Prime Minister’s personal vision. Johnson’s advisors, meanwhile, famously told him what he wanted to hear until the contradictions became impossible to sustain. The sycophancy is not incidental. It is structural. When those closest to power stop pushing back, the leader stops being corrected. When the leader stops being corrected, the behaviour escalates — the jokes get cruder, the hugs get tighter, the performance gets louder. There is no one left to say: this is not what the moment requires. Roosevelt had people who pushed back. Churchill’s cabinet argued with him fiercely — sometimes bitterly. Nehru had [V.K. Krishna Menon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V.%5FK.%5FKrishna%5FMenon?ref=diplopolis.com), described as the second most powerful man in India, who was formidably difficult, and [Sardar Patel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vallabhbhai%5FPatel?ref=diplopolis.com), who challenged him directly on China policy until his dying day. Serious leaders were surrounded by people willing to say no. Today they are surrounded by people competing to say thank you. There is a temptation to treat all of this as entertainment — to scroll past the Pearl Harbor joke, to share the hug meme, to file it all under the general category of political embarrassment that democracies somehow survive. The meme is the medium now. A leader's most undignified moment becomes a gif within hours, translated into dozens of languages, replayed endlessly across platforms that have no memory and no mercy. What once faded is now permanent. What once stayed in the room now circles the globe before the press conference is over. **But the stakes are not merely reputational. They are civilisational.** The world in 2026 faces a convergence of challenges that has no precedent since 1945\. Climate change is rewriting the geography of habitable land and reliable water. Artificial intelligence is reshaping economies, militaries, and the very infrastructure of democratic decision-making. Nuclear arsenals are expanding rather than contracting. The rules-based international order — imperfect, contested, but functional for eight decades — is fraying at every seam. The Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant portion of the world's energy supplies once flowed freely, is now a war zone. Meeting these challenges requires exactly what the post-war generation provided — leaders capable of sustained, serious, trust-based diplomacy. Leaders whose word means something. Leaders whose allies do not leave their meetings wondering whether the whole thing was a performance. Leaders in whose presence a Japanese Prime Minister does not have to sit in silence, her eyes wide, while a joke about Pearl Harbor lands on the other side of the table. In 1945, the architects of the post-war order understood that the moment demanded more than power. It demanded credibility — the intangible authority that comes from being taken seriously by friend and adversary alike. Churchill and Roosevelt had it. Nehru had it, in a different register, for a different world. It was not given to them by their office. It was earned, over decades, through the quality of their seriousness. Credibility, once lost, is not easily rebuilt. Wars damage hard power — armies can be rebuilt, economies can recover. But the authority that comes from being taken seriously is a different kind of asset entirely. It cannot be manufactured or purchased. It can only be demonstrated, patiently, over time — and it can be destroyed in a moment. In an Oval Office. In front of a silent Japanese delegation. With a joke about Pearl Harbor. **The world is not short of power. It is short of leaders equal to the power they hold.** **That is the deficit we cannot afford.** ### Platforms, Power, and the Politics of Control: A Conversation with John P. Wihbey URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/platforms-power-politics-of-control-john-wihbey-interview/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T05:09:27.000Z Every day, billions of people wake up and reach for a screen. They scroll through feeds curated by algorithms they did not design, shaped by rules they did not agree to, enforced by companies that answer to no democratic body. The question of who governs this vast digital commons — and whether it can be governed at all — is one of the defining political challenges of our era. It is a question that touches free speech, national security, electoral integrity, and the very structure of public life in democratic societies. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/05/john-wihbey_northeastern-headshot.png) John P. Wihbey Associate Professor, Northeastern University Institute for Information, the Internet & Democracy (IIID) Director, AI-Media Strategies (AIMES) Lab [John P. Wihbey](https://camd.northeastern.edu/people/john-p-wihbey/?ref=diplopolis.com) has spent years thinking carefully about this problem. An associate professor of media innovation at Northeastern University, co-founder of the Institute for Information, the Internet & Democracy, and director of the AI-Media Strategies Lab, Wihbey brings to the debate both scholarly rigor and a journalist's instinct for the concrete and the consequential. His book, [Governing Babel: The Debate over Social Media Platforms and Free Speech — and What Comes Next](https://amzn.to/3POLMEA?ref=diplopolis.com), published by MIT Press, is one of the most serious attempts yet to imagine what a legitimate, workable framework for platform governance might look like. Efforts to regulate platforms have so far produced wildly divergent results — Europe's Digital Services Act represents one ambitious attempt at accountability, while the United States has moved haltingly, and authoritarian governments have simply weaponised the question of governance to serve their own ends. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/05/governing-babel-cover-jpeg.jpg)](https://amzn.to/3POLMEA?ref=diplopolis.com) The title draws on a powerful image. Babel, in the biblical story, is the moment when shared language collapses and communication fractures into confusion. For Wihbey, it is an apt metaphor for the contemporary information environment — where the same platforms that gave voice to Arab Spring protesters also enabled genocide incitement in Myanmar, where the same algorithms that connect diaspora communities also fuel political polarisation and coordinated disinformation campaigns. In democracies like India, governments have directed platforms to remove posts or suppress content under the broad banners of national security, public order, and electoral integrity — creating legal cover for what critics argue is straightforward political self-interest. The pattern is neither uniquely Indian nor uniquely Asian; it is a global disease spreading through democratic and authoritarian systems alike. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/05/book-review.png)](https://www.diplopolis.com/content/files/2026/05/governing-babel-review-social-media-governance.html) DiploPolis spoke with Wihbey about his central arguments, the prospects for meaningful platform regulation, and why he believes the choices made in the next decade will determine the shape of democratic life for a century to come. **THE INTERVIEW** **Q. Social media platforms are in serious need of an intervention, but the key question is, who truly 'governs' Babel today — should it be the government, the platforms themselves, or some other form of mechanism?** We need regulations that examine and target broad patterns of harm, with a decision-making mechanism that draws its credibility from a democratic source. I could see a hybrid regulator, with appointed commissioners serving with citizen juries or assemblies helping to create legitimacy. **Q. 'Governing' and 'free speech' are ideas that pull in opposite directions. What is the kind of governance that can balance freedom with responsibility in the online world?** The kind of governance that can balance freedom with responsibility in the online world could be organized around what we might call a 'response principle' — an approach rooted not in censorship but in active stewardship and demonstrable duty of care. The key is to judge platforms not on individual posts or instances, but on broad patterns or the totality of their actions in different problem areas — their good faith and diligence in responding to systemic harms. Such governance would be 'effects-based,' meaning regulation does not specify how platforms attend to online harms but rather focuses on outcomes in terms of mitigating or reducing those harms. This requires transparency of evidence, capacity for revision, and orderly procedures for iteration of new rules. Platforms should be encouraged to preserve speech rather than removing it (wherever possible), but vigorously encouraging counterspeech, labeling, right of reply, and other algorithmic tools. We should also interrogate the defaults and design of their products. **Q. Many governments now invoke 'free speech' selectively to justify either censorship or inaction. How do we escape such politicisation of the free-speech debate? How can societies protect open expression and still demand accountability from platforms that have become global gatekeepers of information?** To escape the politicisation of the free-speech debate, we must return to deeper democratic traditions and international human rights law as our North Star, rather than allowing free speech to become a selective political cudgel. The solution lies in smart regulation of internet intermediaries — ensuring their compliance with human rights due diligence, meaningful transparency, and due process requirements, rather than viewpoint- or content-based regulation. This means social media companies should not automatically comply with state requests that violate international human rights law; rather, states should bring their laws into conformity with their UN commitments. A country's courts and judicial system are the appropriate places to render verdicts on whether content is illegal, not politicians in executive branch positions making unilateral decisions. We need regulatory frameworks that are grounded in the deep structures of open societies and continuous with democratic traditions — frameworks that resist both authoritarian censorship and laissez-faire abandonment of responsibility. **Q. Social media has been a double-edged sword — giving voice to the voiceless, but also playing a divisive role. Do you believe we can rebuild trust in the digital world, or has the age of universal public discourse ended for good?** While the age of universal public discourse faces profound challenges, I do not believe it has ended for good — though rebuilding trust will require a fundamental shift in how we approach platform governance. The current moment resembles the early days of broadcast regulation, when new media technologies seemed chaotic and unmanageable. History shows us that it took from roughly 1912 to the 1960s to formulate rules around mass media in the United States; we are likely still decades away from fully getting our arms around social platforms and the new world of networked expression. Trust can be rebuilt, in part, through what we might call the transparency of evidence and orderly procedures for rule-making and revision. Platforms must demonstrate active response to harms, not merely voluntary and selective attention to problems. This means regular public reporting, compliance baselines, and proof that companies are exercising social responsibility as stewards of the information commons. **Q. Many people today trust neither governments nor tech platforms. What, in your view, are the first small steps we can take to rebuild shared trust and shared facts — without falling into censorship or cynicism?** Unfortunately, there are very challenging trends relating to political economy and technological innovation that run deeper than content moderation problems. My general view is that we need platforms to help reinvigorate journalism and other knowledge institutions. Platforms will increasingly come under pressure as the underlying societies in which they operate begin to deteriorate politically. I have no faith that platforms will suddenly become more prosocial, but I think they may see incentives to help rebuild the public sphere. They might also think more about what we might call the 'social epistemology' facilitated by their algorithms and design. In an ideal way, they would see their task as establishing instrumental value — helping users understand the origin, source, and context of information — and knowledge value, so users can make good judgments and formulate true, justified beliefs. We must also ensure platforms treat people fairly as subjects of discussion, creating systems that listen carefully and respond to coordinated harms. **Q. In Nepal, the government's temporary ban on social media platforms ignited public anger and unrest, culminating in the collapse of the ruling administration. How do you interpret such state actions — as legitimate attempts to restore order, or as warning signs of how easily 'governing Babel' can slide into digital authoritarianism?** Such state actions represent warning signs of how easily 'governing Babel' can slide into digital authoritarianism when governments lack transparent, rights-respecting frameworks for addressing online volatility. The pattern we see globally — from Uganda to Russia to India — reveals what happens when executive authorities make unilateral content decisions without judicial oversight or adherence to international human rights norms. These shutdowns reflect the deeper problem that nearly every society faces: the growing contest between platforms and government power, often resulting in damage to human rights and free speech. To manage online volatility without resorting to shutdowns, democracies need mechanisms rooted in what Irene Khan, the UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Opinion and Expression, calls 'survivor rights' — the recognition that access to verifiable information from outside conflicts is essential during times of strife. Companies must hold strong against government requests that violate international human rights law, while states must bring their laws into conformity with UN commitments. New, rights-respecting platform regulatory bodies across countries could serve as a clearinghouse for government-platform communications, documenting interactions and providing legitimate lanes for urgent concerns while preventing coercion. **Q. The US and Europe have very different traditions of free expression, and countries like India, Brazil, and Kenya are experimenting with their own regulatory paths. Do you see the future of online speech governance becoming more globalised or more fragmented along cultural and political lines?** The future of online speech governance appears destined to become more fragmented along cultural and political lines, at least in the near term, though the aspiration for synchronised global norms remains vital. Our own public opinion research across democracies revealed stark differences: Americans are clear outliers in supporting uninhibited free expression and resisting censorship measures, while publics in South Korea, Mexico, and the United Kingdom show greater support for stringent moderation and regulation. Europe's 'Brussels Effect' through the Digital Services Act suggests one path toward alignment, as companies potentially synchronise global efforts with EU rules as prevailing norms. Yet we are increasingly witnessing what Ian Bremmer calls a 'technopolar' world, where technological forces make the cohesion of international, state-based rules more difficult over time. The question of whether fragmentation or alignment prevails may ultimately depend on whether major democracies can articulate compelling visions that give countries a choice rather than forcing them to choose between American, European, and Chinese models. **Q. From the Arab Spring to the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, social media has become both a battlefield and a diplomatic tool. Do you think digital platforms have strengthened or weakened the ability of states to manage conflict, shape narratives, and build consensus internationally?** Digital platforms have both strengthened and weakened the ability of states to manage conflict and build consensus, creating a paradoxical situation where governments face unprecedented challenges to narrative control while simultaneously gaining new tools for surveillance and information warfare. The technology has fundamentally altered the landscape, showing how initial democratic promise can collapse when platforms lack the local contextual knowledge, language expertise, and human resources to properly manage communal violence or contested elections. Platforms have become speech police without adequate accountability to either government or civil society, leaving them pulled by competing incentives — profit and growth, political power and conformity, and the relentless creative energies of human users. Whether digital platforms ultimately strengthen or weaken state power depends less on the technology itself than on whether democracies can establish frameworks that hold platforms accountable as stewards of the information commons while resisting authoritarian demands for censorship. **Q. Social media has become a new arena of geopolitical competition, with governments and state-linked actors using it to spread disinformation and influence politics beyond their borders. How do you see this weaponisation of digital communication altering the balance of power among nations?** The weaponisation of digital communication as a tool of geopolitical competition represents perhaps the defining challenge of our technopolar moment, fundamentally altering the balance of power by creating what we might call an information arms race that transcends traditional state capabilities. China's full court press through information and communications technology, Russia's deployment of social media for political warfare, and other state-linked actors' efforts to shape narratives beyond their borders all exploit the underlying logic of hands-off communications rules that emerged from Section 230's original intent. To contain this weaponisation, democracies need diplomatic approaches that acknowledge countries now have choices — between American libertarian models, European regulatory frameworks, and Chinese authoritarian alternatives. Defending the integrity of information ecosystems requires not just technical solutions but sustained investment in trust and safety professionals, local contextual knowledge, and the kind of active response that demonstrates duty of care — treating this as a systemic risk comparable to challenges in financial or health industries. **Q. As we look ahead to the next decade, do you see the digital communication landscape moving toward greater openness and accountability, or deeper fragmentation and control? What will determine which path we take?** The digital communication landscape stands at a historical pivot point where the trajectory toward either openness with accountability or deeper fragmentation and control remains genuinely uncertain, though current signs are not encouraging. The path we take will be determined, in some large part, by whether the United States can articulate a compelling vision for platform governance rooted in a response principle — or whether the non-regulation status quo and race to the bottom will persist. Other critical factors include whether democracies can establish regulatory frameworks before generative AI agents saturate the online landscape, whether international human rights law gains force as a standard for corporate social responsibility, and whether major powers can offer models that give countries genuine choices. My reading of history and the current moment suggests that without urgent action, we are more likely to see deeper fragmentation than meaningful alignment, as the clouds of moral and political darkness continue spreading across the globe. Yet if we take the long view that history demands — recognising we are somewhere in the early 1930s of this hundred-year journey — there remains hope that new rules rooted in democratic traditions can emerge, preserving innovation and free speech while acknowledging the power of networked communications to inflict harm. The choice between openness and control is ultimately ours to make, but the urgency of response cannot be overstated. **ABOUT THE AUTHOR** [*John P. Wihbey*](https://camd.northeastern.edu/people/john-p-wihbey/?ref=diplopolis.com) *is Associate Professor of Media Innovation at Northeastern University, where he co-founded the Institute for Information, the Internet & Democracy and directs the AI-Media Strategies Lab. He has served as a research consultant to social media companies, foundations, and government.* [*Governing Babel: The Debate over Social Media Platforms and Free Speech — and What Comes Next*](https://amzn.to/3POLMEA?ref=diplopolis.com) *is published by MIT Press (2025).* ### The Ungoverned Commons: Can Democracy Tame Social Media? URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/governing-babel-review-social-media-governance/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T05:07:23.000Z The era of media has changed. From the printed broadsheet to the radio to the television and now to the smartphone screen, the way human beings consume and produce information has undergone a series of dramatic transformations — each one unsettling, each one eventually absorbed into the fabric of social and political life. But something about the latest transformation feels different in scale, in speed, and in consequence. Social media has not merely changed how we receive information. It has changed who gets to produce it, who gets to amplify it, and — most consequentially — who gets to decide what remains visible and what disappears. The arrival of the camera phone gave birth to what mainstream media eagerly branded citizen journalism — a term that flattered the industry's own instincts, since it imagined ordinary people as junior reporters feeding footage upward to professional gatekeepers. That conception was almost immediately overtaken by reality. Social media did not merely give citizens a channel to the newsroom. It gave them a platform of their own — one that could reach millions without passing through any editorial filter at all. Today, anyone with a phone and a following is a broadcaster, a propagandist, an organiser, or all three simultaneously. It is this new reality — vast, ungoverned, consequential, and deeply resistant to the old frameworks of media regulation — that [John P. Wihbey](https://camd.northeastern.edu/people/john-p-wihbey/?ref=diplopolis.com) sets out to address in [Governing Babel](https://amzn.to/3POLMEA?ref=diplopolis.com). An associate professor of media innovation at Northeastern University and co-founder of the Institute for Information, the Internet & Democracy, Wihbey has produced a serious and timely work that asks perhaps the most important governance question of our digital age: who is responsible when the information commons goes wrong — and what should we do about it? **The Babel of Our Times** The book's title is apt in ways that extend beyond the merely metaphorical. In the biblical story, Babel is the moment when shared language collapses, when the ambition to build something that reaches the heavens produces only confusion and fragmentation. Wihbey sees in this ancient parable a precise description of the contemporary information environment. Seven major social media platforms — YouTube, Facebook, WhatsApp, Messenger, Instagram, WeChat, and TikTok — each count more than one billion active users. We are, as he puts it, building technological towers. But the condition of modern Babel is one of permanent unruliness, a multiplication of voices and views that no single authority can contain or comprehend. The consequences of this unruliness are not abstract. Wihbey opens with a panoramic survey of the crises that have defined the social media era. The storming of the United States Capitol in January 2021, when a mob fuelled by months of online disinformation attempted to stop the certification of a presidential election, stands as his central American example. But his canvas is global. In Russia, law enforcement agencies have used social media to reverse-engineer protest communities, identify dissidents, and deliver them to the state. In India, the government ordered platforms to restrict content during the farmers' protest — one of the most sustained democratic demonstrations the country had seen in decades. In Uganda, Nepal, and across the Arab world, governments have simply switched platforms off when the political temperature rose. [![Digital media screens displaying political and diplomatic content.](https://www.diplopolis.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Interview.png)](https://www.diplopolis.com/platforms-power-politics-of-control-john-wihbey-interview/) Across these varied flashpoints, Wihbey identifies a set of common questions that networked communication now forces upon every society: who gets to do the gatekeeping — the global platforms or national governments? To what degree do platforms respect higher principles, such as international human rights law, that transcend nation states? And what happens when the nation state itself is the threat to its own citizens? These are not questions with easy answers. But they are questions that can no longer be deferred. **The Response Principle** At the heart of [Governing Babel](https://amzn.to/3POLMEA?ref=diplopolis.com) is a deceptively simple argument. Wihbey does not advocate for censorship. He does not propose that governments should dictate what citizens may read or say online. What he argues, instead, is that the platforms which host the world's public discourse have a responsibility — a duty of care, in the language of common law — to respond to patterns of harm in good faith and with persistence. He calls this the response principle. The distinction is important and worth dwelling on. Under the response principle, a platform is not judged on whether any individual post was removed or allowed to stand. It is judged on whether it acted in good faith when systemic harms emerged — whether it invested in the tools, the people, and the processes needed to detect and mitigate problems at scale. This is what Wihbey calls an effects-based approach: regulation does not specify how platforms must act, but holds them accountable for what actually happens as a result of their choices. The question regulators would ask is not 'did you take down this post?' but 'did you respond seriously to this category of harm, and can you show us the evidence?' ![](https://www.diplopolis.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/John-Wihbey_Northeastern-headshot.png) John P. Wihbey Associate Professor, Northeastern University Institute for Information, the Internet & Democracy (IIID) Director, AI-Media Strategies (AIMES) Lab To enforce this principle, Wihbey envisions a new regulatory body — not a resurrection of the Federal Communications Commission, which was designed for the broadcast era, but something more suited to the democratic demands of the twenty-first century. He imagines a hybrid institution, with appointed commissioners working alongside citizen juries or assemblies, designed to give the regulatory process both technical competence and democratic legitimacy. Platforms would be required to file regular public reports, demonstrate compliance baselines, and provide transparent evidence of their response efforts. The goal is not to silence speech but to make the stewardship of the information commons a public and accountable act. Wihbey grounds this argument in a sweeping historical account of how democracies have regulated powerful communications technologies before. It took from roughly 1912 to the 1960s to develop a workable regulatory framework for mass media in the United States. By his reckoning, we are somewhere in the early 1930s of the social media era — early enough that the problem still feels chaotic and intractable, but not so early that the outlines of a solution cannot be glimpsed. The hundred-year journey, as he calls it, has barely begun. **A Powerful Argument — and Its Limits** [Governing Babe](https://amzn.to/3POLMEA?ref=diplopolis.com)l makes its central case with clarity, historical depth, and genuine intellectual seriousness. Wihbey is at his best when he is connecting the present crisis to deeper traditions — excavating the First Amendment jurisprudence of the early twentieth century, revisiting Eleanor Roosevelt's foundational work on international human rights, tracing the evolution of broadcast regulation from the chaos of early radio to the relative order of the mid-century FCC. The book earns its ambitions. It is not a polemic or a policy brief. It is an attempt to think carefully about a hard problem, and it largely succeeds. Yet a question nags, and it is one the book does not fully resolve. Wihbey's response principle assumes that the political will to implement it exists, or can be created. But consider what that implementation actually requires: a government willing to establish a genuinely independent regulatory body; a civil society robust enough to participate meaningfully in its proceedings; platforms willing to accept accountability rather than capture the regulator; and a judiciary capable of enforcing the results without political interference. In the United States, where Wihbey's policy prescriptions are primarily aimed, this may be an achievable — if difficult — aspiration. Elsewhere, it is harder to sustain the optimism. Readers from countries like India, where independent institutions have faced sustained pressure and civil society organisations operate under increasing legal constraint, will find themselves asking a pointed question: what happens to the response principle when the government that is supposed to enforce it is also the actor most interested in weaponising social media for its own purposes? Wihbey acknowledges the global dimension of the problem throughout the book, but his solutions remain anchored in the American context. The gap between the universality of his diagnosis and the specificity of his prescription is the book's most significant limitation. There is also a deeper philosophical question lurking beneath the book's argument — one that Wihbey gestures toward but does not fully confront. Social media is routinely blamed for the disruptions of our political era: the rise of populism, the collapse of shared facts, the incitement to violence. But were not people capable of all of these things before social media existed? The India Against Corruption movement of 2011 mobilised millions through a powerful combination of social media, television, and street-level organising — Facebook and Twitter playing a transformative role in mass mobilisation, information dissemination, and agenda-setting for mainstream media. And yet India's independence movement had mobilised an entire nation against an empire with nothing more than print, oratory, and human courage. This paradox runs through the entire social media debate: the very same platforms that governments have used to identify and suppress dissidents are the platforms through which citizens have organised to hold those same governments accountable. The tools of oppression and the tools of liberation are, in this case, identical — which is precisely why blunt censorship is the wrong answer, and why getting regulation right matters so enormously. People have always assembled, always protested, always been susceptible to propaganda and capable of political violence. The question of whether social media has fundamentally changed human nature — or merely accelerated and amplified tendencies that were always present — is one that the governance frameworks of the future will need to answer. Governing Babel takes us a long way toward the right questions. That it does not resolve all of them is less a criticism than an honest acknowledgement of the difficulty of the terrain. **Verdict** [Governing Babel](https://amzn.to/3POLMEA?ref=diplopolis.com) is essential reading for anyone who thinks seriously about democracy, technology, and the future of public life. John P. Wihbey has written a book that is historically informed, analytically honest, and genuinely useful — not as a final answer, but as a serious contribution to a conversation that societies everywhere urgently need to have. The response principle is the right framework: humane, effects-based, and grounded in democratic traditions rather than authoritarian impulse. Whether the political conditions necessary to implement it can be created — in Washington, let alone in New Delhi or Nairobi — remains the harder and more open question. Wihbey's hundred-year journey has barely begun, and the road ahead is considerably less certain than even his cautious optimism allows. **BOOK DETAILS** [Governing Babel: The Debate over Social Media Platforms and Free Speech — and What Comes Next by John P. Wihbey](https://amzn.to/3POLMEA?ref=diplopolis.com). MIT Press, 2025. ### The Ground India Lost URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-ground-india-lost/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T05:06:02.000Z On the morning of February 28, as the United States and Israel launched their [air campaign against Iran](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/12/who-bombed-the-iranian-girls-school-killing-more-than-170-what-we-know?ref=diplopolis.com), a missile struck the Shajareh Tayyebeh girls’ elementary school in Minab, a small town in southern Iran. The school was located near a base belonging to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The roof collapsed on the children inside, killing [more than 170 people](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026%5FMinab%5Fschool%5Fairstrike?ref=diplopolis.com) — most of them schoolgirls between the ages of seven and twelve, along with their teachers and the parents who had rushed to bring them home to safety. > India once spoke for the voiceless. Not anymore. Wreckage identified at the scene included a satellite antenna and an actuator motor, [identified by CNN](https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/11/politics/us-iran-school-strike-civilians?ref=diplopolis.com) and munitions experts, including those from Bellingcat, as components of a US-made Tomahawk missile. Preliminary [findings](https://www.npr.org/2026/03/11/nx-s1-5744981/pentagon-iran-missile-school-hegseth?ref=diplopolis.com) from the US military’s own investigation confirm American responsibility. [Amnesty International](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/03/usa-iran-those-responsible-for-deadly-and-unlawful-us-strike-on-school-that-killed-over-100-children-must-be-held-accountable/?ref=diplopolis.com) and [Human Rights Watch](https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/03/07/us/israel-investigate-iran-school-attack-as-a-war-crime?ref=diplopolis.com) have called for accountability and described the attack as a potential war crime. New Delhi said nothing. And its silence was loud. India felt like a nation that has sacrificed itself on the altar of pragmatism — a nation that has lost its conscience. Not a word of regret. Not a word of condemnation. Not even the careful diplomatic formulation of “concern for civilian lives” that countries use when they want to register disapproval without naming anyone. Several nations stayed quiet for their own convenient reasons. But India was never supposed to be one of several nations. India had a position. For decades since independence, nations have looked to India to see what it would say and how it would behave. Big powers tried to bring India along precisely because of the weight India’s voice carried. India’s silence wasn’t just about staying quiet when someone unknown killed children. India stayed silent when its own strategic partner — the United States, the country New Delhi has been tilting toward — killed over a hundred schoolgirls on the first day of an [illegal war](https://ecfr.eu/article/trumps-strikes-on-iran-are-an-illegalwar-of-choice-and-europeansshould-say-so/?ref=diplopolis.com). New Delhi’s silence wasn’t diplomatic caution. It was a choice — a choice not to say a word when the most powerful nation it has aligned itself with killed children in a school, with precision weapons, and then [initially tried to blame Iran for it](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/12/who-bombed-the-iranian-girls-school-killing-more-than-170-what-we-know?ref=diplopolis.com). For a country that suffered centuries under colonialism and fought its way to independence while supporting others doing the same, India has been the conscience of the Global South. This was the nation that stood for [non-alignment](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Non-Aligned-Movement?ref=diplopolis.com) at the height of the Cold War, when the world was rigidly divided into two blocs and smaller nations were expected to choose sides. India refused. It maintained relations with Washington and Moscow alike, guided not by convenience but by principle. To watch that moral inheritance being quietly surrendered — not under pressure, not under threat, but by choice — is sad in the way that only the loss of something genuinely great can be sad. Which makes what followed all the more painful. When Pakistan struck Kabul and [killed hundreds](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4g8n7e0l40o?ref=diplopolis.com), New Delhi [condemned the attack](https://ddnews.gov.in/en/india-condemns-pakistans-barbaric-cowardly-airstrike-on-kabul-hospital/?ref=diplopolis.com) as unconscionable and barbaric. The condemnation was right. But coming after the silence over Iranian schoolgirls, it did not sound principled. It sounded selective. And selective condemnation is not a moral position — it is a political one. It tells the world not what you believe, but who you are protecting. Making it worse is the fact that the Taliban — an oppressive regime that seized power by force — has become [India’s new partner](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/27/has-indias-influence-in-afghanistan-grown-under-the-taliban?ref=diplopolis.com) in the region. Having made that accommodation, New Delhi had already surrendered the human rights argument in Afghanistan. Increasingly, it looks as though India’s domestic politics is now being projected onto the world stage. India’s greatness, historically, was not military power or economic size. It was moral heft — the ability to speak independently, to condemn wrong regardless of who committed it, to represent the voiceless because it had once been voiceless itself. That moral position was [Nehru’s greatest foreign policy achievement](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/jawaharlal-nehru-the-architect-of-indias-foreign-policy/articleshow/58767014.cms?ref=diplopolis.com). It gave India a seat at every table disproportionate to its material power. New Delhi is stuck. Having lost its moral heft, India is no longer part of the global power conversation. Its condemnations now sound more problematic than principled. Soon enough, India may be seen not as an independent voice but as a satellite of the US-Israel axis. There was a time when the world’s conscience, in a crisis, had an Indian accent. Not anymore. ### When the Numbers Don't Lie: Gaza, Lebanon, and the Legal Case Israel Cannot Close URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/israel-gaza-war-civilian-casualties-icj-genocide-case-analysis/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T04:58:39.000Z In January 2026, something remarkable happened. An Israeli military official told journalists that the Israeli army accepted that approximately 70,000 Palestinians had been killed in Gaza since October 2023\. This was not a concession extracted under legal duress or political pressure. It was stated matter-of-factly, as though the number had become too large to contest. At that point, the war had been running for twenty-seven months. Since then, the number has grown. And the war has spread. Understanding what has happened — and what is continuing to happen — across Gaza, Lebanon, and now Iran requires something more than outrage and something more careful than silence. It requires holding the available evidence against the legal and moral standards that the international community has constructed, over decades, precisely for moments like this one. ## What the Evidence Shows in Gaza The scale of Palestinian death in Gaza is no longer a matter of serious dispute, even among those most invested in contesting it. A peer-reviewed, population-representative household survey published in [*The Lancet Global Health*](https://www.thelancet.com/journals/langlo/article/PIIS2214-109X%2825%2900522-4/fulltext?ref=diplopolis.com) estimated that between 3 and 4 percent of Gaza's entire pre-war population had been killed violently by early January 2025 alone. Independent statistical modelling by the [Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research](https://www.mpg.de/25778228/1125-defo-gaza-study-reveals-unprecedented-losses-of-life-and-life-expectancy-154642-x?ref=diplopolis.com) placed the total at over 78,000 by year-end 2024, with a subsequent update concluding that the true death toll likely now exceeds 100,000\. The [Gaza Health Ministry's figures](https://english.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/168087?ref=diplopolis.com) — long contested — have been deemed generally reliable by both US and Israeli intelligence assessments. The demographic composition of the dead is as significant as the absolute number. An [OHCHR study](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties%5Fof%5Fthe%5FGaza%5Fwar?ref=diplopolis.com), verifying fatalities from three independent sources, found that 70 percent of Palestinians killed in residential buildings were women and children. Across the conflict as a whole, scholars estimate 80 percent of the dead were civilians. Gaza now holds the grim distinction of having the [highest number of child amputees per capita](https://www.statista.com/statistics/1616501/monthly-gaza-fatalities-injuries/?ref=diplopolis.com) anywhere in the world. Life expectancy in the territory, according to the Max Planck analysis, fell in 2024 to less than half the level that would have been expected without the war. Beyond the dead, the *Lancet* researchers estimated 116,000 cumulative injuries as of April 2025, of which between 29,000 and 46,000 require complex reconstructive surgery. At pre-war surgical capacity — itself now destroyed — clearing that backlog would take approximately a decade. [More than 224 humanitarian aid workers have been killed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties%5Fof%5Fthe%5FGaza%5Fwar?ref=diplopolis.com), including 179 UNRWA employees and 248 journalists. Hospitals have been raided. Operations have been performed without anaesthetic. The healthcare system has been, in the *Lancet* researchers' own framing, "repeatedly decimated by attacks despite protection by international humanitarian law." These are not figures from a single contested source. They are the convergent findings of peer-reviewed studies, independent statistical modelling, UN verification, and now Israeli military acknowledgement. ## What the Law Says The [1948 Genocide Convention](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/genocide-conv-1948?ref=diplopolis.com) defines genocide as acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. The acts listed include killing members of the group and deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction. Intent — *dolus specialis* in legal terminology — is the threshold question, and it is the hardest to prove. It is not, however, impossible to establish through the public record. Israeli cabinet ministers have made statements that are now central to legal proceedings. Defence Minister Yoav Gallant declared in October 2023 that Israel was fighting "human animals" and announced a "complete siege" of Gaza — "no electricity, no food, no water, no fuel." Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich said in March 2023 that "there is no such thing as a Palestinian people." These statements did not occur in a vacuum. They were made by senior officials of the state conducting the military campaign, and they have been cited in [International Court of Justice proceedings](https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192?ref=diplopolis.com) initiated by South Africa under the Genocide Convention. In January 2024, the [ICJ found](https://www.icj-cij.org/node/203454?ref=diplopolis.com) that at least some of the rights South Africa asserted under the Genocide Convention were plausible — including the right of Palestinians in Gaza to be protected from genocide — and issued six binding provisional measures accordingly. The court did not determine guilt; that finding awaits the merits stage. But the plausibility threshold, the prerequisite for provisional measures, was met. The court issued provisional measures ordering Israel to take all measures within its power to prevent acts within the scope of the Genocide Convention, to ensure humanitarian aid reached Gaza, and to preserve evidence of alleged violations. Those provisional measures remain in force. The [*Lancet* researchers themselves concluded](https://www.thelancet.com/journals/langlo/article/PIIS2214-109X%2825%2900522-4/fulltext?ref=diplopolis.com) that their findings constituted "an urgent call for accountability and an immediate cessation of hostilities," and that "the healthcare infrastructure in Gaza is being repeatedly decimated by attacks despite protection by international humanitarian law." The full merits case before the ICJ has not concluded. A legal verdict has not been delivered. What has been established — by the court, by independent researchers, and by the documented record of military conduct — is that the question of whether Israel has crossed the line drawn by the Genocide Convention is not an extreme or fringe position. It is a live legal question before the world's highest court. ## Lebanon: The Expansion of a Pattern Gaza is not an isolated case. The conduct of Israel's military in Lebanon, renewed with intensity since March 2, displays features that recur with troubling consistency. When Hezbollah launched missiles at Israeli military bases on March 2 — citing both the killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and what it described as Israel's ongoing violations of the [November 2024 ceasefire](https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2026/03/analysis-israel-strikes-over-500-targets-in-lebanon-issues-evac-orders-in-new-war-with-hezbollah-march-2-6-updates.php?ref=diplopolis.com) — Israel's response was swift and sweeping. [Lebanon's Health Ministry reported 394 people killed in the first week](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/8/israeli-strike-on-hotel-in-lebanons-beirut-kills-four-people?ref=diplopolis.com), including 83 children, 42 women, and nine rescue workers. The specific incidents of that week are worth examining in detail, because detail is what distinguishes pattern from coincidence. [An Israeli strike hit a hotel in Raouche](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/8/israeli-strike-on-hotel-in-lebanons-beirut-kills-four-people?ref=diplopolis.com) — a popular Beirut tourist and residential district — killing four and wounding ten. The hotel was housing civilians displaced by fighting elsewhere in Lebanon. It was the second Israeli attack on a Beirut-area hotel in that same week; the first struck the predominantly Christian neighbourhood of Hazmieh. In the eastern Bekaa Valley, [Israeli raids on the town of Nabi Chit killed 41 people and wounded 40](https://www.euronews.com/2026/03/07/dozens-killed-as-israel-ramps-up-strikes-and-clashes-with-hezbollah-in-eastern-lebanon?ref=diplopolis.com). A strike on the nearby town of Shmistar [killed six people including four children](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/7/hezbollah-israeli-troops-clash-on-the-ground-in-eastern-lebanons-bekaa?ref=diplopolis.com). Near Kfar Tebnit, two children and their parents were killed in a single family strike. The Nabi Chit operation is particularly instructive. [Four Israeli helicopters entered Lebanese airspace](https://edition.cnn.com/2026/03/07/middleeast/israel-commando-raid-lebanon-airman-intl?ref=diplopolis.com), with commandos reportedly wearing uniforms similar to the Lebanese army and using vehicles disguised as Lebanese military equipment. When confronted with the death toll, the IDF stated it was "not aware of any casualties." Israel said the mission was a search for the remains of an airman missing since 1986\. Tami Arad, the missing airman's widow, [publicly objected to the operation](https://edition.cnn.com/2026/03/07/middleeast/israel-commando-raid-lebanon-airman-intl?ref=diplopolis.com), stating that "the sanctity of life (of soldiers) takes priority over the commitment to bring back the remains of a soldier." Throughout this period, Israel's military declared 26 rounds of strikes on Dahiyeh — Beirut's southern suburbs — issued forced evacuation orders covering dozens of villages, and directed ground troops deeper into Lebanese territory. [At least 30,000 people have been displaced](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/3/israel-strikes-lebanons-beirut-again-hezbollah-launches-drones-at-israel?ref=diplopolis.com). The Lebanese government — which has formally outlawed Hezbollah's military activities, ordered the detention of IRGC personnel, and pulled its own army from border positions — has received no diplomatic protection from this campaign as a result. Compliance, in other words, offered no shelter. ## Legal and Institutional Reckoning The international legal and institutional response to these events has been significant, if insufficient. The ICJ's provisional measures in the genocide case remain in force. Writing for the European Council on Foreign Relations, senior analyst Ellie Geranmayeh described the US-Israeli military campaign as ["an illegal war of choice"](https://ecfr.eu/article/trumps-strikes-on-iran-are-an-illegalwar-of-choice-and-europeansshould-say-so/?ref=diplopolis.com) — and argued Europeans had an obligation to say so publicly. Legal scholars at [Just Security](https://www.justsecurity.org/132773/us-iran-war-international-reactions/?ref=diplopolis.com) have raised fundamental questions about whether the strikes on Iran — and by extension the expanding campaign across the region — constitute violations of the UN Charter. France's President Macron has called on Israel to [refrain](http://refrain from a ground offensive in Lebanon) from a ground offensive in Lebanon. The [UK's House of Commons Library](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10521/?ref=diplopolis.com) has noted the legal questions raised by British base usage in the Iran strikes. None of this has produced a change in Israeli military conduct, nor in American political support for it. The United States has not applied meaningful diplomatic pressure at any stage across Gaza, Lebanon, or the Iran campaign. This is not a peripheral observation — it is central to the analysis. States generally moderate military conduct when they face real costs for excess. When an ally signals unconditional support regardless of conduct, the incentive structure for restraint disappears. Researchers from Duke University, Guy's and St. Thomas' NHS Foundation Trust and al-Shifa Hospital, [publishing in *eClinicalMedicine*](https://abcnews.com/Health/46000-injuries-gaza-require-reconstructive-surgery-study/story?id=130228193&ref=diplopolis.com), estimated that between 29,000 and 46,000 Gaza injuries require reconstructive surgery — a figure that could reach 68,000 by May 2026 if hostilities continue. "Without a significant increase in reconstructive capacity," the authors wrote, "tens of thousands of patients will remain with surgically addressable disability." That conclusion comes from peer-reviewed modelling built on attack data, geospatial mapping and population density estimates. It remains unheeded. ## Standard Being Applied There is a version of the argument that says Israel has the right to defend itself — which is true — and that the complexity of urban warfare produces civilian casualties — which is also true — and that Hezbollah and Hamas bear responsibility for embedding themselves among civilian populations — which is a legitimate and serious point that any honest analysis must acknowledge. But that argument runs into the numbers. International humanitarian law does not prohibit civilian casualties in war. It prohibits disproportionate attacks — those where civilian harm is excessive relative to the anticipated military advantage. It prohibits targeting civilians directly. It prohibits the destruction of objects indispensable to civilian survival. The question that the evidence forces is whether these prohibitions have been respected when 80 percent of Gaza's dead are civilians, when hotels housing displaced families are struck twice in a week, when a family of four is killed in a village strike, when 83 children are among 394 Lebanese killed in seven days. The International Committee of the Red Cross, which does not issue political statements lightly, has repeatedly flagged serious IHL concerns throughout the Gaza campaign. The UN's own verification mechanisms have documented systematic patterns. The convergence of independent scientific evidence, legal proceedings, and the documented record of specific incidents — each verifiable, each sourced — constitutes a body of evidence that demands, at minimum, serious institutional accountability. That accountability has not come. What has come instead is an expanding war. --- *DiploPolis covers international affairs, diplomacy, and geopolitical analysis with an independent editorial voice. Follow* [*The DiploPolis Dispatch on Substack*](https://diplopolis.substack.com/) *for weekly insights.* ### The Bargain That Broke: How the Iran War Shattered the Abraham Accords' Founding Logic URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-bargain-that-broke-how-the-iran-war-shattered-the-abraham-accords-founding-logic/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T04:57:08.000Z When the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain signed the Abraham Accords with Israel in September 2020, the deal rested on two pillars that seemed, at the time, mutually reinforcing. The first was a shared perception of Iran as the primary threat to regional stability — a threat that Arab-Israeli security cooperation could contain more effectively than any of the parties could manage alone. The second was an implicit agreement to defer the Palestinian question indefinitely, allowing economic and diplomatic normalisation to proceed without the inconvenience of resolving the conflict that had prevented it for decades. Eight days into a full-scale US-Israeli war on Iran, with Gulf cities absorbing missile strikes, oil installations under attack, hotels housing displaced civilians bombed, and regional leaders nursing a [profound sense of betrayal](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/05/iran-israel-united-states-war-gulf-countries-alliances/?ref=diplopolis.com) toward Washington, both pillars have collapsed simultaneously. The Abraham Accords are not formally dead. But the strategic logic that built them is. ## The Architecture and Its Assumptions To understand what has broken, it is worth being precise about what the Accords actually were — and what they were not. The agreements, brokered by the first Trump administration in 2020, formalised diplomatic and economic ties between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, with Saudi Arabia offering partial facilitation without signing. They emerged from a decade of quietly deepening cooperation, driven primarily by a [shared Gulf-Israeli perception of Iran](https://mei.edu/backgrounder/abraham-accords/?ref=diplopolis.com) as an expanding regional power whose influence across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen constituted an existential threat to the Sunni Arab order. By institutionalising that cooperation, the Accords sought to consolidate a US-backed regional architecture that could contain Tehran without requiring the United States to do it alone. The Palestinian dimension was handled through deliberate ambiguity. Israel agreed to suspend — not abandon — its plans to annex parts of the West Bank. The UAE accepted this as sufficient. Saudi Arabia, more cautious, [repeatedly made clear](https://mei.edu/backgrounder/abraham-accords/?ref=diplopolis.com) that it would not normalise without "concrete steps toward the realisation of a Palestinian state." That position, widely treated in Washington as a negotiating posture to be eventually overcome, would prove to be a strategic judgment of considerable foresight. What the Accords emphatically did not do was consult the Gulf states on how, or when, or whether the Iranian threat would ultimately be addressed militarily. That question — the question of war — was left entirely to Washington and Tel Aviv. ## The War Nobody in the Gulf Voted For The decision to launch strikes on Iran on February 28 was, by all available evidence, made without serious consultation with America's Gulf partners. [Chatham House noted](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/02/why-are-middle-eastern-governments-lobbying-against-us-attack-iran?ref=diplopolis.com) that Gulf governments had in fact been actively lobbying *against* a US military attack on Iran in the weeks before it happened — a remarkable inversion of the assumption, long held in Washington, that Arab Gulf states were quietly eager for American force to be applied to Tehran. The reality, Chatham House found, was that regional states had by 2026 concluded that they had "overestimated the Iranian threat, and underestimated the Israeli one." That judgment emerged from years of watching Israel's conduct — in Gaza, in Lebanon, in its [September 2025 strike on Doha](https://gulfif.org/three-calculations-one-war-inside-the-minds-of-the-united-states-israel-and-iran/?ref=diplopolis.com) targeting Hamas leaders — accumulate into a pattern that Gulf leaders found increasingly alarming. The Abraham Accords had been premised on Israel as a stabilising partner against a shared adversary. What Gulf capitals observed instead was an Israeli government pursuing maximalist military objectives with apparent indifference to the regional consequences for its nominal partners. When the bombs fell on Tehran, Iran's retaliation was immediate and deliberately targeted at the Gulf's most vulnerable points: oil and gas infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, civilian areas including hotels and airports in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the UAE, and US military command centres whose presence on Gulf soil had, overnight, transformed from a security guarantee into a liability. Six American soldiers were killed in Kuwait. The Gulf states found themselves absorbing the costs of a war launched by their patron in pursuit of objectives — regime change in Tehran — that they had explicitly [warned against](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/05/iran-israel-united-states-war-gulf-countries-alliances/?ref=diplopolis.com) and had not authorised. The *Foreign Policy* analysis that followed was striking in its directness: "Gulf leaders have good reason to believe that the United States and Israel launched a war, which directly impacts not just their interests but their survival, without serious consultation." It concluded that for Gulf states, "US military bases have become a source of threat rather than security." ## Saudi Arabia's Vindicated Caution Of all the regional actors, Saudi Arabia's position deserves particular attention — because Riyadh's refusal to join the Abraham Accords without Palestinian progress now appears less like stubbornness and more like strategic clarity. The Saudi condition — concrete steps toward a Palestinian state — was never simply about Palestinian solidarity, though that dimension carried genuine domestic political weight. It reflected a harder calculation: that normalisation purchased without resolving the Palestinian conflict would leave the Kingdom perpetually exposed to the charge of having abandoned the Arab world's most enduring cause in exchange for American security guarantees that might not materialise when tested. October 7, 2023, and the devastation of Gaza that followed — [over 75,000 Palestinians killed](https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/2/18/gaza-death-toll-exceeds-75000-as-independent-data-verify-loss?ref=diplopolis.com), the ICJ examining genocide proceedings — validated that exposure risk in the most brutal possible terms. Riyadh also read the trajectory of Israeli policy more accurately than Washington did. Where the Abraham Accords framework assumed Israeli moderation as a dividend of normalisation, Saudi analysts watched Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich declare that "there is no such thing as a Palestinian people," and observed a government whose coalition arithmetic made territorial restraint structurally impossible. The Gulf International Forum has noted that Israel's strategic vision — voiced by Netanyahu himself — involves a post-war order in which a [friendly Iranian successor regime joins the Abraham Accords](https://gulfif.org/three-calculations-one-war-inside-the-minds-of-the-united-states-israel-and-iran/?ref=diplopolis.com), consolidating what the Forum calls an "anti-Sunni Hexagon Alliance." Whether or not that vision is achievable, its implications for Gulf sovereignty are not reassuring. Saudi Arabia's [Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman met Turkish President Erdoğan in Riyadh in early February 2026](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/02/why-are-middle-eastern-governments-lobbying-against-us-attack-iran?ref=diplopolis.com), as part of a broader effort to assemble a regional grouping — incorporating Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, and Pakistan — that would give the Kingdom strategic alternatives to exclusive dependence on Washington. The war has not derailed that project. It has accelerated its urgency. ## The Irony Washington Built There is a painful irony at the heart of this moment, and it is worth naming precisely. The Abraham Accords were Washington's answer to the question of how to build a durable Middle East order without resolving the Palestinian conflict. The premise was that economic integration, security cooperation, and the shared Iranian threat would gradually make the Palestinian question manageable — something to be administered rather than solved. It was, at its core, a bet that the region's future could be decoupled from its most fundamental unresolved injustice. The Iran war has revealed the cost of that bet. The Gulf states that signed or aligned with the Accords now find themselves caught between an Iranian adversary retaliating against their infrastructure and an Israeli partner whose regional conduct they view with [deepening alarm](https://mei.edu/backgrounder/abraham-accords/?ref=diplopolis.com). They are being asked to openly cooperate with Israel in a war their populations largely oppose, for objectives — regime change in Tehran — whose aftermath they fear as much as the conflict itself. [*Foreign Policy* captures the dilemma starkly](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/05/iran-israel-united-states-war-gulf-countries-alliances/?ref=diplopolis.com): "Washington has always dreamed of Arab-Israeli cooperation against Iran without resolving the Palestinian issue. Here it is." It is not what anyone in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, or Manama bargained for. ## What Comes Next The Abraham Accords will not be formally renounced. Diplomatic ties between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain remain formally intact. Kazakhstan formalised its entry into the framework as recently as early 2026\. The economic architecture — trade agreements, investment flows, the UAE-Israel Comprehensive Economic Partnership — has institutional momentum that a single, even catastrophic, war cannot immediately unwind. But the strategic foundation has shifted in ways that will outlast this conflict. Gulf states have learned that US security guarantees do not extend to protection from the consequences of American military decisions made without their input. They have learned that Israeli strategic priorities and Gulf state survival interests are not reliably aligned. And they have learned, at considerable cost, that a regional architecture built on deferring the Palestinian question cannot defer its consequences indefinitely. [Chatham House concluded](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/02/why-are-middle-eastern-governments-lobbying-against-us-attack-iran?ref=diplopolis.com) that Gulf states will "continue the move to regional reconciliation but on Iran and Israel-Palestine, will look to reset the rules of engagement." That reset — whatever form it takes — will not be shaped by Washington's preferences alone. The bargain of 2020 promised the Gulf states security in exchange for normalisation. What they received was a war. That is not a foundation anyone rebuilds on without asking harder questions first. --- *DiploPolis covers international affairs, diplomacy, and geopolitical analysis with an independent editorial voice. Follow* [*The DiploPolis Dispatch on Substack*](https://diplopolis.substack.com/) *for weekly insights.* ### Semiconductor Chessboard: How the US-China AI Race is Redrawing Global Alliances and Diplomatic Strategy URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/semiconductor-chessboard-how-the-us-china-ai-race-is-redrawing-global-alliances-and-diplomatic-strategy/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T04:55:43.000Z When [OpenAI's leadership approached the Trump administration](https://techcrunch.com/2025/11/08/openai-asked-trump-administration-to-expand-chips-act-tax-credit-to-cover-data-centers/?ref=diplopolis.com) in late October 2025 with an ambitious request to expand Chips Act tax credits beyond semiconductor fabrication to cover AI data centers, they illuminated a fundamental shift in geopolitical competition. The infrastructure of artificial intelligence—the server farms, electrical grids, and specialized processors powering large language models—has become as strategically vital as the manufacturing of the chips themselves. This development, coupled with the [European Union's move toward legally binding phase-outs](https://techcrunch.com/2025/11/11/eu-considers-law-to-phase-out-huawei-and-zte-equipment-from-blocs-telecom-networks/?ref=diplopolis.com) of Chinese telecommunications equipment, reveals how technology policy has transcended the realm of commerce to become the defining battleground of contemporary diplomacy. The competition between Washington and Beijing over semiconductors and AI is not simply a trade dispute magnified. It represents a comprehensive restructuring of international alignments, where alliances are tested not through traditional security commitments but through the willingness to absorb economic costs in service of technological sovereignty. For nations caught between these competing powers, the choice is increasingly stark: accept immediate economic pain to secure long-term strategic autonomy, or maintain profitable arrangements that may become untenable as the bifurcation deepens. ## New Battlefield: Infrastructure as Strategy OpenAI's request for expanding the Advanced Manufacturing Investment Credit—currently offering a 35 percent tax incentive for semiconductor fabrication—to encompass electrical grid components, AI servers, and data centers signals how private sector interests and national security imperatives have become indistinguishable. Chief Global Affairs Officer Chris Lehane's letter to the White House argued that broadening the credit would "lower the effective cost of capital, de-risk early investment, and unlock private capital" to accelerate AI infrastructure development domestically. The company even proposed creating a strategic reserve of raw materials including copper, aluminum, and processed rare earth minerals needed for AI infrastructure. This blurring of lines reflects a fundamental recalculation of what constitutes strategic infrastructure. During the Cold War, steel production and shipbuilding capacity defined industrial power. Today, the ability to train and deploy frontier AI models—which requires [massive computing power housed in energy-intensive facilities](https://www.csis.org/analysis/limits-chip-export-controls-meeting-china-challenge?ref=diplopolis.com)—has become the measure of technological leadership. When OpenAI CEO Sam Altman announced commitments of approximately 1.4 trillion dollars for data center construction over eight years, he wasn't simply outlining a corporate strategy. He was describing the infrastructure requirements of an emerging great power competition. The diplomatic implications extend far beyond corporate subsidies. By treating AI infrastructure as essential to national security, Washington is establishing a precedent that will shape international negotiations for decades. If data centers are strategic assets comparable to semiconductor foundries, then their location, ownership, and the flow of data they process become legitimate subjects of diplomatic pressure and interstate bargaining. Countries hosting such facilities may find themselves facing scrutiny over their technology governance frameworks, cybersecurity standards, and relationships with Chinese firms—all factors that previously existed at the periphery of diplomatic discourse. China's response has followed a parallel trajectory. Through its ["Delete America" initiative](https://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/prc-industrial-policy-in-the-us-china-semiconductor-chip-competition?ref=diplopolis.com), formalized in 2022 by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, Beijing has systematically worked to reduce dependence on Western technologies across the semiconductor value chain. While presented as a defensive measure against recurring American export controls, the policy reveals China's recognition that long-term strategic autonomy requires control over the full technology stack. Chinese firms have accelerated investments in domestic alternatives even in areas where American technology remains superior, accepting short-term inefficiencies to build indigenous capabilities that cannot be denied through export restrictions. ## Alliance Architecture Under Strain The European Union's November 2025 consideration of legally binding requirements to phase out Huawei and ZTE equipment from telecommunications networks—converting a 2020 recommendation into regulation backed by potential financial penalties—exemplifies how technology restrictions are testing alliance cohesion in unprecedented ways. European Commission Vice President Henna Virkkunen's proposal marks a significant escalation, as member states that have resisted full bans on Chinese vendors now face the prospect of infringement procedures for maintaining what Brussels has deemed "high-risk" infrastructure. The economic costs are substantial and unevenly distributed. Countries like Germany, which only [committed to prohibiting Chinese components](https://www.euronews.com/next/2024/07/11/germany-to-ban-chinese-companies-components-from-core-parts-of-5g-networks?ref=diplopolis.com) in core 5G networks starting in 2026, have significant existing investments in Huawei infrastructure. Replacing this equipment requires not only capital expenditure but also temporary service disruptions and the development of relationships with alternative suppliers who may offer less favorable commercial terms. For smaller EU members with limited telecommunications budgets, the financial burden of accelerated equipment replacement strains national resources while delivering security benefits that may seem abstract compared to immediate fiscal constraints. This dilemma differs fundamentally from traditional security burdens within alliances. When NATO members agreed to defense spending targets, the threat was visible and kinetic—Soviet tank divisions positioned across the inner-German border. The security risks posed by Chinese telecommunications equipment are more ambiguous: potential vulnerabilities that might be exploited in future conflicts, backdoors that could enable espionage, or supply chain dependencies that provide Beijing with leverage during crises. The uncertainty makes it politically difficult for European leaders to justify the costs to skeptical publics, even as intelligence services warn of genuine risks. The diplomatic tension extends beyond transatlantic relations. Washington's success in persuading allies like the United Kingdom and Sweden to restrict Huawei gear, while others including Finland expand their bans, creates a patchwork regulatory landscape that complicates European single market integration. Telecommunications networks do not respect national borders, and divergent security standards can fragment infrastructure in ways that undermine the efficiency gains that European integration was designed to achieve. This fragmentation, in turn, makes European telecommunications providers less competitive globally compared to Chinese firms that benefit from a unified domestic market and state support. ## Asymmetric Competition and Its Diplomatic Implications The semiconductor competition is fundamentally asymmetric, with each side leveraging different advantages in ways that shape their diplomatic strategies. The United States maintains dominance in chip design, with firms like NVIDIA and AMD leading in graphics processing units essential for AI training. American companies also control [critical components of the semiconductor manufacturing equipment](https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-us-allies-current-legal-authority-implement-ai-and-semiconductor-export?ref=diplopolis.com) supply chain, particularly electronic design automation software and certain precision manufacturing tools. This leadership in cutting-edge technology provides Washington with "chokepoint" leverage—the ability to deny China access to capabilities that cannot be easily replicated. China's advantages lie elsewhere. Beijing controls approximately 90 percent of rare earth processing capacity and dominant shares of production for critical minerals including gallium, germanium, and antimony. These materials are essential not only for semiconductor manufacturing but also for defense systems, renewable energy technologies, and telecommunications infrastructure. In October 2025, China [imposed its strictest rare earth export controls](https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-new-rare-earth-and-magnet-restrictions-threaten-us-defense-supply-chains?ref=diplopolis.com) to date, requiring licenses for exports of twelve rare earth elements and applying extraterritorial provisions to products made outside China using Chinese-origin materials. This move—mirroring the Foreign Direct Product Rule that Washington has used to restrict semiconductor exports—demonstrates Beijing's willingness to weaponize its control over raw materials. The diplomatic dynamics of this asymmetry create complex calculations for both sides. When the United States tightens semiconductor export controls, it inflicts immediate pain on Chinese technology firms but also accelerates Beijing's investments in indigenous alternatives. [Research from Peking University in March 2025](https://www.csis.org/analysis/limits-chip-export-controls-meeting-china-challenge?ref=diplopolis.com) claimed breakthroughs in two-dimensional transistors that could "change lanes in the semiconductor race" by circumventing silicon-based limitations. Whether such claims prove substantive or aspirational, they reflect how export restrictions can paradoxically strengthen the strategic resolve and innovation imperative of the targeted country. Conversely, when China restricts rare earth exports, it provides immediate leverage but also incentivizes Western investments in alternative supply chains. The U.S. Department of Defense's 400 million dollar investment in MP Materials, including ten-year offtake agreements at prices significantly above market rates, demonstrates how mineral export controls can catalyze the diversification they ostensibly prevent. Beijing's [temporary suspension of rare earth export restrictions](https://www.cnbc.com/2025/11/10/china-suspends-some-critical-mineral-export-curbs-to-the-us-as-trade-truce-takes-hold.html?ref=diplopolis.com) in November 2025, following negotiations with Washington, suggests Chinese policymakers recognize that overuse of this leverage could accelerate the erosion of their market dominance. This dynamic of action and counter-action extends beyond the bilateral relationship to affect multilateral institutions. Both countries have sought to reshape technology governance frameworks to favor their approaches. China has promoted concepts like "cyber sovereignty" and "technological fairness" in international forums, arguing that export controls constitute economic coercion and violate principles of free trade. The United States counters by emphasizing the national security imperatives that justify restrictions on dual-use technologies, while working to establish coalitions—such as the Chip 4 alliance with South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan—that can coordinate export control policies. ## Third-Party Perspective: Navigating the Divide For countries outside the U.S.-China dyad, the semiconductor and AI competition creates dilemmas with no easy resolution. Nations that depend on American technology for innovation while relying on Chinese markets for economic growth find themselves pressured to choose sides in a competition where both outcomes carry substantial costs. East Asian economies face particularly acute tensions. South Korea hosts Samsung, a crucial player in advanced semiconductor manufacturing, and SK Hynix, a leader in memory chips. Both companies have significant operations in China, their largest export market, while simultaneously depending on American design tools and equipment. When the Biden administration [removed Samsung and SK Hynix facilities](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48642?ref=diplopolis.com) from the Validated End User program in September 2025—effectively requiring licenses for semiconductor equipment sales to their Chinese operations—Seoul faced the prospect of seeing its flagship companies caught between competing regulatory regimes. Taiwan's position is even more precarious. [Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company controls](https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/05/01/the-dynamics-of-semiconductor-competition-in-east-asia/?ref=diplopolis.com) over 90 percent of advanced chip production, making the island central to both American technological leadership and Chinese aspirations for self-sufficiency. Washington's payments to TSMC to establish fabs in Arizona represent not only industrial policy but also a strategic hedge against potential disruptions to Taiwanese production. For Taipei, this creates a paradox: American investment in alternative production capacity may reduce Taiwan's strategic importance, potentially weakening American commitments to the island's security, yet refusing to participate in Washington's supply chain diversification could strain the alliance at a moment when Beijing's pressure is intensifying. Southeast Asian nations have sought to position themselves as alternative manufacturing hubs without explicitly aligning with either power. Countries like Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia have attracted investments in semiconductor assembly and testing operations as firms diversify away from China-concentrated supply chains. However, this apparent neutrality has its limits. When Chinese firms seek to circumvent American export controls by routing products through third countries, these nations face pressure from Washington to tighten their own export control enforcement—a demand that carries economic costs and diplomatic complications with Beijing. Middle Eastern and African nations present a different dynamic. These regions have become focal points for Chinese technology infrastructure investments, from 5G networks to smart city systems, often financed through Belt and Road Initiative projects. Gulf states, despite their security partnerships with Washington, have maintained pragmatic relationships with Chinese technology firms. When American officials press for Huawei restrictions, they encounter resistance rooted not in ideological alignment with Beijing but in economic calculus: Chinese firms offer competitive pricing and flexible financing arrangements that Western competitors struggle to match. ## Future of Technology Governance The trajectory of the semiconductor and AI competition points toward a more fragmented international system, where technology standards, supply chains, and governance frameworks develop along divergent paths aligned with geopolitical blocs. This bifurcation carries profound implications for the multilateral institutions designed to manage technological development and trade. The World Trade Organization's consensus-based decision-making and rules designed for an era of economic globalization appear ill-suited to address trade restrictions justified by national security considerations. When member states invoke security exceptions to exempt export controls from WTO disciplines, they exploit provisions that were intended for exceptional circumstances but are now [becoming routine tools of economic statecraft](https://tnsr.org/2025/09/hard-then-harder-now-cocoms-lessons-and-the-challenge-of-crafting-effective-export-controls-against-china/?ref=diplopolis.com). The cumulative effect risks hollowing out the multilateral trading system, replacing it with a patchwork of bilateral and plurilateral arrangements organized around strategic alignments. Alternative frameworks are emerging, though their effectiveness remains uncertain. The European Union's Critical Raw Materials Act and the United States' Chips and Science Act represent efforts to build resilience through industrial policy and supply chain diversification. However, these initiatives also risk [escalating subsidy competitions](https://eastasiaforum.org/2023/07/03/small-powers-caught-in-the-us-china-chips-competition/?ref=diplopolis.com) that smaller economies cannot match. When the U.S., EU, and China collectively deploy hundreds of billions of dollars in semiconductor subsidies, they create [market distortions that disadvantage countries](https://www.iea.org/commentaries/with-new-export-controls-on-critical-minerals-supply-concentration-risks-become-reality?ref=diplopolis.com) lacking similar fiscal capacity. The challenge for policymakers lies in balancing legitimate security concerns with the recognition that [technological progress has historically benefited](https://www.justsecurity.org/121725/export-controls-trade-policy-new-terrain/?ref=diplopolis.com) from international collaboration and economies of scale. Export controls that are too broad or unpredictable can undermine the innovative capacity they aim to protect, while controls that are too narrow may prove ineffective against determined efforts at circumvention. The optimal approach likely involves sustained diplomatic engagement to establish norms around technology export controls, distinguish between genuinely sensitive military applications and commercial technologies, and create mechanisms for regular review as technological capabilities evolve. For smaller and middle-power nations, the path forward requires strategic hedging rather than definitive alignment. Maintaining access to both American and Chinese markets while building domestic capabilities in areas of comparative advantage offers more resilience than exclusive partnerships with either power. This will necessitate sophisticated diplomacy—managing relationships with both Washington and Beijing while investing in research institutions, technical education, and niche areas where indigenous innovation can reduce dependence on external suppliers. The semiconductor and AI competition is transforming international relations in ways that extend far beyond the technology sector. As export controls expand, supply chains reorganize, and alliances realign around technological capabilities, diplomats are discovering that the most consequential negotiations of this era may not occur in traditional forums for security or trade but in technical standard-setting bodies, licensing negotiations, and infrastructure investment decisions. The countries that navigate this landscape most successfully will be those that recognize the strategic dimension of technological development while maintaining the flexibility to adapt as the competition evolves in unpredictable directions. The chessboard is set, the pieces are in motion, and the outcome will shape the international order for decades to come. What remains uncertain is whether this competition will ultimately produce a stable equilibrium with clearly defined rules and spheres of influence, or whether it will accelerate fragmentation until the global technology ecosystem fractures into incompatible systems, each reflecting the values and strategic priorities of its anchor power. The answer will depend not only on decisions made in Washington and Beijing but on the collective choices of nations worldwide as they weigh the costs of alignment against the risks of independence in an increasingly divided technological landscape. ### The New Scramble for Syria: Turkey, Iran, Russia, and the Gulf States Jockey for Power in Post-Assad Syria URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-new-scramble-for-syria-turkey-iran-russia-and-the-gulf-states-jockey-for-power-in-post-assad-syria/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T04:54:21.000Z The transformation from Assad's Syria to [Sharaa's Syria](https://www.newarab.com/news/us-removes-syria-president-terror-list-visit?ref=diplopolis.com) represents nothing less than a geopolitical earthquake that has sent shockwaves through the Middle East's established power architecture. As Ahmed al-Sharaa prepares for his [unprecedented White House visit](https://www.newarab.com/news/former-militant-syrian-leader-make-first-white-house-visit?ref=diplopolis.com) on Monday, November 10, 2025, the former jihadist leader's ascent from U.S. terrorism blacklists to presidential red carpets encapsulates how dramatically Syria's fall has reshuffled regional influence. This [historic moment](https://www.diplopolis.com/content/files/2026/05/syria-al-sharaa-washington-visit-us-middle-east-reset.html)—the first time a Syrian president will officially visit the White House in modern history—crystallizes a broader reality: regional powers are racing to secure their foothold in Syria's new order, each bringing distinct capabilities, competing interests, and fundamentally different visions for the country's future. The stakes could not be higher. Syria's reconstruction carries an estimated price tag of $216 billion according to World Bank projections, but the real contest isn't merely about economic opportunities. Turkey seeks to consolidate its influence while managing Kurdish separatism. Iran desperately attempts to salvage remnants of its [Axis of Resistance](https://www.stimson.org/2025/irans-axis-of-resistance-weakened-but-still-dangerous/?ref=diplopolis.com) that Syria once anchored. Russia fights to preserve strategic military bases as its Ukraine war drains resources. Gulf states aim to displace Iranian influence while containing Turkish-backed Islamist expansion. And threading through all these competing agendas is the United States, newly positioning itself as powerbroker-in-chief. The scramble for Syria is not simply about one fractured nation—it's a microcosm of the broader power recalibration reshaping the entire Middle East. ## Turkey's Assertive Positioning: From PKK Peace to Syrian Influence Turkey has emerged from Assad's collapse in perhaps the strongest position among regional powers, but Ankara's ambitions face complex challenges that require delicate balancing acts across multiple fronts. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's government is leveraging its long-standing support for Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Syrian opposition to position itself as the primary external influence on Damascus. Yet Turkey's Syrian strategy cannot be separated from its most pressing domestic security concern: the four-decade Kurdish insurgency that has claimed 40,000 lives. The Turkish government is [preparing legislation](https://www.newarab.com/news/turkey-preparing-law-let-pkk-fighters-return-under-peace-plan?ref=diplopolis.com) to allow thousands of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) fighters and civilians to return home from northern Iraq under a peace process launched a year ago. This proposed law would enable roughly 1,000 civilians and non-combatants to return first, followed by approximately 8,000 fighters after individual screening. The legislation stops short of general amnesty but represents a historic shift in Turkish policy. However, approximately 1,000 senior and mid-level PKK figures remain a sticking point, with Turkey proposing their relocation to third countries, possibly in Europe—a plan that some negotiators worry could fuel renewed insurgency if PKK leadership is excluded from reintegration. The PKK peace process directly shapes Turkey's calculus in Syria. Kurdish forces, particularly the [Syrian Democratic Forces](https://www.newarab.com/analysis/fragile-federation-will-syrias-sdf-integration-deal-unravel?ref=diplopolis.com) (SDF), control northeastern Syria and maintain close ties with the PKK. Turkey views the SDF as a direct security threat, an extension of the PKK that could enable cross-border attacks or inspire Turkish Kurdish separatism. Ankara's influence over the new Syrian government—which owes its military victory partly to Turkish backing—provides Turkey unprecedented leverage to address this threat. The SDF's current negotiations to integrate into Syria's military structure are taking place under the shadow of Turkish pressure, with Ankara demanding the dismantling of autonomous Kurdish governance structures. Beyond security concerns, Turkey sees Syria's reconstruction as a massive economic opportunity. Turkish construction, transport, and manufacturing companies are [positioned to profit](https://orionpolicy.org/role-for-gulf-states-in-syrias-reconstruction/?ref=diplopolis.com) from the largest projects in rebuilding Syria, though Ankara recognizes it lacks the financial resources to fund reconstruction alone. This necessitates collaboration with Gulf Arab monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who possess the capital but worry about empowering Turkish-backed Islamist governance. Turkey's relationship with Qatar—the Gulf state most aligned with Islamist movements—provides additional economic and diplomatic support for Ankara's Syria strategy. Ankara's positioning in Syria also carries symbolic weight in the broader Muslim world. By supporting the overthrow of Assad's secular Baathist dictatorship and backing an Islamist-leaning transitional government, Turkey reinforces its image as a champion of political Islam and resistance to authoritarianism. This narrative competes directly with Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 model of economic modernization without political liberalization, creating ideological friction even as the two powers cooperate pragmatically on Syria's stability. Yet Turkey's dominance faces potential constraints. The new Syrian leadership, while grateful for Turkish support, must balance relationships with multiple regional powers to secure reconstruction funding and international legitimacy. HTS leader Sharaa has signaled his intention to maintain positive relations with diverse actors, from Russia to Gulf states, suggesting Damascus will resist becoming a Turkish client state. Turkey's assertive regional posture—from northern Syria to Libya to the South Caucasus—has also alarmed Gulf states who view Ankara as a strategic competitor. The question is whether Turkey can translate its current influence into enduring structural power, or whether other actors with deeper pockets will gradually dilute Turkish primacy. ## Iran's Strategic Recalibration: Losing the Axis's Keystone For Iran, Assad's fall represents nothing less than catastrophic strategic defeat—the collapse of a carefully constructed regional architecture built over four decades. The Islamic Republic had invested billions of dollars and immense political capital to preserve Assad's regime during Syria's civil war, dispatching Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) forces, recruiting Shia fighters from Pakistan and Afghanistan, and organizing pro-regime militias. This investment wasn't merely about supporting an ally; Syria served as the critical land corridor connecting Tehran to Lebanese Hezbollah, the most powerful non-state actor in Iran's so-called Axis of Resistance. As analyst Ali Vaez of the International Crisis Group noted, ["There is no axis without access."](https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-syria-assad-lebanon-hezbollah/33232587.html?ref=diplopolis.com) The loss of Syria severs Iran's logistical backbone to the Levant, fundamentally undermining its deterrence strategy against Israel and the United States. Without Syrian territory to transit weapons, train fighters, and establish forward bases, Iran faces severe challenges in supporting Hezbollah's rebuilding efforts after its devastating confrontation with Israel. The implications extend beyond military logistics: Iran has [lost its strategic depth](https://www.stimson.org/2025/irans-axis-of-resistance-weakened-but-still-dangerous/?ref=diplopolis.com), the buffer zone that allowed it to project power while maintaining plausible deniability. Iranian military officials have acknowledged the severity of this setback. Brigadier General Behrouz Esbati, who oversaw Iran's military operations in Syria and coordinated with Syrian and Russian commanders, delivered a [remarkably frank assessment](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/08/world/middleeast/iran-general-syria-defeat.html?ref=diplopolis.com) at Tehran's Valiasr mosque: "I don't consider losing Syria something to be proud of…We were defeated, and defeated very badly, we took a very big blow and it's been very difficult." Such candor from a senior military figure underscores how profoundly Assad's collapse has shaken Iran's strategic posture. The new Syrian government, led by Sunni Islamists backed by Turkey, has vowed to deny the IRGC-QF use of Syrian territory. HTS leader Sharaa has stated that Assad's collapse has "set the Iranian project in the region back by 40 years." This represents more than rhetorical posturing: Syria's Sunni majority harbors deep resentments toward Iran and Hezbollah for their brutal suppression of the 2011 uprising. The sectarian dimensions of Syria's conflict create natural barriers to any Iranian attempt to rebuild influence networks. Compounding Iran's regional setbacks are severe [domestic crises](https://www.newarab.com/news/iran-president-warns-tehran-could-be-evacuated-over-water-crisis?ref=diplopolis.com) that constrain its foreign policy bandwidth. President Masoud Pezeshkian has warned that Tehran faces an unprecedented water and energy crisis, with dam reservoirs at their lowest levels in 60 years. "If it doesn't rain in Tehran by late November, we'll have to ration water. And if it still doesn't rain, we'll have to evacuate Tehran," Pezeshkian stated. The capital's 9.1 million residents face potential water rationing and power shortages as hydroelectric capacity plummets. Decades of mismanagement, sanctions-induced underinvestment, and climate change have created a perfect storm of domestic vulnerabilities that limit Iran's capacity for expensive foreign adventures. Yet Iran's Axis of Resistance, while severely weakened, is not entirely destroyed. The Islamic Republic is now doubling down on its remaining regional allies. [Western intelligence reports](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axis%5Fof%5FResistance?ref=diplopolis.com) from July 2025 indicate Iran has intensified weapons shipments to Houthi forces in Yemen and Iraqi Shia militias, including advanced ballistic and cruise missiles. Iran is attempting to rebuild deterrent capabilities through these proxies, though their geographic distance from Israel limits their strategic utility compared to Hezbollah's former threatening posture on Israel's northern border. Iran's long-term strategy appears focused on exploiting any potential chaos in post-Assad Syria. As analyst Farzan Sabet noted, "If the civil war in Syria is not quickly settled and a new order created, it might become precisely the type of environment where the Islamic republic has historically thrived." Tehran has reportedly engaged Sunni extremists to destabilize Syria's transitional government and facilitate smuggling networks, though these efforts face significant obstacles from Israeli surveillance and U.S. pressure. The specter of Iranian nuclear weaponization also looms larger as Tehran's conventional deterrence capacity erodes, raising concerns that a weakened, cornered Iran might accelerate its nuclear program as an alternative security guarantee. ## Russia's Diminished but Persistent Presence: Pragmatic Retrenchment Russia's position in Syria embodies strategic ambiguity—maintaining military assets while accepting diminished influence, clinging to bases whose future remains uncertain. Moscow's Tartus naval base and Khmeimim Air Base represent Russia's only military installations outside the former Soviet Union, providing crucial Mediterranean access and logistical support for operations in Africa. Yet the rapid collapse of Assad's regime—despite years of Russian military intervention that propped up the dictator—has exposed the limits of Moscow's commitment and capabilities. In January 2025, [Syria's caretaker government terminated the treaty](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tartus%5Fnaval%5Fbase?ref=diplopolis.com) allowing Russian military presence in Syria, and revoked the contract with Russian company Stroytransgaz to manage commercial areas of Tartus port. This legal termination appeared to signal Russia's ejection from Syria. However, by February 2025, Syria's Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra stated that Russia would be allowed to [maintain the bases](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/02/06/syria-could-let-russia-keep-air-and-naval-bases-new-defense-minister-says-a87896?ref=diplopolis.com) "if we get benefits for Syria out of this." As of October 2025, Russia continues using the port for resupplying its airbase while negotiations over the bases' fate continue. This precarious arrangement reflects Russia's weakened bargaining position. The Ukraine war has drained Russian military resources and attention, forcing Moscow into a more reactive posture across its other theaters of engagement. Satellite imagery from December 2024 showed Russia [withdrawing significant equipment](https://www.twz.com/news-features/satellite-imagery-shows-ramp-up-in-russian-forces-massing-at-bases-in-syria-for-withdrawal?ref=diplopolis.com) and massing forces at both bases, suggesting preparations for potential evacuation. The Russian fleet temporarily left Tartus to avoid potential seizure, anchoring at sea before eventually returning—a military precaution highlighting Moscow's vulnerability. Russia has also been [relocating assets](https://peace-ipsc.org/2025/08/02/future-of-russian-military-bases-in-syria/?ref=diplopolis.com) to Qamishli Airport in northern Syria, near the Turkish border in Kurdish-controlled territory. Since March 2025, Russia has intensified cargo flights transferring troops and equipment to Qamishli, while upgrading the base's infrastructure and defensive capabilities. This hedging strategy suggests Moscow is preparing for possible loss of coastal facilities while attempting to maintain some Syrian foothold. The Qamishli location, however, lacks the strategic maritime access that makes Tartus so valuable. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has suggested the bases could be [repurposed as "humanitarian hubs"](https://syria.news-pravda.com/en/russia/2025/10/13/30135.html?ref=diplopolis.com) for sending supplies to Africa, rather than purely military installations—a face-saving narrative that acknowledges reduced capabilities while maintaining presence. This reframing aligns with Russia's broader Africa strategy, where it operates through mercenary groups and military advisors supporting authoritarian regimes. Loss of Syrian bases would severely disrupt logistics for Russia's Africa Corps operations, particularly in Libya and sub-Saharan Africa. Russia's pragmatic engagement with Syria's new government represents a remarkable pivot. Moscow is negotiating with the very Sunni Islamist forces it bombed for years in support of Assad. This flexibility reflects Russia's transactional approach to Middle East relations—prioritizing strategic interests over ideological consistency. The Kremlin has been quick to establish contacts with HTS leadership, offering to maintain security and economic cooperation. Russia's ability to provide Assad safe haven in Moscow may have even facilitated the dictator's peaceful exit, making negotiations with the new government easier. Yet Russia's diminished capacity limits its leverage. Unlike Gulf states with vast financial resources, or Turkey with deep opposition networks, Russia has little to offer Syria's reconstruction beyond weapons and diplomatic support. Moscow's own economy struggles under Western sanctions and war expenditures. The question is whether Russia can convert its existing military presence into a sustainable arrangement that serves Syrian interests, or whether the bases will gradually become untenable as Syria realigns toward Western and Gulf Arab patrons. ## Gulf States' Return and Competition: Checkbooks and Strategic Hedging The Gulf Arab monarchies—particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar—have moved with remarkable speed to shape Syria's post-Assad trajectory, viewing Damascus as both opportunity and imperative. These states had spent years gradually normalizing relations with Assad's regime, reopening embassies and advocating for Syria's readmission to the Arab League in 2023\. Assad's sudden overthrow left them diplomatically empty-handed, but Gulf states quickly pivoted to embrace the new HTS-led government with a pragmatic calculation: better to invest early in shaping Syria's transition than cede influence to rivals. The Gulf response has been swift and substantial. [Saudi Arabia and Qatar jointly paid off](https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/gulf/2025/07/11/why-gulf-states-are-rushing-to-shape-syrias-post-sanctions-transition/?ref=diplopolis.com) Syria's $15.5 million debt to the World Bank in May 2025, enabling international financial institutions to re-engage with Damascus. Both countries announced financial assistance to pay public sector salaries—highly practical measures addressing Syria's immediate governance needs. Gulf states collectively pledged to invest approximately [$14 billion in Syria's reconstruction](https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/11/03/gaza-israel-gulf-oman-qatar-saudi-uae-syria-trump/?ref=diplopolis.com) in 2025, positioning themselves as primary financiers of the country's recovery. Saudi Arabia's approach reflects Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's post-Yemen recalibration toward economic statecraft over military adventurism. After getting bogged down fighting Houthi forces, MBS pivoted to Vision 2030's focus on internal development and regional stability. Syria's transition aligns with this strategy: Riyadh seeks to counter Iranian and Turkish influence through financial leverage rather than military intervention. Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal Bin Farhan has expressed ["cautious optimism"](https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/01/the-gulf-shifts-policies-in-response-to-the-new-syria?lang=en&ref=diplopolis.com) about the new Syria, noting a "great opportunity" for the country to go in a "positive direction." The symbolic weight of Sharaa's first foreign visit being to Riyadh in February 2025 underscored Saudi Arabia's self-perception as leader of the Arab world and primary shaper of regional order. At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Syria's Foreign Minister Assad al-Shaibani referred to the "new Syria" as being [inspired by Saudi Vision 2030](https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/01/the-gulf-shifts-policies-in-response-to-the-new-syria?lang=en&ref=diplopolis.com)—language clearly designed to flatter Riyadh and align Damascus with Gulf modernization narratives. A large Saudi business delegation traveled to Syria in July 2025 for an inaugural [Syrian-Saudi Investment Forum](https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/saudi-arabia-and-the-new-syria-constructive-pragmatism/?ref=diplopolis.com), showcasing private sector interest in reconstruction opportunities. The UAE has adopted a more cautious approach, maintaining public support while carefully calculating the risks of empowering Islamist actors. Abu Dhabi prioritizes managed stability and harbors deep skepticism toward HTS's declared moderation. The UAE was [the last Gulf country](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/what-role-will-gulf-states-play-in-shaping-the-new-syria/?ref=diplopolis.com) to publicly signal positive engagement with Syria's new administration, marked by a December 2024 phone call between foreign ministers. Emirati concerns center on HTS's Islamist ideology, which Abu Dhabi views through the lens of the Muslim Brotherhood threat it has opposed across the region. Yet the UAE recognizes it cannot afford to remain on the sidelines while Saudi Arabia and Qatar secure influence, creating competitive pressure to engage despite reservations. Qatar occupies a unique position as the Gulf state most comfortable with Islamist movements. Doha supported opposition forces throughout Syria's civil war and maintains the closest relationships with Turkey, HTS's primary external backer. Qatar has been [particularly proactive](https://orionpolicy.org/role-for-gulf-states-in-syrias-reconstruction/?ref=diplopolis.com) in providing immediate humanitarian support, facilitating the reopening of Damascus airport, and offering electricity assistance in cooperation with Turkey. Qatar's approach reflects its broader regional strategy of supporting Islamist political movements—from the Muslim Brotherhood to Hamas—as legitimate representatives of popular will against authoritarian regimes. These divergent Gulf approaches—Saudi pragmatic engagement, Emirati caution, Qatari embrace—create both cooperation and competition dynamics. All three states share fundamental interests in Syrian stability, countering Iranian influence, managing the refugee crisis, and preventing extremist resurgence. Yet they differ significantly on means and acceptable outcomes. Saudi Arabia and the UAE worry about Turkish dominance creating an Islamist-leaning Syria aligned with Ankara and Doha. Qatar sees opportunities to support compatible ideological forces. These tensions are modulated by recognition that Gulf disunity would only empower rivals. The broader normalization trend sweeping the Middle East also factors into Gulf calculations. [Kazakhstan's recent joining](https://www.newarab.com/news/kazakhstan-become-latest-country-join-abraham-accords-us?ref=diplopolis.com) of the Abraham Accords—while largely symbolic given existing Israeli-Kazakh ties—signals the expanding acceptability of normalization with Israel. Trump administration officials hope this development will reinvigorate the Abraham Accords expansion, particularly toward Saudi Arabia. Yet Riyadh has made clear it [cannot normalize relations](https://www.newarab.com/news/kazakhstan-become-latest-country-join-abraham-accords-us?ref=diplopolis.com) without at least a pathway to Palestinian statehood, creating tension with Trump's vision of a "new Middle East" incorporating Israeli influence over Syria. Gulf states' leverage in Syria comes from what [Turkey lacks](https://orionpolicy.org/role-for-gulf-states-in-syrias-reconstruction/?ref=diplopolis.com): massive financial resources to fund reconstruction. Turkish companies may secure construction contracts, but Gulf capital will ultimately determine the scale and pace of Syria's rebuilding. This financial power translates into political influence—Damascus will need to maintain positive relations with Gulf states to access reconstruction funding. However, Gulf states face their own constraints: Syria's humanitarian and reconstruction needs far exceed even Gulf resources if Western sanctions remain in place, and Gulf states must coordinate with the Trump administration on sanctions relief to make their investments viable. ## The United States Factor: Arbiter and Power Broker The United States has positioned itself as the ultimate arbiter among competing regional powers in Syria, wielding sanctions relief, security guarantees, and diplomatic recognition as leverage. The Friday decision to [remove Sharaa from terrorism blacklists](https://www.newarab.com/news/us-removes-syria-president-terror-list-visit?ref=diplopolis.com) days before his White House visit crystallizes Washington's central role in Syria's international rehabilitation. The UN Security Council vote to lift sanctions on Sharaa was led by the United States, and the U.S. removal of the terrorist designation for HTS in July 2025 opened the door for other countries to engage with Damascus without legal complications. The Sharaa White House visit represents a major diplomatic gamble by the Trump administration. As analyst Nick Heras of the New Lines Institute noted, "Trump is bringing Sharaa to the White House to make a big statement that Sharaa is not a terrorist anymore." This legitimization carries substantial risks—Sharaa was once affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and HTS remains controversial in U.S. policy circles. Yet Trump appears to view Sharaa as "a pragmatic, and importantly pliable, leader who under American and Saudi guidance will secure Syria as a strategic bulwark in the region for decades to come." The strategic calculus behind U.S. engagement reflects multiple objectives. First, preventing extremist resurgence: the United States wants to ensure Syria doesn't become a safe haven for ISIS or Al-Qaeda as instability creates vacuums. Sharaa is expected to sign an agreement joining the international U.S.-led [anti-ISIS coalition](https://www.newarab.com/news/former-militant-syrian-leader-make-first-white-house-visit?ref=diplopolis.com), formalizing cooperation against jihadist threats. Second, countering Iranian influence: weakening Tehran's regional position aligns with longstanding U.S. Middle East policy. Third, managing allied interests: Washington must balance competing pressures from Turkey (NATO ally seeking free hand against Kurdish forces), Gulf states (seeking reconstruction opportunities and Iranian containment), and Israel (demanding security guarantees and hoping for eventual normalization). Reports of U.S. plans to [establish a military base](https://www.newarab.com/news/former-militant-syrian-leader-make-first-white-house-visit?ref=diplopolis.com) near Damascus "to coordinate humanitarian aid and observe developments between Syria and Israel" underscore America's intention to maintain direct influence. Though Damascus denied these reports, the discussion itself signals U.S. interest in permanent presence beyond its existing northeastern Syria deployment protecting Kurdish-held oil fields. The status of the Syrian Democratic Forces and their integration into Syria's military will be a key negotiation point—the SDF played a vital role defeating ISIS but face Turkish pressure for dismantlement. The Israeli dimension adds further complexity to U.S. policy. Trump has expressed hope that Syria will join the Abraham Accords and normalize relations with Israel. Yet Sharaa has downplayed normalization prospects while remaining open to a [security deal](https://www.newarab.com/news/former-militant-syrian-leader-make-first-white-house-visit?ref=diplopolis.com) to ease Israeli-Syrian tensions. Israel has deployed troops in the UN-patrolled buffer zone separating Syrian and Israeli forces, and launched hundreds of strikes on Syrian territory since Assad's fall—attacks Damascus has notably not retaliated against. Some analysts suggest Israel views Russian military presence in Syria as a ["counterbalance" against Turkey](https://peace-ipsc.org/2025/08/02/future-of-russian-military-bases-in-syria/?ref=diplopolis.com), preferring a weak Syria with competing influences rather than one dominated by Turkish-backed Islamists. U.S. sanctions relief remains the critical variable determining reconstruction pace. The Caesar Act and other sanctions measures have crippled Syria's economy for years. Unless the Trump administration removes or significantly eases sanctions enforcement, reconstruction efforts will be severely constrained regardless of Gulf financial commitments. Gulf states are [actively lobbying Washington](https://orionpolicy.org/role-for-gulf-states-in-syrias-reconstruction/?ref=diplopolis.com) to lift sanctions, arguing that Syria's reintegration into the global economy is essential for stability and preventing extremist exploitation of economic desperation. ## New Great Game and Syrian Sovereignty in Question Syria has become the stage for a new great game where regional and global powers test competing visions of Middle Eastern order. Turkey champions a model of Sunni Islamist governance aligned with popular sovereignty movements. Iran fights to preserve revolutionary resistance ideology even as its network crumbles. Russia demonstrates pragmatic flexibility prioritizing strategic assets over ideological consistency. Gulf states wield financial power to shape outcomes while hedging between cooperation and competition. And the United States positions itself as ultimate arbiter, though Trump's transactional approach creates uncertainty about sustained American engagement. The fundamental question emerging from this competition is whether Syria will achieve genuine sovereignty or remain a battlefield for external agendas. The Assad regime's fall theoretically creates space for Syrians to determine their own future after decades of dictatorship. Yet the new government's survival depends on navigating relationships with multiple regional powers who each bring resources Syria desperately needs—Turkish political support, Gulf reconstruction funding, Russian security cooperation, American international legitimacy. This dependence creates structural constraints on Damascus's autonomy regardless of leadership intentions. The implications for regional stability remain deeply uncertain. Optimists suggest that competing external interests could paradoxically create balance, preventing any single power from dominating Syria while incentivizing cooperation on basic stability measures. The shared interests in preventing extremist resurgence, managing refugee flows, and containing conflicts provide potential foundations for coordination. Pessimists warn that the same competitive dynamics risk turning Syria into a proxy battlefield once again, with regional rivals undermining each other's influence rather than building sustainable peace. The Syrian people themselves remain largely absent from these calculations beyond rhetorical invocations. After enduring thirteen years of brutal civil war, massive displacement, and now uncertain transition, ordinary Syrians face the prospect of their country's future being determined by foreign powers' strategic competitions. Whether the new Syria will represent genuine liberation from tyranny or merely a reshuffling of external dominance remains an open question—one that will be answered not in November 2025 when Sharaa visits the White House, but through years of difficult reconstruction, governance building, and power consolidation ahead. The broader Middle East watches Syria's trajectory with acute interest. If the post-Assad transition produces relative stability and economic recovery, it could model how failed states can be rebuilt through coordinated international support. If Syria descends back into chaos or becomes dominated by a single external power, it will reinforce pessimism about the region's capacity for peaceful transformation. The scramble for Syria is ultimately about more than one country—it's a test case for whether the Middle East's emerging multipolar order can produce outcomes that serve populations rather than simply perpetuating great power competition on other peoples' territories. --- *For continuous coverage of Syria’s transition and U.S. Middle East policy, follow our ongoing analysis of regional diplomatic developments.* ### Syria's New Era: Ahmed Al-Sharaa's Historic Washington Visit Marks Potential Shift in US-Middle East Relations URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/syria-al-sharaa-washington-visit-us-middle-east-reset/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T04:52:30.000Z When Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa steps into the White House on November 10, he will cross a threshold no Syrian head of state has ever approached. The meeting with President Donald Trump represents more than a diplomatic first—it signals a fundamental recalibration of American engagement with a country that spent decades as a pariah state, and marks a stunning personal transformation for a man who once commanded jihadist forces against American troops in Iraq. The symbolism is extraordinary. Less than a year after rebel forces led by Al-Sharaa's Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) toppled [Bashar al-Assad's 54-year family dynasty](https://www.cnn.com/2024/12/09/middleeast/timeline-syria-assad-regime-toppled-intl?ref=diplopolis.com) in an 11-day lightning offensive, the former militant leader designated a terrorist by Washington just two years ago will receive the legitimacy that comes with a presidential audience. Yet beneath the historic imagery lies a complex diplomatic calculation with profound implications for Middle East stability, counterterrorism strategy, and the delicate balance of regional power. ## From Jihadist Commander to Presidential Envoy Ahmed Al-Sharaa's journey epitomizes the contradictions and possibilities of Syria's post-Assad transition. Operating under his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, he spent years [leading Syria's al-Qaeda affiliate](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/2/trump-to-host-syrias-al-sharaa-for-talks-at-white-house-envoy-says?ref=diplopolis.com) before breaking with the network in 2016\. He joined insurgents fighting American forces in Iraq during the 2000s and once carried a $10 million U.S. bounty on his head. His organization was [delisted as a foreign terrorist organization](https://www.timesofisrael.com/trump-to-meet-syrian-president-in-washington-on-november-10/?ref=diplopolis.com) only in July 2025, following intense debate within the Biden and early Trump administrations about whether HTS's evolution from extremist militia to governing authority was genuine or tactical. The rapid sequence of events since December 2024 has been dizzying. Assad's regime, weakened by years of civil war and the distraction of his key backers—Russia in Ukraine and Iran and Hezbollah in conflicts with Israel—[collapsed with stunning speed](https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/the-fall-of-the-assad-regime-regional-and-international-power-shifts?ref=diplopolis.com) when HTS launched its November offensive. What began as an attack on Aleppo on November 27 cascaded into the capture of Hama, Homs, and finally Damascus by December 8\. Assad fled to Moscow, ending more than five decades of his family's authoritarian rule. In January 2025, militia leaders appointed Al-Sharaa as Syria's interim president. His government faces the monumental task of unifying a fractured country, addressing the needs of a population devastated by 14 years of war, and navigating the competing interests of regional and international powers—all while attempting to shed the stigma of its militant origins. ## The Strategic Imperatives Behind the Engagement Trump's decision to meet with Al-Sharaa reflects a pragmatic calculation about American interests in a transformed Middle East landscape. At their [first encounter in Riyadh in May](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/05/meeting-al-sharaa-and-trump-has-shifted-balance-power-middle-east?ref=diplopolis.com), facilitated by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Trump outlined five core principles for U.S.-Syria normalization. These centered on preventing an Islamic State resurgence, normalizing relations with Israel, resolving disputes with the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), protecting minority communities, and implementing verifiable political reforms. The November 10 meeting is expected to formalize Syria's entry into the [Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-11-01/syrian-leader-to-visit-washington-this-month-trump-envoy-says?ref=diplopolis.com), the 89-member international alliance that has worked since 2014 to combat the extremist group. This represents a remarkable diplomatic pivot: a former jihadist organization joining an anti-terror coalition. Yet the strategic logic is clear. ISIS has exploited Syria's post-Assad security vacuum, with independent observers documenting [more than 100 attacks in eastern and central Syria in 2025](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL33487?ref=diplopolis.com)—double the number from 2023\. The group has seized weapons from abandoned regime stockpiles and conducted prison breaks to free extremist fighters. U.S. officials have already begun [sharing secret intelligence on ISIS threats](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/01/24/us-syria-intelligence-hts-isis/?ref=diplopolis.com) with Al-Sharaa's government, reflecting rising alarm about a potential resurgence. With approximately 2,000 American troops deployed in Syria—a presence Trump has signaled will be reduced—Washington needs capable local partners to prevent a repeat of ISIS's territorial conquests from 2014-2017\. The Syrian government, despite its troubled origins, has demonstrated both capability and motivation in combating ISIS, having clashed with the extremist group since 2013. ## The Sanctions Question: Economic Strangulation vs. Reconstruction Hope Perhaps no issue carries more immediate practical significance than the fate of U.S. economic sanctions. The [Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act](https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/31/text?ref=diplopolis.com), passed in 2019 and named after a Syrian defector who documented the Assad regime's torture apparatus, imposed sweeping secondary sanctions targeting anyone providing support to the Syrian government, military, or oil and gas sector. The law was designed to prevent the Assad regime from profiting from reconstruction and to hold it accountable for war crimes. With Assad gone, the Caesar Act's original rationale has evaporated, yet the law remains a formidable obstacle to Syria's recovery. Trump [announced in May](https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/05/providing-sanctions-relief-for-the-syrian-people/?ref=diplopolis.com) that his administration would lift many sanctions and issued a 180-day waiver of mandatory Caesar Act provisions, authorizing transactions in energy, telecommunications, healthcare, and education. However, the law itself requires congressional action for permanent repeal. A [bipartisan coalition](https://joewilson.house.gov/media/press-releases/wilson-introduces-bipartisan-bill-repeal-syria-caesar-civilian-protection-act?ref=diplopolis.com) has introduced legislation to eliminate the Caesar Act, with supporters arguing it now "suffocates a nation seeking to rebuild" rather than pressuring a regime that no longer exists. The stakes are immense. The World Bank estimates Syria's reconstruction will cost [$216 billion](https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/10/inside-congress-battle-repeal-syrias-caesar-sanctions?ref=diplopolis.com)—nearly ten times the country's 2024 GDP. Without sanctions relief, foreign businesses and investors will remain wary of exposure to U.S. penalties, even as 90% of Syria's population lives in poverty and critical infrastructure lies in ruins. A high-level Syrian delegation met with Washington officials in October to advocate for complete sanctions removal, arguing that reconstruction cannot proceed under the current framework. Yet some lawmakers and pro-Israel advocacy groups remain cautious, viewing sanctions as leverage to ensure Al-Sharaa's government follows through on commitments regarding minority protection, democratic reforms, and security arrangements. The tension between providing economic breathing room for Syria's battered population and maintaining pressure for political reforms will likely dominate the Washington discussions. ## The ISIS Conundrum: Partnership with Former Enemies The counterterrorism dimension of U.S.-Syria engagement presents particularly complex ironies. Al-Sharaa's HTS spent years fighting both ISIS and the Assad regime, positions that simultaneously aligned with and contradicted American interests. Now, with [ISIS conducting escalating attacks](https://www.mei.edu/publications/isis-ropes-syria-successful-transition-damascus-could-deliver-knockout-blow?ref=diplopolis.com) in Deir ez-Zor and other eastern provinces, Washington finds itself coordinating with a government led by former extremists to combat current extremists. The U.S. military maintains partnerships with both the Kurdish-led SDF in northeast Syria and Syrian Free Army forces based at the Al-Tanf garrison. These groups have begun coordinating with Al-Sharaa's Ministry of Defense, creating an unusual three-way counterterrorism arrangement. Joint operations have already occurred, including [coordinated raids](https://www.mei.edu/publications/will-syria-join-global-coalition-defeat-isis?ref=diplopolis.com) that killed senior ISIS commanders in August and October 2025. Field intelligence suggests ISIS has evolved from territorial control to "flexible dormancy"—operating through sleeper cells of fewer than ten fighters who conduct ambushes, plant improvised explosives, and carry out assassinations. The group maintains between 2,500 and 3,000 active fighters in Syria, according to local security sources, with operations financed through black market activities and recruitment occurring in detention camps like Al-Hol, which houses tens of thousands of ISIS family members. The challenge is compounded by the U.S. troop drawdown. American forces have [transferred three of eight bases](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/syria/return-isis?ref=diplopolis.com) to the SDF and reduced personnel from 2,000 to approximately 1,400, with further cuts planned. This withdrawal creates precisely the kind of security vacuum ISIS has historically exploited. Syria's formal entry into the anti-ISIS coalition could provide coordination mechanisms and intelligence-sharing frameworks to mitigate these risks, but success will depend on the new government's capacity to project security beyond Damascus and major cities into remote desert regions where ISIS thrives. ## Regional Calculations: The Israel-Syria-Saudi Triangle The diplomatic choreography surrounding Al-Sharaa's Washington visit reveals the intricate regional power dynamics at play. His meeting with Trump occurs just one week before Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's scheduled November 18 White House visit—timing that is hardly coincidental. MbS has emerged as [Al-Sharaa's key regional patron](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/05/meeting-al-sharaa-and-trump-has-shifted-balance-power-middle-east?ref=diplopolis.com), facilitating his introduction to Trump and tying Syria's future to broader questions of regional normalization. The Saudi position represents a significant evolution. Riyadh has made clear that any consideration of normalizing relations with Israel—a centerpiece of Trump's Middle East strategy—now includes conditions about Syrian sovereignty. This means Israel must cease military operations in Syria and withdraw to borders agreed in the 1974 disengagement agreements. Since Assad's fall, Israel has conducted hundreds of airstrikes across Syria and expanded control in the Golan Heights, actions Jerusalem justifies as necessary to prevent weapons transfers and to protect Syria's Druze minority. A [fifth round of direct U.S.-mediated negotiations](https://www.axios.com/2025/11/01/syrian-president-meet-trump-meet-ahmed-al-sharaa?ref=diplopolis.com) between Israel and Syria is expected after Al-Sharaa's Washington visit, with American officials aiming for a security agreement on the Syrian-Israeli border by year's end. For Israel, the primary concerns center on preventing Syria from becoming a corridor for Iranian weapons shipments to Hezbollah and ensuring the new government does not threaten Israeli security. For Al-Sharaa, Israeli military operations represent a violation of Syrian sovereignty that complicates his efforts to consolidate authority and demonstrate national credibility. The Turkish dimension adds further complexity. Ankara supported the rebel offensive that ousted Assad and maintains significant influence through its backing of the Syrian National Army, which controls territory along the Syrian-Turkish border. Turkey's primary objective remains preventing Kurdish autonomy in northeast Syria, viewing the SDF's links to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) as a direct security threat. [The SDF signed an agreement](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL33487?ref=diplopolis.com) in March 2025 to integrate with Syria's national security forces by year's end, but implementation has been uneven and tensions persist. Iran and Russia, Assad's key backers, face dramatically diminished influence. Iran's logistical corridor to Hezbollah has been severed, and Russia risks losing its strategic foothold at Syrian military bases. Moscow persuaded Assad to accept exile rather than fighting to the end, likely calculating that removing a discredited client was preferable to a prolonged conflict that would further strain Russian resources already committed to Ukraine. ## Minority Rights and Democratic Governance: Rhetoric vs. Reality Al-Sharaa's government faces intense scrutiny over its treatment of Syria's diverse religious and ethnic communities. The country's Alawite, Christian, Druze, Kurdish, and other minority populations harbor deep anxieties about potential persecution or marginalization under HTS-dominated rule. These concerns are not unfounded given HTS's Islamist origins and the sectarian dynamics that have plagued Syria's civil war. The new authorities have made public commitments to protect minority rights and implement inclusive governance. Al-Sharaa met with Christian leaders and has appointed members of minority groups to cabinet positions. [HTS declared the dissolution](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL33487?ref=diplopolis.com) of all military factions and revolutionary bodies, calling for their integration into state institutions—though progress has been inconsistent. Yet troubling incidents continue. Sectarian violence in Syria's Alawite coastal regions in March 2025 killed hundreds, with a UN-commissioned report finding that both government forces and armed groups likely committed war crimes. Violence in Druze areas of southern Syria followed in July, prompting [Israeli intervention](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-syria?ref=diplopolis.com) claiming to protect the Druze minority. The UN Security Council issued a presidential statement "strongly condemning" the widespread violence against Alawites. For Washington, verifiable progress on minority protection and democratic reforms represents a key condition for deepening engagement. Syrian authorities have issued a five-year transitional constitutional framework and held [local committee elections](https://www.axios.com/2025/11/01/syrian-president-meet-trump-meet-ahmed-al-sharaa?ref=diplopolis.com) in October to select members of an interim parliament. Whether these steps represent genuine democratic transition or window dressing for continued authoritarian rule will significantly influence the trajectory of U.S.-Syria relations. ## The Reconstruction Challenge: Beyond Sanctions Relief Even with complete sanctions removal, Syria faces staggering reconstruction challenges. Fourteen years of war have devastated roads, hospitals, electrical grids, water systems, and housing—particularly in Damascus countryside and Aleppo, which saw the heaviest fighting. More than half of Syria's pre-war population has been displaced, with over four million Syrian refugees in neighboring countries and millions more internally displaced. Refugee return remains stalled, with European countries halting new asylum claims amid fears of renewed instability while simultaneously hesitating to encourage returns to a country still plagued by violence and economic collapse. The fragile security situation, characterized by continuing clashes between communities and ISIS attacks, makes large-scale voluntary repatriation unlikely in the near term. Reconstruction requires not just capital but also technical expertise, functioning institutions, and reliable security—all of which Syria currently lacks. The transitional government's limited administrative capacity, combined with the challenge of integrating multiple armed factions under unified command, complicates efforts to create the stable environment necessary for reconstruction. Foreign investors will demand assurances about security, rule of law, and contract enforcement before committing substantial resources. The economic dimensions extend beyond physical reconstruction to include currency stabilization, banking sector reform, employment creation, and service delivery. Syria's economy effectively collapsed during the war years, with the Syrian pound plummeting and inflation devastating purchasing power. Rebuilding economic institutions and establishing investor confidence will require sustained international support and domestic reforms that the current government may struggle to implement. ## What Success Looks Like: Modest Goals, High Stakes The November 10 meeting should be understood not as a culmination but as a beginning—the start of what will likely be a long, uncertain process of U.S.-Syria normalization. Realistic success metrics for this initial engagement include: **Formal coalition membership**: Syria's accession to the anti-ISIS coalition, providing frameworks for intelligence sharing and operational coordination against extremist threats. **Sanctions pathway**: Clear congressional commitment to Caesar Act repeal or permanent waiver, allowing foreign businesses to engage Syria's reconstruction without fear of U.S. penalties. **Security understandings**: Progress toward agreements with Israel that reduce military tensions and with Turkey regarding Kurdish areas, creating space for consolidation of state authority. **Minority protections**: Concrete mechanisms for monitoring treatment of religious and ethnic minorities, with international verification of commitments. **Reconstruction planning**: International donor coordination and World Bank engagement in reconstruction planning, even if major capital flows await further political developments. What success emphatically does not include—at least in the near term—is full Syrian democracy, complete resolution of sectarian tensions, or transformation of Al-Sharaa's government into a model of liberal governance. The Trump administration's approach appears refreshingly realistic in this regard, focusing on security cooperation and economic stabilization rather than ambitious political transformation. ## The Broader Strategic Picture: Reshaping Middle East Architecture Al-Sharaa's White House visit occurs within the context of Trump's broader effort to reshape Middle East geopolitics around containment of Iran, Israeli-Arab normalization, and reduced American military presence. The administration has pursued a transactional approach emphasizing burden-sharing with regional partners and skepticism of traditional diplomatic processes. The collapse of Assad's regime has fundamentally altered regional dynamics. Iran's "axis of resistance" has been severely weakened, with its land corridor to Hezbollah severed and its primary Arab ally eliminated. Russia's position has deteriorated as Moscow struggles to maintain its Syrian bases while prosecuting the war in Ukraine. Turkey has gained influence through its support for the rebellion but faces ongoing tensions over Kurdish issues. Israel has achieved tactical gains through military operations but faces new uncertainties about Syria's future orientation. For the United States, Syria represents both opportunity and risk. Successful stabilization could demonstrate that American engagement, even with imperfect partners, can produce meaningful security gains without massive military deployments. It could create a model for post-conflict transitions in the Middle East that balances pragmatism with principles. Conversely, failure could produce another Libya-style fragmentation, providing renewed space for extremist groups and refugee flows that destabilize neighboring countries. The Syrian situation also intersects with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and prospects for Israeli-Saudi normalization. Saudi Arabia has explicitly linked its potential recognition of Israel to multiple conditions including a pathway to Palestinian statehood and, now, respect for Syrian sovereignty. This complicates Trump's hopes for expanding the Abraham Accords and demonstrates how regional issues remain interconnected despite American attempts to pursue separate bilateral deals. ## The Road Ahead: Fragile Progress in Dangerous Times The historic nature of Al-Sharaa's Washington visit should not obscure the profound challenges that will outlast the symbolism. Syria remains a fractured country with competing power centers, unresolved ethnic and sectarian tensions, active insurgent threats, and an economy in ruins. The transitional government has demonstrated neither the capacity nor, in some cases, the willingness to address these challenges comprehensively. Regional powers have competing visions for Syria's future. Turkey wants to prevent Kurdish autonomy. Israel demands security guarantees and the end of Iranian presence. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states seek stability that allows refugee returns and reconstruction investment. Iran and Russia aim to salvage what influence they can from the wreckage of Assad's fall. These competing interests will continue to shape Syria's trajectory regardless of U.S. policy. The Trump administration's engagement represents a calculated bet that working with Al-Sharaa's government, despite its problematic origins, offers better prospects for American interests than isolation or continued sanctions. This approach has precedent—Washington has worked with unsavory partners throughout its history when strategic interests demanded pragmatism over purity. Whether this bet pays off will depend on factors largely beyond American control: Al-Sharaa's willingness and ability to govern inclusively, regional powers' capacity to coordinate rather than compete, and the Syrian people's resilience after 14 years of suffering. The November 10 meeting provides a diplomatic foundation, but transforming that foundation into sustainable peace and reconstruction will require years of sustained effort, substantial resources, and considerable luck. What is certain is that the Middle East that emerges from this period will look fundamentally different from the one that existed before December 2024\. Assad's fall represents the most significant regional transformation since 2011's Arab Spring—with consequences that have only begun to unfold. Al-Sharaa's walk through the White House doors marks one chapter in this unfolding story, a moment when decades of hostility give way to tentative cooperation in pursuit of stability that has eluded the region for far too long. --- *For continuous coverage of Syria's transition and U.S. Middle East policy, follow our ongoing analysis of regional diplomatic developments.* ### The Great Rebalancing: How Multipolarity Is Transforming International Relations in 2025 URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-great-rebalancing-how-multipolarity-is-transforming-international-relations-in-2025/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T04:50:17.000Z When Indonesia formally joined [BRICS in July 2025](https://www.stimson.org/2025/2025-brics-summit-takeaways-and-projections/?ref=diplopolis.com), it marked more than an expansion of an economic bloc—it announced the arrival of a genuinely multipolar world. Just days after the Rio summit concluded, five Central Asian presidents traveled to Washington for an [unprecedented November meeting](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/6/why-is-trump-hosting-c-asia-leaders-can-he-compete-with-russia-china?ref=diplopolis.com) with President Donald Trump, courted by both Beijing and Washington for their critical mineral reserves. These simultaneous diplomatic maneuvers capture the essence of multipolarity in 2025: no single power dictates outcomes, middle powers navigate competing offers, and the world's diplomatic architecture is being fundamentally rewritten. The [Munich Security Report 2025](https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report-2025/?ref=diplopolis.com) identifies "multipolarization" as the defining trend of contemporary international relations. This represents both a redistribution of power toward a larger number of actors and increasing polarization between and within states. The result is a diplomatic landscape where negotiated settlements replace unilateral impositions, where middle powers exercise strategic autonomy rather than choosing exclusive alignments, and where parallel institutions challenge—rather than simply reform—Western-dominated global governance structures. For diplomacy practitioners, the implications are profound: the rules of engagement are changing, the diplomatic toolkit is expanding, and the skills required to navigate this new order differ dramatically from those that sufficed during the unipolar moment. ## Global South: From Reactive to Architectonic The most consequential shift in the international order is the transformation of the Global South from passive recipient to active architect of global governance. This is not merely about rising economies gaining voice within existing institutions—it represents the construction of parallel frameworks that operate according to different principles and serve different constituencies. The [17th BRICS Summit in Rio de Janeiro](https://www.habtoorresearch.com/programmes/brics-summit-2025/?ref=diplopolis.com) crystallized this transition. Indonesia's admission as the 11th full member, alongside the designation of 10 new partner countries, expanded BRICS' reach across Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Central Asia. The bloc now accounts for approximately [40-45% of global GDP](https://brics.br/en/news/brics-gdp-outperforms-global-average-accounts-for-40-of-world-economy?ref=diplopolis.com) when measured by purchasing power parity, surpassing the G7's roughly 28%. More importantly, BRICS issued the Rio de Janeiro Declaration outlining 126 specific commitments across climate finance, artificial intelligence governance, and health partnerships, with each functioning as an alternative to Western-dominated institutional frameworks. This institutional proliferation matters because it provides options. When the [BRICS New Development Bank](https://brics.br/en/about-the-brics/brics-data?ref=diplopolis.com) finances infrastructure projects or when the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank provides development capital, recipient countries gain leverage in negotiations with traditional lenders like the World Bank. The mere existence of alternatives shifts diplomatic dynamics, even when countries continue engaging with legacy institutions. Brazil's emphasis during its 2025 BRICS presidency on "strengthening Global South cooperation for more inclusive and sustainable governance" signals a coherent strategy. These nations aren't simply demanding reform of institutions designed in 1945; they're building new ones designed for 2025's geopolitical realities. The African Continental Free Trade Area, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in Asia, and expanding South-South trade networks reflect this architectural ambition. Critically, economic interdependence among Global South nations is accelerating faster than their trade with developed economies. This creates positive feedback loops: as intra-BRICS trade grows, so does the logic for common payment systems, coordinated industrial policies, and shared infrastructure investments. The transition from reactive to architectonic represents the most significant structural challenge to Western-led international order since its post-1945 establishment. ## Strategic Autonomy: The New Diplomatic Doctrine If institutional proliferation provides the architecture for multipolarity, strategic autonomy provides its operating system. Strategic autonomy—the practice of maintaining partnerships with multiple powers rather than choosing exclusive sides—has become the defining diplomatic strategy of middle powers navigating great power rivalry. Nowhere is this more developed than in Southeast Asia. Through [ASEAN-centric multilateralism](https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/05/30/strategic-autonomy-of-middle-powers-under-us-china-rivalry/?ref=diplopolis.com), countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand have constructed what scholars call an ["omni-enmeshment" architecture](https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ISEAS%5FPerspective%5F2025%5F22.pdf?ref=diplopolis.com): a web of institutions and forums—from the ASEAN Regional Forum to the East Asia Summit—that bind all major powers as dialogue partners. The logic is preventive: by enmeshing both Washington and Beijing in overlapping networks of cooperation, ASEAN makes it costly for either power to pursue zero-sum competition in the region. The [Central Asian states' November 2025 Washington summit](https://www.rferl.org/a/trump-rare-earths-critical-minerals-central-asia-china-kazakhstan/33581310.html?ref=diplopolis.com) exemplifies this strategy's maturation. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—traditionally within Russia's sphere and increasingly courted by China—engaged Trump administration officials on critical minerals cooperation while maintaining their partnerships with Beijing and Moscow. As Kazakhstan's President Tokayev emphasized, his country "maintains good relations with each of the major powers and believes countries should not have to choose sides." India provides another instructive case. New Delhi has deepened security cooperation with Washington through the Quad while simultaneously expanding economic engagement with Russia and maintaining dialogue channels with China despite border tensions. Saudi Arabia balances U.S. security guarantees with Chinese economic partnerships and BRICS membership. This isn't fence-sitting—it's sophisticated statecraft that maximizes options and minimizes vulnerability to coercion. The ASEAN model's most striking success is crisis prevention. Regional forums provided channels for managing India-Pakistan tensions, prevented escalation of territorial disputes, and offered venues for dialogue even when bilateral relations between major powers deteriorated. This preventive diplomacy represents multipolarity's understated dividend: more mediators, more channels, more circuit breakers before conflicts spiral. However, strategic autonomy has inherent limitations. When great powers demand exclusive alignment—as increasingly occurs around technology standards, supply chains, and security partnerships—middle powers face genuinely difficult choices. The formation of competing blocs in critical sectors like semiconductors, rare earth processing, and advanced manufacturing compresses the space for omni-enmeshment. Strategic autonomy works best when great powers value access more than exclusivity; as competition intensifies, that calculus may shift. ## Institutional Transformation: Parallel Systems, Not Just Reform The architecture of global governance is fragmenting, not collapsing. Understanding this distinction is crucial for diplomacy practitioners navigating the 2025 landscape. Legacy institutions—the UN Security Council, IMF, World Bank, WTO—remain operational but increasingly struggle to reflect contemporary power distributions. The Security Council's permanent membership and veto structure, designed for 1945's victors, cannot accommodate 2025's economic giants. India, with the world's largest population and third-largest economy (by PPP), lacks permanent membership. African nations, representing 18% of global population, have no permanent representation despite the African Union's G20 admission in 2023. Reform efforts consistently founder on a fundamental problem: existing veto holders must approve changes that dilute their power. This makes comprehensive Security Council reform virtually impossible without a crisis forcing consensus—a crisis that, by definition, would come too late to prevent whatever catastrophe prompted it. Global South actors have drawn logical conclusions: build parallel institutions rather than await permission to reform existing ones. The [BRICS expansion in 2025](https://www.stimson.org/2025/2025-brics-summit-takeaways-and-projections/?ref=diplopolis.com) exemplifies this strategy. Rather than campaigning for IMF voting reforms (which require 85% approval, giving the U.S. effective veto), BRICS created the New Development Bank with different voting structures and lending criteria. Rather than waiting for World Bank governance changes, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank provides alternative development financing. This creates a bifurcated system: legacy institutions with universal membership but contested legitimacy, and newer institutions with focused memberships but growing capacity. The result is not the death of multilateralism but its fragmentation into issue-specific coalitions rather than universal frameworks. The implications for diplomatic practice are significant. Coordination across multiple institutions becomes more complex. Forum-shopping—selecting venues most favorable to one's interests—becomes standard practice. The multiplication of institutions creates transaction costs but also opportunities: states can play institutions against each other to achieve better outcomes, and the system becomes more resilient through redundancy. The [Munich Security Report 2025](https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report-2025/?ref=diplopolis.com) warns that this fragmentation makes collective action on global challenges more difficult. Climate diplomacy, pandemic response, and financial stability all require coordination across the global economy. When institutions fracture along geopolitical lines, such coordination becomes hostage to great power politics. The optimistic scenario sees competitive pluralism where multiple institutions experiment with different approaches; the pessimistic scenario sees paralysis where no institution can achieve sufficient buy-in. ## Diplomatic Mechanisms in Flux Multipolarity fundamentally alters how diplomacy operates. The shift from unilateral imposition to negotiated outcomes changes diplomatic calculations, required skills, and likely timelines. Consider the evolution of mediation in contemporary conflicts. Gaza negotiations in 2024-2025 involved Qatar, Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, each with different relationships to the parties and different leverage points. No single mediator possessed sufficient influence to impose terms; coordination among mediators became essential. This pattern recurs across conflict zones, with multiple parties claiming mediation roles, each bringing partial influence, requiring unprecedented coordination among the mediators themselves. Preventive diplomacy has gained new urgency in this environment. When power is concentrated, the hegemon can deter or intervene to contain escalation. When power is diffuse, prevention becomes essential because no single actor possesses the capacity to manage spiraling conflicts. ASEAN's role in managing regional tensions, Kazakhstan's Astana International Forum creating dialogue spaces, and the proliferation of track-two diplomacy channels globally all reflect this imperative. The system's stability increasingly depends on preventing crises rather than managing them after eruption. Economic statecraft has largely replaced military coercion as the primary tool of influence. The Central Asian mineral diplomacy exemplifies this shift in multipolarity's diplomatic currency. Rather than coercing alignment, great powers compete to offer attractive economic partnerships. The [U.S. signed $12.4 billion in trade deals](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/6/why-is-trump-hosting-c-asia-leaders-can-he-compete-with-russia-china?ref=diplopolis.com) with Central Asian states in Trump's first six months of 2025\. China simultaneously offers Belt and Road connectivity. Russia provides energy partnerships. Central Asian states extract maximum value by playing suitors against each other, a dynamic that would be impossible in a unipolar system where the hegemon could credibly threaten punishment for hedging. Regional forums have increasingly supplanted global structures as venues for substantive problem-solving. The [Munich Security Report identifies](https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report-2025/?ref=diplopolis.com) a widespread preference for bilateral deals rather than inclusive multilateral cooperation. This reflects practical realities: achieving consensus among 193 UN members is exponentially harder than coordinating among ASEAN's 10 or BRICS' 11\. Regional frameworks become the primary venues for actual problem-solving, while global institutions increasingly serve ceremonial functions or become paralyzed by great power disagreements. Transactional diplomacy has risen correspondingly as principle-based approaches founder. Principle-based diplomacy assumes shared values and rule-based frameworks. Transactional diplomacy treats each interaction as a discrete negotiation based on interests. Trump's approach to international relations epitomizes this shift, but it extends beyond any single leader. When powers disagree on fundamental values regarding human rights, sovereignty, and legitimate governance, transactions become the only available foundation for cooperation. This doesn't make cooperation impossible, but it makes it narrower and more contingent. This diplomatic evolution creates both opportunities and risks. More mediators mean more opportunities for breakthrough but also more complexity in coordination. More forums mean more venues for progress but also more chances for contradictory outcomes. Economic competition for partnerships means better deals for middle powers but also risks of debt traps and asymmetric dependencies. The art of contemporary diplomacy lies in navigating these trade-offs without the simplified decision frameworks that unipolarity or bipolarity once provided. ## Intellectual Crisis: Order Without Consensus Perhaps multipolarity's most profound challenge is intellectual rather than material: the erosion of consensus on what constitutes legitimate international behavior. The post-1945 liberal international order rested on proclaimed universal principles: sovereign equality, self-determination, human rights, rule of law, and peaceful resolution of disputes. Implementation was always contested and often hypocritical, but the principles provided reference points for diplomatic engagement and accountability mechanisms. Multipolarity's rise coincides with—and partly drives—this normative consensus's breakdown. China advances "socialism with Chinese characteristics" and rejects universal human rights in favor of culturally contextual governance. Russia champions "civilizational diversity" and traditional values against Western liberalism. Many Global South states, having experienced colonial domination and contemporary interventions justified by liberal principles, exhibit profound skepticism toward Western normative claims. This creates what some observers call "multipolarism of fools"—a situation where both right-wing authoritarians and left-wing anti-imperialists oppose liberalism but for incompatible reasons, creating strange bedfellow coalitions that lack positive visions for alternatives. The result is more effective at delegitimizing existing order than constructing replacement frameworks. For diplomatic practice, this normative fragmentation produces several consequences. Norm entrepreneurship becomes contentious terrain. When Western powers promote democracy or human rights, Global South states increasingly respond by highlighting historical hypocrisy or asserting alternative values like non-interference and developmental sovereignty. This doesn't necessarily reflect rejection of human rights in principle but rather resistance to selective Western enforcement. Transactional logic fills the normative vacuum left by eroding shared values. Without consensus on fundamental principles, diplomacy defaults to interest-based bargaining. This can produce functional cooperation on specific issues even among states with incompatible worldviews, but it struggles with systemic challenges requiring principled commitments that transcend immediate interests. Rule-making itself becomes competitive rather than cooperative. Rather than a single rule-based order, multiple powers advance competing frameworks embedding different assumptions about legitimate behavior. China promotes Belt and Road's connectivity vision. The United States advances its Indo-Pacific strategy. Europe pursues strategic autonomy. Each framework carries implicit and explicit rules about appropriate governance, economic relations, and security arrangements. The [Munich Security Report warns](https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report-2025/?ref=diplopolis.com) that "multipolarity may well move us away from an order that does have standards, even if they are sometimes implemented inconsistently, and towards an order without any standards at all." This risk is real but not inevitable. An alternative outcome sees multiple regional orders with different but overlapping standards, requiring sophisticated translation and coordination but avoiding the extremes of either hegemonic imposition or anarchic fragmentation. The next five years will reveal which trajectory prevails. ## Conflict Dynamics: The Instability Risk Historical observation provides sobering context: multipolar systems tend toward instability. The pre-1914 Concert of Europe and the interwar period both collapsed into catastrophic conflict. While contemporary nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may provide stabilizers absent in earlier eras, multipolarity's structural characteristics increase miscalculation risks. The possibility of multiple simultaneous conflicts becomes more acute in multipolar systems. Ukraine, Gaza, and potential Taiwan scenarios could escalate concurrently rather than sequentially. No single power possesses the resources or attention span to manage all simultaneously, increasing the likelihood that at least one spirals beyond control while international attention focuses elsewhere. Shifting alliances create dangerous uncertainty about deterrence. When alignments remain stable, states can predict others' behavior and calibrate responses accordingly. When alliances shift—as strategic autonomy encourages—deterrence becomes uncertain. If actors cannot reliably predict who will support whom in contingencies, they may miscalculate the costs of action. This uncertainty pervades contemporary calculations: Will India support the United States in a Taiwan conflict? Would Saudi Arabia remain neutral in an Iran-Israel war? How would ASEAN respond to South China Sea confrontation? These ambiguities can encourage aggressive gambits by actors convinced others will remain neutral. Arms racing accelerates as multiple powers compete for influence without clear hierarchies. The [Munich Security Report documents](https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report-2025/?ref=diplopolis.com) rising global military expenditures driven by multipolar competition. As powers compete for influence, military buildups provide both capability demonstration and hedging against uncertainty. This creates action-reaction spirals where each power's defensive measures appear threatening to others, generating security dilemmas that drive further buildup. > Multipolarity is structural, not cyclical. The diffusion of power toward multiple centers reflects differential growth rates and institutional innovation, representing fundamental rather than temporary change in the international system. Preventive war temptations increase during power transitions. When power shifts occur gradually, declining powers face temptations to use force while still advantageous rather than accepting inevitable decline. China's rise relative to the United States, India's rise relative to China, and various regional power competitions create multiple potential Thucydides Traps where dominant powers might strike preemptively against rising challengers. These risks explain why preventive diplomacy gains such importance in multipolar systems. The [ASEAN model of omni-enmeshment](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/asean-running-out-of-time-to-recast-role-as-buffer-in-us-china-great-power-competition/?ref=diplopolis.com) explicitly aims to prevent precisely these escalation dynamics by maintaining dense networks of cooperation that make conflict more costly. Similarly, middle powers' strategic autonomy serves partly as circuit breakers—by refusing to choose sides definitively, they prevent bipolar bloc formation that would increase conflict likelihood. However, these preventive mechanisms work only if great powers value them. If Washington or Beijing decides that securing exclusive alignments outweighs benefits of preserving middle powers' autonomy, the system's stabilizers erode rapidly. The 2025-2030 window will reveal whether the preventive architecture proves robust or whether great power competition overwhelms it. ## 2025-2030: The Critical Window The next five years will determine whether multipolarity evolves toward cooperative pluralism or competitive fragmentation. Several key metrics warrant close attention. UN Security Council reform efforts will signal the system's capacity for institutional adaptation. If the 2025 Summit of the Future produces meaningful progress toward expanding permanent membership or reforming veto powers, it would demonstrate that legacy institutions can evolve to reflect contemporary realities. Continued deadlock would cement parallel institution building as the primary Global South strategy, accelerating the fragmentation of global governance. Trade architecture developments will reveal whether economic multipolarity produces efficiency gains or coordination losses. The proliferation of regional trade agreements while global frameworks stagnate, the potential traction of alternative payment systems like BRICS Pay platform, and the balance between integration and fragmentation in commercial relations will all shape economic interdependence patterns. These patterns, in turn, determine whether economic ties can constrain security competition or whether geopolitics will trump commerce. Strategic autonomy's sustainability faces genuine tests as great power competition intensifies. Can middle powers maintain multi-alignment when pressured to choose sides, or will they face forced alignments? India's navigation between U.S., Russia, and China partnerships, ASEAN's preservation of centrality amid competing great power demands, and Central Asian balancing between Washington, Beijing, and Moscow all test whether autonomy remains viable or proves ephemeral when great powers demand exclusivity. Technology governance coordination presents perhaps the most challenging test. AI regulation, data governance, cyber norms, and critical technology supply chains all require coordination across incompatible political systems. Success would demonstrate functional cooperation despite value differences and provide templates for managing other domains. Failure would portend dangerous fragmentation in domains where technological interdependence makes isolation impossible and conflict potentially catastrophic. > Strategic autonomy replaces alignment as the dominant diplomatic strategy. Middle powers increasingly refuse binary choices, instead cultivating partnerships across competing poles through "omni-enmeshment" strategies that make exclusive alignment costly for all parties. Climate diplomacy effectiveness constitutes the ultimate test of multipolar cooperation capacity. An existential shared threat that requires coordinated action across the fragmented institutional landscape would validate multipolarity's cooperative potential. If states cannot coordinate on climate despite overwhelming incentives, it would validate pessimists' warnings about collective action problems in diffuse power systems. Climate negotiations over the 2025-2030 period will thus serve as bellwether for whether multipolarity can produce functional cooperation on civilizational challenges. Middle powers hold crucial influence over these trajectories. Their willingness to serve as bridges between competing powers, their insistence on inclusive rather than exclusive frameworks, and their capacity to moderate great power rivalries through forum-building and mediation may determine whether multipolarity stabilizes or destabilizes. The [BRICS expansion](https://www.stimson.org/2025/2025-brics-summit-takeaways-and-projections/?ref=diplopolis.com) and proliferation of regional mechanisms suggest these actors recognize their importance and are building capacity to exercise it. Whether this capacity proves sufficient to the challenge remains the central question of contemporary international relations. ## Conclusion: Diplomatic Skills for a Multipolar Era Multipolarity represents structural transformation, not temporary disruption. The concentration of power that characterized 1945-1990 (bipolar) and 1990-2010 (unipolar) eras was historically anomalous. The current diffusion toward multiple power centers reflects longer historical patterns, now accelerated by differential growth rates, technological diffusion, and institutional innovation. > Parallel institutions, not just reform efforts, define the new governance landscape. Global South actors build alternative frameworks through BRICS institutions and regional arrangements rather than waiting to reform Western-dominated legacy systems, creating competitive pluralism in global governance that changes negotiating dynamics across all institutions. For diplomacy practitioners, this demands new mindsets and capabilities. The first imperative is embracing complexity over simplicity. Cold War binary logic or unipolarity's hierarchical order provided clear decision frameworks. Multipolarity requires navigating multiple relationships simultaneously, managing contradictions, and accepting ambiguity as permanent features of the system rather than temporary confusion. Mastering transactional engagement while maintaining principled relationships presents the second challenge. When values diverge but cooperation remains necessary, diplomats must negotiate specific arrangements without sacrificing long-term relational capital. This balance—conducting transactions without descending into pure cynicism, maintaining principles without rigid inflexibility—defines effective multipolar diplomacy. Building redundant networks becomes essential for resilience. Single-point dependencies create vulnerabilities in multipolar systems where any relationship can deteriorate rapidly. Smart states cultivate partnerships across multiple poles, develop alternative options for critical needs, and participate in overlapping institutions that provide fallback options when primary channels fail. Investing in preventive capacities gains urgency as crisis management becomes more difficult. Waiting for crises to escalate before engaging ensures they spiral beyond any single actor's control. Early warning systems, conflict prevention mechanisms, and maintained dialogue channels—even with adversaries—become essential infrastructure rather than optional luxuries. Thinking regionally while acting globally provides the final strategic orientation. While global institutions struggle with paralysis, regional frameworks remain functional venues for problem-solving. Effective states anchor themselves in regional architectures while maintaining global connections, using regional solidarity as leverage in broader negotiations while ensuring regional concerns get heard in global forums. The world of 2030 will feature more poles, more institutions, and more competing frameworks than today. Whether this produces creative pluralism or dangerous fragmentation depends on choices made in the next five years. The alternative to multipolar order is not renewed unipolarity—that ship has sailed with China's rise and the Global South's institutional innovations. The alternative is multipolar disorder, where power diffusion produces chaos through unconstrained competition rather than stability through mutual restraint. The task for contemporary diplomacy is ensuring that multiple power centers produce system stability. This requires great powers accepting constraints on their ambitions, middle powers exercising their moderating influence effectively, and all actors recognizing that in genuinely multipolar systems, no one gets everything they want but everyone can prevent outcomes they find intolerable. Indonesia's BRICS accession, Central Asian mineral diplomacy, ASEAN's institutional innovations, and proliferating South-South cooperation mechanisms all point toward a world where no single power writes the rules but where rules nevertheless exist—negotiated, contested, and constantly renegotiated. This is the diplomatic reality of 2025: messier than unipolarity, more complex than bipolarity, and demanding skills we are only beginning to develop. The question is whether we develop them fast enough. ### Sudan After al-Fashir: The Logic of Partition URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/sudan-after-al-fashir-the-logic-of-partition/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T04:49:09.000Z The fall of [al-Fashir](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/29/massacre-in-el-fasher-whats-happening-in-sudan-right-now?ref=diplopolis.com) on October 26, 2025, marked far more than a tactical victory for Sudan's Rapid Support Forces. After 18 months of brutal siege that starved a city and displaced hundreds of thousands, the RSF's seizure of North Darfur's capital completed its domination of the entire Darfur region. What followed was [predictable horror](https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2025/11/05/geolocating-darfur-killings-of-those-escaping-al-fashir/?ref=diplopolis.com)—mass executions along earthen berms, hospital massacres documented by satellite imagery showing blood-stained streets, and ethnic cleansing that human rights investigators compare to Rwanda's darkest days. Yet the strategic implications extend beyond atrocity. Al-Fashir's capture represents an inflection point where Sudan's civil war transitions from a contest for national control into something more permanent: de facto partition along an east-west axis that mirrors Libya's decade-long fragmentation. The territorial reality is stark. The RSF now governs all of Darfur plus significant portions of Kordofan, connecting to [supply corridors through Chad and Libya](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/gold-and-war-sudan/04-how-sudans-gold-sector-connects-regional-conflict-ecosystem?ref=diplopolis.com). The Sudanese Armed Forces, meanwhile, retain the Nile valley, the Red Sea coast, and Port Sudan—the rump state's provisional capital. Between them lies not a fluid frontline but increasingly hardened boundaries reinforced by parallel governments, separate economic systems, and irreconcilable visions for Sudan's future. The question is no longer whether partition will occur, but what form it takes and what consequences it unleashes across a region already destabilized by conflicts in Yemen, Libya, and the Sahel. ## Military Stalemate That Enables Division Sudan's war began in April 2023 when the SAF and RSF—former partners in military rule—turned guns on each other in a power struggle over planned democratic transition. The RSF, an outgrowth of the Janjaweed militias responsible for [Darfur's genocide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Fashir%5Fmassacre?ref=diplopolis.com) two decades ago, initially swept across western Sudan. The SAF responded with an offensive that [recaptured Khartoum](https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/b204-sudans-calamitous-war-finding-path-toward-peace?ref=diplopolis.com) in March 2025, marking a critical territorial shift. Yet neither side possesses the capacity for decisive victory. The SAF controls population centers along the Nile, holds Port Sudan's strategic access to the Red Sea, and maintains formal recognition in international forums. [Turkey](https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/sudans-war-the-failure-of-mediation-and-the-struggle-for-civilian-rule/?ref=diplopolis.com) has supplied Bayraktar drones that proved instrumental in urban operations, while Iran provides weapons systems and apparent logistical support through Port Sudan. The military's alliance with Islamist factions, including remnants of al-Bashir's National Congress Party, gives it ideological cohesion but limits its appeal in secular-leaning regions. The RSF compensates for weaker conventional forces with mobility, tribal alliances, and external patronage. Its control of Darfur secures [gold-mining operations](https://www.africangoldreport.org/sudan/?ref=diplopolis.com) worth an estimated $860 million annually, funding weapons purchases and militia recruitment. The UAE's backing—though officially denied—appears confirmed through [flight-tracking data](https://ecfr.eu/article/sudan-a-war-europe-cannot-stop-but-cannot-ignore/?ref=diplopolis.com) showing cargo movements to Chad, Bulgarian-made mortars traced to RSF units, and gold flows to Dubai refineries. General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) also maintains ties to [Khalifa Haftar](https://www.newarab.com/analysis/libya-scenario-sudan-heading-towards-partition?ref=diplopolis.com) in eastern Libya, opening another supply corridor. This military equilibrium creates conditions for partition. Neither force can conquer the other's core territories; neither faces domestic pressure strong enough to force compromise. The RSF's [parallel government](https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/sudans-rsf-proclaims-parallel-government-raising-threat-partition?ref=diplopolis.com), announced in August 2025 with Hemedti as presidential council head and SPLM-N leader Abdelaziz al-Hilu as deputy, formalizes what existed informally. The SAF's amendment of Sudan's transitional constitution to remove all RSF references signals reciprocal rejection. As Crisis Group analyst Alan Boswell notes, "The RSF aims to be legitimate as a national actor. Yet \[this government\] makes de facto partition all the more likely, even if that is not the strategic intent." ## Libyan Template: Rival Governments and Frozen Conflict Sudan's trajectory increasingly resembles Libya's post-2011 collapse. After Gaddafi's fall, Libya fragmented between a [UN-recognized government](https://www.newarab.com/analysis/rsfs-rival-government-sudan-brink-partition?ref=diplopolis.com) in Tripoli and Haftar's Libyan National Army in Benghazi—a division sustained by external patrons, oil revenues, and military stalemate. A decade later, Libya remains partitioned despite periodic unification efforts. Sudan's partition differs in scale and complexity but follows similar logic. Like Libya's oil, Sudan's gold finances parallel war economies independent of central authority. The [UAE imported 29 tonnes](https://www.eurasiareview.com/06112025-as-sudans-agony-deepens-scrutiny-sharpens-on-uae-and-gold-analysis/?ref=diplopolis.com) of gold directly from Sudan in 2024, with major volumes routed through Egypt (27 tonnes), Chad (18), and Libya (9), according to UN trade data. An estimated 90 percent of Sudanese gold bypasses official channels—a smuggling network that both SAF and RSF exploit through different routes. Gold from SAF-controlled areas flows to Egypt and Ethiopia; RSF gold moves through Chad, Libya, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic before reaching Dubai. Like Libya's competing central banks, Sudan now hosts rival administrative structures. The SAF's "Hope Government" in Port Sudan issues currency, manages what remains of state infrastructure, and collects customs revenues at Red Sea ports. The RSF's "Government of Peace and Unity" based in Nyala distributes governance posts to allied militias and attempts to provide basic services in Darfur—though evidence suggests rudimentary capacity at best. Neither government enjoys broad legitimacy or provides effective governance, but both possess sufficient resources to sustain themselves indefinitely. The international response mirrors Libya's trajectory toward frozen conflict. The [African Union warned](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/12/african-union-warns-of-sudan-partition-risk?ref=diplopolis.com) that parallel governments risk "severing the country" and urged states not to recognize either administration. Yet practical engagement already occurs. The SAF maintains Sudan's UN seat and diplomatic presence; the RSF conducts negotiations through Kenya despite Khartoum's protests. External actors prioritize access and influence over reunification—the UAE backs the RSF for gold and Red Sea position; Egypt supports the SAF to preserve Nile valley stability; Saudi Arabia hedges between both. The [U.S.-led "Quad"](https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/09/joint-statement-on-restoring-peace-and-security-in-sudan/?ref=diplopolis.com) mediation effort involving Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE proposed a three-month humanitarian truce leading to permanent ceasefire and nine-month transition to civilian rule. The initiative collapsed when the RSF launched its final assault on al-Fashir days after an October 2025 Quad meeting in Washington. Peace talks have become forums for tactical advantage rather than genuine negotiation—a pattern Libya knows well. ## Regional Security Implications: From Red Sea to Sahel Sudan's partition carries consequences that ripple outward through three overlapping spheres: the Red Sea corridor, the Sahel belt, and East Africa's unstable core. ### Red Sea Maritime Security Port Sudan's strategic location on the Red Sea—controlling access to a waterway carrying [12-15 percent of global trade](https://www.usip.org/programs/red-sea-turmoil-peace-and-security-horn-africa-and-middle-east?ref=diplopolis.com)—makes partition particularly consequential. Russia's rumored [naval logistics facility](https://hornreview.org/2025/10/18/russia-at-port-sudan-how-a-basing-deal-reconfigures-red-sea-power/?ref=diplopolis.com) at Port Sudan would give Moscow a foothold near Bab el-Mandeb strait, enabling forward deployment for vessels operating between the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. China already maintains a base in Djibouti; Russia in Port Sudan completes a strategic encirclement that concerns Western naval planners. The SAF's apparent collaboration with [Yemen's Houthis](https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/10/13/is-houthi-disruption-in-the-red-sea-being-launched-out-of-sudan-with-saf-backing/?ref=diplopolis.com) introduces additional instability. Reports indicate Houthi drone strikes on vessels near Yanbu were launched from Sudanese territory, possibly using Port Sudan's facilities as staging areas. Iran facilitates this alliance, supplying the SAF with Mohajer-6 and Ababil drones while enabling Houthi access to SAF-controlled infrastructure. Sudan's Red Sea coast, once envisioned as a commercial corridor connecting Africa to Gulf markets, now threatens to become a weapons hub extending Yemen's maritime disruption northward. For regional states, the implications are severe. Egypt views an RSF-dominated west as a strategic threat to the Nile valley and potential staging ground for extremist infiltration. Saudi Arabia fears Emirati port facilities in RSF territory could challenge its maritime dominance. The UAE itself invested $6 billion in the proposed Abu Amama port complex—now vulnerable if territories change hands. Every actor has reason to prevent further escalation, yet none possesses leverage to enforce resolution. ### Sahel Contagion and Trans-Saharan Networks The RSF's Darfur stronghold connects directly to the Sahel's arc of instability stretching from Lake Chad to the Atlantic. Darfur borders Chad, Libya, Central African Republic—all experiencing their own conflicts and governance crises. The RSF's supply routes through Chad and Libya create trans-border networks that facilitate not just arms and gold but also extremist movement, human trafficking, and narcotics smuggling. Chad faces particular pressure. Hundreds of thousands of Sudanese refugees strain Chad's limited resources, while [UAE-funded facilities](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/gold-and-war-sudan/04-how-sudans-gold-sector-connects-regional-conflict-ecosystem?ref=diplopolis.com) at Amdjarass near the border allegedly serve as RSF logistics hubs and gold export nodes. Chad's President Mahamat Déby must balance maintaining stability with managing relations between Sudan's warring parties. Libya's Haftar, aligned with both the RSF and UAE, provides additional complications—his control of southern Libya's border region enables weapons flows and offers the RSF sanctuary if needed. Further west, militant groups operating in the Sahel could exploit Sudan's instability to extend operational reach. Al-Qaeda affiliates and Islamic State franchises already contest territory from Mali to Burkina Faso. A fragmented Sudan with porous borders and weak governance offers new transit routes, recruitment grounds, and revenue sources through illicit networks. The SAF's reliance on Islamist militias risks empowering exactly the extremist factions regional security frameworks aim to contain. ### East African Destabilization South Sudan's economic crisis illustrates partition's cascading effects. Approximately [75 percent of South Sudan's oil](https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/b204-sudans-calamitous-war-finding-path-toward-peace?ref=diplopolis.com) exports flow through Sudanese pipelines to Port Sudan—a lifeline Sudan's war severed. Juba's government, already fragile from its own civil conflict, faces fiscal collapse without oil revenues. South Sudan has tried maintaining relations with both SAF and RSF to negotiate pipeline reopening, but lacks leverage to broker agreement. The humanitarian spillover compounds Juba's crisis—Sudanese refugees cross into a country that can barely support its own population. Ethiopia confronts similar dilemmas. Its internal Tigray conflict and tensions with Egypt over Nile waters make Sudanese stability vital. An RSF-dominated west allied with the UAE potentially shifts regional power dynamics; an SAF-dominated east backed by Egypt and Islamist factions threatens different complications. Ethiopia's own fragility leaves little capacity to manage Sudanese spillover. The pattern is clear: Sudan's partition does not create isolated zones of control but rather interconnected instability that resonates across borders. Every neighbor faces refugee flows, economic disruption, security threats, and pressure to choose sides in a conflict where all options carry costs. ## Governance, Finance, and Border Control: Scenarios for a Divided Sudan Three scenarios describe possible outcomes over the next 2-5 years, each with distinct governance structures, financial systems, and border arrangements: ### Formalized Partition This scenario sees international recognition of separate states—an RSF-dominated western entity encompassing Darfur and parts of Kordofan, and an SAF-controlled eastern state along the Nile and Red Sea. Formal partition would require negotiating borders, dividing assets and debts, establishing citizenship rules, and settling questions about oil infrastructure, Nile water rights, and international treaty obligations. Governance would likely remain weak in both entities. The RSF's capacity for state-building appears minimal; its administration relies on militia structures rather than bureaucratic institutions. The SAF's rump state would retain more governmental infrastructure but remain compromised by Islamist influence and military dominance. Neither state would achieve democratic governance in the medium term. Financially, both entities would depend on resource extraction—gold for the RSF, whatever oil production remains for the SAF plus Red Sea port revenues. International financial institutions would face difficult decisions about debt allocation and lending eligibility. The IMF and World Bank have suspended assistance to Sudan since the 2021 coup; partition would complicate resumption of support. Border control would prove challenging. The RSF-SAF boundary would likely remain militarized and contested, particularly around resource-rich areas and transport corridors. International borders with Chad, Libya, South Sudan, and others would remain porous, enabling continued smuggling and militant movement. ### Frozen Conflict and De Facto Partition This more likely scenario maintains formal fiction of a united Sudan while accepting practical division. No international recognition of separate states occurs, but both RSF and SAF administer distinct territories with minimal interaction. Periodic clashes occur along contested boundaries without decisive territorial shifts. Governance remains bifurcated and weak. Both sides issue identity documents, collect taxes in controlled areas, and provide minimal services. No single administration governs effectively; corruption and militia rule predominate. Civilians suffer under dual extraction systems—taxed by whichever force controls their location while receiving little benefit. Financial systems operate independently but inefficiently. Parallel currencies might emerge, though both would likely suffer inflation. International sanctions complicate formal banking; informal networks dominate transactions. Gold smuggling continues as the RSF's primary revenue source; Port Sudan customs and remnant oil production sustain the SAF. Neither side accesses significant international development financing. Border controls remain dysfunctional. The internal boundary between RSF and SAF zones features checkpoints, smuggling routes, and intermittent violence. International borders suffer from state weakness—neither RSF nor SAF can effectively police their territories. Humanitarian access depends on negotiating with multiple armed actors. ### Renewed War and Further Fragmentation The least likely but most destabilizing scenario sees intensified fighting that fragments Sudan beyond the east-west split. Additional armed groups—the SPLM-N in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, various Darfuri factions, eastern tribes, northern movements—carve out autonomous zones. External interventions escalate; regional conflicts merge as Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, and others back different proxies. Governance collapses into warlordism. No central authority exists even nominally; territorial control shifts based on militia strength and external patronage. Somalia-style fragmentation emerges—patchwork of armed fiefdoms with no coherent state structure. Financial systems devolve to local resource extraction and protection rackets. No formal economy operates; black markets and smuggling networks dominate. International aid organizations withdraw due to insecurity, leaving populations dependent on whatever local strongmen provide. Borders become meaningless as state collapse eliminates capacity for control. Refugee flows accelerate; militant groups operate across national boundaries freely; transnational smuggling networks expand. Regional security deteriorates as instability spreads. ## Role of Gold, Customs, and Smuggling Routes Understanding Sudan's partition requires examining the illicit economies that sustain it. Gold operates as the primary currency of war, with production estimated between 65-90 tonnes annually depending on source. The official figure—64 tonnes in 2024 according to state-owned [Sudan Mineral Resources Company](https://www.africangoldreport.org/sudan/?ref=diplopolis.com)—undercounts reality by excluding RSF-controlled mines and informal production. The RSF's Al-Junaid Multi Activities Company, controlled by Hemedti's family and sanctioned by the U.S. and EU, operates major mines at Songo in South Darfur and Jebel Amer in North Darfur. Former engineers estimate Al-Junaid's wartime earnings at minimum $1 billion annually. This gold flows through Chad—where UAE-funded facilities at Amdjarass serve as collection points—then onward to Dubai. [Chatham House research](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/gold-and-war-sudan/03-gold-production-and-trade-during-war?ref=diplopolis.com) documents how much of North Darfur's gold is smuggled to Chad for UAE transportation. SAF-controlled gold moves through different channels. Northern mines near the Egyptian border supply gold that crosses into Egypt, where it enters global markets through less scrutinized channels. The SAF also maintains formal export relationships—90 percent of legal gold exports go to the UAE, according to government advisors, though Qatar and Turkey represent emerging alternatives. Both sides exploit customs revenues where possible. Port Sudan's position as Sudan's only functional seaport gives the SAF monopoly over import duties, fees for South Sudanese oil transit, and charges for humanitarian cargo. The RSF, controlling interior routes, taxes overland trade from Chad, Libya, and Central African Republic. Neither system functions efficiently; corruption siphons revenues while arbitrary taxation burdens civilians. The smuggling networks extend beyond gold. Mercury and cyanide—essential for gold processing—flow from Libya, Egypt, and Chad into mining areas. Weapons move along the same routes in reverse. [UN experts](https://adf-magazine.com/2024/02/smuggled-gold-fuels-war-in-sudan-u-n-says/?ref=diplopolis.com) documented "complex financial networks established by RSF before and during the war" that "enabled it to acquire weapons, pay salaries, fund media campaigns, lobby, and buy support of other political and armed groups." These economic networks make partition self-sustaining. The RSF doesn't need control of Port Sudan if it can export gold through Chad and Libya. The SAF doesn't require Darfur's gold if it controls Red Sea revenues and northern mining. Each side possesses sufficient resources to perpetuate conflict indefinitely, removing economic pressure for negotiated settlement. ## Failed Mediation and Accelerating Fragmentation International peace efforts have collapsed under the weight of external actors' competing interests. The [European Union Institute for Security Studies](https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/commentary/fall-el-fasher-sudans-war-outpaces-truce-plan?ref=diplopolis.com) observed that al-Fashir's fall came days after the latest Quad meeting, illustrating how "Sudan's war outpaces truce plan." The RSF has repeatedly exploited diplomatic initiatives—the November 2023 capture of four Darfur states occurred shortly after Jeddah talks stalled. The London Sudan Conference in April 2025 exemplified diplomatic paralysis. Participating nations failed to produce a joint communique as Egypt and Saudi Arabia sought language recognizing state institutions (implicitly legitimizing the SAF), while the UAE pushed for civilian governance emphasis. These divisions reflect fundamental disagreements about desired outcomes. Egypt prioritizes preventing RSF dominance along its southern border and preserving Nile valley stability. Saudi Arabia seeks to limit both Emirati expansion and Iranian influence while maintaining general Red Sea security. The UAE appears willing to accept permanent partition if it secures gold access and strategic position. The U.S. under Trump prioritizes ties with the UAE and Saudi Arabia over Sudan itself, viewing the crisis as secondary to Gaza, Iran, and Gulf cooperation. Russia and Iran complicate matters further. Russia's pursuit of [naval facilities](https://hornreview.org/2025/10/18/russia-at-port-sudan-how-a-basing-deal-reconfigures-red-sea-power/?ref=diplopolis.com) at Port Sudan trades weapons and support for strategic access—a transaction the SAF accepts from desperation. Iran's drone supplies and apparent facilitation of Houthi operations give Tehran leverage over SAF decision-making. Neither Russia nor Iran supports mediation that might empower Western-backed civilian governance. China maintains lower profile but significant interests. Chinese investment in Sudanese infrastructure and its Djibouti military base make Red Sea stability important. Beijing's standard approach—economic engagement without political strings—becomes impractical when no functional government exists to engage. Like other external actors, China hedges by maintaining channels to both SAF and RSF. The proliferation of armed groups beyond the main belligerents further complicates mediation. Darfuri movements, eastern tribes, SPLM-N factions, Islamist militias allied with SAF, tribal forces backing RSF—each maintains independent interests and grievances. Any viable peace process would require incorporating these groups, yet including them risks rewarding violent actors and incentivizing further militarization. ## Costs of Partition and Paths Not Taken Sudan's slide toward partition represents a catastrophic failure of both internal actors and international community. The human costs are almost incomprehensible: over 40,000 deaths by conservative UN estimates (likely far higher); 15 million displaced; 24.6 million facing acute food insecurity including famine; healthcare systems 70 percent non-functional; an entire generation traumatized and denied education. The strategic costs compound over time. A divided Sudan means permanent instability at the crossroads of Red Sea, Sahel, and East Africa. Extremist groups gain operational space; smuggling networks flourish; refugee crises persist; neighboring states face security threats they cannot manage. The international norms against recognizing territorial changes achieved through violence erode—if Sudan's partition becomes accepted reality, what precedent does it set for other conflicts? Alternative paths exist but require political will currently absent. A genuine international effort might press external backers to cut military support simultaneously, starving both sides of means to continue fighting. The UN could deploy a robust peacekeeping force—though Sudan's size and the belligerents' hostility make this impractical without their consent. A Libya-style arms embargo might reduce weapons flows if enforced seriously, though Chad and Libya's porous borders complicate enforcement. Most fundamentally, any sustainable resolution requires returning to Sudan's abandoned democratic transition. The 2019 revolution that ousted al-Bashir demonstrated mass civilian demand for representative governance. That aspiration didn't die—it was murdered by generals who chose power over principle. Reviving it means supporting civilian political forces, conditioning international engagement on progress toward elections and accountability, and refusing to legitimize military rule through recognition or assistance. Yet the trajectory points overwhelmingly toward partition. Al-Fashir's fall solidified territorial division; parallel governments formalized political split; external actors accepted fragmentation as fait accompli. What remains is acknowledging reality: Sudan is becoming two or more separate entities, each governed by armed factions enriched through resource extraction and violence. The international community's choice is whether to shape this partition toward minimally stable outcomes or allow it to metastasize into broader regional catastrophe. The Libya comparison ultimately proves instructive. A decade after Gaddafi's fall, Libya remains divided, dysfunctional, and dangerous—a failed state whose problems spillover across North Africa and the Mediterranean. Sudan's partition promises similar trajectory but at larger scale. Darfur alone exceeds Libya's population; Sudan's borders touch seven countries; its position astride Red Sea and Sahel gives its instability strategic weight Libya never possessed. Sudan after al-Fashir is Sudan approaching the point of no return. The logic of partition has taken hold—not because Sudanese people desire it, but because those with guns and external backing see division as the path to maintaining their power. The catastrophe unfolding in real-time across Sudan's western reaches, documented in satellite imagery and survivor testimony, should shock the world's conscience into action. Instead, it confirms what realist analysis suggested: when violence pays and external actors enable conflict, partition becomes less a possibility than an inevitability. The question haunting Sudan's future is not whether partition will occur, but what horrors will accompany it, and whether the international community can summon sufficient resolve to prevent worst-case scenarios from materializing. Based on patterns observed in Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and Syria, the answer appears depressingly clear. ### Gaza Ceasefire Violations: Why October 2025 Agreement Remains Dangerously Fragile URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/gaza-ceasefire-violations-why-october-2025-agreement-remains-dangerously-fragile/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T04:47:51.000Z The optimism that accompanied October 10's [ceasefire agreement](https://www.asil.org/ILIB/israel-approves-gaza-ceasefire-and-hostage-exchange-plan?ref=diplopolis.com) between Israel and Hamas lasted precisely eighteen days. By October 28, Israeli airstrikes had killed over 100 Palestinians, including 46 children, in what became the [deadliest single day](https://www.cnn.com/2025/10/28/middleeast/israel-military-strikes-gaza-latam-intl?ref=diplopolis.com) since the truce began. Though Israeli officials declared the ceasefire "back on" the following morning, the episode exposed a fundamental truth about the current Gaza arrangement: this is not peace, nor even a sustainable cessation of hostilities, but rather a precarious pause punctuated by violence, mutual recrimination, and the ever-present threat of renewed warfare. The fragility of the ceasefire reflects deeper structural problems that no diplomatic agreement has yet addressed. After two years of devastating conflict that killed more than 68,000 Palestinians and saw the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks claim over 1,200 Israeli lives, exhaustion drove both parties to accept terms that left their core grievances unresolved. The result is a volatile arrangement where technical violations—real or perceived—can instantly trigger lethal responses, while the underlying conditions that sparked the original conflict remain fundamentally unchanged. ## Architecture of a Fragile Peace The ceasefire agreement, [brokered by the Trump administration](https://govfacts.org/explainer/israel-hamas-ceasefire-deal-october-2025-agreement-explained/?ref=diplopolis.com) with assistance from Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey, represents significant diplomatic achievement in its mere existence. Yet its structure reveals why stability remains elusive. The deal's first phase focused on immediate humanitarian concerns: halting active combat operations, releasing living Israeli hostages, freeing approximately 2,000 Palestinian prisoners, and surging humanitarian aid into Gaza. These provisions addressed symptoms rather than causes, —a framework that temporarily reduces violence while preserving the conditions for its eventual resumption. The agreement's most contentious elements lie in its implementation details. Israel retained control over significant portions of Gaza territory, including strategic corridors that divide the Strip. The provision allowing Israel to maintain a "buffer zone" until there is no "resurgent terror threat" effectively grants indefinite occupation rights, subject entirely to Israeli security assessments. Hamas, meanwhile, faces [complete disarmament in future phases](https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-hamas-gaza-ceasefire-hostages-10-12-25?ref=diplopolis.com)—a requirement that strikes at the organization's fundamental identity and raison d'être. Most problematic is the agreement's approach to hostage remains. The requirement that Hamas return all bodies of deceased Israeli captives within 72 hours proved impossible given Gaza's devastation. With an estimated 10,000 Palestinians still buried beneath rubble and most heavy machinery destroyed, locating specific remains requires resources Gaza simply doesn't possess. This technical impossibility became the trigger for renewed violence when Israel accused Hamas of deliberately withholding bodies and staging discoveries. ## Violation Spiral The October 28 strikes illustrate how quickly ceasefire violations can escalate. Israel's accusation that Hamas had staged the discovery of hostage remains—supported by drone footage showing Palestinians burying and then "[discovering](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog-october-28-2025/?ref=diplopolis.com)" a body—provided the immediate justification. The [killing ](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-871996?ref=diplopolis.com)of Master Sergeant Yona Efraim Feldbaum in Rafah added another violation to Israel's list. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered ["immediate, powerful strikes,"](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2025/10/28/live-israeli-attack-kills-2-in-gaza-as-hamas-returns-body-of-captive?ref=diplopolis.com) which killed 104 Palestinians overnight. Yet Hamas denies involvement in the Rafah incident, and disputes about hostage remains reflect genuine logistical challenges as much as potential manipulation. The International Committee of the Red Cross, which facilitates exchanges, had [warned](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/gaza/israel-gaza-strikes-ceasefire-hamas-trump-netanyahu-rcna240428?ref=diplopolis.com) from the outset that locating bodies under Gaza's ruins would prove extraordinarily difficult. The IRC's unusual criticism of Hamas for allegedly staging a discovery demonstrates the complexity of determining truth amid accusations and counter-accusations. This pattern—alleged violation, military response, contested narratives—has repeated throughout the ceasefire's brief life. Israel has conducted multiple strikes it characterizes as responses to Hamas provocations. Palestinian health officials report nearly [100 killed and 230 wounded](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/20/has-the-gaza-ceasefire-been-broken?ref=diplopolis.com) since October 10, despite the nominal truce. Each incident deepens mistrust and provides ammunition for those on both sides who oppose any accommodation with their enemies. ## Humanitarian Crisis as Strategic Leverage Beyond military violations, the ceasefire's humanitarian provisions have become another battlefield. The agreement specified 600 daily aid trucks as the [minimum necessary to prevent famine](https://www.npr.org/2025/10/15/nx-s1-5574953/israel-gaza-border-crossing-aid?ref=diplopolis.com) in Gaza. Yet Israel has consistently restricted aid flows, at times cutting the permitted number to 300 trucks daily. The Rafah crossing from Egypt [remains frequently closed](https://www.democracynow.org/2025/10/16/gaza%5Fhumanitarian%5Fsituation%5Fafter%5Fceasefire?ref=diplopolis.com), and Israel continues to block materials it deems potentially useful for reconstruction that might benefit Hamas. This weaponization of humanitarian aid serves multiple strategic purposes. For Israel, controlling aid flows provides leverage to ensure Hamas compliance with ceasefire terms. Restricting construction materials, particularly cement and machinery, prevents Hamas from rebuilding military infrastructure. Yet these same restrictions trap Gaza's 2.3 million residents in uninhabitable conditions. The UN Development Programme [estimates reconstruction](https://www.npr.org/2025/10/15/nx-s1-5574953/israel-gaza-border-crossing-aid?ref=diplopolis.com) will require more than a decade and $70 billion—figures that assume a level of access and resources currently impossible under Israeli restrictions. The humanitarian stranglehold also reflects deeper disagreements about Gaza's future. The ceasefire's later phases envision Hamas's complete removal from governance, replaced by a technocratic Palestinian administration overseen by an international "Board of Peace." This arrangement, while potentially acceptable to exhausted Gazan civilians, represents an existential threat to Hamas's political project. By maintaining humanitarian pressure, Israel seeks to turn Gaza's population against Hamas, potentially achieving through deprivation what two years of military assault could not accomplish. ## Regional and International Dynamics The ceasefire's fragility extends beyond the immediate combatants to encompass broader regional dynamics. The Trump administration's investment in the agreement—with the president personally threatening to "[terminate](https://edition.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-hamas-gaza-ceasefire-hostages-10-16-25?ref=diplopolis.com)" Hamas if violations continue—creates pressure for superficial compliance while incentivizing both parties to blame the other for any breakdown. The presence of [high-profile American officials](https://edition.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-hamas-gaza-ceasefire-hostages-10-11-25?ref=diplopolis.com), including Jared Kushner and special envoy Steve Witkoff touring Gaza, in the region demonstrates Washington's stake in maintaining at least the appearance of success. Regional mediators face their own complex calculations. Egypt, which controls Gaza's only non-Israeli border crossing, must balance humanitarian concerns with security fears about Hamas and broader regional stability. Qatar, having spent years cultivating influence through its Hamas relationship, seeks to preserve its mediating role while avoiding blame for ceasefire failures. Turkey's involvement reflects President Erdogan's ambitions to position himself as a champion of Palestinian causes while maintaining pragmatic relations with Israel. European powers, contemplating potential sanctions against Israel, watch the humanitarian aid situation closely. The European Union has indicated that Israel's [handling of aid flows](https://theintercept.com/2025/10/15/israel-ceasefire-violations-gaza-aid/?ref=diplopolis.com) will influence decisions about future diplomatic and economic pressure. This linkage creates additional complexity, as Israel must weigh the domestic political costs of allowing more aid against international diplomatic consequences of restriction. ## Psychology of Perpetual Conflict Perhaps most significant is the psychological dimension of the current arrangement. For Gazans, the ceasefire brings no real peace—merely a reduction in the intensity of suffering. Israeli reconnaissance aircraft and drones continue their constant surveillance. Military positions remain occupied. The threat of renewed bombardment hangs over every day. This perpetual state of tension, what Palestinians describe as "managed occupation," prevents any genuine recovery or reconstruction of normal life. For Israelis, particularly those with family members among the hostages, the slow return of remains and uncertainty about those still missing maintains a state of unresolved trauma. Each delayed handover or disputed identification reopens wounds from October 7, 2023\. The security establishment's insistence on maintaining military readiness and quick-trigger responses reflects deep skepticism about Hamas's intentions and capacity to control other armed groups in Gaza. This psychological landscape makes creative diplomacy nearly impossible. Trust-building measures that might stabilize the ceasefire—prisoner exchanges, economic rehabilitation, gradual military disengagement—require a minimum level of confidence that neither party possesses. Instead, both sides prepare for the resumption of full-scale conflict while going through the motions of compliance with international demands for peace. ## Impossibility of Technical Solutions The current crisis exposes the limitation of approaching the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through technical agreements and phased implementations. The ceasefire's elaborate provisions—detailed schedules for hostage releases, specific aid quotas, predetermined withdrawal lines—suggest precision and careful planning. Yet these technical details cannot overcome fundamental political realities: Israel's determination to prevent any future security threat from Gaza, and Palestinian insistence on genuine sovereignty and an end to blockade. The focus on Hamas's disarmament in future phases exemplifies this disconnect. Disarmament might seem a logical prerequisite for peace, but it requires Hamas to abandon its core identity as an armed resistance movement without receiving the political achievements that might justify such transformation to its base. Similarly, Israel's insistence on maintaining security control until threats are eliminated creates a circular logic: Hamas's existence justifies continued occupation, while occupation ensures Hamas's continued relevance as a resistance force. International efforts to square this circle through creative formulations—international peacekeeping forces, technocratic governance structures, economic rehabilitation programs—fail to address the underlying political grievances. Palestinians in Gaza may desperately want an end to violence, but few will accept arrangements that formalize their permanent subjugation. Israelis may desire quiet borders, but not at the price of empowering an enemy they view as genocidally committed to their destruction. ## Path Ahead: Managing Escalation Given these realities, the immediate future likely holds continued ceasefire violations, periodic escalations, and international efforts to prevent complete breakdown. The October 28-29 violence may serve as a template: significant enough to [demonstrate resolve and extract concessions](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/10/29/israel-gaza-ceasefire-airstrikes/?ref=diplopolis.com), but stopping short of triggering full-scale war. This pattern of controlled escalation serves various purposes—allowing leaders to demonstrate toughness to domestic audiences, testing international tolerance for violence, and potentially shifting the terms of implementation in favorable directions. The United States, having invested presidential prestige in the agreement, will likely continue backing Israel's interpretation of violations while pressuring both parties to avoid actions that completely collapse the framework. President Trump's statement that the ceasefire "[is not in jeopardy](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/29/why-did-israel-launch-air-strikes-on-gaza-then-resume-truce?ref=diplopolis.com)" despite over 100 deaths reveals this approach: maintain the fiction of success while tolerating substantial violence that doesn't generate overwhelming international attention. For regional mediators, the challenge becomes preventing incremental violations from cascading into renewed war. This requires constant diplomatic engagement, creative reinterpretation of agreement terms, and occasional acceptance of face-saving formulas that paper over fundamental disagreements. The sustainability of such efforts remains questionable, particularly as domestic pressures in Israel and among Palestinians push toward more confrontational approaches. ## A Ceasefire Without Peace The Gaza ceasefire represents neither war nor peace but something more dangerous: an unstable equilibrium maintained through exhaustion rather than agreement. Its violations are not aberrations but inherent features of an arrangement that addresses symptoms while leaving causes untouched. The October 28 strikes and their aftermath demonstrate how quickly this equilibrium can shift toward violence, and how readily international actors will rationalize such violence to preserve the broader framework. For Gaza's population, trapped between Hamas's political project and Israel's security imperatives, the ceasefire offers little hope for genuine improvement. Humanitarian aid remains restricted, reconstruction impossible, and normal life a distant dream. The constant threat of renewed bombardment, justified by technical violations or security concerns, maintains a level of tension incompatible with recovery from two years of devastating war. The international community's investment in maintaining this arrangement—through continued mediation, humanitarian assistance, and diplomatic pressure—reflects both the absence of better alternatives and unwillingness to confront the conflict's fundamental dynamics. Yet without addressing core issues of Palestinian sovereignty, Israeli security, and the future of Gaza itself, the current ceasefire merely postpones rather than prevents the next round of devastating violence. As winter approaches and humanitarian conditions worsen, the pressure on this fragile arrangement will only intensify. Whether it survives in its current form, evolves toward something more sustainable, or collapses entirely depends on factors beyond the control of any single actor. What remains certain is that Gazans will continue paying the price for this uncertainty with their lives, their homes, and their hopes for a better future. The ceasefire may be "back on," as Israel declared after its latest strikes, but peace remains as distant as ever. ### When Algorithms Go to War: Artificial Intelligence and the Future of International Conflict URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/when-algorithms-go-to-war-artificial-intelligence-and-the-future-of-international-conflict/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T04:45:43.000Z The next major international crisis may not begin with troops massing at borders or warships crossing into disputed waters. It might start with an algorithm detecting an anomaly, triggering an automated response, and setting off a cascade of machine-speed reactions that outpace human comprehension. As explored in [*Artificial Intelligence and International Conflict in Cyberspace*](https://amzn.to/4ou4vBz?ref=diplopolis.com) (Routledge, 2023), edited by Fabio Cristiano, Dennis Broeders, François Delerue, Frédérick Douzet, and Aude Géry, AI doesn't simply make cyber operations faster; it rewrites the very logic of conflict itself. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/05/artificial-intelligence-and-international-conflict-in-cyberspace.jpg)](https://amzn.to/4qi9Ptq?ref=diplopolis.com) Artificial intelligence is transforming not just how wars are fought, but how they begin, escalate, and potentially end. The integration of AI into military cyber capabilities collapses traditional distinctions—between offense and defense, between war and peace, between human and machine decision-making. This transformation demands urgent attention from policymakers, diplomats, and citizens alike, as our existing frameworks for managing international conflict prove increasingly inadequate for an algorithm-driven world. ## Speed of War: How Machine Learning Changes Command Cycles and Crisis Management The history of military technology is largely a history of acceleration. From cavalry to telegraph to nuclear missiles, each innovation compressed the time between decision and consequence. But AI represents something qualitatively different: the potential for conflict to unfold faster than human cognition can follow. Consider a scenario where Nation A's AI-powered cyber defense system detects what it interprets as preparation for a major attack from Nation B. In milliseconds, it could launch preemptive countermeasures, which Nation B's AI systems interpret as an unprovoked assault, triggering their own automated responses. Within seconds, both nations could find themselves in an escalating cyber conflict that neither intended, with human decision-makers struggling to understand what's happening, let alone stop it. This isn't science fiction. Current AI systems can already identify and respond to cyber threats orders of magnitude faster than human analysts. The U.S. Cyber Command's[ persistent engagement strategy](https://www.cybercom.mil/Media/News/Article/3905064/uscybercom-unveils-ai-roadmap-for-cyber-operations/?ref=diplopolis.com), which involves [continuous contact](https://www.cybercom.mil/Media/News/Article/3198878/cyber-101-defend-forward-and-persistent-engagement/?ref=diplopolis.com) with adversaries in cyberspace, increasingly relies on automated tools to maintain operational tempo. China's [Strategic Support Force](https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2024/05/chinas-new-information-support-force?ref=diplopolis.com) similarly emphasizes "intelligentized" warfare capabilities that leverage machine learning for both defensive and offensive operations. The compression of decision cycles fundamentally alters crisis management. Traditional diplomatic mechanisms—the late-night phone calls, the carefully worded communiqués, the graduated signals—all assume human-speed deliberation. When conflicts can escalate to dangerous levels in minutes rather than days, these tools become obsolete. As the contributors to [*Artificial Intelligence and International Conflict in Cyberspace*](https://amzn.to/4ou4vBz?ref=diplopolis.com) argue, we need new frameworks for managing crises that unfold at machine speed while preserving human control over matters of war and peace. ## Invisible Battlefields: Cyber Operations Below the Threshold of War Perhaps the most insidious transformation AI brings is the normalization of constant, low-level conflict in cyberspace. Machine learning enables what experts call ["gray zone" operations](https://rdcu.be/eLCV8?ref=diplopolis.com)—activities aggressive enough to achieve [strategic objectives](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research%5Freports/RR1772.html?ref=diplopolis.com) but calibrated to remain below the threshold that would trigger traditional military responses. AI systems excel at finding and exploiting vulnerabilities in ways that blur the line between espionage, sabotage, and warfare. They can conduct reconnaissance, map networks, and even manipulate data in ways subtle enough to avoid detection for months or years. The [2020 SolarWinds breach](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-104746?ref=diplopolis.com), while not definitively attributed to AI, demonstrated how sophisticated actors can infiltrate thousands of networks simultaneously, creating strategic advantages without firing a shot. This perpetual state of low-intensity cyber operations challenges fundamental assumptions about international order. The [Westphalian system](https://www.britannica.com/event/Peace-of-Westphalia?ref=diplopolis.com) assumes clear distinctions between war and peace, with different legal and normative frameworks governing each. But when AI enables continuous operations that are neither quite war nor quite peace, these categories lose their meaning. Nations find themselves in a permanent state of competition where the boundaries of acceptable behavior become increasingly unclear. The psychological impact cannot be underestimated. When nations know they're under constant algorithmic surveillance and probing, trust erodes and paranoia grows. Every network anomaly could be an attack; every software update could hide a vulnerability. This atmosphere of perpetual insecurity makes diplomatic solutions harder to achieve and military responses more likely. ## Delegating Judgment: The Risks of Removing Humans from Decision Loops The seductive promise of AI in military applications is its ability to process vast amounts of information and respond faster than any human. But this capability comes with a profound risk: the gradual removal of human judgment from decisions about life, death, and war. Current military AI systems typically include ["human in the loop" safeguards](https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2024-011/beyond-the-loop?ref=diplopolis.com), requiring [human approval for critical decisions](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/396380137%5FThe%5FRole%5Fof%5FHuman%5FOversight%5Fin%5FLethal%5FAutonomous%5FWeapons%5FSystems%5FEnsuring%5FAccountability%5Fand%5FCompliance?ref=diplopolis.com). But the pressure to match adversaries' response times creates powerful incentives to grant AI systems greater autonomy. If your opponent's AI can launch and complete a cyber attack in seconds, can you afford to wait for human approval to respond? This delegation of judgment to machines raises profound ethical questions. AI systems, however sophisticated, lack the contextual understanding, moral reasoning, and accountability that humans bring to decisions about conflict. They operate on probabilities and patterns, not wisdom or restraint. An AI might accurately identify a cyber intrusion but fail to recognize it as a mistaken action by an ally rather than an attack by an adversary. The book's editors pose a crucial question: "What is at stake with the use of automation in international conflict in cyberspace?" The answer extends beyond tactical military concerns to fundamental questions about human agency in matters of war and peace. Each step toward greater automation makes the next step easier to justify, creating a slippery slope toward fully autonomous warfare. ## New Deterrence Dilemma: When Attribution Becomes Impossible Deterrence, the cornerstone of strategic stability since the Cold War, depends on clear attribution and credible threats of retaliation. AI undermines both foundations. When attacks can be launched through layers of automated proxies, masked by AI-generated deceptions, and executed by algorithms that adapt and evolve, determining responsibility becomes nearly impossible. Traditional cyber attribution is already challenging, often taking [months of investigation](https://www.cisa.gov/topics/cyber-threats-and-advisories/advanced-persistent-threats-and-nation-state-actors?ref=diplopolis.com) to establish with moderate confidence. AI exponentially compounds this problem. Adversaries can use machine learning to mimic others' attack patterns, generate false flags at scale, and create [deepfakes](https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-events/publications/facing-reality-law-enforcement-and-challenge-of-deepfakes?ref=diplopolis.com) that muddy the waters further. When you cannot definitively identify your attacker, how can you deter future attacks? This attribution crisis extends beyond technical challenges to political ones. Even when technical evidence points toward a particular actor, the complexity and opacity of AI systems provide plausible deniability. Nations can claim their AI acted autonomously, without direct human instruction. This ambiguity creates a responsibility gap that aggressive actors can exploit while cautious nations become paralyzed by uncertainty. The result is a deterrence paradox: the more sophisticated offensive AI capabilities become, the less effective traditional deterrence strategies prove. This dynamic incentivizes first strikes and preemptive actions, destabilizing the international system. ## Why Governance Matters: Building Frameworks for an AI-Driven World The inadequacy of current international law and norms for governing AI in conflict, thoroughly documented in [*Artificial Intelligence and International Conflict in Cyberspace*](https://amzn.to/4ou4vBz?ref=diplopolis.com), demands urgent attention. The [Geneva Conventions](https://www.icrc.org/en/law-and-policy/geneva-conventions-and-their-commentaries?ref=diplopolis.com), the [UN Charter](https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter?ref=diplopolis.com), the Laws of Armed Conflict—all assume human decision-makers operating at human speeds with human accountability. None adequately address autonomous systems making split-second decisions about war and peace. Creating effective governance requires acknowledging AI's dual nature as both weapon and infrastructure. Unlike nuclear weapons, which have primarily military applications, the same AI technologies that power military systems also run civilian economies. This dual-use nature makes traditional arms control approaches ineffective. We cannot simply ban or limit AI development without crippling legitimate civilian applications. The path forward demands innovative governance approaches that focus on specific military applications while preserving beneficial uses. Most critically, we need mandatory human authorization for escalatory actions, ensuring that decisions to intensify conflicts remain under human control regardless of operational tempo. Technical standards for AI transparency in military systems could enable verification of compliance with international agreements, creating accountability even in highly classified domains. Our cyber-deterrence frameworks must evolve to address AI capabilities, incorporating new forms of attribution and accountability that acknowledge both the technical complexity and political ambiguity of algorithmic warfare. Perhaps most urgently, we need international cooperation mechanisms specifically designed for managing AI-related crises before they escalate beyond control, recognizing that traditional diplomatic timelines are obsolete when conflicts unfold in seconds rather than days. The path forward requires unprecedented cooperation between technologists, policymakers, diplomats, and military leaders. As the contributors to this essential volume make clear, the stakes couldn't be higher. We stand at a crossroads where the choices we make about AI and conflict will shape international security for generations. The question is not whether algorithms will go to war—they already have. The question is whether humans will maintain meaningful control over decisions of war and peace, or whether we'll cede that awesome responsibility to machines. The answer will determine not just how future conflicts unfold, but whether humanity retains agency over its own survival. --- *For deeper insights into these critical issues, read* [*Artificial Intelligence and International Conflict in Cyberspace*](https://amzn.to/4ou4vBz?ref=diplopolis.com) *(Routledge, 2023), edited by Fabio Cristiano, Dennis Broeders, François Delerue, Frédérick Douzet, and Aude Géry.* ### Putin Cancels Russia-Arab Summit as Middle East Influence Wanes URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/putin-cancels-russia-arab-summit-as-middle-east-influence-wanes/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T04:43:13.000Z The Kremlin's sudden cancellation of what was meant to be a showcase of Russian influence in the Arab world has laid bare an uncomfortable truth for Vladimir Putin: Moscow's diplomatic standing in the Middle East is eroding at a critical moment. The [planned Russia-Arab summit](https://tass.com/world/1976797?ref=diplopolis.com), which Putin had promoted as a demonstration of enduring partnerships across the region, was quietly shelved after only a handful of Arab leaders confirmed their attendance. The embarrassingly sparse response stands in stark contrast to the robust participation at a parallel U.S.-led summit in Egypt, where regional leaders gathered to discuss pressing Middle Eastern issues, including the ongoing crisis in Gaza. For the Kremlin, the symbolism is damaging. Russia has long positioned itself as an essential power broker in the Middle East, cultivating relationships across ideological divides and presenting itself as an alternative to Western influence. Yet [the cancelled summit](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/oct/15/putins-cancelled-russia-arab-summit-signals-waning-influence-in-middle-east?ref=diplopolis.com) suggests that Arab states are increasingly willing to look elsewhere for diplomatic leadership, even as Moscow struggles to maintain relevance in regional affairs. ## Ukraine War Constrains Russia's Global Reach The timing of the cancellation is particularly revealing. Russia's bandwidth for international engagement has been severely constrained by its ongoing war in Ukraine, now in its fourth year. The conflict has consumed enormous military, economic, and political resources, leaving Moscow with diminished capacity to project power beyond its immediate sphere of concern. What was once a carefully balanced foreign policy portfolio has narrowed dramatically, and the Middle East appears to be paying the price. This retrenchment has manifested in multiple ways across the region. Russia's relationships with two of its most important Middle Eastern partners, Syria and Iran, have grown complicated. In Syria, where Russian military intervention helped preserve Bashar al-Assad's regime, Moscow's ability to shape outcomes has waned as it redirects resources to Ukraine. The Kremlin's influence in Damascus, once seemingly unassailable, now competes with other regional powers who have stepped into the space Russia has vacated. Meanwhile, Russia's alignment with Iran, while still significant, has created tensions with Arab states wary of Tehran's regional ambitions. This partnership, which has deepened through arms transfers and economic cooperation, has complicated Moscow's efforts to maintain its traditionally balanced approach to Middle Eastern diplomacy. Arab leaders who once appreciated Russia's willingness to engage with all sides now see a power increasingly aligned with their adversaries. ## Sidelined from Gaza Diplomacy Perhaps most telling is [Russia's conspicuous absence from recent diplomatic efforts](https://www.bostonglobe.com/2025/10/09/world/putin-russia-arab-summit-gaza-cease-fire/?ref=diplopolis.com) surrounding Gaza. Moscow, which once positioned itself as an indispensable mediator in Israeli-Palestinian affairs, has found itself sidelined as other actors take the lead. The exclusion from substantive Gaza diplomacy represents a striking reversal for a country that has cultivated relationships with both Hamas and Israel, and which maintains observer status in various Middle Eastern peace frameworks. The contrast with American diplomatic activity in the region could hardly be more pronounced. While Russia struggles to convene a meaningful gathering, the United States has demonstrated sustained engagement, drawing regional leaders to discussions despite its own controversial policies. This divergence suggests that Arab states are recalibrating their strategic calculations, weighing the reliability and relevance of their partnerships in an evolving geopolitical landscape. ## Arab States Reassess Moscow's Value For Arab leaders, the decision to decline or simply ignore invitations to Moscow reflects a pragmatic assessment of where power and influence actually lie. Russia's weakened economic position, its military overextension, and its reduced diplomatic bandwidth have all contributed to a reassessment of Moscow's value as a partner. Countries that once hedged between competing powers are finding less reason to maintain that balance when one side appears increasingly unable to deliver. The cancelled summit also arrives as Middle Eastern states navigate their own complex transitions. The normalization of relations between Israel and several Arab countries, the shifting dynamics of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and evolving positions on conflicts from Yemen to Libya all contribute to a regional order in flux. In this environment, Russia's diminished engagement creates opportunities for other powers to expand their influence. Yet it would be premature to write off Russian influence in the Middle East entirely. Moscow retains important military installations in Syria, maintains energy relationships with several regional producers, and continues to cultivate ties with actors outside the Western orbit. Russia's permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council still gives it formal leverage over regional issues, even if its practical influence has declined. ## A Broader Pattern of Russian Retreat Nevertheless, the trajectory is difficult to ignore. The cancelled summit represents more than a single diplomatic setback; it symbolizes a broader pattern of Russian retreat from global engagement. As Moscow devotes ever more attention and resources to its confrontation with Ukraine and its standoff with the West, other regions inevitably receive less focus. The Middle East, long a theater where Russia competed for influence, now appears to be sliding down the Kremlin's list of priorities. For Putin, whose foreign policy has been built on projecting Russian power across multiple regions simultaneously, this represents a significant constraint. The multipolar world he has long advocated, with Russia as one of several great powers, becomes harder to sustain when Russia lacks the capacity to meaningfully engage across all theaters. The cancelled summit suggests that Arab leaders recognize this limitation, and are adjusting their diplomatic strategies accordingly. As the international order continues to evolve, Russia's experience in the Middle East may preview challenges it will face elsewhere. A country stretched thin by military commitments, economic pressures, and diplomatic isolation will struggle to maintain influence in regions where it cannot offer tangible benefits to potential partners. The Arab world's tepid response to Putin's summit invitation suggests that this reality is already becoming apparent to leaders weighing their strategic options. ## What This Means for Regional Power Dynamics The question now is whether this represents a temporary setback or a more permanent shift in the regional balance of power. If Russia's constraints prove enduring, the Middle East may be entering a new era where Moscow's voice carries less weight and other powers fill the vacuum. The cancelled summit, intended as a display of strength, may instead mark the moment when Russia's diminished regional standing became impossible to ignore. For Middle Eastern states, the implications are significant. The recalibration of regional alignments opens new possibilities for diplomatic maneuvering, but also introduces uncertainty about the future architecture of power in the region. As traditional relationships evolve and new partnerships emerge, the cancelled Russia-Arab summit stands as a stark reminder that influence in international affairs must be continuously earned and maintained—and that even great powers can find their leverage slipping away when their attention and resources are committed elsewhere. ### They Predicted AI Would Rationalize Diplomacy. It Made Everything Worse URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/they-predicted-ai-would-rationalize-diplomacy-it-made-everything-worse/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T04:42:00.000Z In September 2025, when the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted [a landmark resolution](https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/09/1165898?ref=diplopolis.com) establishing the first truly global AI governance mechanisms—an Independent International Scientific Panel on AI and a Global Dialogue on AI Governance—the moment represented something political scientist Valerie M. Hudson could only speculate about in a book first published in 1991\. Yet reading her edited volume [*Artificial Intelligence and International Politics*](https://amzn.to/4q3cBma?ref=diplopolis.com) today feels uncannily prophetic. Hudson's collection arrived at a peculiar moment in time. The Cold War had just ended, personal computers were still rarities, and artificial intelligence meant symbolic logic systems and expert databases—not the generative algorithms now shaping diplomatic cables and negotiation strategies. The scholars Hudson assembled were asking a question that seemed almost quaint: Could machines help us understand how states behave? [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/05/artificial-intelligence-and-international-politics_valerie-m-hudson.jpg)](https://amzn.to/4q3cBma?ref=diplopolis.com) Three decades later, we're asking something far more unsettling: Are machines beginning to *determine* how states behave? ## Architecture of Political Thought Hudson's volume opened with Philip Schrodt's foundational essay, "Artificial Intelligence and International Relations: An Overview," which framed foreign policymakers as information processors operating under severe constraints. Decision-makers, Schrodt argued, function like algorithms themselves—taking inputs, applying rules, generating outputs. The question was whether computers could replicate or illuminate this process. Helen Purkitt extended this framework in her essay on "Intuitive Foreign Policy Decision-Makers Viewed as Limited Information Processors." Long before the data deluge of the 21st century, Purkitt warned that overwhelmed decision-makers rely on simplified mental models—what Herbert Simon called "bounded rationality." Replace those policymakers with contemporary AI systems, and the warning holds: the problem isn't access to information, but the capacity to process it meaningfully. The essays that followed represented the state of the art in early computational international relations: rule-based systems that attempted to model diplomatic behavior, case-based reasoning that drew lessons from historical precedent, and natural language processing systems designed to parse political discourse. These were symbolic AI systems—logic chains and structured databases—attempting to capture the grammar of international politics. What's striking is how their ambitions mirror our own. Those early researchers wanted AI to make foreign policy more rational, transparent, and predictable. Instead, we've built systems that make diplomacy faster, more opaque, and increasingly algorithmic. ## From Theory to Practice: The Algorithmic State The transformation Hudson's contributors anticipated is now reality, though by means they never imagined. For instance, China's [Ministry of Foreign Affairs unveiled](https://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/will-algorithms-make-safe-decisions-foreign-affairs/?ref=diplopolis.com) an AI system designed to evaluate foreign investment projects worth hundreds of billions of dollars under the Belt and Road Initiative—analyzing political, economic, and environmental risks at scale. Israeli diplomat Elad Ratson has pioneered what he calls "algorithmic diplomacy"—using machine learning to shape how national narratives flow through digital spaces. The U.S. State Department released its first [Enterprise Artificial Intelligence Strategy](https://2021-2025.state.gov/artificial-intelligence/?ref=diplopolis.com) in 2024, establishing a framework for how AI will "advance United States diplomacy and shape the future of statecraft." The document acknowledges what Hudson's volume could only theorize: AI is no longer just analyzing diplomacy; it's becoming embedded in its practice. At the Center for Strategic and International Studies, researchers [developed an interactive program](https://www.npr.org/2025/05/12/nx-s1-5375140/ai-foreign-policy-diplomacy-war-ceasefire-ukraine?ref=diplopolis.com) called "Strategic Headwinds" to help simulate negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. The system was trained on hundreds of historical peace treaties and open-source reporting on each side's positions. The goal: identify pathways to agreement that human negotiators might overlook. This is precisely the kind of application Philip Schrodt envisioned in his essay on "Pattern Recognition of International Event Sequences"—using computational methods to detect structures in diplomatic behavior and project them forward. What Schrodt couldn't foresee was how opaque these systems would become. As CSIS researcher Benjamin Jensen notes, [modern AI diplomacy](https://www.csis.org/analysis/ai-benchmarking-and-future-foreign-policy?ref=diplopolis.com) faces a fundamental "black box problem"—it's often impossible to know why a model recommends a particular course of action. ## Language Wars Perhaps the most prophetic essays in Hudson's collection were those focused on political language. John C. Mallery's "Semantic Content Analysis" and Gavan Duffy's work on representing historical time attempted to map political discourse into machine-readable formats. They saw language as data to be structured. Today's AI sees language as something to generate. [Recent research](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666188825000565?ref=diplopolis.com) demonstrates how generative AI is being deployed across diplomatic functions—from drafting consular communications to analyzing crisis situations in real-time. The shift from analytical to generative systems represents a fundamental change: AI no longer just interprets what states say; it increasingly crafts what they might say next. This has profound implications. The same tools that can translate diplomatic documents across languages or identify emerging crises from news reporting can also manufacture disinformation campaigns. China's AI-driven influence operations across the Global South and automated narrative-shaping systems represent the darker evolution of technologies that once promised only insight. ## Governance Paradox Hudson's contributors believed AI could make international politics more rational and predictable. The opposite has materialized: AI has made global affairs faster, more complex, and harder to govern. The UN's August 2025 resolution establishing global AI governance mechanisms represents an attempt to catch up. As [Chatham House analysts note](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/09/can-uns-new-ai-governance-efforts-weather-ai-race?ref=diplopolis.com), these new bodies face formidable challenges: inadequate funding, intensifying US-China rivalry, and no enforcement mechanisms. Moreover, [recent research shows](https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/100/3/1275/7641064?ref=diplopolis.com) that 118 countries weren't parties to any significant international AI governance initiatives as of 2024—only seven developed nations participated in all of them. This creates what scholars call a "weak regime complex"—fragmented governance structures that leave significant gaps and enable competitive dynamics to override cooperative ones. The EU's AI Act attempts to impose human rights-centered standards, while China promotes state-centric sovereignty principles. The United States oscillates between regulatory frameworks emphasizing democratic values and deregulatory approaches prioritizing competitiveness. Hudson and her colleagues hoped AI would help states understand cooperation. Instead, AI has become a new arena for great power competition. ## What the Book Got Right—And Wrong Reading *Artificial Intelligence and International Politics* in 2025 reveals both prescience and blind spots. The contributors were remarkably accurate about three things: First, they understood that AI would fundamentally reshape how foreign policy decisions are made—moving from intuitive judgment toward data-driven analysis. This is now reality, from [diplomatic cable analysis](https://www.ie.edu/uncover-ie/ai-and-diplomacy-master-in-technology-and-global-affairs/?ref=diplopolis.com) to algorithmic trade negotiation support. Second, they recognized that representing political knowledge computationally would raise profound methodological challenges. The "black box problem" they worried about with early expert systems has only intensified with deep learning. Third, they anticipated that AI would create new forms of inequality—between states with computational capacity and those without. This digital divide now shapes global governance negotiations. But they also got key dynamics wrong. They assumed AI would make politics more transparent; instead, algorithmic decision-making often obscures accountability. They expected AI to enhance rational deliberation; instead, it has accelerated information overload and enabled sophisticated manipulation. They hoped AI might reduce cognitive biases; instead, it has embedded new ones through biased training data and Western-centric datasets. Most fundamentally, Hudson's contributors saw AI as a research tool for understanding international politics. We now confront AI as a participant *in* international politics—shaping outcomes, not just analyzing them. ## Enduring Question The core question Hudson's volume posed remains unanswered: Can computational methods illuminate the logic of interstate cooperation and conflict? The technologies have evolved beyond recognition—from symbolic AI to neural networks, from expert systems to large language models. But the fundamental challenge persists. In 1991, AI promised to make the rational actor assumptions of international relations theory more rigorous. In 2025, AI threatens to replace human reasoning altogether—or at least to make the boundary between human and machine judgment increasingly porous. As [researchers now warn](https://trendsresearch.org/insight/ai-powered-diplomacy-the-role-of-artificial-intelligence-in-global-conflict-resolution/?ref=diplopolis.com), the uneven adoption of AI across foreign ministries could deepen global power asymmetries. Nations with advanced AI capabilities may come to dominate diplomatic negotiations, not through better arguments but through superior information processing and faster decision cycles. Hudson's collection reminds us that every generation believes technology will rationalize politics. Every generation confronts, instead, new forms of complexity. The scholars who once tried to teach machines to think politically could not have imagined a world where machines might teach politics how to think—or where that teaching might serve some states far better than others. The task ahead isn't to decide whether AI belongs in international relations—it already does. The question is whether we can build governance structures that keep algorithmic statecraft accountable to human values and diplomatic wisdom. Thirty-four years after Hudson's volume, we're still searching for that answer. ### Kabul Under Pressure: India's Diplomatic Gambit and Pakistan's Airstrikes Reveal Shifting Power Dynamics URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/kabul-under-pressure-indias-diplomatic-gambit-and-pakistans-airstrikes-reveal-shifting-power-dynamics/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T04:40:57.000Z October 10, 2025, delivered two starkly contradictory messages to Afghanistan's Taliban government within hours of each other. In New Delhi, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar stood beside Afghanistan's Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to [announce that India would upgrade its technical mission](https://www.business-standard.com/external-affairs-defence-security/news/s-jaishankar-india-afghanistan-ties-indian-embassy-kabul-reopen-125101000536%5F1.html?ref=diplopolis.com) in Kabul to a full embassy—the first high-level diplomatic engagement with the Taliban since their 2021 takeover. Yet even as Muttaqi participated in diplomatic meetings in the Indian capital, [Pakistani fighter jets were bombing Kabul itself](https://zeenews.india.com/world/pakistan-carrying-out-aerial-raids-in-kabul-ttp-chief-noor-wali-mehsud-feared-dead-2970054.html?ref=diplopolis.com), targeting the leadership of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the first airstrikes on Afghanistan's capital since the Taliban seized power. The juxtaposition was not coincidental. These simultaneous developments expose the deep fault lines reshaping South Asian geopolitics, where Afghanistan has once again become contested ground for regional powers pursuing competing visions of security and influence. For the Taliban government in Kabul, the message is unmistakable: Afghanistan sits at the center of irreconcilable pressures, caught between India's diplomatic embrace and Pakistan's military ultimatums. ## India's Calculated Engagement Jaishankar's announcement carried significant diplomatic weight. India had shuttered its Kabul embassy in August 2021 as the Taliban swept into power following the American withdrawal. The reopening of a full embassy—beyond the technical mission established in 2022—marks a strategic pivot. During his remarks alongside Muttaqi, Jaishankar emphasized India's commitment to "the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Afghanistan," language carefully calibrated to appeal to Afghan nationalism while implicitly criticizing external interference. India announced concrete deliverables: 20 ambulances and medical equipment, expanded educational opportunities for Afghan students at Indian universities, and increased visa processing. These initiatives build on [India's substantial pre-2021 investment](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/10/india-to-reopen-embassy-in-kabul-after-4-year-hiatus-amid-new-taliban-ties?ref=diplopolis.com) in Afghanistan—more than $3 billion in infrastructure, health, and education projects—which earned New Delhi considerable goodwill among ordinary Afghans. The strategic calculation is clear: by maintaining development partnerships, India positions itself as a benign external actor genuinely invested in Afghan welfare, contrasting sharply with Pakistan's transactional security-focused approach. The timing matters enormously. This marks Muttaqi's first official travel to India as Foreign Minister, made possible by a temporary UN Security Council waiver lifting travel sanctions. For New Delhi, hosting Muttaqi demonstrates India's relevance in Afghan affairs and, most significantly, signals to Islamabad that Pakistan no longer monopolizes influence in Kabul. Yet India has carefully avoided formally recognizing the Taliban government. This nuanced position—engagement without recognition—allows India to maintain relationships while preserving diplomatic flexibility and aligning with international consensus that legitimacy remains contingent on governance improvements. ## Pakistan's Desperate Strike The explosions that shattered Kabul's calm on October 9 told a very different story. Multiple strikes hit locations across the capital—including areas near the international airport—targeting compounds believed to house TTP leadership. Pakistani sources claim the operation killed Noor Wali Mehsud, the TTP's chief since 2018 and one of Islamabad's most wanted figures, though [confirmation remains disputed](https://amu.tv/204448/?ref=diplopolis.com). Pakistan's frustration with Taliban tolerance of TTP sanctuaries has been building for years. The TTP has intensified operations against Pakistani security forces, with over 2,500 Pakistanis reportedly killed in TTP-related violence during 2024\. [Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif's parliamentary remarks](https://www.opindia.com/news-updates/pakistan-launches-air-strikes-on-kabul-claims-it-is-hitting-ttp-hideouts-taliban-calls-it-declaration-of-war/?ref=diplopolis.com) hours before the strikes captured Islamabad's exasperation: "Enough is enough, our patience has run out. Terrorism from Afghan soil is intolerable." Significantly, Asif also criticized Afghanistan's "growing cooperation with India" and accused Kabul of "always siding with India"—revealing how security concerns intertwine with anxieties about losing influence to its arch-rival. The decision to strike Kabul itself, rather than border provinces where previous operations occurred, represents dramatic escalation. It demonstrates both operational capability and political will to violate Afghan sovereignty. Yet it also exposes Pakistan's diminishing leverage. The country that midwifed the Taliban's return to power now finds itself unable to secure basic counterterrorism cooperation, resorting instead to unilateral military action that risks fundamentally alienating the very government it once championed. ## Afghanistan's Precarious Balance For the Taliban government, these simultaneous pressures create both challenges and opportunities. Pakistan represents the most complicated relationship. Islamabad provided crucial support during the Taliban's insurgency, yet that patronage came with expectations of deference the Taliban now resists. Afghanistan has historically opposed external domination, and the current Taliban leadership views genuine sovereignty as central to its legitimacy. The Taliban's openness to Indian engagement reflects this desire for strategic autonomy. By cultivating relationships with multiple powers—India, China, Russia, Iran, and Central Asian states—Kabul diversifies its dependencies and creates room for independent action. India offers economic opportunities and development assistance without the security demands or ideological interference characterizing Pakistan's approach. Yet limits exist. The Taliban cannot embrace India so fully as to completely alienate Pakistan, which controls critical border crossings and retains the capability to destabilize Afghanistan. Similarly, India's engagement has boundaries—New Delhi will not provide military equipment or security assistance that could threaten its own interests. The Pakistani airstrikes, occurring while Muttaqi met with Indian officials, sent an unmistakable message about Pakistan's red lines. Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid's measured response—acknowledging the explosions but avoiding inflammatory rhetoric—suggests Kabul understands it must manage this crisis carefully. Taliban-affiliated channels' calls for retaliatory attacks inside Pakistan reflect hardliner sentiment, but the government's actual response will likely balance demonstrating resolve with avoiding full rupture. ## Regional Calculations This India-Pakistan-Afghanistan triangle does not exist in isolation. China maintains significant stakes through both its "all-weather ally" Pakistan and direct engagement with the Taliban government. Beijing's Belt and Road ambitions require Afghan stability, making both Indian-Afghan rapprochement and Pakistan-Afghan tensions problematic for Chinese regional strategy. Russia occupies a unique position as the only country to have formally recognized the Taliban government. Moscow views both Indian and Pakistani presence in Afghanistan through the lens of preventing American military return and maintaining Central Asian stability. Central Asian states face immediate spillover effects from Afghan instability and remain deeply concerned about militant threats and refugee flows. The United States, despite its 2021 withdrawal, retains counterterrorism interests. American policymakers will view India's embassy opening as consistent with goals of integrating Afghanistan into regional economic structures, while Pakistan's unilateral military action complicates the counterterrorism cooperation Washington still values. ## Uncertain Trajectories Several scenarios merit attention in coming months. The possibility of further Pakistani military operations remains high if TTP attacks continue. Pakistan has demonstrated both capability and willingness to strike deep inside Afghanistan. However, repeated airstrikes risk triggering Taliban retaliation—potentially through TTP proxies conducting attacks inside Pakistan or through more direct support for anti-Pakistan groups. India's embassy reopening creates expectations for substantive engagement. If the Taliban expects economic benefits, it must demonstrate credibility as a partner—including sensitivity to India's security concerns. Success requires India to deliver tangible projects while the Taliban maintains sufficient stability to make those projects viable. Pakistan must recalibrate its approach. Military strikes offer tactical satisfaction but strategic frustration—they eliminate individual militants while alienating the government whose cooperation Islamabad ultimately needs. The role of other regional powers—particularly China—may prove decisive in managing these tensions. Beijing possesses unique leverage with both Pakistan and Afghanistan through economic assistance both countries desperately need. The paradox of Afghanistan's current position is that increased international engagement brings both greater legitimacy and greater expectations. Countries opening embassies will demand responsiveness to their concerns. The Taliban must decide whether it can accommodate these expectations while maintaining the ideological commitments that define its identity. ## A Fragile Equilibrium The events of October 9-10 expose fundamental instability in South Asia's evolving strategic landscape. India's diplomatic gambit offers Afghanistan economic opportunities and political validation, challenging Pakistan's assumed primacy. Pakistan's airstrikes demonstrate the limits of Taliban sovereignty and the enduring power of military force to shape events. The Taliban government faces an unenviable task: maintaining relationships with rivals who view Afghanistan as an arena for their competition while asserting enough sovereignty to sustain domestic legitimacy. Pakistan demands security cooperation that would require the Taliban to betray ideological allies. India offers engagement contingent on meeting international standards the movement has consistently rejected. Regional powers expect stability and counterterrorism cooperation while providing limited assistance to build the state capacity that might deliver those outcomes. Whether this contradictory equilibrium holds or collapses into renewed conflict will depend on choices made in Kabul, Islamabad, and New Delhi in the coming months. The stakes extend far beyond these three capitals—regional stability, counterterrorism effectiveness, and millions of Afghan lives hang in the balance. For now, Kabul finds itself under pressure from all sides, navigating between diplomatic opportunities and military threats in a region where yesterday's allies become today's adversaries with dangerous speed. The question is not whether Afghanistan will face external pressures—geography and history guarantee that reality. The question is whether the Taliban government possesses the diplomatic sophistication, internal cohesion, and strategic vision to manage those pressures without triggering the very conflict and isolation it seeks to avoid. October 10 suggests that test has only just begun. ### Civil Society's Frontline: How Aid Flotillas Are Reshaping Conflict Diplomacy URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/civil-societys-frontline-how-aid-flotillas-are-reshaping-conflict-diplomacy/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T04:39:24.000Z When Israeli naval forces [intercepted](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/1/israel-intercepts-gaza-sumud-flotilla-vessels-what-we-know-so-far?ref=diplopolis.com) the Global Sumud Flotilla in early October 2025, detaining over 500 activists from more than 40 countries who were attempting to break the Gaza blockade, the operation represented far more than another chapter in a longstanding maritime confrontation. The flotilla—comprising more than 44 vessels and representing the largest civilian-led maritime convoy in history—embodied an evolving form of humanitarian diplomacy that challenges fundamental assumptions about who holds authority over humanitarian access in conflict zones, and how international law governs the intersection of state sovereignty and civilian intervention. The interception, which took place in international waters approximately 70-80 nautical miles from Gaza's coast, has reignited a debate that extends well beyond the immediate Israel-Palestine context. At its core lies a question with profound implications for the future of humanitarian action: when civil society actors undertake direct maritime missions to deliver aid over governmental objections, invoking international humanitarian and maritime law to justify their actions, how should the international community respond? The answer to this question will shape not only the specific fate of flotilla participants but the broader architecture of humanitarian intervention in an era of proliferating conflicts and contested access. ## Evolution of Flotilla Diplomacy Maritime humanitarian missions to Gaza represent a distinct strand of civil society activism that has developed its own tactical repertoire, legal arguments, and symbolic power since the first successful Free Gaza Movement voyages in 2008\. These missions differ fundamentally from traditional humanitarian operations in several respects. Unlike established humanitarian organizations that negotiate access through diplomatic channels and operate within frameworks sanctioned by conflict parties, flotilla organizers explicitly position their missions as challenges to state authority—in this case, Israel's naval blockade, which activists characterize as illegal collective punishment under international law. The [history of flotilla missions to Gaza](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza%5FFreedom%5FFlotilla?ref=diplopolis.com) traces an escalating pattern of civil society determination and state response. The 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, in which Israeli commandos killed nine Turkish activists (later determined by UN investigations to have used excessive force), marked the bloodiest confrontation but failed to deter subsequent attempts. Flotillas in 2011, 2015, 2016, 2018, and throughout 2025 have all been intercepted, yet each mission has refined its approach, expanded its international composition, and sharpened its legal argumentation. The [Global Sumud Flotilla](https://globalsumudflotilla.org/?ref=diplopolis.com), organized by the [Freedom Flotilla Coalition](https://freedomflotilla.org/?ref=diplopolis.com) alongside the Global Movement to Gaza, Maghreb Sumud Flotilla, and Sumud Nusantara, represented a strategic evolution. Rather than a single convoy, organizers coordinated departures from multiple Mediterranean ports—Barcelona, Italy, Tunisia, and Greece—creating a dispersed network harder to interdict simultaneously. The flotilla's name itself, drawn from the Arabic concept of *sumud* (steadfast perseverance), signaled a long-term commitment to challenging the blockade through repeated attempts rather than singular symbolic gestures. What distinguishes contemporary flotilla diplomacy from earlier humanitarian activism is its sophisticated synthesis of legal claims, media strategy, and international solidarity networks. Participants livestreamed their journeys, documented interceptions in real time, and mobilized diplomatic pressure from their home governments. The flotilla included parliamentarians from multiple countries, journalists, lawyers specifically trained in maritime law, and high-profile activists like climate campaigner Greta Thunberg, whose participation guaranteed global media attention. ## Legal Battleground: Maritime Law Meets Humanitarian Access The confrontation between the Global Sumud Flotilla and Israeli forces plays out on contested legal terrain where international humanitarian law, the law of armed conflict at sea, and human rights frameworks intersect in complex and sometimes contradictory ways. Both sides invoke international law to justify their positions, yet they interpret the same legal instruments in fundamentally opposing ways. Flotilla organizers ground their mission's legality in several key principles. The [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/1/gaza-sumud-flotilla-how-israel-breaks-international-maritime-law?ref=diplopolis.com) (UNCLOS) guarantees freedom of navigation in international waters, a cornerstone principle of maritime law dating back centuries. Under UNCLOS Article 87, all vessels enjoy the freedom of the high seas, which extends beyond any state's 12-nautical-mile territorial waters. The flotilla organizers assert that their vessels, sailing under recognized flag states and carrying humanitarian cargo, possess an unqualified right to navigate international waters without interference. Furthermore, activists invoke the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, which establishes strict conditions for lawful naval blockades. The manual prohibits blockades that cause starvation of civilian populations or inflict disproportionate suffering—standards that flotilla participants argue Israel's Gaza blockade clearly violates. They point to [UN Security Council resolutions demanding unimpeded humanitarian access](https://freedomflotilla.org/legal-analysis/?ref=diplopolis.com) and the removal of barriers to aid delivery as binding legal instruments that supersede any claimed right to maintain a comprehensive naval blockade. The legal case advanced by flotilla organizers received support from international legal experts and workers' federations. Stephen Cotton, General Secretary of the International Transport Workers' Federation representing over 16.5 million transport workers globally, stated unequivocally that "attacking or seizing non-violent, humanitarian vessels in international waters is illegal and unacceptable." UN experts in 2024 and 2025 repeatedly affirmed that Freedom Flotilla missions have "the right of free passage in international waters" and that "Israel must not interfere with its freedom of navigation, long recognized under international law." Israel's counter-argument rests on different legal premises. Israeli authorities assert that they maintain a lawful naval blockade of Gaza, justified as a security measure to prevent weapons smuggling to Hamas, which Israel and numerous countries designate as a terrorist organization. Under the law of armed conflict, belligerents may establish naval blockades to prevent contraband from reaching enemy territory. A 2011 [UN Palmer Report](https://www.ir-journal.com/issues/volume-09-number-033-2012/the-un-palmer-report-mavi-marmara-and-international-law?ref=diplopolis.com) examining the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident concluded that Israel's blockade itself was legal under international law, though the degree of force used in that particular interception was "excessive and unreasonable." Israel argues that the right to enforce a lawful blockade extends to stopping vessels before they reach the blockaded area, even in international waters, to inspect cargo and prevent blockade-running. Israeli officials offered to allow flotilla cargo to be offloaded at Israeli ports, inspected, and then transferred overland to Gaza—a procedure they contend satisfies humanitarian obligations while maintaining security control. The flotilla's refusal to accept this procedure, Israeli authorities argue, demonstrates that the mission's primary objective was political provocation rather than genuine humanitarian relief. The legal debate ultimately turns on contested questions that have divided international law scholars for years: Is Israel's blockade of Gaza itself lawful? Does the right to enforce a blockade permit interception in international waters? Can civilian humanitarian missions be treated as blockade-runners subject to military interdiction? These questions have no universally accepted answers, leaving flotilla diplomacy to unfold in a legal gray zone where both sides claim the mantle of international law while fundamentally disagreeing on its application. ## State Responses: Sovereignty, Security, and Solidarity The Global Sumud Flotilla's composition—with participants from more than 40 countries including EU members, Turkey, Malaysia, Brazil, and South Africa—ensured that its interception would generate diverse governmental responses reflecting different relationships with both Israel and the Palestinian cause. These varied reactions illuminate how flotilla diplomacy intersects with traditional state-to-state relations, creating diplomatic complications that extend far beyond the immediate humanitarian mission. European governments with citizens aboard the flotilla found themselves navigating uncomfortable terrain between humanitarian principles and security partnerships. Spain and Italy deployed naval vessels to escort portions of the flotilla through their territorial waters, ostensibly to ensure the safety of their nationals, but both governments urged activists to turn back rather than confront Israeli forces. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni explicitly discouraged Italian participation, calling the flotilla "unnecessarily dangerous" and suggesting activists use "safer and already existing means" to deliver humanitarian aid. Greece, from whose ports several vessels departed, issued formal diplomatic protests after the interception but took no concrete action beyond providing consular assistance to detained citizens. This European ambivalence reflects the complex position of states caught between competing obligations: duty to protect their citizens, commitments to international humanitarian law, and strategic relationships with Israel. The EU's tepid response contrasts sharply with the legal analysis prepared by Palestinian and international legal organizations, which argued that [EU member states have binding obligations](https://freedomflotilla.org/legal-analysis/?ref=diplopolis.com) under the Treaty on European Union to protect the flotilla as a lawful humanitarian mission and formally notify Israel that interference would constitute a breach of international and EU law. Other states responded more forcefully. Turkey's Foreign Ministry characterized the interception as "an act of terrorism," invoking the memory of the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident in which Turkish citizens were killed. Colombia's President Gustavo Petro took the extraordinary step of expelling Israel's diplomatic delegation and terminating his country's free trade agreement with Israel in protest—one of the most severe diplomatic consequences any state imposed. South Africa's President Cyril Ramaphosa, whose country has brought genocide charges against Israel at the International Court of Justice, demanded the immediate release of South African activists "abducted in international waters." These divergent responses reveal how flotilla diplomacy creates diplomatic spillover effects that extend well beyond the immediate maritime confrontation. For countries like Turkey, Colombia, and South Africa, which have positioned themselves as advocates for Palestinian rights on the international stage, the flotilla interception provided an opportunity to demonstrate solidarity through concrete diplomatic action. For European states more invested in maintaining working relationships with Israel, the flotilla presented an uncomfortable dilemma with no clear resolution that would satisfy domestic humanitarian constituencies while preserving diplomatic capital in Tel Aviv. Israel's handling of the detention phase further complicated the diplomatic fallout. Multiple deported activists, including prominent figures like Greta Thunberg and journalists from various countries, [alleged systematic mistreatment during their detention](https://www.cnn.com/2025/10/06/middleeast/global-sumud-flotilla-gaza-activists-spain-intl-hnk?ref=diplopolis.com), including being forced to kiss Israeli flags, deprivation of food and water, physical abuse, and being held in cells infested with bedbugs. While Israel's Foreign Ministry dismissed these allegations as "brazen lies," far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir stated he was "proud" of the harsh treatment, declaring that activists "deserved the conditions of terrorists." This divergence between official denials and ministerial statements created additional diplomatic complications. The Committee to Protect Journalists called for the unconditional release of 32 journalists detained aboard the flotilla, highlighting how the interception entangled press freedom issues with humanitarian access debates. Countries with detained journalists faced additional pressure from press freedom organizations and media unions, adding another layer of complexity to governmental responses. ## Implications for Humanitarian Intervention The Global Sumud Flotilla case study offers crucial insights into the evolving dynamics of humanitarian intervention in contemporary conflicts, particularly regarding the role of nonstate actors in challenging state authority over access. As conflicts proliferate and humanitarian crises deepen in contexts where traditional diplomatic channels prove inadequate, civil society organizations increasingly turn to direct action approaches that bypass governmental gatekeepers. This shift represents a significant departure from the post-Cold War humanitarian architecture, which was largely state-centric. The traditional model assumed that humanitarian organizations would negotiate access with conflict parties through diplomatic frameworks, with major international organizations like the United Nations, International Committee of the Red Cross, and large NGOs serving as intermediaries. This system granted states significant control over humanitarian flows, with access ultimately dependent on governmental consent. Flotilla diplomacy challenges this model fundamentally. By invoking international maritime law and the principle of freedom of navigation, civil society actors claim a legal right to deliver aid that does not depend on the consent of the blockading state. This framing transforms humanitarian access from a privilege granted by states into a right possessed by civilians acting in solidarity with populations in need. The implications extend well beyond maritime contexts; if civil society successfully establishes precedents for bypassing state authority in delivering humanitarian aid, similar approaches could emerge in other conflict zones where governments restrict access. However, the flotilla model also reveals significant limitations of civil society-led humanitarian intervention. The Global Sumud Flotilla carried only symbolic quantities of aid—a few ships' worth of supplies for a population of over two million people facing severe humanitarian crisis. The mission's impact was primarily political and symbolic rather than materially significant for addressing Gaza's humanitarian needs. This limitation is inherent to confrontational civil society approaches: they excel at generating media attention, mobilizing international solidarity, and challenging legal boundaries, but they cannot replace the large-scale, sustained humanitarian operations that require governmental cooperation. The treatment of detained activists also highlights the vulnerability of civil society actors operating in contested legal spaces. Without the protections afforded to diplomatic personnel or the operational security of established humanitarian organizations, flotilla participants faced arbitrary detention, alleged mistreatment, and deportation with limited ability to challenge their treatment through formal channels. The presence of parliamentarians, journalists, and high-profile activists provided some protection through visibility, but hundreds of less prominent participants experienced detention with minimal international attention to their specific circumstances. For future humanitarian interventions, the flotilla precedent creates both opportunities and risks. On one hand, it demonstrates that determined civil society networks can mobilize significant international attention to humanitarian access issues and create diplomatic complications for states that restrict aid delivery. The flotilla succeeded in forcing the question of Gaza's blockade onto international agendas and compelling governments to articulate positions on humanitarian access—even if those positions often proved disappointingly tepid. On the other hand, the model's confrontational nature carries risks of escalation and potential harm to participants. The 2010 Mavi Marmara incident demonstrated that maritime interceptions can turn deadly. While the 2025 flotilla avoided loss of life, allegations of mistreatment during detention and the psychological impact of confrontation with military forces represent significant costs. For humanitarian organizations considering similar approaches in other contexts, these risks must be weighed carefully against potential benefits. ## Future of Access Diplomacy The Global Sumud Flotilla's interception and its aftermath reveal broader trends in how humanitarian access will be contested in coming years. As conflicts become more protracted and politicized, and as great power competition increasingly shapes humanitarian response, civil society actors will likely expand their use of direct action approaches that challenge state authority over access. Flotilla organizers have already announced their intention to continue missions, with plans for even larger subsequent convoys. This persistence reflects a strategic calculation that sustained pressure through repeated attempts, each generating international attention and diplomatic complications, may eventually force changes in how the international community addresses the Gaza blockade specifically, and maritime humanitarian access more broadly. The legal questions raised by flotilla diplomacy remain unresolved at the international level. Without clear precedents establishing whether civilian humanitarian vessels possess an unqualified right to navigate to conflict zones, or conversely whether states may lawfully intercept such vessels in international waters to enforce blockades, each flotilla mission will continue to generate legal contestation. This ambiguity creates space for civil society innovation but also perpetuates uncertainty about the boundaries of lawful action. The diplomatic dimension of flotilla missions may prove their most enduring legacy. By forcing governments to choose between competing principles—humanitarian solidarity, international law, diplomatic relationships, and security concerns—flotilla diplomacy makes visible the political calculations underlying humanitarian access decisions. Even governments that ultimately side with the blockading state must articulate their reasoning publicly, creating opportunities for domestic advocacy groups to challenge official positions. For states concerned about establishing precedents that might constrain their own future options to control access in conflict zones, the flotilla model presents a distinct challenge. If civil society succeeds in normalizing the idea that humanitarian access is a right that can be claimed directly by civilians invoking international law, rather than a privilege granted by states through diplomatic channels, the implications could extend far beyond the Gaza context. Other conflicts where governments restrict humanitarian access—from Syria to Myanmar to Yemen—could see similar civil society initiatives testing legal boundaries and challenging state authority. The Global Sumud Flotilla thus represents more than an isolated humanitarian mission or publicity stunt. It embodies an emerging form of transnational civil society activism that leverages international law, media attention, and moral authority to contest state monopolies over humanitarian access decisions. Whether this model proves effective in actually improving humanitarian conditions remains uncertain; what is clear is that flotilla diplomacy has established itself as a recurring feature of conflict zones where states restrict maritime access, forcing both legal and political systems to grapple with fundamental questions about sovereignty, humanitarianism, and the authority to decide who may deliver aid to populations in need. As the international community continues to debate these questions, the flotilla participants—some still detained, others deported but vowing to return—have ensured that the legitimacy of comprehensive blockades and the rights of civilians to challenge them through direct action will remain on the international agenda. In an era when traditional humanitarian diplomacy often proves inadequate to address the scale of needs in conflict zones, this civil society innovation, whatever its practical limitations, signals that new approaches to the politics of humanitarian access are emerging—approaches that will continue to test legal boundaries, complicate diplomatic relationships, and challenge assumptions about who ultimately holds authority over the question of whether aid reaches people trapped in conflict. ### Between Technocracy and Sovereignty: Can International Administration Work in Gaza? URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/between-technocracy-and-sovereignty-can-international-administration-work-in-gaza/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T04:38:17.000Z When Cambodia's warring factions signed the Paris Peace Accords in 1991, the United Nations embarked on an unprecedented experiment. The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) would govern the country directly, organizing elections and building state institutions from scratch. Two decades later, as American and Arab diplomats sketch post-war scenarios for Gaza, they're reaching for a similar playbook: the Gaza International Transitional Authority (GITA). The proposal revives one of international relations' most contentious questions—can external administrators build what only local communities can legitimize? The concept reflects both pragmatism and profound uncertainty. With Hamas's governing capacity destroyed by conflict, the Palestinian Authority politically weakened and geographically distant in the West Bank, and Israel unwilling to resume direct occupation, international administration appears to some as the least problematic option in a landscape of bad choices. Yet the model carries uncomfortable echoes of trusteeship and neo-colonialism, particularly in a context where Palestinian self-determination remains unfulfilled after decades of conflict. Historical precedents offer neither clear vindication nor definitive warning. International transitional administrations have succeeded in some contexts and failed spectacularly in others. Understanding what differentiates these outcomes matters enormously as policymakers consider whether to apply this template to Gaza's unique circumstances. ## Historical Record: Lessons from Transitional Administration The United Nations and regional organizations have attempted transitional administration in at least fourteen territories since 1945\. The most relevant precedents—Cambodia, East Timor, Kosovo, and Bosnia—reveal patterns worth examining. UNTAC in Cambodia (1992-1993) represented the UN's most ambitious governance project to that point. With 22,000 personnel and a budget exceeding $1.6 billion, the mission organized elections that brought a coalition government to power. Yet the [UN's own assessment acknowledges](https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/untac.htm?ref=diplopolis.com) that while UNTAC achieved its narrow mandate of organizing elections, it failed to establish sustainable democratic institutions or address the deep factional divisions that continue to shape Cambodian politics three decades later. East Timor offered a more encouraging model. The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET, 1999-2002) governed the territory completely, from tax collection to judicial administration. Unlike Cambodia, where the UN worked alongside existing factions, UNTAET exercised full executive and legislative authority. The mission successfully transitioned to Timorese self-governance, and while the country faces significant development challenges, it has maintained political stability and democratic governance. The critical difference: near-universal local support for independence and international administration as the pathway to achieve it. Kosovo and Bosnia present more ambiguous cases. In Kosovo, international administration has lasted over two decades, far exceeding its intended temporary mandate. Bosnia's complex international oversight structure, established by the Dayton Accords, created a state that functions but remains dependent on external intervention to prevent renewed ethnic conflict. Both cases demonstrate how international administration can stabilize situations without resolving the underlying political conflicts that made intervention necessary. An [analysis by the International Peace Institute](https://www.ipinst.org/category/publications/series/peacekeeping-transitions-papers?ref=diplopolis.com) identifies three factors that determined success or failure: local buy-in from major political actors, clear criteria for transition to self-governance, and sufficient resources matched to realistic objectives. Gaza's current circumstances align poorly with at least two of these criteria. ## Case for International Administration in Gaza Proponents of the GITA model argue from necessity as much as preference. The practical challenges of Gaza governance appear to exceed the capacity of any single actor currently involved in the conflict. Hamas's administrative infrastructure has been severely damaged. The Palestinian Authority, while internationally recognized, has not governed Gaza since 2007 and commands limited legitimacy among Gaza's population. Israel has stated it will not resume the direct occupation it maintained from 1967 to 2005\. Into this vacuum, international administration offers a potential framework. The strongest arguments for GITA emphasize immediate humanitarian imperatives and longer-term state-building objectives. Gaza requires massive reconstruction—estimates suggest $18-20 billion for infrastructure alone. International organizations possess the technical expertise, donor relationships, and implementation capacity to mobilize resources at this scale. The World Bank, European Union, and United Nations agencies have extensive experience in post-conflict reconstruction, from procurement systems that minimize corruption to technical standards for rebuilding essential services. Security sector reform presents another argument for international involvement. Whatever emerges in Gaza will require new police and civil defense forces, ideally professionalized and accountable to civilian authority rather than political factions. International security sector assistance programs, as implemented in Liberia and other post-conflict contexts, could help build these institutions with trained personnel and equipment while establishing accountability mechanisms and civilian oversight. International administration could also provide political space for Palestinian leadership to emerge organically rather than being imposed by external actors. A transitional period under international authority might allow civil society organizations, local administrators, and potential political leaders to develop capacity and legitimacy before assuming full governmental responsibility. This incubation period proved valuable in East Timor, where local leaders gained experience through participation in UNTAET's Timorese advisory bodies before independence. The regional security dimension matters as well. Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia have all expressed willingness to contribute to Gaza's stabilization if it occurs within a credible political framework. An international transitional authority could provide the multilateral structure these states need to justify involvement domestically while coordinating diverse international contributions effectively. ## Case Against: Sovereignty, Legitimacy, and Political Reality Critics of international administration in Gaza raise fundamental objections rooted in both principle and practical assessment. The sovereignty argument cuts deepest. Palestinians have sought self-determination and statehood for over seven decades. Imposing international administration—regardless of its humanitarian justifications—reinforces their status as wards requiring external supervision rather than a people capable of self-governance. This perception carries particular weight in a region where memories of League of Nations mandates and colonial administration remain vivid. The legitimacy challenge compounds the sovereignty concern. Effective governance requires acceptance by the governed. In East Timor, international administration enjoyed nearly universal support because it represented the pathway to independence. In Gaza, no such consensus exists. Any international authority would face immediate questions about its mandate: Who authorized it? Whose interests does it serve? What gives external actors the right to govern Palestinian territory? Without Palestinian political buy-in, particularly from major factions, an international administration would struggle to implement even basic policies. The political context surrounding Gaza makes these challenges more acute. Unlike East Timor, where independence was the agreed endpoint, or Cambodia, where all factions accepted UN-supervised elections, Gaza's future political status remains contested. Is it part of a future Palestinian state? Under what relationship with the West Bank? What role, if any, would Israel play in security arrangements? An international transitional authority cannot resolve these questions—it can only defer them, potentially creating a frozen conflict that prevents rather than enables political resolution. Ground realities further complicate implementation. Gaza has been governed by Hamas for eighteen years, during which the movement built not just military capacity but extensive social services, education systems, and civil administration. This infrastructure employed thousands of civil servants and commanded significant grassroots support, particularly for its resistance to Israeli occupation. An international authority would need to either incorporate these systems and personnel—effectively legitimizing Hamas governance—or build parallel structures, creating duplication and potential conflict while losing access to existing institutional knowledge and relationships. The security environment presents perhaps the most intractable challenge. International administration typically requires a permissive security environment or substantial peacekeeping forces to create one. The [UN peacekeeping department's own guidelines](https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping?ref=diplopolis.com) emphasize that peacekeepers cannot create peace where none exists—they can only help maintain peace where parties have committed to it. Would any international force deploy to Gaza without clear security guarantees? Would they be authorized to use force against Palestinian factions that reject the administration? These questions remain unanswered. ## Can Technocracy Substitute for Politics? The deeper issue transcends Gaza's specific circumstances. International transitional administration represents a fundamentally technocratic approach to governance—the belief that with sufficient expertise, resources, and international coordination, external actors can build functional states. This assumption has been tested repeatedly over the past three decades, with decidedly mixed results. The technocratic model underestimates the degree to which legitimate governance emerges from political processes rather than administrative capacity. Elections, constitutions, and institutional frameworks matter, but they function effectively only when supported by underlying political settlements among competing actors. Cambodia's experience illustrates this clearly: UNTAC organized technically successful elections, but without resolving the fundamental power struggle among factions, those elections produced a government that quickly reverted to authoritarianism. Gaza compounds this challenge because the necessary political settlement extends beyond Palestinians themselves. Any sustainable governance arrangement requires Israeli acceptance of Gaza's security arrangements, Egyptian cooperation on border management, and integration with West Bank governance structures if Palestinian unity remains an objective. An international transitional authority cannot impose these arrangements—it can only implement what political negotiations produce. The resource question also merits scrutiny. International administration is expensive. UNTAET cost approximately $2.5 billion over three years for a territory with under one million people. Scaling to Gaza's 2.2 million population, accounting for extensive infrastructure damage and complexity of the security environment, suggests costs could exceed $10 billion for the administration itself, separate from reconstruction expenses. Are international donors prepared to commit resources at this level for an indefinite period? The declining international appetite for open-ended interventions suggests skepticism is warranted. ## What Would Viability Require? If policymakers proceed with some version of international administration in Gaza, what conditions would maximize chances of success? The historical record suggests several requirements. First, genuine Palestinian political buy-in is non-negotiable. This means not just acquiescence but active participation in governance structures from the outset. East Timor succeeded partly because UNTAET created advisory bodies that gave Timorese leaders real influence over decisions, building capacity and legitimacy simultaneously. A Gaza transitional authority would need similar mechanisms, ensuring Palestinians see it as their pathway to self-governance rather than an imposed external arrangement. Second, clear criteria for transition to Palestinian sovereignty must be established upfront. Open-ended international administration becomes neo-colonial occupation, regardless of intentions. Specific benchmarks—institutional capacity, security sector development, governance standards—should trigger progressive transfer of authority. These criteria must be realistic and achievable, not wishful thinking that indefinitely defers sovereignty. Third, the mandate must address political questions rather than defer them. Will the transitional authority facilitate reconciliation between Gaza and the West Bank? Under what framework? What role will Israel play in security arrangements? Postponing these questions simply stores them up to explode later. The transitional period should be used to negotiate sustainable political arrangements, not avoid difficult conversations. Fourth, security arrangements require both international guarantees and Palestinian capacity-building. Some form of international peacekeeping or monitoring presence will be necessary, but it cannot substitute for Palestinian security forces accountable to Palestinian authorities. The transition from external security provision to Palestinian sovereignty over security remains one of the most difficult phases of any transitional administration. Fifth, reconstruction must proceed in ways that build Palestinian economic capacity rather than create dependencies on international assistance. This means not just rebuilding infrastructure but developing local businesses, training Palestinian professionals, and creating employment beyond the aid economy. The lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq about the limitations of reconstruction spending divorced from sustainable economic development apply here. ## Alternative: Pursuing Political Settlement First The strongest argument against international transitional administration may be that it approaches the problem backwards. Rather than using technocratic governance as a substitute for political settlement, perhaps international efforts should focus on facilitating the political agreements that would make any governance arrangement viable—international or otherwise. This approach would acknowledge that Gaza cannot be separated from the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A transitional authority that simply manages Gaza while deferring questions of Palestinian statehood, relationship with Israel, West Bank-Gaza unity, and final status issues is unlikely to produce sustainable outcomes. Instead, international diplomatic efforts might better focus on the political framework within which any governance arrangement—transitional or permanent—would operate. Such an approach faces its own substantial obstacles, given decades of failed peace processes and the current gulf between Israeli and Palestinian positions. Yet it addresses the fundamental problem that technocratic solutions cannot resolve: the conflict over sovereignty, security, and self-determination that underlies Gaza's governance crisis. ## Beyond Idealism and Cynicism The Gaza International Transitional Authority proposal deserves evaluation based on evidence rather than ideology. Neither uncritical faith in international administration nor reflexive rejection on sovereignty grounds serves policy clarity. The historical record teaches that international administration can work under specific conditions—clear mandate, local buy-in, sufficient resources, realistic objectives, and defined endpoints. It teaches equally that when these conditions are absent, even well-intentioned intervention becomes expensive failure. Gaza presents an unusually challenging environment for international administration. The political context remains contested, local buy-in uncertain, security environment dangerous, and necessary resources substantial. These factors do not make international involvement impossible, but they suggest that any transitional authority would need to be structured very differently from previous models, with greater Palestinian participation from the outset, clearer political objectives, and more realistic expectations about what external actors can achieve. The fundamental question remains whether governance solutions can substitute for political settlement or whether sustainable arrangements in Gaza require first resolving the underlying questions of sovereignty, security, and self-determination that have driven conflict for decades. The technocratic approach assumes the former; the historical record increasingly suggests the latter. As policymakers consider Gaza's future, this tension between administrative capacity and political legitimacy will determine whether any proposed governance arrangement produces sustainable peace or simply manages conflict under different management. ### Russia's Shrinking Sphere: Moldova's Pro-Western Victory Signals Shift URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/russias-shrinking-sphere-moldovas-pro-western-victory-signals-shift/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T04:36:18.000Z When Moldova's pro-Western Party of Action and Solidarity [secured over 50% of the vote](https://www.cnn.com/2025/09/29/europe/moldova-election-eu-russia-intl-hnk?ref=diplopolis.com) on September 28, defeating the pro-Russian Patriotic Bloc's under 25%, it marked more than just another election victory. It represented the latest—and perhaps most symbolically significant—contraction of Russia's sphere of influence in the former Soviet space, coming despite what President Maia Sandu described as [Russia spending "hundreds of millions of euros"](https://edition.cnn.com/2025/09/29/europe/moldova-election-eu-russia-intl-hnk?ref=diplopolis.com) to sway the outcome. The election's significance extends far beyond this small nation wedged between Ukraine and Romania. Moldova's decisive rejection of Moscow's influence campaign offers a window into a broader geopolitical transformation reshaping the post-Soviet landscape—one where Russia's traditional dominance is eroding across multiple fronts, from the South Caucasus to Central Asia. ### Battle for Moldova The [tense ballot ](https://www.npr.org/2025/09/29/nx-s1-5556800/moldova-pro-eu-party-wins-elections-russia?ref=diplopolis.com)pitted the governing PAS against several Russia-friendly opponents but no viable pro-European partners, with electoral data indicating the party will hold a clear majority of about 55 of the 101 seats in the legislature. Election day was marked by[ cyberattacks targeting electoral systems and government websites](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/29/moldovas-pro-eu-party-wins-election-hit-by-russian-interference-claims?ref=diplopolis.com), false bomb threats against polling stations abroad, illegal transportation of voters, and coordinated efforts that Moldovan authorities characterized as a ["tsunami" ](https://edition.cnn.com/2025/09/29/europe/moldova-election-eu-russia-intl-hnk?ref=diplopolis.com)of Russian cash, cryptocurrency and disinformation. Two pro-Russian parties—Heart of Moldova and Moldova Mare—[were barred from the vote](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/29/moldova-election-results-who-won-and-did-the-diaspora-play-a-role?ref=diplopolis.com) on Friday over allegations of illegal financing and vote buying, underscoring the scale of Moscow's attempted interference. Yet despite this unprecedented campaign, Moldova has demonstrated that Russia can be[ defeated against all odds](https://www.cnn.com/2025/09/29/europe/moldova-election-eu-russia-intl-hnk?ref=diplopolis.com) and even in a hugely asymmetric fight, according to Oana Popescu-Zamfir, director of the GlobalFocus Center think-tank. The victory represents the second time in recent years that Sandu and her party have won elections by commanding margins despite widespread Russian meddling. ### Caucasus Pivot Moldova's westward turn is part of a larger pattern. In September 2023,[ Azerbaijan reclaimed complete control of the Karabakh region](https://www.euronews.com/2025/07/10/armenia-and-azerbaijan-move-closer-to-peace-pushing-russia-out-from-the-south-caucasus?ref=diplopolis.com) after a lightning military campaign, exposing what observers called the emptiness of security reliance on Russia. The episode fundamentally altered the South Caucasus power dynamic. In early 2025, [the Armenian parliament adopted a bill aimed at starting the process of joining the European Union](https://www.euronews.com/2025/07/10/armenia-and-azerbaijan-move-closer-to-peace-pushing-russia-out-from-the-south-caucasus?ref=diplopolis.com)—an ultimately hostile step as far as Moscow is concerned. This followed Armenia's growing realization, particularly after the 2020 Karabakh war, that [Russia failed ](https://www.npr.org/2023/05/27/1178575823/russias-long-held-influence-over-former-soviet-republics-is-starting-to-fade?ref=diplopolis.com)to live up to its obligations to the country under a shared regional security pact akin to NATO's Article 5. [While bogged down in Ukraine, ](https://www.euronews.com/2025/07/10/armenia-and-azerbaijan-move-closer-to-peace-pushing-russia-out-from-the-south-caucasus?ref=diplopolis.com)Moscow has been gradually losing its influence in the ex-Soviet space, with both Armenia and Azerbaijan sharing a pursuit of pushing back and pushing out Russia from the South Caucasus. Meanwhile, Georgia presents a more complex picture. Once the [poster child](https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/16/europe/georgia-protests-russia-china-iran-influence-intl-cmd?ref=diplopolis.com) of post-Soviet countries on their way to democracy and freedom a decade ago, Georgia is now quickly slipping under the influence of Russia, China and Iran, according to American lawmakers warning of the country's democratic collapse. Yet even here, [overwhelming public support](https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/07/countering-russian-influence-support-for-armenia-georgia.html?ref=diplopolis.com) for EU membership persists despite an increasingly authoritarian government's pro-Russian slide. ### Central Asia's Hedging Game Further east, the situation is more nuanced but the trend unmistakable. Russia's full-scale war on Ukraine has been a [massive drain on Russian attention and resources](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russia/russia-losing-its-near-abroad?ref=diplopolis.com), presenting many countries in eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia with an opportunity to enhance cooperation with one another, cultivate partnerships outside the region, and loosen bonds tying them to their former imperial hegemon. In Central Asia, Russia is no longer a [regional hegemon](https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/02/russia-is-down-but-not-out-in-central-asia/?ref=diplopolis.com), with China's rise having already displaced it as the premier economic power in the region. When Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan [finalized an agreement ](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russia/russia-losing-its-near-abroad?ref=diplopolis.com)to settle their border disputes in the Fergana Valley earlier this year, they deliberately negotiated without Russia at the table—Moscow, previously the primary broker for such conflicts, was in no position to intervene as it pulled forces from both the Caucasus and Central Asia to shore up frontlines in Ukraine. Central Asian republics have initiated [the Central Asian Summit](https://www.e-ir.info/2024/08/19/central-asia-the-last-stronghold-of-a-declining-russia/?ref=diplopolis.com), held annually since 2018 without the participation of external powers, and recently conducted war games for the first time without Russian or Chinese participation. The region's total foreign trade turnover [in 2024 reached $220 billion](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/playing-both-sides-central-asia-between-russia-and-west?ref=diplopolis.com), nearly doubling compared to 2017. Yet Russia's influence remains embedded. [Russia wields significant ](https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2025/central-asia-emerging-from-the-shadows/5-russia-as-a-systemic-factor/?ref=diplopolis.com)influence through remittances sent by migrant workers from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and to a lesser extent Uzbekistan, with these remittances contributing up to 32% of Tajikistan's 2022 GDP and 27% of Kyrgyzstan's GDP. Central Asia's trade with Russia has been booming, and the number of Russian firms in Central Asia has grown, as the region benefits economically from serving as a conduit for sanctions evasion. ### Belarus: The Outlier In the five years[ since Belarus's 2020 protest movement](https://jamestown.org/program/belarus-2020-2025-domestic-repression-and-russian-influence/?ref=diplopolis.com), President Alyaksandr Lukashenka's authoritarian regime has become characterized by systematic, violent repression of dissent, with the country falling into political, economic, and informational dependence on the Kremlin. Belarus has been Moscow's main [collaborator in its war against Ukraine](https://jamestown.org/program/belarus-2020-2025-domestic-repression-and-russian-influence/?ref=diplopolis.com), with the Kremlin placing more than 30,000 Russian troops inside Belarus in January and February 2022 ahead of the full-scale invasion. During the recent Zapad-2025 military exercises, Russia and Belarus staged a [simulated nuclear strike](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/09/16/russia-and-belarus-stage-simulated-nuclear-strike-during-zapad-2025-war-games-a90539?ref=diplopolis.com), with Belarusian officials saying the maneuvers included planning and examining the potential use of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Yet even here, cracks appear. Lukashenka is pushing a narrative of de-escalation, proposing that the West help him expand his independence from Russia, and recently held a phone call with President Trump about releasing political prisoners. ### What's Driving the Shift? Multiple factors underpin Russia's declining influence. The Ukraine war has stretched Moscow's military and economic resources to breaking points. The war has also created space for other countries [to get involved](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russia/russia-losing-its-near-abroad?ref=diplopolis.com) in Russia's traditional sphere of influence—Armenia purchased $1.5 billion in Indian weapons in 2022-23 alone to end reliance on Russian systems; Saudi Arabia and the UAE are investing in green energy and agriculture in Azerbaijan; and the EU adopted its first Central Asia strategy in 2022 and is now the region's largest source of foreign investment. Demographically and culturally, the shift is generational. The process of regional decolonization is set to [become more pronounced](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/playing-both-sides-central-asia-between-russia-and-west?ref=diplopolis.com) when Soviet-era elites currently at the helm give way to a younger demographic with limited knowledge of the Russian language and no historical attachment to the Soviet period. ### Europe's Response The European Union, [normally strictly neutral about elections](https://www.rferl.org/a/moldova-eu-election-result-win-brussels-chisinau/33543650.html?ref=diplopolis.com) in member states and candidate countries, made little effort hiding its allegiances to Moldova's PAS, with numerous European leaders showing up in Chisinau in recent times and a 1.9 billion euro growth plan unveiled in early 2025 to finance infrastructure and energy projects. [European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen declared](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/29/moldovas-pro-eu-party-wins-election-hit-by-russian-interference-claims?ref=diplopolis.com): "Moldova, you've done it again. No attempt to sow fear or division could break your resolve. You made your choice clear: Europe. Democracy. Freedom. Our door is open. And we will stand with you every step of the way". [With Moldova crammed between Ukraine and NATO](https://www.rferl.org/a/moldova-eu-election-result-win-brussels-chisinau/33543650.html?ref=diplopolis.com) and EU member Romania, Brussels was on edge for weeks leading up to the vote—a pro-Russia win would have put a major wedge into its eastern flank at a time when Moscow appears emboldened to test the West's resolve. ### Road Ahead [Moldova applied to join the EU in 2022](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/29/moldovas-pro-eu-party-wins-election-hit-by-russian-interference-claims?ref=diplopolis.com) in the wake of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and was granted candidate status that year, with Brussels agreeing to open accession negotiations last year. [With momentum on the battlefield still favoring Russia](https://www.rferl.org/a/moldova-eu-election-result-win-brussels-chisinau/33543650.html?ref=diplopolis.com) in Ukraine and no end in sight for the war, Moldova remains the only country in the EU's eastern neighborhood that has a viable chance of becoming a member this decade. [It could well be that Moldova moves ahead in EU accession without Ukraine](https://www.rferl.org/a/moldova-eu-election-result-win-brussels-chisinau/33543650.html?ref=diplopolis.com), potentially even later this year, serving as the locomotive that pulls Ukraine with it into the EU—precisely what EU officials had in mind when both countries were given the green light to join the bloc three years ago. Yet challenges remain formidable. As one analyst noted, Moldova will continue to be in a [difficult geopolitical environment](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/29/moldovas-pro-eu-party-wins-election-hit-by-russian-interference-claims?ref=diplopolis.com) characterized by Russia's attempts to pull it back into its sphere of influence. [In the "waiting room" posture ](https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/07/countering-russian-influence-support-for-armenia-georgia.html?ref=diplopolis.com)between aspirations for EU membership and actual accession, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia remain dangerously exposed to Russian coercion—it is precisely their orientation toward Europe and NATO that increases their vulnerability to Russian pressure, subversion, and in some cases military aggression. ### Bigger Picture Moldova's election represents more than a single country's choice. It illuminates a fundamental transformation in the post-Soviet space where Russia's traditional dominance is yielding—unevenly and incompletely—to a more multipolar reality. From Chisinau to Yerevan to Astana, capitals once firmly in Moscow's orbit are diversifying relationships, asserting sovereignty, and in some cases explicitly pivoting westward. The 2023 Russian Foreign Policy Concept [resurrected the term "near abroad"](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russia/russia-losing-its-near-abroad?ref=diplopolis.com) to describe these countries, pointing to "centuries-old traditions of joint statehood, deep interdependence, a common language, and close cultures" as justification for efforts to keep them within Moscow's sphere of influence. But as Moldova's election demonstrates, historical ties and linguistic commonalities matter less when weighed against security concerns, economic opportunities, and democratic aspirations. Russia's sphere isn't disappearing—it's shrinking. And Moldova just provided the latest measurement. --- **Key Takeaways:** - Moldova's decisive pro-Western vote came despite Russia allegedly spending hundreds of millions on interference - Pattern repeats across former Soviet space: Armenia pivoting to EU, Azerbaijan asserting independence, Central Asia diversifying - Ukraine war has drained Russian resources and attention, creating opportunities for neighbors to reduce dependence - Belarus remains the outlier as Russia's closest ally, though even Lukashenka seeks greater independence - EU fast-tracking Moldova's accession to lock in westward orientation and potentially pull Ukraine along - Generational shift away from Russian language and Soviet nostalgia accelerating the trend ### Afghanistan's Digital Darkness: How the World Learned to Stop Worrying and Forget the Taliban URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/afghanistans-digital-darkness-how-the-world-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-forget-the-taliban/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T04:34:56.000Z For Wahida Faizi, an Afghan journalist living in Denmark, the silence began without warning. One moment she could speak with her parents in Kabul—those nightly video calls that brought "peace to my heart," as she described them. The next moment: nothing. No texts. No calls. Just the crushing realization that Afghanistan had been severed from the world, its 43 million people suddenly unreachable. "It feels like a lifetime has passed," [she told CNN](https://edition.cnn.com/2025/09/29/asia/internet-blackout-afghanistan-latam-intl?ref=diplopolis.com), though it had been only hours. The Taliban had cut the country's 9,350-kilometer [fiber-optic network](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/29/afghanistan-communications-blackout-taliban-shuts-internet?ref=diplopolis.com), reducing mobile phone services to barely 1% of normal connectivity in what became a nationwide communications blackout. [Flights were grounded](https://www.foxnews.com/world/taliban-kills-internet-afghanistan-citing-morality-concerns-un-protests?ref=diplopolis.com), banking systems froze, and families across the globe lost contact with loved ones mid-conversation. The shutdown, which began in late September and lasted two days before international pressure forced its reversal, was justified by Taliban authorities as necessary to prevent "immoral activities." The Taliban's official explanation—preventing "immoral activities"—barely conceals a more fundamental truth: this is what abandonment looks like in the digital age. And the most striking aspect of this crisis isn't the blackout itself, but the deafening quiet that greeted it from a world that has already moved on. The communications shutdown represents both the literal and symbolic culmination of Afghanistan's isolation since August 2021\. While the internet was [restored after two days](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/afghanistan-internet-returns-taliban-2-day-web-blackout-telecom/?ref=diplopolis.com) following international pressure, the episode laid bare a disturbing reality: Afghanistan has become the forgotten crisis, a country whose 43 million people live increasingly beyond the reach—and concern—of the international community that once claimed their fate as a vital interest. ## Vanishing Act The scale of international disengagement from Afghanistan since the Taliban's return to power has been nothing short of astonishing. What was once framed as America's "forever war," consuming trillions of dollars and dominating foreign policy discourse for two decades, has all but disappeared from global consciousness in less than four years. The numbers tell a stark story. [Humanitarian funding for Afghanistan has been slashed by nearly 50% in 2025](https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/09/1165870?ref=diplopolis.com), with the country's aid plan only 17% funded halfway through the year. The United States, which previously accounted for nearly half of all humanitarian funding, [suspended all remaining support in April 2025](https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-humanitarian-update-may-2025?ref=diplopolis.com). [Development assistance that once covered 75% of government expenditures](https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/afghanistan-three-years-after-taliban-takeover?ref=diplopolis.com) evaporated almost overnight in 2021, triggering an economic collapse that saw Afghanistan lose 26% of its GDP in just two years. But perhaps more revealing than the funding cuts is the collapse in attention itself. Afghanistan's media landscape—once hailed as a rare success story with over 500 outlets and 12,000 journalists—has been decimated. [Half of all media outlets have closed](https://www.justsecurity.org/116034/talibans-slow-dismantling-afghan-media/?ref=diplopolis.com), and [84% of female journalists lost their jobs within two months](https://www.justsecurity.org/116034/talibans-slow-dismantling-afghan-media/?ref=diplopolis.com) of the Taliban takeover. The country has plummeted from 118th to 175th place on Reporters Without Borders' World Press Freedom Index. Even more telling: international media has largely abandoned Afghanistan as a story. Where the chaotic U.S. withdrawal in August 2021 dominated headlines for weeks, coverage quickly faded to sporadic mentions. "The silence of the international media is deafening," novelist Elif Shafak [wrote on social media](https://institute.aljazeera.net/en/ajr/article/1895?ref=diplopolis.com) in response to Taliban crackdowns on women protesters. Western news bureaus that maintained permanent presence for twenty years have closed or drastically scaled back. The world's attention has moved to Ukraine, Gaza, great power competition with China—anywhere but Afghanistan. ## Digital Darkness, Analog Suffering The internet shutdown wasn't the Taliban's first attempt at information control, but its scale was unprecedented. Beginning September 16, authorities had been systematically [cutting fiber-optic connections in provinces](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/30/afghanistan-imposes-internet-blackout-what-has-the-effect-been-so-far?ref=diplopolis.com) including Balkh, Badakhshan, Takhar, Kandahar, Helmand, and Nangarhar, citing the need to prevent "vice" under orders from supreme leader Hibatullah Akhundzada. The nationwide blackout simply completed what had been a creeping digital suffocation. The practical impact was immediate and devastating. [The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) lost contact](https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/09/1166002?ref=diplopolis.com) with frontline aid workers, including those responding to a deadly earthquake. Banking systems that millions depend on for basic transactions collapsed. [Healthcare programs, supply chains, and vaccination efforts](https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/09/1166002?ref=diplopolis.com) were disrupted. Afghan women who run online businesses through platforms like Aseel—selling handmade jewelry and carpets to international customers—suddenly found themselves cut off from their only source of income. For Afghanistan's diaspora, the blackout meant something even more primal: the inability to confirm whether family members were alive. "From yesterday there is no communication with a single person," Mohammad Hadi, a 30-year-old Afghan in Delhi, told CNN. "There is no means to talk, to be sure that they are safe or not." But the communications blackout is merely the most visible manifestation of a broader erasure. The Taliban's restrictions have transformed Afghanistan into what amounts to an open-air prison for women. Girls have been [banned from secondary education for four years](https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/09/1165870?ref=diplopolis.com). Women are prohibited from most employment, cannot travel without male guardians, and face the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice's increasingly draconian enforcement. [In September, the Taliban banned Afghan women working for the UN from entering its offices](https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/09/1165870?ref=diplopolis.com), directly hampering humanitarian operations in a country where 22.9 million people require aid to survive. The cumulative effect is a society being systematically dismantled. [Approximately 14.8 million Afghans—one-third of the population—face acute food insecurity](https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-humanitarian-update-may-2025?ref=diplopolis.com). [Over 220 health facilities have closed due to funding cuts](https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-humanitarian-update-march-2025?ref=diplopolis.com), affecting 1.8 million people. Malnutrition has spiked, with districts classified at the worst severity level nearly tripling from 19 in 2024 to 56 in 2025. Meanwhile, regional pressures are intensifying. More than 1.9 million Afghans have been [forcibly returned from Iran and Pakistan](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2025/07/afghanistan-returns-afghans-creating-multi-layered-human-rights-crisis?ref=diplopolis.com) in 2025 alone, with deportees facing persecution and often having nowhere to go. The UNHCR describes Afghanistan as a "protracted crisis" with "widespread and deepening humanitarian needs," yet international support continues to dwindle. ## Why the World Moved On The international abandonment of Afghanistan isn't accidental—it's the product of several converging factors that have made disengagement appear both inevitable and, for many Western policymakers, even rational. First is simple exhaustion. After twenty years, $2.3 trillion spent, and over 170,000 lives lost in the conflict, the American public and NATO allies reached a point of fundamental war fatigue. The chaotic evacuation of August 2021 crystallized a sense that Afghanistan was an unsolvable problem, a place where good intentions inevitably foundered on intractable realities. President Biden's decision to withdraw, however messy its execution, reflected a genuine consensus across the U.S. political spectrum that the war needed to end. Second is the uncomfortable reality of engagement with the Taliban. Unlike other authoritarian regimes where Western governments maintain relations while criticizing human rights abuses, the Taliban represents an ideological challenge that makes standard diplomatic engagement politically untenable. No country officially recognizes the Taliban government. Providing aid or economic support risks being portrayed as legitimizing a regime whose treatment of women and girls violates fundamental principles Western governments claim to uphold. The alternative—comprehensive sanctions and isolation—has proven equally problematic, mainly punishing ordinary Afghans while doing little to moderate Taliban behavior. Third, and perhaps most significantly, the world's attention has been captured by more pressing geopolitical priorities. Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the ongoing crisis in Gaza, escalating tensions with China over Taiwan, climate disasters, and global economic uncertainty have crowded Afghanistan out of the headlines and policy discussions. For European nations, the Ukraine war represents an existential threat on their doorstep. For the United States, great power competition with China has become the organizing principle of national security strategy. Afghanistan, no longer a terrorism concern of the magnitude it once was, has simply fallen down the priority list. The tragic irony is that this abandonment may be counterproductive even on its own terms. The very isolation that seems to reflect Afghanistan's diminished importance could create conditions for future instability. The Taliban's Afghanistan isn't waging attacks on Western targets, but it harbors extremist groups including al-Qaeda, and the economic collapse is creating precisely the kind of ungoverned desperation that terrorist organizations have historically exploited. Pakistan's concerns about the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) operating from Afghan soil have already soured relations between Islamabad and Kabul, introducing a new element of regional instability. ## Cost of Forgetting What does it mean when a country of 43 million people effectively disappears from international consciousness? The internet blackout offers a glimpse: a humanitarian crisis deepening in darkness, with no witnesses and no one held to account. For Afghans, the cost is measured in immediate suffering. [With 75% of the population living at subsistence level](https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/09/1165870?ref=diplopolis.com) and economic growth lagging behind population increases, millions face a grinding daily struggle for survival that receives almost no international attention. The [UNAMA has documented systematic arbitrary arrests, torture, and intimidation](https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-asia/afghanistan/report-afghanistan/?ref=diplopolis.com) of 336 journalists and media workers since the takeover. [Public corporal punishment and executions](https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-asia/afghanistan/report-afghanistan/?ref=diplopolis.com) occur weekly, with UNAMA recording 179 individuals sentenced to such punishments in just three months in 2024\. Yet these abuses unfold largely beyond the gaze of the international community. The abandonment has particular consequences for Afghan women and girls, who face what many observers describe as "gender apartheid." With education, employment, and basic freedom of movement systematically restricted, an entire generation of women is being erased from public life. The internet shutdown compounds their isolation—many had relied on online platforms for education, remote work, and connection to the outside world. As one female teacher in northern Afghanistan told Radio Free Europe, "It's not just the internet, but mobile phone signal" that has been cut, leaving women particularly vulnerable with no way to communicate or document abuses. The international community's response to all this has been a collective shrug. While UNAMA issues strongly-worded statements calling for restoration of internet access and respect for human rights, these carry little weight without the political will or leverage to back them up. Humanitarian organizations continue their work, but under increasingly restrictive conditions and with dramatically reduced resources. The result is a kind of managed decline—enough presence to claim continued engagement, but nowhere near adequate to address the scale of need. There are also broader precedents being set. Afghanistan demonstrates what happens when the international community loses interest: gradual erosion of the modest gains made over decades, systematic rollback of rights, and deepening humanitarian crisis met with declining support. For authoritarian regimes elsewhere, it's a lesson in what they can get away with once international attention fades. For vulnerable populations in other countries, it's a warning that promises of support may evaporate when priorities shift. ## An Impossible Calculus The paradox of Afghanistan is that there are no good options, only varying degrees of bad ones. Engagement with the Taliban risks legitimizing their systematic oppression, particularly of women and girls. Complete isolation punishes the Afghan people far more than it constrains the Taliban leadership. Humanitarian aid is essential to prevent mass starvation, but operating in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan means accepting restrictions that compromise aid delivery and women's participation. This uncomfortable reality doesn't absolve the international community of responsibility—it simply means that responsibility must be exercised with clear-eyed recognition of constraints and trade-offs. Sustained humanitarian funding, even without broader recognition of the Taliban government, remains a moral imperative. Supporting Afghan media in exile, which continues to document abuses and keep attention on the country, matters enormously. Maintaining some diplomatic channels, however informal, preserves minimal leverage and information flow. Most fundamentally, Afghanistan deserves not to be forgotten. The internet blackout should have been a major international story, a stark reminder of a country sliding deeper into isolation and repression. Instead, it barely registered. When a nation of 43 million people can be effectively cut off from the world with minimal international response, it says something troubling about our collective capacity for sustained attention and moral concern. The communications blackout lasted only two days before international pressure forced restoration of connectivity. But the larger blackout—the gradual erasure of Afghanistan from international consciousness—continues unchecked. In the absence of witnesses, in the darkness of international indifference, the Taliban consolidate control and ordinary Afghans bear the consequences of the world's decision to move on. Four years after the fall of Kabul, Afghanistan has become what every failed intervention fears most: not a dramatic collapse that commands attention, but a slow, grinding deterioration that unfolds beyond the spotlight, in a country the world has already filed away as yesterday's crisis. The internet may have been restored, but Afghanistan remains in darkness—and so does the international community's conscience. --- *As humanitarian needs deepen and Taliban restrictions tighten, the question isn't whether Afghanistan will face continued crisis—that seems tragically certain. The question is whether the rest of the world will remember to look.* ### Can Iran and Israel Really Become Friends? Trump Thinks They Can URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/can-iran-and-israel-really-become-friends-trump-thinks-they-can/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T04:33:12.000Z On September 29, 2025, standing alongside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House, President Donald Trump floated an idea that would have seemed inconceivable just months earlier. "Who knows, maybe even Iran can get in there," Trump said, referring to [the Abraham Accords](https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/?ref=diplopolis.com) that normalized relations between Israel and several Arab states during his first term. "I think they're going to be open to it. I really believe that." The statement came barely three months after Israel and Iran concluded a devastating 12-day war that saw hundreds killed, nuclear facilities struck, and missiles raining down on both nations. It followed decades of hostility in which Iran's leaders have routinely called for Israel's destruction, referring to it as the "Little Satan" in their revolutionary lexicon. The notion that these two countries—whose conflict has defined Middle Eastern geopolitics for nearly half a century—could sit together at a negotiating table stretches credibility to its breaking point. Yet Trump's suggestion deserves serious analysis rather than immediate dismissal. The proposal reveals much about the administration's vision for reordering Middle Eastern power dynamics, the limits of military force in achieving diplomatic breakthroughs, and the complex interplay between domestic politics and foreign policy in both countries. Whether genius or madness, the idea forces a reckoning with fundamental questions about what drives the Iran-Israel conflict and whether its underlying causes can ever be resolved. ## From Partners to Enemies: A Historic Rupture The animosity between Iran and Israel was not inevitable. For most of the Cold War era, the two countries enjoyed remarkably close relations under Iran's Pahlavi monarchy. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi recognized Israel shortly after its founding and maintained substantial economic and security cooperation throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Both countries saw themselves as non-Arab powers in a predominantly Arab region, sharing concerns about radical Arab nationalism and Soviet influence. This partnership, grounded in strategic calculation rather than ideological affinity, functioned effectively for decades. The [1979 Islamic Revolution](https://www.britannica.com/event/Iranian-Revolution?ref=diplopolis.com) shattered this relationship overnight. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, architect of Iran's theocratic system, severed diplomatic ties with Israel within days of assuming power and embedded anti-Israel ideology into the Islamic Republic's foundational documents. For Khomeini and his successors, opposition to Israel became inseparable from their revolutionary identity. Supporting the Palestinian cause and calling for Israel's dissolution were not merely foreign policy positions but core elements of the regime's legitimacy and regional appeal. This ideological transformation had concrete consequences. Iran shifted from being Israel's partner to becoming its most committed adversary, providing extensive support to Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon. These groups became the vanguard of what Iran calls its "Axis of Resistance"—a network of proxies extending Iranian influence across the region while maintaining a capability to threaten Israel without direct Iranian military involvement. For four decades, this proxy warfare defined the conflict, allowing both sides to inflict damage while avoiding all-out war. The June 2025 conflict marked a dramatic escalation from this shadow war to direct confrontation. Israel's [June 13 strikes targeted Iranian nuclear facilities](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10284/?ref=diplopolis.com), military bases, and senior commanders in what it called a pre-emptive operation to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Iran responded with ballistic missile barrages that struck Israeli cities and military installations. The United States joined by attacking [Iranian nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan](https://www.usip.org/publications/2025/06/cease-fire-holding-can-israel-and-iran-move-toward-de-escalation?ref=diplopolis.com). The 12-day war ended with a ceasefire brokered by Washington and Doha, but not before hundreds had died and critical infrastructure on both sides sustained severe damage. ## Ideological Chasm Trump's optimism about potential Iranian-Israeli normalization confronts a fundamental obstacle: the conflict is not primarily about specific grievances that negotiation might resolve, but about incompatible visions of regional order rooted in deep ideological commitments. For Iran's Islamic Republic, opposition to Israel represents far more than a foreign policy position. The regime's founding ideology portrayed the Palestinian struggle as emblematic of the oppressed rising against imperial powers, with Israel cast as an illegitimate settler-colonial entity imposed by the West. Khomeini's concept of *velayat-e faqih* (guardianship of the jurist) positioned Iran as the leader of global Islamic resistance, with the liberation of Jerusalem as a central component of this mission. Annual Quds Day rallies, held since 1979, institutionalize anti-Israel sentiment in Iranian public life. This ideological framework has remained remarkably consistent across different Iranian administrations, from hardliners to relative moderates. Even President Masoud Pezeshkian, elected in 2024 as a reformist candidate, has not wavered from the official position denying Israel's legitimacy. Iranian officials frame any recognition of Israel as betrayal of Islamic principles and abandonment of the Palestinian cause—positions that enjoy substantial support among Iran's conservative political establishment and religious authorities. Israel, meanwhile, views Iran through an existential security lens. Tehran's nuclear program, ballistic missile development, and support for armed groups committed to Israel's destruction represent what Israeli leaders consistently describe as an existential threat. The June 2025 strikes reflected a conviction among Israel's security establishment that Iran was approaching a point of no return in developing nuclear weapons capabilities—a red line that Israel has vowed never to allow Iran to cross. Beyond specific capabilities, Israeli strategic thinking has long focused on Iran as the primary organizing threat. The Abraham Accords themselves emerged partly from shared Arab-Israeli concerns about Iranian regional influence. Netanyahu's government has repeatedly emphasized that normalizing relations with Arab states helps build a coalition to counter Iran, not to accommodate it. From this perspective, bringing Iran into the very framework designed to contain it would undermine the Accords' fundamental purpose. ## Domestic Constraints on Both Sides Even if leaders in Tehran and Jerusalem were inclined toward rapprochement—and there is no indication they are—domestic political realities in both countries present formidable obstacles. In Iran, public opinion on Israel is complex but predominantly hostile. An [October 2024 survey by the Middle East Institute](https://mei.edu/publications/new-polling-highlights-iranians-views-irans-foreign-policy-and-regional-role?ref=diplopolis.com) found that 67% of Iranians opposed normalizing relations with Israel, with only 25% in favor. This represents one of the few issues where popular sentiment aligns closely with regime policy. The recent June 2025 conflict appears to have strengthened this consensus, as even regime critics expressed anger over foreign attacks on Iranian soil. The memory of external intervention—from the CIA-backed 1953 coup to the Iran-Iraq War—creates a defensive nationalism that transcends political divisions. Moreover, powerful constituencies within Iran's political system have built their legitimacy and influence on the anti-Israel stance. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which suffered leadership losses in the June strikes, derives substantial political power from its role as defender of the revolution and leader of the Axis of Resistance. Hardline clerics who dominate key institutions like the Guardian Council view the anti-Israel position as non-negotiable. Any leadership that attempted to normalize relations with Israel would face fierce opposition from these entrenched interests and risk being accused of betraying the revolution's core principles. In Israel, public opinion on Iran is shaped by decades of threats and recent direct attacks. A [June 2025 survey by the Institute for National Security Studies](https://www.inss.org.il/publication/survey-june-2025/?ref=diplopolis.com) found 73% support for Israeli strikes on Iran, with majorities viewing the Iranian nuclear program as an existential threat. The trauma of Iranian missile attacks on Israeli cities during the June conflict reinforced perceptions of Iran as an implacable enemy. While some younger Iranians reportedly express frustration with their government's focus on Israel rather than domestic priorities, no equivalent sentiment exists in Israeli public opinion calling for reconciliation with Tehran. Netanyahu's political coalition depends heavily on right-wing parties that view confrontation with Iran as essential to Israeli security. His government has staked substantial political capital on portraying Iran as an existential threat that must be neutralized through military means if necessary. Sudden embrace of Iranian normalization would represent a 180-degree reversal that would likely fracture his coalition and face skepticism from large segments of Israeli society. ## Post-War Regional Landscape The June 2025 conflict fundamentally altered the regional balance of power in ways that complicate any normalization scenario. Israel demonstrated its capability to strike deep inside Iran with considerable effectiveness, [destroying nuclear facilities, assassinating military leaders](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/06/iran-israel-conflict-iran-has-run-out-good-options?ref=diplopolis.com), and degrading Iran's air defense systems. Combined with earlier setbacks—the weakening of Hamas and Hezbollah, the collapse of Assad's Syria, and Iran's inability to protect its proxies from Israeli operations—the Islamic Republic appears substantially diminished. This shift might theoretically create conditions for Iranian recalculation. Some analysts suggest that a weakened Iran, facing economic pressure from renewed sanctions and military setbacks, might pragmatically seek accommodation with its adversaries. Trump's statements about Iran being "better off" if it had joined the Accords earlier suggest he views the recent conflict as providing leverage for such a transformation. However, this logic may fundamentally misunderstand Iranian decision-making. Regimes rarely make dramatic ideological pivots from positions of weakness; such reversals more often come from positions of confidence or after leadership transitions that bring new thinking. The June conflict, rather than inducing Iranian flexibility, [appears to have generated nationalist backlash](https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2025/6/18/israel-tried-to-break-iran-but-it-may-have-actually-helped-unite-it?ref=diplopolis.com) and strengthened the hardline narrative that the country is under assault by external enemies determined to subjugate it. The role of the United States further complicates prospects for any breakthrough. American strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities made Washington a direct combatant in the June war. While Trump has expressed hope for improved U.S.-Iran relations and suggested he would have eased sanctions before Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei made defiant statements, deep mistrust exists on both sides. Iran remembers Trump's 2018 withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal and his "maximum pressure" campaign. American policymakers question whether any agreement with Iran would prove durable given the regime's history of violations and support for proxies attacking American interests. ## What Abraham Accords Expansion Actually Means Trump's suggestion that Iran might join the Abraham Accords deserves scrutiny regarding what such membership would actually entail. The existing Accords established diplomatic relations, opened embassies, launched trade partnerships, and created security cooperation frameworks. Applying this model to Iran and Israel would require not merely ending hostilities but building functional relationships across multiple domains. Consider the practical requirements. Iran would need to recognize Israel's legitimacy as a Jewish state—directly contradicting the Islamic Republic's foundational ideology. Israel would need to accept Iran as a legitimate regional power with legitimate security interests—abandoning decades of policy aimed at containing and weakening the Islamic Republic. Both would need to dismantle the infrastructure of confrontation: Iran would have to end support for groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, while Israel would need to cease covert operations inside Iran and accept limits on its ability to strike Iranian interests. The Abraham Accords worked with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan partly because these countries had no ideological commitment to confronting Israel comparable to Iran's revolutionary identity. Most had limited or covert ties with Israel for years, and formalization served their strategic interests in countering Iranian influence. Normalization enhanced rather than contradicted their core national interests. For Iran, the calculus is entirely different—abandoning hostility toward Israel would require repudiating fundamental elements of the regime's identity and legitimacy. There is also the Palestinian dimension. The Abraham Accords have been criticized for sidelining Palestinian aspirations by normalizing Arab-Israeli relations without progress on Palestinian statehood. Iran has positioned itself as the defender of Palestinian rights and armed resistance. Any move toward normalization with Israel would be seen as betraying this cause—particularly acute because the June 2025 war occurred against the backdrop of ongoing Israeli operations in Gaza that have drawn widespread international condemnation. For Iran to normalize relations while Israel continues actions that much of the world views as violations of international humanitarian law would be politically impossible for any Iranian leadership to justify. ## Alternative Scenarios Short of Friendship While full normalization appears implausible, other forms of de-escalation might be possible. History offers examples of adversarial powers establishing limited mechanisms to manage their conflicts without becoming friends. Iran and the United States maintained no diplomatic relations for decades while occasionally finding ways to address specific shared concerns—from counter-narcotics cooperation in Afghanistan to the nuclear negotiations that produced the JCPOA. Israel and Syria maintained a hostile relationship while effectively managing their border through deterrence and occasional indirect communication channels. The Cold War saw the United States and Soviet Union develop arms control agreements and crisis communication mechanisms while remaining ideological adversaries. Applied to Iran and Israel, this might take several forms. Both countries could commit to not targeting each other's nuclear facilities, reducing the risk of catastrophic escalation. They could establish indirect communication channels to prevent miscalculation during regional crises. They could agree to limit support for proxies that directly threaten the other's territory. Such arrangements would fall far short of the Abraham Accords model but could reduce the likelihood of future direct conflicts. Regional mediators might facilitate such arrangements. Qatar played a key role in brokering the June 2025 ceasefire. Oman has historically maintained relations with both Iran and Israel and could serve as an intermediary. Saudi Arabia, despite its rivalry with Iran, shares interest in regional stability and preventing conflicts that could draw it in or disrupt energy markets. Turkey, despite its own tensions with Israel, has maintained economic ties with both countries and could potentially play a constructive role. These mechanisms would require both sides to acknowledge certain realities. Iran would need to accept that Israel is not disappearing and that pursuing its destruction through proxy warfare risks devastating Iranian interests. Israel would need to accept that regime change in Iran is unlikely and that some form of accommodation with a nuclear-threshold Iran may be necessary. Both would need to prioritize concrete security interests over ideological positions—a significant ask for leaderships that have built their legitimacy partly on unyielding stances. ## Verdict: Vision Versus Reality Trump's suggestion that Iran could join the Abraham Accords represents either audacious strategic vision or fundamental misunderstanding of the conflict's nature—and perhaps both simultaneously. The statement reflects a transactional worldview in which adversaries can become partners if properly incentivized, where military pressure creates opportunities for dealmaking, and where longstanding enmities can be resolved through bold leadership and personal relationships. This perspective has some merit. International relations are not predetermined, and seemingly intractable conflicts have occasionally found resolution through creative diplomacy. Nixon's opening to China, Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, and the Good Friday Agreement all seemed impossible until they happened. Leaders willing to challenge conventional wisdom and take political risks have sometimes achieved breakthroughs that cynics declared unattainable. However, those historical successes shared certain characteristics absent from the Iran-Israel case. They generally involved pragmatic leadership on both sides willing to prioritize strategic interests over ideology. They benefited from changing circumstances that made the status quo untenable for both parties. They built on quiet preparatory diplomacy that established trust and identified zones of potential agreement. None of these conditions currently exists between Iran and Israel. The fundamental issue is that Trump's optimism appears to rest on a category error: treating the Iran-Israel conflict as a dispute about specific grievances amenable to negotiated resolution, when it is actually a deep structural antagonism rooted in incompatible ideological frameworks and competing visions of regional order. Iran's Islamic Republic has defined itself partly through opposition to Israel for 46 years. Israel has organized much of its security policy and regional diplomacy around countering Iranian influence. Neither side shows any indication of rethinking these core positions. The recent military conflict, rather than creating conditions for reconciliation, has likely deepened mutual hostility. Israel demonstrated its capability to inflict severe damage on Iran, strengthening the conviction that only military deterrence ensures security. Iran experienced the humiliation of direct attacks on its territory and the assassination of senior leaders, reinforcing narratives of victimization and the need for resistance. Both societies emerged more convinced of the other's malevolent intentions. This does not mean the conflict is immune to management or that every aspect is irresolvable. Specific mechanisms to reduce risks of inadvertent escalation, limit proxy warfare, and establish communication channels might be achievable through patient diplomacy and sustained regional mediation. But these modest steps toward conflict management differ fundamentally from the Abraham Accords model of normalized relations, diplomatic recognition, and partnership—the framework Trump suggested Iran might join. The path from sworn enemies who fought a war three months ago to partners in a regional peace framework would require transformation of revolutionary Iranian ideology, acceptance by Israel of Iran as a legitimate regional power, and dramatic shifts in domestic politics on both sides. It would demand that both countries repudiate decades of policy and rhetoric, abandon constituencies that have built influence on hostility, and embrace former enemies despite fresh wounds from recent conflict. The obstacles are not merely tactical or political but structural and ideological. Trump's vision of an Iran-Israel reconciliation may ultimately say more about his administration's understanding of Middle Eastern dynamics and limits of American influence than about realistic possibilities for regional transformation. The suggestion reveals a confidence that military pressure and personal dealmaking can resolve conflicts that have resisted generations of diplomatic effort. It demonstrates either inspired strategic imagination or dangerous underestimation of historical, ideological, and political forces shaping the region. For now, the question of whether Iran and Israel can become friends remains firmly in the realm of speculation rather than serious diplomatic possibility. What seems more certain is that any realistic path forward requires acknowledging the profound gulf between these adversaries—a gulf far deeper than Trump's optimistic vision suggests. ### Everyone’s Celebrating Trump’s Gaza Plan—Except the People Who’ve Heard These Promises Before URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/everyones-celebrating-trumps-gaza-plan-except-the-people-whove-heard-these-promises-before/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T04:32:04.000Z On September 29, 2025, President Donald Trump unveiled a [comprehensive 20-point peace proposal](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/read-trumps-20-point-proposal-to-end-the-war-in-gaza?ref=diplopolis.com) designed to end Israel’s devastating war on Gaza, which has claimed the lives of over 66,000 Palestinians since October 2023\. Standing alongside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House, Trump declared it a “historic day for peace,” presenting a plan that has garnered both cautious international support and deep analytical skepticism. As the international community evaluates this latest attempt to resolve one of the world’s most intractable conflicts, critical questions emerge about trust, implementation, and whether history will repeat itself. The proposal arrives at a moment when the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza has pushed the conflict to an unprecedented crisis point, with Israel facing mounting diplomatic isolation and unprecedented international pressure to end hostilities. ## Key Elements of the Trump Proposal Before examining global reactions and historical context, it’s essential to understand the core components of Trump’s plan. The immediate ceasefire terms stipulate that the war ends immediately upon both parties’ acceptance, with all hostages (living and deceased) returned within 72 hours. Israel would then release 250 Palestinian life-sentence prisoners plus 1,700 Gazans detained since October 7, 2023, while humanitarian aid would be scaled up through UN agencies and the Red Crescent. The governance structure envisions Gaza being governed by a technocratic Palestinian committee supervised by an international “Board of Peace” chaired by Trump alongside Tony Blair and other international figures. Hamas would have no role in future governance, while the Palestinian Authority may assume control after completing unspecified reforms. An International Stabilization Force would deploy in Gaza, with progressive Israeli withdrawal linked to demilitarization milestones, though Israel maintains a security perimeter until “Gaza is properly secure.” Hamas members accepting peaceful coexistence would receive amnesty. Looking toward the long term, the plan promises Gaza reconstruction through a Trump economic development plan and envisions a potential pathway to Palestinian statehood after reforms are completed. The proposal explicitly states there will be no forced displacement of Palestinians and that Israel will not annex Gaza, with the United States leading dialogue on a “political horizon for peaceful coexistence.” ## Global Reception: Cautious Optimism from World Leaders The Trump administration’s peace plan received surprisingly broad initial support from key regional and international players, signaling a diplomatic opening that previous proposals failed to achieve. ### Arab and Muslim Nations Express Conditional Support The [foreign ministers of eight major Muslim-majority nations](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/29/trumps-gaza-peace-plan-welcomed-by-arab-and-islamic-countries-the-west?ref=diplopolis.com)—including Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Turkey, and Pakistan—issued a joint statement welcoming Trump’s initiative. However, their endorsement came with significant conditions: no annexation of the West Bank or Gaza, maintenance of the status quo in Jerusalem, full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, increased humanitarian aid, and most critically, a clear pathway toward Palestinian statehood based on the two-state solution. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi separately [praised Trump’s efforts](https://www.axios.com/2025/09/24/trump-israel-gaza-peace-plan-un?ref=diplopolis.com), describing the proposals as “an important foundation upon which we can build” to achieve regional peace. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan commended Trump’s “efforts and leadership aimed at halting the bloodshed in Gaza.” ### European Leaders Emphasize Two-State Solution European leaders, including [French President Emmanuel Macron](https://thehill.com/policy/international/5527891-trump-gaza-peace-plan/?ref=diplopolis.com), welcomed the proposal while insisting it must lead to substantive discussions based on the two-state solution endorsed by 142 UN member states. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen encouraged “all parties to now seize this opportunity,” while EU foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas called it “the best immediate chance to end the war.” Germany’s Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul described the deal as a “unique opportunity to end the horrific war,” urging Hamas to accept it immediately while expecting Israel to “engage resolutely” with the terms. ### The Palestinian Authority’s Measured Response The [Palestinian Authority welcomed](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/29/trumps-gaza-peace-plan-welcomed-by-arab-and-islamic-countries-the-west?ref=diplopolis.com) Trump’s “sincere and determined efforts,” but emphasized the need for mechanisms that protect Palestinian people, prevent annexation and displacement, halt unilateral actions violating international law, ensure full Israeli withdrawal, and create a pathway to Palestinian statehood with East Jerusalem as its capital. Notably, Hamas stated it was reviewing the proposal “in good faith,” though officials confirmed they had not yet received a written version of the plan. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad group took a harder line, calling the proposal a “recipe for continued aggression against the Palestinian people.” ## Skeptics Speak: Expert Analysis and Historical Parallels Despite the warm diplomatic reception, analysts and Middle East experts have raised substantial concerns about the proposal’s viability, drawing on decades of failed peace initiatives and broken promises. ### Familiar Patterns, New Stumbling Blocks [Professor Asher Kaufman](https://theconversation.com/trumps-gaza-peace-plan-a-bit-of-the-old-a-bit-of-the-new-and-the-same-stumbling-blocks-266341?ref=diplopolis.com) of the University of Notre Dame’s peace studies program notes that portions of the plan resembling Israeli withdrawal, hostage-prisoner exchanges, and humanitarian aid delivery mirror past agreements—”including the last one that collapsed after Israel violated its terms in March 2025.” The plan’s most significant innovation involves the creation of a “Board of Peace” chaired by Trump himself, alongside figures including former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, to oversee Gaza’s transitional governance. However, [Michael Lynk](https://www.cbc.ca/news/trump-israel-hamas-peace-plan-1.7646899?ref=diplopolis.com), a Western University law professor who served six years as the UN Human Rights Council’s special rapporteur, expressed deep reservations: “As I read the content, I am less and less surprised, and more and more skeptical.” ### The Netanyahu Factor: Political Survival Over Peace Multiple analysts point to Netanyahu’s political calculations as a fundamental obstacle to implementation. Kaufman observes that Netanyahu “will need to get the approval of the far-right members of his government, who in the past have resisted anything short of a continuation of the war and the final takeover of the Gaza Strip by Israel.” [Michael Koplow](https://thehill.com/policy/international/5527891-trump-gaza-peace-plan/?ref=diplopolis.com), chief policy officer at the Israel Policy Forum, warned that “without dedicated diplomacy to follow through on Trump’s proposal, the Monday announcement only serves as empty political posturing.” He noted that “Trump acts like this is a done deal for political purposes, Bibi \[Netanyahu\] reminds everyone that it is far from over for political purposes, and now comes the much harder part.” Indeed, Netanyahu’s own statements at the White House revealed contradictions with the written plan. While the proposal envisions potential Palestinian Authority governance after reforms, [Netanyahu insisted](https://www.cnn.com/2025/09/29/politics/white-house-peace-plan-gaza-war?ref=diplopolis.com) that “Gaza will have a peaceful civilian administration that is run neither by Hamas nor by the Palestinian Authority.” ### The Blair Problem: Colonial Echoes The involvement of Tony Blair as a key figure in the Board of Peace has raised particular concerns. Palestinians [largely distrust Blair](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/28/why-is-the-divisive-tony-blair-now-touted-for-post-gaza-war-interim-role?ref=diplopolis.com) due to his record of partnering with the United States to install foreign governments in Arab states, particularly the disastrous invasion of Iraq. Blair has been [working for months with Jared Kushner](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/29/what-is-the-trump-plan-for-gaza-and-will-it-work?ref=diplopolis.com), Trump’s son-in-law and former senior adviser, through the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change to develop the post-war plan. This raises questions about whose interests the reconstruction will serve and whether Gaza’s future will be shaped by Palestinians themselves or imposed by external actors with economic interests in the region’s “valuable” Mediterranean waterfront. ## History of Broken Promises: Why Trust Remains Elusive The skepticism surrounding Trump’s proposal is rooted in a painful historical record of failed peace initiatives and violations of previous agreements—by both American mediators and Israeli governments. ### The Oslo Accords: A Blueprint for Disappointment The [Oslo Accords of 1993](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oslo%5FAccords?ref=diplopolis.com), once heralded as a historic breakthrough, created the Palestinian Authority and aimed to resolve final status issues within five years. Instead, Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank nearly doubled during the Oslo peace process, with the settler population expanding from approximately 116,000 in 1993 to over 200,000 by 2000\. As the [Office of the Historian](https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/oslo?ref=diplopolis.com) notes, the Oslo Accords gave the United States only limited monitoring responsibilities, confining the Clinton administration to “defusing crises” rather than ensuring compliance. The Second Intifada erupted in 2000 after the Camp David Summit failed, and by 2002, Israel had re-occupied many areas previously transferred to Palestinian control. Israeli academic Efraim Karsh described the Accords as “the starkest strategic blunder in \[Israel’s\] history,” noting that more than 1,600 Israelis were murdered in the years following the Declaration of Principles. ### Camp David 2000: The Myth of the “Generous Offer” The [Camp David Summit of 2000](https://theintercept.com/2023/11/28/israel-palestine-history-peace/?ref=diplopolis.com) has been mythologized in American political discourse as the moment when Palestinians “missed a historic opportunity for peace.” However, Shlomo Ben-Ami, a key Israeli negotiator at the talks, later admitted: “Camp David was not the missed opportunity for the Palestinians, and if I were a Palestinian, I would have rejected Camp David as well.” The proposal offered Palestinians what were essentially “three disconnected bantustans” in the West Bank, with Israel maintaining control of the border with Jordan indefinitely—hardly the basis for a viable sovereign state. ### Recent Violations: March 2025 Ceasefire Collapse The most recent and relevant precedent occurred just months ago. In January 2025, Israel and Hamas agreed to a [three-phase ceasefire deal](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025%5FGaza%5Fwar%5Fceasefire?ref=diplopolis.com) that was supposed to lead to a permanent end to hostilities. However, as [NPR reported](https://www.npr.org/2025/03/19/nx-s1-5332204/israel-breaks-ceasefire-as-it-strikes-gaza-killing-hundreds?ref=diplopolis.com), leading Israeli defense analysts admitted that “Israel knowingly violated the cease-fire agreement with Hamas – with American approval – because it didn’t want to fully meet the terms it had committed to two months ago.” Israel [refused to withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/27/how-is-israel-violating-the-gaza-ceasefire-deal?ref=diplopolis.com) as required, continued military operations killing over 150 Palestinians during the supposed ceasefire, and on March 2, 2025, blocked all humanitarian aid from entering Gaza—a violation of international humanitarian law. On March 18, Israel launched surprise airstrikes killing over 400 Palestinians in a single night, including 183 children, effectively ending the ceasefire. According to [Gaza’s Government Media Office](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/18/why-did-israel-break-the-ceasefire-in-gaza?ref=diplopolis.com), Israel committed more than 1,000 violations of the ceasefire agreement before completely collapsing it. The [UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/03/gaza-experts-condemn-israeli-decision-re-open-gates-hell-and-unilaterally?ref=diplopolis.com) condemned Israel’s “decision to re-open ‘gates of hell’ and unilaterally change conditions of truce deal.” ### The Pattern: Economic Incentives Over Palestinian Rights Trump’s approach to Middle East peace has consistently emphasized economic development over political rights. His earlier proposal in February 2025 to [“take over” Gaza](https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/05/politics/trump-gaza-takeover-analysis/index.html?ref=diplopolis.com) and permanently relocate its 2 million inhabitants—describing Gaza’s waterfront as “very valuable”—revealed a transactional mindset that views Palestinian land as real estate rather than as the homeland of an indigenous population with rights under international law. As [Chatham House analyst](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/02/negotiating-tactic-or-not-trumps-gaza-plan-has-already-done-irreparable-damage?ref=diplopolis.com) noted in February, such proposals amount to “a second Nakba” and show “indifference the plan shows to Palestinians’ identity and dignity.” ## Implementation Challenge: Gaps Between Rhetoric and Reality Beyond the historical record, the current proposal faces significant structural obstacles that cast doubt on its implementation. ### Vague Timelines and Conditional Language The proposal’s language regarding Palestinian statehood is notably tentative. It states that “conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood” only after Gaza’s redevelopment has advanced and the Palestinian Authority’s reform program has been “faithfully carried out.” This conditional phrasing, with no defined timelines or measurable benchmarks, allows for indefinite delays. As [CNN’s analysis](https://www.cnn.com/2025/09/29/politics/white-house-peace-plan-gaza-war?ref=diplopolis.com) points out, there is “no timeline” for when the Palestinian Authority would assume control of Gaza from the interim technocratic committee, creating a potentially permanent state of limbo. ### Hamas Calculation For Hamas, accepting the proposal would mean “the end of its military and political presence in the Gaza Strip,” as Professor Kaufman notes. The organization, which has governed Gaza since 2007, would need to be “in a desperate situation” to accept such terms—or, more optimistically, “finally be attuned to the desperate plight of Gazans and respond to it.” However, Hamas’s track record suggests it views its existence as inseparable from Palestinian resistance to occupation. The proposal’s demand for complete disarmament and political dissolution represents an existential threat that Hamas leadership may reject despite the humanitarian catastrophe their population faces. ### Netanyahu’s Coalition Politics Netanyahu’s political survival depends on maintaining his far-right coalition, which includes ministers like Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich who have [consistently opposed](https://www.cnn.com/2025/09/27/middleeast/gaza-trump-peace-plan-detail-israel?ref=diplopolis.com) any ceasefire arrangements. Ben-Gvir, who quit Netanyahu’s government over the January 2025 ceasefire only to return when hostilities resumed in March, immediately [opposed the Trump plan](https://www.cnn.com/2025/09/27/middleeast/gaza-trump-peace-plan-detail-israel?ref=diplopolis.com), declaring that Netanyahu does “not have a mandate to end the war without the complete defeat of Hamas.” The plan’s recognition of Palestinian aspirations for statehood directly contradicts Netanyahu’s declaration at the UN General Assembly days earlier that giving Palestinians a state “after October 7th is like giving Al-Qaeda a state one mile from New York City after September 11th.” ### Absence of Palestinian Agency As with the [Abraham Accords](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/29/what-is-the-trump-plan-for-gaza-and-will-it-work?ref=diplopolis.com), “there’s been little input from the Palestinians” in crafting this proposal. Palestinians themselves are relegated to technocratic administrators overseen by an international body chaired by an American president, raising fundamental questions about self-determination and sovereignty. ## Looking Forward: Scenarios and Prospects As diplomatic efforts continue, several possible scenarios emerge, each with profound implications for the region’s future. ### Best Case: Comprehensive Implementation In the most optimistic scenario, Hamas accepts the plan under international pressure, Netanyahu manages his coalition while implementing phased Israeli withdrawal, and the international community provides sustained financial and diplomatic support for Gaza’s reconstruction. The Palestinian Authority undergoes genuine reforms, earning public legitimacy, and within 3-5 years, serious negotiations toward Palestinian statehood commence. However, this scenario requires simultaneous cooperation from parties with conflicting interests and diametrically opposed political survival strategies. History suggests such alignment is extraordinarily rare. ### Partial Implementation: Another Temporary Ceasefire A more likely outcome mirrors previous patterns: initial hostage exchanges occur, humanitarian aid temporarily increases, but permanent status negotiations stall over settlements, borders, Jerusalem, or refugees. Israel maintains security control over Gaza indefinitely under various pretexts, the Palestinian Authority remains weak and divided, and within months or years, violence resumes under similar or different circumstances. This cycle—ceasefire, negotiations, stalemate, renewed conflict—has repeated for decades and represents the path of least resistance for all parties. ### Worst Case: Complete Collapse In the darkest scenario, Hamas rejects the proposal or negotiations fail quickly, Israel escalates military operations claiming self-defense, regional tensions spike with potential conflict involving Iran, Hezbollah, or other actors, and the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza deepens with renewed international condemnation but limited action. Given the March 2025 precedent, where Israel violated a ceasefire agreement with apparent American approval, this scenario cannot be dismissed as mere pessimism but rather represents a pattern-based projection. ### Trump Factor: Unpredictability as Policy Trump’s personal involvement as chair of the Board of Peace introduces unique uncertainty. His transactional approach to foreign policy, tendency to side with strong-man leaders, and focus on “deals” over principles could either provide unprecedented leverage or undermine the proposal’s legitimacy. If Trump loses interest, delegates implementation to subordinates, or faces domestic political pressures, the entire framework could collapse. Conversely, his willingness to pressure both sides—including threatening to withhold support from Israel—could create diplomatic space that previous administrations failed to establish. ## Trust Must Be Earned Through Action, Not Rhetoric Trump’s 20-point proposal represents a genuine diplomatic effort that has achieved notable initial buy-in from regional and international actors. Its recognition of Palestinian aspirations for statehood, commitment to preventing forced displacement, and creation of international governance structures offer potential pathways toward peace that distinguish it from some previous initiatives. However, the fundamental question that haunts this proposal—and every peace initiative in living memory—remains unanswered: Why should Palestinians, or any informed observer of Middle East politics, trust that this agreement will succeed where countless others have failed? ### Evidence Speaks The historical record provides a sobering answer. American-brokered peace initiatives have repeatedly foundered on Israeli refusal to halt settlement expansion during negotiations, systematic violations of negotiated ceasefires, unwillingness to accept genuine Palestinian sovereignty, and political calculations prioritizing coalition survival over peace. The March 2025 ceasefire violations—occurring just six months ago with American acquiescence—demonstrate that agreements are only as durable as the political will to enforce them. When Israel committed over 1,000 violations before entirely collapsing a ceasefire that had been hailed as a breakthrough, it reinforced decades of Palestinian experience with broken promises. ### What Genuine Commitment Looks Like Trust is not rebuilt through eloquent speeches or detailed frameworks. It is painstakingly reconstructed through consistent action over time, where small steps honored consistently outweigh grand gestures abandoned quickly. Transparent enforcement mechanisms with clear monitoring systems and real-time reporting of violations become essential. Meaningful consequences must follow, with tangible costs imposed on any party—regardless of geopolitical importance—that undermines peace efforts. Palestinian agency demands genuine inclusion in designing their own future, not imposed technocratic governance by external powers. Finally, binding timelines with specific, measurable benchmarks and defined consequences for delays or non-compliance provide the accountability structure that past agreements have lacked. Until these elements exist within the Trump framework, Palestinian skepticism represents not cynicism but rational risk assessment based on lived experience. ### International Community’s Responsibility The world’s nations now face a choice that will define the credibility of international law and multilateral diplomacy. Rather than simply applauding proposals and issuing supportive statements, governments must commit to rigorous, independent monitoring of implementation and public documentation of violations by any party. Coordinated diplomatic and economic responses to breaches become necessary, alongside genuine support for Palestinian self-determination rather than mere conflict management. History will judge the international community not by the elegance of this proposal but by its willingness to enforce accountability equally—a standard that has consistently failed when applied to Israeli actions. ### A Sober Assessment As [Professor Asher Kaufman observed](https://theconversation.com/trumps-gaza-peace-plan-a-bit-of-the-old-a-bit-of-the-new-and-the-same-stumbling-blocks-266341?ref=diplopolis.com), “given that all previous U.S.-backed attempts have to date failed, there is reason for skepticism.” This skepticism should not lead to cynical dismissal of peace efforts, but rather to heightened vigilance, rigorous accountability, and recognition that genuine peace requires fundamental shifts in power dynamics, political will, and respect for international law—not merely agreements on paper. ### Crucial Weeks Ahead The coming weeks will reveal whether Trump’s proposal represents a genuine departure from failed policies or merely another chapter in a tragic cycle of raised hopes and shattered promises. Several indicators will prove decisive. Will Israel actually implement the immediate ceasefire and hostage release, or find pretexts for delay? Can the international community establish robust monitoring mechanisms with enforcement teeth? Will Netanyahu manage his far-right coalition, or will political survival trump peace commitments? Can Hamas accept terms that effectively end its governance, gambling on international guarantees? Does the Trump administration maintain focus and pressure on both parties, or lose interest when domestic politics intrude? For the 2 million Palestinians in Gaza—whose homes lie in ruins, whose children have known only war, whose future hangs in the balance—the answer will be written not in diplomatic communiqués but in concrete actions that either honor or betray this latest promise of peace. The international community must ensure that this time, unlike so many times before, words are matched by deeds, and promises are kept by all parties. Anything less would compound tragedy with betrayal. ### New Cold War in the Arctic: Military Buildup, Territorial Claims, and the Fight for the North URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/new-cold-war-in-the-arctic-military-buildup-territorial-claims-and-the-fight-for-the-north/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T04:30:08.000Z The Arctic is experiencing its most dramatic transformation in recorded history—not just environmentally, but geopolitically. As [climate change accelerates Arctic ice melt](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-024-54508-3?ref=diplopolis.com) at rates far exceeding scientific predictions, the Arctic Ocean stands on the precipice of its first ice-free day, potentially before 2030\. This physical transformation is catalyzing an unprecedented scramble for resources, shipping routes, and strategic positioning that is fundamentally reshaping international relations and creating what some observers call a "new Cold War"—though this time, the cold is rapidly disappearing. ## Accelerating Physical Transformation The Arctic's environmental crisis has become a geopolitical opportunity. Recent projections suggest the [Arctic could witness its first ice-free day as early as 2027](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-024-54508-3?ref=diplopolis.com), with near-certainty of ice-free summers by the 2030s—a full decade earlier than the IPCC's most recent estimates. This acceleration matters because it compresses the timeline for strategic decision-making and intensifies competition among Arctic and non-Arctic states alike. The region is [warming at approximately three times the global average rate](https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/rising-tensions-shifting-strategies-evolving-dynamics-us-grand-strategy-arctic/?ref=diplopolis.com), with summer 2023 marking the warmest Arctic conditions since 1900\. NASA estimates indicate the Arctic has lost 21,000 square miles of sea ice annually over the past five decades, and this rate is accelerating. What was once a frozen barrier is becoming navigable ocean, opening both the [Northeast Passage along Russia's northern coast](https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/china-polar-silk-road-long-game-failed-strategy/?ref=diplopolis.com) and the [Northwest Passage through Canada's Arctic archipelago](https://discoveringthearctic.org.uk/governance/arctic-geopolitics/conflicts-geopolitical-issues/?ref=diplopolis.com). These routes could reduce shipping times between Asia and Europe by up to 20 days compared to the Suez Canal route, fundamentally altering global trade patterns and creating new strategic chokepoints. ## Resource Imperative Beneath the melting ice lies one of the planet's last great resource frontiers. The [U.S. Geological Survey estimates the Arctic holds approximately 13% of the world's undiscovered oil reserves](https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-launches-polar-silk-road?ref=diplopolis.com), 30% of its undiscovered natural gas, and vast deposits of critical minerals including rare earth elements essential for modern technology and green energy transitions. These resources are no longer theoretical—they are increasingly accessible and economically viable. Russia has moved most aggressively to capitalize on Arctic resources, with [Arctic development representing a cornerstone of its economic strategy](https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/2024-07/A%20New%20Era%20of%20Arctic%20Geopolitics.pdf?ref=diplopolis.com). The [Yamal LNG project, in which China holds a 30% stake](https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/china-polar-silk-road-long-game-failed-strategy/?ref=diplopolis.com), exemplifies how resource extraction is driving both economic cooperation and geopolitical realignment. Arctic LNG 2, currently under construction, represents another massive investment in monetizing the region's hydrocarbon reserves. For Russia, Arctic resources represent not just economic opportunity but strategic necessity, particularly as Western sanctions have limited other revenue streams. Yet resource competition extends far beyond hydrocarbons. Greenland's rare earth mineral deposits have attracted intense interest from the United States, China, and the European Union. These minerals are critical for everything from smartphones to missile guidance systems to wind turbines. The intersection of resource scarcity, technological dependence, and great power competition makes the Arctic's mineral wealth a flashpoint for future conflict. ## China Factor: A "Near-Arctic State" Stakes Its Claim Perhaps no development has been more consequential—or controversial—than China's Arctic ambitions. In its [2018 Arctic Policy white paper, China designated itself a "near-Arctic state"](https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/14/china-we-are-a-near-arctic-state-and-we-want-a-polar-silk-road.html?ref=diplopolis.com), a self-identification that Arctic nations immediately contested. Located over 7,000 kilometers from the Arctic Circle, China's claim to Arctic stakeholder status rests not on geography but on its economic power, climate vulnerability, and global ambitions. China's ["Polar Silk Road" concept, announced in 2017](https://www.interactioncouncil.org/media-centre/polar-silk-road?ref=diplopolis.com) as an extension of the Belt and Road Initiative, represents an audacious bid to integrate Arctic shipping routes into its global infrastructure strategy. The vision is straightforward: create alternative trade routes that bypass potential U.S. control of the Strait of Malacca and Suez Canal, diversify energy supply sources, and establish China as an indispensable Arctic player. In practice, China's Arctic strategy has pursued multiple vectors simultaneously. Chinese companies have become among the most frequent users of Russia's Northern Sea Route, primarily transporting liquefied natural gas to Chinese markets. Chinese state-owned enterprises hold significant stakes in Russian Arctic energy projects. China has invested in Arctic infrastructure from Iceland to Finland, established research facilities in Norway's Svalbard archipelago, and deployed icebreakers to conduct "scientific research" that some analysts view as serving dual civilian-military purposes. The Ukraine conflict has paradoxically accelerated [Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation](https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/2024-07/A%20New%20Era%20of%20Arctic%20Geopolitics.pdf?ref=diplopolis.com). As Russia faces Western isolation, China has become its most critical economic partner and technology supplier. Russia's willingness to grant China greater access to Arctic resources and sea routes represents a dramatic shift from Moscow's historical reluctance to allow foreign involvement in what it considers sovereign Arctic territory. This deepening partnership concerns Western nations, particularly as [Chinese warships have increasingly operated near Alaska's Aleutian Islands](https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2025C08/?ref=diplopolis.com), sometimes in coordination with Russian vessels. Yet China's Arctic ambitions face significant constraints. Projects beyond Russia have struggled to gain traction, with Nordic countries and Greenland increasingly wary of Chinese investment. The "Polar Silk Road" itself has largely disappeared from official Chinese discourse since 2023, suggesting that Beijing may be reassessing its Arctic strategy in light of geopolitical tensions and practical limitations. ## Military Posturing and Strategic Competition The Arctic's militarization represents perhaps the most concerning dimension of its geopolitical transformation. [Russia has undertaken the most extensive military buildup](https://trendsresearch.org/insight/the-arctic-a-risk-of-escalating-conflicts/?ref=diplopolis.com), reopening Soviet-era bases along its Arctic coast, deploying advanced air defense systems, and establishing new military infrastructure designed to project power across the region. Moscow views the Arctic as both a strategic frontier and a defensive bastion—the Northern Fleet's submarine forces represent Russia's most survivable nuclear deterrent, and maintaining freedom of movement from the Arctic to the North Atlantic remains a core Russian military objective. [NATO's expansion into the Arctic accelerated dramatically](https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/shifting-ice-russian-invasion-ukraine-arctic-circle-governance-arctic-councils-path-forward/?ref=diplopolis.com) following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Finland's accession to NATO in 2023, followed by Sweden's membership, fundamentally altered the Arctic's security architecture. NATO now counts seven of the eight Arctic states among its members, leaving only Russia outside the alliance. Large-scale NATO exercises in the region, including [Northern Response 2024—the alliance's largest Arctic exercise in decades](https://trendsresearch.org/insight/the-arctic-a-risk-of-escalating-conflicts/?ref=diplopolis.com) involving 20,000 troops—signal that the High North has become a critical theater for alliance planning. The United States has belatedly recognized the Arctic's strategic significance. The [2024 Department of Defense Arctic Strategy](https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/rising-tensions-shifting-strategies-evolving-dynamics-us-grand-strategy-arctic/?ref=diplopolis.com) explicitly identifies the region as critical for U.S. sovereignty, global power projection, and great power competition. It mandates enhanced Arctic capabilities, increased exercises, and deeper engagement with allies and partners. Yet the U.S. faces significant capability gaps, including insufficient icebreaker capacity compared to Russia's fleet of over 40 vessels, limited cold-weather operational experience, and infrastructure deficits in Alaska. The intersection of territorial disputes, military buildup, and strategic competition creates dangerous potential for miscalculation. Overlapping territorial claims over extended continental shelves remain unresolved, with Russia, Canada, and Denmark all asserting rights to vast areas of Arctic seabed based on competing interpretations of international law. The status of key waterways remains contested—Canada claims the Northwest Passage as internal waters, while the United States insists it represents an international strait open to all navigation. ## Indigenous Peoples: The Arctic's First Victims Lost in geopolitical maneuvering are the [approximately 400,000 Indigenous peoples](https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2021/02/23/indigenous-peoples-and-climate-justice-in-the-arctic/?ref=diplopolis.com) whose communities have inhabited the Arctic for millennia. [Climate change threatens their traditional ways of life](https://www.arcticwwf.org/the-circle/stories/indigenous-peoples-have-the-knowledge-and-practices-to-support-climate-resilience/?ref=diplopolis.com) with unprecedented speed—thawing permafrost destabilizes communities, changing ice conditions make traditional hunting dangerous, and shifting wildlife populations undermine subsistence practices that have sustained Arctic cultures for generations. Indigenous communities face the dual burden of climate impacts and industrial development. Resource extraction projects frequently proceed on Indigenous lands with inadequate consultation or benefit-sharing. The [Sámi people of Scandinavia have watched as mining, wind farms, and other "green" development](https://polarjournal.net/indigenous-peoples-rights-and-climate-change-in-the-arctic/?ref=diplopolis.com) threatens reindeer herding grounds. Russian Indigenous peoples face particularly acute challenges, with the state showing little regard for Indigenous rights in pursuing Arctic exploitation. The Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North even endorsed Russia's invasion of Ukraine after its leadership was replaced by state-appointed figures, highlighting how Indigenous governance can be co-opted by state interests. The [Arctic Council, established in 1996 with Indigenous peoples' organizations as Permanent Participants](https://arctic-council.org/news/the-importance-of-the-arctic-council-for-indigenous-peoples/?ref=diplopolis.com), once represented a model for inclusive governance. Yet [Russia's invasion of Ukraine has fractured this cooperation](https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/shifting-ice-russian-invasion-ukraine-arctic-circle-governance-arctic-councils-path-forward/?ref=diplopolis.com). The seven non-Russian Arctic states paused Council activities in March 2022, resuming only limited work on projects excluding Russia. In February 2024, [Russia suspended its financial contributions](https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/russia-suspends-funding-arctic-council-wake-call-not-death-knell?ref=diplopolis.com) until "full-fledged work" resumes, leaving the Council in limbo. Indigenous leaders emphasize that they remain the Arctic's most important knowledge holders and most vulnerable populations. Their traditional ecological knowledge—developed over thousands of years—is critical for understanding and adapting to environmental change. Yet too often, they are excluded from high-level decision-making about the Arctic's future. As one Inuit leader stated: "Nothing about us should be done without us." ## Governance Crisis The Arctic governance architecture is collapsing under the weight of geopolitical tensions. The [Arctic Council, once hailed as a model for international cooperation](https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/31/arctic-council-russia-norway/?ref=diplopolis.com) even during periods of broader tension, has been reduced to a symbolic shell. Without high-level political engagement between Russia and other members, the Council cannot fulfill its mandate for environmental protection and sustainable development. Russia's refusal to pay dues and threats to withdraw entirely raise existential questions about the institution's viability. Three scenarios emerge for the Council's future. First, it could continue in diminished form with minimal Russian engagement—maintaining the organization's skeleton in hopes of eventual normalization. Second, the seven Western Arctic states could dissolve the Council and recreate it without Russia, though this would undermine regional governance given that [Russia controls 45% of the Arctic coastline](https://europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/from-russia-to-norway-three-scenarios-for-the-arctic-councils-future-after-the-chairmanship-handover/?ref=diplopolis.com). Third, some form of pragmatic modus vivendi could emerge, with working-level cooperation on technical and scientific matters continuing despite frozen political relations. Norway, which held the Council chairmanship from 2023 to 2025 before transferring it to Denmark (Greenland), has tried to navigate this impossible balancing act. Oslo has the longest experience [managing Arctic cooperation with Russia](https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/05/what-is-next-for-the-arctic-council-in-the-wake-of.html?ref=diplopolis.com), including resolving a 40-year maritime boundary dispute through the 2010 Treaty on Maritime Delimitation. Norwegian officials emphasize that some level of Arctic cooperation with Russia remains necessary given geographic realities, particularly for environmental monitoring, search and rescue, and scientific data sharing. Yet they also acknowledge that "normal political cooperation with the current Russian regime is not possible." Beyond the Arctic Council, other governance frameworks face similar challenges. The [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides the legal foundation](https://academic.oup.com/hrlr/article/23/3/ngad020/7237938?ref=diplopolis.com) for maritime claims, but its dispute resolution mechanisms have proven inadequate for resolving overlapping extended continental shelf claims. The International Maritime Organization's Polar Code establishes shipping standards, but compliance and enforcement remain concerns as traffic increases. Scientific cooperation, once largely insulated from political tensions, has been severely disrupted by the suspension of research partnerships with Russia. ## Looking Forward: Scenarios for 2030 and Beyond The Arctic of 2030 will look dramatically different from today, and several plausible scenarios emerge from current trajectories. **The Deepening Divide Scenario**: Continued geopolitical confrontation hardens divisions between Russia-China and Western Arctic states. Military tensions escalate, with increased close encounters and potential for miscalculation. The Arctic Council either dissolves or becomes entirely ceremonial. Parallel but separate governance arrangements emerge—a Western Arctic framework coordinated through NATO alongside Sino-Russian bilateral arrangements. Indigenous peoples' voices are further marginalized as security concerns dominate decision-making. **The Managed Competition Scenario**: Despite political tensions, functional cooperation continues on specific technical issues where shared interests remain compelling—search and rescue, scientific data sharing, environmental protection. The Arctic becomes a patchwork of selective cooperation within an overall framework of strategic competition. China's Arctic role expands but remains constrained by Western pushback and practical limitations. Economic development proceeds unevenly, with pockets of cooperation existing alongside zones of heightened tension. **The Climate Catastrophe Catalyst Scenario**: Rapid and dramatic environmental changes—potentially including major incidents like massive oil spills in ice-free waters or catastrophic permafrost collapse affecting global methane emissions—force renewed cooperation. The shared threat of environmental catastrophe temporarily overrides geopolitical tensions, leading to reinvigorated international coordination. However, this cooperation remains limited to environmental and safety issues rather than extending to security or economic competition. Each scenario carries profound implications. An [ice-free Arctic summer will arrive regardless of human decisions](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-023-38511-8?ref=diplopolis.com) about cooperation or confrontation. The question is whether states will manage this transition through coordinated frameworks that protect the Arctic environment and its Indigenous inhabitants, or whether the region descends into unmanaged competition that risks both environmental catastrophe and military conflict. ## Implications for Global Order Arctic geopolitics matters far beyond the region itself. The Arctic has become a bellwether for the broader international system's health—a place where climate change, great power competition, resource scarcity, and institutional fragility intersect in concentrated form. How the international community manages Arctic challenges will signal its capacity to address other global problems requiring sustained cooperation despite strategic rivalry. For the United States and its allies, the Arctic represents both a challenge to be managed and an opportunity to demonstrate the continued relevance of democratic alliances. NATO's adaptation to Arctic security concerns shows the alliance can still respond to new threats. Yet capability gaps and divided attention (given competing priorities in Europe and the Indo-Pacific) raise questions about whether the West can effectively compete in the Arctic over the long term. For China, the Arctic represents a test case for its ambitions to reshape global governance and establish itself as a polar power. Success in establishing meaningful presence and influence in the Arctic would validate China's "near-Arctic state" concept and demonstrate its ability to project power and interests globally. Failure would highlight the limits of Chinese influence when confronting coordinated resistance from established Arctic states. For Russia, the Arctic represents both economic lifeline and strategic sanctuary. Arctic resource revenues have become even more critical as Western sanctions bite. Yet Russia's dependence on China for technology and investment in Arctic projects creates its own vulnerabilities and limits Russia's sovereignty in the region Moscow claims as its own. For Indigenous peoples and the Arctic environment, the trajectory appears increasingly ominous. Accelerating climate change, intensifying resource extraction, and growing military activity all threaten the Arctic's fragile ecosystems and the communities that depend on them. Without stronger mechanisms to ensure Indigenous participation in governance and stringent environmental protections, the Arctic risks becoming another zone sacrificed to great power competition and short-term economic gain. The Arctic's transformation from frozen frontier to contested geopolitical space is no longer a future scenario—it is the present reality. As ice disappears, the Arctic is revealing itself to be not the periphery of global affairs but a critical arena where the fundamental questions of 21st-century international relations will be contested: Can great powers cooperate on shared challenges despite strategic rivalry? Will international institutions adapt to new realities or collapse under geopolitical strain? Can environmental imperatives override national interests? The answers emerging from the Arctic will resonate far beyond the region, shaping the contours of international order for decades to come. ### AI and Diplomacy: 3 Must Read Books for Understanding Artificial Intelligence's Impact on International Relations URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/ai-and-diplomacy-3-must-read-books-for-understanding-artificial-intelligences-impact-on-international-relations/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T04:28:30.000Z The diplomatic world stands at an unprecedented inflection point. Artificial intelligence is not merely another technological tool to be adopted—it represents a fundamental shift that will redefine how nations interact, compete, and cooperate. To navigate this transformation, three essential works provide indispensable insights: Henry Kissinger, Eric Schmidt, and Daniel Huttenlocker's [***The Age of AI: And Our Human Future***](https://amzn.to/4pIZdDM?ref=diplopolis.com), Mustafa Suleyman's [***The Coming Wave: Technology, Power, and the Twenty-first Century's Greatest Dilemma***](https://amzn.to/3W8mYHH?ref=diplopolis.com), and Kai-Fu Lee and Chen Qiufan's [***AI 2041: Ten Visions for Our Future***](https://amzn.to/3WaO012?ref=diplopolis.com). Together, these works illuminate why understanding AI has become crucial for anyone engaged in international relations. ## Technological Tsunami Reshaping Global Order We are witnessing what Suleyman describes as a "coming wave" of technological transformation that will be impossible to contain within national borders. This wave encompasses not just artificial intelligence but synthetic biology, quantum computing, and other emerging technologies that will fundamentally alter the nature of power, governance, and international relations. [![The Age of AI And Our Human Future](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/05/the-age-of-ai-and-our-human-future.jpg)](https://amzn.to/4pIZdDM?ref=diplopolis.com) The Age of AI And Our Human Future The erosion of traditional diplomatic advantages is accelerating at an unprecedented pace. Nations that have long dominated through superior intelligence networks, experienced diplomatic corps, or well-established international relationships now find these advantages potentially neutralized by countries excelling in AI development and deployment. Countries like Estonia or Singapore, despite their relatively small size, can punch above their diplomatic weight by leveraging advanced AI capabilities to enhance their analytical and predictive capacities. Consider how traditional intelligence gathering—once requiring extensive human networks, years of relationship building, and sophisticated analysis capabilities—can now be augmented or even replaced by AI systems capable of processing vast amounts of open-source information, satellite imagery, and digital communications in real-time. The speed differential doesn't just change the pace of diplomacy—it fundamentally alters its rhythm and creates new pressures on decision-makers who must distinguish between genuine insights and algorithmic noise. ## Containment Challenge and National Security One of the most profound challenges facing international relations is what Suleyman identifies as the "containment problem"—the near impossibility of keeping advanced technologies within national boundaries. Unlike previous strategic technologies such as nuclear weapons, which required massive infrastructure and rare materials, AI capabilities can be replicated and distributed with relative ease. [![The Coming Wave- Technology, Power, and the Twenty-first Century's Greatest Dilemma](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/05/the-coming-wave-technology-power-and-the-twenty-first-centurys-greatest-dilemma.jpg)](https://amzn.to/3W8mYHH?ref=diplopolis.com) The Coming Wave- Technology, Power, and the Twenty-first Century's Greatest Dilemma This creates unprecedented vulnerabilities for national security. When AI research published in academic journals can be immediately accessed and implemented globally, traditional concepts of technological advantage become fleeting. The open nature of much AI research, while beneficial for scientific progress, means that breakthroughs in one country quickly become available to potential adversaries. The implications extend beyond military applications. AI systems developed for civilian purposes—medical diagnosis, financial analysis, transportation optimization—can be rapidly adapted for intelligence gathering, social control, or economic warfare. Nations must now consider how their technological exports might be weaponized against their own interests, creating new dilemmas for trade policy and international cooperation. ## Technological Sovereignty and Systemic Competition We are witnessing the emergence of what might be termed "computational sovereignty"—the idea that a nation's ability to independently develop, deploy, and control AI systems directly correlates with its strategic autonomy. Countries lacking advanced AI capabilities increasingly find themselves dependent on foreign technologies for critical governmental functions, from border security to economic planning. This dependency creates new forms of vulnerability and leverage in international relations. When a nation's customs system, financial regulations, or even diplomatic communications rely on AI systems developed elsewhere, questions of technological sovereignty become paramount. The country that controls the algorithms increasingly influences the decisions those systems make. China's approach to technological self-reliance, America's efforts to maintain semiconductor supply chain control, and Europe's push for digital sovereignty represent different strategies for navigating this challenge. Each approach reflects fundamental assumptions about the relationship between technology, governance, and national power that will shape international relations for decades to come. [![AI 2041 - Ten Visions for Our Future](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/05/ai-2041-ten-visions-for-our-future.jpg)](https://amzn.to/3WaO012?ref=diplopolis.com) AI 2041 - Ten Visions for Our Future ## Governance Dilemma in a Multipolar AI World The integration of AI into governmental systems means that diplomats increasingly negotiate not just with their human counterparts but with the algorithmic logic embedded in foreign administrative systems. When visa applications are processed by AI, trade compliance is monitored algorithmically, and economic sanctions are enforced through automated systems, the code itself becomes a diplomatic actor. This creates entirely new categories of diplomatic challenges. How do you negotiate with an algorithm? What happens when automated systems make decisions that contradict stated policy positions? How do nations maintain flexibility and the ability to make exceptions—traditionally crucial diplomatic tools—in an era of algorithmic consistency? The challenge is compounded by the fact that AI development occurs primarily in the private sector, creating new relationships between corporations and governments that don't fit traditional diplomatic frameworks. When a handful of technology companies control the infrastructure that governments depend on, questions of accountability and democratic governance become paramount. ## Information Battlefield and Narrative Control The battleground of public opinion and narrative control has been revolutionized by AI capabilities. Sophisticated deepfake technologies can create convincing false evidence of diplomatic meetings, statements, or agreements that never occurred. AI-generated disinformation campaigns can be tailored to specific audiences with unprecedented precision, undermining trust in legitimate diplomatic communications. More subtly, AI systems' ability to analyze vast amounts of social media data allows for precise targeting of influence operations. Foreign actors can identify key opinion leaders, understand their psychological profiles, and craft messages designed to exploit specific cognitive biases or cultural sensitivities. The result is that the information environment surrounding diplomatic initiatives becomes increasingly contested and difficult to control. Traditional diplomatic tools for managing information—official statements, background briefings, cultural exchanges—struggle to compete with AI-enabled information operations that can generate content at scale, test messaging effectiveness in real-time, and adapt strategies based on audience response. This forces diplomatic institutions to develop new capabilities while also raising fundamental questions about truth, authenticity, and trust in international relations. ## Economic Disruption and Geopolitical Realignment AI's economic implications are reshaping traditional sources of national wealth and international competitive advantage. Countries rich in oil or minerals may find their resources less strategically important than nations with advanced semiconductor manufacturing capabilities or large pools of technical talent. The "data economy" creates new forms of wealth extraction and value creation that don't fit traditional economic models. When AI systems trained on data from one country create value in another, questions of digital taxation, intellectual property, and fair compensation become diplomatic issues. Labor market disruptions from AI automation will create new sources of social tension that inevitably affect international relations. Countries will need to cooperate on managing migration flows, sharing best practices for workforce retraining, and preventing AI-driven economic inequality from destabilizing entire regions. The nations that successfully navigate this transition will gain significant advantages over those that struggle with social upheaval and economic displacement. ## Multilateral Governance in the Age of AI International organizations face their own AI-driven transformation challenges. The United Nations, World Trade Organization, and other multilateral bodies must grapple with how AI affects their core functions. How do you conduct fair and transparent voting when AI systems influence domestic political processes? How do you ensure equitable representation when some nations have vastly superior AI capabilities for analysis and advocacy? These institutions must also confront questions about AI governance itself. Should there be international standards for AI development? How can global cooperation be fostered when AI capabilities are seen as national strategic assets? The challenge is that existing international frameworks were designed for a world where technological change occurred more slowly and could be more easily regulated. The European Union's approach to AI regulation, China's state-directed AI development, and America's private sector-led innovation represent fundamentally different models that will compete for global influence. International institutions must navigate these competing approaches while developing frameworks that can accommodate diverse values and priorities. ## Cultural Values Embedded in Code AI systems embed the values and assumptions of their creators, making cultural competence in AI development a diplomatic necessity. When Chinese AI systems reflect collectivist concepts of social harmony or American systems embody individualistic assumptions about privacy and autonomy, these cultural differences become encoded in the technologies that increasingly govern international interactions. Religious and philosophical traditions offer different perspectives on AI's role in human society, creating new sources of potential conflict or cooperation. Islamic concepts of justice, Buddhist ideas about consciousness, or African communitarian values may suggest alternative approaches to AI governance that Western-dominated technology companies haven't considered. These cultural dimensions extend to questions about employment, privacy, and human agency that will increasingly affect international relations. Countries with different approaches to AI's social impact may find themselves in conflict not just over trade or security issues but over fundamental questions about the kind of society they want to create. ## Race for AI Talent and Brain Power The competition for AI expertise has become a critical element of international relations. Countries are implementing new visa policies, research partnerships, and educational initiatives designed to attract and retain AI talent. The "brain drain" phenomenon now includes not just traditional academic researchers but also AI engineers, data scientists, and machine learning specialists. This competition creates new forms of soft power projection. Countries that can offer the best research environments, funding opportunities, and career prospects for AI professionals will have significant advantages in developing next-generation capabilities. The concentration of AI talent in certain geographic regions—Silicon Valley, London, Toronto, Beijing—creates new centers of technological and ultimately political influence. Immigration policies, university partnerships, and research collaborations become tools of technological statecraft. Nations must balance the benefits of open scientific collaboration with concerns about technology transfer and brain drain to potential competitors. ## Imperative for Strategic Adaptation Given these far-reaching implications, understanding AI has shifted from specialized knowledge to fundamental literacy for anyone involved in international relations. The complexity and interconnectedness of these challenges demand multiple analytical perspectives and deep engagement with both current realities and future possibilities. The convergence of artificial intelligence and diplomacy represents one of the most significant developments in international relations since the emergence of nuclear weapons or global telecommunications. Just as previous generations of diplomats needed to master nuclear strategy or satellite communications, today's practitioners must grapple with algorithmic decision-making and machine learning systems. Failure to understand these dynamics risks being relegated to reactive rather than proactive roles in shaping the future of international relations. The nations and institutions that thoughtfully engage with AI's implications for diplomacy will be best positioned to thrive in an increasingly complex and rapidly changing global environment. The coming wave of technological change is not a distant future possibility—it is the present reality that diplomatic professionals must navigate with wisdom, preparation, and strategic foresight. **Essential Reading:** - [***The Age of AI: And Our Human Future* by Henry A. Kissinger, Eric Schmidt, and Daniel Huttenlocker**](https://amzn.to/4pIZdDM?ref=diplopolis.com) - [***The Coming Wave: Technology, Power, and the Twenty-first Century's Greatest Dilemma* by Mustafa Suleyman**](https://amzn.to/3W8mYHH?ref=diplopolis.com) - [***AI 2041: Ten Visions for Our Future* by Kai-Fu Lee and Chen Qiufan**](https://amzn.to/3WaO012?ref=diplopolis.com) ### A Beginner's Guide to Political Realism for the 21st Century Reader URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/a-beginners-guide-to-political-realism-for-the-21st-century-reader/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T04:27:19.000Z In February 2022, Russian tanks rolled across the Ukrainian border despite decades of international law, treaties, and diplomatic assurances. In 2024, the United States and China continue their technological cold war, each racing to dominate artificial intelligence and semiconductor production, even as their economies remain deeply intertwined. Meanwhile, traditional adversaries like Israel and Saudi Arabia quietly coordinate on regional security, setting aside decades of ideological opposition when strategic interests align. Why do nations behave this way? Why does power seem to trump principle so consistently on the world stage? And why do even democracies committed to human rights often act with ruthless pragmatism when their core interests are threatened? The answer, according to political realists, lies not in the failures of individual leaders or temporary moral lapses, but in the fundamental structure of international politics itself. Political realism offers a framework for understanding world affairs that cuts through the rhetoric of values and ideals to focus on the hard currency of international relations: power and interest. This isn't cynicism, realists argue—it's clarity. And remarkably, the clearest articulation of this worldview came not from a hardened general or Machiavellian prince, but from a German-Jewish refugee writing in the shadow of World War II. Hans Morgenthau's theory of political realism, developed in the late 1940s, remains one of the most powerful tools we have for making sense of global politics in our complex, multipolar 21st century. In this guide, we'll explore what political realism actually means, why it continues to shape how nations behave, and how you can use realist thinking to better understand the headlines you read every day—while also recognizing where this framework falls short. ## What is Political Realism? Political realism is a school of thought in international relations that views world politics as a perpetual competition for power among nations pursuing their own interests. Unlike idealistic frameworks that emphasize international cooperation, moral progress, or the spread of democracy, realism starts from a darker premise: in a world without a supreme authority, nations ultimately rely on their own strength to survive. [![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/05/politics-among-nations-by-hans-morgenthau.png)](https://amzn.to/4nrCRoH?ref=diplopolis.com) The intellectual father of modern realism is Hans Morgenthau, a legal scholar who fled Nazi Germany in 1937 and reimagined the study of international relations in his landmark 1948 book "[**Politics Among Nations**](https://amzn.to/4nrCRoH?ref=diplopolis.com)." Morgenthau wasn't just theorizing in an ivory tower. He had watched the League of Nations fail, witnessed the horror of a world war that claimed over 60 million lives, and rejected the idealistic thinking that had left democracies unprepared for fascist aggression. The historical context matters. In the 1920s and 30s, many Western leaders believed that international institutions, treaties, and the growing interdependence of economies would make major wars obsolete. They were catastrophically wrong. Morgenthau and other realists argued that this "idealist" thinking had been dangerously naive—it ignored the harsh realities of power politics and human nature. For realists, the international system is fundamentally anarchic. This doesn't mean chaos or disorder in the everyday sense. It means there's no world government, no global police force with the power to enforce rules on major powers. In this environment, realists argue, states are the primary actors that matter, and they must ultimately rely on their own capabilities—military strength, economic resources, diplomatic leverage—to protect their interests and ensure their survival. This differs sharply from how we use "realistic" in everyday conversation. Being realistic usually means being practical or accepting limits. Political realism is something more specific: a theory about how international politics actually works, based on recurring patterns throughout history. It's descriptive, explaining why states behave as they do, but also prescriptive, suggesting how they should act to survive and thrive. ## Morgenthau's Six Principles: A Modern Translation Morgenthau organized his theory around six core principles. Let's translate each one for the 21st century, examining both their continued relevance and their limitations. ### 1\. Politics is Governed by Objective Laws Rooted in Human Nature Morgenthau believed that political behavior follows patterns based on unchanging aspects of human nature—particularly our drive for power and self-preservation. Just as economists assume people act in their self-interest, realists assume nations do too. Historically, this explains why Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BCE) still resonates: Athens and Sparta competed for dominance in predictable ways that mirror modern great power rivalries. Today, we see this in how the United States responds to China's rise. Regardless of whether Democrats or Republicans hold power, American policy aims to maintain technological and military superiority. The bipartisan consensus on China reflects what realists would call an objective national interest that transcends partisan politics or individual leadership. The complication? Human nature might be more malleable than Morgenthau assumed. The European Union shows that historical rivals can build lasting peace through institutional design. Cultural and ideational factors—democracy promotion, human rights norms—do seem to influence state behavior in ways pure power politics can't fully explain. ### 2\. National Interest Defined in Terms of Power Morgenthau wrote: "The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power." Nations don't act on abstract principles or ideological commitments—they pursue power to secure their interests. During the Cold War, both the United States and Soviet Union supported dictators and autocrats when it served their geopolitical interests, ideology notwithstanding. Consider Saudi Arabia's role in U.S. foreign policy today. Despite widespread criticism of the kingdom's human rights record, including the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the United States maintains close ties with Riyadh. Why? Energy security, regional stability, arms sales, and counterbalancing Iran all represent concrete American interests that override moral concerns about Saudi governance. The modern challenge? Power now includes dimensions Morgenthau couldn't foresee. Control over semiconductor supply chains, dominance in artificial intelligence development, and influence over global digital infrastructure represent new forms of power that don't fit neatly into traditional military-economic categories. The concept must expand, but the core insight—interest trumps ideology—remains. ### 3\. Interest is Variable in Content Across Time and Place While power remains the central concern, what constitutes a nation's interest changes with circumstances. Realism isn't a rigid ideology but a flexible framework that adapts to different contexts. Britain once fought to prevent any single power from dominating Europe. After World War II, it accepted—even encouraged—American leadership in Europe because the context had changed. Climate change illustrates this variability perfectly. Small island nations like Tuvalu and the Maldives now define their core national interest as preventing sea-level rise that could literally erase them from the map. For them, climate negotiations are existential security issues, not environmental amenities. Meanwhile, Russia may view some warming as advantageous, opening Arctic shipping routes and making Siberian resources more accessible. Same planet, radically different interests. The complication arises when we ask: who defines the national interest? Morgenthau assumed relatively clear interests, but modern democracies contain competing factions with different visions. Is America's interest in the Middle East defined by energy security, regional stability, support for Israel, promotion of democracy, or countering terrorism? Different administrations give different answers. ### 4\. Tension Between Moral Imperatives and Political Success Morgenthau acknowledged that universal moral principles exist, but argued that statesmen cannot always follow them. The responsibility to protect one's nation sometimes requires morally questionable actions. This creates an inherent tragedy in international politics. Franklin Roosevelt maintained diplomatic relations with Stalin's Soviet Union during World War II, despite knowing about Soviet atrocities, because defeating Hitler required it. The Afghanistan withdrawal in 2021 exemplifies this tension. The Biden administration faced a choice: continue an unwinnable war indefinitely or abandon vulnerable Afghans who had helped American forces. Either choice involved moral compromise. The decision to withdraw prioritized American interests—ending a costly forever war—over the moral imperative to protect allies, resulting in scenes of desperate Afghans clinging to departing aircraft. Modern complication: social media and 24-hour news cycles make moral compromises more visible and politically costly. Leaders can't as easily separate private realist calculation from public moral rhetoric, creating a gap between what realism prescribes and what publics will accept. ### 5\. No Universal Moral Principles Applicable to States This is realism's most controversial claim: there's no single moral standard by which all nations can be judged. What China considers "sovereignty" and "non-interference," the West might call "enabling authoritarianism." Morgenthau argued against crusading foreign policies that impose one nation's values on others. The Iraq War (2003) was justified partly as spreading democracy, a universalist moral mission that realists like Brent Scowcroft opposed as dangerous overreach. Today's debate over "democratic values versus authoritarian governance" reveals this principle's relevance. When the United States champions a "rules-based international order," China and Russia respond that these are Western rules designed to preserve American hegemony. African and Latin American nations often resist both camps, asserting their right to define their own political systems without external interference. The contentious reactions to Western sanctions on Russia after the Ukraine invasion—with many Global South nations refusing to join—demonstrate that moral principles in international politics remain deeply contested, not universal. The challenge today is that some issues seem to demand universal standards. Climate change, nuclear proliferation, and pandemic response arguably require coordinated global action based on shared principles. Can realism accommodate truly global challenges, or does its state-centric focus leave it unable to address collective action problems? ### 6\. Autonomy of the Political Sphere Morgenthau's final principle holds that political realism maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, understanding politics as distinct from economics, ethics, or religion. A realist analyzes foreign policy in terms of power and interest, not through economic determinism, moral absolutism, or religious ideology. During the Cold War, realists like George Kennan warned against viewing the Soviet Union purely through an ideological lens, arguing that Russian strategic interests—warm water ports, buffer zones, sphere of influence—explained Soviet behavior better than communist doctrine. This principle illuminates current debates about economic interdependence and conflict. Some argue that deep trade ties between the United States and China make major conflict impossible—an economic determinist view. Realists counter that political and strategic considerations can override economic logic. China's willingness to accept significant economic costs to assert control over Taiwan, or Russia's invasion of Ukraine despite devastating sanctions, suggests that political imperatives can trump economic rationality. The modern complication is that economics and politics have become increasingly intertwined. Economic sanctions are now primary tools of statecraft. Technology companies shape geopolitical outcomes. Can we really separate these spheres as cleanly as Morgenthau suggested, or has the nature of power itself changed? ## Key Realist Concepts for Today's World Understanding realism's principles is one thing; applying them requires grasping several core concepts that translate into our contemporary context. **Power** remains central, but its nature has evolved dramatically. Military capabilities still matter—Russia's invasion of Ukraine demonstrated that conventional warfare hasn't become obsolete. But consider the new domains of power competition. The United States' ability to cut Huawei off from advanced semiconductors represents economic coercion that would have been unimaginable in Morgenthau's era. China's Belt and Road Initiative uses infrastructure investment to build influence across Asia, Africa, and Europe. Control over rare earth elements, essential for everything from smartphones to missile systems, gives China leverage over global supply chains. Cyber capabilities allow states to penetrate rivals' critical infrastructure without firing a shot. Power now operates across military, economic, technological, and informational dimensions simultaneously. **National interest** has similarly expanded beyond territorial integrity and physical security. Today's vital interests include technological supremacy, particularly in artificial intelligence and quantum computing, which will determine economic competitiveness and military advantage for decades. Supply chain resilience became a security priority after COVID-19 exposed dangerous dependencies. Energy transition involves not just environmental policy but strategic calculations about dependence on authoritarian regimes. Even space has become a domain of national interest, with satellites essential for communications, navigation, and intelligence gathering. The **balance of power** concept—the idea that states form alliances to prevent any single power from dominating—has adapted to a multipolar world. We're witnessing the emergence of flexible, minilateral arrangements rather than the rigid Cold War blocs. The Quad (United States, Japan, India, Australia) coordinates on Indo-Pacific security without forming a formal alliance. AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom, United States) focuses on specific technological cooperation. Middle powers like South Korea, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia play increasingly independent roles, refusing to choose definitively between great power camps. This fluid balancing creates both opportunities and instabilities that Morgenthau's bipolar Cold War framework didn't fully anticipate. The **security dilemma**—where one state's efforts to increase its security make others feel less secure, triggering an arms race—now plays out in new arenas. AI development creates a security dilemma where each nation fears falling behind in capabilities that could prove decisive in future conflicts, driving rapid advancement despite safety concerns. Space militarization follows similar logic: one nation's anti-satellite capabilities threaten others' space assets, prompting countermeasures. Hypersonic missiles reduce warning times, increasing first-strike temptations and crisis instability. Finally, **anarchy**—the absence of supreme authority above states—persists despite decades of institution-building. The United Nations can't compel Russia to withdraw from Ukraine or prevent China from militarizing the South China Sea. International law proves toothless when great powers choose to ignore it. The World Trade Organization struggles to referee trade disputes between major economies. This doesn't mean institutions are worthless—they provide forums for negotiation and can constrain behavior at the margins—but the fundamental condition of self-help in international politics remains. When their core interests are threatened, nations still rely on their own power, not international authorities. ## Realism in Action: Current Case Studies Let's examine how realist thinking illuminates several contemporary situations where idealistic frameworks struggle to explain state behavior. **The Ukraine War** makes perfect sense through a realist lens, even if we condemn Russia's aggression. From Moscow's perspective, NATO expansion represented an existential threat to Russian security and influence. Ukraine's pivot toward the West after 2014 challenged Russia's conception of its sphere of influence, a concept realists recognize even if they don't endorse it. Vladimir Putin calculated that Russia's interests in maintaining a buffer zone and preventing further Western encroachment justified military action, despite international condemnation and economic sanctions. The West's response—arming Ukraine but avoiding direct military involvement—reflects a realist calculation that Ukrainian sovereignty, while important, doesn't warrant risking nuclear war with Russia. Each side pursues its interests through power politics, not moral principles or international law. **U.S.-China relations** embody what scholar Graham Allison calls the "Thucydides Trap"—the dangerous dynamic when a rising power threatens to displace an established hegemon. Despite massive economic interdependence, with bilateral trade exceeding $750 billion annually in 2022, strategic competition intensifies. The United States views China's technological advancement, military modernization, and regional assertiveness as challenges to American primacy. China sees U.S. efforts to maintain dominance—through alliances, military presence, and technology restrictions—as attempts to contain its legitimate rise. Both nations arm Taiwan differently (the U.S. with weapons, China with threats) based on their interests. The economic costs of confrontation haven't prevented political competition because, as realists would predict, security concerns ultimately trump commercial ties. **Middle East realignments** demonstrate interest-based diplomacy overriding ideological opposition. The Abraham Accords normalized relations between Israel and several Arab states not because of sudden affection or shared values, but because of converging interests in countering Iran, accessing Israeli technology, and maintaining American security commitments. Saudi Arabia and Iran's Chinese-brokered rapprochement in 2023 similarly reflected pragmatic calculation—both wanted to reduce regional tensions and focus on domestic priorities—rather than any resolution of their deep sectarian and strategic rivalry. These developments puzzle those who view Middle East politics primarily through religious or ideological lenses, but realists recognize the shift as classic balance-of-power politics. ## What Realism Gets Wrong For all its explanatory power, political realism has significant blind spots that critics rightly identify. Realism struggles to explain genuinely cooperative outcomes, particularly the European integration project. How did centuries-old enemies like France and Germany build not just peace but a supranational union that pools sovereignty? Realist predictions that the EU would collapse without a common external threat have proven wrong for decades. The framework underestimates how institutions, shared identities, and economic integration can transform state interests themselves, not just constrain behavior. Humanitarian interventions, when successful, challenge realist assumptions. The intervention in Sierra Leone (2000) and the NATO operation in Libya (2011) initially responded more to humanitarian concerns than vital national interests. While realists can explain these as powerful states exercising their capabilities when costs are low, this feels like retrofitting the theory to preserve it. Non-state actors—multinational corporations, terrorist organizations, international NGOs, social movements—wield influence that state-centric realism minimizes. Climate activists, tech companies, and global health organizations shape outcomes in ways that can't be reduced to state power and interest. The COVID-19 pandemic showed both pharmaceutical companies and the WHO playing roles that realism's focus on states doesn't fully capture. Feminist scholars argue that realism's emphasis on power, conflict, and state survival reflects masculine perspectives while ignoring how gender shapes international politics. Post-colonial critics note that realism emerged from European experiences and may not universally apply to states with different historical trajectories and security concerns. Perhaps most fundamentally, realism's focus on continuity and recurring patterns makes it poor at explaining change. How do we get from Morgenthau's world of great power war to our current era of relative great power peace? Why did the Cold War end peacefully? Realism emphasizes eternal verities but struggles with transformation and genuine novelty in international politics. Environmental challenges reveal another limitation. Climate change, ocean acidification, and biodiversity loss are collective action problems requiring cooperation based on shared long-term interests. Realism's emphasis on relative gains—ensuring you do better than rivals—works against the collaborative approaches needed for global commons issues. When every nation pursues its immediate interest, everyone loses. ## Modern Evolution and Debates Realism itself has evolved significantly since Morgenthau's classical formulation. Kenneth Waltz's "neorealism" or "structural realism" in 1979 shifted focus from human nature to the anarchic structure of the international system itself. For Waltz, it doesn't matter whether leaders are aggressive or peaceful—the system's competitive logic forces them to prioritize security and power. This spawned further debates between "offensive realists" like John Mearsheimer, who argue states must maximize power to ensure survival, and "defensive realists" like Stephen Walt, who contend that states seek security, not power for its own sake, and that excessive expansion often backfires. These aren't academic quibbles—they produce different predictions about whether China must challenge U.S. dominance or could be satisfied with regional hegemony. Contemporary scholars continue adapting realism to new challenges. Some incorporate insights from behavioral economics about how cognitive biases affect strategic calculation. Others explore how domestic politics and regime type influence how states define and pursue interests. "Neoclassical realism" blends structural constraints with unit-level factors like leadership and political culture. These internal debates show realism's vitality but also its fragmentation. Is there a single realist theory, or multiple realist theories that sometimes contradict each other? The diversity of realist thought today makes it harder to pin down exactly what realism predicts, even as realist insights remain influential. ## Why It Matters for You You might wonder why a theory developed by Cold War academics should matter to you. Here's why realist thinking remains practically useful for any informed citizen. Understanding realism helps you see through the gap between rhetoric and reality in foreign policy. When political leaders invoke human rights, democracy promotion, or rules-based order, realist analysis asks: what are the underlying interests? This doesn't mean the rhetoric is meaningless—it shapes what policies are politically feasible—but it's rarely the whole story. Recognizing this prevents naive surprise when nations act inconsistently with their proclaimed values. Realism provides a framework for predicting state behavior during crises. When tensions rise over Taiwan, the South China Sea, or the Arctic, realist logic suggests looking at material capabilities, strategic interests, and alliance commitments rather than diplomatic statements or legal claims. This helps you anticipate likely outcomes and assess real risks. For evaluating your own country's foreign policy, realism offers a critical standard. Are proposed policies realistic given the power available and interests at stake? Do they account for how other nations will respond? Realist thinking can identify overreach—commitments that exceed capabilities—and missed opportunities where interests align with feasible action. More broadly, realism cultivates healthy skepticism about grand schemes to transform international politics. It suggests modest expectations and warns against crusades that ignore constraints. This doesn't mean accepting injustice or abandoning improvement, but rather pursuing change with clear-eyed recognition of obstacles and costs. ## Living in a Realist World Political realism offers a powerful lens for understanding international politics, but it's not the only lens, and viewing everything through a realist framework creates its own distortions. The world is complex enough that we need multiple theories and perspectives to grasp it fully. The value of realism lies not in accepting its worldview as complete truth, but in incorporating its insights into a broader understanding. Yes, power and interest drive much international behavior, and ignoring this invites disappointment or disaster. But cooperation, institutions, ideas, and moral progress are also real features of our world that shape outcomes. The most sophisticated analysis combines realist attention to power with liberal insights about institutions, constructivist understanding of how ideas matter, and critical perspectives on whose interests are served by different arrangements. Think of realism as one essential tool in your analytical toolkit, not the only tool. As you read tomorrow's headlines about great power competition, regional conflicts, or international negotiations, try applying the realist framework. Ask yourself: what are the underlying interests? Who has power and leverage? How does the anarchic structure of international politics constrain options? But also ask: where are states cooperating despite competing interests? How do institutions and norms influence behavior? What's missing from a purely realist account? In our interconnected but still anarchic world—where nuclear weapons, climate change, and global pandemics create unprecedented challenges, yet nations remain the primary actors pursuing their interests—Morgenthau's insights remain as relevant as ever. Understanding realism won't make international politics less tragic or frustrating, but it will make it less mysterious. And in a world where power politics continues to shape all our lives, that clarity is invaluable. ### The Moldova Playbook: How Russia's "Occupation" Accusations Mirror Its Prewar Strategy URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-moldova-playbook-how-russias-occupation-accusations-mirror-its-prewar-strategy/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:26:28.000Z Just days before Moldova's critical parliamentary elections, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) has issued a stark warning: [NATO forces are allegedly massing in Romania](https://www.diplopolis.com/temporary-post-used-for-theme-detection-ae8a840b-9ebb-4856-b971-9b5b7b3c720f-3bfe001a-32de-4114-a6b4-4005b770f6d7%5F%5Ftrashed/) and preparing a "landing force" in Ukraine's Odesa region to "occupy" Moldova. For seasoned observers of [Russian information operations](https://www.diplopolis.com/temporary-post-used-for-theme-detection-ae8a840b-9ebb-4856-b971-9b5b7b3c720f-3bfe001a-32de-4114-a6b4-4005b770f6d7%5F%5Ftrashed/), the claims carry an unsettling sense of déjà vu. ## The Accusations and Their Timing On September 23, 2025, the SVR accused the European Union of orchestrating a military operation to keep Moldova "in line with their Russophobic policies" at "any cost, including deploying troops and carrying out the de facto occupation of the country." According to the Russian intelligence service, the first group of military personnel from France and Britain has already arrived in Odesa, while NATO units concentrate near Moldova's borders in Romania. The timing is hardly coincidental. These accusations emerge just five days before Moldova's September 28 parliamentary elections—a vote that many analysts consider the most consequential in the nation's post-Soviet history. The election will determine whether Moldova continues its path toward European Union membership or pivots back toward Moscow's sphere of influence. ## A Pattern of Projection Russia's current narrative follows a well-established pattern: accuse adversaries of precisely what Moscow itself plans to do or has already done. This [projection strategy in hybrid warfare](https://www.diplopolis.com/temporary-post-used-for-theme-detection-ae8a840b-9ebb-4856-b971-9b5b7b3c720f-3bfe001a-32de-4114-a6b4-4005b770f6d7%5F%5Ftrashed/) has preceded major Russian interventions before. In 2014, Moscow claimed it was protecting Russian speakers from Ukrainian "fascists" while annexing Crimea and fueling separatism in Donbas. In 2022, the Kremlin insisted it was preventing [NATO expansion](https://www.diplopolis.com/temporary-post-used-for-theme-detection-ae8a840b-9ebb-4856-b971-9b5b7b3c720f-3bfe001a-32de-4114-a6b4-4005b770f6d7%5F%5Ftrashed/) while launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Moldova accusations fit this template perfectly. Russia already maintains approximately 1,500 troops in [Transnistria, Moldova's Russian-backed breakaway region](https://www.diplopolis.com/temporary-post-used-for-theme-detection-ae8a840b-9ebb-4856-b971-9b5b7b3c720f-3bfe001a-32de-4114-a6b4-4005b770f6d7%5F%5Ftrashed/), along with substantial Soviet-era military stockpiles. These forces have occupied Moldovan territory since 1992, creating what analysts call a "frozen conflict" that serves as a permanent source of leverage over Chisinau. Meanwhile, NATO has no bases in Moldova, and the country's constitution enshrines its neutral status. The alleged "occupation forces" appear to be nothing more than standard NATO rotational deployments in member state Romania and routine military cooperation activities. ## The Hybrid War Intensifies Russia's information operations represent just one vector in a comprehensive [hybrid campaign against Moldova](https://www.diplopolis.com/temporary-post-used-for-theme-detection-ae8a840b-9ebb-4856-b971-9b5b7b3c720f-3bfe001a-32de-4114-a6b4-4005b770f6d7%5F%5Ftrashed/). On September 22, Moldovan authorities arrested 74 people following mass raids across the country, alleging a Russia-backed plot to organize "mass riots" to destabilize the nation around the elections. Prosecutors say most suspects had received training in Serbia and were aged between 19 and 45. Documents obtained by Bloomberg reveal a multi-pronged Kremlin strategy finalized this spring, including recruitment of Moldovan voters abroad, organization of protests, sophisticated [disinformation campaigns](https://www.diplopolis.com/temporary-post-used-for-theme-detection-ae8a840b-9ebb-4856-b971-9b5b7b3c720f-3bfe001a-32de-4114-a6b4-4005b770f6d7%5F%5Ftrashed/), and widespread [vote-buying operations](https://www.diplopolis.com/temporary-post-used-for-theme-detection-ae8a840b-9ebb-4856-b971-9b5b7b3c720f-3bfe001a-32de-4114-a6b4-4005b770f6d7%5F%5Ftrashed/). In the 2024 presidential election and EU referendum, Russian-backed networks allegedly attempted to purchase approximately 150,000 votes—a staggering figure in a country of just 2.6 million people. The hybrid toolkit extends further: [cyberattacks targeting electoral systems](https://www.diplopolis.com/temporary-post-used-for-theme-detection-ae8a840b-9ebb-4856-b971-9b5b7b3c720f-3bfe001a-32de-4114-a6b4-4005b770f6d7%5F%5Ftrashed/), fake bomb threats, illegal party funding channeled through criminal networks, and systematic propaganda campaigns. One operation dubbed "Matryoshka" has promoted fabricated claims that President Maia Sandu embezzled $24 million and is addicted to psychotropic drugs—allegations with zero factual basis but designed to erode public trust. ## The Strategic Stakes Moldova's significance extends far beyond its borders. Sharing a 1,222-kilometer frontier with Ukraine, the country represents a potential second front in Russia's war against Kyiv. A [pro-Russian government in Moldova](https://www.diplopolis.com/temporary-post-used-for-theme-detection-ae8a840b-9ebb-4856-b971-9b5b7b3c720f-3bfe001a-32de-4114-a6b4-4005b770f6d7%5F%5Ftrashed/) could facilitate Russian operations against Ukraine's southwestern flank, disrupt Ukrainian supply lines, and create new pressure points against Western support. For the European Union, Moldova's fate is intertwined with the credibility of its [enlargement policy](https://www.diplopolis.com/temporary-post-used-for-theme-detection-ae8a840b-9ebb-4856-b971-9b5b7b3c720f-3bfe001a-32de-4114-a6b4-4005b770f6d7%5F%5Ftrashed/) and its ability to protect democratic processes in its neighborhood. The country received [EU candidate status in 2022](https://www.diplopolis.com/temporary-post-used-for-theme-detection-ae8a840b-9ebb-4856-b971-9b5b7b3c720f-3bfe001a-32de-4114-a6b4-4005b770f6d7%5F%5Ftrashed/) and began accession talks in 2024, moving with remarkable speed given historical precedent. A reversal of this trajectory would represent a significant geopolitical defeat for Brussels. Recent high-level European engagement underscores these stakes. On Moldova's National Day in August 2025, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk visited Chisinau to reaffirm support for Moldova's sovereignty and European path. Such personal diplomacy by major European leaders for a country of Moldova's size is virtually unprecedented. ## Electoral Landscape Current polling suggests a fragmented outcome. President Sandu's Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) leads with approximately 25 percent support—enough for a plurality but insufficient for an outright majority. The main opposition comes from the Patriotic Electoral Bloc, an overtly pro-Russian coalition uniting former presidents Igor Dodon and Vladimir Voronin with regional figures like former Gagauzia Governor Irina Vlah. More concerning for Moldova's European trajectory is the emergence of supposedly "neutral" blocs that emphasize Moldovan sovereignty while maintaining ambiguous international connections. The Alternativa Bloc, led by Chisinau mayor Ion Ceban and 2024 presidential runner-up Alexandru Stoianoglo, positions itself as "neither Russia nor the West"—a stance that typically favors Moscow by creating space for continued Russian influence while appearing to reject both poles. The mathematics of [coalition-building in fragmented parliaments](https://www.diplopolis.com/temporary-post-used-for-theme-detection-ae8a840b-9ebb-4856-b971-9b5b7b3c720f-3bfe001a-32de-4114-a6b4-4005b770f6d7%5F%5Ftrashed/) will prove crucial. If PAS must form a government with parties that advocate closer Russian ties or a more "balanced" foreign policy, Moldova's EU accession could stall indefinitely. Coalition governments with fundamentally opposed foreign policy visions rarely survive, potentially leading to parliamentary dissolution and snap elections—creating exactly the kind of instability Moscow seeks. ## Testing Ground for Future Operations Western intelligence agencies view Moldova as a [laboratory for Russian hybrid warfare tactics](https://www.diplopolis.com/temporary-post-used-for-theme-detection-ae8a840b-9ebb-4856-b971-9b5b7b3c720f-3bfe001a-32de-4114-a6b4-4005b770f6d7%5F%5Ftrashed/) that may be deployed elsewhere. The techniques refined here—from sophisticated vote-buying schemes to coordinated disinformation networks—could be exported to other vulnerable democracies. Sweden, which holds elections in 2026, has explicitly stated that studying Russian operations in Moldova helps prepare Swedish agencies to protect their own democratic processes. The European Union and member states have responded with unprecedented support, including [cyber defense assistance for elections](https://www.diplopolis.com/temporary-post-used-for-theme-detection-ae8a840b-9ebb-4856-b971-9b5b7b3c720f-3bfe001a-32de-4114-a6b4-4005b770f6d7%5F%5Ftrashed/), election monitoring, strategic communications training, and funding for independent media. The United States, while maintaining that it has "no dog in this fight," has provided substantial technical assistance recognizing that the implications extend far beyond Moldova's borders. ## Week Ahead As Moldovans prepare to vote on September 28, the country faces a choice that transcends typical left-right political divisions. This is fundamentally a referendum on geopolitical orientation: continued integration with Europe or renewed subordination to Moscow's regional ambitions. Russia's "occupation" narrative serves multiple purposes. It primes the domestic Russian audience for potential future intervention while providing a pretext should Moscow decide to escalate. It muddies the information environment, creating false equivalence between [NATO's transparent defensive posture](https://www.diplopolis.com/temporary-post-used-for-theme-detection-ae8a840b-9ebb-4856-b971-9b5b7b3c720f-3bfe001a-32de-4114-a6b4-4005b770f6d7%5F%5Ftrashed/) and Russia's actual occupation of Transnistria. And it tests Western resolve—will Brussels and Washington stand firmly behind [small states navigating great power competition](https://www.diplopolis.com/temporary-post-used-for-theme-detection-ae8a840b-9ebb-4856-b971-9b5b7b3c720f-3bfe001a-32de-4114-a6b4-4005b770f6d7%5F%5Ftrashed/) when the pressure intensifies? The answer to that question will resonate far beyond Moldova's borders, shaping the trajectory of European security for years to come. In an era of renewed [great power competition](https://www.diplopolis.com/temporary-post-used-for-theme-detection-ae8a840b-9ebb-4856-b971-9b5b7b3c720f-3bfe001a-32de-4114-a6b4-4005b770f6d7%5F%5Ftrashed/), small nations like Moldova have become critical battlegrounds where the future of the international order is being contested—not through conventional warfare, but through the sophisticated instruments of hybrid conflict that Russia has spent decades perfecting. For Moldova, the challenge is existential: maintaining democratic sovereignty against a determined adversary willing to deploy vast resources to undermine it. For Europe and its allies, Moldova represents both a test case and a warning—a demonstration of what modern [authoritarian influence operations](https://www.diplopolis.com/temporary-post-used-for-theme-detection-ae8a840b-9ebb-4856-b971-9b5b7b3c720f-3bfe001a-32de-4114-a6b4-4005b770f6d7%5F%5Ftrashed/) can achieve and what will be required to defend democratic systems in the 21st century. --- *The outcome of Moldova's September 28 parliamentary elections will serve as a crucial indicator of whether small democracies on Russia's periphery can successfully chart their own course, or whether Moscow's hybrid warfare toolkit remains effective enough to pull them back into the Kremlin's orbit.* --- ### Myth of Perpetual Dominance: What 500 Years Teaches About Multipolarity URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/myth-of-perpetual-dominance-what-500-years-teaches-about-multipolarity/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:26:12.000Z In an era of heated debate about American decline and Chinese ascendance, Paul Kennedy's [***The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers***](https://amzn.to/46Q2Foz?ref=diplopolis.com) offers a crucial historical corrective: every dominant power believes its supremacy is permanent, and every one has been wrong. From Habsburg Spain to Victorian Britain, hegemonic moments have proven fleeting, giving way to multipolar competition as the international system's natural state. As we witness the return of great power rivalry, Kennedy's five-century analysis suggests we're not experiencing a crisis of world order but rather its predictable evolution—and understanding this pattern is essential for navigating our multipolar future. [![Rise Fall Great Powers by Paul Kennedy](https://storage.ghost.io/c/ff/cd/ffcdfb1e-ce78-4cd4-8077-cceb0889dfd5/content/images/2026/05/rise-fall-great-powers-by-paul-kennedy.jpg)](https://amzn.to/46Q2Foz?ref=diplopolis.com) Rise Fall Great Powers by Paul Kennedy ## The Illusion of Permanence Every hegemon, Kennedy demonstrates, suffers from the same perceptual trap. At the zenith of their power, dominant states and their citizens invariably believe their supremacy reflects some inherent superiority—cultural, institutional, or even divinely ordained—rather than a temporary confluence of favorable circumstances. This assumption of permanence proves consistently wrong. Consider Habsburg Spain in the late 16th century. With silver flowing from the Americas, territories spanning from the Netherlands to Naples, and the most formidable military machine in Europe, Spanish dominance appeared unassailable. Yet within a century, Spain had descended to secondary status, outmaneuvered by the Dutch Republic and France, its economy hollowed out and its treasury perpetually empty. The pattern repeats with remarkable consistency. Louis XIV's France, despite its cultural brilliance and military innovations, exhausted itself in successive wars and ceded primacy to Britain. The British Empire, upon which the sun famously never set, found itself financially dependent on American loans by 1916\. Even apparent exceptions prove the rule: the United States enjoyed genuine hegemonic status for perhaps two decades after 1991, a historical eyeblink. ## The Mechanisms of Decline Kennedy identifies a central mechanism driving this cyclical pattern: the contradiction between military overextension and economic vitality. Great powers acquire their status through economic dynamism—productive capacity, financial innovation, technological advancement. But maintaining dominance requires ever-expanding military commitments, which gradually drain the very economic resources that made dominance possible. The mathematics are unforgiving. A hegemon must maintain military superiority across multiple theaters while competitors can focus resources regionally. Spain faced this reality when fighting Dutch rebels, Ottoman expansion, English privateers, and French ambitions simultaneously. Britain confronted it when trying to defend interests from India to Africa to the Western Hemisphere while rivals emerged in Germany, America, and Japan. This isn't simply about defense budgets as a percentage of GDP, though that matters. It's about the opportunity cost of capital. Resources devoted to military establishments are resources not invested in productive infrastructure, education, or technological innovation—precisely the investments that rising powers make to challenge the existing order. ## The Rise of Competitors Kennedy's analysis reveals that hegemonic decline is inseparable from the rise of new powers, creating an inherently multipolar dynamic. Dominant powers inadvertently foster their own competition through several mechanisms. First, hegemons create the conditions for others' growth. British naval supremacy secured global trade routes that German and American manufacturers exploited. American security guarantees allowed Japan and Western Europe to prioritize economic development over defense spending. The hegemon bears the systemic costs while others reap benefits. Second, the technologies and institutions that enable dominance inevitably diffuse. Spain's tercios were copied and countered. Britain's industrial techniques spread to Belgium, Germany, and America. American financial and technological innovations now power Chinese development. What begins as monopolistic advantage becomes common knowledge. Third, the very success of a hegemon creates niches for competitors. As Britain focused on India and naval supremacy, Germany could concentrate on land power and industrial chemistry. As America maintained global military presence, China could specialize in manufacturing and infrastructure development. ## Historical Multipolarity as the Norm Perhaps Kennedy's most important insight is that multipolarity, not unipolarity, represents the historical norm. The European state system from 1500 to 1945 was fundamentally multipolar, with five or six great powers in constant competition. Even apparent moments of hegemony—Spain under Philip II, France under Louis XIV, Britain in the Victorian era—were merely periods when one power held a temporary edge in an essentially multipolar system. This multipolarity, Kennedy suggests, actually contributed to European dynamism. Competition drove innovation as states sought military and economic advantages. The inability of any single power to achieve lasting dominance prevented stagnation. When China enjoyed regional hegemony or the Ottoman Empire dominated the eastern Mediterranean, innovation slowed. European fragmentation proved paradoxically productive. The Cold War's bipolarity was aberrant, a unique configuration emerging from World War II's destruction of alternative power centers. The post-1991 "unipolar moment" was even more anomalous—a brief interlude between the Soviet collapse and the inevitable rise of new competitors. ## Implications for Contemporary Order If Kennedy's analysis holds, what does it mean for our expectations about future international order? Several implications emerge. **First, current American concerns about decline should be contextualized historically.** The United States isn't experiencing some unprecedented failure but rather the normal pattern whereby economic diffusion erodes hegemonic advantages. China, India, and other emerging powers are doing what rising states always do—leveraging new technologies and institutions to challenge the existing order. This process is neither aberrant nor necessarily catastrophic. **Second, we should abandon fantasies of restored unipolarity.** Whether framed as "making America great again" or maintaining "indispensable" status, efforts to recreate the 1990s are historically naive. The conditions that briefly permitted American unipolarity—Soviet collapse, European weakness, Chinese underdevelopment, unchallenged technological supremacy—cannot be recreated through policy choices. They were contingent historical circumstances, now passed. **Third, multipolarity need not mean chaos.** Kennedy's analysis shows that multipolar systems can be remarkably stable when great powers recognize mutual interests and accept spheres of influence. The Concert of Europe, despite its flaws, maintained general peace for decades. The key is acknowledging that no single power can dominate and that accommodation beats confrontation. **Fourth, economic vitality matters more than military spending.** Kennedy's cautionary tale about imperial overstretch remains relevant. Powers that prioritize military expansion over economic renewal ultimately weaken themselves. The challenge for any great power is maintaining the productive capacity that underwrites influence while avoiding the military commitments that drain it. ## The Multipolar Future As we navigate the emerging multipolar order, Kennedy's historical perspective offers valuable guidance. The competition between the United States and China, the resurgence of regional powers like India and Indonesia, the evolution of European strategic autonomy—these developments aren't anomalies requiring correction but rather the international system returning to its natural state. This doesn't mean the transition will be smooth. Historically, shifts from one configuration to another often involve conflict, as rising and declining powers miscalculate each other's resolve and capabilities. The most dangerous moments come when a declining hegemon refuses to accept new realities or when rising powers overestimate their strength. But Kennedy's five-century survey also suggests grounds for optimism. Great power competition has coexisted with technological progress, economic development, and even, eventually, expanding cooperation. The task for contemporary statesmen isn't preventing multipolarity—that's inevitable—but managing it wisely. The myth of perpetual dominance dies hard. Every hegemon believes itself exceptional, immune to the historical forces that toppled its predecessors. Yet the pattern holds with remarkable consistency: economic diffusion, strategic overextension, and the rise of competitors eventually erode any concentration of power. Understanding this isn't defeatism but realism. It's recognizing that the international system has always been dynamic, that today's dominant power becomes tomorrow's declining force, and that multipolarity represents not a problem to solve but a condition to manage. Five hundred years of history suggest we should adjust our expectations accordingly. The question isn't whether the current order will evolve into something more multipolar—Kennedy's analysis suggests that's certain—but whether we can navigate that transition without the catastrophic conflicts that too often accompanied similar shifts in the past. ### 15 Timeless Books That Define International Relations and Geopolitics URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/15-timeless-books-that-define-international-relations-and-geopolitics/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:25:53.000Z In an era of rapid geopolitical shifts—from the Russia-Ukraine conflict to U.S.-China strategic competition, from climate diplomacy to cyber warfare—understanding the foundational principles of international relations has never been more critical. While headlines change daily, the underlying dynamics of power, security, and statecraft remain remarkably consistent with patterns established decades or even centuries ago. For diplomats, policy analysts, students, and anyone seeking to comprehend our complex world, certain books have stood the test of time as essential guides to international affairs. These works don't just offer historical perspective; they provide analytical frameworks that remain startlingly relevant to today's challenges. ## Why These Classics Matter in Today's World Before diving into social media analysis of the latest crisis, seasoned diplomats and strategists often return to foundational texts. Henry Kissinger's insights on balance-of-power diplomacy inform current approaches to managing great power competition. Kenneth Waltz's structural realism helps explain why rising powers like China inevitably challenge established orders. Thomas Schelling's game theory remains central to nuclear deterrence strategy amid renewed concerns about atomic weapons. These books offer something Twitter threads and policy briefs cannot: depth, nuance, and time-tested analytical frameworks that transcend momentary crises. ## Foundational Theory: Understanding Power and Anarchy ### 1\. [“The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939” by E.H. Carr (1939)](https://amzn.to/46zdjyy?ref=diplopolis.com) [![](https://www.diplopolis.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-Twenty-Years-Crisis-1919%E2%80%931939.png)](https://amzn.to/46zdjyy?ref=diplopolis.com) First published in September 1939, making its debut on the eve of the Second World War, this seminal work of international relations, ***"***[***The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations***](https://amzn.to/46zdjyy?ref=diplopolis.com)***,"*** was written by British historian and diplomat Edward Hallett Carr. The book offers a critical examination of the idealist approach to international affairs that prevailed after the First World War, was released just as the period it analyzed was culminating in another global conflict. Its publication in September 1939 coincided with the invasion of Poland by Germany, a pivotal event that marked the beginning of the war. As Europe stumbled towards the second World War, Carr's critique of liberal idealism remains devastatingly relevant. His argument that international politics cannot be separated from power considerations directly applies to contemporary debates about humanitarian intervention and the limits of international law. Carr's background as both a diplomat and historian provides unique insight into the gap between idealistic aspirations and harsh realities. **Today's Application**: Essential for understanding why international institutions often fail during crises, from Syria to Myanmar. ### 2\. [“Politics Among Nations” by Hans Morgenthau (1948)](https://amzn.to/4nrCRoH?ref=diplopolis.com) [![](https://www.diplopolis.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Politics-Among-Nations-by-Hans-Morgenthau.png)](https://amzn.to/4nrCRoH?ref=diplopolis.com) Morgenthau's six principles of political realism established the foundation for modern IR theory when it was first published in 1948\. His emphasis on national interest defined in terms of power helps explain everything from America's pivot to Asia to Russia's actions in its perceived sphere of influence. As a German refugee who fled Nazi persecution, Morgenthau understood firsthand how power politics could override moral considerations. This influential book, “[***Politics Among Nations***](https://amzn.to/4nrCRoH?ref=diplopolis.com)“ by Hans Morgenthau which became a cornerstone of the realist school of thought in international relations, was written in the immediate aftermath of World War II. It presented a new framework for understanding global politics, emphasizing the pursuit of power as a primary driver of state behavior. "Politics Among Nations" quickly became a standard textbook in universities across the United States and beyond, shaping the study of international relations for generations of students and scholars. **Today's Application**: Provides framework for analyzing why moral arguments alone rarely change state behavior in international conflicts. ### 3\. [“Man, the State, and War” by Kenneth Waltz (1959)](https://amzn.to/4pzx3e7?ref=diplopolis.com) [![](https://www.diplopolis.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Man-the-State-and-War_-by-Kenneth-Waltz.png)](https://amzn.to/4pzx3e7?ref=diplopolis.com) Waltz's three "images" of analysis—individual leaders, domestic politics, and international anarchy—remain the standard framework for understanding conflict causation. This seminal work first published in 1959 introduced the influential concept of the "three images" to explain the causes of war. In ***“***[***Man, the State, and War***](https://amzn.to/4pzx3e7?ref=diplopolis.com)***”*** by Kenneth Waltz provides a framework to analyze the causes of war at three distinct levels: First Image: Man. This level attributes the causes of war to the nature of individuals. It examines aspects of human behavior, psychology, and inherent characteristics as the root of conflict. Second Image: the State. This perspective focuses on the internal characteristics of states. It argues that wars are caused by the domestic makeup of nations, such as their political systems, economic structures, and ideologies. Third Image: the State System. This level posits that the primary cause of war is the anarchic nature of the international system itself. In the absence of a central authority to enforce rules, the competition for power and security among states inevitably leads to conflict. Waltz's "Man, the State, and War" is a foundational text in the field of international relations, particularly for the school of thought known as neorealism or structural realism, which emphasizes the importance of the third image in understanding global politics. **Today's Application**: Indispensable for distinguishing between personality-driven foreign policy and structural inevitabilities in great power competition. Whether analyzing Putin's decision-making, China's domestic pressures, or systemic competition in the Indo-Pacific, Waltz's levels of analysis provide essential analytical clarity. ## Geopolitical Strategy: Geography as Destiny ### 4\. ["The Influence of Sea Power Upon History (1660-1783)" by Alfred Thahan Mahan (1890)](https://amzn.to/46RdFC0?ref=diplopolis.com) [![](https://www.diplopolis.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-Influence-of-Sea-Power-Upon-History-1660-1783.png)](https://amzn.to/46RdFC0?ref=diplopolis.com) Alfred Thayer Mahan's groundbreaking work of military strategy, "[***The Influence of Sea Power Upon History (1660-1783)***](https://amzn.to/46RdFC0?ref=diplopolis.com)," was first published in 1890\. In this highly influential book, Mahan argued that naval supremacy was the single most critical factor determining the rise and fall of great powers. Drawing on his analysis of the maritime struggles between European nations from 1660 to 1783, he contended that control of the seas allowed a nation to protect its own trade while disrupting the commerce of its enemies, thereby securing economic prosperity and military advantage. The book served as a powerful call for the United States to build a modern, powerful navy to protect its commercial interests and project global influence, significantly shaping the views of policymakers like Theodore Roosevelt and contributing to the naval arms race that preceded World War I. **Today's Application**: Critical for understanding why China's Belt and Road Initiative focuses heavily on ports and maritime infrastructure. Mahan's emphasis on naval power and sea-lane control directly informs current tensions in the South China Sea and the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz. His work influenced leaders from Theodore Roosevelt to modern Chinese strategists planning their maritime expansion. ### 5\. ["The Geographical Pivot of History" by Halford Mackinder (1904)](https://amzn.to/4nsAou0?ref=diplopolis.com) [![](https://www.diplopolis.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-Geographical-Pivot-of-History-by-Halford-Mackinder.png)](https://amzn.to/4nsAou0?ref=diplopolis.com) *"*[***The Geographical Pivot of History***](https://amzn.to/4nsAou0?ref=diplopolis.com)*"* was an article by the British geographer Halford Mackinder, first presented to the Royal Geographical Society in 1904. This influential paper introduced Mackinder's Heartland Theory, a foundational concept in the field of geopolitics. He argued that the world's political destiny was determined by the control of a vast and resource-rich area in the center of Eurasia, which he termed the "Pivot Area" or "Heartland." This region, roughly corresponding to modern-day Russia and Central Asia, was seen as a natural fortress, inaccessible to the dominant sea powers of the era, such as Great Britain. Mackinder believed that technological advancements like the railway were overcoming the Heartland's historical isolation, enabling a continental power to consolidate its resources and challenge maritime dominance. His theory is famously encapsulated in the dictum he would later develop: "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; Who rules the World-Island commands the World." This perspective profoundly influenced strategic thinking for decades, shaping Western anxieties about German and later Soviet expansion during the World Wars and the Cold War. Mackinder's "Heartland Theory"—that control of Eastern Europe and Central Asia provides the key to world domination—explains persistent great power competition in these regions. From NATO expansion debates to competition over Central Asian energy resources, Mackinder's geographic determinism remains influential. **Today's Application**: Essential reading for understanding why Ukraine and Central Asia remain flashpoints in U.S.-Russia competition. ### 6\. ["The Grand Chessboard" by Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997)](https://amzn.to/4nJAOMw?ref=diplopolis.com) [![](https://www.diplopolis.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-Grand-Chessboard-by-Zbigniew-Brzezinski.png)](https://amzn.to/4nJAOMw?ref=diplopolis.com) *”*[***The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives***](https://amzn.to/4nJAOMw?ref=diplopolis.com)*"* by Zbigniew Brzezinski was first published in 1997. Written in the immediate post-Cold War era, this influential work of foreign policy analysis casts the Eurasian landmass as a giant chessboard upon which the struggle for global primacy is played. Brzezinski, who served as National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, argues that the United States, as the world's sole superpower, must actively manage the geopolitical dynamics of Eurasia to prevent the rise of a peer competitor that could challenge its global dominance. He posits that America's primary interest is to ensure that no single power, or coalition of powers, gains control over this critical region, which contains the majority of the world's population, resources, and economic activity. Brzezinski identifies key "geopolitical pivots"—states whose actions can significantly alter the strategic balance—and outlines a geostrategy for the U.S. to maintain its preeminent position by shaping alliances and preventing the consolidation of a rival Eurasian hegemon. Former National Security Advisor Brzezinski's analysis of American strategy in Eurasia reads like a blueprint for current U.S. foreign policy challenges. His warnings about preventing any single power from dominating Eurasia directly inform contemporary concerns about Chinese expansion and Russian revisionism. **Today's Application**: Provides strategic context for understanding American alliance systems in Europe and Asia. ## Cold War Lessons: Strategy and Crisis Management ### 7\. ["The Strategy of Conflict" by Thomas Schelling (1960)](https://amzn.to/4pC4Tza?ref=diplopolis.com) [![](https://www.diplopolis.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-Strategy-of-Conflict-by-Thomas-Schelling.png)](https://amzn.to/4pC4Tza?ref=diplopolis.com) This landmark book is celebrated for applying the principles of game theory to the study of international relations and human conflict. Schelling's revolutionary approach was to view conflict not simply as a zero-sum contest of brute force, but as a process of bargaining where opponents have a mixture of conflicting and common interests. He introduced and explored several influential concepts, including the idea of a focal point (or Schelling point), which explains how parties can coordinate their actions without direct communication by gravitating toward a solution that seems natural or obvious. Furthermore, he delved into the critical importance of making threats and promises credible, analyzing how a nation could strengthen its position by visibly limiting its own options or engaging in "brinkmanship." ***“***[***The Strategy of Conflict***](https://amzn.to/4pC4Tza?ref=diplopolis.com)***”*** by Thomas Schelling offers insights into deterrence, credible commitments, and tacit communication profoundly shaped Cold War strategic thinking, particularly in the realm of nuclear policy, and it remains a foundational text in the fields of political science, economics, and conflict resolution. Schelling's insights on bargaining, deterrence, and "the threat that leaves something to chance" remain central to modern strategic thinking. His Nobel Prize-winning work on game theory applies directly to current nuclear tensions with North Korea, Iran's nuclear program, and escalation management in Ukraine. **Today's Application**: Essential for understanding why nuclear powers engage in brinksmanship and how deterrence actually works in practice. ### 8\. ["Essence of Decision" by Graham Allison (1971)](https://amzn.to/46xMKK7?ref=diplopolis.com) [![](https://www.diplopolis.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Essence-of-Decision-Explaining-the-Cubana-Missile.png)](https://amzn.to/46xMKK7?ref=diplopolis.com) First published in 1971, this seminal work on foreign policy analyses and decision-making fundamentally challenged the traditional view of governments as monolithic, rational actors. Using the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis as a detailed case study, Allison introduces three distinct conceptual models in “[***Essence of Decision***](https://amzn.to/46xMKK7?ref=diplopolis.com)” to explain how nations make critical choices. He presents the conventional Rational Actor Model (Model I), where decisions are seen as calculated choices to maximize national interest, but argues for its insufficiency. He then offers two alternative lenses: the Organizational Process Model (Model II), which views decisions as the outputs of large bureaucracies following their pre-established routines and standard operating procedures, and the Governmental Politics Model (Model III), which understands decisions as the outcome of bargaining, negotiation, and compromise among various leaders and political players within the government. By demonstrating how each model provides different insights into the same historical event, Allison's book revolutionized the field, compelling analysts to look inside the "black box" of the state to understand the complex bureaucratic and political dynamics that shape foreign policy. Allison's three models for analyzing the Cuban Missile Crisis—rational actor, organizational process, and governmental politics—revolutionized how scholars and practitioners understand foreign policy decision-making. His frameworks apply to any major international crisis, from COVID-19 responses to climate negotiations. **Today's Application**: Provides tools for analyzing why states often make seemingly irrational decisions during crises. ## International Political Economy: Beyond Pure Power Politics ### 9\. ["The Theory of International Politics" by Kenneth Waltz (1979)](https://amzn.to/3KzzfCo?ref=diplopolis.com) [![](https://www.diplopolis.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-Theory-of-International-Politics-by-Kenneth-Waltz.png)](https://amzn.to/3KzzfCo?ref=diplopolis.com) This book first published in 1979 is the foundational text of neorealism, also known as structural realism, and represents one of the most significant developments in international relations theory in the 20th century. Departing from the classical realist focus on human nature, in *“*[***The Theory of International Politics***](https://amzn.to/3KzzfCo?ref=diplopolis.com)*”*, Waltz argues that the primary driver of state behavior is not the internal characteristics of states or their leaders, but the anarchic structure of the international system itself. He posits that in a system with no overarching authority, the fundamental motive for every state is survival. This constant imperative for security, combined with the distribution of power (or capabilities) across the system, compels states to behave in similar, predictable ways, regardless of their form of government or ideology. Waltz's structural realism explains how the international system's anarchic nature shapes state behavior regardless of domestic politics or individual leaders' preferences. His theory helps explain why even democratic peace theorists acknowledge that structural pressures can override ideological preferences. Waltz famously concluded that bipolar systems, such as the one that characterized the Cold War, are more stable and less prone to major war than multipolar systems. The book's rigorous, systemic approach redefined the study of international politics and established neorealism as a dominant paradigm in the field for decades. **Today's Application**: Critical for understanding why the U.S.-China relationship has become competitive despite decades of economic integration. ### 10\. ["Power and Interdependence" by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977)](https://amzn.to/4pskUaW?ref=diplopolis.com) [![](https://www.diplopolis.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Power-and-Interdependence-by-Robert-Keohane-and-Joseph-Nye.png)](https://amzn.to/4pskUaW?ref=diplopolis.com) This landmark work first published in 1977 challenged pure realism by demonstrating how economic interdependence and international institutions can modify power politics. Their concept of "complex interdependence" helps explain both the resilience and fragility of the current global order. This foundational text of neoliberal and liberal institutionalist theory in international relations presents a significant challenge to the traditional realist perspective. In *“*[***Power and Interdependence***](https://amzn.to/4pskUaW?ref=diplopolis.com)*”*, Keohane and Nye argue that in the modern era, particularly among advanced industrial democracies, the dynamics of world politics are better described by a condition of complex interdependence. They outline three main characteristics of this condition: the existence of multiple channels connecting societies beyond formal state-to-state relations, an absence of a clear hierarchy of issues where military security does not always dominate the agenda, and the consequently minor role of military force as a tool of policy. In such a world, power is not merely a function of military capability but is also defined by a state's vulnerability and sensitivity to the actions of others across various domains, such as trade and finance. By emphasizing the roles of international institutions, transnational actors, and economic cooperation, "Power and Interdependence" provided a powerful framework for understanding how cooperation could emerge and be sustained even in an anarchic international system. **Today's Application**: Essential for understanding how economic sanctions work (or don't) and why complete decoupling remains difficult even amid strategic competition. ## Historical Analysis: Learning from the Past ### 11\. ["The Sleepwalkers" by Christopher Clark (2012)](https://amzn.to/427lXDd?ref=diplopolis.com) [![](https://www.diplopolis.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-Sleepwalkers-by-Christopher-Clark.png)](https://amzn.to/427lXDd?ref=diplopolis.com) Christopher Clark's masterful historical analysis *“*[***The Sleepwalkers***](https://amzn.to/427lXDd?ref=diplopolis.com)*”* first published in 2012 offers a groundbreaking perspective on the outbreak of the First World War, shifting the focus from assigning blame to understanding the complex sequence of events and decisions that led to the catastrophe. The book argues that the war was not the premeditated act of any single nation, such as Germany, but rather a tragedy of collective failure. Clark meticulously details a chaotic international environment where the leaders of Europe—the "sleepwalkers"—were acutely aware of the risks they were taking but failed to grasp the catastrophic consequences of their actions. He portrays a multi-polar world of competing empires, fraught with ethnic nationalism (particularly in the Balkans), rigid alliance systems, and a breakdown in communication. By focusing on *how* the war happened, rather than assigning a singular *why*, Clark illustrates that the key decision-makers in various capitals—Vienna, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Paris, and London—all contributed to the escalating crisis through a series of misjudgments, gambles, and a shared political culture that ultimately made war a conceivable, if not an inevitable, outcome. Clark's masterful analysis of World War I's origins demonstrates how miscalculation, alliance entanglements, and crisis escalation can lead to catastrophic conflicts that no one actually wanted. His work serves as a cautionary tale about the dangers of rigid alliance systems and automatic escalation. **Today's Application**: Provides sobering lessons about how regional conflicts can spiral into global confrontations, particularly relevant to Taiwan and Eastern Europe scenarios. ### 12\. ["Diplomacy" by Henry Kissinger (1994)](https://amzn.to/4gxmu7i?ref=diplopolis.com) [![](https://www.diplopolis.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Diplomacy-by-Henry-Kissinger.png)](https://amzn.to/4gxmu7i?ref=diplopolis.com) Henry Kissinger's sweeping historical narrative provides a comprehensive analysis of the art and practice of international relations over the past four centuries, viewed through the lens of his own distinct realist perspective. Drawing on his extensive experience as a diplomat and statesman, in *“*[***Diplomacy***](https://amzn.to/4gxmu7i?ref=diplopolis.com)*”*, first published in 1994, Kissinger examines the evolution of the international system from the era of Cardinal Richelieu and the birth of *raison d'état* (the national interest) to the post-Cold War world. A central theme of the book is the contrast between the European "balance of power" tradition, which accepted the legitimacy of competing states and sought stability through equilibrium, and the American diplomatic tradition, which has historically been more idealistic, oscillating between isolationism and a crusading impulse to spread its values globally. Kissinger traces the successes and failures of key leaders and pivotal moments—from the Congress of Vienna to the brinkmanship of the Cold War—to argue that a stable world order depends on a clear-eyed pursuit of national interests combined with a pragmatic understanding of the geopolitical realities and the importance of maintaining a global balance of power. Kissinger combines theoretical insight with practical experience as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor. His analysis of diplomatic history from Richelieu to the post-Cold War era provides unmatched perspective on statecraft, balance of power, and the art of negotiation. **Today's Application**: Offers historical context for understanding why diplomatic solutions require patient cultivation of relationships and careful attention to other nations' core interests. ## Contemporary Challenges: Culture, Democracy, and China ### 13\. ["The Clash of Civilizations" by Samuel Huntington (1996)](https://amzn.to/46gMKPY?ref=diplopolis.com) [![](https://www.diplopolis.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-Clash-of-Civilizations-by-Samuel-Huntington.png)](https://amzn.to/46gMKPY?ref=diplopolis.com) The *“*[***Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order***](https://amzn.to/46gMKPY?ref=diplopolis.com)*”* by Samuel P. Huntington was published as a book in 1996, expanding on his highly influential 1993 article in *Foreign Affairs*. Huntington's provocative thesis argues that the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world will not be ideological or economic, but cultural. He posits that while the era of conflict between nation-states or ideologies like communism and capitalism is ending, a new phase will be dominated by clashes between large-scale cultural entities he calls "civilizations." These civilizations—such as Western, Islamic, Sinic (Chinese), and Orthodox—are defined by shared language, history, religion, and traditions. Huntington contended that these deep-seated cultural differences are more fundamental and less easily compromised than political or economic ones. He predicted that the most dangerous global conflicts would occur along the cultural "fault lines" where these civilizations meet, as a powerful West confronts the rise of non-Western civilizations that are increasingly asserting their own values and interests. Despite significant criticism, Huntington's thesis about post-Cold War conflicts being driven by cultural and civilizational differences has proven remarkably prescient in analyzing everything from Middle Eastern conflicts to tensions between the West and authoritarian capitalism. **Today's Application**: Provides framework for understanding ideological dimensions of current great power competition and the limits of universal values. ### 14\. ["The End of History and the Last Man" by Francis Fukuyama (1992)](https://amzn.to/46gd1xS?ref=diplopolis.com) [![](https://www.diplopolis.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-End-of-History-and-the-Last-Man-by-Francis-Fukuyama.png)](https://amzn.to/46gd1xS?ref=diplopolis.com) *"*[***The End of History and the Last Man***](https://amzn.to/46gd1xS?ref=diplopolis.com)*"* by Francis Fukuyama was published as a book in **1992**, expanding on his celebrated 1989 essay, "The End of History?". Fukuyama's landmark thesis argues that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War signaled the definitive triumph of Western liberal democracy as the final and universal form of human government. He famously declared not the end of events, but the "end of history" as a grand ideological struggle, positing that the great questions about how to best organize society had been answered. In this new era, he foresaw no viable long-term competitors to the combination of a market-based economy and a democratic political system. The book also explores the potential downside of this triumph through the concept of the "Last Man," a figure from Nietzsche's philosophy who, living in a world of peace and prosperity, is preoccupied with personal comfort and security, lacking the drive for struggle and recognition that defined historical progress. Fukuyama thus presents a fundamentally triumphant but subtly ambivalent vision of the future, questioning whether this ultimate stage of history would be truly satisfying for the human spirit. While often misunderstood as triumphalist, Fukuyama's work actually grapples with the challenges facing liberal democracy after the Cold War. His concerns about the "last man" and the potential boredom of democratic peace seem remarkably relevant to contemporary democratic backsliding. **Today's Application**: Essential for understanding internal challenges to democratic systems and the appeal of authoritarian alternatives. ### 15\. ["On China" by Henry Kissinger (2011)](https://amzn.to/47Xu894?ref=diplopolis.com) [![](https://www.diplopolis.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/On-China-by-Henry-Kissinger.png)](https://amzn.to/47Xu894?ref=diplopolis.com) Drawing upon his unique position as a central architect of the U.S.-China rapprochement in the 1970s, Henry Kissinger presents a sweeping historical and strategic analysis of Chinese statecraft. The book, *“*[***On China***](https://amzn.to/47Xu894?ref=diplopolis.com)*”* first published in 2011 masterfully weaves together a deep history of China's diplomatic traditions with Kissinger's own firsthand accounts of negotiating with its most powerful leaders, including Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. He argues that to understand China's foreign policy today, one must appreciate its long-standing cultural and strategic mindset, which has been shaped for millennia by a distinct worldview. Kissinger contrasts the Chinese strategic game of *weiqi* (Go), which emphasizes encirclement and the patient accumulation of relative advantage, with the Western game of chess, which seeks decisive, head-on confrontation. He traces China's journey from historical splendor through its "century of humiliation," its communist revolution, and its subsequent rise as a global economic and political power. Ultimately, Kissinger offers a pragmatic vision for the future of the U.S.-China relationship, advocating for a "co-evolution" where the two giants can pursue their interests and manage inevitable conflicts without resorting to a full-scale confrontation that would be catastrophic for the world. Kissinger's analysis combines his personal experience opening U.S.-China relations with deep historical understanding of Chinese strategic culture. His insights into Chinese patience, strategic thinking, and approach to international relations are crucial for managing the defining relationship of the 21st century. **Today's Application**: Indispensable for understanding Chinese foreign policy motivations and the potential for managed competition versus inevitable conflict. Kissinger's analysis of Chinese strategic patience explains why China pursues long-term objectives through incremental steps rather than dramatic confrontations, visible in its approach to Taiwan, South China Sea expansion, and technology competition. ## A Reader's Guide: Where to Start **For Beginners**: Start with Morgenthau's "Politics Among Nations" for theoretical grounding, then move to Allison's "Essence of Decision" for practical crisis analysis. **For Policy Professionals**: Focus on Kissinger's "Diplomacy," Brzezinski's "Grand Chessboard," and Waltz's "Theory of International Politics" for strategic frameworks. **For Understanding Current Crises**: Prioritize Clark's "Sleepwalkers," Schelling's "Strategy of Conflict," and Kissinger's "On China" for historical perspective and escalation dynamics. **For Regional Specialists**: Europe-focused readers should emphasize Carr and Clark; Asia specialists should prioritize Kissinger's China analysis and Mahan's sea power theory; Middle East experts will find Huntington particularly relevant. ## Why These Books Endure In an age of information overload, these works provide something increasingly rare: sustained analytical depth. They offer frameworks for understanding not just what is happening, but why it's happening and what might come next. While technology has transformed how diplomacy is conducted, the fundamental dynamics of power, interest, and human nature that these authors identified remain unchanged. For anyone seeking to understand our complex world—whether as a student, practitioner, or informed citizen—these books represent essential intellectual equipment. They remind us that while history doesn't repeat, it often rhymes, and understanding those patterns can mean the difference between wise statecraft and dangerous miscalculation. In today's rapidly evolving international system, the insights of these masterworks aren't just academically interesting—they're practically indispensable for navigating an uncertain future. --- *Disclosure: As an Amazon Associate, we earn from qualifying purchases. This means that if you click on an Amazon link on our site and make a purchase, we may receive a small commission at no extra cost to you.* ### Canadian Government Admits: Khalistani Extremist Groups Continue Receiving Domestic Financial Support URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/canadian-government-admits-khalistani-extremist-groups-continue-receiving-domestic-financial-support/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:25:32.000Z A bombshell Canadian government report has exposed the continuing flow of financial resources to Khalistani extremist organizations operating within the country's borders, raising serious questions about national security oversight and the effectiveness of counter-terrorism financing measures. The revelations come at a time when Canada-India relations remain strained over allegations of state-sponsored violence and extremist activities. ### Key Findings of the 2025 Assessment Report The recently released "[2025 Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risks in Canada](https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/programs/financial-sector-policy/nira-neri/2025/report.html?ref=diplopolis.com)" by the Canadian Department of Finance has identified several terrorist entities, including prominent Khalistani violent extremist groups, that continue to receive financial support originating from Canada for activities linked to politically motivated violence. Specifically, the report names Babbar Khalsa International and the International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF) as organizations receiving financial backing through networks within Canada. The timing of this admission is particularly significant, as it comes two months after the Canadian Security Intelligence Service's report for 2024, released on June 18, which stated that ongoing involvement in violent activities by Canada-based Khalistani extremists continues to pose a national security threat to Canada and Canadian interests. ### Understanding the Khalistani Movement's Financial Architecture The financial support structure for Khalistani extremism in Canada operates through a complex network that exploits legitimate channels while funding illegitimate activities. The Canadian government's report on terror financing highlights how groups like Babbar Khalsa International have been identified as receiving funds to support their efforts for creating an independent Khalistan in Punjab, India. The report attempts to distinguish between legitimate advocacy and extremist activities. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service acknowledges that some Canadians participate in legitimate and peaceful campaigning to support the Khalistan movement, noting that non-violent advocacy for an independent state of Khalistan is not considered extremism. Only a small group of individuals are considered Khalistani extremists because they continue to use Canada as a base for the promotion, fundraising or planning of violence primarily in India. ### The Broader Terror Financing Landscape The [Khalistani financing networks don't operate in isolation](https://diplopolis.com/khalistani-financing-networks-operate-isolation?ref=diplopolis.com). Canada has admitted that [terror groups such as Khalistani extremists Hamas and Hezbollah financed by Canada](https://diplopolis.com/terror-groups-khalistani-extremists-hamas-hezbollah-financed-canada?ref=diplopolis.com), with the new report detailing how these [terror groups have been operating on Canadian soil](https://diplopolis.com/terror-groups-operating-canadian-soil?ref=diplopolis.com). This revelation exposes a [systemic issue with Canada's counter-terrorism financing mechanisms](https://diplopolis.com/systemic-issue-canada-counter-terrorism-financing-mechanisms?ref=diplopolis.com) that extends beyond any single extremist group. The sophistication of these [financing networks suggests they have adapted to regulatory oversight](https://diplopolis.com/financing-networks-adapted-regulatory-oversight?ref=diplopolis.com) while maintaining operational capability. The report indicates that these groups have successfully [navigated Canada's financial monitoring systems](https://diplopolis.com/navigated-canada-financial-monitoring-systems?ref=diplopolis.com), raising questions about the [effectiveness of current anti-money laundering terrorist financing prevention](https://diplopolis.com/effectiveness-anti-money-laundering-terrorist-financing-prevention?ref=diplopolis.com) measures. ### National Security Implications While there were no Canada-based Khalistani extremist-related attacks in Canada in 2024, ongoing involvement in violent activities by these extremists continues to pose a national security threat to Canada and Canadian interests. This acknowledgment by Canadian intelligence services highlights the persistent nature of the threat, even when it doesn't manifest in domestic attacks. The financial support flowing to these groups enables them to maintain operational capacity, recruit new members, and potentially plan activities that could affect both Canadian and international security. The admission that such financing continues despite existing regulatory frameworks suggests significant gaps in monitoring and prevention capabilities. ### Regulatory and Policy Challenges The persistence of terrorist financing within Canada's borders reflects broader challenges in the country's regulatory approach to counter-terrorism financing. The ability of groups like Babbar Khalsa International and ISYF to continue receiving financial support indicates that current measures may be insufficient or improperly implemented. The report's findings suggest that legitimate financial channels, including potentially charitable organizations and community groups, may be exploited for illicit purposes. This creates a complex regulatory challenge, as authorities must balance protecting legitimate community activities while preventing the misuse of financial systems. ### International Relations Impact These revelations come at a particularly sensitive time in Canada-India relations. The admission that Canada has been a source of financing for groups targeting India adds another layer of complexity to already strained diplomatic ties. The financial support for violent extremism targeting a foreign nation while operating from Canadian soil raises questions about Canada's commitment to preventing transnational terrorism. ### Moving Forward: Reform and Accountability The Canadian government's acknowledgment of these financing networks represents a critical first step, but meaningful reform requires comprehensive action. Enhanced monitoring of financial transactions, improved inter-agency coordination, and stronger penalties for those facilitating terrorist financing are essential components of an effective response. The report's findings demand immediate attention from policymakers, law enforcement agencies, and the financial sector. Without decisive action to dismantle these financing networks, Canada risks becoming a persistent safe haven for extremist groups that threaten regional and international security. The exposure of these financing networks should serve as a catalyst for comprehensive reform of Canada's counter-terrorism financing framework, to prevent the exploitation of Canadian financial systems for violent extremism. ### Gaza Endgame: How Hamas Survival Reshapes Middle East Strategy URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/gaza-endgame-how-hamas-survival-reshapes-middle-east-strategy/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:25:14.000Z The war in Gaza was supposed to end Hamas. Instead, it has created something potentially more dangerous: a battle-hardened insurgent movement with nothing left to lose. Despite Israeli claims of military success, intelligence assessments indicate significant Hamas leadership and operational capacity survived the initial assault, setting the stage for a protracted asymmetric conflict that could reshape Middle Eastern security for years to come. This transformation from conventional warfare to insurgency marks a critical inflection point—not just for Israel and Gaza, but for American strategy in a region where proxy conflicts increasingly determine great power competition. As Hamas adapts to guerrilla tactics, the Biden administration faces uncomfortable questions about the limits of military solutions and the necessity of diplomatic engagement with actors it would prefer to isolate. ## The Insurgency Trap Hamas's evolution into an insurgent force follows a predictable pattern observed from Iraq to Afghanistan: when faced with overwhelming conventional superiority, armed groups retreat into civilian populations, adopt hit-and-run tactics, and shift their strategic objective from victory to survival. But Hamas's transformation carries unique risks. Unlike insurgencies that emerge from external invasion, Hamas retains deep roots in Gaza's social fabric. It runs hospitals, schools, and social services—infrastructure that Israel's military campaign damaged but could not eliminate. This dual civilian-military identity allows Hamas to blend into post-conflict reconstruction efforts while maintaining operational capabilities. The group's survival also validates a broader regional trend toward asymmetric warfare. Iran's "axis of resistance" has watched Israeli military superiority clash against guerrilla tactics in real-time. Houthi missile attacks on Israeli territory and Iranian direct strikes in April and October 2024 demonstrate how regional actors are applying lessons from Gaza to their own confrontations with Israel and, by extension, the United States. For Israeli strategists, the insurgency scenario represents their worst nightmare: an endless cycle of low-intensity conflict that drains resources, undermines deterrence, and provides constant justification for international criticism. Traditional military metrics become irrelevant when the enemy's primary goal shifts from territorial control to political endurance. ## The Humanitarian Leverage The war's humanitarian toll has created new diplomatic realities that neither Israel nor the United States can ignore. With over 42,000 Palestinians killed, including more than 13,300 children, and 318 aid workers killed—the highest number in any single crisis—international pressure for accountability has reached unprecedented levels. These numbers do more than generate sympathy; they reshape diplomatic leverage. European allies increasingly condition support for Israeli security on progress toward Palestinian political rights. Arab states that might have normalized relations with Israel now face domestic pressure that makes public cooperation politically toxic. Even traditional supporters find themselves defending policies that appear to violate international humanitarian law. The systematic targeting of journalists and aid workers particularly complicates Israel's international standing. When neutral actors become targets, it suggests either a breakdown in military discipline or a deliberate strategy to control information—neither interpretation helps Israel's case in international forums. This humanitarian pressure creates what strategists call "moral entrapment"—a situation where continued military operations generate costs that exceed their strategic benefits. For the United States, supporting Israel's operations while condemning their humanitarian consequences creates cognitive dissonance that undermines broader diplomatic credibility. ## Diplomatic Resurgence Paradoxically, the war's devastation has revived serious discussion of the [two-state solution](https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/reviving-the-two-state-solution-the-un-conference-and-the-recognition-of-palestine-215330?ref=diplopolis.com) after years of diplomatic neglect. The July 2025 UN High-Level International Conference brought together world leaders to address the two-state framework at what they termed a "historically critical moment"—though notably without [American or Israeli participation](https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/07/united-states-rejects-a-two-state-solution-conference?ref=diplopolis.com). This revival reflects cold strategic calculation rather than humanitarian sentiment. Regional powers recognize that the current trajectory—endless cycles of violence without political resolution—serves no one's long-term interests. Even states hostile to Israeli policies understand that Palestinian political development requires Israeli security guarantees, creating potential common ground for pragmatic diplomacy. The challenge lies in sequencing. Currently, no two-state proposal is being actively negotiated, with Israel rejecting Palestinian statehood while the Palestinian Authority maintains support for the concept. This asymmetry reflects deeper structural problems: Hamas's survival undermines Palestinian political unity, while Israeli security concerns make territorial concessions appear impossible. Yet the war's outcome creates new incentives for compromise. Israel's military campaign demonstrated both the limits of force in solving political problems and the unsustainability of indefinite occupation. For Palestinians, Hamas's survival proves that armed resistance can endure even overwhelming military pressure, potentially strengthening moderate voices arguing for political strategies. ## Regional Realignment The Gaza war's regional dimensions transform it from a bilateral dispute into a proxy conflict with global implications. Iran's support network—from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Houthis in Yemen—has treated Gaza as a test case for challenging Israeli-American dominance in the Middle East. This regionalization creates both risks and opportunities for American strategy. The risk lies in escalation: each Gaza crisis now threatens to trigger wider conflicts involving multiple state and non-state actors across the region. Iranian capabilities demonstrated during the April and October 2024 attacks suggest that future escalations could overwhelm Israeli defenses and drag American forces into direct confrontation. The opportunity lies in comprehensive diplomacy. Regional actors who previously viewed the Palestinian issue as a zero-sum competition now face shared interests in preventing endless instability. Saudi Arabia's Abraham Accords negotiations, temporarily suspended due to the war, could resume if linked to credible progress on Palestinian political development. This creates space for what diplomatic historians call "linkage strategies"—connecting previously separate issues to create broader bargaining space. Palestinian statehood could become part of a regional security architecture that addresses Iranian expansion, normalizes Israeli-Arab relations, and provides American partners with domestic political cover for cooperation with Israel. ## The Reconstruction Dilemma Gaza's physical destruction creates a paradoxical opportunity for political transformation. Rebuilding will require international assistance on a scale comparable to post-World War II reconstruction efforts. This necessity creates leverage for demanding political reforms and governance changes that military action alone could not achieve. But reconstruction also creates new dependencies and vulnerabilities. Who controls the rebuilding process will largely determine Gaza's political future. If Hamas maintains influence over reconstruction efforts, it could emerge from military defeat stronger than before. If external actors control rebuilding without Palestinian buy-in, they risk creating another failed state dependent on foreign assistance. The most promising approach involves conditional reconstruction tied to political development. International assistance could flow through reformed Palestinian institutions that provide both Israeli security guarantees and Palestinian governance legitimacy. This model requires unprecedented cooperation between traditional adversaries but offers the only realistic path toward sustainable stability. ## Strategic Implications The Gaza conflict's evolution reveals fundamental changes in contemporary warfare and diplomacy. Military superiority alone cannot resolve conflicts rooted in competing national narratives and territorial claims. Insurgencies can survive conventional defeat if they maintain political legitimacy and social support networks. For American policymakers, this creates uncomfortable implications. The "peace through strength" approach that worked during the Cold War proves insufficient for managing proxy conflicts in densely populated areas. Military aid to allies must be coupled with diplomatic pressure for political solutions, even when those solutions require engaging with unsavory actors. The Biden administration's response to Gaza will establish precedents for managing similar crises worldwide. If the United States cannot help resolve a conflict involving its closest regional ally, it raises questions about American capacity to manage great power competition in other regions where proxy conflicts determine strategic outcomes. ## The Path Forward Sustainable solutions require acknowledging hard truths that all parties prefer to avoid. For Israel, military victory cannot eliminate Palestinian political aspirations, and security cannot be achieved through indefinite occupation. For Palestinians, armed resistance alone cannot achieve statehood, and political development requires compromises with Israeli security needs. For the United States, supporting allies requires accepting limits on their actions when those actions undermine broader strategic objectives. The most realistic pathway involves graduated diplomacy that begins with practical cooperation and builds toward political agreements. Humanitarian assistance, reconstruction efforts, and economic development can create stakeholder networks invested in stability. These networks, over time, can provide the social foundation for political arrangements that currently appear impossible. This approach requires strategic patience—accepting that sustainable peace will take decades rather than election cycles. It also requires tactical urgency—recognizing that continued violence creates facts on the ground that make eventual compromise more difficult. The alternative is clear: endless cycles of violence that serve no party's interests while contributing to broader regional instability. The Gaza war's transformation into insurgency makes this cycle more likely unless policymakers embrace the difficult compromises that peace requires. Hamas's survival, paradoxically, may have created the conditions for its own political marginalization—if Palestinian moderates can demonstrate that diplomacy achieves what violence cannot. The question is whether Israeli and American leaders possess the strategic vision to test this proposition before another generation learns to view violence as the only viable political option. The stakes extend far beyond Gaza's borders. In an era of great power competition, the Middle East's stability affects global energy markets, migration patterns, and the credibility of international institutions. Getting Gaza right may be essential for getting everything else right in a region where local conflicts increasingly determine global outcomes. ### China's Massive Military Parade Unites Xi, Putin, and Kim Jong Un in Historic Display of Anti-Western Alliance URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/chinas-massive-military-parade-unites-xi-putin-and-kim-jong-un-in-historic-display-of-anti-western-alliance/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:24:34.000Z In an unprecedented demonstration of solidarity that marked an unprecedented [show of force](https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/chinas-parade-new-weaponry-sends-message-deterrence-2025-09-03/?ref=diplopolis.com) to the Western capitals, China hosted a massive military parade on September 3, 2025, bringing together three of the world's most powerful authoritarian leaders. The military parade is the first time the leaders of Russia, China and North Korea have been seen together in public, marking a significant milestone in the emerging anti-Western coalition that has Western policymakers deeply concerned. ## A Historic Gathering in Tiananmen Square The spectacular event, held in Beijing's iconic Tiananmen Square to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, featured Chinese President Xi Jinping hosting Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. The parade, to be held in Beijing's Tiananmen Square on September 3, is part of China's commemorations to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II following Japan's formal surrender. For Kim Jong Un, this gathering represented a particularly significant diplomatic breakthrough. The parade will be the first time that Kim appears together with both Xi and Putin — offering him a first multilateral diplomatic event and This is also the first multilateral diplomatic event for Kim, who rarely leaves North Korea. The North Korean leader's attendance marked his first visit to China in six years, underscoring the strategic importance all three nations place on strengthening their alliance. ## Showcasing China's Military Modernization Beyond the symbolic importance of the leadership summit, the parade served as China's most comprehensive display of military technological advancement to date. China's parade showed off its newest hardware, including laser weapons and undersea drones, rooting it firmly in the present – and depicting Xi Jinping's future vision for a new world order that can counter the West. The military showcase featured an array of cutting-edge weapons systems that demonstrated China's rapid advancement in defense technology. Some of the newer Chinese military weapons expected to be showcased today: hypersonic missiles, underwater drones, "Loyal Wingmen" autonomous drones, next-generation tanks and advanced fighter jets. Among the most notable revelations were the debut of the DF-61 missile system and various [directed-energy weapons](https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/china-military-parade-xi-jinping-09-03-25-intl-hnk?ref=diplopolis.com) that had never been publicly displayed before. Military analysts were particularly intrigued by China's demonstration of autonomous warfare capabilities. The general ticked off a range of China's most modern weaponry that it's never shown the world before: cutting-edge drones, directed-energy weapons, electronic jamming systems, hypersonic systems, air-defense and missile-defense technologies, and strategic missiles. These [advanced missile systems and stealth technology](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3324119/victory-day-military-parade-china-puts-weapons-progress-and-troops-show?ref=diplopolis.com) represent China's determination to match and potentially exceed Western military capabilities. ## Strategic Implications of the Alliance The timing and composition of this military parade carry profound geopolitical implications. Putin, wanted by the International Criminal Court, last travelled in China in 2024, while North Korea, a formal treaty ally of China's, has been under United Nations Security Council sanctions since 2006 over its development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. The willingness of all three leaders to appear together publicly represents a bold challenge to Western-led international norms and institutions. The deepening Russia-North Korea relationship has been particularly concerning to Western intelligence agencies. Kim's last overseas trip was in September 2023, when he and Putin met at a spaceport in Russia's Far East. Putin also made a trip to Pyongyang, where he and Kim signed a mutual defense pact in June 2024\. This [mutual defense agreement](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/asia/north-koreas-kim-jong-un-attend-military-parade-beijing-week-rcna227664?ref=diplopolis.com) has raised alarms about potential military cooperation that could destabilize multiple regions simultaneously. ## Military Technology as Diplomatic Tool China's decision to unveil its most advanced military technologies during this high-profile diplomatic event reflects a sophisticated understanding of modern power projection. China is preparing to showcase its latest anti-ship missiles, combat drones and nuclear-capable ballistic missiles in a parade aimed at demonstrating its military prowess — and perhaps attracting potential buyers. This dual purpose – intimidating adversaries while attracting allies and clients – demonstrates China's growing confidence in its role as a global military technology supplier. The [hypersonic weapons systems](https://interestingengineering.com/front-lines/china-military-parade-victory-day?ref=diplopolis.com) displayed during the parade represent a particular area where China believes it has achieved technological superiority. Images circulating this week from parade rehearsals on Chinese social media appear to show several new missiles—both supersonic and believed hypersonic—as well as unmanned undersea vehicles roughly 60 feet long, suggesting maritime and long-range strike segments will be prominent. These [underwater drones and advanced missile systems](https://www.euronews.com/next/2025/09/02/china-to-show-off-its-high-tech-weapons-at-its-victory-parade-here-is-what-we-can-expect?ref=diplopolis.com) could fundamentally alter the balance of power in the South China Sea and beyond. ## Challenges to Western Hegemony The parade represented more than military posturing; it embodied a direct challenge to the post-World War II international order dominated by Western powers. For many in the West, the defining unprecedented show of solidarity against the West. From atop the Gate of Heavenly Peace, Xi presided over a 70-minute parade to mark the end of World War II. This symbolic choice of location and timing sent a clear message about China's vision for reshaping global power structures. The coordination between these three nations extends beyond symbolic gestures to practical military cooperation. The [advanced weapons display](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-26/satellite-images-show-latest-chinese-weapons-ahead-of-military-parade?ref=diplopolis.com) included systems that could potentially be shared or jointly developed, creating new security challenges for NATO and allied nations in the Indo-Pacific region. ## Looking Forward: A New World Order? As the dust settles from this historic military parade, the international community must grapple with the reality of a strengthened authoritarian alliance. depicting Xi Jinping's future vision for a new world order that can counter the West is no longer merely aspirational rhetoric but appears to be backed by substantial military capabilities and diplomatic coordination. The success of this parade in demonstrating unity among China, Russia, and North Korea will likely encourage further cooperation and potentially draw other nations into this emerging bloc. For Western policymakers, the challenge lies in developing effective responses that can deter aggression while avoiding escalation into broader conflict. This massive display of military might, diplomatic unity, and technological advancement marks a watershed moment in 21st-century geopolitics, signaling that the era of uncontested Western global dominance may be drawing to a close. The implications of this historic gathering will reverberate through international relations for years to come, as the world adjusts to the reality of a multipolar order defined by competing visions of global governance and security. ### Moral Courage of Limits: How Hans Morgenthau's Political Realism Reveals the Deepest Ethics of Power URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/moral-courage-of-limits-how-hans-morgenthaus-political-realism-reveals-the-deepest-ethics-of-power/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:24:17.000Z There is a peculiar paradox at the heart of moral action in politics: those who claim to act from the highest principles often cause the greatest harm, while those who acknowledge the constraints of power sometimes achieve the most lasting good. This contradiction puzzled Hans Morgenthau, the German-Jewish scholar who fled Nazi Germany and became one of America's most influential thinkers on international relations. In his masterwork *Politics Among Nations*, published in 1948 as the world grappled with the aftermath of unprecedented destruction, Morgenthau articulated a vision of [political realism that was, paradoxically, deeply moral](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/?ref=diplopolis.com)—not despite its recognition of limits, but because of it. Morgenthau's realism has often been misunderstood as cynical pragmatism, a philosophy that reduces politics to mere power struggles devoid of ethical consideration. This interpretation misses the profound moral architecture underlying his thought. For Morgenthau, political realism was not an abandonment of morality but rather a mature understanding of how moral principles must navigate the treacherous terrain of human nature and political necessity. It was, in essence, a moral philosophy of limits—one that insisted that recognizing constraints on our power to do good was itself the highest form of ethical responsibility. This counterintuitive wisdom resonates particularly strongly in our current moment, when global challenges from climate change to humanitarian crises demand both moral urgency and strategic wisdom. Morgenthau's insights suggest that the path to meaningful ethical action lies not in transcending political realities but in working skillfully within them, guided by what he considered the supreme political virtue: prudence. ## Moral Courage of Seeing Reality Clearly To understand Morgenthau's moral vision, we must first grasp what he meant by "realism." For him, political realism was not a celebration of power for its own sake but rather an unflinching commitment to seeing political life as it actually is, rather than as we might wish it to be. This stance required what we might call moral courage—the difficult virtue of accepting uncomfortable truths about human nature and political dynamics. Morgenthau's realism was forged in the crucible of his personal experience. Born in 1904 in Coburg, Bavaria, he witnessed the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the rise of Nazism, experiences that left him deeply skeptical of utopian political projects. He had seen how noble ideals—nationalism, progress, the perfectibility of man—could be weaponized by those who understood the darker currents of human motivation. His exile to America in 1937 only reinforced his conviction that politics must be understood in terms of power relationships, not merely declared intentions. This biographical context illuminates why Morgenthau insisted that political actors must begin with a clear-eyed assessment of human nature. In his view, humans are fundamentally driven by what he called the ["animus dominandi"—the desire to dominate](https://www.e-ir.info/2018/01/21/introducing-realism-in-international-relations-theory/?ref=diplopolis.com). This was not a cynical observation but an empirical one, drawn from centuries of historical evidence. Like the psychoanalysts of his era, Morgenthau believed that acknowledging our shadow impulses was the first step toward managing them constructively. The moral dimension of this stance becomes clear when we consider its alternative. Those who refuse to acknowledge the role of power in politics often end up either naive or hypocritical—naive if they genuinely believe their good intentions will be sufficient, hypocritical if they deploy power while denying its influence. Morgenthau's realism demanded a kind of intellectual honesty that was itself a moral commitment: the commitment to base policy on facts rather than fantasies. Consider how this applies to contemporary international relations. When policymakers speak of "spreading democracy" or "humanitarian intervention" without carefully analyzing the power dynamics involved, they risk creating the very instability they claim to oppose. Morgenthau would argue that the moral thing to do is not to abandon these goals but to pursue them with a realistic understanding of the constraints and unintended consequences that any political action entails. This is where Morgenthau's thought reveals its surprisingly spiritual dimension. Like the Buddhist concept of accepting reality as it is before seeking to change it, or the Stoic emphasis on distinguishing between what we can and cannot control, Morgenthau's realism required a form of ego-death—abandoning our comforting illusions about our own righteousness and the malleability of the world. Only by seeing clearly could one act wisely. ## Prudence as the Supreme Virtue in Politics If clear-sighted realism was Morgenthau's starting point, prudence was his destination. In his understanding, prudence—or practical wisdom—was not mere caution but rather the highest political virtue, the one that made all other virtues possible in the messy realm of politics. This represented a revival of classical political philosophy, particularly [Aristotelian ethics, in an age that had largely forgotten such wisdom](https://iep.utm.edu/aris-eth/?ref=diplopolis.com#SH5c). Morgenthau's conception of prudence was multifaceted. It involved, first, the ability to weigh consequences carefully, understanding that in politics, the road to hell is indeed paved with good intentions. The prudent statesman must ask not merely "Is this policy morally justified?" but also "What are its likely consequences, and are those consequences compatible with my moral aims?" This temporal dimension of ethics—considering how our actions ripple through time—was central to Morgenthau's thought. Second, prudence required what we might call moral proportionality: matching means to ends in a way that doesn't destroy what one seeks to preserve. Morgenthau was particularly critical of policies that, in seeking to achieve perfect justice, risked destroying the conditions that make justice possible at all. This concern led him to oppose both isolationism (which abdicated moral responsibility) and crusading interventionism (which risked destroying international stability in pursuit of ideological goals). The literary critic Isaiah Berlin, writing in the same era as Morgenthau, captured a similar insight in his famous essay "[Two Concepts of Liberty](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/berlin/?ref=diplopolis.com#TwoConcLibe)." Berlin warned against "positive liberty"—the attempt to force people to be free according to some rational plan—arguing that it often led to tyranny. Morgenthau's political prudence operated from a similar recognition: that the attempt to impose comprehensive solutions often generates more problems than it solves. But prudence, for Morgenthau, was not simply a matter of intellectual calculation. It required what the ancient Greeks called *phronesis*—practical wisdom that emerges from experience and judgment rather than abstract reasoning. The prudent politician must develop an intuitive sense for the possible, a feel for when to push and when to yield, when to compromise and when to stand firm. This kind of wisdom cannot be reduced to rules or algorithms; it must be cultivated through practice and reflection. Morgenthau's emphasis on prudence also reflected his understanding of politics as fundamentally a realm of competing goods rather than simple conflicts between good and evil. In international relations, nation-states have legitimate interests that often conflict with one another. The prudent statesman seeks not to eliminate these conflicts—an impossible task—but to manage them in ways that minimize violence and preserve the possibility of cooperation. This requires what Morgenthau called the "diplomacy of accommodation"—the patient work of finding solutions that all parties can live with, even if none gets everything they want. This vision of prudent politics stands in sharp contrast to what Morgenthau saw as the American tendency toward moral absolutism. Americans, he observed, often approached international relations as if they were a courtroom, seeking to determine who was right and who was wrong, then punishing the guilty party. But international politics, Morgenthau argued, was more like a marketplace or a neighborhood—a space where different actors with different interests must find ways to coexist over time. ## Tension Between Aspiration and Responsibility Perhaps the most sophisticated aspect of Morgenthau's moral philosophy was his recognition that political ethics involves a fundamental tension between our highest aspirations and our concrete responsibilities. This tension, rather than being a flaw in his system, was its very heart—the recognition that mature moral action requires holding multiple truths simultaneously, even when they seem to contradict each other. Morgenthau was deeply influenced by the Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, who wrote extensively about the relationship between individual and social ethics. Niebuhr argued that while individuals might be called to self-sacrifice and unconditional love, political leaders have responsibilities to protect their communities that make such pure ethical stances impossible. Morgenthau developed this insight into a full political philosophy, arguing that the statesman faces what we might call the "[dirty hands](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dirty-hands/?ref=diplopolis.com)" problem: the necessity of taking morally ambiguous actions in service of larger moral goals. This creates what Morgenthau called the "tragedy of politics"—the fact that political action almost inevitably involves moral compromise. A leader who refuses to use force may allow terrible injustices to continue; a leader who uses force too readily may become the source of new injustices. There is no position of moral purity available to those who would exercise political responsibility. The French philosopher Albert Camus, writing in the same post-war period, explored similar themes in his novels and essays. In *The Plague*, Camus portrayed characters who must act against an epidemic despite not fully understanding it, knowing that their actions might fail or have unintended consequences. Like Morgenthau's prudent statesman, Camus's heroes act not from certainty but from what he called "lucid recognition" of their situation. They take responsibility for outcomes they cannot fully control because the alternative—paralysis or withdrawal—is even less acceptable. This tension between aspiration and responsibility manifests itself concretely in contemporary debates about humanitarian intervention. On one side are those who argue that we have a moral duty to prevent genocide and mass atrocities, regardless of the political complications. On the other side are those who point to the unintended consequences of well-intentioned interventions in places like Libya and Iraq. Morgenthau's framework doesn't resolve this tension but rather helps us hold it productively. From a Morgenthauan perspective, the question is not whether we should care about distant suffering—of course we should—but rather how to structure our care in ways that are likely to be effective over time. This might mean accepting that we cannot solve every problem, choosing our interventions carefully based on our actual capabilities rather than our moral aspirations, and building institutions that can address injustices gradually rather than seeking dramatic transformations. The wisdom here extends beyond foreign policy to domestic politics as well. Progressive activists often face a version of the same dilemma: whether to compromise with imperfect systems in hopes of incremental progress or to maintain ideological purity at the risk of achieving nothing. Morgenthau's emphasis on prudence suggests that moral responsibility often requires accepting partial solutions and building toward larger goals over time. This perspective can be deeply unsatisfying to those who want politics to provide clear moral direction. But Morgenthau argued that this dissatisfaction itself reflected a dangerous form of political immaturity—the desire for politics to be something other than what it is. The mature political actor learns to find meaning and purpose within constraints rather than seeking to transcend them entirely. ## Contemporary Applications: Humanitarian Intervention and Climate Diplomacy Morgenthau's framework proves particularly illuminating when applied to two of the most pressing moral challenges of our time: humanitarian intervention and climate diplomacy. Both issues reveal how moral urgency must be balanced against political possibility, and how the recognition of limits can actually enhance rather than diminish our capacity for ethical action. The question of humanitarian intervention has become increasingly urgent in an era of global communication, where distant atrocities are visible in real-time and public pressure for "doing something" can be intense. From a purely moral standpoint, the case for intervention often seems clear: if we have the power to stop genocide or mass atrocities, don't we have the obligation to act? But Morgenthau's realism forces us to ask deeper questions: What are the actual consequences of intervention? What are the opportunity costs? What precedents does it set? And perhaps most importantly: Are we prepared to take responsibility for the long-term aftermath of our actions? The [2011 intervention in Libya illustrates both the appeal and the dangers](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/libya-decade-turmoil?ref=diplopolis.com) of humanitarian intervention. Faced with Muammar Gaddafi's threats to massacre civilians in Benghazi, Western powers felt a moral imperative to act. The intervention succeeded in its immediate goal of preventing a massacre, but it also contributed to Libya's descent into chaos, created space for extremist groups to flourish, and generated a refugee crisis that destabilized neighboring regions. A Morgenthauan analysis would not conclude that intervention was necessarily wrong, but it would insist on a more sober accounting of both the costs of action and the costs of inaction. Climate diplomacy presents an even more complex challenge because it requires unprecedented levels of international cooperation to address a problem that unfolds over decades rather than months. Here, Morgenthau's emphasis on working within existing power structures becomes crucial. The Paris Climate Agreement, for all its limitations, succeeded precisely because it didn't try to create a world government or eliminate national sovereignty. Instead, it created a framework that allowed countries to pursue climate action while maintaining their political autonomy. Critics often attack such agreements as insufficiently ambitious, and they're right in absolute terms—the commitments fall short of what scientists say is necessary to prevent catastrophic warming. But Morgenthau's framework suggests that political progress often requires accepting intermediate steps rather than holding out for perfect solutions. The question becomes: What is the maximum cooperation we can achieve given current political realities, and how can we structure agreements to build momentum for more ambitious action over time? This doesn't mean accepting the status quo indefinitely. Rather, it means understanding that transformative change usually happens through the accumulation of partial victories rather than dramatic breakthroughs. Morgenthau's prudent approach to climate diplomacy might focus on building coalitions around specific, achievable goals—like technology transfer or carbon border adjustments—rather than seeking comprehensive global agreements that founder on political reality. The COVID-19 pandemic offered another case study in the tension between moral aspiration and political constraint. From a purely ethical standpoint, the case for global vaccine equity was overwhelming—the virus knew no borders, and protecting vulnerable populations everywhere served everyone's interests. But the political reality involved complex negotiations between pharmaceutical companies, national governments, and international organizations, each with their own constraints and constituencies. Morgenthau's approach would not dismiss the moral urgency of vaccine equity but would focus on identifying the specific political changes that could make progress possible. This might involve working to reform intellectual property rules, building manufacturing capacity in developing countries, or creating incentive structures that align corporate interests with public health goals. The key insight is that moral progress often requires changing the structural conditions that shape actors' choices rather than simply appealing to their better angels. ## Why Limits Enable Rather Than Constrain Moral Action The most counterintuitive aspect of Morgenthau's philosophy is his argument that accepting limits actually enhances rather than diminishes our capacity for moral action. This insight challenges our common assumption that moral progress requires the removal of constraints, and it offers a different way of thinking about the relationship between power and ethics. Morgenthau's argument begins with an observation about human psychology: unlimited power tends to corrupt not just the powerful but the very notion of moral action itself. When actors believe they can reshape reality according to their will, they often lose touch with the human costs of their actions. The recognition of limits, by contrast, forces a kind of moral discipline—it requires us to choose carefully among competing goods and to take responsibility for the consequences of our choices. This insight finds support in contemporary research on decision-making and moral psychology. Studies show that people with more power tend to be less empathetic and less attentive to others' perspectives. Conversely, those who perceive constraints on their actions often engage in more careful moral reasoning. The recognition of limits, it seems, keeps our moral faculties sharp. Morgenthau also argued that limits enhance moral action by making it more sustainable over time. Political movements that ignore constraints often burn themselves out in unsuccessful attempts to achieve everything at once. By contrast, those that work within constraints can build the coalitions and institutions necessary for lasting change. The civil rights movement in the United States, for instance, succeeded not by demanding immediate and total transformation but by identifying specific, achievable goals that could build momentum for broader change. Consider the contrast between two approaches to addressing global poverty. One approach might call for the immediate redistribution of wealth from rich to poor countries, based on principles of global justice. This approach has moral clarity on its side, but it ignores the political realities that make such redistribution unlikely. An alternative approach might focus on incremental changes—reforming trade rules, improving governance in developing countries, or expanding access to education and healthcare. This approach accepts existing constraints while working to gradually shift them. Morgenthau would argue that the second approach, despite its apparent moral modesty, is actually more ethical because it's more likely to produce real improvements in people's lives. The first approach may satisfy our desire for moral purity, but if it cannot be implemented, it serves primarily to make us feel good about ourselves rather than to help those we claim to care about. This perspective also applies to individual moral action. In his personal life, Morgenthau struggled with the question of how to maintain moral integrity while participating in what he saw as a fundamentally flawed political system. His answer was not to withdraw from politics but to engage with it as skillfully as possible, accepting that perfect solutions were unavailable while working to minimize harm and maximize good within existing constraints. The environmental movement provides another illustration of how limits can enable moral action. Early environmental activism often adopted an all-or-nothing approach, calling for the complete transformation of industrial society. While this approach raised important awareness, it often alienated potential allies and made little practical progress. More recent environmental strategies have focused on incremental changes—carbon pricing, renewable energy subsidies, efficiency standards—that work within existing economic and political systems while gradually shifting their direction. Morgenthau's insight here is that moral action in politics is often more like gardening than architecture. The gardener works with existing soil conditions, weather patterns, and plant biology rather than trying to impose an abstract design on unwilling nature. Similarly, the prudent politician works with existing institutions, interests, and cultural patterns rather than trying to create entirely new realities from scratch. ## Diplomacy of Restraint: Lessons for Global Governance Perhaps nowhere is Morgenthau's wisdom more relevant than in our current struggles with global governance. The interconnected challenges of the 21st century—from pandemics to climate change to economic inequality—seem to demand forms of international cooperation that go far beyond what existing institutions can provide. Yet Morgenthau's framework suggests that the path forward lies not in abandoning these institutions but in gradually strengthening them through what he called the "diplomacy of restraint." The diplomacy of restraint begins with the recognition that lasting international agreements must be acceptable to all major powers, even those whose values we might find objectionable. This doesn't mean moral relativism—Morgenthau was clear that some values are better than others—but it does mean that moral progress in international relations usually requires finding ways to align different actors' interests rather than simply imposing one set of values on everyone else. The Paris Climate Agreement exemplifies this approach. Rather than trying to create a binding international authority with enforcement powers—something that would have been politically impossible—the agreement created a framework for voluntary commitments that countries could strengthen over time. Critics argued that this approach was insufficiently ambitious, and they were right in absolute terms. But the agreement succeeded in creating momentum and establishing norms that have influenced national policies around the world. Morgenthau's approach to climate diplomacy would likely emphasize what scholars now call "[polycentric governance](https://ostromworkshop.indiana.edu/prov-governance/index.html?ref=diplopolis.com)"—addressing the problem through multiple, overlapping institutions rather than seeking a single comprehensive solution. This might involve bilateral agreements between major emitters, sectoral agreements within particular industries, city-to-city cooperation, and scientific collaboration—a web of relationships that gradually shifts the overall direction of global policy without requiring unanimous agreement on fundamental values. The recent tensions between the United States and China illustrate both the necessity and the difficulty of Morgenthau's approach. From a moral standpoint, there are legitimate concerns about human rights in China, just as there are legitimate Chinese concerns about American foreign policy. But Morgenthau would argue that allowing these moral differences to prevent cooperation on existential challenges like climate change represents a failure of prudence—a case where the perfect becomes the enemy of the good. This doesn't mean ignoring human rights concerns or abandoning moral principles. Rather, it means structuring international relations in ways that allow for cooperation on some issues while maintaining principled disagreement on others. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union managed to cooperate on arms control while maintaining fundamental ideological opposition. Similar compartmentalization may be necessary for addressing contemporary global challenges. The European Union offers another model of how Morgenthau's principles might apply to contemporary governance challenges. The EU succeeded not by eliminating national sovereignty but by creating overlapping institutions that gradually shift the context within which national interests are pursued. This process has been messy, slow, and incomplete, but it has created unprecedented levels of cooperation among countries that spent centuries fighting each other. ## Ethics of Imperfection in an Interconnected World As we navigate an increasingly interconnected world facing existential challenges, Morgenthau's political realism offers not a counsel of despair but a mature framework for moral action under conditions of uncertainty. His core insight—that acknowledging limits enhances rather than diminishes our capacity for ethical action—provides essential guidance for anyone seeking to make a positive difference in complex political systems. The COVID-19 pandemic illustrated both the necessity and the difficulty of this approach. The moral imperative to protect vulnerable populations was clear, but the political realities were complex: different countries had different healthcare capacities, different economic constraints, and different cultural attitudes toward government authority. Effective pandemic response required not just medical expertise but political wisdom—the ability to design policies that could actually be implemented given existing constraints. The most successful pandemic responses often came from countries that combined moral clarity about protecting public health with practical wisdom about implementation. South Korea's test-and-trace system worked because it was tailored to South Korean institutional capacities and cultural norms. New Zealand's elimination strategy succeeded because of the country's geographic isolation and strong governmental institutions. Attempts to simply copy these approaches in different contexts often failed because they ignored local political realities. Morgenthau's framework suggests that this pattern—moral clarity combined with contextual wisdom—represents the best hope for addressing other global challenges as well. Climate action, for instance, requires both urgent moral commitment and careful attention to what is politically feasible in different national contexts. The countries that have made the most progress on renewable energy have often done so not by adopting abstract global targets but by identifying specific policies that aligned climate goals with domestic economic and political interests. The migration crisis presents similar challenges. From a purely moral standpoint, people fleeing violence and poverty deserve protection and assistance. But sustainable migration policies must also consider the political realities in receiving countries, including public attitudes, institutional capacities, and economic constraints. Morgenthau's approach would focus on building systems that can provide meaningful protection for refugees while maintaining public support for immigration policies over time. This doesn't mean accepting injustice or abandoning moral principles. Rather, it means recognizing that lasting moral progress usually requires building coalitions and institutions that can sustain themselves politically. The civil rights movement succeeded not just because its cause was just but because leaders like Martin Luther King Jr. understood how to [frame moral demands in ways that could attract broader support](https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/nonviolence?ref=diplopolis.com) and create pressure for institutional change. Morgenthau's emphasis on working within constraints also offers guidance for individual moral action in complex institutional settings. Whether we're working within corporations, non-profit organizations, or government agencies, we often face situations where our moral aspirations conflict with institutional realities. Morgenthau's framework suggests that the ethical response is not necessarily to withdraw from these institutions but to work within them as skillfully as possible, accepting that we cannot achieve everything while refusing to abandon our commitment to making things better. The technology industry provides numerous examples of this kind of moral challenge. Engineers and designers working for major tech companies often face pressure to implement features that may have negative social consequences. A Morgenthauan approach might focus on building coalitions within these companies to gradually shift their practices rather than expecting immediate transformation or abandoning the field entirely to those with fewer scruples. In our age of social media and instant global communication, there's often pressure to take clear moral stances on complex issues. Morgenthau's framework suggests that this pressure, while understandable, can sometimes be counterproductive. The most effective moral action often requires accepting ambiguity, building relationships across ideological divides, and working patiently toward incremental progress rather than seeking dramatic transformation. This is not a counsel of complacency but rather a recognition that sustainable moral progress requires what we might call strategic humility—the recognition that our understanding is limited, our power is constrained, and our actions will have unintended consequences. This humility, paradoxically, can make us more rather than less effective as moral agents by forcing us to think carefully about how to make our limited influence count. ## Enduring Relevance of Moral Realism Hans Morgenthau died in 1980, but his central insights have only become more relevant as we face challenges that require unprecedented levels of international cooperation. His vision of political realism as a moral philosophy of limits offers essential wisdom for navigating the complex ethical terrain of the 21st century. The deepest insight of Morgenthau's thought may be his recognition that moral maturity requires accepting paradox rather than resolving it. We must care deeply about justice while accepting that perfect justice is unattainable. We must act decisively while acknowledging our limited understanding. We must work for change while respecting the constraints that make social life possible. These tensions cannot be eliminated through clever reasoning or good intentions; they can only be navigated through the cultivation of practical wisdom. This wisdom is particularly relevant for younger generations who have grown up with global consciousness but must now grapple with the difficulties of translating moral concern into effective action. Morgenthau's framework suggests that the path forward involves neither cynical withdrawal nor naive activism but rather what we might call "engaged realism"—full participation in political life combined with clear-eyed assessment of what is possible. The environmental movement, human rights advocacy, global health initiatives, and other moral causes all benefit from this kind of engaged realism. It asks not whether these causes are important—they clearly are—but rather how to pursue them in ways that build rather than undermine the coalitions and institutions necessary for long-term progress. Perhaps most importantly, Morgenthau's political realism offers a framework for hope that doesn't depend on unrealistic expectations about human nature or political possibility. His hope was grounded not in the belief that humans would transcend their limitations but in the conviction that they could learn to manage those limitations wisely. This more modest hope may also be more durable, capable of sustaining moral action even when dramatic breakthroughs prove elusive. In our current moment of global crisis and transformation, we need both the moral urgency that comes from clear vision of what ought to be and the practical wisdom that comes from clear understanding of what is. Morgenthau's great contribution was showing how these two requirements—often seen as contradictory—can actually reinforce each other. By accepting the limits on our power to do good, we paradoxically enhance our capacity to exercise that power wisely. The ultimate test of any moral philosophy is not whether it makes us feel good about ourselves but whether it helps us act more effectively in service of human flourishing. By this measure, Morgenthau's political realism—with its emphasis on prudence, its acceptance of tragedy, and its insistence on working within constraints—offers resources that our morally ambitious but politically challenging time desperately needs. It teaches us that the courage to see clearly, the wisdom to act prudently, and the humility to accept imperfection are not obstacles to moral action but rather its essential foundations. In embracing these insights, we don't abandon our highest aspirations but rather learn to pursue them through the patient, careful work of politics—the art of the possible in service of the necessary. ### Gaza Crisis: Diplomatic Stalemate as Annexation Calls Deepen Humanitarian Catastrophe URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/gaza-crisis-diplomatic-stalemate-as-annexation-calls-deepen-humanitarian-catastrophe/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:24:00.000Z The Gaza conflict has entered what UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres describes as ["a new and dangerous phase"](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/28/israel-steps-up-bombardment-of-gaza-city-killing-at-least-24-people?ref=diplopolis.com) as Israeli far-right officials openly advocate for territorial annexation while diplomatic efforts remain stalled against a backdrop of deepening humanitarian catastrophe. The convergence of escalating military operations, explicit annexationist rhetoric, and widespread famine signals a potential transformation of the conflict from a military campaign into a broader territorial and demographic restructuring with profound implications for international law and regional stability. The crisis has intensified dramatically as [Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich unveiled a provocative timeline for Gaza's annexation](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/28/israels-smotrich-calls-for-phased-gaza-annexation-if-hamas-does-not-disarm?ref=diplopolis.com), proposing that Israel should annex a section of Gaza each week for four weeks if Hamas refuses to surrender and disarm. This represents the most explicit articulation yet of territorial ambitions that transcend traditional military objectives, suggesting a fundamental shift in Israeli policy discourse toward permanent control. Smotrich's plan, which envisions forcing Palestinian displacement southward followed by systematic annexation, has drawn sharp condemnation from Hamas as "an official call to exterminate our people" and reflects the growing influence of settlement advocates within Israel's governing coalition. Simultaneously, the humanitarian situation has reached catastrophic proportions, with [UN World Food Programme Executive Director Cindy McCain confirming](https://www.scmp.com/news/world/middle-east/article/3323598/un-food-agency-chief-says-women-and-children-are-starving-war-torn-gaza?ref=diplopolis.com) that "starvation was under way in Gaza" after personally meeting with affected families. The scale of the crisis is unprecedented, with hunger-related deaths rising to 317 people, including 121 children, according to Gaza's Health Ministry. McCain's direct engagement with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on food access underscores the severity of conditions, though Netanyahu has historically disputed famine claims as Hamas propaganda. The military dimension of the crisis has evolved into systematic urban destruction, particularly in Gaza City, where Israeli forces are conducting what officials describe as operations against Hamas's last stronghold. The scope of destruction is staggering, with more than 1,500 homes demolished in Gaza City's Zeitoun neighborhood alone, leaving entire districts uninhabitable. This pattern of comprehensive demolition, combined with forced displacement orders, raises fundamental questions about the nature and ultimate objectives of Israeli military strategy. International diplomatic responses have revealed significant fractures in multilateral consensus. [The United States has defended controversial Israeli military actions](https://www.rt.com/news/623645-us-defends-israel-un?ref=diplopolis.com), including strikes on medical facilities, with US Ambassador to the UN Dorothy Shea justifying Israel's airstrike on Nasser Hospital that killed at least 20 people, including five journalists, arguing it targeted Hamas operatives using the facility for military purposes. This defense highlights the complex legal and ethical challenges surrounding military operations in densely populated areas where civilian infrastructure becomes contested terrain. The diplomatic landscape is further complicated by reports of systematic human rights violations beyond conventional military engagement. UN human rights experts have documented what they characterize as "enforced disappearances" of starving Palestinians seeking food at distribution sites, allegations that represent a qualitative escalation in the nature of documented violations. These reports suggest the emergence of tactics that transcend traditional military engagement, potentially constituting systematic persecution of civilians accessing basic humanitarian services. Current ceasefire negotiations remain deadlocked over fundamental structural issues, particularly the duration and scope of any potential agreement. Hamas seeks a permanent end to the war while Israel pursues only temporary arrangements that would allow resumption of military operations after hostage releases. This irreconcilable difference reflects deeper questions about post-conflict governance and territorial control that extend far beyond immediate military objectives. The international community faces a critical test of multilateral institutions and international law enforcement. The UN Security Council's inability to implement effective intervention mechanisms, combined with major power diplomatic cover for Israeli actions, demonstrates the limitations of current international governance structures when confronting systematic violations involving allied states. The situation presents a fundamental challenge to the post-1945 international legal framework governing territorial integrity and civilian protection. Regional implications extend beyond immediate Palestinian-Israeli dynamics, with potential precedent-setting consequences for territorial disputes globally. Smotrich's explicit annexation timeline, if implemented, would represent the most significant unilateral territorial acquisition since Russia's actions in Ukraine, potentially legitimizing similar approaches in contested territories worldwide. The international response to these developments will likely influence calculations in other territorial disputes from the South China Sea to Eastern Europe. The humanitarian crisis has also exposed fundamental weaknesses in international aid delivery mechanisms under conflict conditions. Despite extensive international humanitarian infrastructure, the systematic obstruction of food distribution and the targeting of aid sites demonstrate how military strategy can effectively weaponize humanitarian access, creating tools of population control that operate outside traditional military engagement frameworks. Looking ahead, the Gaza situation represents a convergence point for multiple crisis dynamics that will likely define international relations in the coming decade. The explicit articulation of territorial annexation goals, combined with systematic humanitarian restrictions and civilian targeting, suggests a conflict model that transcends traditional military engagement to encompass demographic engineering and territorial restructuring. The international community's response to these developments will establish critical precedents for how similar situations are addressed elsewhere, making Gaza a test case for the viability of international law and multilateral governance in an increasingly multipolar world. The crisis reveals fundamental tensions between state sovereignty principles and humanitarian intervention obligations, complicated by geopolitical alignments that prioritize strategic relationships over legal consistency. As diplomatic efforts continue to stagnate, the situation increasingly resembles a prolonged siege with territorial acquisition objectives rather than a conventional military conflict, raising profound questions about the adequacy of existing international legal and diplomatic frameworks for addressing hybrid forms of warfare that combine military action with demographic displacement and territorial annexation. ### Trump's India-Pakistan Mediation Claims: A Diplomatic Dispute Over Trade and Territory URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/trumps-india-pakistan-mediation-claims-a-diplomatic-dispute-over-trade-and-territory/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:23:40.000Z The relationship between the United States and India, once hailed as a cornerstone of 21st-century geopolitics, has entered turbulent waters as President Donald Trump continues to assert that his administration single-handedly prevented nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan through tariff threats. This claim has sparked a diplomatic row that extends far beyond mere rhetoric, touching on fundamental questions of sovereignty, mediation, and the weaponization of trade policy. ## Genesis of the Dispute The controversy stems from a four-day military confrontation between India and Pakistan in May 2025, which ended with a ceasefire agreement. While both South Asian nations credited direct military-to-military dialogue for the resolution, Trump has repeatedly claimed credit for brokering the peace through economic pressure on India. Speaking to the press at the White House, [Trump said](https://www.theweek.in/wire-updates/international/2025/08/27/fgn2-us-trump-indopak.html?ref=diplopolis.com), "I am talking to a very terrific man, Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi. I said, 'What's going on with you and Pakistan?' The hatred was tremendous." According to Trump, tensions between the two nations were spiraling, and his intervention through trade leverage was crucial in preventing escalation. This narrative has become a recurring theme in Trump's public statements, since the May ceasefire. The persistence of these assertions has increasingly frustrated Indian officials who view them as an attempt to diminish India's agency in regional affairs. ## India's Firm Rebuttal New Delhi's response has been unequivocal and consistent. In the weeks after India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire in May, officials in New Delhi seethed over Donald Trump's claims that he brokered an end to a four-day armed conflict. This reaction reflects a deeper sensitivity within India's foreign policy establishment about third-party involvement in the Kashmir dispute, a position that has remained consistent across different Indian governments for decades. The Indian government's stance is rooted in its long-held principle that the Kashmir issue is a bilateral matter between India and Pakistan, with no room for external mediation. This policy position has been maintained despite various international attempts at intervention over the years, making Trump's claims particularly galling to Indian officials. ## Tariff Weapon What makes this diplomatic spat particularly complex is its intersection with escalating trade tensions. Trump has implemented a punitive tariff regime against India, citing its continued imports of Russian oil as justification. The US announced an [additional 25 percent tariff on India](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/27/business/india-tariffs-trump-russia-oil.html?ref=diplopolis.com) over its import of Russian oil, taking the total to 50 percent. This represents a dramatic escalation from previous trade relations. Citing India's "massive" purchases of Russian oil, Trump said he would "substantially" increase the U.S. tariff on Indian imports, which is already one of the highest among Asian countries at 25%. The doubling of tariffs to 50% has caught many experts by surprise, particularly given India's early willingness to engage in trade negotiations with the Trump administration. The economic impact of these tariffs is substantial. The 50% tariff would affect tens of thousands of workers and potentially [shave billions](https://www.npr.org/2025/08/07/nx-s1-5494749/india-trump-tariffs-russia-oil-modi?ref=diplopolis.com) off India's earnings, says Anupam Manur, professor of economics at The Takshashila Institution, a Bengaluru-based think tank and public policy school. This comes at a particularly challenging time for India's economy, which has been working to diversify its trade relationships and reduce dependence on any single partner. ## Historical Context and Precedent The current crisis must be understood within the broader context of US-India relations over the past quarter-century. The relationship began its modern transformation during the Clinton administration, accelerated under George W. Bush with the civilian nuclear deal, and reached new heights during the Obama years with the designation of India as a "major defense partner." Trump's first term (2017-2021) saw a complex relationship with India, marked by personal chemistry between Trump and Modi alongside persistent trade disputes. The "[Howdy Modi](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49788492?ref=diplopolis.com)" event in Houston and Trump's visit to India in 2019 symbolized the personal dimension of the relationship, while trade tensions simmered in the background. The current crisis represents a departure from this trajectory. As one analysis notes, The move caught most experts by surprise as New Delhi was one of the [first to start trade negotiations](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/7/us-india-relations-at-their-worst-as-trump-slaps-50-percent-tariff?ref=diplopolis.com) with Washington, DC, highlighting how quickly diplomatic relationships can deteriorate when fundamental disagreements arise. ## Broader Diplomatic Ramifications The current dispute is having ripple effects beyond bilateral relations. Central to the current crisis is India's continued relationship with Russia, particularly its substantial imports of Russian oil. India has defended these purchases as necessary for its energy security and as consistent with its traditional foreign policy of strategic autonomy. India won't give up on Russia or its strategic autonomy, experts say, even as areas of friction with the US grow. This position reflects India's historical non-aligned approach to international relations, which has allowed it to maintain relationships with competing powers. However, this approach is increasingly challenging to sustain as great power competition intensifies and the US demands greater alignment from its partners. On the other hand, China and India have agreed to resume trade ties and move towards resolving their longstanding border dispute. Some analysts suggest that US pressure may be inadvertently pushing India toward closer ties with China, despite their own significant bilateral tensions. This development would represent a significant strategic setback for US interests in the Indo-Pacific, where American strategy has relied heavily on partnerships with democratic allies and partners, with India being the largest and most important among them. ## Looking Forward The persistence of Trump's claims about mediating between India and Pakistan, despite clear denials from India, suggests this dispute may continue to fester. The intertwining of these claims with punitive trade measures creates a complex web of grievances that will be difficult to untangle. For India, the challenge is maintaining its strategic autonomy while preserving important aspects of the US relationship. For the United States, the question is whether the current approach serves broader strategic interests or inadvertently undermines them by alienating a crucial partner. The coming months will test whether diplomatic engagement can overcome these differences or whether the relationship will continue its downward trajectory. What began as a dispute over historical claims about mediation has evolved into a broader test of whether the US-India partnership can survive fundamental disagreements about sovereignty, strategic autonomy, and the role of economic coercion in international relations. As both nations navigate this challenging period, the stakes extend far beyond bilateral ties to encompass the broader architecture of Indo-Pacific security and the global balance of power. The resolution of this dispute may well determine the trajectory of one of the world's most consequential diplomatic relationships for years to come. ### India Offers Flood Alert to Pakistan: Catastrophe Diplomacy Amid Crisis URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/india-offers-flood-alert-to-pakistan-catastrophe-diplomacy-amid-crisis/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:23:13.000Z In a rare diplomatic gesture that pierces through months of frozen bilateral relations, India has alerted Pakistan about possible cross-border flooding after heavy monsoon rains in the South Asian region, marking the first public official contact between the two nuclear-armed rivals in months. This flood warning, delivered through diplomatic channels rather than the usual water-sharing mechanisms, represents a critical case study in how natural disasters can create narrow openings even amid the deepest diplomatic freeze. ## Diplomatic Context: From Crisis to Silence The flood alert comes against the backdrop of the most severe India-Pakistan crisis in recent years. The crisis emerged between the two countries after the Pahalgam terrorist attack, as India accused Pakistan of sponsoring the militants, leading Pakistan to deny its involvement. The attack in April 2025 triggered a cascade of retaliatory measures that brought the nuclear neighbors to the brink of conflict. India announced a series of retaliatory measures against Pakistan, including the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, prompting responsive measures and leading to a diplomatic crisis and border skirmishes. India announced a string of punitive measures. It downgraded diplomatic ties, suspended a crucial water-sharing treaty and revoked all visas issued to Pakistani nationals. The escalation was so severe that a ceasefire was announced on 10 May 2025 following an agreement between India and Pakistan, but diplomatic communications remained largely suspended. ## Catastrophe Diplomacy in Action The flood warning represents a textbook example of "catastrophe diplomacy"—the phenomenon where natural disasters create opportunities for diplomatic engagement between otherwise hostile nations. What makes this communication particularly significant is its departure from established protocols. The ministry said India conveyed the information through diplomatic channels rather than via the Indus Waters Commission, the permanent body set up under the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty—a treaty that India had suspended following the Pahalgam attack. This choice of communication channel sends multiple signals. First, it demonstrates India's recognition that humanitarian concerns can transcend political disputes. Second, by bypassing the suspended Indus Waters Commission, it acknowledges the current state of bilateral relations while still fulfilling moral obligations to warn of impending danger. ## Monsoon Crisis Context The timing of this diplomatic outreach coincides with a devastating monsoon season that has claimed hundreds of lives across the subcontinent. Floods triggered by rains have killed nearly 800 people in Pakistan since June 26\. Dozens of people have been killed in flooding in Indian-administered Kashmir, which is a split between the two sides and claimed by both in its entirety. The shared vulnerability to monsoon flooding creates a natural imperative for cross-border cooperation, regardless of political tensions. Climate change has intensified monsoon patterns across South Asia, making such extreme weather events more frequent and severe. The Indus river system, which flows from India into Pakistan, makes flood management inherently a cross-border issue. When political mechanisms fail, the imperative of saving lives can sometimes override diplomatic paralysis. ## Strategic Implications and Regional Dynamics This flood alert carries implications that extend beyond immediate disaster management. It suggests that despite the severity of the current diplomatic crisis, both nations retain channels for emergency communication—a crucial safety valve in a region where nuclear weapons add existential stakes to every escalation. The gesture also demonstrates the limits of complete diplomatic disengagement. Even in the midst of their worst crisis in years, practical necessities force some level of interaction. This creates a precedent that could potentially be leveraged for broader diplomatic re-engagement as the immediate emotions of the Pahalgam attack aftermath begin to cool. For regional observers, the flood warning offers a glimmer of hope that pragmatic considerations can still pierce through ideological barriers. It shows that while formal diplomatic mechanisms may be suspended, informal humanitarian channels can remain operational. ## Path Forward: Lessons from Crisis Communication The India-Pakistan flood alert offers several lessons for crisis management and diplomacy in South Asia. Natural disasters create moral imperatives that can override political calculations, providing opportunities for communication even during severe diplomatic freezes. The imperative to save lives transcends ideological barriers when the alternative—remaining silent and potentially allowing preventable deaths—becomes morally indefensible. The incident also demonstrates the critical importance of maintaining diverse diplomatic channels. When formal diplomatic mechanisms and technical bodies like the Indus Waters Commission are suspended, having alternative humanitarian channels ensures that essential communication can continue. This diplomatic redundancy prevents complete communication blackouts that could prove catastrophic during emergencies. As climate change intensifies extreme weather events across South Asia, shared environmental challenges may increasingly serve as diplomatic bridges between hostile neighbors. Unlike territorial disputes where one side's gain is another's loss, climate challenges create mutual vulnerabilities that incentivize cooperation regardless of political tensions. Finally, small humanitarian gestures like flood warnings can establish precedents for broader diplomatic re-engagement, creating templates for how nations can gradually rebuild communication channels after severe crises. The flood warning between India and Pakistan demonstrates that even in the darkest moments of diplomatic crisis, the imperative of human safety can create narrow but vital channels of communication. As both nations grapple with the increasing frequency of extreme weather events, such catastrophe diplomacy may become an increasingly important tool for maintaining minimal functional relations between South Asia's nuclear neighbors. Whether this humanitarian gesture can evolve into broader diplomatic re-engagement remains to be seen. However, it serves as a reminder that even the most frozen diplomatic relationships retain the potential for thaw when human lives hang in the balance. ### Cultural Diplomacy's Quiet Revolution: How Identity Politics Are Reshaping International Relations URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/cultural-diplomacys-quiet-revolution-how-identity-politics-are-reshaping-international-relations/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:22:57.000Z In September 2023, Taylor Swift's Eras Tour generated more diplomatic attention than many traditional state visits. When the pop star announced her Singapore concerts, neighboring countries lodged formal complaints about the city-state's exclusive deal, arguing it violated ASEAN's spirit of cooperation. What might seem like entertainment industry politics actually illuminated a profound shift in contemporary diplomacy: the growing recognition that cultural influence, identity narratives, and soft power projection have become as strategically important as military capabilities or economic leverage. This episode reflects a broader transformation in international relations. Today's diplomatic landscape increasingly revolves around questions of cultural authenticity, identity representation, and narrative control. From China's Confucius Institutes to India's International Day of Yoga, from South Korea's Hallyu wave to Nigeria's Nollywood expansion, nations are discovering that cultural diplomacy offers pathways to influence that traditional hard power cannot match. The result is a quiet revolution in how states project power, build alliances, and compete for global influence. ## Historical Arc of Cultural Diplomacy Cultural diplomacy is hardly new, but its contemporary manifestation represents a qualitative leap from earlier iterations. During the Cold War, cultural exchange served primarily as an ideological battleground—the United States promoting jazz and modern art to showcase democratic creativity, while the Soviet Union emphasized classical music and ballet to demonstrate socialist cultural achievement. These efforts, while significant, remained largely state-directed and ideologically rigid. The post-Cold War era initially witnessed a decline in systematic cultural diplomacy as Western liberal democracy appeared triumphant. However, the multipolar world that emerged in the 2000s created space for diverse cultural narratives to flourish. The September 11 attacks further crystallized the importance of cultural understanding, leading to renewed investment in public diplomacy and cultural exchange programs. What distinguishes today's cultural diplomacy is its sophistication, scale, and integration with broader strategic objectives. Modern cultural diplomacy operates across multiple channels simultaneously: government initiatives, private sector partnerships, civil society networks, and digital platforms. It leverages globalization's connectivity while addressing its discontents, offering authentic cultural experiences in an era of increasing homogenization. ## Four Pillars of Contemporary Cultural Power **Cultural Authenticity as Strategic Asset** Nations increasingly recognize that authentic cultural expressions carry more diplomatic weight than manufactured propaganda. South Korea's remarkable transformation from aid recipient to cultural superpower illustrates this principle. The Korean Wave, or Hallyu, began organically with television dramas in the late 1990s but received strategic government support through the Korea Creative Content Agency. By 2022, the Korean cultural content industry generated over $12 billion annually, while Korean language enrollment surged globally following the success of "Squid Game" and BTS. This success stems from Korea's ability to package distinctly Korean narratives—family relationships, social mobility struggles, cultural traditions—in universally accessible formats. Unlike earlier state-directed cultural exports, Korean content resonates because it addresses genuine human experiences while maintaining cultural specificity. **Digital Platforms and Cultural Democratization** Technology has fundamentally altered cultural diplomacy's dynamics. Digital platforms enable direct cultural exchange between societies, bypassing traditional diplomatic channels. TikTok's algorithm, for instance, has introduced millions of Americans to African music, Indian cooking, and Latin American dance—creating cultural connections that formal diplomacy struggles to achieve. However, this democratization also creates vulnerabilities. The European Union's Digital Services Act partly responds to concerns about foreign platforms shaping cultural narratives. China's TikTok faces restrictions in multiple countries over fears about data collection and content manipulation. These tensions highlight how digital cultural exchange intersects with national security considerations. **Identity Politics and Diaspora Engagement** Contemporary cultural diplomacy increasingly targets diaspora communities as bridges between homeland and host countries. India's Ministry of External Affairs operates extensive programs targeting the 32-million-strong Indian diaspora, recognizing their potential to influence host country policies toward India. Similarly, China's United Front Work Department coordinates outreach to Chinese diaspora communities, though these efforts have generated backlash in countries like Australia and Canada. The complexity emerges when cultural diplomacy intersects with domestic identity politics in host countries. Turkey's religious and cultural outreach to European Turkish communities sometimes conflicts with European integration policies. Iran's cultural centers face scrutiny for potentially supporting political activism among Iranian diaspora groups. **Economic Integration and Cultural Soft Power** Modern cultural diplomacy increasingly integrates with economic strategy. Japan's "Cool Japan" initiative explicitly links cultural exports with tourism, technology sales, and economic partnership. The Japan Foundation's cultural centers worldwide promote not just Japanese language and arts, but also Japanese business practices and technological innovation. Similarly, the United Arab Emirates has invested heavily in cultural infrastructure—the Louvre Abu Dhabi, the upcoming Guggenheim Abu Dhabi—as part of its economic diversification strategy. These investments aim to position the UAE as a cultural hub while attracting international businesses and skilled professionals. ## Cultural Diplomatic Innovation **China's Confucius Institute Experiment** China's Confucius Institute network, launched in 2004, represents the most ambitious state-led cultural diplomacy initiative in modern history. At its peak, over 500 institutes operated in more than 140 countries, teaching Chinese language and promoting Chinese culture to millions of students. However, the program's trajectory illustrates cultural diplomacy's inherent tensions. Initially welcomed by universities seeking Chinese language instruction, the institutes faced growing criticism for academic freedom restrictions and political influence concerns. The United States designated the Confucius Institute U.S. Center as a foreign mission in 2020, while countries including Sweden, Denmark, and Germany have closed multiple institutes. China's response has been instructive: rather than abandoning cultural outreach, it has developed more sophisticated approaches. The new Chinese International Education Foundation operates with greater autonomy from government oversight, while private companies like ByteDance (TikTok's parent company) pursue cultural influence through commercial channels. **The African Renaissance and Cultural Reclamation** Africa's cultural diplomacy represents perhaps the most significant untold story in contemporary international relations. Nigeria's Nollywood has become the world's second-largest film industry by volume, with productions distributed across Africa, the Caribbean, and diaspora communities worldwide. This cultural export success has coincided with Nigeria's growing diplomatic influence in West Africa and beyond. Ghana's "Year of Return" campaign in 2019 exemplified strategic cultural diplomacy, attracting over one million visitors and generating $1.9 billion in tourism revenue. The initiative explicitly targeted African diaspora communities, positioning Ghana as a cultural homeland while strengthening economic ties with diaspora populations. South Africa's cultural diplomacy operates differently, emphasizing reconciliation narratives and constitutional democracy as exportable models. The Nelson Mandela Foundation and constitutional court have become pilgrimage sites for democracy activists worldwide, while South African musicians and artists promote messages of unity and human rights. ## Geopolitical Implications and Strategic Challenges This cultural diplomacy revolution creates several profound implications for international relations. First, it challenges traditional power hierarchies. Countries with limited military or economic power can achieve significant influence through cultural appeal. South Korea's global influence today far exceeds what its GDP or military capabilities might predict. Second, cultural diplomacy operates on different timescales than traditional diplomacy. Cultural influence builds gradually but can create lasting attachments that survive political disagreements. American cultural influence persisted throughout various periods of anti-American sentiment globally, while negative perceptions of Chinese government policies coexist with growing appreciation for Chinese culture and philosophy. Third, cultural diplomacy creates new vulnerabilities. Dependence on foreign cultural platforms, educational partnerships, or tourism can become sources of leverage during diplomatic disputes. When China imposed tourism restrictions on South Korea following the THAAD missile defense deployment, it demonstrated how cultural and economic ties could become coercive tools. The intersection of cultural diplomacy with domestic politics also creates complications. European countries struggle to balance multicultural integration with concerns about foreign cultural influence. The United States debates whether international student exchanges strengthen American higher education or create security vulnerabilities. ## Future Trajectories and Diplomatic Opportunities Looking ahead, several trends will likely shape cultural diplomacy's evolution. Artificial intelligence and virtual reality technologies will create new possibilities for immersive cultural experiences, potentially revolutionizing cultural exchange. Climate change and global challenges will create demands for cultural narratives that transcend national boundaries while addressing shared human concerns. The post-pandemic world has accelerated digital cultural exchange while highlighting the irreplaceable value of physical cultural encounters. Countries that successfully blend digital and physical cultural diplomacy—creating online communities that encourage real-world connections—will likely achieve the greatest influence. Perhaps most significantly, the next generation of cultural diplomacy must address authenticity questions in an era of manufactured viral content and deepfake technologies. Countries that maintain genuine cultural expressions while adapting to new distribution channels will build more sustainable influence than those that prioritize manipulation over authentic engagement. The quiet revolution in cultural diplomacy ultimately reflects broader changes in how power operates in an interconnected world. As military conflict becomes more costly and economic integration creates mutual vulnerabilities, the ability to inspire, attract, and persuade through cultural means becomes increasingly valuable. Nations that master this new frontier of diplomacy will find themselves better positioned to navigate the complex challenges of 21st-century international relations, building influence that transcends traditional geopolitical boundaries while creating genuine connections between peoples across cultural divides. ### AI as Power: Can Diplomacy Keep Up With the Technology Race? URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/ai-as-power-can-diplomacy-keep-up-with-the-technology-race/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:22:35.000Z In the past decade, artificial intelligence (AI) has evolved from a speculative technology into a central axis of global competition. Nations now speak of AI in the same breath as energy security, nuclear deterrence, and strategic alliances. Washington frames it as a contest with Beijing; Brussels views it through the lens of regulation and ethics; while emerging economies see both peril and opportunity. The stakes are [immense](https://www.pwc.com/m1/en/publications/potential-impact-artificial-intelligence-middle-east.html?ref=diplopolis.com): by 2030, AI could add up to $15.7 trillion to the global economy, a sum larger than the GDP of China and India combined. Yet behind this promise lies a profound question—how is AI reshaping the distribution of power among states, corporations, and societies? The geopolitics of AI is not only about algorithms and data, but about sovereignty, security, and the very architecture of the global order. ## Technology as a Strategic Arena The relationship between technology and power is not new. From Britain’s mastery of steam power in the 19th century to America’s dominance in nuclear weapons and the internet, technological revolutions have historically redrawn the geopolitical map. What makes AI distinctive is its pervasiveness. Unlike nuclear weapons—restricted to a handful of states—AI is dual-use, diffusing rapidly into civilian and military spheres. It underpins surveillance systems in Xinjiang, enables drone warfare in Ukraine, and drives recommendation engines shaping political discourse in democracies. AI is also deeply entangled with other technological domains: semiconductor supply chains, quantum computing, cloud infrastructure, and cybersecurity. Control over these “choke points” has become as important as territorial control in past eras. For instance, Taiwan’s TSMC, the world’s most advanced chipmaker, is now a geostrategic asset courted by Washington and threatened by Beijing. The U.S. export controls on advanced chips to China, first imposed in October 2022 and expanded since, mark the most significant technological containment strategy since the Cold War. Finally, the geopolitics of AI unfolds in a multipolar environment. Unlike the bipolarity of the U.S.-Soviet contest, today’s landscape involves great powers, middle states, private corporations, and transnational institutions—all competing and cooperating simultaneously. This complexity makes AI geopolitics less predictable, but more consequential. ## Political and Strategic Dimensions At the heart of AI geopolitics is the rivalry between the United States and China. Washington sees leadership in AI as essential to maintaining global primacy. The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy explicitly named AI as a “critical emerging technology” tied to national security. Beijing, in turn, released its “New Generation AI Development Plan” the same year, aiming to become the [global leader](https://www.ginc.org/chinas-national-ai-strategy/?ref=diplopolis.com) in AI by 2030. China’s model leverages state-led investments, vast datasets, and authoritarian governance to accelerate innovation. AI powers its surveillance state, from facial recognition cameras to predictive policing, and increasingly informs its military modernization. For the U.S., the challenge is to mobilize private-sector innovation—concentrated in Silicon Valley giants like Google, Microsoft, and OpenAI—while aligning it with national strategy. Other states are also entering the fray. The European Union positions itself as a normative power, emphasizing “trustworthy AI” and pioneering regulations like the AI Act. India, home to a massive digital population, seeks to position itself as both a developer and ethical steward of AI, though constrained by infrastructural gaps. Gulf states such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia are investing billions in AI as part of diversification strategies, aiming to leapfrog into the knowledge economy. ## Economic and Industrial Dimensions AI is becoming a determinant of economic competitiveness. Countries leading in AI research and commercialization are positioned to capture disproportionate gains in productivity. A [PwC report](https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/analytics/assets/pwc-ai-analysis-sizing-the-prize-report.pdf?ref=diplopolis.com) estimates that China alone could see a 26% boost in GDP from AI by 2030, compared to 14% for North America. Semiconductors are the backbone of this contest. The U.S. has sought to weaponize its dominance in chip design and manufacturing tools, restricting China’s access to advanced processors. China, meanwhile, has doubled down on building a self-reliant semiconductor ecosystem, investing over $40 billion in its “Big Fund.” This has triggered what some call a “chip cold war.” Beyond chips, AI is transforming global labor markets. Automation threatens millions of low- and middle-skill jobs, from manufacturing in Southeast Asia to call centers in India. Yet it also creates opportunities in high-skill domains like data science, cybersecurity, and robotics. States that fail to adapt risk economic marginalization, exacerbating inequality within and between nations. ## Security and Military Dimensions AI is revolutionizing warfare. The Russia–Ukraine conflict has already been called the first “AI-enhanced” war, where machine learning algorithms optimize drone targeting, satellite imagery analysis, and electronic warfare. The U.S. Department of Defense is testing AI-enabled command systems under its “Joint All-Domain Command and Control” (JADC2) initiative, while China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has incorporated AI into war-gaming and autonomous systems. The ethical dilemmas are stark. Lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs) raise questions about accountability: who is responsible when a machine kills? While the United Nations has debated bans or restrictions, major powers have resisted, seeing AI as a decisive military edge. Without agreed norms, the risk of an AI arms race—fueled by secrecy and mistrust—is high. AI also amplifies non-traditional security threats. Deepfakes and generative AI tools have lowered the barriers for disinformation campaigns, undermining democratic processes. Cyber operations augmented by AI could disrupt financial systems, power grids, or even nuclear command-and-control, escalating risks of miscalculation. ## Cultural and Ethical Dimensions The AI race is not only about power but values. The U.S. and Europe promote frameworks emphasizing privacy, transparency, and human rights. China champions “cyber-sovereignty,” arguing that states should control how AI is developed and used domestically. These competing visions reflect deeper ideological divides about governance, freedom, and order in the digital age. For the Global South, the ethical dilemma is acute. Should they adopt Chinese AI systems, often cheaper but less protective of rights, or Western alternatives, which may come with political conditions? This is already evident in Africa, where Chinese firms like Huawei and Hikvision supply surveillance technologies under the Belt and Road Initiative’s “Digital Silk Road.” The diffusion of such tools risks entrenching digital authoritarianism. Civil society and academia play a vital role in contesting these narratives. Initiatives such as the OECD Principles on AI or UNESCO’s Recommendation on the Ethics of AI seek to create global baselines. Yet without binding enforcement, these remain aspirational, highlighting the tension between voluntary norms and hard power. ## U.S.–China AI Rivalry The U.S. ban on semiconductor exports to China in 2022 was a watershed. By restricting access to NVIDIA’s high-performance GPUs, Washington aimed to slow Beijing’s progress in training large AI models. In response, China accelerated efforts to develop indigenous alternatives, while seeking workarounds through imports from third countries. This episode illustrates the weaponization of supply chains as a tool of geopolitical strategy. It also underscores the blurred line between economic and security logics. For American firms, China is a lucrative market; yet for the U.S. government, national security trumps commercial interests. This tension will intensify as AI models become more advanced and embedded in defense systems. ## AI in the Middle East The Gulf states exemplify how middle powers use AI to diversify their economies and project influence. The UAE launched the world’s first Ministry of Artificial Intelligence in 2017, while Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 identifies AI as central to its post-oil future. Abu Dhabi has invested in large AI firms, most notably G42, which collaborates with both Chinese and American partners. Yet these efforts are not just economic. By positioning themselves as hubs of AI innovation, Gulf states enhance their strategic relevance. They also navigate great-power rivalry, balancing ties with Washington and Beijing while carving out diplomatic autonomy. This demonstrates how AI enables smaller states to punch above their weight in the global order. ## Implications The geopolitics of AI has three major implications. First, it accelerates the shift toward a fragmented global order. Competing standards, export controls, and regulatory regimes risk creating “AI blocs,” mirroring the internet’s fragmentation into digital spheres of influence. This undermines the universalist aspirations of global governance. Second, AI intensifies inequality. Advanced economies and tech corporations capture most gains, while vulnerable states face job losses and dependency on foreign technologies. Unless international mechanisms address these asymmetries—through technology transfer, training, or financing—AI could deepen the global North-South divide. Third, AI heightens the risks of instability. From autonomous weapons to algorithmic disinformation, the potential for escalation and manipulation grows. Traditional arms control frameworks are ill-suited for regulating algorithms. This calls for creative diplomacy—new treaties, confidence-building measures, and multi-stakeholder dialogues that include not only states but also corporations and civil society. AI is not simply another tool of statecraft; it is reshaping the very foundations of power. Just as the nuclear revolution altered strategy in the 20th century, the AI revolution is redefining sovereignty, security, and legitimacy in the 21st. Yet unlike nuclear weapons, AI is diffuse, fast-moving, and deeply embedded in everyday life. This makes it harder to regulate—but also more urgent. Looking ahead, the question is whether the world can avoid an AI-driven arms race and instead harness the technology for cooperative ends. Initiatives like the G7’s “Hiroshima AI Process” and India’s push for inclusive AI governance at the G20 are steps in that direction. But they remain tentative compared to the scale of the challenge. The geopolitics of AI is ultimately a test of whether humanity can reconcile technological change with political responsibility. If states see AI solely as a weapon in zero-sum competition, fragmentation and instability will follow. If, however, they craft shared rules and norms, AI could become not just a driver of power, but a foundation for a more resilient global order. ### What is Environmental Geopolitics? A Guide to the 21st Century’s Most Critical Foreign Policy Challenge URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/what-is-environmental-geopolitics-a-guide-to-the-21st-centurys-most-critical-foreign-policy-challenge/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:22:05.000Z For much of the 20th century, geopolitics was defined by territorial ambition, military might, and economic leverage. Borders, armies, and trade routes dictated the rhythm of international relations. But the 21st century has introduced a new, destabilizing variable: the environment. Rising global temperatures, extreme weather events, water scarcity, and the urgent race for renewable resources have transformed environmental issues into strategic levers of power. Environmental geopolitics is the study of how environmental change interacts with global politics. It explores how states, multinational organizations, and non-state actors navigate competition, cooperation, and conflict around environmental challenges. Simply put, climate change and ecological pressures are no longer background concerns—they are central determinants of national security, foreign policy, and global strategy. ## From Climate to Conflict: The Conceptual Framework ### Environmental Stress as a Strategic Factor Historically, environmental events were treated as humanitarian or development issues rather than core security concerns. Floods, droughts, or resource shortages were local or regional crises. Today, environmental stressors are recognized as *threat multipliers*—conditions that exacerbate pre-existing tensions. For instance, prolonged drought can intensify migration, fuel competition for arable land, and heighten political instability. ### Defining Environmental Geopolitics At its core, environmental geopolitics explores the intersection of three powerful forces: resource scarcity, environmental change, and power dynamics. Resource scarcity involves the growing competition for essentials such as water, arable land, minerals, and energy sources. Environmental change encompasses the impacts of climate shifts, extreme weather events, and ecological degradation that reshape human and natural systems. Power dynamics capture how states, corporations, and multilateral organizations leverage or contest control over these critical resources. By examining these forces together, environmental geopolitics moves beyond the study of politics in isolation, offering a lens to understand why nations adopt particular strategic choices in an increasingly warming and resource-constrained world. ## Water and Transboundary Conflicts One of the clearest illustrations of environmental geopolitics is water management. Transboundary rivers, such as the Nile, Mekong, or Indus, are critical to the livelihoods of hundreds of millions. Climate change intensifies variability, creating conditions ripe for conflict—or cooperation. Take the Nile Basin: Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam has become a geopolitical flashpoint. Egypt fears reduced water flow, while Ethiopia asserts its right to develop and use its resources. This conflict is not just about water—it is about national security, regional influence, and negotiating power on the international stage. ## Energy Transition and Global Power Shifts Environmental geopolitics is not limited to crises; it also shapes opportunity. The global transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy is redistributing power. Countries rich in lithium, cobalt, or rare earth minerals—essential for batteries and solar technology—are emerging as key players in the new energy order. Meanwhile, traditional oil and gas exporters are recalibrating their economic and diplomatic strategies. This shift illustrates the dual nature of environmental geopolitics: the climate crisis creates both vulnerability and opportunity. States that adapt strategically—through green technology, resilient infrastructure, and climate-smart diplomacy—stand to gain influence, while laggards risk marginalization. ## Climate Security: Reconceptualizing National Defense For decades, national security focused on military threats. Environmental geopolitics reframes security in a broader sense. Rising seas threaten naval bases and coastal cities. Extreme weather can destabilize states and trigger mass migration. Resource competition may fuel regional conflicts. Organizations such as NATO, the United Nations, and the U.S. Department of Defense increasingly recognize climate change as a security threat. Military planners now incorporate climate scenarios into operational readiness and strategic planning. This represents a paradigm shift: environmental considerations are no longer secondary—they are central to the calculus of power. ## Global Governance and Environmental Diplomacy Environmental geopolitics also redefines diplomacy. Climate summits, multilateral treaties, and international agreements are arenas where states negotiate both ecological goals and strategic advantage. The Paris Agreement, for example, is more than a climate treaty—it is a geopolitical reshuffle. Countries negotiate emission targets, financing, and technology transfer not only to address climate change but to secure influence and economic leverage. Non-state actors—NGOs, corporations, and research institutions—play an increasingly significant role. From lobbying for renewable energy investment to mediating transboundary conflicts, these actors are part of the new environmental power network. ## Methodologies in Environmental Geopolitical Analysis Analysts studying environmental geopolitics rely on a range of methodologies that bring together science, data, and policy. Geospatial data, such as satellite imagery, is used to monitor deforestation, glacier retreat, and changing water levels, providing tangible evidence of environmental stress. Climate modeling offers predictive insights by simulating how shifts in climate could affect political and economic systems. Scenario planning helps evaluate possible outcomes of resource scarcity, mass migration, or energy transitions, and how these dynamics might influence regional stability. Policy analysis, meanwhile, examines the extent to which national strategies acknowledge—or overlook—climate risks. Together, these methods equip policymakers and researchers with the tools to anticipate challenges and craft informed responses to the complex realities of environmental geopolitics. ## Emerging Trends in Environmental Geopolitics Several emerging trends are reshaping the field of environmental geopolitics, beginning with the Arctic. As ice melts at unprecedented rates, new shipping lanes are opening and previously inaccessible natural resources are becoming available. This transformation has heightened competition among major powers such as the United States, Russia, and China, as well as the Arctic states themselves, making the region a focal point of strategic rivalry. Another critical trend is climate-induced migration. Rising sea levels, prolonged droughts, and desertification are forcing large populations to relocate, often across national borders. These mass movements of people not only create immense humanitarian crises but also spark political tensions and security challenges in receiving regions, testing the resilience of international systems of governance and aid. At the same time, green technology is emerging as a powerful tool of diplomacy. Nations are increasingly using renewable energy innovations, control over battery supply chains, and participation in carbon markets as instruments of foreign policy. This form of “green diplomacy” allows states to project influence and secure long-term strategic advantages in the global energy transition. Finally, climate litigation is gaining traction as both international and domestic courts become arenas for enforcing accountability. Lawsuits targeting governments and corporations are shaping how states behave and respond to climate risks. Collectively, these trends underscore the urgency of integrating environmental concerns into the core of geopolitical strategy, as the consequences of inaction are no longer distant but immediate and deeply consequential. ## Implications for Policy and Strategy Environmental geopolitics compels policymakers and strategists to recognize that climate and ecological factors are now inseparable from political power. This means incorporating environmental risks directly into national security planning, ensuring that defense and strategic outlooks account for the destabilizing effects of climate change. It also requires active participation in multilateral diplomacy to manage transboundary resources such as rivers, forests, and oceans that no single nation can control alone. At the domestic level, investing in climate resilience and adaptive infrastructure becomes essential to safeguard societies against extreme weather and resource scarcity. Equally important is collaboration with non-state actors—including NGOs, businesses, and local communities—to develop sustainable solutions that bridge the gap between policy and practice. ## Future of Global Power is Green Environmental geopolitics is more than a theoretical framework—it is the lens through which contemporary global affairs must be understood. Climate change, resource scarcity, and environmental degradation are not peripheral—they are central determinants of power, diplomacy, and conflict. As the 21st century progresses, nations, corporations, and civil society must navigate a world in which environmental challenges are inseparable from strategic interests. Those who understand and act upon the dynamics of environmental geopolitics will shape the emerging order; those who do not risk being left behind. In short, the age of environmental geopolitics has arrived. And it will define the contours of global power for decades to come. ### Death of Privacy: How Digital Surveillance Is Reshaping International Relations and State Power URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/death-of-privacy-how-digital-surveillance-is-reshaping-international-relations-and-state-power/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:21:25.000Z In 2023, the Mexican government discovered that Israeli spyware had infiltrated the phones of Supreme Court justices, human rights activists, and journalists—surveillance conducted not by foreign intelligence agencies, but by the Mexican state itself using tools purchased from the NSO Group. This revelation, part of a global pattern involving over 50 governments deploying commercial spyware against their own citizens, illustrates how digital surveillance has fundamentally altered the relationship between states and societies. Today, governments possess unprecedented capabilities to monitor, predict, and influence human behavior at scales unimaginable just two decades ago. The transformation extends far beyond domestic governance. Digital surveillance has become a primary instrument of international statecraft, reshaping alliance structures, trade relationships, and concepts of sovereignty itself. When the United States banned TikTok citing data security concerns, it wasn't merely regulating a social media platform—it was asserting that Chinese access to American user data constituted a national security threat. Similarly, Europe's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) functions as both privacy legislation and economic diplomacy, imposing European values on global technology companies while generating billions in fines for non-compliance. This digital revolution in state power represents one of the most significant shifts in international relations since the nuclear age, yet it operates largely invisible to public scrutiny. Unlike military deployments or economic sanctions, surveillance capabilities develop in classified environments and deploy through commercial platforms that citizens use voluntarily. The result is a fundamental restructuring of global power dynamics that challenges core assumptions about privacy, sovereignty, and democratic governance. ## Historical Evolution of State Surveillance State surveillance has existed throughout human history, but its scale, scope, and sophistication have undergone revolutionary change in the digital age. Traditional intelligence gathering required significant human resources and physical access, naturally limiting governments' ability to monitor large populations continuously. The Stasi, East Germany's notorious secret police, employed an estimated 91,000 officers and 173,000 informants to surveil 16 million citizens—a massive undertaking that ultimately consumed 2% of the country's workforce. Digital technology eliminates these resource constraints while exponentially expanding surveillance capabilities. Modern smartphones generate approximately 2.5 quintillion bytes of data daily, creating detailed records of human movement, communication, consumption, and behavior that governments can access through legal processes, commercial partnerships, or covert operations. The National Security Agency's PRISM program, revealed by Edward Snowden in 2013, demonstrated how intelligence agencies could harvest vast quantities of personal data from technology companies with minimal human resources or public awareness. This transformation reflects broader changes in information technology architecture. The internet's original design prioritized connectivity and efficiency over security or privacy, creating structural vulnerabilities that both democratic and authoritarian governments have learned to exploit. Cloud computing centralizes data storage in ways that facilitate government access, while artificial intelligence enables pattern recognition across datasets too large for human analysis. The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated these trends as governments worldwide deployed digital contact tracing, movement monitoring, and health surveillance systems with limited oversight or sunset provisions. South Korea's aggressive digital contact tracing helped control viral spread but created detailed databases of citizen movements and associations that persist beyond the health emergency. ## Five Dimensions of Digital Surveillance Geopolitics ### The Authoritarian Advantage Authoritarian governments possess structural advantages in deploying surveillance technologies that challenge fundamental assumptions about the relationship between regime type and technological capability. China's Social Credit System represents the most comprehensive attempt to integrate digital surveillance with governance, combining financial records, social media activity, travel patterns, and behavioral assessments into unified citizen scores that determine access to employment, education, transportation, and housing. The system processes data from over 600 million surveillance cameras, mobile payment platforms, social media networks, and government databases to create real-time assessments of citizen "trustworthiness." By 2020, the system had restricted 23 million citizens from purchasing flight tickets and 11 million from buying high-speed train tickets, demonstrating how digital surveillance can enforce social control without traditional coercive methods. China's surveillance capabilities extend globally through technology exports and infrastructure investments. Huawei's telecommunications equipment, deployed in over 170 countries, includes capabilities that could enable Chinese intelligence access to foreign communications networks. The company's "Safe City" projects in countries like Serbia, Uganda, and Ecuador integrate Chinese surveillance technologies with local law enforcement, potentially creating intelligence-gathering opportunities while strengthening authoritarian governance models. Russia's SORM (System for Operative Investigative Activities) requires internet service providers and telecommunications companies to install equipment enabling real-time government access to communications. This system, operational since the 1990s but significantly expanded in recent years, provides security services with comprehensive monitoring capabilities while avoiding the legal and political constraints that limit democratic governments' surveillance activities. ### Democratic Surveillance Dilemmas Democratic governments face complex tensions between security imperatives and privacy rights that authoritarian regimes can ignore. The United States operates the world's most sophisticated intelligence apparatus while maintaining constitutional protections that theoretically limit domestic surveillance. However, the distinction between domestic and foreign intelligence has blurred as digital communications cross international boundaries and American technology companies serve global users. The Five Eyes intelligence alliance between the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand demonstrates how democratic governments circumvent domestic surveillance restrictions through international cooperation. Partner agencies can collect intelligence on each other's citizens that would be illegal if conducted domestically, then share the information through "liaison relationships" that technically comply with legal restrictions. European approaches emphasize regulatory constraints over intelligence capabilities, with GDPR establishing the world's most comprehensive privacy protection framework. However, European intelligence services maintain significant surveillance capabilities, and the regulation's extraterritorial reach has created tensions with countries that view European privacy standards as barriers to legitimate security cooperation. The Israeli model illustrates how democratic governments can develop advanced surveillance capabilities through security imperatives. The NSO Group's Pegasus spyware, capable of completely compromising smartphones without user interaction, has been sold to governments worldwide despite evidence of abuse against journalists, activists, and political opponents. Israel's regulatory approach treats surveillance technology as a strategic export while maintaining limited oversight over end-use monitoring. ### Corporate Surveillance Infrastructure Technology companies have become central actors in global surveillance ecosystems, possessing capabilities that rival or exceed those of many governments. Google processes over 8.5 billion searches daily, Facebook maintains detailed profiles on 2.9 billion monthly active users, and Amazon's Alexa devices create continuous audio records in millions of homes. This data collection occurs through terms of service agreements that users rarely read but legally authorize extensive surveillance. The business model of "surveillance capitalism," as scholar Shoshana Zuboff terms it, transforms human behavior into predictive products that companies sell to advertisers, governments, and other third parties. This creates structural incentives for maximum data collection while minimizing user awareness or control, aligning corporate profits with state surveillance objectives. Government-corporate surveillance partnerships operate through various mechanisms, from legal compulsion under programs like PRISM to voluntary cooperation through programs like the FBI's InfraGard network. The revelation that NSA contractors working at technology companies could access user data without formal legal process demonstrated how traditional distinctions between public and private surveillance have collapsed. Chinese technology companies face different constraints, with national intelligence laws requiring cooperation with state security agencies when requested. This creates automatic suspicion of Chinese technology platforms in democratic countries while providing Beijing with potential access to global user data through companies like TikTok, which claims 1 billion monthly active users worldwide. ### Data Sovereignty and Cyber Borders The concept of data sovereignty—national control over data generated within territorial boundaries—has emerged as a key principle in digital diplomacy. Russia's data localization requirements mandate that personal data of Russian citizens be stored on servers within Russian territory, enabling government access while complicating foreign intelligence collection. China's Cybersecurity Law and Data Security Law establish comprehensive frameworks for state control over data flows, requiring companies to undergo security reviews before transferring important data overseas and providing authorities with broad powers to access information for national security purposes. These regulations effectively create "cyber borders" that divide the global internet along national lines. The European Union's approach emphasizes adequacy decisions that determine which countries provide sufficient privacy protection to receive European data transfers. These decisions function as diplomatic tools, with the EU using data transfer restrictions to pressure countries to strengthen privacy protections while rewarding compliant nations with improved market access. India's proposed Data Protection Bill would create a Data Protection Authority with extensive powers to regulate cross-border data flows and require local storage of sensitive data. This reflects growing recognition among emerging powers that data governance represents a crucial aspect of digital sovereignty that cannot be left entirely to market forces. ### Surveillance Technology Proliferation Commercial surveillance technologies have proliferated globally with minimal oversight or export controls, enabling governments with limited technical capabilities to acquire sophisticated monitoring systems. The global spyware market, valued at approximately $12 billion annually, provides even small nations with capabilities that previously required massive intelligence infrastructures. The NSO Group's client list reportedly included 40 government customers across five continents, demonstrating how Israeli surveillance technology has become a global commodity. Similar companies in France, Germany, Italy, and other countries provide competing products, creating a marketplace where surveillance capabilities are available to any government willing to pay market prices. This proliferation creates new forms of international instability as governments gain capabilities to monitor dissidents, journalists, and political opponents across borders. The 2021 Pegasus Project investigation revealed targeting of heads of state, cabinet ministers, and diplomats by foreign governments using commercial spyware, representing a form of espionage that bypasses traditional diplomatic protections. Social media intelligence (SOCMINT) tools enable governments to monitor public communications, predict social unrest, and identify protest organizers through automated analysis of platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and Telegram. These capabilities have been used to suppress democratic movements from Hong Kong to Belarus while providing early warning systems for authoritarian governments facing popular challenges. ## Surveillance Diplomacy ### The TikTok Wars The global controversy surrounding TikTok illustrates how social media platforms have become instruments of digital diplomacy and national security policy. The United States government's attempts to ban or force divestiture of TikTok reflect concerns that ByteDance, the app's Chinese parent company, could provide Beijing with access to American user data or influence American public opinion through algorithmic manipulation. TikTok's response strategy demonstrates how technology companies navigate conflicting national requirements. The company established data centers in Singapore and Virginia, hired American executives, and created transparency reports to address security concerns while maintaining Chinese ownership. However, these measures failed to satisfy American security agencies, which argued that Chinese national intelligence laws would compel cooperation regardless of corporate structure. The TikTok controversy has spread globally, with India banning the application entirely following border tensions with China, while European regulators have launched investigations into data handling practices. This fragmentation of the global internet along national security lines represents a fundamental shift from the open, borderless internet envisioned by early advocates. ### European Privacy Diplomacy Europe's GDPR has functioned as both domestic legislation and international diplomacy, imposing European privacy values on global technology companies while generating significant friction with countries that prioritize security or economic growth over privacy protection. The regulation's extraterritorial reach means that any company serving European users must comply with European standards, effectively globalizing European privacy norms. GDPR enforcement has generated over €1.6 billion in fines since implementation, with major penalties imposed on American technology companies including Google (€90 million), Facebook (€405 million), and Amazon (€746 million). These fines represent more than regulatory enforcement; they constitute a form of economic diplomacy that redistributes wealth from American companies to European governments. The regulation has inspired similar legislation worldwide, from California's Consumer Privacy Act to Brazil's Lei Geral de Proteção de Dados, demonstrating how regulatory leadership can project soft power globally. However, it has also created tensions with countries that view European privacy standards as barriers to legitimate law enforcement cooperation and economic development. ### China's Digital Silk Road China's Digital Silk Road initiative extends surveillance capabilities globally through infrastructure investments, technology transfers, and standard-setting activities. The project involves laying undersea cables, building data centers, and installing telecommunications networks that could provide China with intelligence collection opportunities while reducing global dependence on Western technology providers. Chinese companies have built or operate critical telecommunications infrastructure in over 70 countries, creating potential vulnerabilities that concern Western intelligence agencies. The debate over Huawei's 5G technology reflects broader concerns about Chinese access to critical communications infrastructure, with the United States pressuring allies to exclude Chinese equipment from sensitive networks. However, many developing countries view Chinese technology offerings as more affordable and accessible than Western alternatives, creating tensions between security concerns and development needs. The choice between Chinese and Western technology platforms increasingly reflects broader geopolitical alignments rather than purely technical considerations. ## Strategic Implications for Global Order Digital surveillance capabilities are reshaping international relations in ways that challenge traditional concepts of sovereignty, diplomacy, and state power. The ability to monitor communications, predict behavior, and influence opinion across borders creates new forms of statecraft that operate below the threshold of traditional conflict while potentially achieving strategic effects. The proliferation of surveillance technologies is creating new vulnerabilities for democratic societies, which depend on open information flows and citizen participation. Authoritarian governments can use surveillance capabilities to suppress dissent, monitor diaspora communities, and intimidate critics abroad, while democratic governments struggle to balance security needs with constitutional protections. The emergence of competing surveillance models—Chinese state control, American corporate collection, European regulatory constraints—reflects broader competition over the future of digital governance. These models are increasingly incompatible, leading to internet fragmentation and the creation of separate digital spheres aligned with different political systems. International law has struggled to address surveillance activities that cross borders through commercial platforms and technical infrastructure. Traditional concepts of espionage and diplomatic immunity become meaningless when governments can access foreign communications through commercial data brokers or technical vulnerabilities in global platforms. ## Navigating the Surveillance Society The transformation of surveillance from an exceptional state power to a routine aspect of digital life represents one of the most significant political changes of the 21st century. Citizens worldwide now live under levels of monitoring that would have seemed dystopian to previous generations, yet this transformation has occurred gradually and largely invisibly through the voluntary adoption of digital technologies. The challenge facing democratic societies is developing governance frameworks that can regulate surveillance activities while preserving legitimate security capabilities and technological innovation. This requires international cooperation on standards, transparency requirements, and accountability mechanisms that can operate across different legal and political systems. Success will depend on recognizing that privacy is not merely a individual right but a collective good essential for democratic governance, creative expression, and social development. As surveillance capabilities continue expanding through artificial intelligence, biometric identification, and internet-connected devices, the choices made today about digital governance will determine whether technology serves human flourishing or enables unprecedented forms of social control. The death of privacy is not inevitable, but preventing it will require unprecedented international cooperation and political commitment to human dignity in the digital age. ### Scramble for Critical Minerals: How Lithium, Cobalt, and Rare Earths Are Fueling New Conflicts URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/scramble-for-critical-minerals-how-lithium-cobalt-and-rare-earths-are-fueling-new-conflicts/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:19:45.000Z Deep beneath the Congo Basin, children as young as seven descend into dangerous cobalt mines to extract a mineral essential for every smartphone, electric vehicle, and wind turbine battery on Earth. Meanwhile, in the remote salt flats of Chile's Atacama Desert, lithium extraction operations consume 65% of regional water supplies, threatening indigenous communities' survival as global demand for electric vehicle batteries surges 30% annually. These scenes underscore a fundamental shift in geopolitical competition: the new "Great Game" revolves not around oil fields or shipping lanes, but around critical minerals buried in some of the world's most unstable regions. The green energy transition has created unprecedented demand for materials like lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earth elements—minerals essential for solar panels, wind turbines, and battery storage systems. China currently controls 80% of global rare earth processing, while the Democratic Republic of Congo produces 70% of the world's cobalt under conditions that international observers describe as a humanitarian crisis. As nations scramble to secure supply chains for their clean energy futures, these mineral dependencies are reshaping alliance structures, trade relationships, and conflict dynamics across continents. This mineral scramble represents more than economic competition; it reflects a fundamental tension between climate imperatives and geopolitical realities. The same materials needed to combat climate change are concentrated in regions plagued by political instability, human rights abuses, and Chinese economic influence, creating strategic vulnerabilities that could undermine the global energy transition itself. ## Geological Foundation of Green Power The transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy systems requires massive quantities of specific minerals that exist in commercially viable concentrations in relatively few locations worldwide. A single electric vehicle battery contains approximately 17 pounds of lithium, 77 pounds of nickel, and 30 pounds of cobalt—materials that must be extracted, refined, and processed before reaching consumers. Lithium, dubbed "white gold" for its silvery appearance and soaring value, is primarily found in two geological formations: hard rock deposits in Australia and underground brines in South America's "lithium triangle" spanning Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia. These three countries control an estimated 58% of global lithium reserves, with Bolivia alone possessing 21 million tons—approximately one-quarter of known global reserves. Rare earth elements, despite their name, are relatively abundant in Earth's crust but extremely difficult to extract and process without severe environmental consequences. China's dominance in this sector stems not from geological advantage but from willingness to accept environmental and health costs that Western nations have deemed unacceptable. The processing of rare earths generates toxic waste streams and radioactive byproducts that require careful management over decades. The concentration of these resources creates what economists call "resource curse" vulnerabilities—nations rich in critical minerals often struggle with governance challenges, while consumer nations face supply security risks. This dynamic has become more pronounced as clean energy demand accelerates faster than new supply sources can be developed. ## Five Dimensions of Mineral Geopolitics ### China's Strategic Dominance China's control over critical mineral supply chains represents one of the most significant strategic advantages in contemporary international relations. Beyond holding substantial reserves of several critical minerals, China has systematically invested in processing infrastructure, overseas mining operations, and technological capabilities that give it near-monopolistic control over global supplies. In rare earth elements, China processes approximately 85% of global production despite holding only 37% of known reserves. This dominance stems from decades of investment in refining capabilities while Western nations shuttered operations due to environmental concerns and cost pressures. The closure of California's Mountain Pass mine in 2002, following environmental violations, exemplified how strict environmental standards inadvertently strengthened Chinese market control. China's Belt and Road Initiative has extended this mineral dominance globally through strategic investments in mining operations across Africa, Latin America, and Central Asia. Chinese companies own or have significant stakes in lithium projects in Argentina, Chile, and Australia, cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and copper operations in Peru and Zambia. This "resource diplomacy" provides Beijing with leverage over nations dependent on Chinese investment while securing long-term supply agreements. The weaponization potential of this dominance became apparent in 2010 when China temporarily restricted rare earth exports to Japan during a diplomatic dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Although the restrictions lasted only months, they demonstrated how mineral dependencies could be leveraged for political objectives, prompting urgent diversification efforts among consuming nations. ### The Democratic Republic of Congo Crisis The Democratic Republic of Congo's cobalt sector exemplifies how mineral wealth can perpetuate rather than alleviate instability and suffering. Despite possessing an estimated 3.4 million tons of cobalt reserves—representing 48% of global totals—the DRC remains among the world's poorest nations, with 77% of its population living below the international poverty line. Artisanal mining, involving an estimated 200,000 workers including approximately 40,000 children according to UNICEF, accounts for 15-30% of DRC cobalt production. These miners work in dangerous conditions without safety equipment, earning between $2-3 per day while global cobalt prices reached $80,000 per ton in 2022\. The contrast between mineral wealth and human poverty has created a complex ethical crisis for technology companies dependent on Congolese cobalt. Chinese companies dominate DRC cobalt operations through investments exceeding $6 billion since 2007\. China Molybdenum's $2.65 billion acquisition of the Tenke Fungurume mine in 2016 represented the largest Chinese mining investment in Africa, while Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt's supply chain extends from DRC mines to Chinese battery manufacturers and ultimately to international technology companies. The mineral wealth has also fueled conflict, with armed groups controlling mining areas and imposing illegal taxes on operations. The UN estimates that conflict minerals generate $400-500 million annually for armed groups in eastern DRC, perpetuating instability that affects 5.6 million internally displaced persons. ### European Union's Strategic Response The European Union's recognition of critical mineral vulnerabilities has prompted the most comprehensive Western response to China's dominance through the Critical Raw Materials Act, approved in 2024\. The legislation aims to secure supply chains for 34 critical materials by establishing domestic processing capabilities, diversifying supply sources, and creating strategic reserves. The Act sets ambitious targets: by 2030, the EU aims to extract at least 10% of its annual critical mineral consumption domestically, process at least 40% within EU borders, and ensure no single third country provides more than 65% of any critical material. These targets represent a fundamental shift from market-based procurement toward strategic resource planning reminiscent of wartime mobilization. Implementation faces substantial challenges, particularly regarding environmental regulations that make European mining operations expensive compared to alternatives in nations with weaker standards. The EU's Green Deal requirements mandate environmental impact assessments and community consultations that can extend project timelines by years, creating tension between sustainability goals and supply security imperatives. The Global Gateway initiative, promising €300 billion in infrastructure investment through 2027, includes significant funding for mineral projects in developing nations. Partnership agreements with Canada, Australia, and Chile aim to create "trusted supplier" relationships, while investments in African mining infrastructure seek to reduce Chinese influence over critical supply chains. ### Deep-Sea Mining's Controversial Promise The prospect of harvesting critical minerals from the ocean floor has emerged as a potential game-changer in global supply dynamics, though it remains highly controversial due to environmental concerns and technological challenges. Polymetallic nodules scattered across deep ocean floors contain significant quantities of nickel, cobalt, copper, and manganese—materials essential for battery production and renewable energy infrastructure. The International Seabed Authority, operating under UN Convention on the Law of the Sea framework, regulates deep-sea mining in international waters. The "Area" beyond national jurisdiction covers approximately 54% of ocean surface and contains an estimated 21 billion tons of polymetallic nodules. A single nodule field in the Pacific's Clarion-Clipperton Zone reportedly contains more nickel, cobalt, and manganese than all terrestrial reserves combined. However, deep-sea mining faces fierce opposition from environmental groups and some Pacific Island nations who argue that insufficient research exists regarding ecosystem impacts. The Nauru government's 2021 request to begin commercial mining triggered a two-year deadline for international regulations, creating pressure for premature authorization of potentially destructive activities. Major technology companies including Google, Microsoft, and BMW have called for moratoriums on deep-sea mining until environmental impacts are better understood. This corporate opposition reflects growing consumer pressure for sustainable supply chains, though it also perpetuates dependence on existing terrestrial sources with their own environmental and human rights challenges. ### Emerging Alternative Strategies Nations and companies are pursuing diverse strategies to reduce dependence on Chinese-controlled supply chains and conflict-affected regions. Recycling technologies offer particular promise, with current battery recycling rates below 5% globally despite the potential to recover 95% of lithium and cobalt from spent batteries. Direct lithium extraction technologies, which can recover lithium from brines without traditional evaporation ponds, could unlock new resources while reducing environmental impacts and processing times from months to hours. Companies like ExxonMobil and Chevron are investing in these technologies to extract lithium from oil field brines, potentially making the United States a major lithium producer. Urban mining—recovering critical materials from electronic waste—represents another promising avenue. The UN estimates that global e-waste contains $62.5 billion worth of recoverable materials annually, though current recovery rates remain below 10%. Japan's urban mining program has successfully recovered gold, silver, and rare earth elements from discarded electronics, providing materials for Olympic medals and reducing import dependence. ## Mineral Diplomacy ### Australia's Lithium Leverage Australia's emergence as the world's largest lithium producer, accounting for 52% of global production, demonstrates how geological endowments can translate into geopolitical influence. The country's hard rock lithium deposits, primarily in Western Australia's Pilbara region, have attracted over $10 billion in Chinese investment since 2018. However, Australia's 2021 decision to block Chinese company Yibin Tianyi Lithium's $300 million acquisition of lithium producer Alita Resources reflected growing concern about foreign control over critical resources. The Australian government subsequently established the Critical Minerals Facilitation Office to coordinate strategic investments while maintaining domestic control over supply chains. The AUKUS partnership between Australia, Britain, and the United States includes provisions for critical mineral cooperation, with Australia positioned as a "trusted supplier" of lithium and rare earth elements for Western defense and technology industries. This arrangement demonstrates how mineral resources are becoming integrated into broader alliance structures and strategic partnerships. ### Bolivia's Resource Nationalism Bolivia's approach to lithium development illustrates how resource nationalism can complicate global supply chains while reflecting legitimate sovereignty concerns. Despite possessing the world's largest lithium reserves, Bolivia has struggled to commercialize its resources due to technical challenges with high-magnesium brine extraction and political instability. President Evo Morales's government (2006-2019) insisted on state control over lithium development, rejecting foreign investment proposals that would have transferred technology or profits abroad. This approach reflected Bolivia's historical experience with resource exploitation, from Spanish colonial silver extraction to 20th-century tin mining that enriched foreign companies while leaving Bolivia impoverished. Recent political changes have opened Bolivia to limited foreign partnerships, with agreements signed with Chinese and Russian companies for lithium processing facilities. However, environmental protests and indigenous rights concerns continue to complicate development efforts, demonstrating how local communities increasingly demand participation in decisions affecting their territories. ## Strategic Implications for Global Order The critical minerals scramble is reshaping international relations in ways that extend far beyond traditional resource competition. Unlike oil, which can be stored and transported relatively easily, many critical minerals require complex processing chains that create multiple vulnerability points and opportunities for supply disruption. This complexity is creating new forms of economic interdependence and strategic vulnerability. Nations pursuing green energy transitions find themselves potentially more dependent on authoritarian suppliers than they were during the fossil fuel era. China's dominance over critical mineral processing creates leverage that extends beyond trade relationships into technology standards, environmental regulations, and foreign policy alignment. The human rights implications of current supply chains are creating reputational and legal risks for companies and governments committed to responsible sourcing. California's Senate Bill 252, requiring companies to disclose supply chain risks related to conflict minerals, represents early efforts to address these challenges through transparency requirements and due diligence standards. Regional security implications are emerging as nations compete for access to mineral resources. China's investments in mining infrastructure across Africa and Latin America create economic dependencies that potentially limit recipient nations' foreign policy autonomy. Meanwhile, Western efforts to diversify supply chains require substantial investments in regions that may lack political stability or adequate governance structures. ## Toward Sustainable Mineral Security The critical minerals challenge requires coordinated international responses that balance supply security, environmental protection, and human rights considerations. Success will depend on developing technologies and governance frameworks that can support the clean energy transition while avoiding the resource curse dynamics that have plagued previous commodity booms. Investment in recycling technologies, alternative materials research, and more efficient resource utilization offers paths toward reduced dependence on primary extraction. However, these solutions require time to scale while current demand continues growing exponentially. The gap between clean energy ambitions and sustainable supply chain realities represents one of the most significant challenges facing global climate action. International cooperation mechanisms, from multilateral mining codes to technology transfer agreements, will prove essential for managing this transition equitably and sustainably. The choices made in the next decade regarding critical mineral supply chains will shape geopolitical relationships and environmental outcomes for generations to come. As the world races to decarbonize its energy systems, ensuring that the cure for climate change does not create worse geopolitical diseases may prove the ultimate test of 21st-century diplomacy. ### Terrorism's Evolution: From Al-Qaeda's Hierarchy to Digital Lone Wolves URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/terrorisms-evolution-from-al-qaedas-hierarchy-to-digital-lone-wolves/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:19:30.000Z On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched a sophisticated multi-domain attack on Israel that combined traditional asymmetric tactics with modern technology—drones, cyber operations, and real-time social media coordination. Within hours, the operation's livestreamed violence went viral across platforms like Telegram and TikTok, inspiring copycat attacks and recruitment drives thousands of miles away. This convergence of kinetic violence and digital amplification represents the latest evolution in a terrorist landscape that has transformed dramatically since September 11, 2001\. Where Al-Qaeda once required years to plan complex operations through hierarchical networks, today's threats emerge from algorithmic radicalization pipelines that can turn isolated individuals into violent actors within weeks. The contemporary terrorism threat defies traditional counterterrorism frameworks built around organizational structures, state sponsors, and geographic safe havens. Instead, security services now confront a fragmented ecosystem where ISIS franchises operate across continents, far-right extremists coordinate through encrypted messaging apps, and artificial intelligence algorithms inadvertently accelerate radicalization processes. From the 2019 Christchurch shooter's manifesto spreading virally online to ISIS's use of sophisticated media production techniques rivaling Hollywood studios, terrorist organizations have become early adopters of emerging technologies, forcing governments to rethink fundamental assumptions about threat detection, prevention, and response. ## Arc of Modern Terrorism Terrorism's modern evolution traces a path from the centralized, state-like ambitions of Al-Qaeda through ISIS's territorial caliphate to today's decentralized, digitally-enabled threat environment. This transformation reflects broader technological and geopolitical shifts that have democratized both information access and destructive capabilities while fragmenting traditional sources of authority and identity. Al-Qaeda's pre-9/11 model emphasized careful operational security, lengthy planning cycles, and spectacular attacks designed to provoke Western military responses in Muslim-majority countries. The organization's hierarchical structure, with Osama bin Laden providing strategic direction and regional commanders executing operations, mirrored traditional insurgent organizations adapted for global reach through modern communications and transportation networks. The 2003 Iraq invasion created conditions for Al-Qaeda's evolution into a more decentralized network, spawning affiliates from North Africa to Southeast Asia. However, the emergence of ISIS in 2013-2014 represented a qualitative shift toward territorial control, sophisticated governance structures, and unprecedented use of digital media for recruitment and inspiration. ISIS's brief territorial success demonstrated how terrorist organizations could exploit state collapse and sectarian divisions to achieve quasi-governmental status while maintaining global networks. The coalition military campaign that eliminated ISIS's territorial holdings by 2019 scattered the organization's remnants across multiple countries while preserving its digital infrastructure and ideological appeal. This diaspora coincided with rising domestic terrorism in Western countries, the proliferation of far-right extremist networks, and the emergence of new threat vectors enabled by artificial intelligence and social media algorithms. ## Four Dimensions of Contemporary Terrorism ### Digital Radicalization and Algorithmic Amplification Social media platforms have fundamentally altered radicalization processes, replacing physical recruitment networks with algorithmic recommendation systems that can lead users from mainstream content to extremist ideology within hours. Research by the Counter Extremism Project found that YouTube's recommendation algorithm directed users from conspiracy theories to white supremacist content in an average of five clicks, while TikTok's algorithm has been shown to promote ISIS-related content to users who engage with Middle Eastern political topics. The 2019 Christchurch shooter exemplified this new radicalization pathway, moving from online gaming communities to white supremacist forums through algorithmic connections that amplified his grievances and provided tactical guidance. His attack was deliberately designed for viral spread, with references to internet memes and real-time streaming calculated to maximize online engagement and inspire copycat attacks. ISIS pioneered sophisticated digital media strategies that transformed terrorist communications from clandestine messaging to high-production propaganda campaigns. The organization's media wing, Al-Hayat Media Center, produced content in over 20 languages using professional-grade equipment and editing software, creating recruitment materials that competed with mainstream entertainment for audience attention. This approach influenced other terrorist organizations, from Al-Qaeda affiliates adopting similar production values to far-right groups creating polished documentaries promoting their ideologies. ### Lone Wolf Attacks and Inspired Violence The shift toward "lone wolf" terrorism reflects both organizational adaptation to increased security pressure and the democratizing effects of digital communications. Rather than recruiting and directing operatives through traditional networks, terrorist organizations now focus on inspiring autonomous actors through online content, tactical guidance, and ideological justification. This model offers significant advantages for terrorist organizations: inspired attacks require minimal resources, provide operational security through disconnection from central leadership, and create unpredictable threat patterns that strain law enforcement resources. The 2016 Nice truck attack, which killed 86 people using only a rented vehicle, demonstrated how simple tactics could achieve mass casualties while requiring virtually no organizational infrastructure. However, lone wolf attacks also present limitations, including reduced operational sophistication, higher failure rates, and limited strategic coherence. The 2017 London Bridge attackers, inspired by ISIS but lacking professional training, were neutralized by police within eight minutes, while many attempted lone wolf attacks result in minimal casualties or complete failure due to inadequate planning and execution. ### Technological Innovation and Emerging Threats Terrorist organizations have consistently demonstrated remarkable adaptability to new technologies, often adopting commercial innovations for violent purposes more rapidly than governments develop countermeasures. The proliferation of commercial drone technology has enabled terrorist organizations to conduct surveillance, deliver explosives, and coordinate attacks with unprecedented precision and mobility. ISIS used consumer drones extensively during the battle for Mosul, modifying commercial quadcopters to drop grenades and improvised explosive devices on Iraqi and coalition forces. These attacks demonstrated how readily available technology could provide tactical advantages traditionally requiring sophisticated military equipment. The 2019 drone attacks on Saudi Aramco facilities, attributed to Iran-backed Houthi forces, showed how similar technologies could achieve strategic effects against critical infrastructure. Artificial intelligence and machine learning present both opportunities and risks for counterterrorism efforts. While AI can enhance threat detection through pattern recognition and behavioral analysis, these same technologies enable terrorist organizations to improve recruitment targeting, operational planning, and attack coordination. Deepfake technology, already used to create convincing propaganda videos, could potentially enable terrorist organizations to impersonate public officials or create false evidence to justify attacks. ### Franchise Models and Network Resilience The contemporary terrorist threat increasingly operates through franchise models that combine brand recognition with operational autonomy. ISIS's provincial structure, spanning from West Africa to Southeast Asia, exemplifies this approach, with local affiliates adopting the organization's ideology and tactics while pursuing region-specific objectives. This model provides resilience against counterterrorism pressure by distributing leadership, resources, and operational capabilities across multiple jurisdictions and security environments. The elimination of ISIS's core leadership in Syria and Iraq had limited impact on affiliate operations in Somalia, Nigeria, or the Philippines, where local conditions and grievances sustained ongoing violence. Al-Qaeda has similarly evolved toward a franchise model, with affiliates like Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al-Shabaab maintaining operational independence while coordinating strategic messaging and sharing tactical innovations. This decentralization complicates counterterrorism efforts by requiring simultaneous engagement across multiple theaters while limiting the strategic impact of tactical successes against individual nodes. ## Modern Terrorism Evolution ### ISIS's Digital Caliphate Strategy ISIS's media strategy represented a revolutionary approach to terrorist communications that influenced extremist movements worldwide. The organization's English-language magazine "Dabiq" combined theological justification with practical guidance, providing both ideological framework and tactical instruction for potential recruits. The publication's professional design, sophisticated arguments, and multilingual distribution demonstrated ISIS's understanding of contemporary media consumption patterns. The organization's use of encrypted messaging applications like Telegram enabled secure coordination between geographically dispersed cells while maintaining operational security. ISIS created thousands of channels distributing propaganda, recruitment materials, and operational guidance, with automated bots ensuring content survival despite platform removal efforts. This digital infrastructure outlasted the organization's territorial presence, continuing to inspire attacks years after ISIS's military defeat. ### Christchurch Effect and Viral Violence The March 2019 Christchurch mosque shootings marked a turning point in far-right terrorist tactics, with the attacker deliberately designing his operation for maximum viral spread. The 74-page manifesto, livestreamed attack video, and social media coordination created a template that subsequent attackers have attempted to replicate, from the 2019 Poway synagogue shooting to the 2022 Buffalo supermarket attack. This "viral terrorism" model exploits social media algorithms and human psychology to maximize psychological impact and recruitment potential. The Christchurch attacker's manifesto included references to internet culture and memes calculated to appeal to online extremist communities, while the livestream format provided immersive experience designed to normalize violence and inspire imitation. The attack's digital afterlife demonstrates how modern terrorism transcends physical acts to become ongoing information campaigns. Despite removal efforts by major platforms, the Christchurch video and manifesto continue circulating on alternative sites, inspiring new adherents and providing tactical guidance for potential attackers. This persistence highlights the challenge of containing digitally-native terrorist content in an interconnected information environment. ## Implications for Global Security These evolutionary trends in terrorism present fundamental challenges to traditional counterterrorism approaches developed during the "War on Terror" era. The shift from hierarchical organizations to networked movements, from clandestine planning to open-source inspiration, and from geographic concentration to digital dispersion requires new frameworks for threat assessment, prevention, and response. The convergence of terrorism with emerging technologies creates new vulnerabilities while complicating attribution and response. Cyberattacks attributed to terrorist organizations could potentially disable critical infrastructure, disrupt financial systems, or compromise sensitive government communications. The integration of artificial intelligence into terrorist operations could enable more sophisticated targeting, improved operational security, and enhanced recruitment effectiveness. International cooperation becomes more critical as terrorist networks transcend national boundaries while exploiting jurisdictional gaps and regulatory differences. The ability of terrorist content to migrate across platforms and jurisdictions faster than removal efforts can contain it requires coordinated response mechanisms that balance security concerns with privacy rights and free speech protections. The democratization of destructive capabilities through commercial technology proliferation means that small groups or individual actors can potentially achieve effects previously requiring substantial organizational resources. This capability diffusion challenges traditional assumptions about threat assessment and resource allocation, requiring security services to monitor broader populations while respecting civil liberties and avoiding discriminatory practices. ## Strategic Responses and Future Challenges Effective counterterrorism in this evolved threat environment requires adaptive strategies that address both technological innovation and underlying radicalization processes. Technology companies face growing pressure to develop more effective content moderation systems, while maintaining platforms that serve legitimate users without enabling terrorist recruitment or coordination. The development of artificial intelligence tools for threat detection presents opportunities to identify suspicious patterns, monitor extremist communications, and predict potential attacks. However, these capabilities also raise concerns about surveillance overreach, algorithmic bias, and the potential for technology to exacerbate existing social tensions or target marginalized communities unfairly. Community-based prevention programs have shown promise in addressing radicalization before it leads to violence, but these approaches require sustained investment, cultural sensitivity, and coordination between security services and civil society organizations. The challenge lies in scaling effective intervention models while avoiding stigmatization of entire communities or ideological groups. International legal frameworks struggle to keep pace with technological change and the global nature of contemporary terrorist threats. Existing counterterrorism legislation often proves inadequate for addressing online radicalization, cross-border digital coordination, or the use of emerging technologies for violent purposes. ## Navigating the Digital Battlefield The evolution of terrorism from hierarchical organizations to digitally-enabled networks represents one of the most significant security challenges of the 21st century. Success in this environment requires understanding how technology amplifies traditional grievances while creating new vulnerabilities and attack vectors. Rather than viewing technological innovation as inevitably advantaging terrorist organizations, policymakers must recognize opportunities to leverage the same tools for prevention, detection, and response. The key lies in developing adaptive institutional frameworks that can evolve with changing threats while preserving the open, connected societies that remain terrorism's ultimate target. The future of counterterrorism will be determined not just by security services and military capabilities, but by the collective ability of governments, technology companies, and civil society to shape digital environments that promote human flourishing while denying space for violent extremism to take root and spread. ### Hybrid Warfare 2.0: How Disinformation, Cyberattacks, and Proxy Conflicts Define Modern War URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/hybrid-warfare-2-0-how-disinformation-cyberattacks-and-proxy-conflicts-define-modern-war/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:19:12.000Z In February 2024, Romanian intelligence services uncovered a sophisticated influence operation that had manipulated nearly 800,000 social media accounts to promote far-right presidential candidate Călin Georgescu through TikTok's algorithm. The operation, attributed to Russian actors, combined artificial intelligence-generated content, coordinated inauthentic behavior, and precisely targeted messaging to thrust an unknown candidate from 5% to first place in Romania's presidential election—before the Constitutional Court ultimately annulled the results. This incident exemplifies the evolution of hybrid warfare into what experts now term "Hybrid Warfare 2.0": a sophisticated blend of disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, economic coercion, and proxy conflicts that operates below the threshold of conventional war while achieving strategic objectives traditionally requiring military force. Unlike traditional warfare's clear battle lines and uniformed combatants, hybrid warfare exploits the gray zone between peace and war, targeting democratic institutions, social cohesion, and decision-making processes. Russia's interference in Western elections, China's economic coercion campaigns, and Iran's proxy network across the Middle East demonstrate how state and non-state actors now wage conflicts through information manipulation, cyber operations, and plausibly deniable activities. The challenge for policymakers lies in recognizing these hybrid threats while developing proportionate responses that don't inadvertently escalate conflicts or undermine the very democratic values they seek to protect. ## Evolution of Hybrid Conflict Hybrid warfare concepts trace back to ancient strategies of deception and subversion, but the digital age has exponentially expanded their scope and effectiveness. Soviet-era "active measures" provided early blueprints for information warfare, while China's "Three Warfares" doctrine—psychological, media, and legal warfare—established frameworks for comprehensive influence operations that avoid direct military confrontation. The 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea marked a watershed moment, demonstrating how hybrid tactics could achieve territorial conquest with minimal conventional military engagement. Russian forces operated without insignia while information operations created confusion about events on the ground, and cyber attacks disrupted Ukrainian communications. This template has since been refined and exported globally, from election interference operations in Western democracies to influence campaigns in Africa and Latin America. Modern hybrid warfare differs from earlier forms through its exploitation of digital connectivity, social media algorithms, and the speed of information flow in democratic societies. Where Cold War-era influence operations required years to shape public opinion, today's hybrid actors can amplify divisions and manipulate perceptions within weeks or even hours of major events. ## Four Pillars of Hybrid Warfare 2.0 ### Information Operations and Cognitive Warfare Contemporary information warfare transcends traditional propaganda by leveraging big data analytics, artificial intelligence, and behavioral psychology to target specific audiences with precision-crafted narratives. Russia's Internet Research Agency, exposed following the 2016 U.S. elections, demonstrated how small teams could achieve massive reach through coordinated social media manipulation, generating millions of impressions with relatively modest resources. The concept of "cognitive warfare," now formally recognized by NATO as the seventh domain of warfare, targets human cognition itself rather than merely spreading false information. These operations exploit cognitive biases, emotional triggers, and existing social divisions to reshape how populations perceive reality. China's influence operations during the COVID-19 pandemic exemplified this approach, promoting conspiracy theories about U.S. biological weapons while positioning China as a responsible global leader providing medical assistance. Artificial intelligence has revolutionized information operations by enabling the creation of synthetic media—deepfakes, AI-generated text, and fabricated audio—that can be produced at scale and distributed across multiple platforms simultaneously. The Russian state media outlet RT reportedly invested heavily in AI-generated content capabilities, allowing small teams to produce massive volumes of tailored disinformation for different regional audiences. ### Cyber Operations and Digital Infrastructure Attacks Cyber warfare has evolved from isolated hacking incidents to sustained campaigns targeting critical infrastructure, democratic processes, and economic systems. The 2015 and 2016 cyber attacks on Ukraine's power grid, attributed to Russian actors, demonstrated how digital weapons could achieve physical effects comparable to conventional military strikes while maintaining plausible deniability. The SolarWinds hack, discovered in 2020 and attributed to Russian intelligence services, compromised over 18,000 organizations globally, including U.S. government agencies and Fortune 500 companies. The operation's sophistication and scope illustrated how cyber capabilities now enable intelligence collection and influence operations at previously impossible scales, with effects lasting years after initial penetration. Ransomware attacks have become a preferred tool for both criminal organizations and state actors seeking to generate revenue while disrupting adversary capabilities. The Colonial Pipeline attack in 2021, which temporarily shut down the largest fuel pipeline system in the United States, demonstrated how cyber operations against private infrastructure can achieve strategic effects without directly targeting government systems. ### Economic Coercion and Supply Chain Manipulation Economic warfare has become increasingly sophisticated, moving beyond traditional trade disputes to encompass supply chain manipulation, technology transfer coercion, and financial system weaponization. China's restriction of rare earth element exports to Japan following the 2010 Senkaku Islands incident illustrated how control over critical materials could be leveraged for geopolitical advantage. The weaponization of economic interdependence accelerated during the COVID-19 pandemic, as nations discovered their dependence on single-source suppliers for critical goods. China's initial restrictions on medical equipment exports, combined with widespread shortages of semiconductors and other manufactured goods, highlighted vulnerabilities in globalized supply chains that could be exploited during crises. Digital currencies and financial technologies have created new vectors for economic warfare. China's development of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) aims to reduce reliance on the U.S.-dominated SWIFT financial messaging system, while cryptocurrency ecosystems provide new mechanisms for sanctions evasion and illicit finance that complicate traditional economic pressure tactics. ### Proxy Conflicts and Plausibly Deniable Operations Proxy warfare has evolved beyond traditional arms transfers to include comprehensive support packages encompassing training, intelligence, logistics, and technological capabilities. Iran's support for the Houthis in Yemen demonstrates this evolution, providing not only weapons but also targeting intelligence, maintenance support, and operational planning that enables asymmetric capabilities against better-equipped adversaries. The Wagner Group's operations across Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East illustrate how private military companies serve as instruments of state policy while providing plausible deniability. These organizations can conduct operations that would be politically or diplomatically costly if attributed directly to state actors, while generating revenue through resource extraction and security contracts. Non-state actors have gained unprecedented capabilities through technology diffusion and state sponsorship. Hezbollah's precision missile program, developed with Iranian support, has evolved from crude rockets to guided munitions capable of striking specific targets throughout Israel, fundamentally altering regional deterrence dynamics without direct Iranian military involvement. ## Modern Hybrid Warfare ### Ukraine: The Complete Hybrid Campaign The ongoing conflict in Ukraine represents the most comprehensive example of hybrid warfare in practice, combining all elements of modern gray-zone tactics with conventional military operations. Beginning in 2014, Russian hybrid operations included cyber attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, information campaigns designed to legitimize separatist movements, economic pressure through energy cutoffs, and the deployment of "little green men"—unmarked special forces that enabled territorial seizure while maintaining deniability. The 2022 escalation to full-scale invasion was preceded by months of hybrid operations designed to weaken Ukrainian resistance and fracture Western support. Cyber attacks targeted government communications and financial systems, while information operations promoted narratives about Ukrainian corruption and Western abandonment. Simultaneously, Russia positioned conventional forces along Ukraine's borders to create psychological pressure and complicate Western decision-making. Ukraine's response has demonstrated both successful adaptation and ongoing vulnerabilities to hybrid tactics. The government's rapid mobilization of civilian volunteers for cyber defense, combined with partnerships with international technology companies, helped maintain critical digital infrastructure despite sustained Russian attacks. However, Russian disinformation campaigns continue to exploit political divisions within Ukraine and among its international supporters. ### China's Gray-Zone Campaign in the South China Sea China's approach to territorial disputes in the South China Sea exemplifies sophisticated gray-zone tactics designed to achieve strategic objectives without triggering military responses from regional powers or the United States. The campaign combines infrastructure development on disputed features, coordinated operations by fishing vessels and coast guard units, legal warfare through international forums, and information operations promoting historical claims. The construction and militarization of artificial islands in disputed waters illustrates how hybrid tactics can create irreversible facts on the ground. China's use of civilian fishing vessels—supported by maritime militia forces—creates complex scenarios for adversary responses, as defensive actions against ostensibly civilian vessels risk escalation while inaction enables continued encroachment. Chinese information operations supporting South China Sea claims demonstrate coordination across state media, academic institutions, and social media platforms to promote narratives about historical sovereignty while portraying other claimants as aggressors threatening regional stability. These campaigns target both domestic Chinese audiences and international opinion, seeking to normalize Chinese control over disputed territories. ### Russia's African Expansion Through Hybrid Means Russia's growing influence across Africa demonstrates how hybrid warfare tactics can achieve strategic objectives in regions where direct military intervention would be costly or politically unfeasible. Russian operations combine private military contractors, disinformation campaigns, resource extraction deals, and diplomatic initiatives that collectively challenge Western influence while avoiding the responsibilities of formal military commitments. Wagner Group operations in the Central African Republic, Mali, and Sudan have provided security services to local governments while securing access to mineral resources and military bases. These arrangements create mutual dependencies that serve Russian strategic interests while providing host governments with capabilities they cannot afford through traditional military procurement. Russian information operations across Africa exploit legitimate grievances about colonial history and contemporary Western policies, promoting narratives that position Russia as a partner offering security and development assistance without political conditionality. These campaigns utilize local media partners, social media influencers, and cultural programs to build favorable perceptions of Russian involvement. ## NATO and Western Responses Western responses to hybrid warfare have evolved from reactive measures to proactive strategies designed to deter, detect, and counter gray-zone activities. NATO's recognition of hybrid threats as Article 5 challenges—potentially triggering collective defense obligations—represents a significant doctrinal evolution, though the alliance continues to grapple with attribution challenges and proportional response dilemmas. The establishment of NATO's Counter Hybrid Support Team and the European Union's East StratCom Task Force demonstrates institutional adaptation to hybrid threats. These organizations focus on early warning, rapid response, and building resilience among member states while coordinating responses to identified hybrid activities. However, Western responses face inherent challenges in democratic societies that value free speech, open markets, and transparent governance. Measures designed to counter disinformation risk censorship accusations, while efforts to secure critical infrastructure must balance security concerns with economic efficiency and civil liberties. The development of "active defense" concepts—preemptive responses to identified hybrid threats—raises questions about escalation and the rule of law. Western democracies struggle to match the speed and deniability of authoritarian hybrid operations while maintaining democratic accountability and legal constraints on government action. ## Strategic Implications for Global Security Hybrid warfare's proliferation creates several challenges for international stability and existing security frameworks. The blurring of peace and war complicates alliance obligations, as partners struggle to determine when hybrid activities warrant collective responses and what forms those responses should take. The success of hybrid tactics in achieving strategic objectives below the threshold of conventional conflict creates incentives for their proliferation among state and non-state actors. As costs decrease and effectiveness increases, hybrid warfare capabilities may become standard tools of international competition, potentially destabilizing regions where conventional deterrence mechanisms remain effective. The targeting of civilian populations and infrastructure through hybrid means raises questions about the protection of non-combatants in modern conflict. Traditional laws of armed conflict provide limited guidance for information operations designed to manipulate democratic processes or cyber attacks that temporarily disrupt civilian services without causing permanent damage. The global nature of hybrid threats requires unprecedented international cooperation, yet such cooperation is often hindered by the same divisions that hybrid actors seek to exploit. Building effective responses requires sharing intelligence, coordinating policies, and maintaining unity of purpose among allies who may have different threat perceptions and strategic priorities. ## Building Resilience in the Hybrid Age Defending against hybrid warfare requires comprehensive approaches that address vulnerabilities across multiple domains simultaneously. Media literacy programs, cybersecurity investments, supply chain diversification, and institutional reforms can build societal resilience against hybrid attacks while preserving democratic values and open societies. The challenge for policymakers lies in developing responses that are both effective against hybrid threats and sustainable within democratic frameworks. Success will require not only defensive measures but also positive visions for international cooperation that can compete with authoritarian alternatives in the global marketplace of ideas. As hybrid warfare continues to evolve, the test for democratic societies will be whether they can adapt their institutions and responses quickly enough to counter these threats while maintaining the openness and freedom that make them worth defending. The future of international security may well depend on this balance between security and liberty in an age of persistent competition. ### Rise of Middle Powers: How India, Turkey, and Brazil Are Reshaping Global Order URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/rise-of-middle-powers-how-india-turkey-and-brazil-are-reshaping-global-order/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:18:52.000Z When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi hosted the G20 summit in New Delhi in September 2023, the carefully orchestrated event symbolized more than diplomatic protocol—it represented the ascendance of middle powers in shaping 21st-century geopolitics. As the United States and China engaged in strategic competition, India successfully positioned itself as a bridge between rival blocs, securing consensus on contentious issues while advancing its own economic and diplomatic interests. This performance exemplified how middle powers are no longer content to choose sides in great power competition, instead leveraging their strategic positions to extract concessions from all parties while pursuing independent foreign policy agendas. The traditional bipolar and unipolar frameworks that defined the Cold War and post-Cold War eras are giving way to a more complex multipolar system where countries like India, Turkey, Brazil, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia wield disproportionate influence relative to their raw power capabilities. These nations, commanding significant regional influence while maintaining global aspirations, are exploiting the strategic space created by great power competition to maximize their autonomy and advance national interests. Their success challenges conventional wisdom about international hierarchy and suggests that the future global order may be shaped as much by middle power diplomacy as by superpower rivalry. ## Strategic Logic of Middle Power Ascendance Middle powers occupy a unique position in the international system—too significant to ignore, yet not powerful enough to dominate unilaterally. This positioning creates opportunities for strategic leverage that these nations are increasingly exploiting with sophistication. Unlike great powers, which often trigger balancing coalitions when they become too assertive, middle powers can pursue ambitious policies while maintaining relationships across multiple camps. The current international environment particularly favors middle power maneuvering. Great power competition between the United States and China creates competing demands for alignment, allowing middle powers to extract concessions from both sides. Simultaneously, global challenges like climate change, energy transitions, and pandemic recovery require multilateral cooperation that middle powers can facilitate or obstruct, giving them outsized influence in international negotiations. Historical precedent exists for middle power influence during periods of great power competition. During the Cold War, countries like Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito and Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser leveraged superpower rivalry to secure aid from both camps while maintaining independence. Today's middle powers employ similar strategies but with greater sophistication, utilizing economic integration, technological capabilities, and institutional diplomacy to maximize their strategic options. The rise of middle powers also reflects structural changes in the global economy and international system. Economic growth in emerging markets has created new centers of prosperity and influence beyond traditional Western powers. Simultaneously, the democratization of technology and information has reduced barriers to diplomatic and economic engagement, allowing middle powers to bypass traditional gatekeepers and engage directly with global markets and international institutions. ## Four Pillars of Middle Power Strategy ### Strategic Non-Alignment and Hedging Contemporary middle powers have mastered the art of strategic hedging, maintaining relationships with competing great powers while avoiding exclusive alignment with any single bloc. This approach, often termed "multi-alignment" or "omni-directional foreign policy," allows these nations to maximize benefits from great power competition while minimizing risks. India exemplifies this strategy through its simultaneous participation in the Quad (with the United States, Japan, and Australia) and BRICS (with China, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa). Despite border tensions with China and deepening defense cooperation with the United States, India maintains substantial trade relationships with China ($125 billion in 2021-2022) while refusing to join Western sanctions against Russia following the Ukraine invasion. This balancing act allows India to access technology and investment from the West while maintaining energy imports and defense relationships with Russia. Turkey's foreign policy under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan demonstrates similar hedging strategies, albeit with more volatility. Despite NATO membership, Turkey has purchased Russian S-400 missile systems, maintained economic ties with Iran despite U.S. sanctions, and pursued independent interventions in Syria, Libya, and the Eastern Mediterranean. This approach reflects Turkey's desire to maximize its strategic autonomy while leveraging its geographic position between Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. ### Regional Leadership and Sphere Building Middle powers increasingly view regional dominance as a pathway to global influence, investing heavily in building spheres of influence within their immediate neighborhoods. This regional focus allows them to develop capabilities and confidence that translate into broader international influence. Brazil's leadership in Latin America illustrates this dynamic. Through Mercosur, the Union of South American Nations, and bilateral relationships, Brazil has positioned itself as the region's natural leader while mediating disputes and representing Latin American interests in global forums. Brazil's role in climate diplomacy, particularly regarding Amazon preservation, gives it global influence despite its distance from major geopolitical flashpoints. Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 represents an ambitious attempt to transform the kingdom from a oil-dependent monarchy into a regional hub for finance, technology, and logistics. The kingdom's investments in NEOM, its hosting of global sporting events, and its diplomatic initiatives like the China-Iran reconciliation demonstrate how economic modernization can translate into enhanced regional and global influence. ### Economic Statecraft and Development Finance Middle powers are increasingly using economic instruments to advance foreign policy objectives, often through development finance, infrastructure investment, and trade relationships that compete with or complement great power initiatives. This economic statecraft allows them to build influence while addressing domestic development needs. India's development partnership programs across Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean region represent sophisticated economic diplomacy that builds influence while supporting Indian businesses. The India Development and Economic Assistance Scheme has provided over $30 billion in lines of credit to developing countries, often for projects implemented by Indian companies using Indian expertise and equipment. Turkey's economic engagement with Africa exemplifies similar strategies. Turkish trade with Africa increased from $5.4 billion in 2003 to over $34 billion in 2022, while Turkish Airlines serves more African destinations than any other non-African carrier. This economic engagement translates into diplomatic influence, as demonstrated by Turkey's mediation role in regional conflicts and its growing soft power across the continent. ### Institutional Entrepreneurship and Coalition Building Middle powers have become increasingly sophisticated in using international institutions to amplify their influence and advance their interests. Rather than simply participating in existing forums, they are creating new institutions, informal coalitions, and diplomatic initiatives that serve their strategic objectives. The BRICS grouping, despite internal tensions, has provided middle powers with a platform for coordinating positions on global governance issues while developing alternative institutions like the New Development Bank. The recent expansion to include Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the UAE reflects the grouping's appeal as an alternative to Western-dominated institutions. India's leadership during its G20 presidency demonstrated sophisticated institutional diplomacy. By focusing on consensus-building around development issues while managing disagreements over geopolitical conflicts, India successfully positioned itself as a responsible global leader while advancing its interests in areas like digital infrastructure, sustainable development, and energy transitions. ## Middle Power Diplomacy ### India: Strategic Autonomy in Action India's approach to the Ukraine conflict illustrates the sophisticated balancing strategies that define contemporary middle power diplomacy. While the United States and European allies sought Indian support for sanctions against Russia, India maintained its traditional non-aligned stance while quietly supporting diplomatic efforts to end the conflict. This position allowed India to continue importing Russian energy at favorable prices while avoiding alienation from Western partners. India's energy diplomacy demonstrates the economic benefits of strategic autonomy. Russian crude oil imports increased from less than 1% of India's total imports before the war to over 20% by late 2022, providing significant cost savings that supported India's economic growth. Simultaneously, India maintained energy partnerships with Middle Eastern suppliers and pursued renewable energy cooperation with Western nations. The success of India's balancing strategy became evident during the 2023 G20 summit, where India's leadership helped achieve consensus on a joint declaration despite deep disagreements over Ukraine. This diplomatic success enhanced India's international reputation while demonstrating the value of middle power mediation in resolving global challenges. ### Turkey: Leverage Through Geographic Position Turkey's role in the Black Sea grain deal following Russia's invasion of Ukraine showcased how middle powers can leverage geographic advantages to gain international influence. Turkey's control over the Bosphorus Strait and its relationships with both Russia and Ukraine made it indispensable for facilitating grain exports that were crucial for global food security. This mediation role enhanced Turkey's international standing despite strained relationships with NATO allies over various issues. Turkey's success in negotiating the grain deal demonstrated its value as a bridge between conflicting parties while advancing its interests in regional stability and economic cooperation. Turkey's energy diplomacy further illustrates middle power leverage strategies. The country's position as a transit route for natural gas from Russia and Central Asia to Europe provides significant economic and political leverage. Projects like the TurkStream pipeline and the potential Trans-Anatolian Pipeline give Turkey influence over European energy security while generating substantial transit revenues. ## Implications for Global Governance The rise of middle powers is fundamentally reshaping global governance structures and processes. Traditional models based on great power leadership and alliance systems are giving way to more complex arrangements that require accommodation of middle power interests and preferences. This shift creates both opportunities and challenges for international stability and cooperation. Middle powers are driving demand for reform of international institutions that reflect 20th-century power distributions rather than contemporary realities. The under-representation of countries like India and Brazil in institutions like the UN Security Council creates legitimacy deficits that these nations are increasingly unwilling to accept. Their growing influence provides them with tools to pressure for institutional reform or create alternative arrangements. The multiplication of middle power initiatives and institutions creates both coordination challenges and opportunities for forum shopping. Countries can now choose among multiple institutions and initiatives to advance their interests, potentially leading to fragmentation of global governance but also creating competition that may improve institutional effectiveness. For great powers, the rise of middle powers complicates alliance management and strategic planning. Traditional approaches based on clear alliance structures and hierarchical relationships must adapt to accommodate middle power autonomy and strategic hedging. This requires more sophisticated diplomatic engagement and recognition that influence increasingly flows in multiple directions. ## Challenges and Limitations Despite their growing influence, middle powers face significant constraints that limit their ability to reshape international order fundamentally. Economic and military capabilities remain concentrated among great powers, creating ultimate dependencies that constrain middle power autonomy. Additionally, domestic political pressures and resource limitations can undermine ambitious foreign policy initiatives. The sustainability of middle power strategies depends partly on continued great power competition that creates space for maneuvering. Should the United States and China reach accommodation or should one achieve clear dominance, middle powers might find their strategic options significantly reduced. Similarly, economic crises or political instability could force middle powers to prioritize immediate needs over long-term strategic positioning. Coordination among middle powers remains limited despite shared interests in preserving strategic autonomy and reforming international institutions. Competition for regional leadership, differing domestic political systems, and varying relationships with great powers create obstacles to sustained cooperation that could amplify middle power influence. ## Navigating the Middle Power Moment The rise of middle powers represents one of the most significant shifts in international relations since the end of the Cold War, creating a more complex but potentially more stable global system. These countries' success in leveraging strategic autonomy and regional influence suggests that the future international order will be more multipolar and less hierarchical than previous systems. For policymakers in both great powers and middle powers, this transformation requires adaptive strategies that recognize the growing importance of coalition-building, institutional diplomacy, and economic statecraft. Great powers must learn to accommodate middle power aspirations while middle powers must balance ambition with capacity and maintain the strategic discipline that has enabled their rise. The ultimate test will be whether this more complex system can address global challenges that require sustained multilateral cooperation, from climate change to technological governance, in an era where power is more distributed but problems remain global in scope. ### Return of Great Power Competition: How the U.S., China, and Russia Are Reshaping the World Order URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/return-of-great-power-competition-how-the-u-s-china-and-russia-are-reshaping-the-world-order/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:18:31.000Z The world witnessed a defining moment in February 2022 when Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin declared their nations' friendship had "no limits" just weeks before Russia's invasion of Ukraine. This alignment between Beijing and Moscow, combined with China's emergence as America's primary strategic rival, has officially ended the brief unipolar moment that followed the Soviet Union's collapse. Today, three nuclear-armed giants command global attention: the United States with its $25 trillion economy and worldwide alliance network, China with its $17.7 trillion economy and Belt and Road Initiative spanning 70 countries, and Russia wielding energy exports and military intervention capabilities across multiple continents. This return to great power competition represents more than a nostalgic replay of Cold War dynamics. Unlike the ideologically rigid bipolar confrontation of the 20th century, today's competition unfolds across multiple dimensions—economic, technological, military, and normative—while operating within a deeply interconnected global system. The result is a more complex, multipolar world where traditional alliance structures coexist with new partnership arrangements, where economic interdependence constrains conflict while enabling new forms of strategic competition, and where middle powers possess unprecedented agency to shape outcomes between competing great powers. ## From Unipolarity to Multipolarity: The Historical Arc The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 created an unprecedented situation in modern history: a single superpower with global reach and no peer competitor. The United States emerged from the Cold War with unmatched military capabilities, economic dominance, and soft power influence. American defense spending exceeded that of the next ten nations combined, while U.S. cultural exports and democratic ideals seemed to offer a universal model for political development. This "unipolar moment," as Charles Krauthammer termed it, lasted approximately two decades. During this period, the United States launched military interventions from the Balkans to the Middle East largely without great power opposition, expanded NATO eastward to Russia's borders, and championed economic globalization on largely American terms. The 2008 financial crisis marked the beginning of this era's end, exposing vulnerabilities in the U.S.-led economic system while accelerating the rise of alternative power centers. The transition from unipolarity to multipolarity reflects both American relative decline and the rise of new powers. While the United States remains the world's most powerful nation, its share of global GDP has decreased from 40% in 1960 to approximately 25% today. Simultaneously, China's economy has grown from $1.2 trillion in 2000 to over $17 trillion today, while countries like India, Brazil, and Turkey have emerged as significant regional powers with global ambitions. ## Three Pillars of Contemporary Competition ### The United States: Defending Hegemonic Order America's approach to great power competition reflects the challenge of maintaining global leadership while managing imperial overstretch and domestic polarization. The 2017 National Security Strategy formally acknowledged the return of great power competition, marking a strategic pivot from counterterrorism toward peer competitor challenges. This shift encompasses military modernization, alliance strengthening, and economic decoupling from strategic rivals. The U.S. maintains significant advantages in several domains. American military spending of $816 billion in 2023 exceeds China and Russia combined, while the dollar's reserve currency status provides leverage over global financial systems. The United States leads in advanced technologies including semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and biotechnology, with Silicon Valley companies dominating global digital platforms. However, American hegemony faces structural challenges. The 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan symbolized limits to military intervention, while domestic political divisions complicate long-term strategic planning. The rise of "America First" sentiment has introduced unpredictability into alliance relationships, even as strategic competition demands greater international cooperation. American strategy increasingly emphasizes alliance networks as force multipliers against revisionist powers. The reinvigoration of NATO, expansion of the Quad partnership in the Indo-Pacific, and creation of AUKUS reflect efforts to leverage collective capabilities against single-state challengers. This approach recognizes that maintaining global leadership requires burden-sharing with allies and partners. ### China: The Revisionist Challenger China's rise represents the most significant challenge to American hegemony since the Soviet Union. Under Xi Jinping's leadership, China has abandoned Deng Xiaoping's strategy of "hiding capabilities and biding time" in favor of assertive global leadership across multiple domains. The Belt and Road Initiative, military modernization, and promotion of alternative international institutions signal Beijing's ambition to reshape rather than simply join the existing international order. Chinese economic strategy emphasizes technological self-reliance and supply chain security while maintaining beneficial trade relationships. The Made in China 2025 plan targets dominance in emerging technologies including artificial intelligence, renewable energy, and quantum computing. China's economy, measured by purchasing power parity, already exceeds America's, providing resources for sustained competition across multiple domains. Military modernization reflects China's strategic ambitions. The People's Liberation Army has transformed from a large but technologically inferior force into a modern military capable of challenging American dominance in the Western Pacific. Chinese defense spending, officially $293 billion but likely higher, funds advanced missile systems, naval expansion, and space capabilities designed to deny American access to the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. China's approach to international institutions reveals revisionist rather than revolutionary intentions. Rather than destroying existing organizations, Beijing creates parallel institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and promotes alternative norms like "non-interference" in domestic affairs. This strategy appeals to developing nations seeking alternatives to Western-dominated governance structures while avoiding direct confrontation with established powers. ### Russia: The Spoiler Power Russia occupies a unique position in contemporary great power competition. Despite possessing the world's largest nuclear arsenal and significant natural resource wealth, Russia's $2.2 trillion economy ranks closer to Italy than to the United States or China. This gap between military capabilities and economic power creates incentives for disruptive strategies designed to weaken adversaries rather than compete directly. Russian strategy under Vladimir Putin emphasizes asymmetric approaches including cyber warfare, disinformation campaigns, and military intervention in peripheral regions. The 2014 annexation of Crimea, interference in Western elections, and 2022 invasion of Ukraine demonstrate Moscow's willingness to use force to challenge the post-Cold War order. These actions reflect frustration with Russia's exclusion from Western institutions and determination to maintain influence in the former Soviet space. Energy exports provide Russia's primary source of international leverage. Control over natural gas supplies to Europe enabled Moscow to weaponize energy relationships, though the Ukraine conflict has accelerated European efforts to reduce dependence on Russian hydrocarbons. The development of alternative suppliers and renewable energy sources may diminish this leverage over time. Russian alignment with China creates challenges for both Washington and Beijing. While the partnership provides mutual benefits—Chinese technology and markets for Russia, Russian energy and military capabilities for China—it also risks drawing China into conflicts with the West. The relationship remains tactical rather than strategic, as both nations pursue independent objectives that may diverge over time. ## Regional Theaters of Competition ### The Indo-Pacific: Primary Arena of Sino-American Rivalry The Indo-Pacific region has emerged as the central theater of great power competition, with overlapping territorial disputes, alliance networks, and economic integration creating complex strategic dynamics. China's claims over 90% of the South China Sea conflict with the territorial assertions of six other nations, while the Taiwan question represents the most dangerous potential flashpoint for military conflict between nuclear powers. The United States has responded to Chinese assertiveness through alliance strengthening and military repositioning. The Quad partnership with Japan, India, and Australia provides a framework for coordinating responses to Chinese pressure, while AUKUS creates new capabilities for long-term competition. The stationing of advanced missile systems in Japan and plans for military base access in the Philippines demonstrate American commitment to maintaining regional presence. Economic competition in the Indo-Pacific reflects broader struggles over technological standards and supply chains. China's Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership competes with American efforts to maintain economic influence through bilateral agreements and technology partnerships. The semiconductor industry has become a particular focus, with Taiwan's central role in global chip production adding strategic significance to its contested status. ### Europe: The Russian Challenge and Transatlantic Response Russia's invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally altered European security dynamics, ending post-Cold War assumptions about peaceful change and economic integration as sources of stability. The conflict has revitalized NATO while demonstrating both the possibilities and limitations of economic warfare through sanctions regimes. European responses reveal both unity and divergence in addressing Russian aggression. While EU nations have largely coordinated sanctions and military aid to Ukraine, debates over energy policy, defense spending, and long-term Russia strategy expose underlying tensions. Germany's dramatic policy shifts, including increased defense spending and acceleration of renewable energy transition, illustrate how great power competition forces strategic recalculations. The European Union's efforts to achieve "strategic autonomy" complicate transatlantic relations while potentially creating new poles of power. French President Emmanuel Macron's calls for European independence from both American and Chinese influence reflect desires to avoid becoming a theater for external competition while maintaining agency over European interests. ### The Middle East: Proxy Competition and Regional Realignment Great power competition in the Middle East operates primarily through proxy relationships and arms sales rather than direct confrontation. Russia's military intervention in Syria, China's growing economic presence through Belt and Road investments, and continued American military deployments create overlapping spheres of influence that complicate regional dynamics. The Abraham Accords and broader Arab-Israeli normalization reflect regional balancing against Iranian influence while potentially reducing great power competition over Middle Eastern alignments. However, China's growing energy relationships with Gulf states and Russia's arms sales to traditional American allies create new sources of strategic competition. ## Strategic Implications and Future Trajectories The return of great power competition creates both risks and opportunities for global stability and prosperity. Unlike Cold War bipolarity, contemporary multipolarity offers middle powers greater autonomy to pursue independent foreign policies and balance between competing great powers. Countries like India, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia have demonstrated willingness to maintain relationships with all three great powers while avoiding exclusive alignments. However, multipolarity also increases risks of miscalculation and conflict escalation. The absence of clear spheres of influence creates uncertainty about red lines and escalation thresholds, while the multiplication of competitive relationships increases opportunities for proxy conflicts and strategic miscommunication. The interconnectedness of modern economies means that great power conflicts could have devastating global consequences even if they remain below the nuclear threshold. Arms racing across multiple domains—conventional weapons, nuclear modernization, cyber capabilities, and space systems—reflects the competitive dynamics inherent in multipolar systems. The challenge for policymakers lies in managing competition while preserving cooperation on global challenges that transcend national boundaries, including climate change, pandemic preparedness, and nuclear nonproliferation. ## Navigating Multipolar Realities The transformation from American unipolarity to great power multipolarity represents one of the most significant shifts in international relations since 1945\. Success in this environment requires understanding that competition and cooperation must coexist, that alliance relationships provide essential leverage for all powers, and that the stakes of mismanaging these relationships extend far beyond the immediate interests of the competing nations. The emerging multipolar order will likely prove more complex and potentially more unstable than either the Cold War's rigid bipolarity or the post-Cold War's American dominance. Yet this complexity also creates opportunities for creative diplomacy, innovative partnerships, and shared solutions to common challenges. The ultimate measure of statecraft in this era will be the ability to compete vigorously while cooperating effectively on issues that transcend national boundaries and threaten human welfare regardless of political system or strategic alignment. ### Digital Diplomacy: How Social Media Is Rewriting the Rules of International Relations URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/digital-diplomacy-how-social-media-is-rewriting-the-rules-of-international-relations/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:18:11.000Z When Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy posted a selfie video from Kyiv's government quarter on February 25, 2022—hours after Russian forces launched their invasion—the 40-second clip garnered over 20 million views within 24 hours. "We are here. We are in Kyiv. We are defending Ukraine," he declared, directly addressing not just his own citizens but global audiences through Instagram, Twitter, and Telegram. This moment crystallized how digital platforms have fundamentally altered diplomatic practice, enabling leaders to bypass traditional media gatekeepers and speak directly to international publics with unprecedented immediacy and emotional impact. The transformation extends far beyond wartime communications. Today, over 4.8 billion people use social media platforms, creating a global public sphere where diplomatic messages can reach audiences instantly across borders. Foreign ministers conduct policy debates through Twitter threads, diplomats livestream negotiations, and artificial intelligence algorithms increasingly determine which diplomatic messages achieve viral reach. The Chinese Foreign Ministry's "wolf warrior" diplomacy on Twitter, India's digital outreach through its diaspora networks, and the Vatican's sophisticated social media presence all demonstrate how digital tools have become essential instruments of 21st-century statecraft. This digital revolution in diplomacy represents more than technological adoption—it constitutes a fundamental shift in how nations project soft power, shape international narratives, and conduct relations with both state and non-state actors. The question facing diplomatic establishments worldwide is not whether to engage digitally, but how to harness these platforms' power while managing their inherent risks and volatility. ## Evolution of Diplomatic Communication Traditional diplomacy operated through carefully controlled channels: formal correspondence between foreign ministries, structured negotiations in embassy settings, and measured public statements filtered through official press releases and media interviews. This system emphasized precision, confidentiality, and the maintenance of protocol—values that served diplomatic practice well for centuries but often resulted in slow, opaque communications that struggled to engage public attention or generate popular support. The internet initially supplemented these traditional methods, with foreign ministries establishing websites and email communications while maintaining conventional diplomatic protocols. However, the emergence of social media platforms fundamentally disrupted this model by democratizing international communication and collapsing the temporal and hierarchical barriers that previously structured diplomatic discourse. The 2009 Iranian Green Movement marked an early watershed moment when protesters used Twitter to coordinate activities and communicate with international audiences despite government media restrictions. Western governments recognized social media's potential for both supporting democratic movements and advancing their own foreign policy objectives, leading to the integration of digital platforms into official diplomatic strategies. Today's diplomatic landscape reflects this transformation through the proliferation of "digital embassies," virtual diplomatic missions that exist primarily online, and the emergence of "citizen diplomacy," where individuals and non-governmental organizations conduct quasi-diplomatic activities through social media engagement with foreign audiences. ## Five Pillars of Contemporary Digital Diplomacy ### Direct Public Engagement and Narrative Control Social media platforms enable governments to communicate directly with foreign publics, bypassing traditional media intermediaries who might filter or contextualize official messages. This direct access allows nations to shape narratives about their policies, respond immediately to criticism, and build support for their international positions among global audiences. Estonia's e-Residency program exemplifies this approach, using digital platforms to promote its vision of digital governance while attracting international investment and talent. The program has enrolled over 100,000 digital residents worldwide, creating a global constituency with direct stakes in Estonia's success while demonstrating technological leadership to international audiences. China's digital diplomacy efforts span multiple platforms and languages, with Chinese diplomatic missions operating thousands of social media accounts worldwide. The Chinese Foreign Ministry's Twitter presence, despite the platform being banned within China, enables direct communication with international audiences while promoting Beijing's perspectives on issues ranging from trade policy to human rights. This approach allows China to contest Western narratives about its domestic and international behavior while building support among developing nation audiences. ### Real-Time Crisis Communication Digital platforms excel at rapid information dissemination during international crises, enabling governments to provide immediate updates, counter misinformation, and coordinate responses with allies and international organizations. The speed and reach of social media can help contain crisis escalation by enabling quick clarifications and direct communication between adversaries. During the 2020 India-China border tensions in the Galwan Valley, both nations used social media to manage domestic and international perceptions of the conflict while avoiding escalation. Indian and Chinese foreign ministries coordinated their messaging through digital platforms, emphasizing diplomatic solutions while maintaining face before their respective domestic audiences. This digital crisis management helped prevent a localized border incident from escalating into broader conflict. The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated digital crisis communication adoption as governments worldwide used social media to share health information, coordinate international responses, and maintain diplomatic relationships despite travel restrictions. The World Health Organization's social media campaigns reached billions of users globally, demonstrating how digital platforms can facilitate multilateral cooperation during global emergencies. ### Diaspora Engagement and Cultural Diplomacy Nations increasingly leverage social media to engage diaspora communities as unofficial diplomatic assets, mobilizing expatriate populations to advocate for home country interests and serve as cultural ambassadors. These strategies recognize that diaspora communities often maintain strong digital connections with their countries of origin while possessing influence within their adopted nations' political and economic systems. India's digital outreach to its 32-million-strong global diaspora exemplifies this approach. The Indian government uses social media platforms to celebrate cultural events, promote investment opportunities, and mobilize diaspora support for India's international positions. During diplomatic disputes, Indian diaspora communities have organized social media campaigns supporting government positions, creating grassroots pressure on foreign governments while demonstrating international support for India's policies. Israel's digital diplomacy heavily emphasizes diaspora engagement, particularly among Jewish communities worldwide. Israeli diplomatic missions coordinate social media campaigns that combine cultural content, historical education, and contemporary policy advocacy. This approach has proven particularly effective during periods of heightened international criticism, when diaspora communities provide crucial support for Israel's international positions through digital activism and traditional lobbying efforts. ### Multilateral Coordination and Coalition Building Digital platforms facilitate rapid coordination among allied nations, enabling them to synchronize messaging, share information, and present unified positions on international issues. This coordination capacity has become particularly valuable as international challenges increasingly require multilateral responses that traditional diplomatic channels might coordinate too slowly. The European Union's response to Russian disinformation campaigns demonstrates effective digital coordination among member states. EU institutions work with national governments to identify false narratives, coordinate fact-checking efforts, and promote alternative messages across multiple languages and platforms. The EU's East StratCom Task Force monitors and counters Russian disinformation while supporting pro-European messaging in Eastern Partnership countries. NATO's social media strategy similarly coordinates alliance messaging on security issues, presenting unified positions while adapting content for different national audiences. During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, NATO allies used coordinated digital campaigns to demonstrate alliance unity, share intelligence assessments, and build international support for sanctions and military assistance to Ukraine. ### Economic Diplomacy and Investment Promotion Social media platforms have become essential tools for economic diplomacy, enabling nations to promote trade relationships, attract foreign investment, and showcase economic opportunities to international business communities. These digital economic diplomacy efforts often achieve greater reach and engagement than traditional trade missions or economic forums. Singapore's digital economic diplomacy combines targeted advertising on professional platforms like LinkedIn with influencer partnerships and content marketing that showcases the city-state as a regional business hub. Singapore's Economic Development Board uses data analytics to identify potential investors and customize digital outreach based on industry sectors and geographic markets, achieving measurable returns on digital diplomatic investments. Rwanda's digital transformation narrative, promoted through sophisticated social media campaigns, has successfully repositioned the country's international image from post-genocide recovery to technological innovation leader. This digital rebranding effort has attracted significant foreign investment in technology sectors while building Rwanda's influence in African regional organizations and global development initiatives. ## Digital Diplomatic Innovation ### Ukraine's Wartime Digital Diplomacy Ukraine's digital diplomacy during the Russian invasion represents perhaps the most comprehensive and effective use of social media platforms for international relations in modern history. President Zelenskyy's regular video addresses, broadcast across multiple platforms and translated into dozens of languages, have maintained international attention and support for Ukraine's resistance while humanizing the conflict for global audiences. Ukraine's digital strategy extends beyond presidential communications to include crowdsourced intelligence gathering, cryptocurrency fundraising campaigns that have raised hundreds of millions of dollars, and sophisticated information warfare operations that counter Russian propaganda while promoting Ukrainian perspectives. The government's use of platforms like TikTok to reach younger demographics and WhatsApp for direct communication with European leaders demonstrates the comprehensive integration of digital tools into wartime diplomacy. The effectiveness of Ukraine's digital diplomacy is measurable through sustained international military and economic support, continued media attention despite the conflict's duration, and successful counter-narratives to Russian justifications for the invasion. This success has established new benchmarks for crisis communications and digital advocacy that other nations are studying and adapting for their own diplomatic strategies. ### China's Wolf Warrior Digital Strategy China's "wolf warrior" diplomacy represents a more assertive approach to digital international relations, characterized by confrontational messaging, rapid responses to criticism, and proactive promotion of Chinese perspectives on contentious international issues. Chinese diplomatic social media accounts regularly engage in debates about human rights, trade policies, and security issues, abandoning traditional diplomatic restraint in favor of vigorous defense of Chinese positions. This approach reflects broader shifts in Chinese foreign policy toward greater assertiveness and confidence in promoting alternative models of governance and development. Chinese diplomats use Twitter, Facebook, and other Western platforms to challenge Western narratives about Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan while promoting China's Belt and Road Initiative and development achievements. The effectiveness of wolf warrior diplomacy remains debated, with some analysts arguing it successfully challenges Western information dominance while others contend it generates backlash and reduces China's soft power appeal. However, the strategy undeniably demonstrates how digital platforms enable smaller diplomatic establishments to achieve global reach and influence through strategic communication approaches. ## Challenges and Limitations of Digital Diplomacy Despite its advantages, digital diplomacy faces significant challenges that traditional diplomatic methods avoid. The speed and informality of social media communications create risks of miscommunication, unintended escalation, and diplomatic incidents arising from poorly considered posts or algorithmic amplification of controversial content. Platform dependency creates vulnerabilities as nations rely on foreign-owned social media companies that may restrict access, modify algorithms, or suspend accounts based on corporate policies that may not align with diplomatic objectives. The 2021 suspension of former President Trump's social media accounts demonstrated how platform decisions can directly impact diplomatic communications, while ongoing debates about content moderation reveal tensions between free expression and platform governance. Misinformation and disinformation campaigns exploit the same accessibility and reach that make digital diplomacy effective, creating environments where false narratives can spread faster and wider than accurate information. State and non-state actors regularly use social media platforms to promote misleading information about international events, undermining the credibility of legitimate diplomatic communications and complicating efforts to build international consensus around factual assessments. The digital divide limits digital diplomacy's global reach, as billions of people worldwide lack reliable internet access or smartphone technology necessary to engage with social media content. This limitation means digital diplomatic efforts may primarily reach educated, urban, and economically privileged audiences while missing rural, lower-income, and technologically underserved populations who remain important constituencies for international relations. ## Implications for International Relations Theory Digital diplomacy's emergence challenges traditional international relations theories that emphasize state-to-state interactions and formal diplomatic institutions. The democratization of international communication through social media platforms empowers non-state actors, diaspora communities, and individual citizens to influence international relations in ways that classical theories struggle to incorporate. The concept of sovereignty faces new complications as digital diplomatic communications transcend borders instantly and platform companies exercise significant control over international political discourse. Nation-states must navigate relationships with technology companies whose policies directly impact their diplomatic effectiveness, creating new forms of interdependence that traditional sovereignty concepts cannot adequately address. Public diplomacy theory requires updating to account for two-way communication patterns enabled by social media platforms, where target audiences can respond immediately and publicly to diplomatic messages. This interactivity creates opportunities for engagement and relationship building but also risks uncontrolled conversations that diplomatic establishments cannot manage through traditional means. ## Future Landscape of Digital Statecraft As artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies mature, digital diplomacy will likely become increasingly automated and personalized. AI-powered systems already analyze social media conversations to identify influential users, optimal posting times, and effective messaging strategies. Future developments may include real-time language translation, automated response systems, and predictive analytics that anticipate international reactions to diplomatic initiatives. The integration of emerging technologies like virtual and augmented reality may create new forms of digital diplomatic engagement, enabling immersive cultural exchanges, virtual diplomatic visits, and enhanced educational programming that builds international understanding. These technologies could partially address digital diplomacy's limitation in creating meaningful personal connections that traditional face-to-face diplomacy facilitates. However, the human element remains essential to effective diplomacy, requiring diplomatic establishments to balance technological capabilities with personal relationships, cultural sensitivity, and nuanced understanding of local contexts that algorithms cannot replicate. The most successful digital diplomatic strategies will likely combine technological tools with traditional diplomatic skills rather than replacing human judgment with automated systems. The continuing evolution of digital platforms, changing user demographics, and emerging technologies ensure that digital diplomacy will require constant adaptation and innovation. Nations that successfully navigate this landscape will be those that view digital tools as supplements to rather than replacements for fundamental diplomatic principles of relationship building, mutual understanding, and peaceful conflict resolution. As the global digital ecosystem continues to evolve, diplomatic success will increasingly depend on nations' abilities to authentically engage diverse international audiences while maintaining the trust, credibility, and strategic coherence that effective diplomacy demands. The future belongs to those who can master both the art of traditional statecraft and the science of digital engagement. ### Global South Rising: How Developing Nations Are Reshaping World Politics URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/global-south-rising-how-developing-nations-are-reshaping-world-politics/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:17:53.000Z When India's External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar declared at the Munich Security Conference that "Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe's problems are the world's problems," he articulated a sentiment reverberating across continents. This assertion of strategic autonomy reflects a broader transformation: the Global South is no longer content to remain on the periphery of international decision-making. From Brazil's leadership in climate negotiations to South Africa's pivotal role in BRICS expansion, from Nigeria's growing influence in African peacekeeping to Indonesia's emergence as a middle power broker, developing nations are fundamentally altering global power dynamics. The numbers tell the story of this shift. The Global South now accounts for over 40% of global GDP when measured by purchasing power parity, up from 24% in 1990\. China and India alone represent nearly 30% of world economic output, while the combined GDP of BRICS nations exceeded that of the G7 for the first time in 2023\. Yet this economic rise translates into something more profound: a growing assertion of political agency that challenges Western-dominated international institutions and creates new coalitions that transcend traditional North-South divisions. This transformation represents more than statistical rebalancing—it signals a fundamental restructuring of how global governance operates, from trade and climate policy to security cooperation and technological standards. ## Historical Context: From Decolonization to Multipolarity The concept of the Global South emerged from the Non-Aligned Movement of the 1950s and 1960s, when newly independent nations sought to chart courses independent of Cold War superpowers. The 1955 Bandung Conference, bringing together 29 African and Asian nations, established principles of sovereignty, non-interference, and South-South cooperation that continue to influence contemporary Global South politics. However, the economic realities of the post-colonial era often constrained political aspirations. Structural adjustment programs imposed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in the 1980s and 1990s reinforced dependency relationships, while debt crises limited policy autonomy. The Washington Consensus promoted market-oriented reforms that frequently prioritized Northern economic interests over Southern development needs. The 21st century marked a turning point. Rising commodity prices, technological advancement, and successful economic reforms enabled many Global South nations to reduce poverty, build infrastructure, and accumulate foreign exchange reserves. China's rise as both a Global South leader and major development financier created new opportunities for South-South cooperation, while the 2008 financial crisis highlighted the limitations of Western-led economic models. Today's Global South operates in a fundamentally different context than previous generations. Digital connectivity enables direct South-South knowledge sharing, while sovereign wealth funds and development banks provide alternative financing sources to traditional Northern institutions. This combination of economic capacity and technological capability has translated into unprecedented political assertiveness. ## Four Pillars of Global South Agency ### Economic Sovereignty and Alternative Institutions The most visible manifestation of Global South rising influence lies in the creation of alternative economic institutions that challenge Western financial hegemony. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), established in 2016 with 57 founding members including major European allies of the United States, has approved over $37 billion in financing for infrastructure projects across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. BRICS institutions represent even more ambitious attempts at financial architecture reform. The New Development Bank has committed over $33 billion to sustainable development projects, while the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement provides $100 billion in emergency financing as an alternative to IMF conditionality. The 2023 BRICS expansion to include Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and UAE signals growing appetite for alternatives to Western-dominated institutions. Regional development banks are proliferating across the Global South. The African Development Bank's lending reached $6.4 billion in 2023, while the Development Bank of Latin America has become a major infrastructure financier. These institutions operate with different governance structures, lending criteria, and conditionality requirements than traditional Bretton Woods institutions, reflecting Global South priorities and development models. Currency diversification initiatives further demonstrate economic assertion. China and Russia conduct increasing bilateral trade in their national currencies, while the Reserve Bank of India has established rupee trade mechanisms with over 18 countries. Saudi Arabia's openness to pricing oil in currencies other than the dollar reflects broader Global South interest in reducing dollar dependence. ### Climate Leadership and Environmental Justice Climate policy has emerged as a crucial arena for Global South agency, particularly following the recognition that developing nations face disproportionate climate impacts despite contributing least to historical emissions. The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Climate Vulnerable Forum have effectively advocated for ambitious temperature targets and loss-and-damage mechanisms in international negotiations. The COP28 presidency of the United Arab Emirates, a Global South nation, resulted in the first global agreement to transition away from fossil fuels. This achievement reflected sophisticated coalition-building that bridged traditional divides between oil producers and climate-vulnerable nations. Similarly, the V20 group of climate-vulnerable finance ministers has advocated successfully for climate finance mechanisms that address adaptation and resilience needs. Brazil's leadership in forest conservation demonstrates how Global South nations leverage environmental assets for global influence. The Amazon Fund, supported by international donors, provides Brazil with significant diplomatic leverage while positioning the country as essential to global climate stability. President Lula's return to power in 2023 immediately elevated Brazil's climate diplomacy profile, demonstrating how domestic political changes in Global South nations can have global implications. African nations are pioneering renewable energy transitions that leapfrog traditional development models. Morocco's Noor Ouarzazate solar complex, one of the world's largest concentrated solar power facilities, provides clean energy while establishing Morocco as a renewable energy hub for Europe and Africa. These initiatives demonstrate Global South capacity for technological leadership rather than merely technology adoption. ### Digital Sovereignty and Technological Independence The digital revolution has created new opportunities for Global South agency while also generating new dependencies. India's development of the Unified Payments Interface (UPI), processing over 100 billion transactions worth $1.8 trillion in 2023, demonstrates how Global South nations can create indigenous digital platforms that reduce reliance on Western technology companies. Africa's mobile money revolution, led by Kenya's M-Pesa and adopted across the continent, shows how Global South innovations can leapfrog traditional financial infrastructure. With over 548 million registered mobile money accounts across sub-Saharan Africa, the continent leads global digital payment adoption despite limited traditional banking infrastructure. However, digital dependencies remain significant challenges. The Global South consumes vast quantities of digital services from Northern companies while contributing relatively little to global digital governance. Chinese technology companies like Huawei and TikTok provide alternatives to Western platforms, but create new dependency relationships rather than genuine technological independence. Data sovereignty has become a crucial Global South concern. Nigeria's Data Protection Regulation and Brazil's General Data Protection Law reflect efforts to assert control over data governance, while the African Union's Digital Transformation Strategy aims to create continental digital infrastructure. These initiatives demonstrate growing recognition that digital autonomy requires both technological capacity and regulatory frameworks. ### Security Cooperation and Conflict Resolution Global South nations are increasingly asserting agency in security matters, challenging Northern dominance in peacekeeping and conflict resolution. African Union peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Mali, and the Central African Republic demonstrate continental capacity for security provision, even as they rely on international financial support. The African Union's "Silencing the Guns" initiative aims to end all wars on the continent by 2030, representing an ambitious assertion of African agency in conflict prevention and resolution. Similarly, ECOWAS interventions in West African political crises, despite mixed results, demonstrate regional organizations' growing willingness to act independently of global powers. Latin American initiatives like the Contadora Group and the Rio Group (now CELAC) have historically provided regional alternatives to U.S.-dominated security frameworks. Brazil's leadership in MINUSTAH, the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti, demonstrated South American capacity for international security provision beyond the Western Hemisphere. Middle Eastern nations are increasingly pursuing independent foreign policies that transcend traditional alliance structures. The UAE's balanced approach between the United States and China, Saudi Arabia's diversification away from exclusive U.S. partnership, and Turkey's multi-vector foreign policy reflect growing confidence in pursuing autonomous strategies rather than bandwagoning with great powers. ## Global South Leadership ### India's Strategic Autonomy India's approach to the Russia-Ukraine conflict exemplifies Global South strategic autonomy. Despite Western pressure, India has maintained trade relationships with Russia, including increased oil imports that reached 1.6 million barrels per day by 2023\. This policy reflects historical Non-Aligned Movement principles while serving contemporary economic interests. India's G20 presidency in 2023 demonstrated sophisticated diplomatic leadership, successfully building consensus on issues from digital public infrastructure to sustainable development goals. The New Delhi G20 Leaders' Declaration's focus on Global South priorities, including climate finance and food security, reflected India's ability to shape international agendas rather than merely respond to Northern initiatives. The country's digital public infrastructure, including the India Stack of digital identity, payments, and data exchange systems, is being exported to other Global South nations through technical cooperation programs. This represents a shift from India as a recipient of Northern technical assistance to a provider of indigenous technological solutions. ### African Continental Integration The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), launched in 2021, represents the world's largest free trade agreement by participating countries, covering 1.3 billion people and $3.4 trillion in combined GDP. The agreement reflects African agency in economic integration, pursuing intra-African trade growth rather than continued dependence on Northern markets. African nations are asserting greater agency in natural resource governance. The African Mining Vision promotes value addition and beneficiation of mineral resources on the continent rather than raw material export to Northern processing facilities. Countries like Botswana and the Democratic Republic of Congo are increasingly demanding equity participation in mining operations and technology transfer agreements. The African Union's Agenda 2063 represents perhaps the most ambitious development vision articulated by any regional organization, aiming to transform Africa into a global powerhouse through industrialization, integration, and technological advancement. While implementation faces significant challenges, the vision reflects continental confidence in African agency and capacity. ## Implications for Global Governance These developments signal a fundamental shift from a Western-dominated international order toward a more multipolar system where Global South voices carry increasing weight. Traditional institutions like the UN Security Council, World Bank, and IMF face growing pressure to reform governance structures that reflect 20th-century power distributions rather than contemporary realities. The emergence of competing governance models presents both opportunities and challenges for international cooperation. Multiple development financing options can increase policy space for developing nations while creating pressure for improved performance among competing institutions. However, institutional fragmentation may complicate coordination on global challenges requiring universal participation, such as climate change and pandemic preparedness. The Global South's growing agency also creates new forms of South-South competition and tension. China's Belt and Road Initiative generates both opportunities and concerns among recipient nations, while India's rivalry with China complicates Asian regional integration. Brazilian and Nigerian competition for African influence reflects how Global South rise creates new geopolitical dynamics rather than simple North-South replacement. Regional organizations are gaining prominence as mechanisms for Global South agency, potentially creating a more decentralized international system. The African Union, ASEAN, CELAC, and other regional bodies increasingly serve as platforms for collective action and alternative governance models, though their effectiveness varies significantly across regions and issue areas. ## Challenges and Limitations Despite significant progress, Global South agency faces substantial constraints. Economic dependencies persist through debt relationships, technology gaps, and continued reliance on Northern markets for high-value exports. Many Global South nations remain vulnerable to external economic shocks, as demonstrated by the impact of COVID-19 and the Russia-Ukraine conflict on developing economies. Internal governance challenges limit many Global South nations' ability to project influence effectively. Corruption, weak institutions, and political instability constrain development outcomes and international credibility. The gap between diplomatic ambitions and domestic capacity remains significant for many countries seeking enhanced international roles. Technological dependencies create new forms of subordination even as Global South nations assert political agency. Reliance on Northern intellectual property, manufacturing capacity, and digital platforms limits genuine technological sovereignty. The global semiconductor shortage highlighted these vulnerabilities while demonstrating the concentration of critical technologies in relatively few Northern and East Asian suppliers. Climate change poses existential challenges for many Global South nations, particularly small island developing states and least developed countries. While climate policy provides opportunities for international influence, the urgency of adaptation needs may constrain longer-term development strategies and policy autonomy. ## The Path Forward The Global South's rise represents neither a complete displacement of Northern influence nor a return to Cold War-era bloc politics. Instead, it signals the emergence of a more complex, multipolar international system where agency is more widely distributed and governance mechanisms more diverse. Success for Global South nations will require balancing assertiveness with pragmatism, pursuing strategic autonomy while maintaining beneficial relationships with traditional partners. The challenge lies in translating economic growth and demographic advantages into sustainable influence that serves both national development goals and global stability. For the international community, accommodating Global South agency requires institutional reform, recognition of diverse development models, and genuine partnership rather than continued paternalism. The alternative—attempting to maintain outdated power structures—risks fragmentation and conflict that serves no one's interests. The Global South's rising influence offers opportunities for more inclusive, representative, and effective global governance. Whether this potential is realized depends on the wisdom of leaders both North and South in navigating the complex transition from a Western-dominated order to something genuinely multipolar and inclusive. ### Future of War: How Technology Is Rewriting the Rules of Global Conflict URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/future-of-war-how-technology-is-rewriting-the-rules-of-global-conflict/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:17:37.000Z In October 2023, Israeli forces deployed artificial intelligence systems to identify and strike over 15,000 targets in Gaza within weeks—a pace of target acquisition that would have taken human analysts months to achieve. Simultaneously, Ukrainian forces used commercial drones modified with explosives to disable Russian tanks worth millions of dollars, while hacktivist groups launched cyberattacks that temporarily shut down Iranian government websites. This convergence of artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and cyber warfare represents the most fundamental transformation in military affairs since the advent of nuclear weapons, reshaping how nations project power, deter adversaries, and conceptualize security itself. The traditional Clausewitzian notion of war as politics by other means persists, but the "other means" have expanded exponentially. Today's conflicts unfold simultaneously across physical battlefields, digital networks, and autonomous systems operating at machine speed. From China's development of hypersonic weapons that can circumnavigate the globe in under an hour to Russia's deployment of AI-enabled electronic warfare systems, military technological advancement is outpacing doctrinal development and international law. The question facing defense planners is no longer whether technology will reshape warfare, but whether human decision-making can maintain control over increasingly autonomous military systems. ## Historical Arc of Military Innovation Military technology has always driven changes in warfare, from gunpowder's democratization of medieval battlefields to aviation's transformation of 20th-century conflict. However, the current technological revolution differs in both scope and speed. Where previous innovations typically enhanced existing military capabilities, today's technologies are creating entirely new domains of warfare while compressing decision-making timeframes to milliseconds. The nuclear age introduced the concept of mutually assured destruction, fundamentally altering strategic calculations through the threat of civilization-ending consequences. Today's emerging technologies operate below this threshold while potentially achieving similar strategic effects through precision, speed, and deniability. The result is a more complex deterrence environment where traditional concepts of escalation and proportionality require redefinition. Historical precedent suggests that major military technological shifts typically require decades for full doctrinal integration. The machine gun, invented in the 1880s, didn't fundamentally alter military tactics until World War I's devastating lessons forced adaptation. Similarly, early nuclear weapons were initially viewed as "bigger bombs" rather than strategically transformative capabilities. Today's accelerated technological development cycle, however, compresses these adaptation periods from decades to years or even months. The Pentagon's 2018 National Defense Strategy explicitly acknowledged this challenge, noting that the pace of technological change requires "increased speed of delivery, continuous adaptation, and frequent experimentation." This recognition reflects broader understanding that military institutions must fundamentally restructure their acquisition and development processes to remain relevant in an era of exponential technological advancement. ## Five Dimensions of Technological Transformation ### Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Artificial intelligence is revolutionizing warfare across multiple domains, from target identification and battle damage assessment to logistics optimization and strategic planning. The Pentagon's Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) system aims to create an AI-enabled network connecting sensors and shooters across land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains, enabling machine-speed decision-making that humans cannot match. China's military modernization heavily emphasizes AI integration, with the People's Liberation Army developing "intelligentized warfare" concepts that leverage machine learning for everything from swarm drone coordination to predictive maintenance of weapon systems. Chinese defense spending on AI reached an estimated $2.6 billion in 2023, focusing particularly on autonomous decision-making systems that can operate in communications-denied environments. The strategic implications extend beyond tactical advantages. AI-enabled systems can process vast quantities of intelligence data, identifying patterns and threats that human analysts might miss while operating continuously without fatigue or cognitive bias. The U.S. Department of Defense's Project Maven, which uses AI to analyze drone footage, processes more imagery in a day than human analysts could review in years. However, these capabilities introduce new vulnerabilities, including adversarial machine learning attacks designed to fool AI systems and the challenge of maintaining meaningful human control over life-and-death decisions. The European Union's proposed AI Act includes specific provisions for military AI systems, reflecting growing international concern about autonomous decision-making in warfare. ### Autonomous Weapons Systems The development of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) represents perhaps the most ethically and strategically significant military technological advancement since nuclear weapons. These systems can select and engage targets without direct human intervention, operating based on pre-programmed parameters and machine learning algorithms. Current autonomous weapons range from defensive systems like Israel's Iron Dome, which automatically intercepts incoming projectiles, to offensive capabilities like loitering munitions that can independently identify and attack specific target types. Turkey's deployment of autonomous drones against Syrian forces in 2020 marked one of the first documented uses of fully autonomous weapons in combat, raising urgent questions about accountability and escalation control. The United States maintains a policy requiring "meaningful human control" over lethal autonomous weapons, as outlined in Department of Defense Directive 3000.09\. However, this position faces pressure from military leaders who argue that human decision-making speeds are inadequate for modern threats. Meanwhile, China and Russia have expressed fewer reservations about fully autonomous systems, with both nations developing capabilities that could operate independently of human oversight. The proliferation of autonomous weapons creates new strategic dynamics. Lower-cost autonomous systems can potentially neutralize expensive traditional platforms, as demonstrated by drone swarms overwhelming air defense systems in recent conflicts. This capability diffusion may level playing fields between great powers and smaller states or non-state actors, fundamentally altering regional power balances. International efforts to regulate autonomous weapons through the Convention on Conventional Weapons have made limited progress, with key military powers resisting binding restrictions. The International Committee of the Red Cross has called for prohibitions on autonomous weapons that cannot comply with international humanitarian law, but achieving consensus remains elusive. ### Cyber Warfare and Information Operations Cyber warfare has evolved from a supporting capability to a primary domain of military operations. The 2010 Stuxnet attack on Iranian nuclear facilities demonstrated how cyber weapons could achieve physical destruction traditionally requiring kinetic force. Since then, cyber operations have become routine elements of great power competition and regional conflicts. Russia's cyber operations during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine showcased both the potential and limitations of digital warfare. While Russian hackers successfully targeted Ukrainian government networks and energy infrastructure, Ukraine's cyber resilience—supported by private sector partnerships and international assistance—limited the strategic impact of these attacks. The conflict highlighted how cyber capabilities require integration with conventional operations to achieve maximum effectiveness. The emergence of quantum computing threatens to revolutionize cybersecurity by potentially rendering current encryption methods obsolete. Nations investing heavily in quantum research—including the United States ($1.2 billion National Quantum Initiative) and China (estimated $15 billion investment)—may gain decisive advantages in both offensive cyber capabilities and defensive quantum-resistant encryption. Attribution challenges in cyberspace complicate deterrence and response strategies. The 2020 SolarWinds hack, attributed to Russian intelligence services, demonstrated how cyber operations can achieve strategic intelligence gathering that would be impossible through traditional espionage methods. However, the months-long delay in attribution and response illustrates the difficulties of applying traditional deterrence concepts to cyber operations. Information warfare, closely related to cyber operations, has become a persistent feature of international competition. Social media manipulation, deepfake technologies, and AI-generated disinformation campaigns represent new forms of warfare that target societal cohesion rather than military capabilities directly. ### Space Militarization Space has rapidly evolved from a sanctuary for civilian and dual-use capabilities to a contested military domain. The establishment of the U.S. Space Force in 2019 reflected recognition that space superiority is essential for modern military operations, given military dependence on satellite communications, navigation, and intelligence gathering. Anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons development by China, Russia, and increasingly other nations has created new strategic vulnerabilities. China's 2007 ASAT test, which destroyed one of its own satellites and created thousands of pieces of space debris, demonstrated both capability and willingness to weaponize space despite potential consequences for all space users. Russia's 2021 ASAT test and India's 2019 Mission Shakti similarly showcased growing capabilities and normalization of space weapons testing. The commercialization of space through companies like SpaceX, which has launched over 5,000 Starlink satellites, and the proliferation of small satellites are democratizing space access while complicating military planning. Mega-constellations of thousands of satellites create both opportunities for resilient military communications and targets for adversarial interference, requiring new approaches to space security and conflict prevention. China's rapid expansion of its space capabilities, including the deployment of potentially dual-use satellites and development of ground-based ASAT systems, has prompted U.S. concerns about space-based threats to critical infrastructure. The Pentagon's 2023 China Military Power Report highlighted Chinese space capabilities as a growing challenge to U.S. space superiority. ### Hypersonic Weapons and Missile Defense Hypersonic weapons, capable of traveling at speeds exceeding Mach 5 while maneuvering unpredictably, represent a significant challenge to existing missile defense systems and strategic stability. Russia's deployment of the Kinzhal hypersonic missile and China's development of the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle have prompted urgent U.S. responses, including accelerated hypersonic weapon development and next-generation missile defense research. These weapons compress warning times from 30 minutes for traditional ICBMs to as little as 5-10 minutes, while their maneuverability makes interception extremely difficult with current technologies. The strategic implications include potential first-strike advantages and challenges to extended deterrence commitments, as allies may question whether hypersonic-armed adversaries could prevent effective retaliation or alliance support. The U.S. hypersonic weapons program, receiving $4.7 billion in fiscal year 2024 funding, aims to field operational systems by 2025\. However, testing challenges and technical difficulties have delayed deployment timelines, while China and Russia appear to have achieved earlier operational capabilities. ## Modern Military Technology ### Ukraine Conflict: The Drone Revolution The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has become a laboratory for emerging military technologies, particularly unmanned systems. Ukrainian forces have effectively used commercial drones modified for military purposes, achieving tactical successes against Russian forces while spending thousands of dollars to destroy equipment worth millions. The conflict has demonstrated both the potential and limitations of low-cost autonomous systems. Ukrainian operators have used everything from consumer quadcopters for reconnaissance to modified racing drones carrying small explosives for precision strikes. The Turkish-supplied Bayraktar TB2 drones proved devastatingly effective against Russian armor in the conflict's early phases, destroying over $300 million worth of equipment according to Ukrainian claims. However, the rapid cycle of innovation and counter-innovation in Ukraine also illustrates technological limitations. Russian electronic warfare systems have increasingly neutralized Ukrainian drone operations, while both sides have developed new countermeasures ranging from anti-drone weapons to camouflage techniques specifically designed to fool AI target recognition systems. The conflict's lessons extend beyond tactical applications to strategic implications. The effectiveness of relatively inexpensive systems against traditional military platforms suggests fundamental shifts in military procurement priorities and force structure planning for armies worldwide. ### Gaza Conflict: AI-Enabled Targeting Israel's use of AI systems for target identification and battle damage assessment in Gaza represents one of the first large-scale deployments of artificial intelligence in active combat operations. The "Gospel" AI system reportedly processes intelligence data to identify potential targets faster than human analysts, while the "Where's Daddy?" program tracks targets to optimize timing of strikes. According to Israeli military sources, these AI systems enabled the identification and engagement of thousands of targets in the conflict's initial phases, far exceeding the capacity of human analysts working with traditional intelligence methods. The systems reportedly integrate data from multiple sources, including signals intelligence, imagery analysis, and pattern recognition algorithms. This application of AI in warfare raises critical questions about human control, civilian protection, and the speed of military decision-making. While AI can potentially reduce human error and improve precision, concerns persist about algorithmic bias, verification of targets, and the risks of automated escalation in complex urban environments where military and civilian targets are closely intermixed. International humanitarian law requires distinction between military and civilian targets, proportionality in attacks, and precautionary measures to minimize civilian harm. The delegation of these judgments to AI systems, even with human oversight, represents uncharted territory in the application of the laws of armed conflict. ## Implications for Global Security Architecture These technological developments are fundamentally reshaping global security architecture and strategic stability. Traditional concepts of deterrence, based on visible capabilities and clear escalation ladders, become more complex when dealing with cyber weapons, AI systems, and hypersonic delivery vehicles that compress decision-making time and blur attribution. The proliferation of advanced military technologies beyond traditional great powers creates new regional security challenges. Nations like Iran, which has developed sophisticated drone and missile capabilities, and North Korea, with its advancing hypersonic and nuclear programs, are acquiring capabilities that were previously exclusive to superpowers. This diffusion of military capability is creating more complex threat environments and challenging existing alliance structures. International legal frameworks struggle to keep pace with technological development. The Laws of Armed Conflict, codified in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, provide limited guidance for autonomous weapons, cyber operations, or space conflicts. The absence of clear legal frameworks creates risks of miscalculation and escalation while potentially legitimizing the deployment of destabilizing technologies. Arms control mechanisms face similar challenges. Traditional arms control agreements focus on quantifiable systems like nuclear warheads or conventional forces. The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which eliminated an entire class of weapons, demonstrates successful arms control for traditional systems. However, regulating software-based weapons, dual-use technologies, or capabilities that exist primarily in cyberspace requires fundamentally different approaches to verification and enforcement. The commercial sector's central role in military technological development further complicates traditional security governance. Unlike the Cold War era, when military research occurred primarily in government laboratories, today's critical technologies emerge from private companies with global supply chains and civilian applications. This reality challenges export controls, technology transfer restrictions, and military-civilian technology boundaries. ## Strategic Challenges and Opportunities The integration of these technologies creates both opportunities for enhanced security and risks of destabilization. On the positive side, precision weapons and AI-enabled systems could potentially reduce civilian casualties through more accurate targeting and better battle damage assessment. Autonomous defensive systems might provide smaller nations with effective deterrent capabilities against larger adversaries, potentially contributing to regional stability. Advanced warning systems powered by AI and satellite intelligence could provide early detection of military buildups or preparations for aggression, enabling diplomatic intervention before conflicts escalate. The integration of cyber capabilities with conventional forces might also enable more surgical military operations that achieve political objectives with reduced destruction and casualties. However, the risks are substantial and multifaceted. The speed of machine decision-making could lead to rapid escalation before human leaders can intervene, potentially triggering conflicts that no party desired. The 1995 incident in which Russian radar operators mistook a U.S. scientific rocket launch for a submarine-launched ballistic missile, nearly prompting nuclear retaliation, illustrates how misunderstandings can escalate rapidly even with human decision-makers. The complexity of integrated systems creates new single points of failure, while the dual-use nature of many technologies complicates export controls and proliferation prevention. A successful cyber attack on military AI systems could potentially blind and confuse forces more completely than traditional electronic warfare, while the proliferation of autonomous weapons to non-state actors could enable new forms of terrorism and asymmetric warfare. For military planners, these developments require fundamental reconsiderations of force structure, training, and doctrine. Traditional measures of military effectiveness—numbers of tanks, aircraft, or ships—become less relevant when small, autonomous systems can achieve strategic effects. The premium on human decision-making paradoxically increases even as human reaction times become inadequate for many tactical situations. Military education and training programs must adapt to prepare officers for warfare involving autonomous systems, cyber operations, and AI-enabled intelligence analysis. The U.S. military's establishment of cyber and space commands reflects institutional recognition of new domains, but full integration across services and with traditional operations remains a work in progress. ## Preparing for an Uncertain Future The transformation of warfare through emerging technologies demands adaptive approaches to security planning and international cooperation. Nations must balance the advantages of technological superiority against the risks of arms racing and destabilization, while ensuring that human agency remains central to critical decisions about the use of force. Success requires unprecedented cooperation between technologists, military planners, policymakers, and international legal experts. The tech industry's growing influence on military capabilities necessitates closer collaboration between Silicon Valley and Pentagon, while international forums must develop new approaches to regulating rapidly evolving technologies. Educational institutions and think tanks play crucial roles in fostering informed debate about military technology's implications. Programs like MIT's Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory's work on AI ethics and Stanford's Human-Centered AI Institute contribute essential research on maintaining human control over autonomous systems. The development of international norms and agreements for emerging military technologies requires patient diplomacy and technical expertise. While comprehensive treaties may prove elusive, bilateral agreements, confidence-building measures, and industry standards could help establish guardrails against the most destabilizing applications of new technologies. As artificial intelligence and autonomous systems reshape the battlefield, the ultimate test will be whether human wisdom can guide these powerful tools toward a more stable and secure world. The stakes of getting this balance right have never been higher, as the technologies that promise to make warfare more precise and limited also risk making it faster, more automated, and potentially beyond human control. ### Balance of Power: Why Classical Theory Still Shapes Our Multipolar World URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/balance-of-power-why-classical-theory-still-shapes-our-multipolar-world/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:17:21.000Z The ancient principle of balance of power, once wielded by Greek city-states and European monarchs, is experiencing a dramatic renaissance in today's interconnected world. As China's GDP approaches $18 trillion and military spending surges past $290 billion annually, while the United States maintains its $816 billion defense budget, the classical dance of great power competition has returned with digital-age complexity. From the South China Sea's contested waters to the Arctic's melting geopolitical landscape, nations are rediscovering that the 400-year-old Westphalian logic of equilibrium remains surprisingly relevant in an era of artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, and climate diplomacy. This revival challenges the post-Cold War assumption that globalization and interdependence would render traditional balance-of-power politics obsolete. Instead, economic integration has created new venues for strategic competition, while technological advancement has multiplied the dimensions across which power must be balanced. The question facing policymakers today is not whether balance-of-power dynamics persist, but how classical theory adapts to a world where power flows through fiber optic cables as readily as naval straits. ## Timeless Logic of Equilibrium Balance-of-power theory emerged from centuries of European statecraft, crystallized by thinkers like Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz into a core principle of international relations: states naturally seek to prevent any single power from achieving hegemony. The theory posits that when one state grows too powerful, others will form coalitions to contain it, creating a self-regulating system that preserves sovereignty and prevents domination. Historically, this dynamic shaped everything from the Concert of Europe following Napoleon's defeat to the Cold War's bipolar standoff. The 1648 Peace of Westphalia established the foundational principle that no single power should dominate Europe, a concept that guided diplomatic thinking through two world wars and beyond. Even the United Nations Security Council, with its permanent five members wielding veto power, reflects balance-of-power logic in institutional form. The theory's endurance stems from its basis in fundamental human and state behavior: the desire for security and autonomy drives nations to resist domination, regardless of the era's prevailing technology or ideology. This creates predictable patterns of alignment and realignment that transcend specific historical contexts. ## Four Dimensions of Modern Power Balancing ### Military and Security Competition Traditional military balance remains central to contemporary geopolitics, though its expression has evolved significantly. The Indo-Pacific region exemplifies this evolution, where the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) between the United States, Japan, India, and Australia represents a classic balance-of-power response to China's military modernization and territorial assertions in the South China Sea. China's military buildup, including its expansion from 250 nuclear warheads in 2010 to an estimated 500 today, has triggered countermeasures across the region. Japan increased its defense spending to 2% of GDP for the first time since World War II, while Australia committed $200 billion to submarine acquisition through the AUKUS partnership with Britain and the United States. These developments mirror 19th-century European alliance patterns, updated for 21st-century threats including hypersonic missiles and space warfare capabilities. ### Economic Interdependence as Strategic Competition Modern balance-of-power dynamics increasingly play out through economic instruments, transforming trade relationships into geopolitical battlegrounds. China's Belt and Road Initiative, spanning over 70 countries and involving $1 trillion in planned infrastructure investment, represents economic statecraft designed to shift global power balances. The initiative creates dependencies and influence networks that extend Beijing's reach far beyond traditional military projection capabilities. Western responses follow classical balancing logic: the European Union's Global Gateway program promises €300 billion in infrastructure investment to compete with Chinese influence, while the G7's Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment pledges $600 billion for developing nations. These initiatives demonstrate how economic integration, rather than eliminating balance-of-power politics, has created new arenas for strategic competition. The weaponization of economic interdependence became starkly visible following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, when Western sanctions targeted everything from Russian central bank reserves to semiconductor exports. This "geoeconomic" competition shows how supply chains, currency systems, and technology standards have become instruments of power projection and containment. ### Technological and Cyber Domains The digital revolution has created entirely new dimensions for balance-of-power competition. Control over critical technologies—semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and 5G networks—has become a central component of national power. The United States' restrictions on Chinese access to advanced semiconductors, coupled with export controls on AI chips, represent technological containment strategies reminiscent of Cold War technology transfer limitations. China's response includes massive investments in domestic semiconductor production and alternative technology ecosystems, from Huawei's attempts to create 5G alternatives to TikTok's challenge to Western social media dominance. The European Union's Digital Services Act and data sovereignty initiatives reflect attempts to balance American and Chinese technological influence while preserving European autonomy. Cyber warfare capabilities add another layer of complexity, where attribution challenges and the speed of digital attacks create new forms of deterrence and escalation. The SolarWinds hack, attributed to Russian intelligence services, demonstrated how cyber operations can achieve strategic effects traditionally requiring military force, forcing nations to develop cyber balancing strategies alongside conventional deterrence. ### Institutional and Normative Competition International institutions themselves have become venues for balance-of-power competition, as rising powers challenge Western-dominated governance structures. China's creation of alternative institutions—the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the BRICS New Development Bank—reflects dissatisfaction with existing power distributions in organizations like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. These institutional balancing efforts extend to normative competition over governance models, human rights standards, and economic systems. China's promotion of "whole-process people's democracy" and Russia's emphasis on "traditional values" represent ideological alternatives to Western liberal democratic models, creating competition for global influence that echoes Cold War dynamics. ## Contemporary Balancing ### The Middle East's Shifting Alignments The Abraham Accords, normalizing relations between Israel and several Arab states, illustrate how balance-of-power logic adapts to regional contexts. Faced with Iran's growing influence through proxy forces in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, traditional adversaries aligned to balance Tehran's regional ambitions. The UAE and Bahrain's recognition of Israel, followed by Morocco and Sudan, reflects pragmatic power balancing that transcends historical animosities. This realignment accelerated following the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, which Gulf states perceived as legitimizing Iranian regional dominance. The subsequent formation of anti-Iranian coalitions, including enhanced Israeli-Saudi cooperation despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations, demonstrates how classical balancing logic operates even in complex regional systems with multiple overlapping conflicts. ### Arctic Competition and Climate Geopolitics Climate change has created new geopolitical spaces where balance-of-power dynamics play out with growing intensity. Arctic ice melt has opened new shipping routes and resource extraction opportunities, triggering competition between Arctic Council members and non-Arctic states. Russia's militarization of the Arctic, including the deployment of S-400 missile systems and nuclear-powered icebreakers, has prompted NATO responses including increased exercises and infrastructure investments. China's self-designation as a "near-Arctic state" and its Polar Silk Road initiative represent attempts to gain influence in a region where it has no territorial claims, forcing Arctic states to balance Chinese economic opportunities against sovereignty concerns. The exclusion of Russia from Arctic Council activities following the Ukraine invasion has further complicated regional balance-of-power calculations. ## Implications for Global Order These developments suggest that rather than becoming obsolete, balance-of-power theory is experiencing a renaissance adapted to contemporary conditions. The multipolar order emerging in the 21st century creates more complex balancing requirements than the bipolar Cold War system, as multiple great powers compete across numerous dimensions simultaneously. This complexity creates both opportunities and risks for international stability. On one hand, multipolar systems can provide more flexibility and prevent the rigid confrontations that characterized bipolar competition. Multiple power centers can create space for middle powers to maneuver and pursue independent foreign policies, as evidenced by India's strategic autonomy policy or Turkey's balanced approach between NATO allies and regional rivals. However, multipolarity also increases the potential for miscalculation and conflict, as classical balance-of-power theory predicts. The absence of clear hierarchies can create uncertainty about red lines and escalation thresholds, while the multiplication of competitive dimensions increases opportunities for friction and confrontation. For policymakers, understanding these dynamics requires appreciating both continuity and change in international relations. While the fundamental logic of power balancing persists, its expression through economic, technological, and institutional means demands new forms of statecraft and diplomacy. ## Navigating the New Balance The persistence of balance-of-power dynamics in an interconnected world suggests that classical realist insights remain relevant for contemporary diplomacy, even as their application requires constant adaptation. Success in this environment demands understanding how traditional concepts of power, alliance, and competition translate into domains from cyberspace to climate policy. Rather than viewing interdependence as eliminating balance-of-power politics, policymakers must recognize how it creates new venues for strategic competition while raising the costs of miscalculation. The challenge for the coming decade lies in managing these competitive dynamics while preserving the benefits of global cooperation on challenges that transcend national boundaries. In this complex landscape, the ancient wisdom of balance-of-power theory offers not obsolete thinking, but essential guidance for navigating an interconnected yet competitive world. ### Soft Power vs. Hard Power: Which Matters More in Global Politics Today? URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/soft-power-vs-hard-power-which-matters-more-in-global-politics-today/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:17:05.000Z In March 2022, as Russian tanks rolled across Ukraine's borders, an unexpected front opened in the conflict—not on battlefields, but on smartphone screens worldwide. Within hours, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky transformed from a former comedian into a global symbol of democratic resistance, delivering virtual addresses to parliaments from London to Tokyo while wearing his signature olive-green t-shirt. His masterful use of social media, combined with Ukraine's narrative of David versus Goliath, mobilized unprecedented international support that translated into $100 billion in military aid, crippling sanctions on Russia, and NATO expansion that Moscow had sought to prevent. This juxtaposition—raw military force meeting sophisticated information warfare and narrative control—encapsulates the central tension in contemporary international relations. Russia deployed overwhelming hard power through conventional military invasion, yet Ukraine's soft power strategy arguably proved more decisive in shaping global responses and determining conflict outcomes. The war demonstrated that in our interconnected world, the ability to influence hearts and minds can be as crucial as the capacity to destroy targets and seize territory. The distinction between hard power—military force and economic coercion—and soft power—cultural attraction and ideological persuasion—has never been more relevant or complex. China's Belt and Road Initiative combines massive infrastructure investments with cultural exchanges and educational programs. The United States maintains global military supremacy while American entertainment, technology, and values shape global culture. European Union regulatory frameworks influence worldwide business practices while European universities attract international students who become tomorrow's leaders. Yet determining which form of power "matters more" oversimplifies how influence actually operates in the 21st century. Modern international relations increasingly feature the strategic combination of hard and soft power—what Harvard's Joseph Nye terms "smart power"—rather than simple substitution of one approach for another. Understanding how these different forms of power interact, complement, and sometimes undermine each other has become essential for grasping contemporary geopolitics and predicting future international dynamics. ## Defining Power in International Relations Power in international relations encompasses the ability to influence others' behavior to achieve desired outcomes, but this deceptively simple definition masks enormous complexity about how influence actually operates in practice. Classical realist approaches emphasized military capabilities and economic resources as the primary sources of international power, reflecting historical periods when military conquest and territorial control dominated international competition. Hard power operates through coercion and inducement, using military force and economic leverage to compel or incentivize specific behaviors. Military power provides the ultimate coercive capability through the threat or use of violence to impose costs that exceed the benefits of resistance. Economic power operates through trade relationships, financial systems, and resource control that create dependencies and leverage opportunities for policy influence. Soft power, a concept developed by Joseph Nye in the 1990s, encompasses the ability to attract and persuade rather than coerce. It operates through three primary sources: political values that are attractive to others, foreign policies that are seen as legitimate and having moral authority, and culture that finds broad appeal. Soft power succeeds when others want what you want rather than being forced to comply through threats or payments. The information revolution and globalization have fundamentally altered power dynamics by reducing the costs of communication while increasing the speed and reach of information flows. Social media platforms enable direct communication with foreign populations while 24/7 news cycles create constant opportunities for narrative shaping. These changes have arguably increased soft power's relative importance while creating new vulnerabilities for traditional hard power approaches. However, the hard power versus soft power distinction can be misleading if understood as mutually exclusive alternatives. Most successful influence strategies combine both approaches in ways that maximize effectiveness while minimizing costs and risks. Military capabilities may enable diplomatic credibility while cultural attraction can reduce the costs of maintaining alliance relationships. The concept of "smart power" attempts to capture this integration by emphasizing the strategic combination of hard and soft power resources to achieve optimal outcomes in specific contexts. Smart power requires understanding target audiences, available resources, and situational constraints to deploy the most effective influence strategies. Contemporary power analysis must also consider new forms of influence that don't fit neatly into traditional hard/soft power categories. Cyber capabilities can cause physical damage like traditional military weapons while also shaping information environments like soft power tools. Economic interdependence creates mutual vulnerabilities that complicate simple coercion-attraction distinctions. ## Enduring Relevance of Hard Power Despite predictions about soft power's growing importance, hard power retains crucial roles in international relations through its capacity to provide security, deter aggression, and enforce international law when persuasion fails. Military capabilities remain the ultimate guarantee of state survival while economic power provides essential tools for achieving policy objectives. Military power continues evolving through technological advancement that increases destructive capabilities while potentially reducing political constraints on force usage. Precision weapons, cyber attacks, and autonomous systems enable more discriminating use of force that may reduce civilian casualties and international opposition. These developments could increase military power's utility for achieving specific political objectives. Nuclear weapons represent the ultimate expression of hard power through their capacity to inflict unacceptable costs on any potential adversary. Nuclear deterrence continues providing security guarantees that soft power cannot match while extended deterrence commitments underpin alliance relationships worldwide. The nuclear revolution fundamentally altered international relations by making direct conflict between major powers potentially suicidal. Economic power operates through multiple channels that provide both coercive and attractive capabilities. Large markets offer access opportunities that create incentives for cooperation while trade relationships can be restricted or terminated to impose costs on uncooperative countries. Financial systems provide payment mechanisms and investment capital that other countries require for economic development. The United States demonstrates hard power's continued relevance through military capabilities that enable global power projection and economic leverage derived from dollar dominance and market size. American military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya show both the capabilities and limitations of contemporary military power in achieving political objectives. China's military modernization reflects recognition that hard power capabilities remain essential for protecting core interests and achieving great power status. Chinese investments in advanced military technologies, nuclear weapons, and power projection capabilities demonstrate continued belief in hard power's importance for international competition. Russia's invasion of Ukraine exemplifies both hard power's potential and limitations in contemporary international relations. Military force enabled rapid territorial gains while generating international responses that may ultimately prove more costly than the benefits achieved through conquest. Economic statecraft through sanctions, trade restrictions, and investment controls has become increasingly sophisticated and widely used by major powers seeking to influence international behavior without military force. The scope and effectiveness of economic coercion have expanded significantly as global economic integration creates more vulnerabilities and leverage opportunities. However, hard power faces significant limitations in achieving complex political objectives that require sustained cooperation and legitimacy. Military occupation can control territory but struggles to win hearts and minds necessary for stable governance. Economic coercion can impose costs but may generate resistance and workaround strategies that reduce long-term effectiveness. The humanitarian and legal constraints on hard power usage have strengthened through international law development and civil society advocacy that increase political costs of military action. International Criminal Court prosecutions, human rights monitoring, and media coverage create accountability mechanisms that limit how hard power can be employed. ## Rise and Limits of Soft Power Soft power's prominence in international relations reflects both technological changes that have increased its reach and effectiveness, and growing recognition that many contemporary challenges require cooperation rather than coercion to address successfully. However, soft power also faces significant limitations and vulnerabilities that constrain its utility as a substitute for hard power. Cultural influence represents perhaps the most visible form of contemporary soft power, with American entertainment, technology, and lifestyle choices shaping global preferences and aspirations. Hollywood movies, social media platforms, and consumer brands create positive associations with American values while generating economic benefits that support continued soft power projection. Educational systems provide long-term soft power influence through international student programs that create personal connections and shared experiences among future leaders. American universities attract over one million international students annually while European institutions provide alternative models of higher education that compete for global talent and influence. Language adoption reflects and reinforces soft power influence as English becomes the global lingua franca for business, science, and diplomacy. Mandarin Chinese language programs expand worldwide as China's economic importance grows while French and Spanish maintain influence through historical connections and cultural programs. Digital platforms have democratized soft power projection by enabling direct communication with global audiences while reducing traditional gatekeeping roles of governments and media organizations. Social media allows countries, organizations, and individuals to shape narratives and build constituencies independent of traditional diplomatic channels. However, soft power effectiveness depends on credibility and authenticity that can be easily undermined by policy contradictions or cultural misunderstandings. American soft power has suffered from military interventions that contradict democratic values while Chinese soft power faces skepticism about authoritarian governance models and human rights practices. Measurement challenges complicate soft power assessment as influence over attitudes and preferences may not translate into concrete policy changes or behavioral modifications. Opinion polls and cultural surveys provide some indicators, but the causal relationship between positive attitudes and political outcomes remains unclear. Cultural resistance and backlash can limit soft power effectiveness as target populations reject foreign influence attempts or government policies that appear to compromise sovereignty. Anti-American sentiment in various regions reflects concerns about cultural imperialism while similar reactions affect other countries' soft power efforts. The speed and scale of information flows create new vulnerabilities as soft power messages can be rapidly countered or distorted by adversaries with competing narratives. Social media platforms that enable soft power projection also provide opportunities for disinformation campaigns that undermine credibility and effectiveness. Authoritarian governments have developed increasingly sophisticated approaches to limiting foreign soft power influence through internet restrictions, media controls, and civil society limitations. China's "Great Firewall" and Russia's information controls demonstrate how governments can reduce soft power vulnerability while maintaining domestic control. The competition for narrative control has intensified as multiple actors recognize soft power's importance while possessing unprecedented capabilities to shape information environments. This competition can lead to information overload and audience skepticism that reduces all soft power efforts' effectiveness. ## American Power in the 21st Century The United States exemplifies both the potential and limitations of combining hard and soft power in contemporary international relations. American experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and global counterterrorism operations demonstrate how military superiority alone cannot achieve complex political objectives without accompanying soft power elements and local legitimacy. American hard power capabilities remain unmatched in global scope and technological sophistication. Military expenditure exceeding $800 billion annually supports power projection capabilities that enable rapid deployment to any global location while advanced weapons systems provide decisive advantages in conventional conflicts. Nuclear arsenals maintain deterrent effects while alliance commitments extend security guarantees to dozens of countries worldwide. Economic power derives from the world's largest national economy, dominant financial markets, and dollar's role as the primary international reserve currency. American markets provide access opportunities that create incentives for cooperation while financial systems enable sanctions and other economic pressures. Technology leadership in areas like semiconductors and artificial intelligence provides additional leverage and influence opportunities. However, American soft power has experienced significant decline from its post-Cold War peak due to controversial military interventions, domestic political polarization, and rising competition from alternative models. The Iraq War damaged American credibility and legitimacy while the 2016 election and January 6, 2021, events raised questions about American democratic institutions and values. The "America First" approach during the Trump administration explicitly prioritized hard power and transactional relationships over traditional soft power investments in alliances, international institutions, and multilateral cooperation. This approach achieved some tactical successes while potentially undermining long-term influence and leadership capabilities. Biden administration efforts to restore American soft power through alliance renewal, climate leadership, and democracy promotion face challenges from domestic political divisions and international skepticism about American consistency and reliability. The chaotic Afghanistan withdrawal and continuing domestic political tensions complicate soft power restoration efforts. American cultural influence remains extensive through entertainment industries, technology platforms, and educational institutions that continue attracting global audiences and participants. However, this influence faces increasing competition from other countries' cultural products and alternative social media platforms that reduce American dominance. The COVID-19 pandemic response illustrated both American capabilities and limitations in global leadership. Advanced vaccine development demonstrated technological capabilities while initial distribution inequities and domestic political conflicts undermined global leadership credibility. China's vaccine diplomacy provided alternative leadership models that competed with American influence. Regional variations in American power effectiveness reflect different combinations of hard and soft power acceptance. European allies generally welcome American soft power while accepting security relationships, while Middle Eastern countries may value security cooperation while resisting cultural influence. Asian countries balance American and Chinese influence based on specific interests and circumstances. American power's future trajectory depends partly on successfully integrating hard and soft power approaches that address contemporary challenges while maintaining credibility and attractiveness. This integration requires domestic political stability, consistent foreign policy approaches, and investments in both military capabilities and soft power resources. ## China's Belt and Road Initiative as Smart Power China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) represents perhaps the most ambitious contemporary attempt to combine hard and soft power elements in a comprehensive strategy for expanding international influence. The initiative demonstrates both the potential and challenges of integrating economic investment, infrastructure development, cultural exchange, and strategic positioning. The BRI's economic dimensions involve over $1 trillion in planned infrastructure investments across Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America. Projects include railways, ports, highways, power plants, and telecommunications networks that address genuine development needs while creating dependencies and influence opportunities for China. These investments provide tangible benefits that generate goodwill while positioning Chinese companies for long-term economic relationships. Infrastructure development creates physical connections that can reshape trade patterns and political relationships in ways that favor Chinese interests. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor provides China with alternative energy supply routes while increasing Pakistani dependence on Chinese investment and support. Similar dynamics operate across multiple BRI countries and regions. Cultural and educational components accompany economic investments through Confucius Institutes, student exchange programs, and cultural centers that promote Chinese language learning and positive attitudes toward Chinese culture and governance. These programs attempt to create understanding and appreciation for Chinese approaches while building personal relationships among future leaders. Digital connectivity projects extend BRI influence into information and communications technologies that could provide surveillance and control capabilities alongside economic benefits. Chinese technology companies' involvement in 5G networks, smart city systems, and digital payment platforms creates opportunities for both cooperation and competition with Western alternatives. However, the BRI faces significant challenges from debt sustainability concerns, environmental impacts, and governance questions that undermine its soft power objectives. Critics characterize BRI lending as "debt trap diplomacy" designed to seize strategic assets when countries cannot repay loans. Environmental degradation from BRI projects conflicts with climate change concerns and sustainable development goals. Transparency and governance issues surrounding BRI projects generate suspicion about Chinese motivations and methods that reduce soft power effectiveness. Corruption allegations, labor practices, and environmental standards that fall below international norms create negative associations that undermine positive economic benefits. Geopolitical competition has increasingly framed BRI projects as elements of strategic rivalry rather than mutual development cooperation. American and European alternative initiatives like the Partnership for Global Infrastructure explicitly compete with BRI while promoting different governance models and standards. Local resistance to BRI projects has emerged in multiple countries due to environmental concerns, debt burdens, and sovereignty questions that limit Chinese influence despite economic investments. Sri Lanka's Hambantota Port lease to China following debt difficulties became a symbol of BRI risks that other countries seek to avoid. The COVID-19 pandemic created both opportunities and challenges for BRI soft power as China provided medical assistance and vaccines to BRI partner countries while project delays and reduced funding raised questions about China's commitment and capacity. BRI evolution reflects Chinese learning about soft power requirements and limitations as initial focus on economic benefits expands to include environmental standards, debt sustainability measures, and governance improvements designed to address criticisms and increase acceptance. The initiative's success as smart power depends on China's ability to balance economic objectives with partner country interests while addressing legitimate concerns about debt, governance, and environmental impacts. Success could demonstrate alternative development models while failure might reinforce skepticism about Chinese intentions and capabilities. ## Information Warfare and Digital Influence The digital revolution has fundamentally transformed how soft power operates by creating new platforms for influence while enabling unprecedented speed and scale in information dissemination. However, the same technologies that enhance soft power capabilities also create vulnerabilities through disinformation campaigns and information warfare that can undermine traditional soft power approaches. Social media platforms enable direct communication with global audiences while bypassing traditional gatekeeping mechanisms of governments and media organizations. Countries can engage foreign populations directly through official accounts, cultural content, and targeted messaging that builds positive associations and understanding. These capabilities democratize soft power projection while reducing costs and barriers to entry. State-sponsored media organizations have evolved from traditional broadcasting to sophisticated digital operations that produce content across multiple platforms and languages. RT, CGTN, and other state media outlets combine news reporting with cultural programming and political commentary designed to promote favorable narratives and counter negative coverage. Disinformation campaigns represent the weaponization of information technologies to undermine adversaries rather than promote positive attractions. Russian interference in Western elections, Chinese information operations regarding Hong Kong and Xinjiang, and American counter-narratives demonstrate how information warfare can complement or substitute for traditional hard power approaches. Artificial intelligence and big data analytics enable more sophisticated targeting and personalization of influence campaigns through analysis of individual preferences, beliefs, and susceptibilities. Micro-targeting capabilities allow tailored messaging that maximizes persuasive impact while automated content generation reduces costs and increases scale possibilities. However, information warfare faces significant limitations from audience skepticism, platform restrictions, and counter-operations that can expose and neutralize influence attempts. Public awareness of disinformation risks has increased critical thinking about information sources while social media companies have implemented restrictions on state-linked accounts and inauthentic behavior. The proliferation of information sources and perspectives creates competitive environments where no single actor can dominate narrative control. Multiple countries, organizations, and individuals compete for attention and credibility in increasingly crowded information spaces that may reduce all influence efforts' effectiveness. Credibility remains essential for effective digital influence as audiences can rapidly verify claims and compare sources in ways that expose inaccuracies or manipulation attempts. Countries with strong soft power foundations may be better positioned to succeed in digital influence competition while those relying primarily on manipulation face greater risks of exposure and backlash. Platform governance decisions increasingly affect state influence capabilities as private companies establish content policies and enforcement mechanisms that can limit or enhance different countries' digital reach. These decisions represent a form of private governance over state influence capabilities that complicates traditional sovereignty concepts. The integration of digital influence with broader foreign policy strategies requires coordination between diplomatic, intelligence, and military capabilities that many governments struggle to achieve effectively. Success may depend on developing institutional capabilities for strategic communication that spans multiple agencies and platforms. ## Economic Interdependence as a Double-Edged Sword Global economic integration creates both opportunities for soft power projection and vulnerabilities that adversaries can exploit through economic coercion and dependence manipulation. Understanding these dynamics requires analyzing how economic relationships generate influence while creating risks that may limit policy autonomy. Trade relationships create mutual interests in cooperation while providing leverage opportunities for the larger or more essential partner. China's position as the largest trading partner for over 120 countries provides influence opportunities through market access, investment flows, and supply chain participation that can be modified to encourage specific behaviors. Supply chain dependencies have become particularly significant as globalization has created complex production networks that span multiple countries and regions. Disruptions to critical supply chains can impose significant economic costs while control over essential inputs provides leverage over downstream producers and consumers. Financial interdependence through banking relationships, payment systems, and currency usage creates additional influence opportunities while generating vulnerabilities for countries that depend on external financial infrastructure. Dollar dominance enables American sanctions reach while also creating dependencies that other countries seek to reduce. However, economic interdependence creates mutual vulnerabilities that limit coercion effectiveness while providing targets for retaliation and counter-pressure. The Russia-Europe energy relationship demonstrated how economic dependencies can be weaponized by both sides while imposing costs on all participants. Economic statecraft through sanctions, trade restrictions, and investment controls has become more sophisticated and widely used while generating countermeasures and adaptation strategies that may reduce long-term effectiveness. Targeted sanctions attempt to minimize collateral damage while alternative payment systems and trade arrangements provide workaround options. The COVID-19 pandemic revealed supply chain vulnerabilities that have prompted reshoring and "friend-shoring" initiatives designed to reduce dependence on potentially hostile suppliers. These changes could reduce economic interdependence while potentially limiting both influence opportunities and vulnerability risks. Digital economic relationships through technology platforms, data flows, and digital services create new forms of interdependence that combine economic and informational elements. Control over digital infrastructure and platforms provides both economic leverage and information influence capabilities that traditional economic relationships lack. Regional economic integration through trade agreements and economic partnerships can provide alternatives to global interdependence while creating new influence relationships at regional scales. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and other arrangements demonstrate how economic integration can operate at multiple geographic levels simultaneously. Climate change and energy transition requirements create new forms of economic interdependence through critical mineral dependencies, renewable energy technologies, and carbon market mechanisms. These relationships may replace traditional energy dependencies while creating new influence opportunities and vulnerabilities. ## Cultural Influence in a Globalized World Cultural soft power operates through entertainment, lifestyle, values, and identity formation that can create lasting influence over attitudes and preferences. However, cultural influence faces challenges from local resistance, competing cultures, and authenticity requirements that limit its effectiveness as a deliberate policy tool. Entertainment industries provide perhaps the most visible form of cultural influence as movies, television, music, and digital content shape global preferences and aspirations. American entertainment dominance has created worldwide familiarity with American values, lifestyles, and perspectives while generating economic benefits that support continued production and distribution. Language adoption both reflects and reinforces cultural influence as global populations learn languages that provide economic and educational opportunities. English dominance in science, technology, and business creates advantages for English-speaking countries while Mandarin Chinese growth reflects China's economic importance and educational investments. Educational systems provide long-term cultural influence through international student programs, educational standards, and academic exchanges that create personal relationships and shared experiences among future leaders. American universities' attractiveness to international students provides ongoing influence opportunities while European alternatives offer different models and perspectives. Digital culture through social media, gaming, and online communities creates new forms of cultural influence that operate independent of traditional cultural industries and government policies. These platforms enable cultural exchange and influence that may be more authentic and persuasive than deliberate soft power campaigns. However, cultural influence faces significant limitations from local resistance, cultural authenticity requirements, and competing alternatives that may be more attractive or relevant to specific audiences. Cultural imperialism concerns can generate backlash that undermines influence objectives while local cultural productions may be more appealing than foreign alternatives. Religious and traditional cultural frameworks provide resistance to foreign cultural influence while creating opportunities for countries that can align with local values and practices. Islamic culture, Confucian traditions, and other cultural frameworks shape receptivity to different types of cultural influence while providing alternative organizing principles. Generational differences in cultural consumption and identity formation may create different influence patterns as younger populations engage with global digital culture while older generations maintain traditional cultural preferences. These differences complicate cultural influence strategies that must appeal to diverse audience segments. Commercial cultural production driven by market considerations may be more effective than government-sponsored cultural programs because market success requires genuine audience appeal. However, commercial culture may not align with government policy objectives while entertainment content may contradict official messaging and values. The globalization of cultural production through international co-productions, global distribution systems, and cross-cultural collaboration may reduce any single country's cultural dominance while creating hybrid cultural products that reflect multiple influences simultaneously. ## Technology as a New Dimension of Power Technological capabilities increasingly constitute a distinct form of power that combines elements of both hard and soft power while creating new opportunities for influence and vulnerability. Understanding technology's role in contemporary power relationships requires analyzing both its instrumental capabilities and its influence over global standards and preferences. Digital platforms control information flows and communication channels that can shape public opinion while providing surveillance and data collection capabilities that inform influence strategies. Platform companies' decisions about content policies, algorithmic recommendations, and user access can significantly affect political discourse and opinion formation. Artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies provide analytical capabilities that can enhance both hard and soft power effectiveness through improved targeting, prediction, and decision-making support. Military applications include autonomous weapons and intelligence analysis while civilian applications include personalized influence campaigns and policy optimization. Semiconductors and advanced computing technologies provide foundational capabilities for modern military systems, economic competitiveness, and information influence while creating dependencies that can be exploited for policy leverage. Control over semiconductor design, manufacturing, and access has become a central element of contemporary great power competition. Telecommunications infrastructure including 5G networks, undersea cables, and satellite systems provides essential connectivity while creating opportunities for surveillance, control, and disruption that combine hard and soft power elements. Countries that control these systems can potentially monitor communications while shaping information flows and access. Standards-setting processes for emerging technologies provide long-term influence opportunities by shaping how new technologies develop and operate worldwide. Countries that participate effectively in standards development can ensure their preferences and interests are embedded in global technology systems. However, technological power faces significant limitations from rapid change, competitive development, and user adaptation that can quickly alter power balances and effectiveness. Technology leadership requires sustained investment and innovation capabilities that may be difficult to maintain while competitors can often develop alternatives or workarounds. Cyber vulnerabilities create mutual dependencies as all technologically advanced countries face risks from cyber attacks while possessing capabilities to conduct similar operations against others. These vulnerabilities may create deterrence relationships similar to nuclear weapons while providing new forms of coercive and influence capabilities. Ethical and governance concerns about technology applications can undermine soft power effectiveness when technology use contradicts stated values or generates international criticism. Surveillance technologies, artificial intelligence applications, and data privacy practices create reputational risks that may offset technological capabilities' influence benefits. The global nature of technology development and deployment creates collaboration requirements that may limit any single country's control while providing opportunities for cooperation that transcends traditional geopolitical divisions. Technology standards, research cooperation, and talent mobility create interdependencies that complicate purely competitive approaches. ## Smart Power: Integrating Hard and Soft Approaches The most effective contemporary influence strategies typically combine hard and soft power elements in ways that maximize benefits while minimizing costs and risks. This integration requires understanding how different power types complement and reinforce each other rather than viewing them as mutually exclusive alternatives. Military capabilities can provide credibility for diplomatic initiatives while soft power attraction can reduce the costs of maintaining military alliances and overseas presence. The United States' security guarantees gain credibility from military capabilities while alliance relationships benefit from shared values and cultural connections that pure security arrangements might not sustain. Economic power provides resources for soft power investments while cultural attraction can create preferences for economic relationships that reduce coercion requirements. China's Belt and Road Initiative demonstrates attempts to integrate economic investment with cultural exchange and political influence, though with mixed effectiveness and significant challenges. Timing and sequencing considerations affect how different power types can be effectively combined as some approaches may need to precede others or operate simultaneously for maximum effectiveness. Humanitarian assistance following natural disasters can create goodwill that enhances subsequent diplomatic initiatives while military threats may undermine simultaneous soft power campaigns. Audience-specific strategies recognize that different targets may respond more effectively to different power types based on their vulnerabilities, interests, and cultural contexts. Democratic countries may be more responsive to soft power approaches while authoritarian governments might require harder forms of pressure or inducement. *\[Suggested infographic: Smart power strategies by region and target type\]* Institutional frameworks can facilitate smart power integration by providing mechanisms for coordinating different government agencies and policy tools while maintaining consistency and avoiding contradictory approaches. However, many governments struggle with institutional coordination requirements for effective smart power implementation. Resource allocation decisions affect smart power effectiveness as investments in military capabilities, economic aid, cultural programs, and diplomatic presence require budget priorities and opportunity cost considerations. Optimal resource allocation depends on specific strategic objectives and target characteristics rather than generic formulas. Measurement and assessment challenges complicate smart power evaluation as different power types operate over different time horizons while producing different types of outcomes that may be difficult to compare or aggregate. Military effectiveness may be measurable through deterrence or conflict outcomes while soft power success requires attitude and behavior changes that develop gradually. Credibility requirements mean that smart power strategies must avoid contradictions between hard and soft power approaches that could undermine overall effectiveness. Military interventions that contradict democratic values can damage soft power while soft power commitments that lack hard power backing may appear weak or ineffective. The competitive environment affects smart power strategies as adversaries may attempt to counter or undermine influence efforts through their own hard and soft power applications. Success may depend on relative rather than absolute capabilities while competitive dynamics can escalate influence campaigns in ways that reduce overall effectiveness. ## The Future of Power in International Relations Contemporary trends suggest that both hard and soft power will remain relevant in international relations while their relative importance and effectiveness may continue evolving based on technological developments, political changes, and emerging challenges that require different influence approaches. Climate change and environmental challenges may increase soft power's relative importance as these issues require cooperation and shared commitment that coercion alone cannot achieve effectively. Countries that provide climate leadership and environmental solutions may gain influence that transcends traditional hard power capabilities. Technological development continues altering power dynamics through artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology, and other emerging capabilities that could provide decisive advantages while creating new vulnerabilities and dependencies. Technology leadership may become increasingly important for both hard and soft power effectiveness. Demographic changes including urbanization, generational transitions, and educational expansion may affect receptivity to different power types as younger, more educated, and more connected populations may be more responsive to soft power approaches while remaining skeptical of traditional authority and coercion. Economic development patterns may alter power distributions as new centers of wealth and innovation emerge while existing powers face relative decline. The rise of middle powers and regional influences could create more complex power environments that require different influence strategies. Information warfare and disinformation campaigns may reduce soft power effectiveness by increasing audience skepticism and making credibility more difficult to establish and maintain. However, countries with authentic attractiveness and consistent messaging may gain competitive advantages in increasingly cluttered information environments. *\[Suggested chart: Future power trends - projected changes in military spending, soft power investments, and technology leadership\]* Institutional evolution in international organizations, alliance structures, and global governance mechanisms may affect how different types of power can be applied effectively. Multilateral institutions may provide frameworks for soft power projection while constraining unilateral hard power applications. Domestic political changes including democratization trends, authoritarian consolidation, and political polarization may affect both power projection capabilities and receptivity to different influence approaches. Democratic backsliding could reduce soft power attractiveness while authoritarian resilience may limit soft power effectiveness. Regional variations in power dynamics suggest that global trends may not apply uniformly as different regions develop distinct patterns of hard and soft power relationships based on local conditions, cultural contexts, and historical experiences. The proliferation of non-state actors including multinational corporations, civil society organizations, and terrorist groups creates additional complexity as these entities may possess significant influence capabilities while operating outside traditional state-based power frameworks. Rather than asking which form of power "matters more," the crucial question for contemporary international relations is how different types of power can be most effectively combined to address specific challenges and achieve particular objectives. The answer varies significantly based on context, targets, resources, and competition dynamics that require sophisticated analysis and strategic thinking. The Ukrainian example that opened this analysis demonstrates both hard and soft power's continued relevance while illustrating their interdependence in contemporary conflicts. Ukraine's soft power success required hard power resistance to provide credibility while international hard power support reflected soft power influence over global opinion. Neither approach alone would have been sufficient for Ukrainian success. The future will likely feature continued evolution in how power operates rather than simple dominance by any single type. Countries that develop sophisticated capabilities for integrating different power approaches based on specific circumstances and objectives may achieve the most effective influence while those that rely excessively on any single approach may find their options limited and their effectiveness reduced. Success in contemporary international relations requires understanding that power is multidimensional, context-dependent, and relational rather than absolute. The most influential countries will be those that can deploy the right combinations of hard and soft power at the right times for the right audiences while maintaining credibility and consistency across their various influence efforts. In an interconnected world facing shared challenges, the capacity to inspire cooperation may prove as important as the ability to compel compliance. ### Privatization of Conflict: The Growing Role of Mercenaries and PMCs in World Affairs URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/privatization-of-conflict-the-growing-role-of-mercenaries-and-pmcs-in-world-affairs/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:16:51.000Z On February 7, 2018, American special forces and Kurdish fighters faced an unprecedented adversary near the Syrian town of Khasham—Russian-speaking mercenaries from the Wagner Group attacking a strategic oil facility. The four-hour battle, which killed over 200 Wagner fighters, marked a watershed moment in modern warfare: the first direct combat between Russian and American forces since the Cold War, fought not by regular armies but by proxies operating in the shadows of state accountability. This confrontation exemplified how private military companies (PMCs) have fundamentally altered the nature of international conflict. The incident revealed the new reality of warfare in the 21st century. While governments maintain official deniability, private military contractors prosecute conflicts with increasing autonomy and lethality. Wagner Group's operations span from Syria to Mali, from Ukraine to the Central African Republic, providing Moscow with strategic capabilities while maintaining plausible deniability. Similar dynamics unfold globally as states increasingly outsource security functions to private entities that operate beyond traditional legal frameworks and international oversight. This privatization of force represents one of the most significant transformations in international relations since the Peace of Westphalia established the state monopoly on legitimate violence. Today, private military companies generate over $200 billion annually while deploying in conflicts across six continents. From Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone to Blackwater in Iraq, from Wagner Group in Africa to Chinese security companies in the Belt and Road Initiative, PMCs have become indispensable actors in contemporary geopolitics. Understanding the rise of private military companies has become essential for grasping modern conflict dynamics, state sovereignty evolution, and international accountability challenges. These entities blur traditional distinctions between state and non-state actors, combatants and contractors, legitimate security and mercenary activity. Their growing prominence reflects broader trends including state capacity limitations, conflict complexity, and the globalization of security markets that reshape how violence is organized and deployed in international relations. ## From State Monopolies to Market Solutions The modern state system emerged from the principle that legitimate governments maintain exclusive control over the means of violence within their territories. Max Weber's famous definition of the state as the entity that "successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" reflected centuries of political development that consolidated military power under centralized authority. This monopolization process involved eliminating private armies, mercenary companies, and feudal militias that had dominated medieval warfare. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 established sovereign equality principles that included state responsibility for military forces and accountability for their actions. Professional military establishments emerged as extensions of state power, bound by national command structures and international legal obligations. The 20th century seemingly strengthened state military monopolies through mass conscription, industrial warfare, and international humanitarian law that recognized only state armed forces as legitimate combatants. The Geneva Conventions explicitly addressed mercenary activities by denying prisoner-of-war status to fighters not belonging to state militaries or recognized armed groups. However, several factors converged to weaken state military monopolies from the 1990s onward. The Cold War's end reduced superpower military assistance to client states while creating surplus military personnel and equipment. Simultaneously, humanitarian interventions, peacekeeping operations, and counterterrorism campaigns generated security demands that exceeded many states' military capabilities. Economic liberalization ideologies promoted privatization of government functions, including security services previously considered core state responsibilities. Market efficiency arguments suggested that private companies could provide security services more cost-effectively than government agencies. Political considerations favored private contractors because their casualties attracted less public attention than military deaths. Technological developments also facilitated military privatization by reducing the specialized knowledge required for effective military operations. Precision weapons, communications systems, and intelligence platforms became commercially available, enabling private operators to achieve capabilities previously restricted to state militaries. The internet and global transportation networks allowed rapid deployment and coordination of private military services worldwide. The result has been a dramatic expansion of private military markets that now encompass traditional combat roles alongside support functions like logistics, training, and intelligence analysis. This expansion represents not just quantitative growth but qualitative transformation in how organized violence operates in international relations. ## The Spectrum of Private Military Services Contemporary private military companies operate across a broad spectrum of services that ranges from traditional combat operations to specialized support functions. Understanding this diversity is crucial for assessing PMCs' impact on international relations and accountability challenges they present. Combat services represent the most controversial category, involving direct participation in hostilities through offensive operations, defensive actions, and tactical support. The Wagner Group exemplifies this category through its operations in Syria, where its fighters conducted assault missions alongside Syrian government forces. Executive Outcomes performed similar functions in Sierra Leone during the 1990s, conducting offensive operations against Revolutionary United Front rebels. Security services encompass protective operations for personnel, facilities, and assets in hostile environments. Companies like Academi (formerly Blackwater) and DynCorp provide close protection for diplomats, corporate executives, and government officials in conflict zones. These services often involve armed personnel authorized to use deadly force in defensive situations. Training and advisory services involve capacity building for local military and security forces through instruction, mentoring, and operational support. MPRI trained Croatian forces during the 1990s Balkan conflicts while similar companies provide ongoing training for armies across Africa and Asia. These services blur lines between military assistance and direct participation in conflicts. Intelligence and surveillance services provide information gathering, analysis, and dissemination capabilities that support military operations or security planning. Private intelligence companies operate sophisticated collection systems while providing analytical products that inform both government and corporate decision-making. Logistics and support services encompass the vast infrastructure required for modern military operations, including transportation, maintenance, medical support, and base operations. Companies like KBR and Halliburton have provided extensive logistics support for American military operations while similar firms support peacekeeping forces and humanitarian operations globally. Specialized technical services include cyber warfare capabilities, drone operations, maritime security, and other high-tech military functions that require specific expertise. The growth of these services reflects the increasing technological sophistication of modern conflicts and the comparative advantage that private companies may have in rapidly evolving technical fields. The boundaries between these categories often blur in practice, as companies provide integrated services that span multiple functions. This integration allows PMCs to offer comprehensive security solutions while creating dependencies that can extend their influence beyond initial contracts. ## The Russian Model: Wagner Group and State-Sponsored Deniability The Wagner Group represents perhaps the most significant development in contemporary private military affairs, demonstrating how PMCs can serve as instruments of state policy while maintaining plausible deniability. Wagner's operations across multiple continents illustrate both the capabilities and limitations of the private military model in great power competition. Wagner emerged from the 2014 Ukraine conflict as Russian regular forces faced political constraints on direct intervention. The group, led by Dmitry Utkin and financed by oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin, initially provided Moscow with capabilities to support separatist forces in eastern Ukraine while denying official Russian involvement. This model proved sufficiently successful to warrant expansion to other theaters. Syrian operations established Wagner as a significant military actor capable of sustained combat operations in complex environments. Wagner fighters provided assault troops for Syrian government offensives while Russian aerospace forces supplied air support and artillery. The arrangement allowed Moscow to maintain official distance from ground combat while achieving strategic objectives through proxy forces. African deployments demonstrate Wagner's evolution into a comprehensive geopolitical instrument. Operations in the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan, and Libya combine military services with economic extraction arrangements that benefit Russian state interests. Wagner provides security for mining operations, government protection services, and training for local forces while securing resource access and political influence for Moscow. The group's business model integrates military services with economic extraction in ways that generate revenue while serving Russian strategic interests. Wagner secures mining concessions, oil facilities, and other economic assets that provide both company profits and Russian state benefits. This model allows sustained operations without direct government funding while advancing Moscow's geopolitical objectives. However, Wagner's relationship with the Russian state remains deliberately ambiguous. Official Moscow denies controlling Wagner while the group's operations clearly serve Russian foreign policy interests. This ambiguity provides deniability benefits while creating accountability gaps that complicate international responses to Wagner activities. The February 2023 mutiny by Prigozhin against Russian military leadership revealed tensions within the Wagner model and its ultimate dependence on state sponsorship. The attempted rebellion demonstrated both Wagner's military capabilities and the risks that powerful PMCs pose to their sponsoring states when interests diverge. Wagner's influence extends beyond direct military operations to information warfare, political manipulation, and economic penetration that collectively advance Russian influence in target regions. This comprehensive approach demonstrates how modern PMCs can serve as multifaceted instruments of state power rather than simple military service providers. International responses to Wagner operations have struggled with the group's ambiguous status and distributed operations. Sanctions targeting Wagner leadership and associates have had limited effect due to the group's adaptability and alternative funding sources. The challenge of countering Wagner illustrates broader difficulties in regulating PMC activities that span multiple jurisdictions and legal frameworks. ## Blackwater and the Iraq Experience The Iraq War marked the largest deployment of private military contractors in modern history, with Blackwater Worldwide (later Academi) becoming the most prominent and controversial PMC involved. The company's operations in Iraq between 2003-2009 illustrate both the capabilities and accountability challenges associated with large-scale PMC deployment. Blackwater received its initial Iraq contract in 2003 to provide security for Coalition Provisional Authority head Paul Bremer. The company's responsibilities expanded to include diplomatic security, facility protection, and convoy escort services across Iraq. At its peak, Blackwater employed over 1,000 contractors in Iraq while maintaining a global workforce exceeding 2,300 personnel. The company's operational model emphasized aggressive tactics and superior firepower to accomplish protective missions in hostile environments. Blackwater contractors carried military-grade weapons, operated armored vehicles, and used helicopter support to provide security services that regular military forces might not have been available to deliver. This approach proved effective in protecting clients while generating significant controversy about contractor behavior and accountability. The September 16, 2007, Nisour Square incident became emblematic of PMC accountability challenges when Blackwater contractors killed 17 Iraqi civilians during a convoy escort mission in Baghdad. Initial investigations revealed contradictory accounts of the incident, with Blackwater claiming defensive actions against insurgent attacks while Iraqi authorities and witnesses described unprovoked shooting of civilians. Legal proceedings following Nisour Square exposed complex jurisdictional and accountability issues surrounding PMC operations. Contractors operated under Status of Forces Agreements that provided immunity from local prosecution while unclear authority structures complicated U.S. military justice application. The incident triggered years of legal battles that ultimately resulted in federal convictions for four Blackwater contractors, though these verdicts faced appeals and presidential pardons. Congressional investigations revealed broader accountability gaps in contractor oversight, training standards, and rules of engagement. The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform documented numerous incidents involving contractor misconduct while identifying inadequate government supervision of private security operations. These findings prompted reforms in contractor oversight and legal frameworks, though significant gaps remain. Blackwater's Iraq experience demonstrated both PMC capabilities and limitations in complex counterinsurgency environments. Contractors provided essential services that enabled diplomatic and reconstruction activities while their aggressive tactics potentially undermined broader strategic objectives by alienating local populations and complicating civil-military relations. The company's business model proved highly profitable, generating over $1 billion in Iraq contracts while expanding globally to other conflict zones and security markets. However, reputational damage from Iraqi operations forced multiple corporate restructurings and name changes that reflected the political costs associated with controversial PMC activities. Iraq established precedents for PMC regulation and oversight that influence contemporary private military markets. The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) and other regulatory frameworks developed during Iraq operations provide templates for contractor management, though enforcement remains challenging in complex operational environments. ## Executive Outcomes and African Resource Wars Executive Outcomes (EO) pioneered the modern private military company model through its operations in Africa during the 1990s, demonstrating how PMCs could decisively influence conflicts while pursuing resource extraction opportunities. The company's activities in Sierra Leone and Angola established templates for subsequent PMC operations worldwide. Executive Outcomes emerged from South Africa's post-apartheid military transformation, which created surplus military personnel with extensive combat experience and limited economic alternatives. Company founders included former South African Defence Force officers and special operations veterans who possessed sophisticated military capabilities and regional knowledge that proved valuable in African conflict markets. The company's business model integrated military services with resource extraction arrangements that provided sustainable revenue streams while serving client government interests. EO negotiated payment arrangements that included mining concessions and oil exploration rights alongside traditional service fees, creating long-term economic relationships that extended beyond immediate military contracts. Sierra Leone operations beginning in 1995 demonstrated EO's military effectiveness against irregular forces. The company deployed approximately 200 personnel who provided training, advisory services, and direct combat support that helped government forces regain control over diamond mining areas from Revolutionary United Front rebels. EO's operations enabled the restoration of government authority and economic activity in previously rebel-controlled territories. The company's tactical approach emphasized mobility, firepower, and intelligence capabilities that provided decisive advantages over rebel forces. EO operated helicopters, armored vehicles, and sophisticated communications systems while conducting coordinated operations that combined air and ground elements. This approach achieved rapid battlefield success that conventional military advisors had failed to accomplish. However, EO's success generated controversy about mercenary activities and resource extraction arrangements that critics characterized as exploitative. The company's diamond mining concessions and security arrangements created dependencies that some analysts viewed as neo-colonial relationships that undermined state sovereignty and democratic governance. International pressure led to EO's withdrawal from Sierra Leone in 1997 following government commitments to end PMC contracts. The subsequent collapse of government forces and renewed rebel offensives suggested that EO's withdrawal was premature, though alternative approaches might have provided more sustainable security improvements. The company's closure in 1999 reflected both international opposition to mercenary activities and internal South African policy changes that restricted private military exports. However, EO personnel established successor companies that continued operating in Africa and other regions, demonstrating the difficulty of eliminating private military capabilities once developed. Executive Outcomes' legacy includes both positive and negative precedents for contemporary PMC operations. The company demonstrated that small, well-equipped forces could achieve decisive results against irregular opponents while resource-based payment arrangements provided sustainable financing mechanisms. However, accountability concerns and resource extraction controversies illustrated potential conflicts between military effectiveness and broader governance objectives. ## Accountability Gaps and Legal Challenges The privatization of military functions creates significant accountability gaps that traditional legal frameworks struggle to address. PMCs operate in legal gray areas where national jurisdiction, international law, and contractual arrangements create overlapping and often contradictory authority structures that limit effective oversight and accountability. National jurisdiction issues arise when PMCs operate across multiple countries while maintaining legal registration in states that may lack extraterritorial enforcement capabilities. Companies can incorporate in jurisdictions with favorable regulations while operating in countries with limited legal systems or ongoing conflicts that prevent effective law enforcement. International humanitarian law application to PMCs remains ambiguous due to their hybrid status between combatants and civilians. The Geneva Conventions recognize only state armed forces and organized armed groups as legitimate combatants eligible for prisoner-of-war status, while mercenaries explicitly face exclusion from legal protections. However, many PMC personnel fall between these categories, creating legal uncertainties about their status and obligations. The 1989 UN International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries attempts to address mercenary activities but has achieved limited ratification and effectiveness. The convention's narrow definition of mercenary activity excludes many contemporary PMC operations while enforcement mechanisms remain weak and politically constrained. Contractual relationships between PMCs and their clients create private law arrangements that may conflict with public international law obligations. Companies may receive instructions that violate international humanitarian law while contractual immunities shield them from local prosecution. These arrangements can create situations where serious crimes lack effective legal remedies. Corporate structures designed to limit liability and obscure beneficial ownership complicate accountability efforts by making it difficult to identify responsible parties and enforce legal judgments. PMCs often operate through complex subsidiary arrangements and shell companies that distribute legal risks while concentrating operational capabilities. Human rights law application to PMC operations faces similar challenges from jurisdictional gaps and enforcement limitations. Companies may operate in countries that lack effective human rights protection mechanisms while home states disclaim responsibility for extraterritorial corporate activities. The result can be accountability vacuums where serious human rights violations lack effective legal remedies. Victim compensation mechanisms remain inadequate for addressing harm caused by PMC operations, particularly in conflict-affected areas where local legal systems may be non-functional. Traditional state responsibility mechanisms don't clearly apply to private actors while corporate liability faces significant legal and practical obstacles. The development of soft law approaches through industry self-regulation and multi-stakeholder initiatives represents one response to legal accountability gaps. The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers attempts to establish industry standards while the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights provide frameworks for corporate behavior in conflict-affected areas. However, voluntary approaches face limitations from competitive pressures, enforcement challenges, and varying commitment levels among industry participants. Self-regulation may be insufficient for addressing the most serious accountability concerns while lacking mechanisms for independent monitoring and enforcement. ## Impact on State Sovereignty and International Order The proliferation of private military companies fundamentally challenges traditional concepts of state sovereignty and the international legal order based on state monopolies over legitimate violence. PMCs create new actors in international relations while blurring distinctions between state and non-state activities that complicate sovereignty principles and accountability mechanisms. Westphalian sovereignty concepts assume that states maintain exclusive control over military forces within their territories and bear responsibility for their actions. PMCs complicate this assumption by creating military actors that may serve foreign interests while operating with domestic or international legal authorization. The result can be situations where military activities occur without clear state responsibility or control. The mercenary prohibition in international law reflects attempts to preserve state military monopolies by prohibiting the use of private fighters in international conflicts. However, contemporary PMCs often operate with state authorization or contract while serving commercial rather than purely political motivations, creating ambiguities about mercenary law application. Proxy warfare through PMCs enables states to pursue military objectives while maintaining plausible deniability about their involvement. Wagner Group operations demonstrate how PMCs can serve state interests while providing legal and political distance from controversial military activities. This capability undermines traditional concepts of state accountability for military actions. Weaker states may become increasingly dependent on PMC services due to limited military capabilities and resources, creating new forms of dependency relationships that could compromise sovereignty. External PMCs may gain significant influence over domestic security policies while serving foreign interests that may not align with local governance objectives. Regional security arrangements face challenges from PMC activities that cross borders and serve external interests rather than regional stability objectives. African Union and other regional organizations have attempted to regulate mercenary activities while lacking effective enforcement capabilities against well-funded and internationally connected PMCs. The normalization of PMC activities may contribute to the erosion of international humanitarian law and conflict regulation mechanisms that depend on clear distinctions between combatants and non-combatants. PMCs' hybrid status creates gray areas that could undermine broader legal frameworks for conflict limitation and civilian protection. However, PMCs may also serve sovereignty-enhancing functions by providing military capabilities that enable states to maintain territorial control and fulfill basic governance functions. Small states facing insurgencies or external threats may gain effective sovereignty through PMC assistance that would otherwise be unavailable. International organizations increasingly employ PMCs for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, creating precedents for legitimate private military activities under international authority. These arrangements could provide models for regulated PMC employment that serves international community interests while maintaining accountability mechanisms. ## Economic Dimensions and Market Dynamics The global private military market represents one of the fastest-growing sectors in the international security industry, with annual revenues exceeding $200 billion and projected continued expansion driven by conflict proliferation, state capacity limitations, and security privatization trends. Market concentration varies significantly across service categories and geographic regions. Combat services remain dominated by a relatively small number of companies with specialized capabilities, while logistics and support services feature more competitive markets with numerous providers. Geographic concentration reflects conflict distributions and regulatory environments that favor certain market participants. Barriers to entry in PMC markets depend on service categories and operational requirements. Combat-oriented services require specialized personnel, equipment, and reputation that create high barriers to entry. Support services may have lower barriers but face competitive pressures from established companies with economies of scale and existing client relationships. Revenue models range from traditional fee-for-service contracts to complex arrangements involving resource extraction rights, revenue sharing, and long-term partnership agreements. Wagner Group's African operations demonstrate how integrated business models can provide sustainable financing while serving broader strategic objectives beyond immediate contract requirements. Client diversity includes governments, international organizations, multinational corporations, and non-governmental organizations that require security services in challenging environments. Government clients typically provide the largest contracts while corporate clients may offer more stable long-term relationships with predictable revenue streams. Financing mechanisms include traditional corporate investment, sovereign wealth fund backing, and integrated business models that combine security services with resource extraction or other revenue-generating activities. State-sponsored PMCs may receive indirect financing through preferential contracts or regulatory arrangements that provide competitive advantages. Insurance and risk management services have developed around PMC operations to address liability concerns and operational risks. Specialized insurance products cover contractor personnel, client assets, and third-party liability while risk assessment services inform client decision-making about PMC employment. Labor markets for PMC personnel draw from former military personnel, law enforcement officers, and security professionals seeking employment opportunities in growing private security sectors. Recruitment networks span multiple countries while training programs attempt to standardize capabilities and reduce operational risks. Technology investments by PMCs focus on capabilities that provide competitive advantages through superior firepower, mobility, intelligence, and communications systems. Technological superiority can provide decisive advantages in combat operations while reducing personnel requirements and operational risks. Economic impacts on conflict-affected regions include both positive and negative effects from PMC operations. Positive impacts may include security improvements that enable economic activity and infrastructure development. Negative impacts can include resource extraction arrangements that may not benefit local populations and dependency relationships that compromise economic sovereignty. ## Regional Variations and Cultural Contexts PMC operations vary significantly across regions due to different legal frameworks, cultural contexts, conflict patterns, and state capacities. Understanding these variations is crucial for assessing PMC impacts and developing appropriate regulatory responses. African PMC markets are characterized by resource extraction integration, weak state capacity, and limited regulatory oversight that creates permissive environments for PMC operations. Companies like Wagner Group and various Western firms compete for contracts that often include mining concessions and natural resource access alongside traditional security services. Middle Eastern PMC activities focus primarily on government protection, facility security, and specialized services like training and intelligence support. The region's oil wealth provides substantial revenue opportunities while ongoing conflicts create sustained demand for private security services across multiple countries. Asian PMC markets reflect diverse development levels and security challenges, from Chinese Belt and Road Initiative security services to counterpiracy operations in Southeast Asian waters. Rapid economic growth creates new security demands while varying regulatory approaches affect market development and operational practices. European approaches emphasize regulation and oversight through comprehensive legal frameworks that attempt to balance private security industry development with accountability requirements. EU member states maintain varying approaches to PMC regulation while coordinating through regional institutions and international agreements. Latin American PMC activities often focus on drug trafficking conflicts, corporate security, and specialized services like hostage recovery and maritime security. Regional legal frameworks vary significantly while cross-border operations create jurisdictional challenges for regulatory enforcement. North American markets feature extensive government contracting for military support services alongside private security markets for corporate and individual clients. Regulatory frameworks are relatively well-developed while oversight mechanisms face challenges from classification issues and commercial confidentiality requirements. *\[Suggested map: Regional PMC activity patterns and regulatory approaches\]* Cultural factors influence PMC operations through local attitudes toward foreign military presence, traditional security arrangements, and governance expectations. Companies must navigate cultural sensitivities while building local partnerships that enable effective operations and sustainable business relationships. Religious and ethnic considerations affect PMC recruitment, operational practices, and client relationships in many regions. Companies may need specialized cultural knowledge and personnel from appropriate backgrounds to operate effectively in sensitive environments. Language requirements and local knowledge create needs for indigenous personnel while potentially compromising operational security and company control over sensitive activities. Balancing local integration with operational requirements represents ongoing challenges for international PMC operations. ## Regulatory Responses and International Initiatives International efforts to regulate PMC activities have produced multiple frameworks with varying effectiveness and participation levels. These initiatives reflect growing recognition of accountability gaps while facing limitations from sovereignty concerns and competitive market dynamics. The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, adopted by 17 countries in 2008, represents the most comprehensive international framework for PMC regulation. The document clarifies existing international legal obligations while providing recommendations for national legislation and industry best practices. However, the document's non-binding status and limited participation reduce its regulatory effectiveness. The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC), launched in 2010, attempts industry self-regulation through voluntary standards and oversight mechanisms. The initiative includes over 700 signatory companies while providing frameworks for monitoring and accountability that supplement government regulation. National regulatory approaches vary significantly in scope, enforcement capabilities, and extraterritorial reach. The United States maintains extensive contractor regulations through defense acquisition rules and export control systems while the United Kingdom has developed comprehensive private security industry licensing and oversight mechanisms. South African legislation represents the most restrictive national approach through the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation and Certain Activities in Country of Armed Conflict Act, which requires government approval for PMC activities and prohibits certain categories of private military services. However, enforcement faces challenges from jurisdictional limitations and corporate evasion strategies. Regional organizations have attempted coordination approaches with mixed success. The African Union's Convention for the Elimination of Mercenary Activities seeks to prevent private military activities that undermine regional stability while the Organisation of American States has developed similar frameworks for the Western Hemisphere. UN initiatives include Working Group on Mercenaries reporting and Special Rapporteur investigations that document PMC activities and accountability gaps. However, these mechanisms have limited enforcement authority while facing resistance from states that employ PMC services or host PMC companies. Industry self-regulation initiatives extend beyond the ICoC to include specialized programs for maritime security, training standards, and operational practices. These initiatives reflect industry recognition of reputational risks while providing mechanisms for competitive differentiation based on professional standards and accountability measures. *\[Suggested infographic: Timeline of major PMC regulatory initiatives and their key provisions\]* Export control systems provide indirect PMC regulation through restrictions on military equipment, technology transfers, and defense services that PMCs require for operations. However, dual-use technologies and service categories create enforcement challenges while international coordination remains limited. Financial regulation through banking oversight, sanctions compliance, and anti-money laundering requirements affects PMC operations by limiting access to financial services and payment systems. However, informal financing arrangements and cryptocurrency adoption may reduce regulatory effectiveness. The challenge of developing effective PMC regulation reflects broader difficulties in governing globalized industries that operate across multiple jurisdictions while serving diverse clients with competing interests. Success likely requires combining international frameworks with strengthened national regulation and industry accountability mechanisms. ## Future Trajectories and Strategic Implications The private military industry appears positioned for continued growth and evolution driven by conflict proliferation, technological advancement, and changing state approaches to security provision. Several trends suggest significant transformations in PMC roles, capabilities, and international impacts over the next decade. Technological integration will likely expand PMC capabilities through artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, cyber warfare tools, and advanced surveillance technologies that could provide decisive advantages in future conflicts. However, technology costs and technical complexity may favor larger companies while creating new categories of specialized services. State sponsorship models pioneered by Wagner Group may proliferate as governments recognize PMCs' utility for deniable operations and resource extraction integration. China's expanding global presence through Belt and Road Initiative security services demonstrates alternative approaches to state-sponsored private military activities. Regulatory evolution faces pressures from accountability concerns and competitive dynamics that may produce more comprehensive international frameworks. However, regulatory effectiveness will depend on major power cooperation and industry compliance incentives that remain uncertain. Market consolidation trends may produce larger, more capable PMC entities while specialized service providers maintain niche market positions. Consolidation could improve professional standards and accountability mechanisms while potentially creating market concentration concerns and reduced competition. Conflict evolution toward hybrid warfare, information operations, and technological competition may expand PMC roles beyond traditional military services toward comprehensive security provision that includes cyber capabilities, intelligence services, and influence operations. Climate change impacts on conflict patterns and resource competition may create new opportunities for PMC services in environmental security, migration management, and resource protection activities. These applications could expand PMC markets while creating new accountability challenges. Regional variation in PMC acceptance and regulation suggests continued fragmentation in global approaches to private military services. Some regions may develop comprehensive regulatory frameworks while others maintain permissive environments that attract controversial PMC activities. The fundamental question for international relations is whether PMC proliferation strengthens or undermines international stability and state-based order. PMCs may provide capabilities that enhance weak state capacity while potentially serving great power competition objectives that complicate regional security arrangements. Democratic accountability faces particular challenges from PMC activities that operate outside traditional oversight mechanisms while serving government interests. The privatization of military functions may reduce public scrutiny and democratic control over conflict participation and resource allocation decisions. International humanitarian law and conflict regulation mechanisms require adaptation to address PMC activities that blur traditional combatant-civilian distinctions while operating outside established legal frameworks. Success in maintaining international legal order may depend on developing new approaches that accommodate private military realities while preserving essential humanitarian protections. The privatization of conflict represents one of the most significant transformations in international relations since the emergence of the modern state system. Private military companies have become permanent features of the global security landscape while challenging fundamental assumptions about state sovereignty, democratic accountability, and international legal order. Their continued growth and evolution will significantly influence whether the 21st century features increased conflict privatization that undermines state control and international stability, or regulated private military industries that supplement state capabilities while maintaining essential accountability mechanisms. The stakes extend beyond military effectiveness to encompass the preservation of international legal order and democratic governance in an era of profound security transformation. Understanding PMC impacts on international relations requires recognizing both their capabilities and limitations, their contributions to security provision and their challenges to accountability mechanisms. Success in managing PMC proliferation may determine whether private military services strengthen or undermine the international system's capacity to regulate conflict and protect civilian populations in an increasingly complex and militarized world. ### Water Wars & Resource Diplomacy: How Transboundary Rivers Shape 21st Century Conflict and Cooperation URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/water-wars-and-resource-diplomacy-how-transboundary-rivers-shape-21st-century-conflict-and-cooperation/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:16:33.000Z In March 2021, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed made a declaration that reverberated across the Horn of Africa and beyond: "No force will prevent Ethiopia from building a dam." His defiant words, referring to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile, crystallized one of the most contentious water disputes of our time. With Egypt threatening military action and Sudan caught between upstream and downstream pressures, the Nile basin exemplifies how water scarcity can transform from technical challenge into existential threat, potentially triggering conflicts that could destabilize entire regions. Across the globe, transboundary water disputes are multiplying as climate change intensifies hydrological cycles, populations grow, and development pressures mount. The Mekong River faces unprecedented stress from Chinese dam construction and regional droughts. The Indus Waters Treaty—a rare success story of water diplomacy—confronts new pressures from climate change and political tensions between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. From the Jordan River to the Brahmaputra, shared waterways that once sustained civilizations now threaten to divide them. Yet water disputes also demonstrate humanity's capacity for cooperation under extreme pressure. The Indus treaty has survived three wars between India and Pakistan. The Mekong River Commission continues dialogue despite great power competition. Even the Nile basin maintains diplomatic channels while tensions escalate. These examples suggest that while water can indeed trigger conflicts, it more often compels cooperation through shared vulnerability and mutual dependence. Understanding transboundary water dynamics has become essential for grasping contemporary international relations. With over 260 river basins and 600 aquifers crossing national boundaries, water diplomacy affects nearly every region of the world. Climate change is intensifying both droughts and floods, while growing populations demand more water for agriculture, industry, and urban consumption. The next two decades will determine whether shared water resources become sources of unprecedented cooperation or drivers of regional instability that could reshape the international system. ## The Hydropolitics of Scarcity Water scarcity affects over 2 billion people globally and is projected to worsen significantly as climate change alters precipitation patterns while population growth and economic development increase demand. Unlike other strategic resources such as oil or minerals, water cannot be substituted and must often be shared across political boundaries that rivers and aquifers ignore. The concept of "water stress" encompasses both physical scarcity—when water resources cannot meet demand—and economic scarcity—when infrastructure or governance failures prevent access to available water. The Middle East, North Africa, and parts of Asia already experience severe water stress, while climate change projections suggest many additional regions will face scarcity within decades. Transboundary water systems complicate scarcity management by creating upstream-downstream asymmetries that generate both interdependence and conflict potential. Upstream countries control water flows and can significantly impact downstream users through infrastructure development, consumption patterns, or deliberate manipulation. Downstream countries often depend entirely on transboundary flows while possessing limited leverage over upstream decisions. The securitization of water resources reflects growing recognition that water access affects national security, economic stability, and regime legitimacy. Military establishments increasingly analyze water-related conflict scenarios while governments develop water security strategies alongside traditional defense planning. The UN Security Council has debated water-related conflicts multiple times, acknowledging their potential to threaten international peace and security. However, the relationship between water scarcity and conflict is complex rather than deterministic. Historical analysis reveals that water disputes more often drive cooperation than warfare, as shared dependence creates incentives for negotiated solutions. The "water wars" predicted by some analysts have largely failed to materialize, while water cooperation agreements have proliferated even among adversarial countries. Academic research identifies several factors that influence whether water scarcity produces conflict or cooperation: institutional capacity for dispute resolution, alternative water sources availability, economic interdependence levels, and broader political relationships between riparian countries. These factors suggest that water conflicts are preventable through appropriate governance mechanisms and diplomatic engagement. ## Institutional Frameworks for Transboundary Water Management International water law provides the foundational framework for transboundary water management through customary principles and treaty-based arrangements. The UN Watercourses Convention, adopted in 1997 and entering force in 2014, establishes general principles including equitable and reasonable utilization, no significant harm obligations, and cooperation duties. However, the convention's limited ratification and general language leave substantial room for interpretation and dispute. Regional water management institutions demonstrate varied approaches to transboundary cooperation. River basin organizations like the Mekong River Commission and the Nile Basin Initiative attempt comprehensive management approaches covering multiple countries and water uses. Bilateral treaties such as the Indus Waters Treaty focus on specific relationships and detailed technical arrangements. Issue-specific agreements address particular concerns like flood management or environmental protection. Successful water institutions typically combine technical expertise with political legitimacy through inclusive governance structures, transparent information sharing, and equitable benefit distribution. The International Joint Commission managing U.S.-Canada boundary waters exemplifies effective institutional design through equal representation, technical focus, and dispute resolution mechanisms. Similar principles guide successful regional arrangements including the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine. However, institutional effectiveness faces significant challenges from power asymmetries, changing circumstances, and enforcement limitations. Upstream countries often resist binding obligations while downstream countries demand guaranteed water allocations. Economic development and population growth alter water demand patterns faster than institutions can adapt. Climate change creates unprecedented challenges that existing agreements may not adequately address. Enforcement mechanisms for international water agreements remain limited, relying primarily on reciprocity, reputation, and issue linkage rather than external coercion. The International Court of Justice can adjudicate water disputes, but jurisdictional requirements limit its role. Regional organizations and third-party mediation provide alternative dispute resolution mechanisms with mixed effectiveness records. Financing mechanisms increasingly influence transboundary water cooperation through development bank lending, climate financing, and private investment flows. The World Bank's approach of requiring downstream country consent for upstream project financing in disputed basins creates de facto veto powers that can either prevent conflicts or block necessary development. Green climate funds prioritize water adaptation projects while potentially creating new conditionalities and dependencies. ## The Nile Basin - Ancient River, Modern Tensions The Nile River system illustrates the full complexity of transboundary water management in a climate-changed world. As the world's longest river, flowing through eleven countries and supporting over 400 million people, the Nile represents both humanity's oldest hydraulic civilization and its most challenging contemporary water diplomacy test case. Historical agreements heavily favor downstream countries, particularly Egypt, which has traditionally claimed absolute sovereignty over Nile waters based on historical use and existential dependence. The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and Sudan allocated the entire annual flow between these two countries while excluding upstream nations entirely. Egypt's position that the Nile is a "gift from God" and any reduction in flows represents an existential threat has shaped regional politics for decades. Ethiopia's construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) fundamentally challenged this arrangement by asserting upstream water sovereignty and development rights. The $4.8 billion project, begun in 2011, will become Africa's largest hydroelectric facility and potentially transform Ethiopian economic prospects while providing electricity to over 60% of the population currently lacking access. Egyptian responses have combined diplomacy, international pressure, and military threats as successive governments viewed GERD as an existential challenge to national security. Cairo's concerns include potential reductions in downstream flows during dam filling and operation, impacts on High Aswan Dam operations, and precedent-setting for Ethiopian control over Blue Nile waters. Egyptian officials have repeatedly stated that "all options are on the table" regarding GERD, including military action. Sudan's position reflects the complexity facing middle riparian countries with both upstream and downstream interests. The GERD could provide electricity benefits and flood control while potentially reducing downstream water availability and threatening Sudan's own dam operations. Political instability following the 2021 military coup has further complicated Sudanese participation in negotiations. African Union mediation efforts have achieved limited success despite years of technical discussions and high-level diplomacy. Disagreements persist over dam filling schedules, drought mitigation measures, and dispute resolution mechanisms. The AU's consensus-based approach provides legitimacy while limiting effectiveness when core interests appear irreconcilable. International actors have provided alternative mediation attempts with mixed results. The United States under the Trump administration attempted mediation but was perceived as biased toward Egyptian positions. The World Bank withdrew from mediation citing irreconcilable differences. European Union engagement has focused on technical assistance while avoiding political mediation. Climate change adds urgency and uncertainty to Nile diplomacy by increasing precipitation variability and extreme event frequency. Drought conditions in recent years have intensified concerns about water availability while demonstrating the basin's vulnerability to climate impacts. Projected climate changes suggest increased variability rather than clear trends, complicating planning and negotiation efforts. The GERD dispute demonstrates both the potential for water conflicts and the persistent pull toward negotiated solutions. Despite military threats and diplomatic deadlocks, all parties continue engaging in dialogue while avoiding military escalation. The shared recognition that conflict would harm all parties provides foundation for eventual accommodation, though the path remains uncertain. ## The Mekong - Development Dreams and Environmental Realities The Mekong River basin exemplifies how rapid economic development and climate change interact to create new pressures on transboundary water systems. Supporting 65 million people across six countries—China, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam—the Mekong faces unprecedented stress from dam construction, climate change, and competing development models. China's upper Mekong dam cascade represents the most significant intervention in the river system's history. Eleven completed dams and additional planned projects provide flood control, hydroelectric power, and navigation improvements while fundamentally altering downstream flow patterns. Chinese dam operations during the 2019-2020 drought helped maintain downstream flows but demonstrated Beijing's control over river systems crucial to regional food security. Lower Mekong countries face difficult trade-offs between development needs and environmental sustainability. Laos pursues the "battery of Southeast Asia" strategy through hydroelectric exports while maintaining limited environmental safeguards. Thailand and Vietnam balance energy needs with concerns about fisheries and agricultural impacts. Cambodia confronts particular challenges as the most downstream country with high dependence on Mekong fisheries for protein security. The Mekong River Commission (MRC), established in 1995, provides institutional frameworks for cooperation among lower riparian countries while excluding China and Myanmar. The MRC's technical expertise and data sharing capabilities support regional cooperation, but consensus requirements and limited enforcement powers constrain effectiveness during disputes. China participates in dialogue partnerships while maintaining sovereignty over upstream activities. Climate change intensifies Mekong challenges through increased drought and flood frequency alongside changing precipitation patterns. The 2019-2020 drought reached the lowest water levels in recorded history, forcing Cambodia to import rice and threatening regional food security. Conversely, extreme flooding in recent years has displaced hundreds of thousands and caused billions in damages. Environmental degradation affects the Mekong's capacity to support regional development and food security. Fish catches have declined by up to 80% in some areas due to dam impacts, overfishing, and habitat destruction. Sediment trapping behind dams contributes to coastal erosion in the Mekong Delta, threatening Vietnam's agricultural productivity and urban infrastructure. Regional cooperation mechanisms demonstrate both achievements and limitations in addressing complex transboundary challenges. The MRC's flood and drought management programs provide early warning capabilities and technical assistance. However, the commission lacks authority to regulate dam construction or enforce environmental standards, limiting effectiveness in addressing core drivers of ecosystem change. Great power competition adds complexity to Mekong diplomacy as China's upstream position intersects with broader regional influence patterns. The United States, Japan, and other partners have increased engagement through development assistance and diplomatic initiatives. These efforts provide alternative financing and technical support while potentially politicizing technical cooperation efforts. The Mekong case illustrates how economic development pressures can overwhelm environmental governance mechanisms in transboundary river systems. Rapid dam construction has proceeded faster than impact assessments or adaptation measures, creating fait accompli situations that constrain future cooperation options. Recovery of sustainable river management may require fundamental reconsideration of development models and governance approaches. ## Indus Waters Treaty - Surviving Conflict Through Water Diplomacy The Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan represents international water diplomacy's most remarkable success story, having survived three wars, numerous political crises, and persistent bilateral tensions while managing one of the world's largest river systems. The treaty's durability offers lessons for water cooperation under extreme political stress. Partition of British India in 1947 created the fundamental challenge by dividing the Indus river system between two hostile countries with asymmetric positions. India gained control over upper watersheds and headworks infrastructure while Pakistan inherited lower basins and agricultural systems dependent on upstream flows. Early disputes over water allocations and infrastructure control threatened Pakistani agricultural productivity and political stability. World Bank mediation from 1952-1960 produced an innovative solution that allocated entire rivers rather than sharing flows from individual waterways. Pakistan received unrestricted use of the three western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) while India gained the three eastern rivers (Sutlej, Beas, Ravi). Massive infrastructure construction, financed internationally, replaced disrupted irrigation systems and enabled continued agricultural development. The treaty's durability stems from several design features that address common sources of international water disputes. Clear allocation formulas reduced ambiguity about water rights. Technical focus limited political manipulation of water management decisions. Graduated dispute resolution mechanisms—from technical to diplomatic to arbitral—provided multiple avenues for addressing disagreements. Regular interaction through the Permanent Indus Commission maintained dialogue even during political tensions. However, the treaty faces unprecedented challenges from climate change, development pressures, and evolving political relationships. Himalayan glaciers that feed Indus tributaries show accelerating melting trends that could fundamentally alter seasonal flow patterns. Population growth and urbanization increase water demand while agricultural intensification requires more reliable irrigation. Hydroelectric development creates new infrastructure that wasn't anticipated in original treaty provisions. Recent tensions focus primarily on Indian hydroelectric projects on Pakistani-allocated rivers that Pakistan claims violate treaty provisions by providing storage capabilities or altering natural flows. The Kishenganga and Ratle projects have triggered arbitration proceedings while generating domestic political pressures in both countries. Pakistani concerns about Indian water leverage have intensified following political crises and military tensions. Climate change adds new uncertainties that the treaty's original framework may not adequately address. Changing precipitation patterns, extreme weather events, and glacial melting could alter water availability in ways that make historical allocations obsolete. Adaptation requirements may necessitate joint planning and investment that exceeds current cooperation levels. The treaty's survival through multiple crises demonstrates water cooperation's potential even under extreme political stress. Technical cooperation has continued through periods when other bilateral relationships were suspended. Joint fact-finding missions and data sharing have maintained professional relationships that facilitate broader diplomatic engagement. The shared recognition that water conflicts would harm both countries provides powerful incentives for accommodation. However, the treaty's future faces significant challenges from domestic political pressures, changing technical circumstances, and evolving strategic relationships. Success in adapting to these challenges may require fundamental updates to treaty provisions, governance mechanisms, and cooperation frameworks. The alternative—collapse of cooperation—could trigger conflicts with regional and global implications given both countries' nuclear capabilities. ## Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier Climate change fundamentally alters transboundary water dynamics by intensifying hydrological variability, shifting seasonal patterns, and increasing extreme event frequency. These changes affect both water availability and demand while challenging existing management institutions and agreements designed for relatively stable conditions. Precipitation pattern changes create winners and losers within river basins while complicating water sharing arrangements based on historical flows. Some regions experience increased precipitation while others face persistent droughts. Seasonal timing shifts affect agricultural cycles, hydroelectric generation, and flood management systems. These changes can render existing water allocations obsolete while creating new sources of interstate tension. Temperature increases accelerate evaporation rates and alter snow and ice dynamics that regulate river flows. Glacial melting initially increases flows followed by long-term reductions as ice reserves are depleted. Earlier spring melting alters seasonal distribution patterns that irrigation systems depend on. Higher temperatures increase water demand for agriculture while reducing supply reliability. Extreme weather events—droughts, floods, and storms—become more frequent and severe, testing institutional capacity and cooperation mechanisms. The 2010 Pakistan floods demonstrated how extreme events can overwhelm national response capabilities while creating international humanitarian obligations. Conversely, multi-year droughts like those affecting the Mekong basin can trigger food security crises with regional political implications. Sea level rise affects river deltas and coastal aquifers through saltwater intrusion that degrades freshwater quality and agricultural productivity. The Nile Delta faces particular vulnerability as one of the world's most densely populated low-lying areas. Similarly, the Mekong Delta's agricultural productivity faces threats from both upstream dams and downstream sea level rise. Adaptation requirements often exceed individual country capabilities, creating needs for enhanced cooperation or risks of unilateral actions that harm neighbors. Flood control infrastructure in one country affects downstream flood risks. Drought response measures can reduce flows to neighboring countries. Climate adaptation becomes a transboundary challenge requiring coordinated planning and investment. Early warning systems and climate information sharing represent areas where cooperation provides clear mutual benefits. Flood forecasting requires upstream data to protect downstream populations. Drought monitoring enables coordinated response measures. Seasonal climate predictions can inform agricultural planning and water allocation decisions across river basins. However, climate uncertainty complicates long-term planning and agreement design. Traditional approaches based on historical data become less reliable when climate patterns are shifting. Adaptive management approaches that can respond to changing conditions may conflict with legal frameworks that emphasize predictability and clear obligations. Balancing flexibility with certainty represents a fundamental challenge for climate-informed water diplomacy. ## Success Factors and Cooperative Models Successful transboundary water cooperation typically combines several key elements that address both technical challenges and political constraints. Understanding these factors can inform policy design and diplomatic strategies for preventing water conflicts while promoting development and environmental protection. Inclusive governance structures that provide meaningful participation for all riparian countries create legitimacy and buy-in for cooperative arrangements. The Rhine Action Program's success partly reflects equal participation by upstream and downstream countries in both decision-making and cost-sharing. Conversely, arrangements that exclude key stakeholders often face legitimacy challenges and implementation difficulties. Technical focus and professional expertise help depoliticize water management by emphasizing objective data and scientific analysis over political positions. The International Joint Commission's effectiveness in managing U.S.-Canada water issues reflects its technical mandate and expert composition. Professional networks among water managers can maintain cooperation even when broader political relationships deteriorate. Equitable benefit sharing ensures that all parties gain from cooperation while distributing costs and risks fairly. Benefits may include flood protection, hydroelectric power, navigation improvements, and environmental protection rather than just water allocations. The Columbia River Treaty between the United States and Canada demonstrates how power sharing arrangements can provide ongoing incentives for cooperation. Graduated dispute resolution mechanisms provide multiple avenues for addressing disagreements before they escalate to political crises. Technical consultation, diplomatic negotiation, and third-party arbitration offer increasingly formal options while maintaining relationship preservation possibilities. The Indus Waters Treaty's dispute resolution procedures have prevented minor technical disagreements from becoming major political confrontations. Adaptive management approaches allow institutions to respond to changing circumstances while maintaining cooperation frameworks. Climate change, population growth, and economic development create evolving challenges that rigid agreements cannot anticipate. Successful institutions combine stability in core principles with flexibility in implementation approaches. Financial mechanisms that provide sustainable funding for cooperation activities and infrastructure development address practical constraints on institutional effectiveness. River basin organizations require ongoing funding for technical activities, data collection, and secretariat functions. Infrastructure development often requires international financing that can incentivize cooperation while ensuring project sustainability. Third-party facilitation and guarantee mechanisms can overcome trust deficits and power asymmetries that limit bilateral cooperation. World Bank involvement in the Indus Waters Treaty provided neutral expertise and financial resources while reducing risks for both parties. Regional organizations and international institutions can play similar roles in other contexts. Legal frameworks that clarify rights and obligations while providing enforcement mechanisms create predictability and reduce conflict risks. However, overly rigid legal approaches may not accommodate changing circumstances or provide sufficient flexibility for adaptation. Balancing legal certainty with practical flexibility represents an ongoing challenge in international water law development. ## Economic Dimensions and Development Challenges Water development projects often require massive investments that exceed individual country capabilities while providing benefits that cross national boundaries. Hydroelectric dams, irrigation systems, flood control infrastructure, and navigation improvements typically require international financing and may benefit multiple countries simultaneously. Development banks play crucial roles in transboundary water project financing through lending policies that can either encourage or discourage cooperation. The World Bank's policy of requiring downstream consent for projects in disputed international waterways provides de facto veto powers that can prevent harmful projects while potentially blocking beneficial development. Other multilateral institutions have adopted similar approaches with varying effectiveness. Regional development banks and bilateral financing arrangements offer alternative approaches that may be more flexible or politically acceptable than global institutions. The Asian Development Bank's Greater Mekong Subregion program attempts integrated development planning across multiple sectors and countries. Chinese Belt and Road Initiative projects include water infrastructure components that could either enhance cooperation or create new dependencies and conflicts. Private sector involvement in water infrastructure development creates new opportunities and challenges for transboundary cooperation. Private financing can supplement public resources while bringing technical expertise and efficiency pressures. However, profit motives may not align with broader cooperation objectives, and private contracts can complicate international relationships if disputes arise. Economic valuation of transboundary water benefits faces significant methodological and political challenges. Water's value varies enormously across uses—drinking water, irrigation, industrial cooling, hydroelectric generation, navigation, and ecosystem services—while some values resist quantification. Benefit-sharing arrangements require agreement on valuation approaches that may reflect different national priorities and economic conditions. Virtual water trade through agricultural and industrial products allows countries to import water-intensive goods rather than depleting domestic resources. This trade can reduce pressure on transboundary water systems while creating new dependencies and vulnerabilities. Countries with abundant water resources may develop comparative advantages in water-intensive industries while water-scarce regions specialize in other sectors. Water markets and pricing mechanisms remain underdeveloped for transboundary systems despite growing interest in economic approaches to water management. Technical challenges include measuring and monitoring cross-border flows while political challenges involve sovereignty concerns and distributional impacts. Successful market mechanisms may require prior agreement on water rights allocations and institutional frameworks. ## Regional Variations and Cultural Contexts Transboundary water management approaches vary significantly across regions due to different legal traditions, cultural values, institutional capacities, and political systems. Understanding these variations is crucial for developing appropriate cooperative mechanisms and avoiding one-size-fits-all approaches. European approaches emphasize integrated river basin management through comprehensive legal frameworks and well-funded institutions. The European Union's Water Framework Directive requires member states to achieve good ecological and chemical status for all water bodies while the Rhine Action Program demonstrates successful pollution reduction and ecosystem restoration. These approaches benefit from similar legal systems, economic development levels, and institutional capacities. African transboundary water management faces challenges from limited institutional capacity, economic constraints, and complex multi-country river systems. The Nile Basin Initiative attempts comprehensive cooperation among eleven countries with vastly different development levels and political systems. Success requires accommodating Egyptian historical claims, Ethiopian development aspirations, and upstream countries' sovereignty rights while addressing climate change impacts and population pressures. Asian water diplomacy operates in contexts of rapid economic development, population growth, and major power competition. The Mekong River Commission provides technical cooperation among lower riparian countries while China maintains upstream control and development priorities. The Indus Waters Treaty demonstrates successful cooperation potential even between adversarial countries with nuclear capabilities. Latin American approaches often emphasize environmental protection alongside development coordination. The Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization includes water management within broader environmental and development frameworks. The La Plata Basin system demonstrates long-term institutional development despite periodic political tensions among member countries. Middle Eastern water diplomacy faces particular challenges from water scarcity, political conflicts, and weak regional institutions. The Jordan River system involves multiple countries with ongoing political disputes while the Tigris-Euphrates system faces upstream development pressures and downstream environmental degradation. Success requires addressing both water scarcity and broader political relationships. Indigenous perspectives on transboundary water management emphasize traditional ecological knowledge, spiritual relationships with water systems, and community-based governance approaches. Native American involvement in Columbia River management provides models for incorporating indigenous rights and knowledge into formal water diplomacy. Similar approaches could benefit other regions with significant indigenous populations and traditional water management systems. Cultural and religious dimensions of water relationships affect negotiation approaches and outcome possibilities. Water's sacred significance in many traditions can complicate purely technical or economic approaches to management. Conversely, shared cultural values may provide common ground for cooperation that transcends political boundaries and national interests. ## Technology and Innovation in Water Diplomacy Technological developments create new opportunities for transboundary water cooperation while potentially altering power balances and negotiation dynamics. Advanced monitoring systems, data analysis capabilities, and communication technologies can enhance cooperation effectiveness while satellite observation and remote sensing provide independent verification of water system conditions. Satellite monitoring and remote sensing technologies provide real-time data on river flows, reservoir levels, and land use changes that can support cooperative management while reducing disputes over information accuracy. The Mekong River Commission's drought monitoring system uses satellite data to provide early warning capabilities across the basin. Similar systems could benefit other transboundary rivers while addressing concerns about data manipulation or withholding. Advanced hydrological modeling enables better prediction of climate change impacts, development project effects, and management scenario outcomes. These capabilities can support negotiation processes by providing objective analysis of proposed actions and their consequences. However, model complexity and uncertainty can also complicate decision-making processes and provide opportunities for selective interpretation. Digital platforms and communication technologies facilitate ongoing cooperation through virtual meetings, data sharing systems, and stakeholder engagement platforms. The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated possibilities for maintaining diplomatic engagement through digital means while reducing travel costs and time constraints. However, digital divides and cybersecurity concerns can create new barriers to participation and trust. Blockchain and distributed ledger technologies offer possibilities for transparent water allocation tracking, payment systems for ecosystem services, and smart contracts for automated management responses. These applications remain experimental but could address trust and verification challenges that limit cooperation effectiveness. Implementation requires agreement on technical standards and governance frameworks. Desalination and water recycling technologies can reduce pressure on transboundary water systems by providing alternative sources for domestic and industrial uses. However, these technologies require significant energy inputs and may not be suitable for agricultural uses that typically represent the largest water demands. Cost reductions and efficiency improvements could make these alternatives more attractive for inland and developing country applications. Early warning systems for floods and droughts provide clear mutual benefits that can build trust and demonstrate cooperation value. Regional and global initiatives are developing integrated systems that combine meteorological forecasting, hydrological modeling, and communication networks. Success requires sustained technical cooperation and information sharing that can create foundations for broader collaboration. Artificial intelligence applications in water management include demand forecasting, system optimization, leak detection, and automated control systems. These technologies could improve efficiency and reduce waste while providing more precise information for management decisions. However, AI systems require extensive data and technical capacity that may not be available in all regions or countries. ## The Future of Water Diplomacy Transboundary water management faces unprecedented challenges from climate change, population growth, and geopolitical tensions that require innovative diplomatic approaches and institutional arrangements. The next two decades will determine whether shared water systems become sources of cooperation or conflict in an era of intensifying scarcity and competition. Preventive diplomacy approaches that address water tensions before they escalate to crises offer promising directions for reducing conflict risks. Early warning systems for water-related conflicts could enable timely intervention by international organizations, regional bodies, or third-party mediators. The UN Secretary-General's prevention agenda increasingly recognizes water scarcity as a conflict driver requiring systematic attention. Climate adaptation financing provides opportunities for enhancing water cooperation through joint projects that address shared vulnerabilities. The Green Climate Fund and other mechanisms could prioritize transboundary adaptation projects that build resilience while strengthening cooperative relationships. Success requires developing project pipelines and institutional capacities for joint proposal development and implementation. Regional water security frameworks that connect water management to broader security cooperation could provide stronger institutional foundations for addressing conflicts and promoting cooperation. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has developed water security approaches that could inform similar efforts in other regions. Integration with existing security architectures may be more effective than creating separate water institutions. Innovation in international law and governance mechanisms could address current limitations in enforcement, adaptation, and dispute resolution. Proposals include international water courts, binding arbitration mechanisms, and adaptive treaty frameworks that can evolve with changing conditions. However, legal innovation requires political support from major powers and regional leaders. Youth engagement and future generations' perspectives on water sharing could provide fresh approaches to longstanding disputes. Climate activism and generational change may create new political dynamics that favor cooperation over competition. Educational exchanges and professional development programs could build transboundary networks among emerging leaders. The integration of water diplomacy with other policy areas—energy, food security, migration, and environmental protection—reflects the interconnected nature of sustainable development challenges. Water-energy-food nexus approaches attempt comprehensive planning that addresses trade-offs and synergies across sectors. Success requires institutional innovations that can manage complexity while maintaining decision-making effectiveness. Water cooperation between India and Pakistan will continue despite political tensions because both countries recognize that water conflicts serve neither's interests. The Mekong countries will eventually establish more effective governance mechanisms as environmental degradation threatens regional food security and economic development. Even the contentious Nile basin will likely reach accommodation as all parties realize that continued confrontation risks everyone's development aspirations. The fundamental lesson from transboundary water experience is that cooperation emerges from necessity rather than friendship. Shared dependence on water systems creates powerful incentives for negotiated solutions even when broader political relationships remain adversarial. Success requires patient institution-building, technical expertise, and diplomatic creativity that acknowledges both sovereignty concerns and interdependence realities. Water diplomacy represents humanity's capacity to cooperate on essential challenges that transcend political boundaries. In an era of rising nationalism and great power competition, transboundary water management offers examples of sustained cooperation that could inform responses to other global challenges. The choice between water wars and water diplomacy will significantly influence whether the 21st century features conflict or cooperation in addressing humanity's shared environmental challenges. ### New Great Game: Geopolitics of the Arctic and Antarctic in an Era of Climate Change URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/new-great-game-geopolitics-of-the-arctic-and-antarctic-in-an-era-of-climate-change/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:16:06.000Z When Russia planted a titanium flag on the Arctic Ocean floor beneath the North Pole in 2007, the symbolic gesture sent shockwaves through global capitals. The expedition, led by explorer Artur Chilingarov, wasn't merely scientific theater—it was a calculated assertion of sovereignty over potentially vast underwater resources as melting ice opened new frontiers for competition. "The Arctic is Russian," Chilingarov declared, crystallizing what security analysts now recognize as the defining geopolitical contest of the climate change era. The world's polar regions are experiencing the most rapid environmental transformation in human history. Arctic temperatures are rising twice as fast as the global average, while Antarctic ice sheets show accelerating melt rates that threaten global sea levels. These changes aren't just environmental phenomena—they're reshaping the strategic landscape by opening new territories for resource extraction, creating navigable sea routes, and altering territorial claims that have remained frozen for decades. The polar regions represent the ultimate intersection of climate change and geopolitics. Melting ice reveals hydrocarbon reserves estimated at 30% of global natural gas and 13% of oil resources in the Arctic alone. New shipping routes through previously impassable waters could reduce Asia-Europe transit times by 40%. Military strategists view polar regions as the next frontier for great power competition, with nuclear submarines already patrolling beneath Arctic ice and nations scrambling to establish territorial claims before international law solidifies around new realities. Understanding polar geopolitics has become essential for grasping 21st-century international relations. The Arctic Council, once a sleepy forum for environmental cooperation, now hosts heated debates over resource rights and military activities. The Antarctic Treaty System faces unprecedented pressures as climate change accelerates and resource scarcity intensifies. From Washington to Beijing, polar strategies are becoming central components of national security planning and economic competitiveness. ## Historical Context: From Exploration to Strategic Competition The polar regions have long captured human imagination, but their geopolitical significance remained limited by technological constraints and extreme environments. Early exploration focused on geographical discovery and scientific understanding rather than resource extraction or territorial control. The heroic age of Antarctic exploration, epitomized by expeditions from Scott, Shackleton, and Amundsen, established national prestige claims but limited practical sovereignty. The Cold War transformed polar regions into strategic frontiers. The Arctic's geographic position made it crucial for intercontinental ballistic missile trajectories and early warning systems. The United States and Soviet Union established extensive military infrastructure across Arctic territories, from radar stations in Greenland to nuclear submarine bases in the Kola Peninsula. Antarctic militarization was prevented by the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which suspended territorial claims and banned military activities while promoting scientific cooperation. Climate change has fundamentally altered polar geopolitics by making previously theoretical resources practically accessible. Arctic sea ice extent has declined by approximately 13% per decade since satellite measurements began in 1979\. Antarctic ice sheet dynamics show accelerating mass loss, with implications for both sea level rise and resource accessibility. These environmental changes transform abstract territorial claims into concrete economic and strategic opportunities. The 2007 Russian flag-planting expedition exemplified this transformation. While dismissed by some as political theater, the mission represented sophisticated geological surveying aimed at supporting continental shelf extension claims under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Russia's submission claimed an additional 1.2 million square kilometers of Arctic Ocean floor, potentially containing vast hydrocarbon reserves. Contemporary polar competition differs from historical patterns in its multilateral complexity and resource-driven motivations. Cold War Arctic competition was essentially bilateral between superpowers focused on military positioning. Today's polar geopolitics involves multiple state and non-state actors pursuing economic opportunities, environmental protection, indigenous rights, and strategic advantages simultaneously. ## The Arctic: Melting Ice, Rising Stakes Arctic geopolitics centers on the region's transformation from frozen wasteland to accessible frontier. The Arctic contains an estimated 90 billion barrels of oil and 1,670 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, mostly offshore in areas becoming accessible as sea ice retreats. Beyond hydrocarbons, the region holds significant mineral deposits including rare earth elements essential for renewable energy technologies. The Arctic Council, established in 1996, includes eight Arctic states: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. Indigenous peoples' organizations hold permanent observer status, reflecting recognition of traditional territorial rights. However, climate change has strained the Council's consensus-based approach as economic interests increasingly conflict with environmental protection and indigenous concerns. Russia dominates Arctic geography and resources, controlling approximately 53% of Arctic Ocean coastline and 60% of Arctic land territory. Moscow's Arctic strategy emphasizes resource development, Northern Sea Route commercialization, and military capability development. Russian investments in Arctic infrastructure exceed $300 billion since 2010, including new ports, airfields, and icebreaker fleets. The Northern Fleet's elevation to strategic military district status in 2014 underscored the region's military importance. The United States approaches Arctic competition from a position of relative disadvantage despite Alaska's strategic location. American icebreaker capabilities lag significantly behind Russian fleets, limiting year-round presence and search-and-rescue capabilities. The Trump administration's 2019 decision to establish U.S. Space Command's first Arctic strategy and the Biden administration's updated Arctic strategy emphasize competition with Russia and China while addressing climate change impacts. China's Arctic engagement represents the most significant non-Arctic state involvement in polar affairs. Beijing's 2018 Arctic Policy designated China a "near-Arctic state" despite being located 1,500 kilometers from Arctic territories. Chinese investments in Greenlandic mining projects, Icelandic infrastructure, and Russian energy developments reflect systematic efforts to gain Arctic access and influence. The Polar Silk Road initiative explicitly connects Belt and Road infrastructure development to Arctic opportunities. Canada and Nordic countries face complex balancing acts between sovereignty assertion and international cooperation. Canada's Northwest Passage sovereignty claims conflict with international straits navigation rights, creating tensions with allies including the United States. Denmark's Kingdom includes Greenland and the Faroe Islands, providing significant Arctic territory and potential resource wealth that could transform Danish geopolitical weight. Norway exemplifies successful Arctic resource development through its sovereign wealth fund, built on North Sea oil revenues and extended to Arctic territories. Norwegian experience in Arctic petroleum extraction, environmental protection, and indigenous relations provides models for sustainable resource development that other Arctic states study closely. ## Antarctic Ambitions: The Frozen Continent's Growing Appeal Antarctic geopolitics operates under different legal frameworks but faces similar pressures from climate change and resource competition. The Antarctic Treaty System, comprising the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and subsequent agreements, established Antarctica as a scientific preserve and banned military activities while suspending territorial claims. However, this framework faces growing strains as climate change reveals resources and territorial claims become more economically significant. Seven countries maintain territorial claims in Antarctica: Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom. Some claims overlap, creating potential conflict zones, while the United States and Russia reserve rights to make claims while not recognizing existing ones. The treaty's prohibition on new claims doesn't prevent countries from strengthening their positions for potential future negotiations. Climate change accelerates Antarctic ice loss while revealing mineral resources and biological assets. The continent contains significant coal, iron ore, and precious metal deposits, though extraction remains technically challenging and legally prohibited. Marine living resources, including krill and fish stocks, become more accessible as ice retreats, creating new fisheries management challenges. Scientific research provides the primary legal mechanism for maintaining Antarctic presence and influence. Research station locations often correspond to territorial claim areas, reflecting strategic considerations alongside scientific objectives. China has rapidly expanded Antarctic research capabilities, establishing five permanent stations and conducting extensive geological surveys that some analysts view as resource assessment activities. The Antarctic Treaty's renewal mechanisms create potential pressure points. While the treaty lacks expiration dates, the Protocol on Environmental Protection includes provisions for modification after 2048\. This timeline creates incentives for position-strengthening activities as countries prepare for potential renegotiation opportunities. Commercial interests focus increasingly on Antarctic tourism and bioprospecting. Tourism to Antarctica has grown from fewer than 10,000 annual visitors in 1990 to over 70,000 pre-COVID, creating environmental pressures and governance challenges. Bioprospecting for pharmaceutical compounds and industrial enzymes adapted to extreme environments represents another emerging economic interest. ## Resource Competition and Strategic Calculations Polar resource competition encompasses traditional extractive industries alongside emerging strategic materials essential for renewable energy transitions. Arctic hydrocarbon resources become increasingly valuable as conventional reserves decline and energy security concerns intensify following the Ukraine war. Simultaneously, polar regions contain mineral deposits including rare earth elements, lithium, and cobalt crucial for battery technologies and renewable energy infrastructure. The Northern Sea Route exemplifies how climate change creates new strategic opportunities. This shipping lane along Russia's Arctic coast could reduce Asia-Europe transit times from 34 days via the Suez Canal to 20 days, representing significant cost savings and supply chain advantages. However, the route remains challenging due to ice conditions, limited infrastructure, and political risks associated with Russian territorial control. China views Arctic shipping routes as alternatives to current chokepoints including the Strait of Malacca and Suez Canal, which could be closed during conflicts or disrupted by adversaries. Chinese shipping companies have conducted trial voyages through Arctic routes while Beijing invests in port infrastructure and navigation technologies. The Polar Silk Road concept explicitly connects Arctic shipping to broader Belt and Road Initiative objectives. Resource development faces significant environmental and technical challenges that complicate economic calculations. Arctic offshore drilling requires specialized technologies and environmental protections that increase costs significantly above conventional petroleum extraction. Extreme weather conditions, limited infrastructure, and environmental regulations create additional operational challenges. Indigenous communities play crucial roles in polar resource development through treaty rights and traditional territorial claims. Inuit communities across Arctic territories maintain traditional hunting and fishing rights that can limit or condition resource extraction activities. Indigenous organizations increasingly engage in international forums, providing perspectives that challenge purely state-centric approaches to polar governance. Climate change creates temporal urgencies around resource claims and development opportunities. Ice-free periods in Arctic waters remain limited, creating seasonal windows for exploration and extraction activities. Antarctic ice loss could accelerate suddenly if tipping points are reached, potentially altering resource accessibility and territorial boundaries more rapidly than current projections suggest. ## Military and Security Dimensions Polar regions have become increasingly militarized as climate change opens new strategic frontiers and resource competition intensifies. Arctic military activities have expanded significantly since 2014, driven by deteriorating Russia-West relations and great power competition dynamics. Russia leads Arctic militarization through comprehensive infrastructure development and force modernization. Moscow has reopened Soviet-era bases, established new facilities, and deployed advanced military systems including S-400 air defense missiles and nuclear-capable Kinzhal hypersonic missiles to Arctic territories. Russian military exercises in Arctic conditions have increased in frequency and scale, demonstrating capabilities for sustained operations in extreme environments. The United States has struggled to match Russian Arctic military capabilities despite strategic recognition of the region's importance. American military infrastructure in Alaska provides some capabilities, but icebreaker shortfalls limit sustained presence and operations. The establishment of Arctic commands and updated strategies reflect growing attention, but capability development lags behind strategic ambitions. NATO allies have enhanced Arctic cooperation through exercises and infrastructure development. Norway's High North strategy emphasizes alliance cooperation and presence activities. Canada has committed to new Arctic patrol vessels and surveillance capabilities. However, alliance cohesion faces challenges from Turkey's blocking of Finnish and Swedish NATO membership, which affects Arctic security cooperation. China's growing Arctic presence creates new strategic challenges for established Arctic powers. While Chinese activities remain primarily economic and scientific, Beijing's military modernization and expanding global presence raise questions about future Arctic military intentions. Chinese research activities and infrastructure investments could provide foundations for future military presence if political circumstances change. Nuclear weapons add particular complexity to Arctic security dynamics. The region contains significant nuclear infrastructure including missile silos, submarine bases, and early warning systems. Nuclear-powered icebreakers and submarines operate routinely in Arctic waters. Any military conflict involving nuclear powers in Arctic territories could escalate rapidly to strategic levels. Cybersecurity and space-based assets become increasingly important for Arctic operations. GPS and communications satellites enable navigation and coordination in extreme environments where traditional systems fail. Cyber attacks on Arctic infrastructure could disrupt energy production, shipping, and military operations across vast territories with limited redundancy. ## The Svalbard Archipelago - Microcosm of Arctic Competition The Svalbard archipelago illustrates Arctic geopolitical complexities through its unique legal status and strategic location. The 1920 Svalbard Treaty grants Norway sovereignty while providing other signatory countries equal rights to commercial activities and prohibiting military installations. This arrangement creates ongoing tensions as strategic interests evolve. Russia maintains significant presence on Svalbard through mining operations in Barentsburg and research activities. Russian activities serve economic purposes while maintaining political influence in a strategically located Arctic territory. Moscow has challenged Norwegian interpretations of treaty provisions, particularly regarding environmental regulations and maritime zones around the archipelago. China has expanded Svalbard engagement through research station establishment and tourism development. Chinese scientific activities on Svalbard provide Arctic research capabilities and demonstrate growing polar interests. While currently within treaty provisions, Chinese presence represents emerging great power competition in Arctic territories traditionally dominated by regional states. Norway faces delicate balancing requirements between treaty obligations and sovereignty assertion. Oslo must provide equal treatment to foreign activities while maintaining effective administration and environmental protection. Climate change intensifies these challenges as ice retreat makes previously inaccessible areas available for competing uses. The Svalbard Global Seed Vault, established in 2008 as a agricultural biodiversity protection facility, has become symbolically significant for global food security discussions. The facility's location on Svalbard reflects the archipelago's neutral status while demonstrating international cooperation possibilities in Arctic territories. Recent tensions include disputes over research activities, environmental regulations, and maritime boundaries. Russia has challenged Norwegian fishing regulations in waters around Svalbard, claiming treaty rights extend to maritime zones. These disputes illustrate how climate change and resource competition create new interpretation challenges for historical agreements. ## Greenland's Strategic Transformation Greenland exemplifies how climate change transforms peripheral territories into strategic assets. The world's largest island, with only 56,000 inhabitants, suddenly finds itself at the center of great power competition due to its strategic location, mineral resources, and melting ice sheet. Denmark's relationship with Greenland provides the constitutional framework for international engagement. Greenland achieved home rule in 1979 and expanded self-government in 2009, gaining control over natural resources while remaining within the Danish Kingdom. This arrangement allows Greenlandic authorities significant autonomy in economic development while Denmark retains foreign policy control. The United States maintains strategic interests in Greenland through the Thule Air Base, established during World War II and maintained through Cold War and contemporary operations. The base provides early warning capabilities and supports space surveillance activities. In 2019, President Trump's reported interest in purchasing Greenland reflected recognition of the island's strategic value, though the proposal was dismissed by Danish and Greenlandic authorities. China has pursued economic engagement with Greenland through mining investments and infrastructure development proposals. Chinese companies have acquired stakes in Greenlandic mining projects while Beijing offered to finance airport construction projects. These activities raised security concerns in Washington and Copenhagen about Chinese strategic presence in Arctic territories. Climate change accelerates Greenland's economic potential while creating environmental challenges. Ice sheet melting reveals mineral deposits including rare earth elements, uranium, and precious metals. However, traditional livelihoods including fishing and hunting face disruption from environmental changes. Rising sea levels globally result partly from Greenlandic ice loss, creating international implications for domestic policy decisions. Greenlandic independence discussions reflect both opportunities and challenges created by climate change and resource development. Independence would provide full control over natural resources and foreign relations while requiring assumption of Danish subsidies and security responsibilities. The feasibility depends partly on resource development success and international recognition. The Greenlandic case illustrates broader themes in polar geopolitics: how climate change transforms peripheral territories into strategic assets, how small populations gain leverage through resource control, and how great power competition affects sovereignty arrangements and development opportunities. ## Environmental Governance and International Law Polar environmental governance faces unprecedented challenges as climate change accelerates ecosystem disruption while opening new territories for human activities. Existing international frameworks, designed for stable environmental conditions, struggle to adapt to rapid ecological transformation and intensifying competition. The Arctic Council has evolved from environmental cooperation forum toward quasi-security institution as climate change creates new strategic challenges. The Council's Arctic Marine Protection Area network attempts to balance conservation with resource development, but consensus requirements limit effectiveness when economic interests conflict. Recent suspension of cooperation with Russia following the Ukraine invasion demonstrates how geopolitical tensions can undermine environmental governance. Antarctic Treaty System governance faces pressures from climate change impacts and resource competition. The Committee for Environmental Protection struggles with tourism impacts, research station expansion, and bioprospecting activities that blur lines between scientific research and commercial exploitation. The system's consensus requirements create deadlock potential as economic interests intensify. Marine protected areas represent one governance response to increased polar activities. The Ross Sea Marine Protected Area, established in 2016 after lengthy negotiations, protects Antarctic marine ecosystems while allowing limited research and fishing activities. Similar proposals for Arctic marine protection face greater challenges due to overlapping national jurisdictions and competing economic interests. Climate change complicates territorial boundaries and resource jurisdictions as ice retreat reveals new territories and alters coastlines. Arctic maritime boundaries remain disputed in several areas, while Antarctic ice sheet collapse could fundamentally alter territorial geography. International law provides limited guidance for managing territorial changes caused by climate change. Indigenous rights frameworks increasingly influence polar governance through international law and domestic constitutional arrangements. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples provides frameworks for traditional territory protection and resource benefit-sharing. Arctic indigenous organizations have gained influence in international forums while Antarctic governance lacks comparable indigenous participation. ## Implications for Global Climate Security Polar geopolitics and global climate security are inextricably linked through feedback loops that connect regional competition to planetary environmental stability. The Arctic contains massive carbon stores in permafrost and methane hydrates that could be released through warming and industrial activities. Antarctic ice sheet dynamics affect global sea levels and climate patterns with implications for international security and migration. Arctic resource extraction accelerates climate change while being enabled by it, creating positive feedback loops that could produce irreversible environmental changes. Increased shipping through Arctic routes reduces global transit emissions while potentially increasing regional environmental impacts. These trade-offs complicate policy responses and international cooperation. Geoengineering proposals increasingly target polar regions for climate intervention activities. Arctic ice preservation through marine cloud brightening or surface albedo modification could slow warming while affecting weather patterns globally. Solar radiation management deployment in polar regions could provide climate benefits while creating new forms of environmental governance challenges. International climate cooperation faces challenges from intensifying polar competition. Countries may prioritize short-term resource access over long-term climate stability if economic benefits appear immediate while climate costs remain future and uncertain. Success in polar environmental protection requires aligning economic incentives with climate objectives. Military activities in polar regions contribute to climate change through emissions while being necessitated partly by climate change impacts. Arctic military infrastructure requires enormous energy inputs for heating and transportation in extreme environments. Balancing security requirements with climate objectives represents a fundamental policy challenge for polar states. Climate refugee scenarios could involve entire populations from small island states and low-lying areas, creating unprecedented challenges for international refugee law and polar territorial administration. If significant populations require relocation due to sea level rise, polar regions might provide destination territories, fundamentally altering demographic and political dynamics. ## Future Scenarios and Strategic Implications Multiple scenarios are possible for polar geopolitics depending on climate change rates, technological developments, and international cooperation levels. Understanding these scenarios is crucial for long-term strategic planning and policy development. Accelerated warming scenarios could open polar regions rapidly while creating environmental disruptions that limit economic activities. Faster ice loss might reveal resources while making extraction more difficult due to unstable conditions and extreme weather. International cooperation could strengthen if climate impacts create shared threats requiring collective responses. Technological breakthroughs in renewable energy could reduce demand for polar hydrocarbon resources while increasing demand for mineral resources required for clean energy infrastructure. Advanced extraction technologies might make previously uneconomical deposits viable. Autonomous systems could reduce human risks in polar operations while increasing activity levels. Geopolitical scenarios range from cooperative resource management to territorial conflicts and military confrontation. Successful diplomacy could create frameworks for shared resource development and environmental protection. Alternatively, territorial disputes could escalate to conflicts that disrupt global commerce and environmental cooperation. Economic scenarios depend on commodity prices, technological costs, and regulatory frameworks. High energy prices make Arctic resources more attractive despite extraction challenges. Environmental regulations could limit activities while carbon pricing affects project economics. Indigenous benefit-sharing requirements influence development feasibility. Legal framework evolution could strengthen or weaken current governance systems. UNCLOS modifications might address climate change impacts on territorial boundaries. New treaties could emerge for polar resource management or environmental protection. Alternatively, existing frameworks might collapse under pressure from competing interests and rapid environmental change. The polar regions have become the ultimate testing ground for humanity's ability to manage planetary change while pursuing national interests. The stakes extend far beyond regional territories to encompass global climate stability, resource security, and international cooperation. How countries navigate polar competition will significantly influence whether the 21st century features cooperative responses to shared challenges or conflictual competition that accelerates environmental and security crises. The new great game in polar regions differs fundamentally from historical precedents in its planetary implications and technological possibilities. Success requires unprecedented cooperation between traditional rivals while managing legitimate security interests and economic opportunities. The alternative—unconstrained competition in Earth's most fragile environments—risks outcomes that no single country can control and all must live with. The ice is melting, the stakes are rising, and the world is watching to see whether polar geopolitics produces cooperation or conflict in humanity's hour of environmental trial. ### Geopolitics of AI: How Technology is Rewiring Global Power Structures URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/the-geopolitics-of-ai-how-technology-is-rewiring-global-power-structures/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:15:52.000Z In the past decade, artificial intelligence (AI) has evolved from a speculative technology into a central axis of global competition. Nations now speak of AI in the same breath as energy security, nuclear deterrence, and strategic alliances. Washington frames it as a contest with Beijing; Brussels views it through the lens of regulation and ethics; while emerging economies see both peril and opportunity. The stakes are immense: by 2030, AI could add up to $15.7 trillion to the global economy, a sum larger than the GDP of China and India combined. Yet behind this promise lies a profound question—how is AI reshaping the distribution of power among states, corporations, and societies? The geopolitics of AI is not only about algorithms and data, but about sovereignty, security, and the very architecture of the global order. ## Technology as a Strategic Arena The relationship between technology and power is not new. From Britain’s mastery of steam power in the 19th century to America’s dominance in nuclear weapons and the internet, technological revolutions have historically redrawn the geopolitical map. What makes AI distinctive is its pervasiveness. Unlike nuclear weapons—restricted to a handful of states—AI is dual-use, diffusing rapidly into civilian and military spheres. It underpins surveillance systems in Xinjiang, enables drone warfare in Ukraine, and drives recommendation engines shaping political discourse in democracies. AI is also deeply entangled with other technological domains: semiconductor supply chains, quantum computing, cloud infrastructure, and cybersecurity. Control over these “choke points” has become as important as territorial control in past eras. For instance, Taiwan’s TSMC, the world’s most advanced chipmaker, is now a geostrategic asset courted by Washington and threatened by Beijing. The U.S. export controls on advanced chips to China, first imposed in October 2022 and expanded since, mark the most significant technological containment strategy since the Cold War. Finally, the geopolitics of AI unfolds in a multipolar environment. Unlike the bipolarity of the U.S.-Soviet contest, today’s landscape involves great powers, middle states, private corporations, and transnational institutions—all competing and cooperating simultaneously. This complexity makes AI geopolitics less predictable, but more consequential. ## Political and Strategic Dimensions At the heart of AI geopolitics is the rivalry between the United States and China. Washington sees leadership in AI as essential to maintaining global primacy. The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy explicitly named AI as a “critical emerging technology” tied to national security. Beijing, in turn, released its “New Generation AI Development Plan” the same year, aiming to become the global leader in AI by 2030. China’s model leverages state-led investments, vast datasets, and authoritarian governance to accelerate innovation. AI powers its surveillance state, from facial recognition cameras to predictive policing, and increasingly informs its military modernization. For the U.S., the challenge is to mobilize private-sector innovation—concentrated in Silicon Valley giants like Google, Microsoft, and OpenAI—while aligning it with national strategy. Other states are also entering the fray. The European Union positions itself as a normative power, emphasizing “trustworthy AI” and pioneering regulations like the AI Act. India, home to a massive digital population, seeks to position itself as both a developer and ethical steward of AI, though constrained by infrastructural gaps. Gulf states such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia are investing billions in AI as part of diversification strategies, aiming to leapfrog into the knowledge economy. ## Economic and Industrial Dimensions AI is becoming a determinant of economic competitiveness. Countries leading in AI research and commercialization are positioned to capture disproportionate gains in productivity. A PwC report estimates that China alone could see a 26% boost in GDP from AI by 2030, compared to 14% for North America. Semiconductors are the backbone of this contest. The U.S. has sought to weaponize its dominance in chip design and manufacturing tools, restricting China’s access to advanced processors. China, meanwhile, has doubled down on building a self-reliant semiconductor ecosystem, investing over $40 billion in its “Big Fund.” This has triggered what some call a “chip cold war.” Beyond chips, AI is transforming global labor markets. Automation threatens millions of low- and middle-skill jobs, from manufacturing in Southeast Asia to call centers in India. Yet it also creates opportunities in high-skill domains like data science, cybersecurity, and robotics. States that fail to adapt risk economic marginalization, exacerbating inequality within and between nations. ## Security and Military Dimensions AI is revolutionizing warfare. The Russia–Ukraine conflict has already been called the first “AI-enhanced” war, where machine learning algorithms optimize drone targeting, satellite imagery analysis, and electronic warfare. The U.S. Department of Defense is testing AI-enabled command systems under its “Joint All-Domain Command and Control” (JADC2) initiative, while China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has incorporated AI into war-gaming and autonomous systems. The ethical dilemmas are stark. Lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs) raise questions about accountability: who is responsible when a machine kills? While the United Nations has debated bans or restrictions, major powers have resisted, seeing AI as a decisive military edge. Without agreed norms, the risk of an AI arms race—fueled by secrecy and mistrust—is high. AI also amplifies non-traditional security threats. Deepfakes and generative AI tools have lowered the barriers for disinformation campaigns, undermining democratic processes. Cyber operations augmented by AI could disrupt financial systems, power grids, or even nuclear command-and-control, escalating risks of miscalculation. ## Cultural and Ethical Dimensions The AI race is not only about power but values. The U.S. and Europe promote frameworks emphasizing privacy, transparency, and human rights. China champions “cyber-sovereignty,” arguing that states should control how AI is developed and used domestically. These competing visions reflect deeper ideological divides about governance, freedom, and order in the digital age. For the Global South, the ethical dilemma is acute. Should they adopt Chinese AI systems, often cheaper but less protective of rights, or Western alternatives, which may come with political conditions? This is already evident in Africa, where Chinese firms like Huawei and Hikvision supply surveillance technologies under the Belt and Road Initiative’s “Digital Silk Road.” The diffusion of such tools risks entrenching digital authoritarianism. Civil society and academia play a vital role in contesting these narratives. Initiatives such as the OECD Principles on AI or UNESCO’s Recommendation on the Ethics of AI seek to create global baselines. Yet without binding enforcement, these remain aspirational, highlighting the tension between voluntary norms and hard power. ## U.S.–China AI Rivalry The U.S. ban on semiconductor exports to China in 2022 was a watershed. By restricting access to NVIDIA’s high-performance GPUs, Washington aimed to slow Beijing’s progress in training large AI models. In response, China accelerated efforts to develop indigenous alternatives, while seeking workarounds through imports from third countries. This episode illustrates the weaponization of supply chains as a tool of geopolitical strategy. It also underscores the blurred line between economic and security logics. For American firms, China is a lucrative market; yet for the U.S. government, national security trumps commercial interests. This tension will intensify as AI models become more advanced and embedded in defense systems. ## AI in the Middle East The Gulf states exemplify how middle powers use AI to diversify their economies and project influence. The UAE launched the world’s first Ministry of Artificial Intelligence in 2017, while Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 identifies AI as central to its post-oil future. Abu Dhabi has invested in large AI firms, most notably G42, which collaborates with both Chinese and American partners. Yet these efforts are not just economic. By positioning themselves as hubs of AI innovation, Gulf states enhance their strategic relevance. They also navigate great-power rivalry, balancing ties with Washington and Beijing while carving out diplomatic autonomy. This demonstrates how AI enables smaller states to punch above their weight in the global order. ## Implications The geopolitics of AI has three major implications. First, it accelerates the shift toward a fragmented global order. Competing standards, export controls, and regulatory regimes risk creating “AI blocs,” mirroring the internet’s fragmentation into digital spheres of influence. This undermines the universalist aspirations of global governance. Second, AI intensifies inequality. Advanced economies and tech corporations capture most gains, while vulnerable states face job losses and dependency on foreign technologies. Unless international mechanisms address these asymmetries—through technology transfer, training, or financing—AI could deepen the global North-South divide. Third, AI heightens the risks of instability. From autonomous weapons to algorithmic disinformation, the potential for escalation and manipulation grows. Traditional arms control frameworks are ill-suited for regulating algorithms. This calls for creative diplomacy—new treaties, confidence-building measures, and multi-stakeholder dialogues that include not only states but also corporations and civil society. AI is not simply another tool of statecraft; it is reshaping the very foundations of power. Just as the nuclear revolution altered strategy in the 20th century, the AI revolution is redefining sovereignty, security, and legitimacy in the 21st. Yet unlike nuclear weapons, AI is diffuse, fast-moving, and deeply embedded in everyday life. This makes it harder to regulate—but also more urgent. Looking ahead, the question is whether the world can avoid an AI-driven arms race and instead harness the technology for cooperative ends. Initiatives like the G7’s “Hiroshima AI Process” and India’s push for inclusive AI governance at the G20 are steps in that direction. But they remain tentative compared to the scale of the challenge. The geopolitics of AI is ultimately a test of whether humanity can reconcile technological change with political responsibility. If states see AI solely as a weapon in zero-sum competition, fragmentation and instability will follow. If, however, they craft shared rules and norms, AI could become not just a driver of power, but a foundation for a more resilient global order. ### Economic Statecraft: When Trade Becomes a Weapon URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/economic-statecraft-when-trade-becomes-a-weapon/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:15:37.000Z In September 2022, BASF, Europe's largest chemical company, announced it would permanently downsize operations in Germany and shift production to China. The decision wasn't driven by market forces or corporate strategy—it was a direct response to soaring energy costs after Russia cut natural gas supplies to Europe. What had once been a routine commercial relationship between supplier and customer had transformed into a geopolitical weapon capable of reshaping entire industries and forcing multinational corporations to relocate across continents. This episode illustrates the defining feature of 21st-century international competition: the weaponization of economic interdependence. From China's rare earth export restrictions to American semiconductor sanctions, from Russian energy cutoffs to European investment screening mechanisms, states increasingly deploy economic tools to achieve political objectives traditionally pursued through military means. The era of economic statecraft has arrived, fundamentally altering how power operates in international relations. Economic weapons offer compelling advantages over traditional military force, particularly among nuclear-armed powers where direct conflict risks catastrophic escalation. They provide plausible deniability, operate below thresholds that might trigger military responses, and leverage the complex interdependencies created by globalization. Yet they also generate unexpected consequences, from supply chain fragmentation to the acceleration of technological decoupling between major powers. Understanding how economic statecraft works—its tools, effectiveness, and limitations—has become essential for navigating contemporary geopolitics. ## Evolution from Military to Economic Competition The shift toward economic statecraft reflects both the constraints of nuclear deterrence and the opportunities created by global economic integration. During the Cold War, ideological competition limited economic interdependence between rival blocs. Today's multipolar world features extensive trade and investment relationships that create both vulnerabilities and leverage opportunities for strategic competitors. Nuclear weapons fundamentally altered the logic of great power competition by making direct military confrontation potentially suicidal. The Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated how quickly conventional conflicts could escalate to existential threats. Subsequent crises reinforced the lesson that nuclear powers must find alternative means of pursuing strategic objectives without triggering military escalation. Simultaneously, economic globalization created unprecedented interdependencies among national economies. International trade expanded from 24% of global GDP in 1960 to over 60% by 2020\. Foreign direct investment flows increased exponentially, creating complex ownership structures spanning multiple jurisdictions. Supply chains fragmented across dozens of countries, making finished products dependent on components and materials from potential adversaries. These developments provided new tools for statecraft while creating vulnerabilities that rivals could exploit. Countries with dominant positions in critical supply chains gained leverage over downstream consumers. Financial centers could exclude adversaries from payment systems. Technology leaders could restrict access to essential components and software. Economic integration, intended to create mutual benefits and reduce conflict incentives, paradoxically generated new instruments of coercion. The 2008 financial crisis accelerated recognition of economic security dimensions. Financial contagion demonstrated how economic disruptions could threaten national stability as directly as military attacks. Bank failures and sovereign debt crises forced governments to reconsider assumptions about market forces versus state intervention. Recovery efforts emphasized domestic production capabilities and financial resilience alongside traditional military preparedness. *\[Suggested infographic: Evolution of global trade as percentage of GDP, 1960-2023, with key economic statecraft milestones marked\]* ## Arsenal of Economic Weapons Modern economic statecraft employs multiple tools, each with distinct characteristics, effectiveness levels, and collateral damage potential. Understanding these instruments is crucial for both practitioners and targets of economic coercion. Sanctions represent the most visible form of economic statecraft, ranging from targeted asset freezes to comprehensive trade embargoes. The United States maintains over 40 sanctions programs targeting countries, entities, and individuals deemed threats to national security or foreign policy interests. European Union sanctions frameworks have expanded significantly since 2014, particularly targeting Russian entities following the Ukraine invasion. Even middle powers like Canada and Australia increasingly employ sanctions as foreign policy tools. Secondary sanctions extend primary measures by threatening penalties against third parties conducting business with sanctioned entities. American secondary sanctions effectively globalize U.S. enforcement reach by leveraging dollar dominance and access to American markets. The Iran sanctions regime exemplifies this approach, forcing international companies to choose between Iranian business and U.S. market access. Most choose American relationships due to market size and financial system centrality. Export controls restrict technology transfers to protect national security advantages or prevent military applications. The Wassenaar Arrangement coordinates export controls among 42 countries for dual-use technologies. Recent U.S. controls on semiconductor equipment exports to China represent the most aggressive peacetime technology restrictions since the Cold War, designed to prevent Chinese military and surveillance capabilities development. Investment screening mechanisms allow governments to review and block foreign acquisitions of sensitive domestic assets. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) has expanded its scope to cover broader categories of transactions, particularly those involving Chinese investors. European countries have established similar mechanisms, reflecting concerns about strategic asset acquisition by state-controlled entities. Supply chain weaponization exploits dependencies on critical materials or components. China's 2010 rare earth export restrictions during a territorial dispute with Japan demonstrated how resource concentration could create coercive leverage. The COVID-19 pandemic revealed extensive vulnerabilities in pharmaceutical supply chains, prompting reshoring initiatives and strategic stockpiling programs. Financial system exclusion represents perhaps the most powerful economic weapon available to major financial centers. SWIFT network access is essential for international transactions, making exclusion economically devastating. The 2012 decision to disconnect Iranian banks from SWIFT significantly contributed to sanctions effectiveness. Similar measures against Russian banks following the 2022 Ukraine invasion prompted development of alternative payment systems. ## Why Economic Weapons Dominate Modern Competition Several factors explain the preference for economic over military instruments in contemporary international competition. Nuclear deterrence creates strong incentives to avoid direct military confrontation between major powers, making economic tools attractive alternatives for pursuing strategic objectives without crossing escalatory thresholds. Globalization provides extensive opportunities for economic leverage while creating vulnerabilities that military force cannot easily address. A country's economic competitiveness depends on access to international markets, technology, and investment capital—areas where economic statecraft operates effectively. Military conquest cannot force innovation or create comparative advantages in complex global supply chains. Economic weapons offer plausible deniability and gradual escalation possibilities unavailable to military force. Countries can claim market-based justifications for economic measures while denying political motivations. Sanctions can be implemented incrementally, allowing for calibrated pressure and face-saving exits. These characteristics make economic statecraft particularly suitable for gray-zone competition that operates below traditional warfare thresholds. International law provides fewer constraints on economic measures than military force. While trade agreements establish some limitations, countries generally retain broad discretion over trade and investment policies based on national security grounds. Economic statecraft operates in legal gray areas where international arbitration is slow and enforcement mechanisms are weak. Domestic political considerations often favor economic over military tools. Public opinion typically supports economic measures against adversaries while remaining skeptical of military interventions. Economic statecraft can serve domestic industrial policy objectives while pursuing foreign policy goals, creating broader political coalitions. Import restrictions protect domestic producers while pressuring foreign governments. Technological developments enhance economic weapon effectiveness while reducing military alternatives. Cyber capabilities can disrupt economic systems without physical violence. Artificial intelligence enables more sophisticated targeting of individuals and entities. Cryptocurrency and alternative payment systems complicate traditional sanctions evasion while creating new enforcement challenges. ## Russia's Energy Weapon and European Responses Russia's use of energy exports as geopolitical leverage illustrates both the potential and limitations of economic statecraft. European dependence on Russian natural gas, built over decades of apparently mutually beneficial trade, became a strategic vulnerability that Moscow exploited to pursue political objectives and respond to Western sanctions. The relationship developed incrementally from the 1970s onward, driven by complementary needs: Europe required energy imports to fuel economic growth, while Russia needed export revenues to support government budgets and economic development. By 2021, Russian gas accounted for approximately 40% of EU imports and 16% of total consumption. Germany's particularly heavy dependence—over 50% of gas imports—reflected deliberate policy choices to phase out nuclear power while maintaining industrial competitiveness. Russia began weaponizing energy relationships well before the 2022 Ukraine invasion. Disputes with Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 interrupted gas supplies to European consumers, demonstrating supply vulnerability. The 2014 Ukraine crisis prompted initial European discussions about energy security, but limited policy changes. Economic relationships continued expanding despite deteriorating political ties, reflecting powerful commercial interests and policy inertia. The February 2022 invasion transformed energy trade into explicit economic warfare. Russia demanded ruble payments for gas supplies, violating existing contracts while attempting to circumvent financial sanctions. When European buyers refused, Russia cut supplies to Poland, Bulgaria, and other countries. The September 2022 Nord Stream pipeline explosions—regardless of attribution—symbolically ended the energy partnership era. European responses revealed both economic statecraft's effectiveness and its costs. Emergency measures included gas rationing systems, alternative supplier negotiations, and accelerated renewable energy deployment. Industrial consumers faced energy costs increases of 300-500%, forcing production cuts and facility closures. BASF's decision to permanently downsize German operations demonstrated how energy weaponization could achieve strategic competitors' long-term objectives of reducing Western industrial capacity. *\[Suggested chart: European natural gas imports by source, 2019-2024, showing shift from Russian to alternative suppliers\]* However, Russia's energy weapon proved double-edged. Lost European gas revenues exceeded $100 billion annually, forcing Moscow to seek alternative markets at discounted prices. Infrastructure built for European exports couldn't easily redirect to Asian consumers. Energy revenues that historically funded government operations and military capabilities declined significantly, undermining the strategic objectives that energy weaponization was supposed to serve. The crisis accelerated European energy independence efforts with potentially permanent consequences for Russian influence. The REPowerEU plan allocated €300 billion for alternative energy sources and efficiency improvements. Liquefied natural gas terminals constructed for emergency purposes became permanent infrastructure reducing future Russian leverage. European energy policies increasingly prioritized supply diversification over cost optimization. ## China's Economic Coercion of Australia and Its Reversal China's economic pressure campaign against Australia between 2020-2022 provides insights into both the reach and limitations of economic statecraft when applied to middle powers with alternative options. The episode demonstrated how economic interdependence could be weaponized rapidly but also how target countries could adapt and find alternative partners. The campaign began after Australia called for independent investigation of COVID-19's origins and restricted Chinese investment in telecommunications infrastructure on national security grounds. Beijing responded with a systematic economic pressure campaign targeting multiple Australian export sectors simultaneously, including coal, wine, beef, timber, and barley. Chinese measures were comprehensive and coordinated. Coal imports faced indefinite delays at Chinese ports, effectively creating an informal embargo. Wine exports encountered prohibitive anti-dumping duties exceeding 200%. Beef processing facilities lost import licenses over alleged labeling violations. These actions targeted sectors with high China dependence, affecting regions and constituencies important to Australian domestic politics. The pressure campaign aimed to demonstrate costs of challenging Chinese interests while encouraging policy reversals on contentious issues. Beijing likely calculated that economic pain would force Australian policy changes, as had occurred in other bilateral disputes. Chinese officials privately indicated that improved relationships could restore trade access, creating incentives for Australian compliance. However, the campaign generated unexpected resistance and adaptation. Australian public opinion hardened against Chinese pressure rather than supporting accommodation. Alternative markets absorbed most affected exports, with Indian coal purchases and European wine sales compensating for Chinese restrictions. Government support programs cushioned economic impacts on affected producers and communities. Regional partners provided crucial support that undermined Chinese leverage. Japan and South Korea increased Australian coal imports despite Chinese pressure. The United States facilitated alternative market access through diplomatic channels. These responses demonstrated how economic statecraft effectiveness depends partly on target isolation, which Australia successfully avoided. By late 2022, China quietly began reversing restrictions as economic costs mounted. Chinese steel producers struggled with coal shortages, forcing expensive alternative supplier relationships. Wine import restrictions harmed Chinese consumers and hospitality industries more than Australian producers. The campaign's failure to achieve policy objectives while generating economic self-harm led to gradual abandonment. The reversal process accelerated after leadership changes in both countries created opportunities for relationship reset. China's post-COVID economic reopening prioritized growth over political symbolism. Australia's new Labour government offered diplomatic opportunities for face-saving exits from failed pressure campaigns. By 2024, most trade restrictions had been quietly lifted with minimal public acknowledgment of policy changes. This case illustrates economic statecraft's limitations when applied to countries with strong institutions, diversified trade relationships, and alliance support. Australia's successful resistance required alternative markets, domestic resilience, and partner assistance—conditions not available to all economic statecraft targets. The episode also demonstrated reputational costs of failed economic coercion for the initiating country. ## Global Impact of U.S. Secondary Sanctions American secondary sanctions represent perhaps the most far-reaching form of economic statecraft, leveraging U.S. financial system centrality and market access to enforce global compliance with American foreign policy objectives. These measures effectively extend U.S. jurisdiction worldwide, creating compliance costs and strategic decisions for businesses and governments with no direct American connections. The mechanism operates through the dollar's role in international transactions and the centrality of American financial institutions in global commerce. Most international trade uses dollar denominations, requiring access to U.S. banking systems for settlement. American markets represent significant revenue sources for multinational corporations, making exclusion economically devastating. These relationships give Washington leverage over entities that never operate directly in the United States. Iran sanctions exemplify secondary sanctions' global reach and effectiveness. The 2018 U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reimposed comprehensive sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports, financial transactions, and industrial sectors. European companies conducting legal business under international law faced American sanctions threats, forcing them to choose between Iranian operations and U.S. market access. The results demonstrated American economic power's global reach. European energy companies including Total and Shell abandoned Iranian projects worth billions of dollars. Financial institutions ceased Iranian transactions despite European government preferences for continued engagement. Airlines cancelled aircraft sales to Iranian carriers. These decisions reflected American market leverage rather than legal obligations to U.S. authorities. Secondary sanctions create significant compliance costs for international businesses. Companies must conduct extensive due diligence to avoid inadvertent sanctions violations. Legal and consulting industries have developed specialized practices addressing sanctions compliance. Software systems track beneficial ownership and transaction flows to identify potential sanctions nexuses. These costs affect small businesses and developing country entities most severely. The Russia sanctions regime following the 2022 Ukraine invasion extended secondary sanctions logic to an unprecedented scale. Measures targeting Russian energy exports, financial institutions, and technology imports created global compliance challenges. Companies worldwide faced decisions about Russian market participation that had no direct relationship to the underlying conflict. *\[Suggested infographic: Global compliance costs of U.S. secondary sanctions by sector and region\]* However, extensive secondary sanctions use has generated pushback and workaround development. The European Union's Blocking Statute attempts to shield European companies from American sanctions compliance requirements, though with limited practical effect. China and Russia have developed alternative payment systems to reduce SWIFT dependence. Cryptocurrency adoption partly reflects sanctions avoidance motivations among state and non-state actors. Some allies question American secondary sanctions' extraterritorial reach, viewing it as economic imperialism that undermines sovereignty. European leaders have criticized American sanctions on European companies conducting legal business under international law. These tensions affect alliance relationships and could reduce long-term cooperation on shared security objectives. The proliferation of secondary sanctions also risks dollar system fragmentation as countries seek alternatives to American financial infrastructure. Central bank digital currencies, bilateral payment agreements, and alternative clearing systems all partly reflect sanctions avoidance motivations. While these alternatives remain limited in scope and effectiveness, their development could eventually undermine the financial leverage that makes secondary sanctions possible. ## Effectiveness and Limitations of Economic Statecraft Assessing economic statecraft's effectiveness requires distinguishing between immediate economic impact and ultimate policy objectives. Economic measures often inflict significant costs on target countries while failing to achieve the behavioral changes they were designed to produce. Success rates vary significantly by objective and context. Economic statecraft appears most effective when goals are limited and specific, such as securing prisoner releases or preventing particular weapons sales. Comprehensive policy changes, regime change, or major strategic realignments prove much more difficult to achieve through economic pressure alone. The Cuba embargo exemplifies economic statecraft's limitations when applied to fundamental regime change objectives. Six decades of comprehensive sanctions have imposed enormous economic costs on Cuba while failing to produce the political transformation they were intended to achieve. The regime adapted to isolation, found alternative partners, and used external pressure to justify domestic restrictions and mobilize nationalist support. Conversely, the South Africa anti-apartheid sanctions contributed to policy change, though in combination with other pressures including domestic resistance, international isolation, and changed strategic circumstances. Disentangling economic pressure's specific contribution from other factors remains analytically challenging but suggests that economic statecraft works best as part of broader pressure campaigns rather than standalone instruments. Target country characteristics significantly influence economic statecraft effectiveness. Authoritarian regimes often prove more resilient than democratic governments because they can redirect economic pain to populations with limited political voice. Countries with diversified economies and trade relationships can find alternative partners more easily than those dependent on specific relationships. Large economies generally withstand pressure better than smaller ones due to market size and resource availability. Economic statecraft also generates unintended consequences that may undermine its effectiveness or create new strategic challenges. Sanctions often strengthen targeted regimes domestically by providing external scapegoats for economic problems. They can accelerate technological development as sanctioned countries invest in import substitution and indigenous capabilities. Long-term application may reduce future leverage as target countries permanently diversify relationships. The humanitarian impact of comprehensive economic measures raises ethical questions about targeting civilian populations for government policies they may not control. The Iraq sanctions of the 1990s contributed to significant civilian hardship while failing to achieve policy changes, leading to "smart sanctions" approaches that target specific individuals and entities rather than entire economies. ## Technological Disruption and Future Economic Weapons Emerging technologies are creating new instruments of economic statecraft while potentially undermining traditional tools. Artificial intelligence, blockchain systems, quantum computing, and biotechnology offer novel coercive possibilities alongside defensive capabilities for economic statecraft targets. Cyber capabilities enable economic disruption without physical damage through attacks on financial systems, supply chain management software, and industrial control systems. The 2014 Sony Pictures hack demonstrated how cyber attacks could impose economic costs while serving political objectives. State-sponsored ransomware attacks on infrastructure and businesses blur lines between criminal activity and economic statecraft. Blockchain technologies and cryptocurrencies offer both new sanctions targets and evasion mechanisms. Digital assets can facilitate cross-border payments outside traditional financial systems, potentially undermining sanctions effectiveness. However, most cryptocurrency exchanges comply with government regulations, limiting utility for large-scale sanctions evasion. Central bank digital currencies may eventually provide new tools for economic statecraft through programmable money and enhanced transaction monitoring. Artificial intelligence applications enhance both offensive and defensive economic statecraft capabilities. Machine learning can identify sanctions evasion patterns and beneficial ownership structures that traditional analysis might miss. AI-powered economic modeling could improve predictions about sanctions effectiveness and unintended consequences. Conversely, AI systems could help sanctions targets optimize workaround strategies and minimize economic damage. Supply chain visibility technologies including blockchain tracking and IoT sensors could make export control evasion more difficult while enabling more targeted economic measures. Real-time supply chain monitoring might allow precision application of economic pressure to specific companies or individuals without broader collateral damage. However, technological development also creates new vulnerabilities for economic statecraft practitioners. Decentralized systems reduce single points of failure that economic pressure can exploit. Alternative internet architectures could limit information control capabilities. Quantum computing might eventually undermine encryption systems that secure financial networks and enable surveillance. ## Implications for Global Economic Architecture Economic statecraft's proliferation is fragmenting the integrated global economy that emerged in the post-Cold War era. Trade relationships increasingly reflect political alignments rather than purely economic considerations. Investment flows face growing restrictions based on national security grounds. Financial systems are developing along geopolitical lines rather than efficiency criteria. This fragmentation process, often termed "decoupling" or "de-risking," affects multiple economic sectors simultaneously. Technology markets are splitting into competing ecosystems with incompatible standards and restricted interoperability. Supply chains are being reconfigured to reduce dependency on potentially hostile countries. Financial relationships are being restructured to minimize sanctions vulnerability. The implications extend beyond bilateral relationships between major powers to affect middle powers and developing countries worldwide. Countries face pressure to choose sides in technological and economic blocs, limiting their traditional hedging strategies. Compliance costs for international business are increasing as regulatory complexity grows. Development financing faces restrictions based on geopolitical considerations rather than economic criteria. International economic institutions designed for integrated global markets struggle to adapt to fragmented realities. The World Trade Organization's dispute resolution system faces paralysis as major powers reject adverse rulings. Bretton Woods institutions confront competing alternatives that offer different governance models and conditionalities. Regional trade agreements proliferate as global frameworks lose effectiveness. The future global economic architecture likely will feature multiple, partially integrated systems rather than a single global market. Economic relationships within geopolitical blocs may remain highly integrated while connections between blocs become more restricted and politicized. This structure resembles Cold War patterns but with greater complexity due to multiple poles and cross-cutting relationships. Managing this transition requires new approaches to international economic governance that can accommodate political constraints while maintaining sufficient integration to capture globalization benefits. Sectoral agreements might preserve cooperation in specific areas while acknowledging broader fragmentation. Neutral institutions could facilitate transactions between competing blocs. Crisis management mechanisms could prevent economic competition from escalating to military conflict. The age of economic statecraft is reshaping international relations as fundamentally as nuclear weapons transformed military strategy. Trade relationships that once seemed purely commercial now carry geopolitical weight. Investment decisions reflect national security considerations alongside profit motives. Financial systems serve political objectives while maintaining market functions. Success in this environment requires understanding economic statecraft's possibilities and limitations. Economic weapons can impose significant costs and achieve specific objectives, but they rarely produce fundamental policy changes alone. Their effectiveness depends on target characteristics, alternative options, and broader strategic context. Most importantly, economic statecraft generates reactions and adaptations that may ultimately limit its utility while creating new forms of international competition. The multipolar world order explored in our previous analysis operates increasingly through economic rather than military instruments. How countries develop, deploy, and defend against economic weapons will significantly determine their influence and autonomy in the 21st century. The integration that defined globalization is giving way to fragmentation driven by security concerns and great power competition. Understanding these dynamics has become essential for anyone seeking to navigate contemporary international relations. ### Climate Security: How Environmental Change is Redefining Geopolitics and International Diplomacy URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/climate-security-how-environmental-change-is-redefining-geopolitics-and-international-diplomacy/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:15:19.000Z In November 2023, UN Secretary-General António Guterres delivered an unprecedented address from Antarctica's melting ice sheets, warning that "we are not moving fast enough" on climate action. His stark imagery—standing amid collapsing glaciers that could trigger catastrophic sea level rise—underscored a fundamental shift in international relations. Climate change is no longer an environmental issue managed by specialist agencies; it has become a core driver of geopolitical competition, diplomatic strategy, and security planning from Washington to Beijing to Lagos. The transformation is visible everywhere. NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept explicitly identifies climate change as a "defining challenge of our time" that affects Alliance security. The UN Security Council now regularly debates climate-related conflicts, from flooding in Pakistan displacing 33 million people to drought driving instability across the Sahel. China positions itself as a climate leader while simultaneously expanding coal production. The United States treats clean energy as a national security imperative through massive industrial policy interventions. This isn't environmental activism dressed up as foreign policy—it's hard-nosed recognition that planetary heating fundamentally alters the strategic landscape. Resource availability, territorial control, population movements, and economic competitiveness increasingly depend on climate dynamics. Traditional diplomatic frameworks, designed for state-to-state negotiations over discrete issues, struggle to address challenges that transcend borders, generations, and conventional policy categories. Understanding climate security has become essential for anyone seeking to navigate 21st-century international relations. ## From Environmental Concern to Security Imperative The securitization of climate change represents one of the most significant expansions of the security agenda since the Cold War's end. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, climate change remained largely confined to environmental ministries and specialized UN agencies. The 2007 UN Security Council debate on climate and security marked the first high-level recognition that environmental degradation could threaten international peace and stability. The conceptual shift accelerated after the 2008 financial crisis and Arab Spring demonstrated how resource scarcity could trigger political upheaval. Military establishments began incorporating climate projections into strategic planning. The Pentagon's 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap identified rising seas, extreme weather, and resource competition as "threat multipliers" requiring defense preparation. Similar assessments emerged from European militaries, the African Union, and regional security organizations. Academic research provided the analytical foundation for climate security thinking. Studies linking temperature increases to conflict probability, drought to state failure, and sea level rise to territorial disputes gave policymakers empirical justification for treating climate change as a security issue. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's successive reports increasingly emphasized security implications alongside environmental impacts. By 2020, climate security had achieved mainstream acceptance across international institutions. The G7, G20, and major alliance structures incorporated climate considerations into strategic documents. Central banks began climate stress testing. Development agencies reframed programs around climate resilience. The Biden administration's appointment of a Special Presidential Envoy for Climate elevated environmental diplomacy to Cabinet-level status. ## Direct and Indirect Pathways to Instability Climate security operates through multiple causal pathways, from immediate weather disasters to gradual environmental degradation that undermines state capacity and social cohesion. Understanding these mechanisms is crucial for diplomatic and security responses. Direct impacts include extreme weather events that overwhelm government response capabilities. The 2022 Pakistan floods affected one-third of the country, causing $30 billion in damages and requiring massive international assistance. Hurricane Maria's devastation of Puerto Rico in 2017 triggered prolonged political crisis and population exodus. Australian bushfires in 2019-2020 forced military deployment and strained alliance relationships as smoke reached South America. Indirect pathways prove more complex but potentially more destabilizing. Gradual environmental changes interact with existing vulnerabilities—poverty, weak governance, ethnic tensions—to create conditions for conflict. The Syrian drought of 2006-2010, while not causing civil war directly, displaced 1.5 million rural residents to urban areas, straining resources and contributing to social unrest that preceded the 2011 uprising. Resource competition intensifies as climate change alters availability and distribution. The Lake Chad Basin, shared by Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger, has shrunk by 90% since 1960, forcing pastoralists into conflict with farmers over remaining arable land. Arctic ice melt opens new territories for resource extraction while creating sovereignty disputes among polar nations. Water stress affects international river systems from the Nile to the Mekong, complicating already tense relationships between upstream and downstream countries. Migration represents perhaps the most politically sensitive climate security challenge. While "climate refugees" lack legal recognition under international law, environmental degradation increasingly drives population movements. Small island states face potential disappearance, raising unprecedented questions about sovereignty, citizenship, and territorial integrity. Low-lying areas of Bangladesh could displace tens of millions, potentially destabilizing regional migration patterns and creating humanitarian crises. State fragility accelerates under climate pressure. Countries with limited institutional capacity struggle to provide basic services during environmental stress, undermining legitimacy and creating opportunities for non-state actors. The Sahel exemplifies this dynamic, where drought, desertification, and extreme weather interact with weak governance to enable terrorist recruitment and criminal networks. ## The Evolution of Climate Diplomacy Climate diplomacy has evolved from narrow technical negotiations toward comprehensive political engagement spanning development finance, technology transfer, and security cooperation. The Paris Agreement's 2015 adoption marked a watershed, establishing nationally determined contributions (NDCs) that allow countries to set their own targets while creating peer pressure for ambitious action. However, implementation reveals the political complexity of climate cooperation. Developed countries' commitment to mobilize $100 billion annually for developing country climate action remains unfulfilled, undermining trust and hampering ambition. The Loss and Damage Fund, established at COP27 in 2022 after decades of developing country advocacy, reflects growing recognition that adaptation has limits and some climate impacts are unavoidable. Technology transfer emerges as both opportunity and source of tension. Clean energy deployment requires critical minerals concentrated in specific countries, creating new dependencies and potential chokepoints. China dominates solar panel production and rare earth processing, while the Democratic Republic of Congo controls much of global cobalt supplies essential for batteries. These dependencies shape diplomatic relationships and strategic calculations. Climate finance represents soft power competition among major economies. China's Belt and Road Initiative increasingly emphasizes green infrastructure, offering developing countries alternatives to Western-led institutions. The EU's Global Gateway program explicitly positions itself as a values-based alternative to Chinese investment. The United States' renewed climate engagement under the Biden administration attempts to reclaim leadership after Trump-era withdrawal from international agreements. Minilateral climate diplomacy supplements multilateral processes through smaller groupings focused on specific issues. The Major Economies Forum brings together high-emitting countries for technical cooperation. The Climate Club concept, championed by Germany, seeks to coordinate carbon pricing among willing participants. Sector-specific initiatives like the International Solar Alliance create focused cooperation frameworks outside traditional UN processes. ## The Sahel's Climate-Security Nexus The Sahel region exemplifies climate security challenges in their most acute form. Stretching across Africa from Senegal to Sudan, the Sahel faces temperature increases 1.5 times the global average, declining rainfall, and advancing desertification that threatens traditional livelihoods for 400 million people. Environmental degradation interacts with existing vulnerabilities—poverty, weak governance, ethnic tensions—to create conditions exploited by terrorist groups and criminal networks. Boko Haram recruitment in northeastern Nigeria correlates with areas affected by Lake Chad's shrinkage and agricultural decline. Islamic State in the Greater Sahara expanded rapidly following droughts that displaced pastoralist communities and undermined state presence in remote areas. International responses illustrate the complexity of climate security interventions. France's military operations—Serval, Barkhane, and their successors—addressed symptoms rather than root causes, achieving tactical successes while failing to address underlying drivers of instability. The G5 Sahel Joint Force, supported by international donors, attempted to build regional capacity but struggled with funding shortfalls and political instability among member countries. Development approaches increasingly recognize climate dimensions of Sahel challenges. The Great Green Wall initiative, launched in 2007 to restore degraded landscapes across Africa's width, received renewed international support totaling $19 billion at the 2021 One Planet Summit. The African Union's ambitious reforestation program aims to restore 100 million hectares while providing employment for rural populations vulnerable to terrorist recruitment. Recent political developments complicate international engagement. Military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, partly attributed to governments' inability to address security and development challenges, led to suspension from regional organizations and withdrawal of international partners. France's forced departure from the region opened space for alternative partners, including Russia and China, potentially altering approaches to climate security challenges. The Sahel case demonstrates that climate security requires comprehensive responses addressing immediate threats while building long-term resilience. Military interventions alone cannot address environmental root causes, while development programs need security conditions to succeed. Effective climate security strategies must integrate environmental restoration, economic development, governance strengthening, and security provision—a coordination challenge that exceeds most international institutions' capabilities. ## China's Climate Strategy - Leader, Laggard, or Strategic Opportunist? China's climate policy illustrates the complex intersection of environmental necessity, economic opportunity, and geopolitical strategy. As the world's largest greenhouse gas emitter and second-largest economy, China's climate decisions significantly impact global outcomes while serving domestic political and strategic objectives. Beijing positions itself as a climate leader through ambitious renewable energy deployment and international cooperation initiatives. China accounts for over half of global renewable energy capacity additions and dominates manufacturing of solar panels, wind turbines, and electric vehicle batteries. President Xi Jinping's 2020 pledge to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 surprised international observers and established China as seemingly more ambitious than many developed countries. However, contradictions complicate China's climate leadership narrative. Coal consumption increased in 2021 and 2022, driven by energy security concerns and economic recovery priorities. China continues financing coal-fired power plants internationally through Belt and Road Initiative projects, despite domestic renewable energy success. Air pollution remains a serious domestic challenge, affecting public health and social stability. China's climate diplomacy serves multiple strategic objectives beyond environmental protection. Belt and Road green infrastructure projects create economic dependencies while positioning China as a responsible global power. Dominance in clean energy supply chains provides leverage over countries pursuing decarbonization. Climate cooperation offers opportunities for diplomatic engagement even when other issues create tensions. The strategic dimensions became evident during recent climate negotiations. China's cooperation with the United States on climate issues continued even as broader relationships deteriorated over trade, technology, and security concerns. The 2021 Glasgow Climate Pact's success depended partly on last-minute US-China cooperation, demonstrating climate diplomacy's potential to provide stable channels for great power engagement. Domestic considerations increasingly drive Chinese climate policy. Severe air pollution in major cities creates public health crises and social discontent, forcing government response regardless of international considerations. Water scarcity, agricultural stress, and extreme weather events threaten economic stability and regime legitimacy. Climate action serves domestic political needs while providing international benefits. China's climate trajectory will significantly influence global outcomes and geopolitical relationships. Success in decoupling economic growth from emissions while maintaining social stability could provide a model for other developing countries. Failure to balance environmental protection with economic development might undermine both domestic legitimacy and international climate cooperation. Either outcome shapes 21st-century geopolitics as much as traditional military and economic measures of power. ## Security Institutions Adapt to Climate Realities Traditional security institutions increasingly incorporate climate considerations into strategic planning, force structure decisions, and operational activities. This institutional adaptation reflects recognition that environmental changes affect security interests as directly as conventional threats. NATO's 2030 agenda identifies climate change as a defining challenge requiring alliance-wide response. The organization established a Climate Change and Security Center of Excellence to develop doctrine, training, and capabilities for climate-related security challenges. Military installations face flooding, extreme heat, and infrastructure damage that affect operational readiness. NATO exercises increasingly include climate scenarios, from Arctic operations in melting polar regions to disaster response in member countries. The European Union integrates climate security into its Common Security and Defence Policy through the European Green Deal and Strategic Compass documents. EU military missions in the Sahel explicitly address climate-conflict linkages through integrated approaches combining security assistance with environmental restoration. The European Peace Facility supports partner countries' climate resilience as part of broader security cooperation. Regional organizations demonstrate varying approaches to climate security integration. The African Union's 2050 Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy explicitly connects blue economy development with climate adaptation and maritime security. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations addresses climate change through disaster management frameworks rather than traditional security institutions, reflecting regional preferences for non-militarized responses. National militaries adapt operational concepts and capabilities for climate-related missions. The US military's Task Force Climate integrates environmental considerations into strategy, operations, and acquisition decisions. European militaries develop capabilities for climate-related disaster response, from flood management to wildfire suppression. Even countries with limited military capabilities recognize climate security implications for territorial integrity and border management. Intelligence communities increasingly analyze climate security implications. The US National Intelligence Council's 2021 climate assessment identified specific countries and regions at risk of climate-induced instability. European intelligence services monitor climate-related migration patterns and resource competition. These assessments inform diplomatic engagement and development assistance priorities alongside traditional security planning. ## Implications for Global Governance and Diplomatic Strategy Climate security challenges existing governance frameworks designed for state-centric negotiations over discrete issues. Environmental degradation transcends borders, affects multiple policy areas simultaneously, and operates over time scales exceeding electoral cycles. Traditional diplomatic institutions struggle with these characteristics, creating needs for innovative approaches and institutional reforms. Multilateral climate governance faces implementation gaps despite normative progress. The Paris Agreement's nationally determined contribution structure allows flexibility but lacks enforcement mechanisms. Climate finance commitments remain inadequately funded, undermining developing country trust and participation. Loss and damage negotiations revealed fundamental disagreements about responsibility, liability, and compensation that complicate future cooperation. Minilateral initiatives supplement multilateral processes through focused cooperation among willing participants. The International Solar Alliance, launched by India and France, brings together over 100 countries for solar energy deployment. The Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance coordinates fossil fuel phase-out among ambitious countries. These initiatives demonstrate possibilities for climate diplomacy outside traditional UN frameworks while potentially fragmenting global governance. Private sector engagement increasingly influences climate diplomacy outcomes. Multinational corporations' net-zero commitments create market pressures for climate action independent of government policies. Financial institutions' climate risk assessments affect capital flows and investment decisions. Technology companies' clean energy procurement drives renewable energy deployment. This private governance supplements and sometimes substitutes for government action. Climate security requires new diplomatic skills and institutional capabilities. Environmental literacy becomes essential for foreign policy professionals dealing with resource conflicts, climate migration, and adaptation financing. Traditional diplomatic training programs increasingly include climate components. Embassies establish environmental attaché positions to manage climate-related cooperation and monitor environmental security implications. Early warning systems for climate security emerge as diplomatic priorities. The UN Secretary-General's Early Warning for All initiative aims to provide climate risk information globally by 2027\. Regional organizations develop conflict prevention mechanisms that incorporate environmental indicators. These systems could enable preventive diplomacy to address climate security challenges before they escalate to crisis levels. ## Future of Climate Security Diplomacy Climate security will increasingly dominate international relations as environmental changes accelerate and their impacts become more severe. Current diplomatic frameworks represent early adaptation attempts; more fundamental reforms seem inevitable as climate impacts intensify. Temperature increases beyond 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, now considered likely by most scientific assessments, will create security challenges exceeding current institutional capacities. Sea level rise threatens small island state sovereignty, potentially creating stateless populations requiring new legal frameworks. Arctic ice loss opens new territories while eliminating traditional boundaries, creating novel sovereignty questions. Extreme weather frequency increases faster than adaptation capabilities, requiring sustained international assistance mechanisms. Technological developments could either exacerbate or mitigate climate security challenges. Geoengineering technologies—from solar radiation management to carbon dioxide removal—raise governance questions about unilateral deployment and international coordination. Artificial intelligence applications for climate monitoring and prediction could improve early warning capabilities. Clean energy transitions might reduce resource conflicts while creating new dependencies on critical minerals and manufacturing capabilities. Great power competition increasingly incorporates climate dimensions. The United States and China compete for clean energy technology leadership while cooperating on specific climate initiatives. Europe positions climate action as soft power projection while depending on others for critical materials. Russia and other fossil fuel exporters face stranded asset risks that could drive aggressive international behavior. Developing countries' climate diplomacy will likely become more assertive as impacts intensify and adaptation needs exceed available resources. South-South cooperation on climate issues might expand independently of North-South transfers. Coalition building among climate-vulnerable countries could create new negotiating dynamics in multilateral forums. The next decade will determine whether international institutions adapt successfully to climate security challenges or face obsolescence as environmental crises overwhelm existing frameworks. Success requires unprecedented cooperation between traditionally separate policy domains—environment, security, development, trade—while managing competing national interests and time horizons. Climate security represents both humanity's greatest collective action challenge and an opportunity to build more effective global governance systems. How diplomatic institutions adapt to these realities will shape not only environmental outcomes but the broader trajectory of international relations in an era of planetary transformation. The unipolar moment may be over, but the climate security era has only just begun. ### Evolution of Diplomacy: From Westphalia to the Digital Age URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/evolution-of-diplomacy-from-westphalia-to-the-digital-age/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:14:59.000Z The year 1648 marked more than the end of Europe's devastating Thirty Years' War. When diplomats gathered in the towns of Münster and Osnabrück to hammer out the Peace of Westphalia, they unknowingly established the foundational principles that would govern international relations for centuries. Yet today, as artificial intelligence algorithms analyze global sentiment in real-time and cyber attacks serve as tools of statecraft, the diplomatic landscape bears little resemblance to those smoke-filled rooms of 17th-century Germany. The transformation of diplomacy from its classical roots to today's digital-first environment represents one of the most profound shifts in international relations. In March 2022, during the height of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, global leaders scrambled to coordinate sanctions, mobilize humanitarian relief, and manage a torrent of disinformation. The pace and complexity of their deliberations, turbocharged by secure messaging, artificial intelligence, and public scrutiny via social media, would have been unthinkable a century ago. Today’s diplomacy unfolds not in gilded palace chambers but on secure servers, Twitter threads, and amid a cacophony of real-time leaks and cyber threats. How did we get here? Tracing the arc from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 to the algorithmically mediated negotiations of the 2020s reveals not just the endurance of diplomacy as an art, but its extraordinary adaptive capacities in the face of technological and geopolitical upheaval. Where once ambassadors relied on horse-drawn carriages and coded letters, modern diplomats navigate Twitter storms, coordinate through encrypted messaging apps, and deploy AI-powered analytics to predict negotiation outcomes. This evolution reflects not merely technological advancement, but a fundamental reimagining of how states communicate, compete, and cooperate in an interconnected world. Understanding this transformation is crucial for policymakers and citizens alike, as traditional diplomatic norms clash with digital-age realities, creating both unprecedented opportunities for global cooperation and dangerous new vectors for international conflict. ## The Westphalian Foundation The Peace of Westphalia established three enduring principles that shaped diplomatic practice for over three centuries: state sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs, and the balance of power. These concepts created the modern state system and with it, the need for systematic diplomatic engagement. The Treaty of Westphalia introduced the concept of permanent diplomatic missions, moving beyond ad hoc negotiations toward sustained bilateral relationships. This innovation reflected a practical reality: as trade expanded and conflicts grew more complex, states required continuous channels of communication rather than sporadic diplomatic ventures. Classical diplomacy operated on principles of secrecy, protocol, and personal relationships. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 codified these practices, establishing diplomatic ranks, immunity principles, and procedural norms that persist today. Diplomats like Prince Metternich mastered the art of balance-of-power politics through careful cultivation of personal networks and behind-the-scenes negotiations. The 19th and early 20th centuries saw diplomacy professionalized through the establishment of foreign ministries and diplomatic academies. The Concert of Europe demonstrated how great powers could manage international crises through coordinated diplomatic action, even as the system ultimately failed to prevent World War I. ## The Multilateral Revolution The catastrophic failures of traditional diplomacy in two world wars catalyzed a fundamental shift toward multilateral institutions. The League of Nations, despite its ultimate failure, established the precedent for global governance through international organizations. The United Nations system, created in 1945, institutionalized multilateral diplomacy on an unprecedented scale. This transformation introduced new diplomatic actors beyond traditional nation-states. International organizations, non-governmental organizations, and transnational corporations began participating in diplomatic processes. The European Union's development from the European Coal and Steel Community exemplifies how economic cooperation evolved into supranational governance structures that transcend traditional sovereignty concepts. Multilateral diplomacy democratized international relations by providing smaller states with platforms to influence global affairs. The Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War demonstrated how developing nations could leverage multilateral forums to advance their interests despite limited bilateral diplomatic resources. The proliferation of international law through multilateral treaties created new diplomatic obligations and opportunities. From the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the Paris Climate Agreement, multilateral diplomacy increasingly focused on global challenges requiring coordinated responses rather than traditional balance-of-power calculations. ## The Communication Revolution The telegraph, telephone, and jet aircraft fundamentally altered diplomatic practice by enabling real-time communication and rapid travel. The Cuban Missile Crisis illustrated both the opportunities and dangers of instantaneous communication, as Kennedy and Khrushchev navigated nuclear brinksmanship through direct telephone diplomacy while managing slower-moving formal diplomatic channels. Television introduced public diplomacy as a critical component of international relations. The broadcast of diplomatic proceedings, from UN Security Council debates to summit meetings, made diplomacy a public spectacle subject to media analysis and popular opinion. This transparency transformed diplomatic strategy, requiring negotiators to consider domestic and international audiences simultaneously. The internet era accelerated these trends exponentially. Email enabled diplomatic coordination across time zones, while video conferencing reduced the need for physical meetings. The 2015 Iran nuclear negotiations demonstrated how modern diplomacy could leverage secure digital communications to maintain continuous dialogue among multiple parties across different continents. Social media platforms created new diplomatic opportunities and challenges. The Arab Spring showed how digital networks could facilitate popular movements that traditional diplomacy struggled to address. Simultaneously, platforms like Twitter enabled direct communication between leaders, sometimes bypassing traditional diplomatic channels entirely. ## Digital Age Transformation Contemporary diplomacy increasingly operates in digital-first environments where cyber capabilities shape power dynamics. Estonia's e-Residency program exemplifies how small states can leverage digital innovation to enhance their diplomatic influence beyond traditional geographic or economic constraints. Artificial intelligence now supports diplomatic analysis through sentiment monitoring, pattern recognition, and predictive modeling. The European External Action Service employs AI tools to analyze social media trends and predict potential conflict escalation, enabling proactive diplomatic interventions. Cyber diplomacy has emerged as a distinct field addressing internet governance, data sovereignty, and digital rights. The EU's General Data Protection Regulation demonstrates how regulatory frameworks become diplomatic tools that project values and influence global standards. Digital platforms enable new forms of citizen diplomacy and public engagement. Virtual reality technology allows immersive cultural exchanges, while blockchain systems could potentially revolutionize treaty verification and international agreement implementation. However, digital transformation also introduces vulnerabilities. The 2016 U.S. election interference allegations highlighted how cyber operations can undermine diplomatic relationships and democratic processes. The SolarWinds hack affected multiple government agencies, demonstrating how cyber vulnerabilities can compromise sensitive diplomatic communications. ## Diplomatic Evolution The Camp David Accords of 1978 exemplify traditional diplomatic methods at their finest. President Carter's intensive personal diplomacy with Begin and Sadat, conducted in isolation from media scrutiny, achieved breakthrough agreements through sustained face-to-face negotiations. The success relied on personal relationships, cultural sensitivity, and gradual trust-building over thirteen days of direct dialogue. In contrast, the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement represents diplomacy adapted to digital-age realities. The negotiations involved 195 countries coordinating through digital platforms, with real-time document sharing, simultaneous translation technologies, and social media engagement with civil society organizations. The agreement's bottom-up approach reflected networked rather than hierarchical diplomatic structures. The ongoing digital governance negotiations at the International Telecommunication Union illustrate contemporary diplomatic challenges. Traditional diplomatic methods struggle with technical complexity and rapid technological change, while private sector actors like Google and Amazon wield influence comparable to many nation-states. These negotiations require new diplomatic skills combining technical expertise with traditional relationship-building. ## Implications for International Order Digital transformation is reshaping global power dynamics by creating new sources of influence and vulnerability. China's digital silk road initiative demonstrates how technological infrastructure becomes a diplomatic tool for building international partnerships and dependencies. Meanwhile, the U.S.-China technology competition shows how digital capabilities increasingly determine strategic advantages. The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated diplomatic digitization by necessitating virtual summit meetings and remote negotiations. While digital tools enabled continued international cooperation, they also highlighted the importance of informal relationship-building that remains difficult in virtual environments. Emerging technologies like quantum computing and artificial intelligence will likely reshape diplomatic practice further. Quantum-secured communications could revolutionize diplomatic confidentiality, while AI negotiation systems might eventually supplement or replace human diplomats in routine negotiations. The democratization of information through digital platforms creates both opportunities and challenges for diplomatic effectiveness. While social media enables direct leader-to-leader communication and public engagement, it also facilitates misinformation campaigns that can undermine diplomatic agreements and international cooperation. ## Future of Diplomatic Practice The evolution from Westphalian diplomacy to digital-age statecraft reveals both continuities and transformations in international relations. While technological tools have revolutionized diplomatic communication and analysis, fundamental challenges of building trust, managing conflicts, and coordinating collective action remain unchanged. Future diplomatic practice will likely blend human relationship-building with digital efficiency, leveraging AI for analysis while maintaining personal connections for sensitive negotiations. The most effective diplomatic systems will combine traditional skills of cultural sensitivity and strategic thinking with technical expertise in emerging technologies. The success of 21st-century diplomacy depends on adapting institutional structures designed for a Westphalian world to address networked, transnational challenges. This adaptation requires not just new tools, but new thinking about sovereignty, legitimacy, and effectiveness in international relations. As diplomacy continues evolving in response to technological change and global challenges, the enduring question remains whether human wisdom can keep pace with technological capability in managing an increasingly complex and interconnected world. ### Understanding Multipolarity: Why the Unipolar Moment is Over URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/understanding-multipolarity-why-the-unipolar-moment-is-over/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:14:45.000Z When Saudi Arabia and the UAE joined BRICS in January 2024, alongside Egypt, Ethiopia, and Iran, the moment crystallized a fundamental shift reshaping global politics. For the first time since the Cold War's end, major powers are openly constructing alternative institutional frameworks to challenge Western-led international order. This expansion wasn't merely about economics—it was a declarative statement that the era of American unipolarity, which defined international relations for three decades, has definitively ended. The transition to multipolarity represents the most significant transformation in global power distribution since 1991\. Unlike the bipolar Cold War system that divided the world into two competing blocs, today's multipolar order features multiple centers of power with overlapping spheres of influence, competing governance models, and fluid alliance structures. This shift fundamentally alters how international politics operates, from trade negotiations to security arrangements. Understanding multipolarity isn't an academic exercise—it's essential for navigating contemporary geopolitics. Policymakers in Washington, Beijing, Brussels, and New Delhi are recalibrating strategies based on multipolar realities. Business leaders are hedging investments across different spheres of influence. Even smaller nations are discovering new leverage opportunities by playing great powers against each other. The multipolar world is already here; the question is whether we understand its implications. ## The Architecture of American Unipolarity The unipolar moment emerged from the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, leaving the United States as the sole global superpower. Charles Krauthammer famously termed this the "unipolar moment" in 1990, predicting it would be temporary. What he couldn't foresee was how long it would last or how comprehensively American power would dominate. During the 1990s and 2000s, American unipolarity was multidimensional. The US controlled approximately 40% of global military spending, maintained the world's largest economy, and led international institutions from the UN Security Council to the World Bank. The dollar's dominance in international trade gave Washington unprecedented financial leverage. NATO expanded eastward virtually unopposed, while American-led interventions in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan faced limited great power resistance. This period established what scholars call the "liberal international order"—a system of institutions, norms, and practices centered on American leadership and Western values. The Washington Consensus promoted market economics globally. Democracy promotion became official policy. International law increasingly reflected Western interpretations of sovereignty, human rights, and economic governance. However, unipolarity contained the seeds of its own transformation. The 2008 financial crisis damaged confidence in American economic leadership. The Iraq War's aftermath demonstrated limits of military power. Meanwhile, other powers were quietly accumulating capabilities and challenging American assumptions about permanent dominance. ## Defining Multipolarity in the 21st Century Today's multipolarity differs fundamentally from historical precedents. Unlike the 19th-century European balance of power or Cold War bipolarity, contemporary multipolarity is characterized by asymmetric power distribution, functional specialization, and institutional multiplicity. The primary poles include the United States, China, the European Union, Russia, and India, each wielding different types of influence. China dominates manufacturing and trade, holding the world's largest foreign exchange reserves and serving as the top trading partner for over 120 countries. The EU remains the world's largest single market and regulatory superpower, with its standards adopted globally. Russia leverages energy exports and military capabilities, particularly in nuclear weapons and arms sales. India's growing economy and demographic advantages position it as an emerging superpower. Secondary poles are equally important. Regional powers like Brazil, Nigeria, Indonesia, and Turkey exercise significant influence within their spheres while maintaining strategic autonomy in global affairs. Middle powers such as South Korea, Australia, and Canada punch above their weight through specialized capabilities and alliance networks. *\[Suggested infographic: Global power distribution by military spending, GDP, trade volume, and institutional leadership\]* This multipolar structure creates what international relations theorists call "complex interdependence"—multiple channels of connection between societies, absence of hierarchy among issues, and diminished role of military force. Economic statecraft, technological competition, and soft power projection become primary tools of influence. ## Economic Foundations of Multipolar Power Economic multipolarity emerged first, driven by differential growth rates and technological advancement. China's economy grew from $1.2 trillion in 2000 to over $17 trillion in 2022, while the US economy expanded from $10.3 trillion to $25.5 trillion over the same period. The gap narrowed dramatically, fundamentally altering global economic gravity. Trade patterns reflect this shift. China became the world's largest exporter and second-largest importer, while intra-Asian trade now exceeds trans-Pacific trade. The Belt and Road Initiative, launched in 2013, represents China's systematic attempt to create alternative economic networks spanning three continents. Over 150 countries have signed BRI agreements, with total investment commitments exceeding $1 trillion. Financial multipolarity follows economic trends. Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) challenge dollar dominance, with China's digital yuan leading development. Cross-border payment systems like China's CIPS and Russia's SPFS provide alternatives to SWIFT, particularly important after Western sanctions on Russia demonstrated weaponization of financial infrastructure. The BRICS economies collectively represent over 40% of global population and approximately 25% of global GDP. Their New Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangement offer developing countries alternatives to World Bank and IMF lending, often with fewer conditionalities and governance requirements. ## Military and Security Dimensions Security multipolarity reflects both American military overstretch and other powers' capability development. While the US maintains global military superiority, regional balances have shifted significantly. China's military modernization, particularly in anti-access/area-denial capabilities, challenges American naval dominance in the Western Pacific. Russia's military intervention in Georgia (2008), Ukraine (2014), and Syria (2015) demonstrated willingness to use force despite Western opposition. The 2022 invasion of Ukraine, while revealing Russian military limitations, also highlighted Western constraints in directly confronting nuclear-armed powers. Nuclear proliferation adds complexity to security multipolarity. Nine countries possess nuclear weapons, with several others maintaining nuclear latency. Tactical nuclear weapons development, hypersonic delivery systems, and cyber capabilities blur traditional deterrence calculations. Regional security architectures reflect multipolar realities. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization balances NATO in Central Asia. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue counters Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific. African Union peacekeeping operations reduce Western military presence in Africa. ## Ukraine War as Multipolar Catalyst The Russia-Ukraine conflict exemplifies multipolar dynamics in action. Rather than creating a unified global response, the war revealed sharp divisions in international opinion and capability. Western nations imposed unprecedented sanctions on Russia, demonstrating collective economic power. However, major economies including China, India, Brazil, and South Africa refused to join sanctions, maintaining trade relationships and even increasing energy imports from Russia. This sanctions resistance highlighted limits of Western economic leverage in a multipolar world. The conflict accelerated military and economic decoupling. European dependence on Russian energy forced painful adjustments toward American LNG and renewable alternatives. China's support for Russia, while carefully calibrated to avoid secondary sanctions, signaled prioritization of strategic partnership over Western economic relationships. Global South reactions proved particularly revealing. Many developing nations abstained from UN votes condemning Russia, viewing the conflict through post-colonial lenses as European power politics rather than universal principles. African and Latin American countries prioritized food and fertilizer supplies over geopolitical alignment, demonstrating pragmatic hedging strategies characteristic of multipolar systems. ## Middle East Hedging Between Great Powers Middle Eastern dynamics illustrate how regional powers navigate multipolarity. Traditional American allies increasingly diversify partnerships while maintaining security relationships with Washington. Saudi Arabia's foreign policy exemplifies this approach. Despite longstanding security guarantees from the US, Riyadh joined BRICS, maintains oil production coordination with Russia through OPEC+, and deepened economic ties with China. The kingdom's Vision 2030 development program attracts investment from multiple powers while reducing dependence on any single partner. The UAE similarly balances relationships, hosting American military bases while becoming China's largest trading partner in the Arab world. Emirati investments span American technology companies, Chinese infrastructure projects, and European financial institutions. Even Israel, America's closest regional ally, maintains growing economic and technological relationships with China despite US pressure to limit cooperation. Israeli-Chinese trade reached $18 billion in 2022, reflecting economic imperatives that transcend security partnerships. *\[Suggested infographic: Middle East trade relationships with major powers, 2010 vs. 2023\]* Iran's integration into Chinese and Russian economic systems, accelerated by American sanctions, demonstrates how isolation strategies can backfire in multipolar environments. Rather than forcing behavioral change, sanctions pushed Iran toward alternative partners, strengthening autocratic partnerships. ## Implications for International Institutions and Governance Multipolarity fundamentally challenges existing international institutions designed for American leadership. The UN Security Council's permanent membership reflects 1945 power distribution rather than contemporary realities. Reform proposals consistently fail due to competing national interests and institutional inertia. Alternative institutions proliferate as emerging powers create parallel structures. BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership represent institutional multipolarity. These organizations don't necessarily oppose Western-led institutions but provide developing countries with additional options and leverage. Norm competition intensifies in multipolar systems. Western emphasis on human rights, democracy promotion, and rules-based order faces challenges from alternative governance models emphasizing sovereignty, non-interference, and development priorities. China's promotion of "common prosperity" and "community of shared future" concepts offers developing countries different frameworks for international cooperation. Trade governance fragments along multipolar lines. The World Trade Organization faces paralysis as major powers pursue bilateral and regional agreements. The Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and various bilateral trade deals create overlapping jurisdictions and competing standards. Climate governance reveals both multipolar challenges and opportunities. While great power competition complicates cooperation, it also drives competitive decarbonization as nations seek technological advantages in renewable energy, electric vehicles, and carbon capture technologies. ## Looking Forward: Navigating the Multipolar Future The multipolar transition is irreversible but its ultimate configuration remains uncertain. Several scenarios are possible: stable multipolarity with defined spheres of influence, chaotic competition between rival blocs, or hierarchical multipolarity with the US remaining first among equals. Successful navigation requires updating Cold War-era strategic thinking. Binary alliance structures give way to issue-specific partnerships. Economic and security relationships increasingly decouple. Middle and small powers gain leverage through strategic hedging rather than permanent alignment. For the United States, managing multipolarity means accepting constraints on unilateral action while leveraging alliance networks and institutional advantages. America's democratic values, innovative economy, and alliance systems remain significant assets, but they require different deployment strategies in multipolar contexts. China faces the challenge of translating economic power into comprehensive influence while managing relationships with established powers and developing countries simultaneously. Beijing's success depends partly on avoiding the "Thucydides Trap" of conflict with declining hegemons while building alternative institutions that attract rather than coerce participation. European powers must develop strategic autonomy while maintaining transatlantic partnerships and managing economic interdependence with China and Russia. The EU's regulatory power and economic scale provide leverage, but require greater political cohesion to maximize influence. Regional powers and middle states benefit from increased options but face complex choices about alignment and autonomy. Success requires sophisticated diplomatic strategies that balance competing pressures while advancing national interests. The multipolar future will be messier than unipolar dominance but potentially more representative of global diversity. Rather than lamenting the end of American hegemony or fearing Chinese dominance, policymakers should focus on building institutions and norms capable of managing multipolarity constructively. The unipolar moment is over; the multipolar era has begun. How we adapt will determine whether this transition strengthens or undermines global stability and prosperity. ### UN at a Crossroads: Can Multilateralism Survive the 21st Century? URL: https://www.diplopolis.com/un-at-a-crossroads-can-multilateralism-survive-the-21st-century/ Last updated: 2026-05-07T06:14:30.000Z On September 21, 2023, world leaders gathered in New York for the UN General Assembly's annual opening, but the empty chairs told a more compelling story than the speeches delivered. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov sat alone, diplomatically isolated after his country's invasion of Ukraine. Chinese President Xi Jinping was notably absent, sending his foreign minister instead. Even Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, addressing the assembly virtually, highlighted the organization's paralysis in stopping aggression against his nation. The scene crystallized a growing crisis: the United Nations, created to prevent the scourge of war, seemed powerless to address the conflicts defining our era. This paralysis extends far beyond Ukraine. The UN Security Council has failed to authorize meaningful action on Syria's civil war, Myanmar's genocide against the Rohingya, or the humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen. Climate change threatens global stability while the organization struggles to coordinate effective responses. Rising authoritarianism challenges the liberal international order that underpins UN legitimacy. Great power competition between the United States, China, and Russia has effectively neutered the Security Council's capacity to maintain international peace and security. Yet dismissing the UN as irrelevant would be premature and dangerous. The organization successfully coordinated global COVID-19 vaccine distribution through COVAX, albeit imperfectly. UN peacekeepers maintain fragile stability in over a dozen conflict zones. The Sustainable Development Goals provide frameworks for addressing poverty, inequality, and environmental degradation that affect billions. International law continues evolving through UN institutions while humanitarian aid reaches the world's most vulnerable populations through UN agencies. The fundamental question facing international relations today is whether multilateralism—cooperative approaches to global governance through international institutions—can adapt to 21st-century challenges or will fragment under pressure from nationalism, great power rivalry, and institutional obsolescence. The UN's survival and effectiveness will significantly determine whether humanity can collectively address existential threats including climate change, nuclear proliferation, pandemics, and technological disruption that transcend national boundaries and require coordinated responses. ## Promise and Peril of 1945 The United Nations emerged from World War II's devastation with an ambitious mandate to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" while promoting human rights, international law, and economic development. The organization's founders, writing in San Francisco as Allied victory became apparent, designed institutions they hoped would prevent future global conflicts while facilitating cooperation on shared challenges. The UN Charter established principles that seemed revolutionary in 1945: sovereign equality of nations, peaceful settlement of disputes, collective security against aggression, and international cooperation on economic and social issues. These principles reflected liberal internationalist ideals that had been developing since World War I while incorporating lessons learned from the League of Nations' failures. The Security Council's design reflected the realities of post-war power distribution by granting permanent membership and veto powers to the five major Allied powers: the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and China. This arrangement was intended to ensure great power cooperation while preventing any single country from dominating international institutions. The General Assembly provided representation for all member states while specialized agencies addressed technical issues requiring international coordination. Early successes included decolonization processes that created dozens of new member states, humanitarian assistance programs that aided post-war reconstruction, and international law development through the International Court of Justice. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, established global standards that continue influencing domestic and international politics. However, Cold War competition quickly exposed fundamental flaws in the UN's design. The Soviet Union and United States used their veto powers to block Security Council action on issues affecting their interests while pursuing proxy conflicts that the organization could not prevent or resolve. The Korean War proceeded under UN authorization only because Soviet absence from the Security Council prevented a veto, demonstrating the system's dependence on great power consensus. Decolonization transformed the General Assembly from a Western-dominated forum into a body where developing countries could challenge established powers and demand attention for issues including economic development, racial equality, and anti-imperialism. This shift created new dynamics but also complicated consensus-building as membership diversity increased. The organization's financial structure created ongoing tensions as assessed contributions failed to keep pace with expanding mandates while voluntary funding created dependencies on donor country preferences. Budget crises became recurring features that limited institutional capacity and program effectiveness. Despite these challenges, the UN system expanded throughout the Cold War to include specialized agencies, regional commissions, and programs addressing specific issues from refugee assistance to environmental protection. This institutional proliferation created expertise and capabilities while contributing to coordination challenges and bureaucratic inefficiencies that critics continue highlighting. ## Security Council Paralysis: The Veto Problem The UN Security Council's dysfunction has become the most visible symbol of multilateral institution failure in addressing contemporary security challenges. The veto power granted to permanent members, designed to ensure great power consensus, has instead become a tool for protecting allies, advancing strategic interests, and preventing accountability for international law violations. Since 1946, the Security Council has cast 296 vetoes, with Russia/Soviet Union leading with 120, followed by the United States with 82\. These vetoes have blocked resolutions on conflicts ranging from the Vietnam War to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to recent crises in Syria, Myanmar, and Ukraine. The pattern reveals how veto powers protect permanent members and their allies while preventing collective action against aggression and human rights violations. The Syrian conflict epitomizes Security Council paralysis as Russia and China have vetoed 16 resolutions addressing humanitarian access, chemical weapons use, and accountability mechanisms. These vetoes enabled the Assad regime's continued atrocities while demonstrating the Council's inability to protect civilian populations from mass atrocity crimes that the UN was created to prevent. Recent vetoes have become increasingly controversial as they appear to flout international law and humanitarian principles. Russia's veto of a resolution condemning its invasion of Ukraine occurred while Russian forces were actively violating the UN Charter. China's vetoes on Myanmar resolutions continued despite overwhelming evidence of genocide against Rohingya populations. The veto power's legitimacy faces growing challenges from non-permanent members and civil society organizations that view it as an anachronistic privilege that undermines democratic governance and accountability. Reform proposals include veto restrictions for mass atrocity situations, expanded permanent membership, and alternative decision-making procedures that could bypass Security Council deadlock. However, veto reform faces seemingly insurmountable obstacles as any Charter amendment requires approval from all permanent members, each of whom benefits from veto privileges and opposes reforms that would limit their influence. This creates a constitutional deadlock where those most responsible for Security Council dysfunction have the power to prevent reforms. Alternative mechanisms have emerged to address Security Council paralysis, including General Assembly emergency sessions under the "Uniting for Peace" procedure and regional organization actions under Chapter VIII provisions. However, these alternatives lack enforcement capabilities while potentially fragmenting international responses to security challenges. The veto problem extends beyond specific conflicts to undermine the UN's broader legitimacy and effectiveness. When the organization appears unable to prevent aggression or protect human rights due to great power vetoes, public confidence in multilateral institutions declines while alternative approaches gain appeal. Some analysts argue that Security Council paralysis may actually prevent escalation by forcing great powers to compete through proxies rather than direct confrontation. This perspective suggests that institutional dysfunction may serve stabilizing functions by channeling competition into manageable forms while preventing nuclear conflict. Nevertheless, the current veto system appears increasingly incompatible with contemporary global governance needs and democratic expectations. Reform efforts continue despite implementation obstacles while alternative institutions and mechanisms develop to address Security Council limitations. ## Challenge of Great Power Competition The return of great power competition between the United States, China, and Russia has fundamentally altered the international environment in which the UN operates, creating systemic challenges that extend far beyond Security Council vetoes to affect all aspects of multilateral cooperation. U.S.-China strategic competition increasingly affects UN institutions as both countries seek to advance their interests while preventing the other from gaining influence. The United States has withdrawn from or reduced support for several UN agencies while China has increased contributions and personnel in efforts to shape international standards and norms. Chinese officials now head four of the fifteen UN specialized agencies, including the International Telecommunication Union and International Civil Aviation Organization, while Beijing has significantly increased assessed and voluntary contributions. This influence campaign aims to promote Chinese development models and governance approaches while constraining criticism of human rights practices. Russian approaches emphasize sovereignty principles and non-interference norms that limit international intervention capabilities while protecting authoritarian allies from external pressure. Moscow's UN strategy focuses on blocking Western initiatives while promoting alternative international law interpretations that favor state prerogatives over human rights concerns. The competition has effectively divided the UN into competing blocs that align with broader geopolitical rivalries rather than specific issue positions. Voting patterns in the General Assembly increasingly reflect strategic alignments rather than policy merits while consensus-building becomes more difficult across traditional North-South and East-West divides. Trade and technology disputes have spilled into UN forums as countries seek to legitimize their positions while constraining competitors' access to international markets and standard-setting processes. The World Trade Organization's paralysis partly reflects U.S.-China trade tensions while technology governance debates affect multiple UN agencies. Climate change negotiations demonstrate both competitive dynamics and cooperation possibilities as countries balance environmental needs with economic interests and strategic positioning. China's climate commitments provide diplomatic advantages while American leadership absence creates opportunities for alternative approaches and partnerships. However, great power competition need not inevitably undermine multilateral cooperation if institutional frameworks can accommodate diverse interests while maintaining functional effectiveness. Cold War experience suggests that limited cooperation on specific issues may continue even during broader strategic rivalry. Issue-specific cooperation may prove more sustainable than comprehensive multilateral frameworks as countries can collaborate on shared interests while competing in other areas. Technical agencies and specialized programs may maintain effectiveness while political bodies face paralysis. Regional and minilateral institutions may supplement or substitute for global multilateralism by providing alternative forums for cooperation among like-minded countries. These arrangements could preserve multilateral principles while reducing the consensus requirements that complicate global institutions. The challenge for UN leadership is maintaining organizational unity and effectiveness while accommodating great power competition that seems likely to persist. This requires diplomatic skills and institutional innovations that can manage rivalry while preserving cooperation possibilities on shared challenges. ## Reform Debates: Security Council Expansion and Beyond UN reform debates have continued for decades without producing fundamental changes, reflecting both the complexity of institutional modification and the political obstacles created by member state interests and Charter amendment requirements. Contemporary reform discussions encompass Security Council expansion, financing mechanisms, and operational effectiveness improvements. Security Council expansion represents the most prominent reform proposal as countries argue that the 15-member body inadequately represents contemporary global power distribution. The current composition reflects 1945 realities while excluding major economies and regional powers that have emerged since the UN's founding. The Group of Four (G4) countries—Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan—seek permanent membership based on their economic contributions, regional influence, and democratic governance. Their proposal would expand the Council to 25 members while maintaining veto powers for new permanent members. However, this approach faces opposition from regional rivals and smaller countries concerned about reduced influence. African Union positions demand two permanent seats with veto powers for African countries while arguing that the continent's 54 UN members deserve greater Security Council representation. African proposals reflect both population size and historical grievances about colonial-era exclusion from global governance institutions. Alternative reform models include intermediate membership categories that provide longer terms without veto powers, rotational permanent seats that distribute influence among regional groups, and veto restrictions that limit their use in specific circumstances such as mass atrocity situations. However, any Charter amendment requires approval from two-thirds of General Assembly members and all five permanent Security Council members, creating veto points that have blocked reform efforts for decades. Current permanent members resist expansion that would dilute their influence while disagreeing among themselves about acceptable candidates. Beyond Security Council reform, other proposals address financing inequities, operational inefficiencies, and coordination challenges that affect UN effectiveness. The organization's budget structure creates dependencies on voluntary contributions while assessed contribution scales reflect outdated economic data. Secretariat reform efforts aim to reduce bureaucracy, improve coordination, and enhance accountability through performance measurement and management systems. However, these reforms face resistance from member states concerned about sovereignty and staff unions protecting employment security. Gender parity initiatives have achieved some success in senior leadership positions while remaining incomplete across the UN system. Women now lead several major UN agencies while comprising growing percentages of peacekeeping personnel and senior management positions. Technology integration offers possibilities for improving UN operations through digital communications, data analytics, and online participation mechanisms that could reduce costs while increasing accessibility. However, digital divides and cybersecurity concerns complicate technology adoption in multilateral institutions. The fundamental reform challenge remains political rather than technical as member states must agree on changes that may affect their relative influence and interests. Successful reform requires either crisis-driven consensus or incremental changes that accumulate over time into substantial transformation. ## Climate Change and Global Governance Gaps Climate change represents perhaps the ultimate test of multilateral institution effectiveness as it requires unprecedented global cooperation while challenging national sovereignty principles that underpin the international system. The UN's response to climate change illustrates both multilateral potential and limitations in addressing existential challenges. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), adopted in 1992, established frameworks for international climate cooperation while recognizing national circumstances and capabilities. The subsequent Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement created legally binding commitments while accommodating diverse development levels and political systems. The Paris Agreement's success in achieving near-universal participation demonstrates multilateral diplomacy's potential when institutional frameworks accommodate diverse interests while maintaining ambitious objectives. The agreement's nationally determined contribution structure allows flexibility while creating peer pressure and transparency mechanisms. However, climate governance faces significant gaps between agreed commitments and implementation requirements. Current nationally determined contributions fall far short of limiting warming to 1.5°C while financing commitments for developing country adaptation and mitigation remain inadequately funded. The UN's climate institutions lack enforcement mechanisms beyond peer pressure and reputational consequences that may be insufficient for ensuring compliance with legally binding commitments. Unlike trade agreements with dispute resolution and retaliation mechanisms, climate agreements rely primarily on voluntary compliance. Loss and damage provisions for climate impacts that exceed adaptation capabilities represent emerging governance challenges as small island states and other vulnerable countries demand compensation from major emitters. These discussions challenge traditional sovereignty concepts while raising complex questions about responsibility and liability. Climate migration could affect tens of millions of people while existing international law provides limited frameworks for protecting climate refugees or managing large-scale population movements. The 1951 Refugee Convention doesn't recognize environmental displacement while climate impacts often interact with other displacement drivers. Geoengineering technologies including solar radiation management and carbon dioxide removal raise governance questions about unilateral deployment and international coordination. These technologies could provide climate solutions while creating new risks that existing institutions may be unprepared to manage. Carbon markets and pricing mechanisms require international coordination while affecting national competitiveness and development strategies. The European Union's carbon border adjustment mechanism demonstrates how climate policies can create trade tensions that affect multilateral cooperation. Private sector engagement and non-state actor participation have expanded significantly in climate governance while challenging traditional state-centric approaches. Cities, businesses, and civil society organizations increasingly commit to climate action independent of national government positions. The integration of climate considerations into broader UN activities remains incomplete as humanitarian, development, and peace operations face climate impacts while lacking systematic adaptation and resilience programming. Climate security discussions in the Security Council face resistance from countries emphasizing sovereignty and traditional security concepts. ## Humanitarian Crises and Protection Failures The UN's humanitarian system faces unprecedented challenges from the scale and complexity of contemporary crises while struggling with funding shortfalls, access restrictions, and coordination difficulties that limit effectiveness in protecting vulnerable populations. Global humanitarian needs have increased dramatically over the past decade, with over 350 million people requiring assistance in 2023 compared to 81 million in 2014\. This growth reflects conflict proliferation, climate change impacts, and economic disruptions that have overwhelmed humanitarian response capabilities and resources. The Syrian conflict exemplifies humanitarian system limitations as the UN has struggled to provide assistance to besieged populations while facing deliberate targeting of humanitarian facilities by conflict parties. Cross-border aid delivery has required creative legal interpretations and diplomatic negotiations that highlight sovereignty constraints on humanitarian access. The Rohingya crisis in Myanmar demonstrated both humanitarian response capabilities and protection failures as UN agencies provided assistance to refugees in Bangladesh while being unable to prevent genocide or ensure safe return conditions. The crisis illustrates tensions between humanitarian principles and political realities that limit protection effectiveness. COVID-19 revealed pandemic response gaps as the World Health Organization faced criticism for delayed warnings and limited enforcement capabilities while vaccine distribution inequities highlighted global health governance limitations. However, the COVAX facility demonstrated multilateral cooperation potential despite implementation challenges. Humanitarian financing faces chronic shortfalls as voluntary contributions fail to meet growing needs while donor priorities may not align with humanitarian requirements. The Ukraine crisis generated rapid funding responses while other crises in Africa and Asia received insufficient attention and resources. Protection of civilians remains a core UN mandate that faces implementation challenges from sovereignty constraints, capacity limitations, and political resistance. The Responsibility to Protect doctrine has achieved limited success while facing opposition from countries concerned about intervention precedents. Humanitarian access restrictions have increased as conflict parties deliberately target aid workers, impose administrative barriers, and weaponize assistance to achieve military objectives. These restrictions compromise humanitarian principles while limiting assistance reach and effectiveness. Refugee protection faces growing challenges from large-scale displacement, protracted situations, and host country capacity constraints that overwhelm international response systems. The 1951 Refugee Convention's frameworks may be inadequate for contemporary displacement patterns and causes. Climate-related displacement represents an emerging challenge that existing refugee protection frameworks don't adequately address while potentially affecting tens of millions of people. International law development is needed to address protection gaps for climate migrants and environmentally displaced populations. Coordination challenges among humanitarian actors reflect institutional proliferation and competitive dynamics that may reduce overall effectiveness while increasing costs. The humanitarian system includes UN agencies, international NGOs, and national organizations with different mandates, capabilities, and approaches. ## Peacekeeping in a Changing World UN peacekeeping operations have evolved significantly from their Cold War origins as traditional ceasefire monitoring missions to complex multidimensional operations that address state-building, human rights protection, and sustainable peace challenges in post-conflict societies. Contemporary peacekeeping involves over 87,000 uniformed personnel in 12 active missions across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. These operations combine military, police, and civilian components while addressing diverse mandates including civilian protection, democratic governance support, and economic reconstruction assistance. The shift toward robust peacekeeping mandates, authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, reflects recognition that traditional consent-based approaches may be inadequate for protecting civilians in active conflicts. However, robust mandates create tensions with sovereignty principles while requiring military capabilities that many contributing countries lack. Peacekeeping effectiveness faces challenges from inadequate resources, limited political support, and unrealistic mandate expectations that exceed operational capabilities. The UN Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) faced persistent violence and political instability that ultimately led to mission withdrawal in 2023. Troop contributing countries are primarily from the Global South while financial contributors are predominantly wealthy nations, creating disconnects between those providing personnel and those setting policies. This division affects mission effectiveness and sustainability while raising questions about burden-sharing equity. Protection of civilians has become a central peacekeeping mandate that requires proactive engagement and use of force in extreme circumstances. However, protection mandates often exceed peacekeeping capabilities while generating expectations that missions cannot fulfill with available resources and rules of engagement. Women, peace and security considerations have gained prominence in peacekeeping through increased female participation and gender-sensitive programming. However, progress remains limited as women comprise only 6% of military peacekeepers while sexual exploitation and abuse scandals continue affecting mission credibility. Regional organizations increasingly complement UN peacekeeping through African Union, European Union, and other arrangements that may provide more appropriate responses to specific conflicts. However, regional approaches may lack impartiality while requiring UN support and legitimacy. Peace building and conflict prevention represent emerging priorities as the UN recognizes that military peacekeeping alone cannot ensure sustainable peace without addressing root causes of conflict. The Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Fund attempt to coordinate post-conflict recovery while facing funding and coordination challenges. Host country relations affect peacekeeping effectiveness as missions require government cooperation while potentially needing to protect populations from state actors. The Democratic Republic of Congo's request for MONUSCO withdrawal illustrates tensions between host country sovereignty and protection mandates. ## Economic Development and the SDG Challenge The UN's development architecture faces fundamental questions about effectiveness, relevance, and coordination as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development approaches its deadline with mixed progress across the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). SDG implementation has achieved notable successes in areas including poverty reduction, educational access, and health improvements while facing setbacks from COVID-19, economic disruptions, and climate change impacts. Progress varies significantly across countries and goals while global trends mask substantial regional and national disparities. The COVID-19 pandemic reversed years of development progress by increasing poverty, disrupting education, and overwhelming health systems while exposing structural inequalities that the SDGs were designed to address. Recovery efforts have been uneven as wealthy countries rebounded more quickly than developing nations lacking fiscal resources and healthcare capabilities. Climate change increasingly affects development outcomes by disrupting agricultural systems, increasing disaster risks, and requiring massive adaptation investments that compete with other development priorities. The integration of climate and development objectives remains incomplete while financing gaps persist. Development financing faces significant shortfalls as official development assistance remains below agreed targets while private investment flows are concentrated in middle-income countries rather than least developed countries with greatest needs. Innovative financing mechanisms including green bonds and blended finance show promise while facing scale and accessibility limitations. The proliferation of development actors including emerging donors, private foundations, and corporate initiatives has increased resources while creating coordination challenges that may reduce overall effectiveness. South-South cooperation provides alternative development models while traditional North-South frameworks evolve. Technology transfer and digital divide issues affect development outcomes as information and communication technologies become essential for economic participation while remaining inaccessible to billions of people. Digital governance questions affect UN development programming while creating new inequalities. Trade and development linkages remain contentious as developing countries seek improved market access while facing non-tariff barriers and competition from subsidized products. The World Trade Organization's development provisions require updating while multilateral trade negotiations face persistent deadlocks. Debt sustainability concerns affect many developing countries as borrowing costs increase while export revenues decline due to commodity price volatility and economic disruptions. Debt relief initiatives provide temporary assistance while systemic reforms may be needed to prevent recurring crises. Gender equality represents both a standalone SDG and a crosscutting theme that affects progress across all development areas. Women's economic participation has increased while political representation and protection from violence remain inadequate in many countries. ## Regional Organizations and Competitive Multilateralism The proliferation of regional and issue-specific international organizations has created a complex landscape of "competitive multilateralism" where the UN system faces alternatives that may either complement or undermine global governance effectiveness. Regional organizations including the African Union, European Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and Organization of American States provide alternative forums for addressing issues that may receive inadequate attention or face deadlock in global institutions. These organizations can respond more quickly while reflecting regional preferences and cultural contexts. The African Union has assumed increasing responsibility for peace and security issues on the continent through the Peace and Security Council, African Standby Force, and Continental Early Warning System. AU operations in Somalia, Mali, and other conflicts demonstrate regional capacity while requiring UN support and legitimacy. ASEAN's consensus-based approach and non-interference principles provide alternative governance models that emphasize sovereignty and gradual integration rather than supranational authority. However, these approaches may limit effectiveness in addressing human rights violations and transboundary challenges. Issue-specific organizations including the International Energy Agency, Financial Action Task Force, and various standard-setting bodies address technical issues that may be handled more effectively in specialized forums than comprehensive multilateral institutions. These arrangements can achieve concrete results while potentially fragmenting global governance. Minilateral arrangements among smaller groups of countries can achieve consensus more easily than large multilateral institutions while addressing specific shared interests. Examples include the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, United States), AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom, United States), and various climate coalitions. Forum shopping allows countries to choose institutional venues that favor their interests while potentially undermining less favorable arrangements. This dynamic can create competition among institutions while reducing overall effectiveness and coherence in addressing global challenges. However, institutional proliferation also provides benefits through specialization, innovation, and backup mechanisms when global institutions fail. Regional approaches may be more culturally appropriate while specialized institutions can develop technical expertise and implementation capacity. Coordination mechanisms between global and regional organizations remain underdeveloped despite Chapter VIII provisions in the UN Charter that recognize regional arrangements' roles in maintaining peace and security. Better coordination could enhance overall effectiveness while reducing duplication and competition. The European Union represents the most advanced regional integration model while facing internal challenges from Brexit, populist movements, and sovereignty concerns that could affect its global influence and multilateral leadership. EU approaches to migration, climate change, and digital governance may provide models for other regions. Competitive multilateralism may ultimately strengthen global governance by providing alternatives and innovation while maintaining pressure on established institutions to reform and improve effectiveness. However, fragmentation risks could undermine cooperation on issues requiring comprehensive global responses. ## Technology, Sovereignty, and Digital Governance Digital technologies pose fundamental challenges to multilateral governance by creating new policy issues that transcend borders while affecting sovereignty, security, and human rights in ways that existing international law and institutions struggle to address effectively. Artificial intelligence governance requires international coordination on standards, ethics, and risk management while different countries pursue competing approaches based on distinct values and strategic interests. The UN has established advisory bodies on AI governance while facing limitations in developing binding frameworks that major powers would accept. Cybersecurity threats including state-sponsored attacks, ransomware, and critical infrastructure vulnerabilities require international cooperation while involving military, intelligence, and law enforcement capabilities that countries guard jealously. UN cyber governance discussions proceed slowly while cyber conflicts escalate. Internet governance involves technical standards, content moderation, and platform regulation that affect global communications while raising questions about sovereignty, censorship, and corporate power. The multistakeholder approach championed by Western countries faces challenges from authoritarian preferences for state control. Data governance and privacy protection require international coordination as information flows cross borders while different jurisdictions maintain incompatible regulatory frameworks. The European Union's General Data Protection Regulation has global influence while facing resistance from countries with different approaches. Cryptocurrency and digital currencies create new financial instruments that operate outside traditional monetary systems while potentially facilitating illicit activities and undermining sanctions regimes. International coordination on digital currency regulation remains limited while central bank digital currencies develop rapidly. Platform responsibility for content moderation, disinformation, and user safety involves private companies making decisions that affect public discourse and democratic processes worldwide. UN involvement in platform governance faces resistance from both companies concerned about regulation and countries defending sovereignty. Space governance faces new challenges from commercial space activities, satellite proliferation, and potential weaponization that existing treaties may not adequately address. The UN Office for Outer Space Affairs attempts coordination while lacking enforcement mechanisms for emerging space activities. Biotechnology governance including genetic engineering, pandemic preparedness, and dual-use research requires international coordination while involving proprietary technologies and national security considerations that complicate information sharing and standard-setting. Digital divides affect UN effectiveness as many member states lack technical capacity for meaningful participation in digital governance discussions while populations without internet access remain excluded from digital policy development. Technology companies have gained unprecedented influence over global communications and information systems while operating with limited accountability to international institutions or democratic processes. This corporate power may undermine state sovereignty while creating governance gaps. ## Path Forward: Reform or Replacement? The UN faces a fundamental choice between comprehensive reform that addresses contemporary challenges and gradual obsolescence as alternative institutions and arrangements assume greater importance in global governance. The organization's future depends partly on member state commitments and partly on its ability to demonstrate continued relevance. Incremental reform approaches focus on operational improvements, coordination enhancements, and efficiency gains that don't require Charter amendments while addressing some performance limitations. These reforms may be politically feasible while insufficient for fundamental challenges requiring structural changes. Comprehensive reform would address Security Council composition, financing mechanisms, and institutional authority in ways that could enhance effectiveness while facing political obstacles from countries that benefit from current arrangements. Charter amendment requirements create seemingly insurmountable barriers to fundamental change. Alternative global governance models could emerge through new institutions, expanded regional organizations, or issue-specific arrangements that bypass UN limitations while potentially fragmenting international cooperation. These alternatives might be more effective for specific issues while lacking the legitimacy and universality that give the UN unique advantages. Coalition of the willing approaches allow like-minded countries to cooperate on specific issues without requiring universal consensus while potentially excluding countries whose participation would be essential for comprehensive solutions. These arrangements can achieve results while creating governance gaps and legitimacy questions. Private governance through corporations, civil society organizations, and multi-stakeholder initiatives increasingly addresses issues that governments cannot or will not tackle effectively. These arrangements can be innovative and responsive while lacking democratic legitimacy and accountability mechanisms. The UN's survival may depend on demonstrating irreplaceable value in areas where no alternative institution can provide comparable services. These areas likely include peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, standard-setting, and providing forums for dialogue even when consensus is impossible. Crisis-driven reform has historically produced the most significant institutional changes as emergencies create political opportunities for overcoming resistance to structural modifications. However, waiting for crises risks institutional collapse before reform opportunities emerge. Youth engagement and generational change may eventually create political constituencies for multilateral institution reform as younger populations face climate change, technological disruption, and global challenges that require international cooperation. However, generational change operates slowly while urgent problems require immediate attention. The 2024 Summit of the Future represents a potential opportunity for member states to commit to institutional reforms and governance improvements while the organization approaches its 80th anniversary. However, summit outcomes will depend on political will that has been lacking in previous reform efforts. Ultimately, the UN's future may depend less on institutional design than on great power relationships and global political dynamics that determine whether countries choose cooperation or competition in addressing shared challenges. Institutional effectiveness requires political commitment that no amount of structural reform can substitute. The United Nations stands at a crossroads that will determine not just the organization's future but the broader trajectory of multilateral cooperation in the 21st century. The challenges facing humanity—from climate change to pandemics to technological disruption—require collective responses that no single country can provide alone, yet the political conditions for effective multilateralism appear increasingly elusive. The organization's 78-year history demonstrates both the potential and limitations of international institutions in addressing global challenges. The UN has prevented nuclear war between major powers, coordinated humanitarian responses to countless crises, advanced human rights and international law, and provided forums for dialogue even during periods of intense rivalry. These achievements suggest that multilateral institutions serve irreplaceable functions that justify continued investment and reform efforts. However, the UN also reflects the international system's fundamental contradictions between sovereignty and interdependence, between national interests and global needs, between democratic ideals and great power realities. These contradictions cannot be resolved through institutional design alone but require political commitment and leadership that transcends narrow self-interest in favor of collective benefit. The question is not whether multilateralism will survive—some form of international cooperation is inevitable given global challenges that transcend borders—but whether it will be effective, legitimate, and inclusive enough to address humanity's greatest challenges. The UN's next chapter will be written by political leaders who must choose between the hard work of reforming and revitalizing international institutions or the illusory comfort of nationalist solutions to global problems. The stakes could not be higher. In an era of climate change, nuclear weapons, and technological disruption, the choice between effective multilateralism and institutional fragmentation may determine whether the 21st century features unprecedented human flourishing or civilizational collapse. The United Nations, for all its flaws, remains humanity's best hope for choosing cooperation over competition, dialogue over conflict, and collective action over individual futility in shaping a more peaceful, just, and sustainable world.